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Portuguese Television.

I'd like to ask the panel, in 35 years NATO has changed its strategy twice towards the Warsaw Pact. It turned from mass retaliation to what you call "flexible response". According to some observers, this has been overcome. My question is what kind of strategy has NATO at the moment?

MR. : Well, if I might try to respond to that, the strategy of flexible response, which has been in effect, now, for 20 years or so, remains the basic strategy of the Alliance. It represents an understanding that we need to be able to deter Soviet aggression at all levels, at the nuclear level, at the conventional level, and in the theater nuclear weapons as well. It is a strategy that integrates all of the members of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic, and we think it's served us well and, indeed, in frequent discussions in Brussels, when NATO ministers meet and talk about improvements to NATO forces and adjustments to strategies, again and again we've concluded that the strategy of flexible response is sufficient to permit us to respond to the growth in Soviet forces and maintain adequate deterrence.

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MR. GALL: Andre Fontaine, do you want to respond?

(No response.)

MR. GALL: We have a question from Oslo.

QUESTION: This is Dominik Bruno (?), Norwegian News Agency. My question goes to Senator Lugar.

The Norwegian Parliament is today adopting a reporting from its Foreign Policy Committee which says that there is an overall balance of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States. This part of the report was unanimously adopted by all parties in the Committee. What is your comment on this, in view of the film which we have seen?

SENATOR LUGAR: I think I understood that the Parliament was adopting a report that says that the forces should be balanced, or that they are balanced. My general comment is that however one describes the situation, and this is always a precarious type of a judgment to make, the defense of the West depends upon, first of all, the deterrent quality of our -- of the perceptions of that aggregation of power that we have, and likewise, upon the political will that we have and the perceptions of that, and I suppose upon our ability

to respond in terms of new innovations, and to keep pressing for reductions and for negotiations.

In short, at the moment the Soviets have not chosen to negotiate reductions. We are shut out from a closed society from knowledge of what sort of breakthroughs are contemplated or developments that might be underway. And the missiles that imperil Europe are still there. They haven't been removed. So that if there was even overall balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, this might be of small comfort, specifically, to many of our NATO allies.

I think a sophisticated analysis must take all these points into consideration.

MR. GALL: Well, can I bring in Andre in Paris, Andre Fontaine? Would you like to give us your comments on that?

MR. FONTAINE: Well, I think on this particular point I don't think I have much to add. I think we will discuss very long between the East and the West who is leading, and the second thing is that everyone has his own way of making his account, and the other thing is that nobody will feel secure as long as it is not absolutely sure to have some advantage vis-a-vis the other.

And that's the reason why, I'm afraid, that this arms struggle, race, will last very long, and all the examples of agreements on the arms race which we have had in the past shows that, unfortunately, they never slow the pace of the arms race.

MR. GALL: Thank you very much.

Can we now go to The Hague. Have you got a question?

QUESTION: Misha Klauser (?). I am of the Volkskompt (?) in Amsterdam, a daily newspaper.

I have a question for Mr. Fontaine. Mr. Fontaine, do you think that the trust between the Germans and the French is, on the moment, strong enough to build a strong European pillar under the NATO by the Western European Union?

MR. FONTAINE: Well, I think for the time being that the pillar is very strong and I think it has been extremely interesting and meaningful to see that when we have a change of government in France, I mean when the left comes to power, the first visit to our President was the German Chancellor, who was then a Socialist, a Social Democrat.

And when there has been a change of government

in Germany, the first man to whom the new German Chancellor paid a visit, was the French President too. So, I think it's very important. It means that any government, either on the left or on the right, in both countries, thinks that it's absolutely fundamental to secure the best possible relationship between France and Germany, and I must say that if there has been an achievement of the post-war policy of the western powers, this is the best example.

This being said, we know that in West Germany, for the time being, there is a trend, among the Greens, among the Social Democrat Party, which is not exactly in that direction. They think that something can be found to improve the situation in Central Europe, to improve the relationship with Soviet Russia, and maybe they could be tempted by exploring other ways.

What I very strongly feel is that we have to explore all the possibilities to improve the climate in Europe, but if we explore they divided, then we can be sure that we, everybody, will be a loser.

MR. GALL: Senator Lugar, how do you feel about that as an outsider, as it were, as an American? About the question that Andre Fontaine has just been

talking about?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, I really cannot capture the gist of precisely where he has come down. It appears to me that the relationship of Germany and France is absolutely critical to the West, and I'm encouraged, as he is, that it appears to be going so well.

I think those of us visiting either of the countries note anxieties as to the future of the relationship and, as good American friends in both cases, we are pushing toward unity and common purpose. But there are some subtleties, certainly of history there, that are probably beyond the scope of this program to explore, and I think I would just add words of encouragement that the visitation continue, that the mutual support be there.

MR. GALL: Thanks very much.

Now let's go to Munich for the next question.

QUESTION: Josef Perner (?) from the Bavarian Broadcasting, Munich.

Mr. Senator Lugar, in the future is it possible to get more cooperation in Western Europe, not against the United States, but a little besides the United States? What is your opinion about this possible

tendency?

SENATOR LUGAR: Could you help me with that question? I just do not understand what is said. Can anyone on the panel help on what was asked?

MR. GALL: I think he asked -- well, you tell me, being a --

MR. : Well, it's because I could hear the Bavarian accent a little bit better. I think he says would the United States not be worried if Europe got together in cooperation, not necessarily against the United States, but for itself, and as you said, beside the United States?

SENATOR LUGAR: Oh, well, my own judgment is that that's precisely a trend that ought to be explored, because it seems to me that European defense, to a great extent, has probably relied in the minds of many Europeans too much upon the United States. The thought has been that a nuclear umbrella was over Europe, that essentially hard decisions might ought to be made with conventional armaments, with defense budgets, and a great deal of querulous diatribe from time to time about interference from the United States and a pushing of Europe to defend itself, which is nonsense. Europeans

want to defend themselves.

My guess is to the extent that Europeans really work toward some type of defense, with the United States, certainly, as a very good friend, but not looked upon as either the pusher or shover, or a person in a patronizing way, that we likely will make greater progress. I think that would be an interesting concept.

MR. GALL: Paris has a question. Now would you like to come in?

QUESTION: Yes. My name is Raoul Fein (?) in Paris.

A question of information, before Mr. Perle leaves. What do you think about the project of President Mitterrand to Moscow? President Mitterrand as, one president of the state of NATO. Thank you, sir.

MR. PERLE: Well, we are not at all unhappy to see whatever effort can be made to engage the Soviets in constructive dialogue. There has been a succession of visits to Moscow recently. They have all, unhappily, been unproductive. It seems to be the case that the Soviets have adopted a quite deliberate policy of both freezing the state of East-West relations, increasing tension, exaggerating the fears that they believe to be

useful to them politically, and so while everyone hopes for the best in an effort to get a dialogue going, the indicators are not particularly favorable.

MR. GALL: Can we now have the last question, from Ankara?

QUESTION: From Ankara, this is Maria Botura (?) of Turkish Daily (?).

My question is to Mr. Richard Perle and Senator Lugar. The Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, in his recent speech in the General Congress of his party, accused NATO of pursuing an imperialist strategy and the U.S. as follows, quote: "The USSR cannot be called an imperialist power like the United States. It is, of course, against imperialism and capitalism. Even in Africa, the Soviets are only trying to counter U.S. expansionism." Unquote.

How do you assess this attitude, from the viewpoint of NATO solidarity and the future of the Alliance?

MR. GALL: Well, my assessment would be that the United States, friends of Greece, really, we need to visit with the Prime Minister and try to work through the nature of some of our difficulties for the present. I

think Secretary Shultz touched upon those. We've had a vigorous debate in the United States Senate about foreign assistance and military assistance to Greece and to Turkey, and those situations are not yet resolved. They have brought forward, in our committee chambers, a lot of people who are friends of Greece and friends of Turkey, who have distinctly different points of view. I would not ascribe the Prime Minister's words simply to irritation over our debate. There are some fundamental problems that he sees with regard to the future of Greece and the relationship.

But for the moment, I think we would be well to approach the situation calmly, try to work it through in the United States Congress, as well as into NATO, the strength of both of our friends, in Greece and Turkey, and movement, if we can, toward peace and equilibrium and justice on Cyprus, and perhaps other issues that tend to exacerbate that relationship.

MR. GALL: Thank you, Senator Lugar. Let's move on now to a second lot of interviews with the European man in the street. The topic this time, the balance between nuclear weapons and conventional forces. Does NATO have it right?

MAN IN THE STREET: (USIA TRANSLATION):

"I don't trust either the Soviets or the Americans, when it comes to peace. One can't fight for peace by deploying missiles."

MAN IN THE STREET: Oh, certainly. I think that we've got to keep pace with the Russians and keep ahead of them if we possibly can. I mean, after all, they've been deploying the SS-20s for a long time now.

MAN IN THE STREET: (USIA TRANSLATION):

"In my opinion it would be better to strength the conventional weapons so that in a conventional war we can offer resistance to the quantitatively superior strength, than to exclusively rely on the rockets and shoot them, thereby destroying more than can be saved."

MR. GALL: Richard Perle, buildup our conventional forces, that's an argument that's attractive to many Europeans who are, understandably, worried about the risk of nuclear war. Is it realistic?

MR. PERLE: It's realistic in two important senses. It's entirely consistent with NATO doctrine.

It is entirely consistent with the technological capability of the West. The big question is whether we are prepared, as an Alliance, as individual members of that Alliance, to make the necessary financial sacrifice.

The reason for the initial deployment of rather large numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe was largely financial. It was a lot cheaper to provide a deterrent capability with nuclear weapons than with conventional forces. The Alliance has been constantly re-examining the nuclear element of its strategy and, over the years, has been reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe.

In fact, last October the Alliance took a decision to reduce by an additional 1,400 the total number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, and when that reduction is complete, we will have removed more than 2,400 such weapons, even after one takes into account the new Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. So, we think we have the balance about right. We think we've now reduced, or plan to reduce, the nuclear component of the deterrent to the absolute minimum necessary to deter the Soviet Union, and we

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should, certainly, indeed, get on with the job of improving conventional capabilities.

MR. GALL: Arrigo Levi in Brussels, isn't that a fair point, made by the second speaker? The Russians have been deploying SS-20s for a long time now, he said.

MR. LEVI: Yes, indeed, they have been, and the perception of the Soviet threat has been even increased lately by a series of Soviet actions even outside the field itself of strategy.

The point is that in spite of what the Russians do, public opinion in Europe, although it varies a lot, still is the public opinion of very peaceful nations, nations which have to make an effort to understand the Russian logic and do not really believe in it. They do not understand why the Russians have that obsession with an outside threat, which we know does not exist.

So that democracies tend always to believe that there must be some misunderstanding which can be solved just by talking. Let's talk to them man to man and we'll understand each other. That is repeated, let's say, every generation, does the same thing. We start all over over and over again, by going to the

Soviet Union and trying to get through to them.

But there is a danger. Although this is a good thing, because there is a certain -- I think that there is a basic decency in this approach, which is a good thing. But there is a danger, that if we insist too much in these offers, and if we insist too much in these separate trips to Moscow, as Andre Fontaine was saying earlier, especially if we try to explore possibilities of negotiations, but separately, being divided, then we can convey the wrong message to the Soviet Union, a message of weakness and division, which in the end will have the very wrong effect of making the Russians even more reluctant to start negotiations again.

So, I believe that there is a certain reason, at a certain point, in diplomacy, to do nothing, to wait and see, to be patient and wait for the Russians to assess more thoroughly the situation. I believe this would be the time to do little, but practically to stop the continuous efforts and trips and journeys, offers. They give the wrong impression to the Russians and to the Americans.

MR. GALL: Thank you very much, Arrigo Levi.

Let's bring in the colleagues, now, in the

European capitals. Reykjavik, would you like to start?

QUESTION: Yes. This is Johann Deyonas (?) from Icelandic Television. I would like to address my question to Richard Perle.

In view of recent speculation within NATO on turning, on an increasing scale, away from nuclear weapons to conventional weapons, I would like to ask to what extent such considerations on conventional strategy apply to the naval arena? In other words, to what extent is it possible to denuclearize the oceans, with regard to tactical nuclear weapons?

MR. PERLE: Well, here there are some very promising technologies, in particular the emerging capability that we have and that the Soviets certainly have as well, to guide weapons with quite extraordinary accuracy over long ranges.

Indeed, the Soviet growth of anti-naval forces, which is represented in part by their Backfire Bombers, pose a very serious threat to the survivability of the NATO fleet. So, we are working hard to find counters to the Soviet offensive threat and to improve our own ability to deal with the Soviet naval threat, without resort to nuclear weapons at sea. It's a very promising

area.

MR. GALL: Arrigo Levi in Brussels, do you have a comment on that?

MR. LEVI: Not on the naval angle, but perhaps I would add one word on the conventional weapons. Informed opinion agrees that there is an undeniable logic in strengthening our conventional defenses, so that by raising the -- by making our conventional forces stronger we can raise the nuclear threshold. And I believe that public opinion might be ready to accept and support such a policy if it is made to understand that it is a policy that reduces the danger of a nuclear war.

However, this would be a costly thing, as Richard Perle reminded us earlier, and being a costly thing, the cost can be reduced by much, much higher levels of inter-governmental cooperation in Europe and between Europe and the U.S. This is a huge effort which must be made, both to increase cooperation, to reduce costs, and here we have in Ambassador Abshire, a real expert on the whole problem, and I don't want to steal from what he might say much, much better than I would, than I can.

And I believe that the government could, in

the end, by making a strong effort, convince public opinion. But this is in the future. It's still to be done.

MR. GALL: Thank you. Let's go to Oslo now.

QUESTION: From Oslo this is Solomey Mono (?), the Norwegian News Agency.

I am coming back to the Norwegian Parliament, since there is an important debate going on at the moment. And my question goes to both Mr. Perle and Mr. Levi. The Norwegian Parliament has now established a majority position, including the parties in the government coalition on the freeze issue.

The Parliament is asking the government to work actively within NATO to establish a variable freeze as a starting point for negotiating reductions in the nuclear arsenal. Is this in line with the U.S. and NATO policy? And secondly, what is your reaction to this development?

MR. GALL: Arrigo Levi, would you like to start with that?

MR. LEVI: The technology is very good but it's not really perfect. I understood up to a point the question.

I believe that making efforts to establish a negotiating platform on disarmament has been a major point in the policy of NATO from the very beginning, because we believe that by negotiating arms control agreements we can have a more stable balance of power and reduce costs, and we have been making efforts to establish platforms, common platforms. So, I believe that in principle we all agree on that. We also all know the difficulty in carrying through these negotiations, although we must not forget, because right now negotiations are interrupted, we should not forget that there have been successes in achieving arms control agreements. It's true they have been enough, adequate, success to prove that they could be attained in the future as well.

I don't know if Mr. Perle agrees.

MR. GALL: Mr. Perle?

MR. PERLE: I did want to say a word about the notion of a freeze, which we think would not advance the cause of arms control but, in fact, would set it back significantly. And there's one point that's been lost in much of the discussion on the freeze. The United States, today, has a nuclear, strategic, capability

both longer and shorter range, that are on the verge of obsolescence. This is a simple result of the fact that most of these weapons were built 20, 25 years ago. As a matter of fact, 75 percent of all the American nuclear weapons are carried by delivery systems, by missiles and aircraft and on submarines that are 15 years old or older.

By contrast, the Soviet strategic forces is brand new. Seventy-five percent of their weapons have been deployed in the last five years.

So, if we were to have a freeze, we would be unable to replace obsolete systems with modern successes, and in a very short period of time we would have a strategic deterrent that simply couldn't be operated, because those weapons are on their way to retirement and inevitable replacement and any government in the United States, Democrat or Republican, would have to face the physical realities of obsolescence and replace those forces.

So, a freeze would put us at such a permanent and worsening disadvantage that we can't see any productive negotiation on that basis.

QUESTION: Mr. Perle, it's Doug Small from Global Television, Ottawa.

If I could just follow that up, briefly, it seems to me that the question isn't so much one of freezes, but when we get into the question of "conventional" as opposed to "nuclear" weapons, it really boils down to whether or not the Soviets are convinced that you, in the United States, would actually push the button. Do you think that the Soviet Union is convinced of that, that you would actually use nuclear weapons that are now positioned in Europe?

MR. PERLE: I think they are. I don't know any other way to explain the fact that in the post-war period, despite substantial Soviet advantages in conventional forces, they have, even in periods of great tension, always backed away from pushing the issue to the point where that proposition might be tested. So, I think that ultimate nuclear deterrence has served us well. It has brought stability and peace for the longest period in this century to Europe, and I don't foresee a Soviet leader in the future, if we maintain the strength and vigor of our deterrent, and replace obsolete systems when they're no longer operable, taking the enormous risk involved in assuming that we would not respond, as we have said repeatedly we would respond in the defense

of the Alliance.

QUESTION: This is Monroe Minezey (?) from Portuguese Television.

I address my question to Mr. Perle. Just before the NATO meeting last week in Brussels, Moscow announced the deployment of new missiles -- (inaudible) -- does that mean that the -- (inaudible) -- of Mr. Mitterrand has not produced any results?

MR. PERLE: No, I don't think it has, and in fact, the new missiles that the Soviets are now deploying, that they attempt to persuade us are being deployed in response to what NATO has done, are weapons that they decided to build many years ago. You don't develop these things overnight. The lead time is 10 or 12 years. The weapons are the next generation that follow on from the generation already deployed, including in Eastern Europe. And I think it's clear that the Soviets from now on, for as long as they can get away with it, for as long as they can make it appear plausible, will attempt to dress up their deployment plans, which are vigorous and aggressive, as a response to what NATO has done when, in fact, those plans have been underway for many years.

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MR. GALL: I think we have a question from Munich for Arrigo Levi.

QUESTION: This is Helmut Englehart from German Television, Munich.

I should like to ask my question to Senator Lugar. Senator, there is a large and more growing discussion on what price could the West pay to get the Soviets back to the table of negotiations on INF arms control. Do you think it is worth (it) to pay any price at all to get them back to the table?

SENATOR LUGAR: My own judgment is that this may not be the calculation either for us or for them. It would appear that the Soviets are still attempting to formulate what their position will be, given the success of NATO in 1983. We're not at all clear that their decision-making process has arrived at a negotiating position. And, therefore, the temptation on the part of all of us who like to tidy things up and to move things forward, to try out experimentally any number of situations, is likely to be a gesture in futility, if there is not a situation in which the leadership situation in the Soviet Union is clear, and in which someone could actually make a deal.

Now, beyond that, it appears to us in the United States that the Soviets, for various reasons, are attempting to play a role in our electoral procedures in 1984. There appear to be a number of signs that the Soviets are reticent to support our President, Ronald Reagan. As a matter of fact, they may not want to deal with him at all during this particular year or offer him any aid or comfort or successes. This has nothing to do, really, with the INF negotiations. It does have something to do, I suppose, with the patience and their prospects of sort of plodding onward.

For these reasons, I would say that the advice given by Mr. Levi is probably right. There are times in which it is well simply to survey the situation. I think that is what we need to do presently, because the positions we've taken are fully reasonable and we're prepared to reduce nuclear weapons one by one or two by two, or in large swatches, or in any number of positions that are on the table, and to which the Soviets could respond.

MR. GALL: Thank you, Senator.

We move now to our third series of interviews, about the American role in NATO, is it too dominant for

the good of the Alliance?

MAN IN THE STREET: It's not being totally controlled by America and it's not being totally controlled by Europe, in a useful going on between those two areas.

MAN IN THE STREET: (USIA TRANSLATION):
The Americans are always present, but they disappear quickly. I feel the small allies or the nations which are offered help by the Americans virtually cannot rely on the Americans, for which we have various examples.

WOMAN IN THE STREET: (USIA TRANSLATION):
There's a tendency to shift the blame: The Americans blame the Russians, and the Russians blame the Americans. So, it seems to me, that unfortunately, the entire world population is caught in the very middle.

MR. GALL: So, "useful dialogue" or "caught in the middle"?

Let me ask you, Mr. Abshire, in Brussels, are the Americans inconsistent allies?

MR. ABSHIRE: No, I don't believe the Americans are inconsistent allies. I think it's important, however, to strengthen both parts of the two pillars, the American pillar and the European pillar. Another way -- I think we in the United States need to broaden our consensus. We must remember why NATO came about. We had the experience of two world wars. Had there been a NATO those could have been presented. Sixty-five million people would not have died. And it's this, not our investment in the Pacific Basin or the Atlantic Community that is important.

And our aim is to reduce the nuclear risk. That's the overriding interest in the NATO commitment.

Now, as we broaden our consensus and strengthen our pillar, I think it is equally important that Europeans strengthen their pillar. And that will produce better balance. And here I agree very much with Mr. Levi in his comments. I think that it's better for the Europeans to do more on, for example, arms cooperation within their own industrial markets, in a way that is not protectionist, however, and I think that the upgrading of what we call the Independent Program Group of European Countries, the Euro-Group, all of those efforts will give

us better balance, and that cooperation can, in better expenditures of defense, will gain more public support.

By the same token, we do have a perceptual problem and therefore I think we must reach out and European leaders must reach out to youth, to church leaders and others, to broaden the consensus, and broaden the understanding of NATO strategy. Because when you look at alternatives, I think we come out that we've got the best strategy but we should all get behind it and as has been said by General Rogers and others, "Make sure that flexible response is fully flexible, particularly by building up the conventional wing of the triad." This will produce that better balance between Europe and America.

MR. GALL: Thank you. Dr. Joffe, I would like to bring you in there and ask you this: Are the Europeans doing enough for their own defense?

DR. JOFFE: I think the Europeans are doing plenty. We have about a million men on the ground in Central Europe, and that is a very impressive peacetime concentration of forces.

Are they doing enough to dispense with nuclear weapons? No. We could easily get rid of our

reliance on nuclear weapons if we feel that twice as much manpower on the ground as we have now -- but for a number of reasons which are only too well known to all of us, we are not likely to do it.

Let me perhaps address a more philosophical issue here, which is what kind of partner is the United States? Is it a dominant, a bullying partner, or is it an unreliable partner? And, of course, allies always kind of gyrate wildly between those two opposite fears.

As to the dominance of the United States, it has not been -- if you are dominant you get to make people do what they don't want to do, and it seems to me if you look at the "pipeline war" last year, the United States has not been so dominant as to make the Europeans cut the pipeline.

So, the Alliance seems to be a great deal more equal than some of its critics maintain.

As for unreliability, it seems to me another lesson of the past few years ought to be driven home, which is the United States went into Europe with weapons, INF, longrange weapons, which exponentially increased its risk to be hit by Soviet nuclear weapons. The Soviets have said so. They will not pay any attention as to

whether the missiles comes from southwest Germany or from Montana. So, the United States, in the process of protecting its European allies, is assuming greater nuclear risk than before. So that seems to me rather impressive, if you're going to take risks on behalf of the allies. That's a rather impressive way of showing it.

MR. GALL: Thank you, Dr. Joffe.

Let's bring in the other NATO countries again. London, your question?

QUESTION: From London here is Vir Nukrinkenstein (?) of the BBC.

My question is to David Abshire. From your previous position as the Director of the Strategic Research Center and Chairman of the Board of National Broadcasting, you certainly know that NATO is invariably portrayed by the Soviet media as an instrument of war. I have in front of me a recent article by the most prominent Soviet political writer, Ernst Henry (?) entitled, "A Plot Against Europe". He writes, I quote, "Every day it becomes clearer and clearer that a map of a huge new war is being drawn in --" (inaudible) -- and of course America is in NATO and that they're preparing a new war.

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We know that NATO is defensive. It is taken for granted. But how can we persuade them that it is so? What facts can you cite to confirm that NATO is only defensive?

MR. ABSHIRE: Well, of course, first of all, if you look at the basic deployments of NATO, they're of a defensive nature. Our deterrent strategy of a deterrent nature. One reason this is such a remarkable alliance, it's the first great defensive alliance of democracy in history.

But you started out with your reference to my past role in international broadcasting, and I became a believer in the role of international broadcasting and I think part of the answer to your question lies in communication. This is why I have favored all of these countries of ours to do more in international broadcasting and international communications on a people to people basis, so that the Soviet citizens and the citizens of Eastern Europe better understand our purposes and the truth behind some of these wrong assertions.

I think an enormous amount, with a stronger program, could be done on this basis, and I think it's

critical that we do it. I don't think this is a secondary endeavor. I think this is a primary endeavor to attempt to be able to communicate the truth better to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the purposes of NATO, our strategy, and our ultimate goals.

QUESTION: From Copenhagen, this is Jens Halser (?) from the Daily Politiken (?).

My question is, is the U.S. moving towards unilateralism worldwide and is the upcoming meeting of the Western European Union a sign that the larger European countries are afraid of this?

MR. GALL: Shall we have -- Dr. Joffe, would you like to answer that?

DR. JOFFE: I don't feel I should answer for the --

MR. GALL: As a European. As a European in America.

DR. JOFFE: I don't think I should answer for the supposedly heinous plot the Americans are hatching.

MR. ABSHIRE: (Laughs.)

DR. JOFFE: In the world. Are they moving towards greater unilateralism? Well, all great powers are

often tempted to shed the burdens of dependence on allies and they attempted to move on their own. I think in this administration the temptations have been larger in the beginning than they are now, because one does need allies not only for defense; one needs allies also for all these issues that are properly political, whether you want to have embargoes in common or whether you want to have Olympic boycotts in common.

And I think over the last three years this administration has become more properly sensitive to the claims or the necessities of acting in common than it may have been at an earlier stage. And I think that's all for the better for the entire Alliance.

MR. GALL: Mr. Richard Abshire, have we time for a quick one -- sorry, David Abshire in Brussels. Would you like to give us a very quick response?

MR. ABSHIRE: Yes, I would. I do not see from my seat as the Permanent Representative to NATO, any trend towards unilateralism. When I think of all of the consultations and discussions that we have, it's just not there.

I think we've got some weak spots in the Alliance. We have mentioned improving conventional

defense, better management of the total resources of the Alliance, things of that nature.

But I must say that I think in the history of the Alliance that consultations have never been as great and as thorough as they are in this particular point in the Alliance. Were this not true, NATO would not have been able to move forward so successfully on the INF front. Because it's those consultations, in the North Atlantic Council, Special Consultative Group, negotiators coming to the Council to report, that web of consultation that has moved us forward. And if I can add that this gives me my enormous confidence in NATO in the future because the other areas, the troublespots of NATO, if this same kind of intensive consultation is brought to bear and the unity that emerges from it and the better understanding, I think we can tackle the other problems that face us.

MR. GALL: I think your colleague, Mr. Levi, sitting next to you, would like to say something too.

MR. LEVI: Well, I think it's a remarkable fact that this American administration, a very strong administration, self-assertive, an administration which to some extent took an approach to international affairs and relations with the Soviet Union which did not coincide

with the main basic trend in Europe, has however become as strong and supportive an administration of consultations with the allies and on the whole, in all practical fields, after a difficult period, as my friend Jozef Joffe reminded us, for instance, the pipeline, in many fields we have proved that we can carry on and that making foreign policy a sort of cooperative, collective, exercise, is, after all, recognized as an aim. Achieving that aim is not easy. It cannot be done in one day. But it's very important to see that governments of all different political trends, the Socialist government in France and Reagan government in America, they still all come back to the point of recognizing the need for strong cooperation.

That, I believe from that point of view, the last four years have told us a sort of reassuring message that I think can carry us on for a long period of time.

MR. GALL: Thank you. We've time just for one last question. So let's go to Paris.

QUESTION: This is a question for Ambassador Abshire on behalf of Marie-Therese Genscher, French Television, TF1.

"Mr. Ambassador, if the situation in the Persian Gulf worsens, will the U.S. remain passive and accept the progressive paralysis of the Gulf?"

MR. ABSHIRE: Well, I think the President, in his recent statement, has made very clear our concerns about the situation in the Persian Gulf. We, however, first rely on the countries of the area and we respect very much their wishes and their desires and I think that is appropriate. In our consultations, we've been talking about consultations, and our consultations with other countries are very thorough and complete.

So, I think we have a sound policy there. It's in the interest of all of us to see the situation not escalate. And I think that both European countries and the United States have a good policy approach. First of all, we want to see the strength of the friendly countries in the area put forth.

MR. GALL: Mr. Perle, would you like to say something on that?

MR. PERLE: Yes. I think while we and others are properly concerned about the situation in the Gulf, we are hopeful that the other countries of the Gulf will prevail in their diplomatic efforts, and if it should

become necessary, even going beyond that, wholly within the Gulf itself. That's clearly the best way to solve that problem, and we hope that that will be the outcome.

MR. GALL: Thank you very much.

Now we have a question from Ankara.

QUESTION: From Ankara this is Jovas Taylor (?). Daily Wota (?).

My question is for Mr. Perle. What is the American view on Europe's self sufficiency in the defense of Europe at a time of proposals for a European defense community which would exclude North American members of the Alliance, as well as northern and southern flank members, namely the United States, Canada, and Turkey, and forming, geographically speaking, a Western European defense organization?

MR. PERLE: Well, we would be very much opposed to a fragmentation of the Alliance along the lines that that depiction suggests. First of all, the European members of the Alliance, despite their very best efforts, cannot hope to match the Soviet Union and provide an adequate deterrence without the full involvement both of the United States and Canada, on this side of the Atlantic, and all of the members of the Alliance. And

Turkey has an extremely important role to play in that regard.

I think there's a slight misinterpretation here of the discussion of revitalizing the Western European Union, and a greater European defense cooperative effort, if I may say so. It seems to us that that effort, which is being promoted principally by France, is underway because of French concerns about the political situation in the Federal Republic of Germany, and in order to strengthen a part, but it is only a part, of the European pillar of the Alliance.

Were France a member of the integrated defense structure of the Alliance, which it is not, it would have the option of pursuing the same objectives in that forum, and I think precisely because it is not integrated into the defense structure of the Alliance, France has looked for another mechanism by which to shore up the center. So, we don't regard this as an ominous development, and certainly not as a development that would fragment the Alliance and separate those of us in North America and Turkey and other countries on the flanks from the Alliance as a whole.

MR. GALL: Thank you very much, gentlemen on

both panels.

We're going over to Brussels now where the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Leo Tindemans, has just arrived in the studio and is able to join us for the last part of our discussion.

Mr. Tindemans, how does the Alliance look to you in Brussels?

MR. TINDEMANS: I think that the Alliance is in good health, in Brussels at least, and that the cohesion was strengthened in the last month. We took important decision -- decisions in the plural -- on the deployment of the INF, of the intermediate nuclear forces took place in three countries. Other countries like mine are preparing the deployment. So, in general, as I said already, the Alliance is in good health and the cohesion is very good for the moment.

MR. GALL: Thank you, Mr. Tindemans. We will go over now to Rome, who will have a question for you.

QUESTION: Mr. Tindemans, do you believe that the INF deployment is mainly of military or of political importance?

MR. TINDEMANS: I am a Minister of Foreign Affairs and so I know very well the political aspects of

that question. The ministers of defense have to explain to us what the military need of these measures is.

I believe that there is a military need and that there are very important political aspects of that question also. To make our system of defense credible, we need, in that field, a response. Otherwise, the strategy of the flexible response has no sense. And on the other hand, it's extremely important for several political reasons. They are well known, I suppose, but I believe firmly in both aspects.

QUESTION: From Madrid. Ambrizio Perez (?) from the National Radio of Spain.

I would like to ask Mr. Tindemans if he thinks that the reluctance of the Netherlands or Belgium to deploy the Cruise missiles in their territory can be considered as the symbol of the existing European fear of atomic war?

MR. TINDEMANS: We in Belgium, we are not speculating on the developments in the Netherlands. We accepted the double track decision. We had votes in Parliament, even a vote of confidence on that question. And we have to do what we accepted to do, because it was European countries who were asking for that defense system.

So, we are evaluating regularly the international situation and, for the moment, the government of the Netherlands didn't change its attitude.

QUESTION: There have in recent years been many calls for nuclear disarmament from -- both from within NATO and from outside the Alliance. (Audio breakup) -- arms talks with the Soviets and my question is -- this has been touched on before.

This week six national leaders, in four continents, raised the issue of nuclear disarmament. Is a third party such as this group of leaders, perhaps needed in order to break the deadlock?

MR. TINDEMANS: Who is not in favor of disarmament? We are also. And several conferences are going on. I think the last one is the one that started in Geneva on the 17th of January, on disarmament in Europe. We regret very much that the Soviet Union left the conference in Geneva on the INF weapons, for instance. So, it's not because people are proposing for the moment that an agreement is reached.

The Belgian attitude is known, I think. If a negotiated solution is reached, we will adapt or change our policy accordingly. But for the moment there is no

agreement and we stay faithful to the double track decision.

QUESTION: My name is Hans Pieter Snitzer (?) from Munich. My newspaper, Auchsburger (?) Allgemeine.

Mr. Tindemans, isn't it a necessity for the European states to build up their own European defense alliance, especially if people in Western Europe hear of intentions in the Reagan administration to turn towards the Pacific region with her policies?

MR. TINDEMANS: It's an important question. It's a technical one, a military one, and a psychological one. You know the theory of the two pillars in NATO, can we develop more the European pillar, and can we reach an agreement, then, with the American pillar, so that we have a new structure for NATO, without weakening the Alliance?

There is a second aspect. With the deployment of the INF, European opinion, it was proven, it was proved, does not always understand the nature of the measures taken. So, some political leaders in Europe think that if we could convince more European public opinion that the decisions are taken not only by the United States but also by the European member states, and are very often asked for by the European member states, as was the case for the INF, public opinion would accept

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more easily the measures and efforts necessary to have them to deploy them.

So, what can be done? A strengthening of the European pillar, but not all the member states of the Alliance are in favor of that solution. Some think that not all the European countries will do the necessary effort. Others fear that the United States, in these circumstances, could be less attached to the defense in Europe. So, some leaders are looking for other possibilities and that's the reason why the last time there were proposals in order to reform the Western European union, for instance. There is a French memorandum. The Belgian government prepared a document about it. Our document is neither anti-American nor anti-European, because in the opinion of the Belgian government, for instance, the ideal situation would be that we organize a European union, more than a European Community, and that European union would also have competences for the political aspects of security problems, for instance.

But that is not possible for the moment, so let us try to give new life to the Western European Union, for instance, so that the ministerial conferences in that framework have a certain political and military

significance.

We can maybe strengthen the Secretariat. We can organize a better result, I would say, for the specialized agency or implement some measures that could be executed by the agencies, and so on.

The real discussion will begin next week. I mean in the framework of the Western European Union. But it's an attempt to have a discussion among European nations about European security policy and strategy, and that's the real nature of that effort.

QUESTION: Francis Seloine (?), Le Soir, Brussels.

Monsieur Tindemans, President Reagan, in his last press conference, hinted that the hesitating and the attitude of Holland towards the acceptance of her share of Cruise missiles could have an impact on the attitude of the smaller NATO members. There is only one other smaller member of the Alliance that is supposed to get Cruise missiles, and that is Belgium. Do you think that Mr. Reagan actually meant that Belgium could be influenced by the attitude of Holland?

MR. TINDEMANS: First of all, as I told you already, the official attitude of the Dutch government

didn't change until now.

Second, I don't know -- excuse me for saying it -- if it was a slip of the tongue or if the President of the United States had Belgium in mind, because he spoke in the plural. He said "several smaller countries" or "smaller countries", in the plural. So afterwards it was confirmed that he didn't have in mind Belgium. We must analyze what he said exactly.

On the other hand, I think, as I told you already, we are not speculating on a change in the attitude of the Netherlands, or on a development in the attitude of the Netherlands. Of course, politically speaking, some people would exploit a change in the attitude of the Netherlands. But we forget all the time it's the same reasoning, it is not the United States, it's not that country that's imposing the deployment of missiles on Europe. It was asked by the European countries in order to save the credibility of the defense system and the strategy in Europe, so it was European countries asking for a deployment, when there were no results at the negotiations.

So, it's a wrong presentation of facts if we do ask if the President of the United States is

deciding or speculating on what can happen in Western Europe.

QUESTION: This is Monroe Minezey (?) from Portuguese Television in Lisbon. The Portuguese government has emphasized that recovery of the Portuguese economy depends to a big extent from the entry into the EEC, which has been delayed for some years now. Do you think, Mr. Tindemans, that a rapid accession (?) will improve Portugal's capabilities, from the economic point of view, to fulfill its role in the Alliance?

MR. TINDEMANS: The economic situation, certainly is an influence on the Alliance also. We have budgetary problems in Belgium, for instance, with a certain influence on the development of some arms in the Belgian Army, integrated in the military system of NATO.

But I can only speak now for Belgium. We are in favor of the Portuguese membership of the EEC. When we were six we were always accused of being a rich man's club, and we protested at that moment, saying, "It's not true. European countries with a democratic regime who accept the treaties can become members, or a member, of the Community." Portugal is now a democratic country. It wants to enter the Community. We cannot refuse it.

Another thing is the negotiations, the transitional period, and so on.

So, the membership of the EEC is one problem and I think it will be solved very soon. Another thing is the membership of NATO by Portugal. My judgment for the moment is that there is no problem there. But in general the economic crisis has an influence as well on the EEC, as on NATO.

QUESTION: From Ankara, this is Josef Karlo (?), Turkish Daily News.

My question is, Mr. Minister, is there some problem within NATO in the recent years? On the one hand there are difficulties in implementation of NATO decisions, on the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. On the other hand, the problems in your southern flank cannot be solved and a new discussion has started in the European Community.

Despite all this, can we still say that there is cohesion within NATO?

MR. TINDEMANS: Well, as I said at the beginning, my feeling is that NATO, notwithstanding certain difficulties, but we will always have difficulties, I even said last week concerning the EEC that you will

always have difficulties, that's very clear, where human beings are working together. You will always have some difficulties.

But in general NATO is in good health. And we are even examining the possibility of organizing, eventually, a constructive dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries. That exercise is going on, for the moment, in NATO and we hope that it will have very good results.

On the other hand, there was the deployment in Germany, in Great Britain and Italy, of the INF. So I think as to the firmness of the Alliance, the cohesion has been proved, the purpose of strength, and on the other hand, on the strength of purpose, and on the other hand, we are prepared to look for new possibilities to open a dialogue, if it is serious.

Of course, there are difficulties within the framework of the Alliance. You were referring to these difficulties. But I am still convinced that it must be possible between adult nations to find solutions for that kind of problems.

QUESTION: (Audio breakup) -- such secretaries of state official affirm that they think of the possibility to place the 48 Cruise missiles in another

NATO country, let them come over to the Netherlands in a period of crisis. Would Belgium accept the Dutch Cruise missiles if it was asked so by the Dutch government?

MR. TINDEMANS: Listen, we accepted the double track decision. The burden of Belgium was to deploy 48 missiles. We accepted it. And that's the only responsibility we have for the moment.

I saw the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs on television yesterday night and he said that at the coming meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries, in Washington, he will not table new proposals. So, I suppose that the Dutch government is still looking for a solution for its own problem and its own engagement.

QUESTION: From Oslo this is Olenir Mulnar (?), the Norwegian News Agency.

Mr. Tindemans, at the Council meeting in Brussels last December, you suggested the member countries should review NATO's policy towards the East Bloc and define a more active and consistent policy on detente. Did your initiative spring from a feeling of disappointment or unease over the present political profile of NATO? And secondly, what do you expect to come out of this policy

rethinking?

MR. TINDEMANS: No, it was not -- the origin was not a disappointment. Far, far from that. But last year, in two communiques, NATO referred to the so-called "Harmel Doctrine". Pierre Harmel was a former Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he was asked in the sixties to draft the report on the future tasks of NATO. NATO had been created for a period of 20 years. That was in '49. So the question was will NATO continue after '69 and what will be the future tasks of NATO?

So, Pierre Harmel drafted the report. It was approved; it was published. And in the report he developed two ideas which we call now the Harmel Doctrine. The first was we must show firmness in the defense of the Western world. But the second was we must also, all the time, be open for a constructive dialogue.

My reasoning now was at the meeting of the NATO countries in December, '83, we started with the deployment of the missiles, of the INF weapons. Well, we must prove that we take seriously the second branch of the Harmel Doctrine. That means the openness to dialogue. And I suggested to start an exercise within NATO in order to see what were the reasons of the failure of detente in

the past and what could we eventually propose in the future in order, as I said it already, to have a constructive dialogue and in order to reach positive results? That was the origin, not a disappointment.

QUESTION: Mr. Foreign Minister, it's Doug Small from Global Television in Ottawa calling.

The peace movement appears to be growing. Public manifestations of that movement, largescale demonstrations, are now commonplace. I am wondering if you, in your opinion, feel that large peace demonstrations actually hurt the cause of NATO?

MR. TINDEMANS: It's very difficult to analyze the very nature of these peace movements. When I looked at the demonstration, the big one, that took place in Brussels, for instance, the motives for demonstrating were very different. Some people were demonstrating against NATO, others against the United States, others against the Soviet Union, others for peace in general, others for disarmament and so on. All kinds of people were marching in that demonstration.

So, it's difficult, extremely difficult, at least for my country, to know exactly the meaning or the objective of the activities of that peace movement here.

In some countries it has more of a political character. I think in the Federal Republic, for instance, or in the Netherlands, very often it has a kind of religious character. Well, once again, it's difficult to say what exactly what the purpose or the target of these movements is at this moment.

Of course, from a political point of view, they are creating if not difficulties, at least sorrows for the governments that have accepted, that have approved, the double track decision. They have to justify all the time their position. And it's not so easy to explain in a language that people can understand what is the origin of the double track decision, what defense, and what strategy means in these times, given the existence of nuclear weapons. It's extremely complicated and difficult. But we must do it.

It's not because it's difficult that political leaders are not obliged to explain to the people what their objectives are and what they are, themselves, defending and believing in.

MR. GALL: Now we've time just for one last question, a brief question and a brief answer, from Copenhagen.

QUESTION: This is Copenhagen with a question from Connie Peterson, Danish Wire Service. I should like to follow up on the East-West studies. When can we expect a report from the Working Group within NATO and what prospect do you see for a dialogue with the Soviet Union, judging from the Soviet response to the broadened declaration from December '83?

MR. TINDEMANS: I hope that at the coming meeting, now, in the month of May, next week in Washington, we will already have a first result of the work that is done for the moment by the Atlantic Council and some of their assistants, if I may express myself in this way. It's not yet sure but I hope that the first draft, or a first kind of document will be published at this occasion.

It's at least a token of goodwill from the Atlantic Alliance, and we still hope that the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact countries will understand the message and that they also will react in a positive way so that we will find the forum where we can start negotiations again, in a better climate.

MR. GALL: Thank you very much, Mr. Tindemans in Brussels, and thank you too, the members of

our panels, our two panels, first in Brussels, and also here in Washington.

Well, we've heard something of the preoccupations and concerns of many of the 16 member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have heard from the United States, from the Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, a strong plea for the continuation of the Alliance, even in stronger form than before. We've heard from the Europeans their concerns, and some fears. But on the whole we've seen that, generally speaking, there's widespread, deep, and genuine support for the NATO idea, and the realization that after 35 years, but for NATO, Western Europe as we know it, and indeed, the free world, would not exist.

So, from us all in Washington, from me, Sandy Gall, all of us here, good-bye.

END