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IT 067-02

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Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84, 04, 09

Name of Correspondent: HORACE W. FLEMING

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: ON BEHALF OF THE STROM THURMOND INSTITUTE, HE SENT A COPY OF PROFESSOR WHITEHURST'S LECTURE ON PORTUGAL'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN NATO DEFENSE PLANNING.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CS K. CAMALIER	ORIGINATOR	<u>84, 04, 19</u> LD		<u>C 84, 06, 21</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOD EXEC. SECRETARIAT	R	<u>84, 04, 23</u> LD		<u>A 84, 05, 03</u> LD
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- C - Comment/Recommendation
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- S - For Signature
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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

WWS

IT 067

ID

222966

3 MAY 1984

In reply refer to:
I-09480/84

C 84/06/05

A 84/05/03

222966

IT 067-02

T-NATO 381

Mr. Horace W. Fleming, Director
The Strom Thurmond Institute
201 Martin Street
Clemson University
Clemson, South Carolina 29631

Dear Mr. Fleming:

Thank you for your letter of April 9 to Mr. James Baker which enclosed an advance copy of Professor Whitehurst's paper on Portugal's strategic importance.

Professor Whitehurst raises an interesting problem when he suggests that Portugal could become a last line of defense in Europe. Such a situation is conceivable, especially if we rely solely on conventional forces for NATO's defense. But the agreed NATO strategy of flexible response calls for the use of the NATO triad of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces in whatever combination may be necessary to force the aggressor to cease his aggression and to withdraw from NATO territory. So long as NATO remains firmly committed to this strategy -- and maintains an adequate conventional and nuclear force posture -- I believe that the situation posited by Professor Whitehurst should not come to pass.

At the same time, the US and its allies fully recognize the importance of increased military assistance to Portugal. This problem is singled out, for example, in the December 1983 communique of the NATO Defense Planning Committee: i.e., NATO Defense Ministers agreed that more aid to Portugal is "essential."

Again, I wish to thank you for the advance copy of Professor Whitehurst's paper.

Sincerely,

Ronald S. Lauder

RONALD S. LAUDER
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense
European and NATO Policy

(23 Apr 84)

W07682



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CSCAPA

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

In reply refer to:
I-09480/84

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201 Martin Street
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Sincerely,

RONALD S. LAUDER
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense
European and NATO Policy

COORDINATION:

Executive Secretary
to SecDef

Seifer

W07052

24 APR 84 17 05

OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

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APRIL 23, 1984

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DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 222966
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 9, 1984
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM: MR. HORACE W. FLEMING
DIRECTOR
THE STROM THURMOND INSTITUTE
201 MARTIN STREET
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY
CLEMSON SC 29631

SUBJECT: ON BEHALF OF THE STROM THURMOND INSTITUTE,
HE SENT A COPY OF PROFESSOR WHITEHURST'S
LECTURE ON PORTUGAL'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
IN NATO DEFENSE PLANNING

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
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SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

W07682

DOD

THE
STROM THURMOND
INSTITUTE



222906

April 9, 1984

Honorable James A. Baker
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Baker:

Enclosed is an advance copy of a lecture soon to be published by The Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs. Because of the timeliness of the topic, a limited number of pre-publication copies are being provided key defense policy makers.

The author, Professor Clinton Whitehurst of Clemson University, starts with the premise that the United States and our allies could lose the initial battle for Europe should war break out between NATO and the Soviet Union. History, it could be argued, is on his side. In World War I, German armies swept through Belgium and by August 23, 1914, less than a month after hostilities began, the German First Army was within 20 miles of Paris. In World War II, British and French forces were defeated in less than two months during the German Blitzkrieg. Essentially, the Allies were driven from Europe. Only Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland were able to maintain a precarious neutrality. During the first few weeks of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, American and South Korean forces were driven into a small corner of Korea around the town of Pusan.

Professor Whitehurst does not argue that NATO forces will be defeated in the initial battle for Europe but rather urges that such a possibility be recognized and a contingency plan be developed. His position is that, even should NATO lose the initial battle for Europe, a secure position can be maintained in NATO member Portugal at a relatively small cost.

Professor Whitehurst concludes that we should "prepare for the worst and diminish the chance of the worst occurring." That conclusion and his premises of argument are worthy of consideration, and it is in that spirit that this advance copy of his paper is provided you.

Sincerely,

Horace W. Fleming
Director

CLINTON H. WHITEHURST, JR. is Professor of Management and Economics at Clemson University. His teaching and research areas are transportation, logistics management, and defense economics. He received his Bachelor of Science in International Affairs from Florida State University, a Master of Arts in Economics from the University of Virginia, and the Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Virginia. He did post-graduate work in Defense Studies at Edinburgh University.

Professor Whitehurst served in the merchant marine in World War II, the U.S. Army in the Korean War, and in 1958 was commissioned as a Naval Reserve Intelligence Officer. Presently, Professor Whitehurst is a consultant to the U.S. General Accounting Office in the area of defense readiness.

Professor Whitehurst is the author of some 75 professional papers and articles and four books.

PORTUGAL'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
IN NATO DEFENSE PLANNING

By

Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr.

Preface

Scores of press releases, news stories, and in-depth analyses over the past five years have focused on the ability (or inability) of NATO forces to turn back a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The title of a December 1983 analysis in U.S. News and World Report fairly summed the problem.

NATO'S DILEMMA: STOPPING RUSSIA WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Building conventional weapons to defend Europe seems simple and sensible. But it's easier said than done.¹

This lecture addresses the question: What happens if a Soviet attack is successful and Warsaw Pact forces overrun Western Europe to the English Channel and North of the Pyrenees, i.e., the German Federal Republic, France, and the Low Countries, and in the process outflank Italy, Greece, and Turkey? Figure 1 depicts NATO and Soviet positions at the end of such a hypothetical "Phase I" of the Battle For Europe.

Assuming the war continues, two countries which have not figured largely in analyses to date become vitally important-- NATO members Portugal and Norway. The possible role of one of these countries, Portugal, is considered here.²

While every aspect of the role Portugal might play cannot be treated in detail, some critical issues can be identified and discussed. A major one is what the other European NATO nations




Figure 1.
End Of Phase I - Battle For Europe

and the United States might do to enhance Portugal's contribution to NATO's defense.

Spain

One cannot, however, consider the role of Portugal in an Iberian theater of war and not Spain.

In June 1982, Spain became a member of NATO but with a change of governments in December of the same year (center-right to socialist), Spain's integration into NATO was halted and the issue made subject to a future referendum. Since the new government took office, it has obliquely linked Spain's membership in the European Economic Community and membership in NATO, i.e., EEC membership first, then NATO, perhaps. At present, the only tie between Spain and NATO is United States bilateral agreements with Spain granting U.S. access to Spanish naval and air bases under strictly specified conditions.

Thus, while it is recognized that the 350,000-man Spanish armed forces would be of value beyond price in a worst case NATO scenario, given the continuing unrest in Northern Spain, and popular support for Spanish membership in NATO about evenly divided, it is deemed prudent, at least for the moment, to focus on Portugal as the rock upon which a last European defense line might be built.

The renowned military analyst, B.H. Liddell Hart, once noted that men "talk much about war, but rarely do they talk of it--as a subject so serious as to be worth the serious study of every thinking man and woman."³ Here we will not only talk of war but of the real possibility of initially losing major campaigns as

was so often the case of the Allies in World War II. Such a discussion will hardly make anyone's day, but then that is not the purpose of the lecture.

Portugal and NATO

In December 1983, the United States and Portugal renewed an agreement which will allow American planes to continue using their air base at Lajes in the Azores. The pact will run for seven years and by its terms the United States will compensate Portugal with military and economic aid valued at \$145 million annually.⁴ In addition to the Azores agreement, negotiations will take place looking toward additional U.S. base facilities in southern Portugal. A large part of U.S. military aid will be used to reequip Portugal's armed forces, a need which was stressed by Mota Pinto, Portugal's Vice Premier and Minister of Defense, during the 1983 Lajes negotiations.⁵

The need to modernize the Portuguese armed services is not disputed, in particular the need to bring more advanced aircraft into the inventory. Table I shows the composition and equipment of Portugal's military forces in 1983.

But while the need for modern military equipment is accepted, a more fundamental issue is Portugal's role in overall NATO war planning. Defense Minister Pinto believes that "NATO reaps a considerable benefit from Portugal's strategic location" and, in fact, that his country is a part of NATO's first line of defense.⁶ Pinto's assessment that a major contribution of Portugal to NATO defense posture is its strategic location is correct. Not agreed to, however, is that this strategic

TABLE I

ORGANIZATION/EQUIPMENT OF PORTUGAL'S ARMED SERVICES, 1983^aArmy (Active Duty Personnel 41,000)

- 12 Infantry regiments
- 2 Cavalry regiments
- 1 Commando regiment
- 2 Field Artillery regiments
- 1 Anti Aircraft regiment
- 1 Coastal Artillery regiment
- 2 Engineer regiments
- 1 Signal regiment
- 1 Special Forces Regiment

Navy (Active Duty Personnel, including Marines 13,000)

- 17 Frigates
- 3 Submarines
- 10 Large patrol crafts
- 19 Coastal patrol crafts
- 4 Minesweeps
- 2 LCT, 11 LCM, 1 LCA

Air Force (Active Duty Personnel, including 1,500 paratroops 9,500)

- 3 Fighter squadrons
- 1 Reconnaissance squadron
- 2 Torpedo squadrons
- 3 Search and Rescue squadrons
- 2 Helicopter/Utility squadrons
- 2 Liaison squadrons
- 3 Training squadrons
- Total combat aircraft = 74*

^aAir Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84, p. 90.

*On order: 30 A-7s, 20 TA-4s, 12 A-109s.

importance is limited to the well understood and conventional reasons usually cited, i.e., the geostrategic importance of Portugal's ocean ports and air bases (including those in the Azores and Madeira) in maintaining sea control in the North Atlantic, its proximity to the vitally important approaches to the Western Mediterranean (Straits of Gibraltar) and its role as a stabilizing influence on the Iberian peninsula and Northwest Africa.⁷

Equally important is the part Portugal could play in an in-depth NATO defense strategy, in particular, the role it might play as a last line of European defense. As noted earlier, this latter role is predicated on a worst case scenario in which the Soviet Union launches a broad front attack across West Germany that NATO forces are unable to contain, the ultimate result being Allied armies being driven across the English Channel and from Europe North of the Pyrenees.⁸

Were such to occur, could Portugal, in fact, be a viable last line of European defense? Would Portugal see itself in this role? If the requisite military capability is not there, what can be done? What might the United States and other NATO members contribute?

Historical Background

Portugal's identification and alliances with the West date back over 600 years to 1373 when the first Anglo-Portuguese treaty was signed in London.⁹ Winston Churchill once referred to Portugal as England's "Oldest Ally." The occasion was the announcement in the House of Commons in 1943 of an agreement

which made facilities available for British shipping in the Azores. [The United States later received similar base rights within the framework of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty.]

The 1943 base agreement was essentially one more instance of active English-Portuguese cooperation in times of adversity and, in a sense, a century old debt was repaid. In this regard, following the invasion of Portugal by Napoleon in 1807, a British expeditionary force was landed under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington). In a see-saw struggle, major victories at Vimeiro, Talavera, Torres Vedras, and the retaking of Almeida in 1810, finally forced the French troops out of Portugal for good.¹⁰

In World War I, at England's request, Portugal detained German ships that were in Portuguese ports, an act which led to a German declaration of war in 1916. Portugal mobilized some 200,000 men from which an expeditionary force of 65,000 was sent to France. Casualties exceeded 4,000 men, not including those sustained in Africa where Portuguese troops participated in the conquest of Germany's African colonies of Southwest Africa and Tanganyika.

Although neutral in the second World War, Portugal's act of friendship toward Britain, already noted, was certainly important in winning the Battle of the Atlantic. After the war when the end result of Soviet expansionism was finally perceived in Western Europe, Portugal became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In more recent times, Portugal's support of United States interests was demonstrated when it

allowed American planes engaged in the resupply of Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to use the Azores as a refueling stop.¹¹ No such support was given by any other European NATO nation and, in fact, overflight rights for U.S. planes resupplying Israel were denied by most of them.

The Revolution of the Carnations

When long-time Portuguese Prime Minister Oliverira Salazar was permanently hospitalized in 1968, some of the more repressive policies of his administration were relaxed by his hand-picked successor, Marcelo Caetano. However, it was a case of too little, too late. A bloodless revolution in 1974 overthrew the Caetano government. As a symbol of support for the revolution, soldiers in Lisbon put carnations in their rifle barrels as well as wore them. Caetano and the President of the Republic, Americo Tomas, were exiled. For a period of 1½ years Portugal's politics was strongly influenced by pro-communist General Vasco Goncalves. He was the main political force behind successive provisional governments and actually headed the Fifth Provisional Government. He was forced from office in September 1975 and in November a military revolt of the far left was put down.

It was during this period of "Goncalvismo" that NATO Europe became increasingly concerned about Portuguese participation and dedication to the Alliance. It is a topic briefly addressed here because that short interval in Portuguese history tends to be somewhat exaggerated and basically misunderstood.

The best perspective can be gained by reviewing election results between April 1975 and April 1983. Clearly shown in

Table II is that while the communists in Portugal may be vocal, they are in a decided minority.

After the 1983 general elections, seats in the Assembly were divided as follows:

Socialist	94
Social Democratic	75
Communist	41
Social Democrat Center	30
Other	<u>10</u>
	250

And while Table II indicates communist gains, about 4 percentage points over an 8-year period, these must be seen in the context of Portugal's inflation, one of the highest in Western Europe, and the severe austerity measures imposed by earlier as well as the present government in attempting to bring about economic stability. That communist gains have been so slight in such an economic environment is quite remarkable.

Another way to gauge the communist influence in Portugal is to compare their vote-getting appeal with another West European nation--France. In the April 1981 French presidential elections, the communist vote percentage was 15.3. In the National Assembly election in June 1981, the communist vote was 16.2 percent.¹² The important point to note is the relative lack of communist influence on French national policy when their vote percentage is in the 15-20 percent range. In this respect, the Socialist President, Francois Mitterrand, once regarded in some circles as soft on communism, has been quite willing to challenge the Soviet Union when French national interests are involved. In the past,

TABLE II
VOTING RESULTS IN PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS, 1975-1983

<u>Date</u>	<u>Election For</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Percent of Vote</u>
April 1975	Assembly	Non-Communist	87.5
		Communist	12.5
April 1976	Assembly	Non-Communist	85.5
		Communist	14.5
June 1976	Presidential	Non-Communist	92.4
		Communist	7.6
October 1980	Assembly	Non-Communist	83.3
		Communist	16.7
December 1980	Presidential	Non-Communist	97.0
April 1983	Assembly	Non-Communist	82.0
		Communist	18.0

Source: Colliers Yearbooks, 1975-84, "Portugal" (New York: Collier-Macmillan), pp. 439, 449, 454, 447, 450, 434, 440, 435; and Lisbon

he has minced no words about the danger of the Soviet military buildup.

A fair and supportable conclusion is that Catholic and tradition-bound Portugal is as firmly in the NATO camp as any other West European member country.

Worst Case NATO Scenario

The collapse of NATO armies following a Soviet attack on Western Europe and a quick overrunning of Europe North of the Pyrenees, if not a worst case scenario, is certainly close to it. The scenario itself, however, is just one of many, including those with more favorable outcomes. The problem is to estimate the odds of the worst occurring.

If military planners believe the odds to be long, then a good case exists for allocating the preponderance of NATO military expenditures to forces in place in West Germany with the aim of effectively absorbing an initial attack and ultimately turning it back. In a broad sense, that is the goal of NATO and U.S. policy in 1984 and a part of the rationale for significant increases in recent U.S. defense budgets.

However, no one is that sure of the odds and military planners cannot have it both ways--on the one hand, asserting it is extremely unlikely that NATO armies will be pushed out of Europe, and on the other, urging a buildup of Alliance forces to prevent that unstated possibility from occurring.

In the context of a war fought with conventional weapons, at least, the figures suggest the odds against a worst case scenario occurring are not that long. Table III contrasts NATO and Warsaw

TABLE III

ACTIVE ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, 1983^a

<u>NATO</u>		<u>WARSAW PACT</u>	
United States	2,136,400	Soviet Union	5,050,000
Belgium	94,717	Bulgaria	162,000
Britain	320,623	Czechoslovakia	204,500
Canada	82,858	German Democratic	167,000
Denmark	30,700	Republic	
France	492,850	Hungary	105,000
Federal Republic	495,000	Poland	340,000
Germany		Romania	<u>189,500</u>
Greece	185,000		6,128,000
Italy	373,100		
Luxembourg	720		
Netherlands	102,957		
Norway	43,170		
PORTUGAL	63,500		
Spain*	347,000		
Turkey	<u>569,000</u>		
	5,337,595		

^aSource: Air Force Association, Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Association, December 1983), pp. 74-91.

*Spain joined NATO in June 1982. In December 1982, the Spanish government ordered a freeze on integrating Spain's forces into the NATO Alliance.

military manpower in 1983. And while the total numbers seem reasonably close, it is really the forces in Europe and essentially in place that count.

In the context of forces in place, a more realistic picture is provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.¹³

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>
Manpower	2.6 million	4.0 million
Tanks	13,000	42,500
Combat aircraft	2,975	7,240
Helicopters	1,800	1,000

The problem since the formation of NATO is how to move large forces and their equipment located some distance from Northern Europe, the United States in particular, to West Germany.

Whether sufficient troops and equipment can be transported in time to stabilize a West German front is unknown. However, the possibility of failure does exist. And for a relatively small amount of money and planning, the logical fallback position can be significantly improved. That position is to hold the entire Iberian peninsula if possible, and Portugal at all costs.

Would Portugal See Itself As The Last Line of NATO Defense?

Portugal in 1984 is a country at peace. Its most serious problems are economic. There are no territorial disagreements with the ancient enemy Spain. Differences that exist between the Iberian neighbors are basically economic, and although serious, are not likely to lead to conflict.¹⁴ Differences between the military and political leaders tend to be resolved in the

accepted Western tradition; that is, the supremacy of civilian control. For example, in November 1983, General Garcia dos Santos, Army Chief of Staff, publicly stated that the attitude of the [Portuguese] government "knives the military" and that its new attitude has "altered the quality of the armed forces." The incident was front page news. Pro-NATO Defense Minister Mota Pinto and Prime Minister Mario Soares refused to publicly comment on the episode. General Santos had made his point and within a few days his replacement had peaceably been named.¹⁵

While the West Germans consistently visualize their country as the major battleground in a NATO-PACT conflict, the Portuguese see a NATO war as a far-removed contingency. And although they deplore military rule in Communist Poland and shared the world's revulsion when the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Airlines 747 in late 1983, as a people, they do not feel directly threatened. This attitude fairly raises the question of whether Portugal would remain faithful to the alliance should the main theater of war shift to the Iberian peninsula. The best answer is to pose another question. What options exist other than to fight?

In this regard, it is assumed the Soviet Union would not be likely to offer even a Vichy France type peace to Spain and Portugal should NATO resistance collapse north of the Pyrenees, that is, risk the possibility of these countries becoming a staging area for a NATO reconquest of Western Europe. Rather, it is argued here, that following a victory in Northern Europe, PACT forces would regroup, if necessary, and invade Iberia. Thus, the war would come to Portugal like it or not.

Should Iberia become the main theater of war, the present small Portuguese military force would be of little help in stabilizing a front in either Spain or Portugal.¹⁶ Table IV shows the decline in numbers of Portugal's armed forces since 1972. The need for reequipping these forces was noted earlier.

Another question is whether NATO forces and their equipment could be extracted from continental Europe and redeployed to Iberia in numbers sufficient to hold an Iberian front without a significant Portuguese contribution. If such a contingency has ever been "gamed," the infinite number of assumptions that would have to be made, coupled with the myriad number of probabilities to be calculated, would make any conclusion highly suspect. In truth, we don't know.

If a worst case scenario comes to pass and the quick redeployment of any significant number of NATO forces from Northern Europe to Iberia is held unlikely, then it will be the Portuguese, and hopefully Spanish, forces in place that will determine whether a "European" front can be maintained until the full military might of the Allies can be brought to bear. At the same time, it must be recognized that Portugal's present lack of military capability would be a negative factor influencing that nation's willingness to support a NATO stand in Iberia.

Developing a Geostrategic Portugal Defense Policy

In 1984, the Portuguese armed forces stand at 63,000 men excluding paramilitary forces. The country, one of the poorest in NATO in terms of per capita income, spent 3.3 percent of its gross domestic product on its military, a somewhat higher percent

TABLE IV
 PORTUGAL'S ARMED FORCES, 1972-83^a

<u>Year</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>National Guard</u>	<u>Para- military</u>
1972	175,000	20,000	18,000	-----	
73	180,000	18,000	21,000	9,700	
74	179,000	19,500	18,500	9,700	
75	179,000	19,500	18,500	9,700	
76	179,000	19,500	18,500	-----	
77	36,000	12,800	10,000		29,900
78	40,000	14,000	10,000		29,400
79	37,000	14,000	9,500		31,850
80	37,000	13,040	9,500		31,850
81	37,000	13,040	9,500		36,300
82	41,000	13,426	12,000		38,243
83	41,000	13,000	9,500		37,276

^aColliers Yearbooks 1973-1984, "Portugal" (New York: Collier-Macmillan), pp. 468, 442, 435, 439, 449, 454, 447, 450, 434, 440, 435, 519.

than the NATO average. Table V indicates defense expenditures and per capita income data for NATO countries.

The major conclusion to be drawn from Table V is that if Portugal is going to reequip and expand its military forces, the undertaking will have to be externally funded. Assuming external funding is made available, what difficulties, political and economic, must be overcome?

First, the Salazar legacy must be recognized and dealt with. Essentially, it is that a large active duty military force would be politically unacceptable to any of Portugal's major political parties today.

Second, over the long term, the Portuguese must come to accept their armed services as a part of society--not apart from it.

Third. If, in a poor country, being a member of the military forces becomes a way to better economic opportunities, then membership must be open to all. No economic or social constraint must bar the way.

Fourth. Granting that general population identification with the armed services is important, such identification is doubly important with respect to the officer corps.

Fifth. Agreements must be negotiated that would allow reasonable levels of equipment and material to be prepositioned in Portugal.

Considering the problems in order. If a large active duty military force is ruled out for political reasons, the only remaining alternative is a well trained and equipped citizen reserve.

TABLE V
 NATO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
 AND NATO NATIONS PER CAPITA INCOMES^a

	<u>Percent GDP</u>	<u>Per Capita Income</u>
Belgium	3.3	\$ 9,810
Britain	5.1	9,280
Canada	2.0	11,356
Denmark	2.0	11,399
France	4.1	10,552
Federal German Republic	4.3	11,097
Greece	6.7	3,890
Italy	2.6	6,100
Luxembourg	1.2	10,785
Netherlands	3.3	9,830
Norway	3.0	13,915
PORTUGAL	3.3	2,370
Spain*	2.6	4,228
Turkey	5.2	1,291
United States	<u>7.2</u>	<u>13,154</u>
Average	3.28	\$ 8,599
Average, w/o U.S.	3.00	

^aSources: Air Force Association, Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Association, December 1983), p. 139; The World Fact Book 1983; U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, 1983.

On paper, Portugal is held to have a reserve force of some 90,000 men.¹⁷ However, the numbers, age, training status, condition of call-up, and state of equipment is highly questionable. A number of senior Army officers heavily discount any contribution the reserve might make to military preparedness. In any event, if the active duty forces are badly in need of new equipment, as is the case today, the condition of the reserves in this regard can, at best, be only marginal.

A common thread ties together the other points made above. It is that any armed service, active duty or reserve, must be viewed as being "of the nation" in every sense of the term. In practice, it means that if completion of a secondary school education and/or attendance at institutions of higher education is foreclosed to an otherwise qualified individual for whatever reason, be it lack of ability to pay or the constraint of limited places, and a military career requires specific educational attainments for entry, retention, and advancement, then the military services must be prepared to fund and offer the needed education, in-house, if necessary.

Should the European NATO nations, the United States and Canada agree that Portugal is strategically more important to the alliance than heretofore realized, and that increasing the country's military capability is money well spent, then several actions/programs should have a high priority.

First, reequipping the present active duty military force of 63,000 men must continue. In the process, however, every effort must be made to hold the present force level reasonably constant.

Reequipping should not become a rationale for any significant active force expansion. Rather, the active duty forces should be the nucleus around which a larger reserve force is built.

The second action is to prune the present reserve force. In final form, it would be composed of educated, well trained volunteers receiving reserve pay. Of all NATO countries, the U.S. has the greatest experience with voluntary reserve forces and would become the role model.¹⁸

Specific projects that should be funded include upgrading the present service academies (Army, Navy, Air Force) to full degree granting institutions.¹⁹ At present, these institutions do not have authority to grant the baccalaureate degree. In this respect, it is axiomatic that if the academies are to have a fair share of Portugal's brightest young people, then the granting of a recognized academic degree, in addition to military instruction, is a must requirement. In this regard, a program model is already in place. In 1984, the Agency for International Development is funding capital improvements and the education of Portuguese faculty in the United States at three Portuguese institutions of higher learning--Evora University, Instituto Universitario de Beira Interior and Instituto Universitario de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro.²⁰

To provide officers for a relatively large reserve force, the American ROTC experience is again a worthy model.

Since the 1974 revolution, Portugal has doubled the number of institutions granting baccalaureate degrees. None, however, have any semblance of a military presence on their campuses,

i.e., a formal ROTC-like program. Nor does a program in which civilian lecturers are brought to the military academies on a continuing basis exist. The funding of a number of ROTC units at civilian universities to meet the demands of an expanded reserve force is a high priority goal.

Today, Portugal's Army has a good school for training its noncommissioned officers.²¹ However, this school must be expanded, as must counterpart schools in other services.

Finally, a reserve force is only as good as its training, and training is only as good as hands-on experience with first-line equipment. In this respect, as a part of their commitment, reserves must be prepared to attend summer camps to attain this proficiency. Training with wooden rifles and mock tanks, as was the case of the United States in 1940, is not an option in 1984.

Conclusion

What would be the end result if NATO planners upgrade the strategic role of Portugal as suggested in this lecture? Most important, an active duty armed force of about 70,000 men, backed by a well-trained and equipped reserve force of 80,000, would be in place to support a NATO defense line in Iberia should the need ever arise. As might be expected, the largest component of this force would be army reservists. This 150,000-man Portuguese force would be the nucleus around which NATO reinforcements would be deployed.

Every option to strengthen NATO has a price tag attached, and in 1984 with American defense (and NATO) budgets squarely

"under the gun," the cost of upgrading Portugal's military capability cannot be overlooked.

In 1982, Portugal spent an estimated \$630 million on its armed forces.²² This works out to approximately \$10,000 for each man on active duty. By an admittedly rough calculation, to increase the active forces to 70,000 and maintain a reserve of 80,000 would cost approximately \$470 million annually.

In FY 1982, Portugal was granted \$42.5 million under the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS), \$20.4 million under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), and \$2.2 million under the International Military Education and Training Program for a total of \$65.1 million. Under the Azores base agreement negotiated in 1983, U.S. aid will increase to \$145 million. A part of this increase could be earmarked for an expanded reserve force.

In considering additional military funding for Portugal, it is often helpful to examine an expenditure in the context of alternative uses. In this respect, \$470 million would buy one-fourth of one Trident submarine, one-third of a guided missile cruiser, or 2.2 MX missiles. Alternatively, to implement and fund the Portuguese reserve force described here for the next 7 years, NATO would have to give up 1 Trident submarine and 1 guided missile cruiser.

It has been often said "prepare for the worst and hope for the best." I would change that slightly and assert "prepare for the worst, and diminish the chance of the worst occurring." Stated another way, an Iberian defense in-depth capability might go a long way to deter a Soviet attack on Europe in the first place.

APPENDIX

TABLE VI
RESERVE FORCES AS PERCENT OF U.S. ARMED SERVICES, 1982^a

	<u>Active</u>	<u>Reserve & National Guard</u>
<u>ARMY</u>		
Combat Divisions	65%	35
Separate Brigades	20	80
Special Forces	40	60
Armor Battalions	55	45
Field Artillery Battalions	40	60
Conventional Ammunition Companies	25	75
Light Equipment Maintenance Companies	8	92
Training Divisions	0	100
<u>NAVY</u>		
Carrier Air Wings	85	15
Intelligence Units	70	30
Construction Battalions	62	38
Minesweeps	15	85
CONUS Based Logistical Aircraft and Combat S & R	0	100
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
CONUS Air Defense Interceptors	35	65
Tactical Fighters	70	30
Aerial Refueling	80	20
Rescue Recovery	65	35
Strategic Airlift Crews	55	45
Tactical Airlift	32	68
Tactical Reconnaissance	48	52
<u>MARINES</u>		
Combat Divisions	65	35
Air Wings	65	35
Force Reconnaissance Companies	50	50
Heavy Artillery Batteries	60	40
Tank Battalions	60	40

Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Defense 83 Almanac
(Arlington, Va.: Department of Defense, 1983, pp. 16-17.)

FOOTNOTES

¹"NATO's Dilemma: Stopping Russia Without Nuclear Weapons," U.S. News and World Report, December 12, 1983, p. 41.

²While this lecture considers only the role of Portugal in a worst case scenario, it is not implied that Norway is of any less importance. The difference is in the different roles each would play. The scenario described might or might not include the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

³"Hammond, Paul Y., et al., The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking For Arms Sales (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hair, 1983), p. 17.

⁴"U.S., Portugal Sign Agreements on Strategic Base," Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1983, p. 3.

⁵"Reequipamento militar tem de ser acautelado," Diario de Noticias, 5 Dezembro 1983, p. 1.

⁶"Portugal esta na primeira linha de defesa da NATO," Correio da Manha, 9 Setembro 1983, p. 9.

⁷Disputes in the Iberian peninsula and Northwest Africa include the issue of Spain's claim to sovereignty over British-held Gibraltar, the issue of Spanish sovereignty over its enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa, and anti-government guerrillas in Morocco supported by Algeria and Libya.

⁸The potential for Spain providing a defense-in-depth to the NATO alliance was noted in "The Security of the Atlantic, Iberian and North African Regions, report on a conference held May 9-10

in Lisbon sponsored by the Institute for Strategic and International Studies and The Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis.

⁹The sixth centenary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was celebrated in Lisbon in 1973 with Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, in attendance.

¹⁰It was during this period that the Portuguese army was reorganized under the direction of British Marshall William Beresford. The Victors, edited by Brigadier Peter Young (London: Hamlyn Publishing Group, 1981), p. 25.

¹¹The U.S. Portuguese agreement grants base rights to U.S. forces for out-of-theater contingencies on a case-by-case basis.

¹²"France," Colliers Yearbook 1982 (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1982), pp. 260-61. In the 1983 French municipal elections, the electorate shifted to the right with rightist parties receiving 51 percent of the vote.

¹³"NATO's Dilemma: Stopping Russia Without Nuclear Weapons," p. 41.

¹⁴Major economic problems include a heavy trade imbalance favoring Spain, Spanish tariff barriers against Portuguese products, and disagreement over the present arrangements governing Spanish fishing rights in Portuguese territorial waters.

¹⁵Diario de Noticias, 19 Novembro 1983, p. 1.

¹⁶Portugal, however, has some natural defensive advantages based on its rugged terrain, particularly the Serra da Estrela mountains in the central region of the country.

¹⁷Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84, p. 90.

¹⁸U.S. reserve forces as well as the American ROTC program is discussed in "The Recruitment and Education of the American Officer Corps: Can Lessons Learned Benefit Portugal's Armed Services?" by Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., Working Paper Series WP 122883, Strom Thurmond Institute For Public Policy Research, December 1983.

¹⁹This issue is discussed in "Relatorio da Comissao Nomeada Para O Estudo da Insercao da Escola Naval, Academia Militar e Academia da Force Aerea no Esquema Geral do Ensino Superior (Report of Standards Committee on the Study to Include the Naval School, the Military Academy, and Air Force Academy in the General Plan of Higher Education. (Unpublished mimeographed report, 1983).

²⁰A beginning in upgrading Portuguese military academies to degree granting institutions would be the establishment of a program whereby instructors at these schools could attend U.S. universities and earn advanced degrees in their respective fields in the same manner in which the AID program is upgrading faculties at civilian institutions.

²¹The Army school for non-commissioned officers is located at Caldas da Rainha. Nomination to the two-year program is from enlisted ranks and is by examination.

²²Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84, p. 90.



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/3/84

MEMORANDUM

LD

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE (Coordinate with James Rosebush)

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: NATO Ministerial Working Dinner

DATE: May 30, 1984

TIME: 7:30 pm

DURATION: 2 hours

LOCATION: Residence

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

- | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|------------|
| cc: R. Darman | J. Rosebush | R. Kimmitt |
| R. Deprospero | R. Scouten | |
| B. Elliott | B. Shaddix | |
| D. Fischer | W. Sittmann | |
| C. Fuller | L. Speakes | |
| W. Henkel | WHCA Audio/Visual | |
| E. Hickey | WHCA Operations | |
| G. Hodges | A. Wrobleski | |
| C. McCain | Nell Yates | |
| B. Oglesby | | |

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1/31/84

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE (Coordinate with James Rosebush)

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: NATO Ministerial Working Dinner

DATE: May 30, 1984

TIME: Evening - exact time to be determined

DURATION: To be determined

LOCATION: Residence

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: R. Darman	J. Rosebush	R. Kimmitt
R. Deprospero	R. Scouten	
B. Elliott	B. Shaddix	
D. Fischer	W. Sittman	
C. Fuller	L. Speakes	
W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual	
E. Hickey	WHCA Operations	
G. Hodges	A. Wrobleski	
C. McCain	Nell Yates	
B. Oglesby		

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

236664

IT 067

Dear Lady Olga:

I am writing this on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meetings.

Ambassador Price has passed to me the letter of support which you so kindly presented to him during my recent visit to London. Thank you very much for your generous words. Ambassador Price and Ed Meese have also told me of the good and tireless work you are doing to ensure that the voice of the majority is heard on issues of defense and disarmament in Britain.

It is very heartening to me to realize that NATO and our policies of collective defense have supporters in Europe willing to devote so much time and effort to the cause of peace. I know that what you and your organization are doing requires not only considerable energy, but sometimes considerable courage as well. Your efforts are recognized and appreciated here, as I know they are in your own country.

I share your view about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter. Please convey my thanks to your associates, and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

X
Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

Darman

840622

Summer

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1984

Dear Lady Olga:

I am writing this on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meeting.

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous words. I am most grateful and I share your strong feeling about the responsibility of our two peoples to maintain our close ties. Regardless of what the press might say, the Summit served to strengthen these ties.

Insert

I share your view, also, about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter. ~~and~~ Please convey my thanks to your associates, *and keep up the good work.*

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

AWH ROBO

FINAN

NSC/S

Okay for
dispatch.
Jennifer

6.22.84

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dick Darman:

Embassy London has asked for a modification to a letter sent by the President to Lady Olga Maitland on June 10, 1984.

The proposed redo is next under, with the original letter below it.

Bob Kimmitt

CS

text file



date

disposed thru
DTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1984

Dear Lady Olga:


I am writing this on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meeting.

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous words. I am most grateful and I share your strong feeling about the responsibility of our two peoples to maintain our close ties. Regardless of what the press might say, the Summit served to strengthen these ties.

I share your view, also, about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter, and please convey my thanks to your associates.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

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TR105-02

June 10, 1984

Dear Lady Olga:

I am writing this on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meeting.

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous words. I am most grateful and I share your strong feeling about the responsibility of our two peoples to maintain our close ties. Regardless of what the press might say, the Summit served to strengthen these ties.

I share your view, also, about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter, and please convey my thanks to your associates.

Sincerely,

Support for trip

ETAW ALAN

X
Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

RR/DICTATION/lme

840612

HANDWRITING FILE

To Lady Olga Maitland - Women & Families For Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2 England

Dear Lady Maitland

I am writing this on A.F. / somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England & the Summit meeting.

Thank you very much for your letter & your generous words. I am most grateful and I share your strong feeling about the responsibility of our two peoples to maintain our close ties. Regardless of what the press might say, the Summit served to strengthen those ties.

I share your view also about those misguided
(over)

possibly well intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter & please convey my thanks to your associates
Sincerely P.A.

WOMEN & FAMILIES FOR DEFENCE

1 Lincoln's Inn Fields London WC2 01-831-0180

June 7th, 1984

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We would like to salute the United States of America for its leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In expressing this, we feel we are echoing the views which are held by the vast majority of British men and women.

We are fully aware that the freedom and democracy which we value so highly are largely maintained by the unstinting backup in armed forces, equipment and technology provided by the United States.

The North Atlantic Alliance is composed of 16 nations, all of which have an indispensable role to play, but it is the United States which has given its partners the strong foundation upon which they depend for their security.

It is disappointing that our mutual endeavours to work together as a team, which have successfully kept the peace for 35 years, have been bitterly criticised.

There are those who do not put the same value on maintaining our freedoms as we do. Indeed, a vocal minority have sought to gain support for their call for one-sided disarmament. They delude the naive into the belief that despite NATO's very great achievements in maintaining the peace, we are brought closer every day to a nuclear war.

It is they who endanger our peace and security by giving Moscow the impression that we might not be prepared to defend ourselves. We recognise also that in your country there are those who are perturbed when they view through the media our so-called 'peace movements' and fear they signify a lack of national will and resolve.

We know that the anti-nuclear demonstrators in this country do not represent the majority. Indeed, British support for NATO and its policy of deterrence, combined with dialogue, was fully endorsed in the General Election last year.

WOMEN & FAMILIES FOR DEFENCE

1 Lincoln's Inn Fields London WC2 01-831-0180

We believe that we must work all the more urgently to proclaim to our peoples on both sides of the Atlantic that we face a common threat and must meet it as one.

We know that the British will not renege on our responsibilities. Our will is steadfast to uphold our well-tried partnership in the cause of peace, security and freedom.

Yours sincerely,



Lady Olga Maitland
CHAIRMAN

PRESIDENT: Rt. Hon. Viscount Trenchard, MC

VICE-CHAIRMEN: Mrs. Angela Rumbold, CBE, MP
Miss Janet Parrett
Mr. Toby Horton
Mr. Charles Mosely

PATRONS: Rt. Hon. Baroness Airey of Abingdon
Rt. Hon. Sir Peter Blaker, KCVO, PC, MP
Sir John Biggs-Davison, MP
Sir Antony Buck, QC, MP
Sir Patrick Wall, MP
Mr. Charles Irving, MP
Mrs. Virginia Bottomley, MP
Br. John Rae

National Executive: Mr. Geoffrey Lenox-Smith
Mrs. Margaret Clark
Mr. F. John L. Bindon
Mrs. Sandy Heard
Mrs. Julia Price
Major John Bletchley
Mr. Adrian Lee
Miss Angela Jones
Miss Ann Widdecombe (author, 'Layman's Guide to Defence')

Area Chairmen: Mrs. Christine West - North West
Dr. Evelyn Le Chene - South Eastern Area
Mr. Thomas West - East Midlands
Mrs. Brenda Utting - Wessex Area
Mrs. Angela Browning - Western Area
Mrs. Doris Welsh - Wales
Mrs. Pat Hyde - Northern Area

236664

IT 067

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1984

Dear Lady Olga:

I am writing this on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meeting.

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous words. I am most grateful and I share your strong feeling about the responsibility of our two peoples to maintain our close ties. Regardless of what the press might say, the Summit served to strengthen these ties.

I share your view, also, about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter, and please convey my thanks to your associates.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

AUH ROBO

FINAL

NSC/S

Okay for
dispatch.

RECEIVED 14 JUN 84 18

TO MAITLAND, OLGA FROM PRESIDENT

DOCDATE 10 JUN 84

KEYWORDS . GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO LADY OLGA RE SUMMIT

ACTION:	PRES SGD LTR	DUE:	STATUS C	FILES WH
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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DISPATCH ed MSD 6/14 W/ATTCH FILE WH (C)M

REFERRAL

DATE: 14 JUN 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: MAITLAND, OLGA

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 10 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO LADY OLGA RE SUMMIT

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 84

COMMENTS:

Melanie J. Beres
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



TEB

File

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June 14, 1984

Dear Jim:

With the enclosed, I am pleased to be able to share with you a final compilation of information on the usage resulting from WORLDNET's commemoration of NATO's 35th Anniversary.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
James A. Baker III
Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House

SIGNIFICANT REACTION
TO WORLDNET NATO SPECIAL PROGRAM
MAY 24, 1984

BELGIUM:

RTBF carried a three minute special summary of the program on its prime time evening newscast (3 million), including Secretary Shultz' reply to a question of fair burden sharing.

Le Soir (215,000) carried an article and Belga National News Agency summarized Secretary Shultz' views as well as those of Mr. Tindemans.

A frontpage story under the heading "Belgium Remains Prepared to Deploy Missiles" in the Catholic Gazet Van Antwerpen (194,000) said that Foreign Minister Tindemans by emphasizing that Belgium will honor its commitments "wiped away all doubts about the installation or non-installation of the 48 cruise missiles on Belgian soil."

De Morgen (54,000) carried the following item on the program: "Minister Tindemans told BRT radio yesterday that he judged from the Reagan remarks that foreign problems are increasingly 'a specialist's job'. In the same radio interview the Minister cited his wife as a 'witness beyond suspicion' to state that Reagan may have made a mere slip of the tongue. Tindemans yesterday was one of the stars of the interational 'talk show' which was broadcast from the RTBF studios. Also participating were, among others, NATO Commander Rogers, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and Le Monde editor Andre Fontaine, while via satellite Tindemans' American colleague Shultz also spoke. Tindemans said: 'Belgium will honor its NATO commitments -- but continues to evaluate the evolution of the situation. It is important to make public opinion realize

how much Europe is directly involved in NATO decisions and that the European countries themselves are the ones who asked Washington to deploy the Euromissiles."

CANADA:

Embassy Ottawa reports that the audiences in both Ottawa and Montreal were effusive in their praise of the program. Turnout at Ambassador Robinson's residence was heavy with NATO Ambassadors, military attaches, Canadian press and government. In Montreal, one member of the audience of press and NATO Consular representatives stated: "how wonderful it is to sit in Canada and finally hear some good European views."

Global TV fashioned a major news item out of the event for May 24 early and late evening newscasts repeated in May 25 noon news show. While it emphasized the local angle of the Trudeau "Peace Initiative" it also repeated at some length Secretary Shultz' response to the six-nation nuclear freeze proposal explaining the danger of leaving all deployments to one side.

DENMARK:

Copenhagen reports that their first participation in WORLDNET was a highly successful experience appreciated by all who attended. Print media coverage was substantial and upbeat, and Danish T.V. used over three minutes in its prime time evening newscast on May 24, carrying its correspondent's question to Secretary of State Shultz as well as as a question from the Hague on INF. TV correspondent Karin-Lis Svarre described the Secretary as "friendly and diplomatic."

Berlingske Tidende (conservative) reported: "Questions and answers were issued at the first major trans-atlantic press conference and security policy dialogue via TV and satellite taking place between Western Europe and North America, an unusual media event on the occasion of NATO's 35th anniversary and an example of the democratic openness which characterizes Western defense cooperation....[Shultz] stated that 'NATO is strong and our best guarantee for peace.' This was the prevailing theme of the lengthy dialogue between the many capitals...."

Under a story in Information (leftist) headlined "New Era with TV Communication Brings Washington Nearer," correspondent Jorgen Dragsdahl says: "From studios in the American embassy

journalists had the possibility to raise direct questions to top members of the Reagan administration....Danish journalists have not been included in previous telecasts but the 35th anniversary of NATO allowed the circle to be extended to include 14 countries....After drawing straws the invited press were allowed to address questions to the color TV monitor....The American embassy has great expectations for regular meetings via satellite which also can include others besides the media. For example, European and American artists can meet and exchange viewpoints....A new era has begun."

Conservative Jyllands-Posten's Nils Thostrup wrote: "The U.S. government has begun utilizing satellite technology in order to be able to include its partners in the NATO alliance in quick debates on mutual problems....Thursday the American embassy in Denmark was linked up on this network on the occasion of NATO's 35th anniversary...."

Social Democratic Aktuelt's foreign affairs editor stated: "NATO is alive and well. Despite minor problems things are going pretty well. This is what TV viewers were told yesterday by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, seconded by politicians and experts from the U.S. and Europe...."

Kristeligt Dagblad (independent Christian) wrote: "The questions of the journalists from the 16 countries were transmitted back and forth between the U.S. and Europe via satellite. [The press conference] centered around the intermediate range missiles. The situation in the Gulf area and the possibility of renewed negotiations...."

FRANCE:

Agence France Presse carried a four paragraph dispatch reporting Secretary Shultz's reaction to President Mitterrand's remarks on the necessity of European defense and the Secretary's comments on Spain's joining the NATO alliance.

UNITED KINGDOM:

Attendees to this program generally found it of considerable interest and praiseworthy.

BBC Russian Service prepared a 6 minute segment on the transmission which went out on the Russian Service's Weekend Magazine show (repeated twice on May 26 and 27).

WEST GERMANY:

Embassy Bonn noted that audiences in the capital and Munich felt that the program appropriately commemorated the anniversary of NATO by demonstrating that this Alliance of sixteen democratic states reaches its decisions through a process of consultation and discussion, in stark contrast to the Warsaw pact.

Suddeutsche Zeitung weekend edition (May 26/27) (478,000 circ.) reported Secretary Shultz's statement that the U.S. Administration's planned strategic defense initiative did not represent a serious obstacle to the NATO alliance as well as the Secretary's comments about the possibility of a neutralist government in West Germany (which he saw as unlikely) and about the need for greater European defense expenditures.

Bayrischer Rundfunk (BR) closed its 6:45 PM television newscast Thursday with a 90-second feature on Munich's participation in EURONET.

ICELAND:

The special NATO WORLDNET program was broadcast for one hour and fifteen minutes on Icelandic State Television on Friday, May 25, starting at 10:30 PM. The commitment of such a large block of time to a political issue is unusual for state television.

Morgunbladid, Iceland's largest daily, noted the NATO broadcast in an editorial on May 27. "The television program telecast on the 24th that was done simultaneously in all NATO member states and was shown here....confirmed once again that NATO is the strongest peace movement that has been established since the end of the Second World War and even further back in history. Of course, no one is in full agreement on everything that NATO has done, but the overwhelming opinion in the member states is that a more sound option than military cooperation between the member states is not possible if they want to ensure their security and independence."

"It is necessary to keep this in mind when one listens to the various outcries and sensationalism in the name of peace. For a long time, the Soviet propaganda machine has been busy portraying Kremlin leaders, whoever they may be, as the greatest peace chiefs of the world. Now, even as the Soviet Army is decimating the people of Afghanistan, the peace drums have been beaten harder than ever in the hope that their sound will drown out the cries of agony and the bomb percussions from Afghanistan...."

"As Leo Tindemans said during the NATO WORLDNET interview on TV, 'Who is not for peace and against nuclear weapons?' Of course, everyone chooses peace without nuclear weapons, but there are only a few who find it necessary to advertise themselves as the saviours of mankind with that view on their lips."

Thodviljinn, Iceland's most leftist-leaning daily, carried a major article on May 25 that was remarkable in its content since it was generally more evenhanded than what is expected of the newspaper which is the strongest print critic of the NATO base and Iceland's participation in the alliance.

ITALY:

Rome

The special WORLDNET program on the occasion of NATO's 35th anniversary received coverage by major newspapers and electronic media throughout Italy.

Italian television's moderate Channel One News (TG-1), which was on the site with a correspondent and crew, carried a clip on its late-night "TG-Notte" broadcast (275,000). The clip, narrated by Fabrizio Del Noce, highlighted his one INF-related question and used a variety of visuals from the program.

Moderate GR-2 -- Channel Two Radio News -- carried brief summaries of the broadcast on its morning news roundups on May 24 (1.4 million).

Leftist, influential La Repubblica (260,000) headlined its report "Shultz: We Shall Not Give In to The Kremlin."

Caludio Lanti in leading conservative Il Giornale (182,000): "'NATO is strong and firm,' said the U.S. Secretary of State Shultz"....During the many-voiced debate the defensive nature of the pact was repeatedly stressed. Lanti followed with a summary of the program's views, listed theme by theme.

Rome's conservative Il Tempo (130,000) called Secretary Shultz "cautious and positive at the same time." The headline: "Shultz: 'There Will Be No Concessions To Bring Moscow Back to the Negotiating Table.'"

Il Popolo (80,000): "It was not only a celebration, but also an occasion for debate and study. What's the present status of health of the 35-year old alliance? Almost everybody says it is good, even if there are problems."

The longest article on the program appeared in radical left Il Manifesto (30,000) under headline: "35 Years of NATO, Shultz makes a Television Toast to Peace and to Cruise Missiles."

Milan

Overall, the EURONET transmission to Milan was a great success. The inaugural telecast of EURONET in Milan attracted television and press coverage on a national and regional level.

An estimated audience of 100,000 viewed the RAI 3 evening newscast for the Lombardy region which devoted three minutes to the EURONET transmission.

Corriere Della Sera (502,000), Italy's top circulation, centrist daily carried an article on EURONET on the day of the transmission and covered the program the following day, May 25, on its foreign affairs page. Headline read: "Shultz Live on Television: European Plan for Common Defense a Constructive Step."

L'Avvenire, the national Catholic daily, covered the transmission in a five-column wide box on the front page. The headline read: "NATO, A Choice of Peace" with subhead: "Anniversaries: Press Conference of Shultz via Satellite with the Capitals of the Alliance."

Naples

The foreign editor of Naples' Il Mattino, Almerico Di Meglio, gave a lengthy, positive story on the program under the headlines: "Deterrence: Strategy for Peace; Shultz for the NATO's 35 Years."

NORWAY:

A 3-column story headlined: "International Press Conference via Satellite," focused on the program, its participants, and types of questions. Aftenposten, (independent conservative)

In a story that illustrated the timeliness of the program, the Dagbladet (sensationalist liberal) focused on the answer Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle gave to a question about a nuclear freeze. The reporter asking the question came straight from the Parliament which the same day approved nearly unanimously a report favoring a freeze. Dagbladet in its five column story headlined, "Freeze: Cold Shoulder from USA" said:

"Richard Perle said almost the exact opposite of the Norwegian parliament. He denied that a nuclear freeze is an advantage for the disarmament effort, and said that a freeze would increasingly place the West in a worse situation, with the deterrent force gradually losing its credibility."

PORTUGAL:

An estimated 4.5 million people saw RTP's (Portugal's state-owned and only television station) prime-time evening broadcast May 29, which aired major portions of May 24 WORLDNET special. The feature lasted for over an hour and included introductory film, Shultz and Tindeman's interviews and the two panel discussions. In addition to WORLDNET's "man-in-the-street interviews," RTP included a couple of their own.

SPAIN:

The May 24 WORLDNET special was well covered in the Spanish media: a full minute on Spanish television, broad radio coverage and articles in Madrid's three leading dailies on May 25th. In addition to journalists, the program at the Embassy was attended by representatives from the Office of the Spokesman of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Defense and three political parties.

TURKEY:

Turkey's first participation in WORLDNET programming was highly successful. The NATO special generated great interest among working journalists and attracted an invited audience that included the Director of Turkish Television, Director of the Government of Turkey's Press Office, several Members of Parliament and other foreign policy analysts.

Ankara reports that TRT Television ran a six minute segment on their main news broadcast, featuring Turkish questions, answers and in-studio visuals.

Semi-official Anatolian News Agency distributed story with excerpts, and the report was carried in Milliyet (liberal - 232,122).

Both Tercuman (259,000 - conservative) and Bulvar (177,000 - sensational) carried stories including color pictures of TRT studio scene (frontpage in Tercuman). Cumhuriyet and Gunes (232,000 - popular/family) both carried brief items emphasizing "boycott."