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**WHORM Subject File Code:** IT067

(International Organizations:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO))

**Case file Number(s):** 216125-216611

**Box Number:** 14

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

DLB 3/21/2023

**File Folder** IT067 (NATO) (216611)

**FOIA**

S9352/3

**Box Number**

SYSTEMATIC

81

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
249239	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #249241	2	7/16/1984	B1
249240	MEMO	DON MAHLEY, TOM LENEY TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON NATO NUCLEAR POSTURE <b>R 5/5/2014 WH GUIDELINES</b>	1	7/2/1984	B1
249241	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: DOD REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF NATO	2	7/16/1984	B1

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

*BB*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1984

**C.F.**

*216611  
1230  
1120  
IT067*

*RS  
ND018  
AT  
F6013  
F600612  
F6038  
F6034*

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to section 1105(b) of the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94), this report contains my views on the DoD report on the tactical nuclear posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is the first of four reports required by the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act. It analyzes some of the most crucial problems facing U.S.-NATO defense policy, both because of the weapons involved and the essential role of nuclear weapons in NATO's deterrent posture.

*comment*

I have reviewed Secretary Weinberger's very comprehensive report on the nuclear posture of NATO, and I strongly endorse the report's recommendations. I therefore urge the Congress to provide the necessary support so that the agreements reached within the Alliance for improving NATO's nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF) can be sustained.

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Letter also to George Bush  
attached

21661155

NSC #8404365

*Delivered by hand: 9/12/84 (1:45p)*

*Handwritten initials*

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I am fully aware of the views in the Congress that we should do more to improve our conventional forces. I intend to take a balanced approach to improving our capabilities in both areas. You have received a report from DoD which looks at conventional plans and requirements in detail. I shall be providing my views on how to pursue some of those recommendations soon. It is true that we need to continue to improve our conventional forces. However, it is essential that, in the process of examining conventional problems, we not lose sight of the very essential, significant contributions that credible, survivable, and stable NATO nuclear forces make to enhancing conventional defense or of the fact that such nuclear forces are presently our most credible deterrent to chemical attack.

I especially endorse those recommendations that improve the survivability of NATO's nuclear forces. Closely associated security improvements will also do much to improve the safety of our weapons in peacetime. I have placed significant emphasis on carrying out such improvements. I intend to encourage our Allies to take an equally serious view of the problem. We are working through several NATO organizations to obtain Allied assistance in and agreement to making needed improvements.


At Montebello, Defense Ministers agreed to make further stockpile reductions which leave the stockpile at its lowest level in the last twenty years. At the same time, the Allies agreed that NATO must pursue appropriate modernization programs so that this reduced stockpile will continue to constitute an adequate and credible deterrent. I will support both the stockpile level decision and the modernization programs which will ensure a credible deterrent. Present U.S. defense programs and budgets provide the means to implement these decisions. I ask for your support to ensure that they can be carried out in an orderly and timely fashion. The DoD report accurately documents the need, and outlines the remedial measures which we will be pursuing. The associated requirement to improve our target acquisition and communications capabilities is also well documented in the report.

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NATO Allies are aware of the requirements for nuclear modernization and improvements in survivability and security. The U.S. will continue to provide the leadership and encouragement to stimulate the Allies to participate in their portions of future programs. As a result of the 1979 dual-track decision on LRINF, NATO is proceeding with deployments in the absence of a satisfactory negotiated arms reduction agreement which would make such deployments unnecessary. I stand fully committed to seek an equitable and verifiable arms reduction solution, and, as I have said many times, the U.S. is ready to recommend negotiations without preconditions at any time. Until such a negotiated solution is reached, however, the U.S. must provide the means to ensure that the nuclear posture of NATO does not deteriorate to such a degree that deterrence is threatened.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent "R" at the beginning.

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.  
Speaker of the  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 12, 1984

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*Delivered by hand: 9/12/84 (2:01p)*

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
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable George Bush  
President of the Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510



THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

September 12, 1984

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE  
PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

September 12, 1984

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

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(OVER)

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Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

# # # # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

*P.L. 98-94*

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*1105(b) report  
as done by NSC  
final done from  
this 7/16/84  
JPM*

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Sincerely,

The Honorable George Bush  
~~The President of the Senate~~  
~~United States Senate~~  
Washington, D.C. 20510

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE CLERK  
TRACKING SHEET FOR PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

TITLE:

*I*  
Confidential Report on Nuclear Posture of NATO

TYPE DOCUMENT:

PROCLAMATION

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS/SENATE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

SIGNING STATEMENT

LETTER (S)

OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVED:

7/16/84

Time:

4:50 a.m./p.m.

SENT TO CORRESPONDENCE FOR TYPING IN FINAL:

Date:

7/16/84

Time:

4:55 a.m./p.m.

TO RICHARD DARMAN'S OFFICE:

Date:

7/16/84

Time:

6:35 a.m./p.m.

INFO, INCLUDING STENCIL, TO PRESS OFFICE:

Date:

9/11/84

Time:

5 a.m./p.m. *for release*

NOTIFICATIONS:

*SPM*  
(initial)

On any major transmittals to the Congress, and in every instance when draft legislation is sent, notify Linda Bennett (ext. 2230).

*SPM*  
(initial)

N.S.C., when appropriate (Brian Merchant, ext. 2585)

*advised 9/12/84 (9:32)*

*9/11  
Kathleen 4:40p*

OTHER INFORMATION:

*Double check 9/12 (10:50a)  
923  
for Doc Malley*

*→ reports not classified. SPM*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

*Withdrawer*

DLB 3/21/2023

*File Folder*

IT067 (NATO) (216611)

*FOIA*

S9352/3  
SYSTEMATIC

*Box Number*

81

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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C. F.

216611

IT067

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sept 11, 1984

NSC/S:

Per Dan Marks, Exec Clerk's  
ofc this has been sgd  
by RR, dated 9/12/84. Press  
ofc will announce tomorrow  
and they well be sent to  
the hill tomorrow.

# 4365 & # 4536.

NATO

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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249239	MEMO  DUPLICATE OF #249241	2	7/16/1984	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to section 1105(b) of the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (SR 98-213), this report contains my views on the DoD report on the tactical nuclear posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is the first of four reports required by the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act. It analyzes some of the most crucial problems facing US-NATO defense policy, both because of the weapons involved and the essential role of nuclear weapons in NATO's deterrent posture.

I have reviewed Secretary Weinberger's very comprehensive report on the nuclear posture of NATO, and I strongly endorse the Report's recommendations. I therefore urge the Congress to provide the necessary support so that the agreements reached within the Alliance for improving NATO's non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) can be sustained.

The military threat to the Alliance has not lessened since the last report in 1975. There have been significant improvements by both the U.S. and the Europeans in conventional and non-strategic nuclear forces over the last several years. Nonetheless, the quantitative military balance has, in fact, worsened. Our goal remains not to match the Warsaw Pact system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead, but to maintain forces adequate for credible deterrence and defense. NATO can accomplish this objective by continuing force improvement, including both nuclear and conventional modernizations, and by developing more effective use of our defense resources. Meanwhile, we will continue to work to achieve equitable and verifiable arms reductions which would assist NATO to obtain greater stability and security at lower levels of defense effort.

In October 1983, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), as part of a theater-wide improvement of NATO's nuclear posture, decided to withdraw an additional 1,400 warheads over the next five to six years, in addition to the 1,000 warheads withdrawn in 1980. The basis for these decisions was a broadly supported Alliance study. This study was used as the cornerstone for the DoD report. Thus, the recommendations and intermediate steps outlined in the DoD report to improve NATO's nuclear posture are fully consistent with the views of our Allies.

I am fully aware of the views in the Congress that we should do more to improve our conventional forces. I intend to take a balanced approach to improving our capabilities in both areas. You have received a report from DoD which looks at conventional plans and requirements in detail. I shall be providing my views on how to pursue some of those recommendations soon. It is true that we need to continue to improve our conventional forces. However, it is essential that, in the process of examining conventional problems, we not lose sight of the very essential, significant contributions that credible, survivable, and stable NATO nuclear forces make to enhancing conventional defense or of the fact that such nuclear forces are presently our most credible deterrent to chemical attack.

I especially endorse those recommendations that improve the survivability of NATO's nuclear forces. Closely associated security improvements will also do much to improve the safety of our weapons in peacetime. I have placed significant emphasis on carrying out such improvements. I intend to encourage our Allies to take an equally serious view of the problem. We are working through several NATO organizations to obtain Allied assistance in and agreement to making needed improvements.

At Montebello, Defense Ministers agreed to make further stockpile reductions which leave the stockpile at its lowest level in the last twenty years. At the same time, the Allies agreed that NATO must pursue appropriate modernization programs so that this reduced stockpile will continue to constitute an adequate and credible deterrent. I will support both the stockpile level decision and the modernization programs which will ensure a credible deterrent. Present U.S. defense programs and budgets provide the means to implement these decisions. I ask for your support to ensure that they can be carried out in an orderly and timely fashion. The DoD report accurately documents the need, and outlines the remedial measures which we will be pursuing. The associated requirement to improve our target acquisition and communications capabilities is also well documented in the report.

As I mentioned earlier, NATO's nuclear posture correctly constitutes NATO's most effective deterrent against Soviet use of chemical weapons. We must do better than that, which is why the U.S. should develop a limited but modern chemical capability to serve as a direct deterrent against Soviet chemical use. U.S. defense budgets and programs include the necessary steps to sustain this deterrent.



NATO Allies are aware of the requirements for nuclear modernization and improvements in survivability and security. The U.S. will continue to provide the leadership and encouragement to stimulate the Allies to participate in their portions of future programs. As a result of the 1979 dual-track decision on LRINF, NATO is proceeding with deployments in the absence of a satisfactory negotiated arms reduction agreement which would make such deployments unnecessary. I stand fully committed to seek an equitable and verifiable arms reduction solution, and, as I have said many times, the U.S. is ready to recommence negotiations without preconditions at any time. Until such a negotiated solution is reached, however, the U.S. must provide the means to ensure that the nuclear posture of NATO does not deteriorate to such a degree that deterrence is threatened.

NATO's conventional, chemical, and nuclear forces are inextricably linked in achieving the Alliance's objective of deterrence and defense. If we are to maintain deterrence and live in peace and freedom, we must continue to improve each capability. Secretary Weinberger's report on NATO's nuclear posture has outlined the current situation and a practical way to proceed towards an enduring nuclear posture in NATO. I fully endorse his recommendations.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill  
The Speaker of the House  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

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Sincerely,

The Honorable George Bush  
The President of the Senate  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4365

3

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

July 2, 1984

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DON MAHNEY <sup>DM</sup> / TOM LENEY

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter on NATO Nuclear Posture

The FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (extract at Tab II) requires the President to submit a written report containing his views on the DOD report on NATO's Nuclear Posture "... together with such recommendations ... as he considers appropriate."

The report on Nuclear Posture is one of four reports required by the Authorization Act. The DOD report was submitted on May 1st. The Presidential Report, drafted in the form of letters to both Houses of Congress, is at Tab A. A parallel Presidential letter to Congress concerning the DOD's report on NATO conventional force and strategy issues will be forwarded next week.

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President recommending that he sign and forward the letter at Tab A as his supplement to the Nuclear Posture report.

Concurrence: Ron Lehman; Don Fortier; Jack Matlock; Ron Sable; and Chris Lehman. <sup>RL</sup> <sup>DF</sup> <sup>JM</sup> <sup>RS</sup> <sup>CL</sup> <sup>Bob Hubbard</sup>

Recommendation

That you sign the memo at Tab I recommending the President sign and forward the letter at Tab A to the Congress.

Approve   ✓   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
  - Tab A Proposed letter to the Hill
- Tab II Extract of FY 84 Defense Authorization Act

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

REF ID: A66774  
DATE 5/5/2014

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b) The President shall submit to the Congress not later than June 1, 1984, his recommendations and plan for improving NATO conventional defense capabilities.

Fy 1984 Def Authorization  
ACT (SR 98-213)

REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF NATO

SEC. 1105. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on the tactical nuclear posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and submit a report on the results of such study to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than May 1, 1984. Such study shall include—

(1) a detailed assessment of the current tactical nuclear balance in Europe and that projected for 1990;

(2) an assessment of the current, respective operational doctrines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe of the Warsaw Pact and NATO;

(3) an explanation of how the threat of the use of such weapons relates to deterrence and to conventional defense;

(4) an identification of the number and types of nuclear warheads, if any, considered to be inessential to the defense structure of Western Europe, the quantity and type of such weapons that could be eliminated from Europe under appropriate circumstances without jeopardizing the security of NATO nations and an assessment of what such circumstances might be;

(5) an explanation of the steps that can be taken to develop a rational and coordinated nuclear posture by NATO in a manner that is consistent with proper emphasis on conventional defense forces; and

(6) an identification of any notable, relevant developments that have occurred since the submission to the Congress in April 1975 of the report entitled "The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe", prepared by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 302 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975 (Public Law 93-365), which might cause the findings and conclusions of that report to require revision and such revisions in such report as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(b) The President shall submit a written report to the Congress on or before June 1, 1984, containing his views on the Department of Defense study and report required under subsection (a) together with such recommendations with respect to such study and report as he considers appropriate.

REPORT ON COMBAT-TO-SUPPORT RATIO OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE IN SUPPORT OF NATO

SEC. 1106. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives not later than May 1, 1984, on the combat, combat support, combat service support, and noncombat components of the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent duty in Europe in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Secretary shall include in such report—

(1) an analysis of the historical (since 1974), current, and projected combat, combat support, combat service support, and non-

combat components of the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent duty in Europe in support of NATO and their relationship to each other;

(2) a review of the requirements for such combat, combat support, combat service support, and noncombat components; and

(3) his assessment of the current balance among units of United States combat components, combat support components, and combat service support components forward deployed in Europe and his recommendations for any changes needed to improve that balance in the future.

(b) For the purposes of the report required by subsection (a)—

(1) the combat component of the Army includes only the infantry, cavalry, artillery, armored, combat engineers, special forces, attack assault helicopter units, air defense, and missile combat units of battalion or smaller size;

(2) the combat component of the Navy includes only the combatant ships (aircraft carrier, battleship, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, submarine, and amphibious assault ships) and combat aircraft wings (fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and patrol); and

(3) the combat component of the Air Force includes only the tactical fighter, reconnaissance, tactical airlift, fighter interceptor, and bomber units of wing or smaller size.

REPORT ON UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES IN SUPPORT OF NATO

SEC. 1107. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall review and analyze the fiscal year 1983 expenditures of the Department of Defense in fulfilling the United States commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the expenditures projected for such purpose for each of the fiscal years 1984 through 1989.

(b)(1) The Secretary of Defense shall submit a detailed written report to the Congress not later than June 1, 1984, on the review and analysis required under subsection (a). The Secretary shall set out in such report, in current and constant fiscal year 1983 dollar figures, the expenditures made in fiscal year 1983 and expenditures projected to be made in fiscal years 1984 through 1989 by the United States in fulfilling its commitment to NATO in each of the following categories:

(A) Procurement.

(B) Operations and maintenance.

(C) Military construction.

(D) Military personnel.

(E) Research, development, test, and evaluation.

(2) The Secretary of Defense shall also include in such report a separate breakout of the fiscal year 1983 Department of Defense expenditures in each of the categories specified in paragraph (1) for the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent duty ashore in the European member nations of NATO and the expenditures projected to be incurred by the Department of Defense in each of those categories in each of the fiscal years 1984 through 1989 for personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States planned to be assigned to permanent duty ashore in such nations during each of those fiscal years. The Secretary of Defense shall also include in such report similar separate breakouts for all classes of United

National Security Council  
The White House

System # 4  
Package # 4363

1045

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>VM</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>7</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>8</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>Correction Tab A</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Bob - will tab A be redone by clerks office? spacing problems*





