

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:

Green, Max: Files, 1985-1988

Folder Title:

Foreign Policy (1 of 4)

Box: Box 10

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Harvard-trained politician such as Barney Frank is a liberal gadfly in the best tradition. On the other side, Martin Feldstein, Reagan's former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Charles Fried, the current solicitor general, have imparted to public affairs a reflective academic conservatism.

The theoretical scholarship that emerges from Cambridge often buttresses doctrines that demonstrate the difficulties of reform and renovation, whether because of our genes or the refractoriness of society. Spokesmen from Harvard (they deny speaking for Harvard, but the distinction is less noted elsewhere) are reluctant to associate the university as such with an activist cause unless it is seen as directly affecting the climate for teaching and learning. Derek Bok is an advocate of U.S. political sanctions against South Africa, but an opponent of university disinvestment. Congress will probably move faster on the issue than Harvard. The University will not shake the Republic.

At 350 the prevailing attitude among students and faculty seems to be one of cautious incrementalism and earnest moralism: a whiggish equipoise. This is certainly Derek Bok's posture, and it probably reflects the preferences of a faculty still remembering the bitter polarization of the 1960s—a difficult period, to be sure, but nonetheless one of the few in which ideas have been taken so seriously, sought so desperately, albeit sometimes derided so intolerantly.

Whiggish equipoise often means contradictory responses. The chairman of the Board of Overseers (Harvard's general board of elected directors) formally sought

to discourage alumni voters from electing a three-member anti-apartheid slate in the recent annual elections lest they polarize that governing body along "single-issue" lines. (Happily, many outraged alumni wrote to protest, many more alumni than usual voted, and one of the dissident candidates was elected.) On the other hand, the university showed savvy enough not to tear down its anti-apartheid shantytown. Statements by the president and dean and an accumulating body of case law show that discipline will be invoked to defend speech and assembly, but that protest can be tolerated if it does not interrupt teaching and discussion.

The new ideas will now often come from New York or California or Paris, but the college in Cambridge will accredit them, still have the chance to temper them with approved old ones, expose some of the most motivated and smartest young people in the country to the leaven. It will doubtless court complacency; too often its established faculty will underrate the intellectual activity carried on in the many excellent American university departments outside Cambridge, and will dismiss much of this ferment as mere trendiness. But despite some lapses, Harvard's students, professors, and alumni will still occasionally worry about what is beautiful and true and good, and not merely what is profitable, fashionable, or likely to find favor in Washington. In an America blitzed by the media, perhaps more willing now to tread hard on civil liberties, pessimistic about social reform, sometimes truculent about power, these virtues are important.

Public policy

The rights and wrongs of guerrilla war.

MORALITY AND THE REAGAN DOCTRINE

BY CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER

AS HEIR TO the European colonial powers, the United States is a status quo power. The United States, particularly under FDR, did favor decolonization (much to the displeasure of Britain and France) but took upon itself the task of preserving the Western orientation of the new states (e.g., in the Persian Gulf, Vietnam) and of weak, dependent old states (Greece, Turkey) against the threats and ambitions of the new have-not power, the Soviet Union.

Next March marks the 40th anniversary of the formal declaration of this American role: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The Truman Doctrine set the United States on the side of legitimate governments against insurgencies.

Starting with Greece, and extending later to the postcolonial successor governments of the Third World, the United States has resisted guerrilla insurgencies, occasionally with men, often with matériel, always with rhetoric. "The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred," said Truman in his Joint Address to Congress, "But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration."

Forty years later, the Soviet Union is a full-fledged superpower with an impressive array of colonies. Although not yet a status quo power, it has much to defend. Today in several crucial regions, the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves in historically reversed roles. Soviets and their clients act as the status quo power, learn-

ing everything from counterinsurgency to the proper uses of international law and the World Court. And the United States finds itself supporting guerrilla insurgencies in four corners of the earth, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. The American policy that declares the legitimacy of American support for these wars is known as the Reagan Doctrine.

The Reagan Doctrine is not a one-man or one-party show. Support for each of these guerrilla armies has been approved by Congress. True, there is no great popular support for these enterprises. But then there never is for intervention (except following a direct attack on the United States), and only rarely for any foreign policy initiative in the absence of a crisis. Public opinion polls taken after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine showed a majority favoring economic aid, but 60 percent opposed military aid, either in the form of supplies or of military advisers. By a 2-to-1 margin, Americans thought that military aid to Greece would increase the likelihood of war with Russia, and that the problem should be turned over to the U.N., yesterday's Contadora. Indeed, were there a referendum today on, say, keeping American troops in Korea, or on spending \$150 billion a year to defend our European allies and Japan, popular support would hardly be greater than it is for the Reagan Doctrine.

In any case, the Reagan Doctrine of active, military support for guerrilla war is current American policy, initiated by the president and supported by Congress. It has an obvious strategic logic as a post-Vietnam (i.e., only indirectly interventionist) strategy for challenging the most recent and most vulnerable acquisitions of the Soviet empire. (See "The Poverty of Realism," *TNR*, February 17, 1986. For recent dissents from this view, see "The Reagan Doctrine: The Guns of July" by Stephen Rosenfeld, *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1986, and "When to Intervene" by Stephen Solarz, *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1986.) But for a democracy, and particularly one founded on a political idea, strategy cannot be enough. Any foreign policy must meet a second test. That test is ideological—moral, if you will. The Reagan Doctrine may be strategically compelling. But is it wrong?

THE OBJECTIONS fall into three categories. The first objection is to intervention generally, on the grounds that whatever fine values (e.g., freedom) we think motivate our interventions, what we are really engaged in is the pursuit of American power and interests.

The second objection concerns only a specific form of intervention: intervention on the side of insurgency. Trying to overthrow governments is both illegal and immoral. Indeed, our engagement in this enterprise represents the Sovietization of American strategy. The inviolability of sovereignty is one of the oldest international principles. Its violation is Soviet practice, declared by Khrushchev at the World Communist Party Congress of 1960 as the doctrine of "national liberation" and practiced by every Soviet leader before and since. Now, after 40 years of cold war, we have finally succumbed to the tactics of our enemies. And,

by sinking to their moral level, we have forfeited a large part of the war.

The third objection has to do not with ends but with means, guerrilla means. Guerrilla war is morally problematic because it is, by nature, a form of warfare that deliberately blurs the line between civilian and military. It thus challenges the conventional and consensual standards of ethical combat. If we support guerrilla war, does that not mean that we, like the Soviets, put in with terrorism, torture, and assassination?

I. THE CRITIQUE OF INTERVENTIONISM

ANTI-INTERVENTIONISM, the polite word for isolationism, is a popular and highly pedigreed American foreign policy. For some, such as George Kennan, anti-interventionism has nothing to do with moral questions. Indeed, they profess to be anti-moralists. They merely believe it is hopelessly imprudent, an example of the triumph of American innocence over American intelligence, for the United States to involve itself in conflicts that have no direct effect on its survival.

But Kennan's bloodless amoralism is unattractive to most Americans. The more powerful strain of American anti-interventionism is moral. And it comes in two versions. One is to say that the United States goes abroad in search not of freedom but of markets. The more modern, less crudely Marxist (or more precisely: Leninist) version goes now by the name of "moral equivalence": whatever we may tell ourselves, the United States intervenes abroad for the same reason any great power does—power.

One must not, and cannot, deny that considerations of power or economic advantage motivate American intervention. Considerations of interest motivate all intervention, current and historical, American and otherwise. And they should. Diplomacy is not philanthropy. Foreign policy is necessarily mostly about interests. But that does not mean that we cannot then distinguish between policies that are moral and those that are not. The fact that one may have strategic interests does not mean that one's intervention does not also have a genuinely moral purpose and does not produce a morally defensible result. True, the American imperium is about power, but power in the service of certain values. These values we hold, domestically, to be not only good but self-evidently good. And as we have gone abroad, we have spread them. In Europe, the line where American armies stopped at the end of World War II marks the limits of free, self-governing societies. Every inch of soil that lies behind American lines is now a liberal democracy. And elsewhere, where liberal democracy has not been achieved, American-made or American-supported frontiers—the DMZ in Korea, the Strait of Formosa, the Thai-Cambodian border—divide better from worse.

To be sure, liberty has not always been the American purpose. Guatemala 1954 exemplifies American banana diplomacy, undertaken under the assumptions that democracy is not a real option in the Third World, and that interest is the only relevant consideration. But history

is not destiny, and today's America is not Teddy Roosevelt's or Eisenhower's or even that imagined by Ronald Reagan, the candidate. Because of many factors—our experience in Vietnam, the decline of race stereotypes in American consciousness and culture, the recent startling success of democracy in Latin America and elsewhere, and, most importantly, the disastrous consequences of our long-term postwar support for dictators like Batista and Somoza—democracy in the Third World has become, for the right as well as the left, a principal goal of American foreign policy. The last of the unconverted, Jesse Helms, has done his best to make the point. His bitter quarrel with the Reagan administration is precisely over the State Department's advancement of democracy, rather than blind anti-communism, as a guiding foreign policy principle.

Today's anti-imperialist case is an echo of the belief, fashionable at the height of the Vietnam War, that American power was, perhaps despite itself, a force for evil in the world. That echo is heard today only on the extreme left of the Democratic Party, and even there in muted form. Jesse Jackson carries the idea that American foreign policy is necessarily intervening on the wrong side of history. Five years ago that sentiment could emanate from mainstream Democrats, such as Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut who, at the time, characterized our choice in El Salvador as either "to move with the tide of history" or "stand against it." Fewer and fewer Democrats say that today.

It is an argument that has suffered much from history, the history that followed American failures in Vietnam and elsewhere, where the successor regimes have proven far more tyrannous, ruthless, and, in some cases, barbaric than the regimes we were supporting. Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, and now Nicaragua. The sweeping anti-interventionist argument, based on moral—i.e., anti-imperial—grounds, is a slogan in search of an applicable history.

II. THE CRITIQUE OF INSURGENCY

ONE NEED NOT be a pan-isolationist (though it helps) to oppose the Reagan Doctrine and its enthusiasm for insurgency. Indeed, the mainstream position of the Democratic Party approves American intervention in support of counterinsurgency in, for example, El Salvador and the Philippines, and opposes American intervention in support of insurgency in Nicaragua and Angola. It is opposed, then, not to intervention in general, but to a particular kind, the kind that tries to topple legitimate governments. It can live quite comfortably with the Truman Doctrine. But it questions the morality of going around trying to change governments we do not like. On three related grounds: world order, international law, and popular will.

Order. When we speak of order in the international arena, we mean two things. One is peace, the other is rules. The first is concrete: you start a war, you destroy the peace of a region, of a country, of families. The other is abstract. You start a war and, it is said, you injure the structure of

international relations, including international law. World order enthusiasts speak of a "web of international relations," the implication of the metaphor being that if it is weakened here, it threatens to unravel there.

Consider first, order as peace. There must always be a moral presumption for peace. War means death. You must therefore have a good reason to start one, particularly one in which you seek to overthrow the government of another country. One such good reason is rescue, freeing a subjugated people from particularly oppressive rule. George McGovern proposed American intervention against the Cambodian regime of Pol Pot. Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979 and ousted Idi Amin. And in 1983, the United States invaded Grenada and rid the island of its Marxist-Leninist rulers, much to the relief of its people.

Reagan Doctrine opponents would say that the degree of malignity of Pol Pot or Amin or Coard might justify unilateral intervention, but that in Reagan Doctrine countries today that is not the case. Rescue can justify invasion. Unfreedom cannot.

BUT TO GRANT that is merely to say that the United States may not unilaterally invade other countries in the name of liberation, that it may not arrogate to itself the decision of whether freedom is a higher value than peace in these countries. But the Reagan Doctrine is not about invasion. It is about helping one side in a civil war. In Reagan Doctrine conflicts, the question of breaching the peace has been pre-empted. There already is civil war. A large number of people in a country have concluded—at the risk of their own lives and the suffering of their countrymen—that freedom is more precious to them than peace. The question then is not whether to give peace a chance but whether to give one side (generally, the weaker side) a chance.

Now, we may not agree exactly where the threshold that justifies an indigenous insurrection lies, but we can agree that it is lower than that for a foreign (even if benevolent) invasion. The former need not prove, say, genocide. Oppression will do. For Jonas Savimbi or Adolfo Calero to justify leading a rebellion requires less of a provocation than for Ronald Reagan to launch a liberating invasion.

Yet a Calero still needs reasons. Order (as peace) has its claims. It requires those who propose to breach the peace to produce reasons: a history of oppression, the call of freedom, and the like. Jefferson compiled an impressive list of grievances the redress of which are morally superior to order. (And leaving aside the question of whether Calero is Jefferson, one is hard-pressed to argue that the oppression suffered by the American colonists was worse than that experienced now by Nicaraguans, Angolans, Afghans, or Cambodians.)

We believe in freedom. That may not be enough reason to disturb the peace in places where there is no freedom. But if indigenous rebels, claiming their right to freedom, meet the (lesser) requirements to justify revolution and call for American support, it is hard to see

what morally proscribes us from responding.

But by responding are we not jeopardizing order in another sense, order as rules? By showing disrespect for the rules against non-intervention and particularly against overthrowing a legitimate government, do we not weaken the fabric of international society?

The case for world order is this: the international arena is not quite a state of nature. There is a fragile structure. That structure depends on all states adhering to certain rules. The most basic of these is respect for sovereignty. The West (and the United States, in particular) is the great inventor and upholder of this order. If it goes around breaking it to suit other ends, what will be left of it?

This is a familiar argument generally made by pragmatists. But is it a moral argument? Is order—the predictable, non-threatening conduct of international affairs according to rules—a moral value? Even the great anti-moralist, Hans Morgenthau, felt compelled to answer yes. True, he says, in the international arena there is no morality; it is only within states that a moral order can exist. "There is a profound and neglected truth hidden in Hobbes's extreme dictum that the state creates morality as well as law and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state." Vis-à-vis each other, states are not moral agents; vis-à-vis their own citizens, they are. However, since world order is the necessary condition for the stability of individual states, world order becomes the indispensable condition for the existence of any moral order.

Thus order achieves moral dignity (Morgenthau's phrase), instrumentally. Though not itself a moral value, it permits the survival of moral values. But it is one thing to say that order is thus, in a backhanded way, a moral good. It is quite another to elevate it to the status of supreme good, which is what those who oppose the Reagan Doctrine on the grounds that it is wrong to overthrow legitimate governments must argue.

THERE ARE other goods more important than order. There are wrongs worth righting even at the cost of injuring order. To demonstrate this, one does not have to resort to the obvious and all-purpose example of a war against Hitler. Consider the supreme principle of the Organization of African Unity: in order to minimize conflict, colonial boundaries, however wrongly drawn, are to be the basis of the new sovereignties of Africa. This is the perfect example of an otherwise arbitrary rule that, because of its contribution to order, acquires moral status. Yet: Biafra rejected that principle when it declared its independence. In pressing its anti-secessionist war, Nigeria was upholding that principle. Whether that declaration was a good idea is not the point. The point is that the "order" principle does not tell you on which side of this war morality lay.

There is one exception: nuclear order. If disorder takes the form of a third world war, then the defenders of the status quo have a winning case. Liberating, say, Czechoslovakia does not warrant the risks it entails. But the brush-fire conflicts of the Reagan Doctrine are not wars over

which the superpowers are themselves going to go to war. Thus when critics of the Reagan Doctrine argue in the name of order, they mean not nuclear peace but the status quo. It is a profoundly reactionary position. There are things worse than disorder. A major premise of the Reagan Doctrine is that living under a Leninist dictatorship is one of them.

BUT THERE IS something even more wrong with the order-as-rules argument: the assumption that, on the question of subverting and overthrowing existing regimes, there is a world order to be violated in the first place. In fact, there is not. At best there is only half an order. The Soviet system proclaimed rejection of the idea with its policy of support for "wars of national liberation."

Those taken with the "web" metaphor sometimes argue that if we start supporting guerrillas where we want, they will support guerrillas where they want. The fact is, they already support guerrillas where they want, and have been doing so wherever it suits their interests going back to Greece. The Soviet bloc does not have to learn its internationalism from the West. Quite the contrary.

In some spheres of international life there is an order. All states adhere to the postal code because they recognize that adhering to this set of rules brings long-term advantages that outweigh the short-term gain that would come from breaking them. But that is simply not the case with the entirely different sphere of international order having to do with military action and violations of sovereignty. In this case, the existence of some order is a convenient Western fiction. It admits to Soviet "violations," as if these were not systematic and intentional. The word "violations" implies that a pre-existing norm is abused. In fact, systematic violations of a norm by one of the two major parties pledged to it renders it nonexistent. It does not enjoy a platonic life outside of history.

International Law. But should we not respect the rules because they are law? The unsentimental case against assisting insurgency is the need for order. The sentimental case is the imperative of international law: that we are contractually bound, treaty bound, morally bound to obey it, just as individuals are enjoined to obey domestic law; that, whatever the theory underlying international law, it has a moral claim on us; and that therefore "illegal" violations of sovereignty are immoral. In the case of Nicaragua, the World Court has just ruled that American actions in Nicaragua violate international law on not one but ten counts.

The Nicaragua case is a particularly elegant example of the absurdity of such rulings. Elegant, because Nicaragua at first openly, and then, for prudential reasons, covertly, has been the principal supplier and sanctuary for the Salvadoran insurgency. A regime that at one point publicly declared its support for "liberation movements" to be not simply policy but an internationalist obligation then proceeds to the World Court (and now—the ultimate homage of vice to virtue—to American courts) to declare illegal precisely such actions by the United States.

Why should the democratic world then adhere to such a law? Either because (a) the underlying basis of the law—the need for rules of order in international life—is morally compelling (which I have considered above); or (b) the promise to do so is morally compelling. Consider b. We solemnly promised. But surely, if the moral obligation is sanctity of contract, and the other major party to the contract is given to repeated, systematic, and open “violations,” then the obligation, like the contract, is rendered void. The point is not that Nicaragua violated the law and therefore it is not binding. The point is that Nicaragua (and Cuba and the Soviet Union) don’t consider the law binding—on them—in principle. That is why it is no longer binding on other parties.

DOES THAT mean that all contracts are void, that all of international law is useless? Do we, for example, throw out the Geneva conventions? No. The fallacy again is to see “international law” as a seamless whole. There are distinctions to be made.

International law encompasses a variety of norms with very different moral valences. Conventions (like the 200-mile fishing limit) require reciprocity to be useful. Moral imperatives (like proscriptions against the maltreatment of prisoners of war) do not. If one side begins torturing its prisoners of war, it does not follow that the other side may do the same. Similarly, if one side in a war uses terror (e.g., deliberate attacks on innocent civilians), that does not excuse the use of that tactic by the other side. Moral imperatives command no matter what happens on the other side. Conventions have no meaning unless adhered to by both sides.

The rule prohibiting intervention against existing governments, like the OAU rule against secession, is an order-contributing convention. Respect for sovereignty in itself is not a moral imperative. It cannot be. The sanctity of sovereignty enshrines a radical moral asymmetry. It grants legitimacy and thus protection to whoever has guns and powder enough to be in control of a government. Those challenging that government, the Salvadoran no less than the Nicaraguan guerrillas, have no standing before the World Court. They cannot get a ruling, for whatever it’s worth, against their government. Unlike domestic courts, it is an arena for the haves only.

Popular Will. But is there not a third reason why intervening to overthrow other governments is wrong? Not because it threatens order, nor because we promised not to do so, but because it is wrong for one people to impose its will upon another? Yes, but that assumes that overthrowing a government is necessarily to oppose the will of the people, which, in turn, assumes that governments reflect the will of the people. This is true of democracies. It is not true of dictatorships. It cannot be true that if, say, Aquino had requested outside intervention last February, giving it would have been wrong because it was one people imposing its will on another. Dictators are in the business of imposing their will on unwilling people. Deposing them may be wrong for other reasons (order, promises), but not

on the grounds of violating a people’s autonomy.

For some critics, popular will is a crucial determinant of the morality of intervention. Michael Walzer opposes American support to the Nicaraguan *contras* on moral grounds but says, “I would feel differently about a genuinely popular struggle.”

I would accept Walzer’s popular will condition. So does Arturo Cruz. In Cruz’s first, somewhat anguished, declarations of support for the *contras*, he said that he was prepared to join and to lead because (among other reasons) the *contras* had become an authentic national resistance. The difference, then, between Walzer and Cruz becomes an empirical one: Is the current resistance truly popular?

One does not have to believe that Cruz or Robelo or Calero are national heroes to believe that the resistance itself, decentralized and fought on many fronts, represents an authentic “revolt of Nicaraguans against oppression by other Nicaraguans” (Cruz’s phrase). Are they a majority? No one knows. Despotisms don’t permit such facts to be ascertained. How does one prove, or know, whether the NLF commanded a majority of South Vietnamese opinion? What counts is whether large sectors of the nation are engaged in resistance. In Nicaragua, I would argue, they are. Some of it is armed, some is unarmed, though it gives obvious, if veiled, support to the armed resistance. (For example, the writings in the *Washington Post* of *La Prensa* editor Roberto Cardenal Chamorro and Cardinal Obando y Bravo are both clearly in support of the resistance.) True, there is, as yet, no action in the cities. That is difficult against an efficient secret police, such as that at the disposal of Tomás Borge. But is the Nicaraguan resistance any less popular than that in El Salvador? Or than the Sandinista resistance in its fifth year (1966)? Or than the Sandinista dictatorship today?

THE CASE AGAINST assisting rebels is weak enough. Ironically, it is fairly well undermined by a remarkable detail in the World Court’s recent long and otherwise unremarkable decision on Nicaragua. It seems, according to a majority of the Court, that intervention is against international law, unless it involves “the process of decolonization,” an exception with which “the Court is not here concerned.” This detail is remarkable not because it shows the anti-Western bias of the majority of the Court—“colonialism,” in UNese, is an exclusively Western practice—but because of what it says about the principles that underlie the non-intervention rule.

Popular will? Presumably, intervening against colonialism cannot violate a people’s autonomy because no people can conceivably prefer colonial status to freedom. The Reagan Doctrine assumes (with good historical reason) that no people willingly bear a communist dictatorship.

Order? The Court’s exception also establishes that there are values higher than order, and decolonization is one of them. The Reagan Doctrine does not really challenge that premise. It merely says that any definition of colonialism that excludes Soviet colonialism and any definition of wars

of national liberation that excludes anti-communist insurgencies makes for moral nonsense. (To hold that Western colonialism is the only evil that justifies intervention leads to other interesting moral nonsense. Foreign support for the insurgencies in British East Africa—i.e., before independence—would be justified. The Tanzanian invasion of Uganda that toppled Idi Amin 17 years after decolonization would not.)

TO SAY THAT the rules against intervention or against supporting insurgencies are unconvincing is not to say that all guerrilla wars are morally worthy of support. How to decide? I suggest three tests.

One, already discussed, is evidence of popular support.

A second is ends. Ultimately we decide which insurgencies are worthy of support and which are not in the same way we decide about other causes: we ask what they are trying to achieve. I accept the World Court's view that there are higher principles than non-intervention and higher values than order. The real moral question is: What are those higher values? I would accept decolonization as one, but would generalize it to read freedom, meaning a regime of democratic rule and individual rights, or, where that is not possible (Afghanistan, for example), of national independence and the relative freedom of living under a traditional government rather than under communism.

Because ends are so important, I make an exception for the administration's (and Congress's) position on the Cambodian insurgency. The forces of Son Sann and Sihanouk are worthy of support. However, the Khmer Rouge, whose aims for Cambodia are not a mystery, so dominate the insurgency that it is they who are likely to rule in a post-revolutionary Cambodia. Although it might serve Western interests, that is not an outcome that the West can in good conscience promote.

The same three tests would apply in, say, South Africa. I see no moral objection to supporting those trying to overthrow the apartheid regime, even if by force of arms. The usual question—are they for or against violence?—is not the relevant moral one. Oppression justifies violent resistance in South Africa just as it does in Nicaragua or Afghanistan. The question of whether one should support one opposition group or another should hinge on other considerations: popular support, ends (what kind of South Africa is this group likely to produce should it prevail), and means.

III. THE CRITIQUE OF GUERRILLA WAR

WHICH BRINGS US TO the last, and, in my view, most serious moral objection to the Reagan Doctrine, or, for that matter, any policy or theory that proposes support for insurgent guerrillas. The problem is not the ethics of intervention or even of insurgency. It is with the way irregular war is fought.

Guerrilla war is the most morally troubling type of war because its technique is to subvert one of the most funda-

mental rules of war, the distinction between soldier and civilian. That does not mean that there are no rules in guerrilla war. The conventional code of distinguishing between uniformed soldier and ordinary civilian gives way in guerrilla war to a "political code" in which the crucial distinction is between those who are and are not agents of a (perceived) oppressive political structure (even—perhaps especially—if they are not soldiers, since soldiers are often conscripts just carrying out orders).

The current American anti-war movement reached a peak of indignation two years ago with the publication of a CIA manual that talked about "neutralizing," i.e., assassinating, Sandinista officials. One does not recall the Vietnam anti-war movement being similarly disturbed over the massive NLF assassination campaign of the early '60s, which killed 7,500 South Vietnamese government officials. But hypocrisy is not the issue. The issue is whether assassination of officials is a war crime. In a closely argued analysis of the NLF assassination campaign, in *Just and Unjust Wars*, Walzer shows—convincingly, I believe—why not. Since guerrilla war is by nature a political ("hearts and minds") struggle, and village officials are agents of the enemy political structure, they have a role somewhat analogous to that of military officials in a conventional war. With political power comes responsibility, and danger. "I do not mean to defend assassination . . . and yet 'just assassinations' are at least possible, and men and women who aim at that kind of killing and renounce every other kind need to be marked off from those who kill at random—not as doers of justice, necessarily, for one can disagree about that, but as revolutionaries with honor."

THERE ARE limits, however. Walzer rightly finds "disturbing" the NLF's expansion of the category of official (and, thus, of assassination target) to include even low-level, non-political functionaries and private notables who were pro-government. The line of where real political power ends is, he argues, an indistinct one, but in principle it exists. "Assuming that the regime is in fact oppressive, one should look for agents of oppression and not simply for government agents."

A good line. It implies immediately that one should not look for ordinary civilians, who are agents of humanity only. The practice of deliberately targeting random innocents has another name: terrorism. The exigencies of guerrilla war are no excuse for terrorism. Assassination of (perceived) agents of oppression, problematic as it is, is one thing; the murder of innocents is another. Even guerrilla war has rules.

One, therefore, is the impermissibility of terrorism. Simple enough. But guerrilla war has a subtler dynamic. Guerrillas classically try to make *the government* resort to terror. They try to provoke increased repression—"heightening the contradictions"—in order to build the insurgency and undermine popular support for the government. As the contradictions heighten and the war gets dirtier, then, who is to blame?

Walzer argues that at a certain point when an insurgency has grown sufficiently large and has acquired sufficient popular support, it becomes truly a "people's war." The distinction between soldier and civilian has then indeed been erased, and the government finds itself at war with a people. "It is no longer an anti-guerrilla but an anti-social war. . . ." Counterinsurgency becomes a form of genocide. At that point, no matter what the aims of either side, the means that the government must use to fight become so evil as to make any end morally insupportable.

Did the Vietnam War ever reach this critical point of popular support, where it was the United States and its client army against the people? It is difficult to argue that now, particularly given what we have learned from the testimony of former NLF officials. In fact, the NLF was largely sacrificed in the Tet offensive of 1968. Thereafter the armed forces of Hanoi bore the brunt of the war and were the agents of victory. But if Saigon's war was not then truly a "war against the people," that gravely weakens the argument that the means the Saigon side had to use were necessarily morally impermissible.

Hence an updated, slightly modified version of this argument (see "Why the War Was Immoral" by Hendrik Hertzberg, *TNR*, April 29, 1985). It says not that the communist side of the war was "the people" but that it was implacable and relentless. It was the utter tenacity of the guerrillas—North Vietnamese that made the war, for our side, morally unfightable. The communists would not relent whatever the suffering, most of which was incurred on their side. Because of that, we really did have to destroy too much of Vietnam in order to save it. Thus, however just the aim—and in retrospect it is more just now than it had appeared at the time—the means of conducting that war were too awful to sustain *any* purpose.

At least that was said when the United States was in the counterinsurgency business. Now the United States finds itself in several places around the world in the insurgency business. If guerrillas now are deemed the ones morally obliged to cease and desist, a simple rule emerges regarding guerrilla war and just means: if you are fighting communists, dedicated relentless communists, you are morally obliged to quit; it does not matter whether they are the government or the guerrillas; they will escalate whatever the civilian toll; therefore the injustice of war's means outweighs the value of any possible end. I am not prepared to say this. It is a perverse political reflex that takes a moral stance against the suffering of guerrilla war but manages to assign blame for bringing it on to whatever side, insurgent or counterinsurgent, happens to be fighting communists (and thus is aligned with the United States).

ON THE contrary. Each side is responsible for its own actions only. Now that the Soviets and their clients find themselves in the counterinsurgency business, they, like the United States in Vietnam, are to be held accountable for means they use to suppress revolt. Reagan Doctrine guerrilla forces are entitled to the same moral standard that was extended to the NLF in Vietnam.

Each side accounts for its own actions. And, we agree, those actions, even in guerrilla war, must exclude terrorist means. What, then, of the atrocities (euphemistically called "human rights violations") committed by the anti-communist guerrillas supported by the Reagan Doctrine? This is not a minor problem. Indeed, it is such a crucial moral challenge to the Reagan Doctrine that, in the case of Nicaragua, supporters have pushed very hard for ways (structures, procedures, increased direct American control) to reduce the abuses.

By abuses I do not mean blowing up power lines, burning crops, and mining harbors, tactics that have aroused much protest in the United States. The moral indignation here seems to me misplaced. Attacks on property seem a far more humane way to conduct a war than attacks on even military targets, since this often means soldiers, who are apt to die as a result.

By abuses I mean terror and torture. If these are committed by members of an armed force, its cause is not necessarily de-legitimized. These abuses always occur. The important question is whether or not the use of such means is deliberate policy, and whether the army, guerrilla or otherwise, establishes rules prohibiting such conduct and takes steps to enforce the rules.

IT SEEMS to me that the guerrilla army that least meets these criteria is in Afghanistan. Its guerrilla force, for example, rarely takes prisoners, except a few for purposes of propaganda or exchange. Yet the Afghan rebels enjoy unflinching liberal support. On Capitol Hill, Afghanistan is perhaps the holiest cause, even among critics of the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua and Angola. On October 4, 1984, the House passed, without dissent, the Ritter resolution "to encourage and support the people of Afghanistan in their struggle to be free from domination" and "to provide the people, if they so request, with material assistance . . . to help them fight effectively." March 21, 1985, was "Afghanistan Day" in the United States, so declared by a joint resolution of Congress, also passed by unanimous consent. Receptions are held and toasts given to Afghan guerrilla commanders.

Why do Afghan atrocities not de-legitimize their struggle, and require us to cease support? Again the issue is not hypocrisy. It must be morally self-evident to both critics and supporters of the Reagan Doctrine that the Afghan guerrillas still deserve support. Some other principles must be involved here.

It has, I think, to do with control. The sensibilities of the West and its idea of rules of engagement will not change the Afghans. They can be counted on to carry on regardless. If we were fighting Soviet forces in the United States (or even Afghanistan) we should not permit ourselves to fight this way. But the Afghans will anyway. We have only one choice: to decide between the lesser of two evils. And we decide that, taking into account both the means and ends of the guerrillas and of their enemy, the lesser evil is to support the rebels.

I am not pretending that strategic considerations do not

dwarf these moral considerations and that these considerations are not why even liberals embrace the Afghan guerrillas. But, as in all such decisions, strategic considerations are insufficient if the policy is morally unacceptable. There must always be two tests. I have never gotten an adequate accounting from those who indignantly protest Savimbi and the *contras* as to how the Afghan war passes a moral test. My reasoning above is the best I can do, for them and for myself.

It is, I believe, fair reasoning, with important historical precedent. This is not the first time we make such choices. We could not dictate Stalin's tactics either. And yet we chose to ally ourselves with the second greatest monster of the century in order to defeat the first. The decision to do so was not even a close call. Or consider the Spanish Civil War. The atrocities committed by the Loyalist forces are the equal of those attributed to any of the Reagan Doctrine forces. That does not prevent Walzer from terming "shameful" (I agree) the democracies' refusal to intervene (as legitimate counterintervention against German and Italian efforts to "turn the balance") on the Loyalist side. My point is not that this is hypocrisy. Not at all. It is merely an example of making a necessary moral calculus when faced with two sides, the behavior of neither of which we are likely to alter substantially. There are no moral foxholes.

The same lesser-of-two-evils case can be made for the other Reagan Doctrine conflicts. But it would be insufficient. Afghan atrocities do expose hypocrisy, but they do not provide moral cover, because in Nicaragua (and, to a minor extent, in Angola) the United States has more control over the insurgency. (One need not accept the Sandinista fantasy that the resistance is a CIA puppet to maintain this.) And with control comes responsibility. One responsibility is to see to it that the guerrilla war is fought within certain moral boundaries. No more use of pressure-sensitive land mines. A human rights office to investigate reported atrocities. This is the standard to which we would hold ourselves were we conducting a guerrilla war of our own. We are morally obliged to try to impose it in support of guerrilla wars where possible, i.e., where we exercise a sufficient degree of control. We are obliged to try to prevent abuses and to ensure that resort to such tactics does not become guerrilla policy. But that is different from saying that we are obliged to wash our hands of the war because, in this war as in others, such abuses occur.

THERE IS ONE final critique of the use of guerrilla means. Not that they violate the rules of war, but they violate another standard, the Vince Lombardi standard: the rebels cannot win. The immorality lies in using foreign peasants as cannon fodder for a cynical American policy of bleeding the Soviets and their allies.

What is not explained is why so many people are willing to go to their deaths (they are not, by and large, drafted) in order to serve the marginal interest of an alien power. I offer a better explanation. These guerrillas must believe

either that they can win, or that their fight will force some solution short of victory that is better than the status quo, so much better that it is worth dying for. These guerrillas ask for our help. It seems a form of moral hauteur to deny them the help (and, incidentally, expose them to more danger, since in most cases they will carry on regardless) because we know better whether they can achieve what they are prepared to risk their lives to achieve.

Moreover, how do Reagan Doctrine critics know that these wars are unwinnable? The Vietnamese communists, starting with a very small number of cadres, took 30 years to expel the French and Americans and ultimately subdue all of their Indochinese neighbors. It took three decades, too, for Chinese communists to achieve victory. In less than half a decade the Reagan Doctrine has produced no success. That is not proof that these wars are unwinnable. Unless one adds: these wars must fail because our enemies will always match us and escalate to meet any challenge by our side. But just because that was true in Vietnam does not mean it will be true everywhere else. It was not, for example, true of Malaysia or Thailand, where the communist side was defeated. Moreover, this critique degenerates into the earlier argument that because they will fight to win at all cost, our contesting their will (or more precisely: our assisting others who choose to contest their will) becomes morally untenable. We return to the proposition that fighting determined communists who refuse to quit is in itself a moral offense.

Americans might be more humble about deciding which wars are winnable and which are not. Our track record in this department is not good. It was once thought that a fifth-rate military power in Southeast Asia could not possibly defeat the premier power of the world. War is mostly a matter of will. People are not going out into the field and being shot in unwinnable wars because they are being forced to or bribed by the United States. They are doing so because they think their struggle is worth fighting for. Some people fight to the death for honor, but not many.

THE REAGAN DOCTRINE is a strategic response of the United States to the needs of a containment policy and to a change in the correlation of forces in the world in the 1970s. But it cannot be defended purely on strategic grounds. It must be morally defensible. An analysis of the principles underlying intervention, insurgency, and guerrilla war yields, in my view, the conclusion that it is. It also yields certain conditions for this to remain so—conditions of popular support, ends, and means. (For example, it is my view that the Cambodian insurgency fails a crucial test of ends.)

But what of the real suffering that war necessarily brings to real people? There is no denying the suffering. Nevertheless, the cry of the bereaved mother is not an argument against war. It is an argument against unjust war. It is an argument for careful thinking about principles that justify war and for doing what one can to prevent wanton destruction. In any war, we owe that to both sides and to ourselves. □

EVERY NOW AND THEN YOU NEED TO GET DOWNRIGHT ARM-WAVING, POUND-ON-THE-TABLE ANGRY.

"The authors are especially skillful...
the details are fascinating."
—The American Spectator

"Jesse's reputation suffers
devastating disclosures."
— C. Vann Woodward in
The New Republic

"...Odyssey
through America's
racial politics—including
Jackson's life, the civil rights
movement, the Black Muslims, Chicago
politics and relations between blacks and Jews."
—Clarence Page, Chicago Tribune

"Well-written, insightful and highly unflattering
account of Mr. Jackson's career."
—Fred Barnes in the
Wall Street Journal




"I've read
at least a
hundred
books while
commuting to
and from work
...but not one of
those books moved
me enough to laugh
—or curse—out loud.
While reading Jesse
Jackson and the Pol-
itics of Race, I did both."
—Philadelphia
Daily News

"Treat yourself to a
gripping portrait of a
dangerous demagogue."
—Red Buckley, National Review

JUST READ THIS BOOK.

If you're black, you'll fume about his treatment of black author Barbara Reynolds. If you're white, you'll grind your teeth over his blackmail of neighborhood businesses. If you're Jewish, you'll rage about his \$200,000 connection with the Arab League. If you're Christian, you'll seethe at his self-serving use of the pulpit. If you're liberal, you'll bridle at exaggerations of his relationship with Martin Luther King. If you're conservative, you'll boil with indignation over his fast and loose juggling of government money.

Confirm what you've suspected all along. Read the truth about the erect-walking chameleon of our time. Hardcover, 260 pages. At your bookseller or use this coupon.



To: Green Hill Publishers, Inc.
P.O. Box 738, Ottawa, IL 61350

TNRJX3

Yes. Send me the hard-cover *Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race* by Thomas Landess and Richard Quinn for 15-day examination. Check or money-order for \$12.95 is enclosed, or charge my

VISA MASTERCARD number _____

Exp. Date _____ Signature _____

Telephone orders: 815-434-7905

name _____

address _____

city _____ state _____ zip _____

Illinois residents please add 6% sales tax. **Money-back guarantee:** If you are not completely satisfied, please return the book within 15 days, and we'll refund your \$12.95 in full, no questions asked.

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

The Way They Were

Last week Eric Rohmer's *Summer*, which is short on story. This week Nadine Trintignant's *Next Summer*, which overflows with story.

Trintignant, who wrote her own script, is the wife of Jean-Louis Trintignant and the mother of Marie Trintignant, both of whom are in her film. The family ambience encircles a family

Next Summer
(European Classics)
A Fine Mess
(Columbia)

chronicle. I certainly don't know how much of the film is biographical, but I think it would have been difficult to write such a film, then make it with (among others) your husband and daughter, without drawing on some shared experiences.

This pleasant picture wanders a bit, sometimes puzzlingly though always pleasantly, and in time an amiable, un-rigorous pattern emerges. Basically, it's about the marriage of two middle-aged people, Philippe Noiret and Claudia Cardinale, who live in a nice house in the mountains of southern France. At the start, Cardinale is in labor with their sixth child and is escorted to the hospital by her other children because Noiret is off somewhere. We see that he's with a young woman. When he hears of his new daughter, he returns at once and, as always, lavishes love and tenderness on his family. The father is a very engaging, self-gratifying freeloader on life whose irresponsibilities are excused by his family because he is so truly loving of those he shortchanges.

Then Cardinale finds a note to him from the young woman. The last straw. She has long endured being viewed as a household utility, she has long endured his extensive absences, presumably on business, but her patience snaps at this confirmation of his philandering while she has been home caring for the brood. She throws him out. Tearfully, he goes

to live elsewhere—in the neighborhood, so that he can see his children.

Seven years pass in a subtitle. (Not all of the children seem seven years older.) Noiret has some sort of cerebral attack and is taken to a hospital in Nice. The family gathers round during his long hospital siege. At the end Cardinale and Noiret—he with his head still bandaged—are reunited in their mountain home.

Within the embrace of their story lie the stories of their children—two, chiefly. The oldest daughter, a designer-decorator played by Fanny Ardant, lives with a playwright-director much older than herself, Jean-Louis Trintignant, in a provincial city. Eventually they get to Paris, which is their aim, but the journey and the results are not what they had hoped for. The next daughter, Marie Trintignant, is a gifted pianist who is quite unable to play in public. She and another pianist, Jerome Ange, fall in love, marry, and through the years produce a child and the solution to her problem.

But some problems in the script itself are left unsolved. The source of Noiret's income isn't clear—how his family, especially when he is estranged, lives in that nice house so nicely. Some of the dialogue, to judge by the subtitles, is from the French National Archives of Film Dialogue. At one point Noiret says philosophically to a friend, "You know . . . women. . . ." In a scene with Trintignant, Ardant says, "I'd like to be bored," and he replies, "I love you when you're like this." And some of the plot developments are quite arbitrary.

However, the writer-director compensates for these shortcomings by one persuasive expedient: she makes it all enjoyable—so much so that we never even feel constrained to forgive the film its faults. The title is a pet phrase of Noiret's. He keeps promising the family that they're all going to visit America. When? Next summer. The tone of his solicitude, genuine but not strictly disci-

plined, is the tone of the whole picture.

"Soap opera" is a ready term these days to patronize nearly every story of family life, of domestic troubles and joys. But surely the term is qualitative, not categorical. Trintignant gives her film a texture better than soap opera, not by any great depth in her script but by all the qualities of its execution. The colors of William Lubtchansky's camera are just pretty enough. Philippe Sarde's music makes a not-too-soft cushion. And Trintignant has cast her film splendidly. Her husband, Jean-Louis, is a dependably intelligent actor. Their daughter, Marie, who has the dramatic beauty of a Cretan figurine, acts with a reserve that bespeaks selfhood. Her fellow pianist, Ange, is as adoring of her as (we feel) he ought to be. Fanny Ardant once again seems a bit outsize, gauche, but the family might well have one daughter like her. Cardinale, 45 when the film was made in 1984, now gives us a more mature version of the beauty and tenderness we first saw in 1958. Noiret has a wonderful time—and heaven knows, he provides one—as the virtually irresistible papa.

Beauty is no longer an absolute requisite in film women. (Is Sandrine Bonnaire of *Vagabond* beautiful?) Beauty

FILMS WORTH SEEING

"*About Last Night . . .*" David Mamet's play *Sexual Perversity in Chicago* has been taken for a ride. But there's salty, sexy fun along the way. (Reviewed 8/4/86)

Hearburn. Mike Nichols, directing deftly, and Meryl Streep, performing brightly, give some amusement to this fairly vapid comedy about a yuppie marriage that flops. (7/28/86)

Nothing in Common. An attempt to show a young advertising hotshot learning values from his parents' marital troubles. The attempt is muddled; still, Tom Hanks, the young man, and Jackie Gleason, his father, aided by slick dialogue, keep it moving. (9/1/86)

A Room with a View. Forster's novel brought to pretty good screen life with a lush camera and (except Lucy) a skillful cast. (6/2/86)

SK

MAXIMUM FEASIBLE CONTAINMENT

BY JOSHUA MURAVCHIK

THE IRAN/*CONTRA* scandal has prompted an intellectual offensive against the Reagan Doctrine and the very notion of an ideologically animated foreign policy. Thus far the assault has been clearer in its denunciations than in its recommendations for new strategies purged of ideological excess. Yet certain dominant themes can be discerned. What they add up to is a new conservative isolationism.

I use the adjective "conservative" to distinguish these views from the liberal isolationism that followed the Vietnam War. Then, the impetus for disengagement was the conviction that America was a malign force in the world. The idea now is that engagement will be harmful to America. Just as many of the voices in this chorus are not conservative, some are not isolationist. Yet this is where their arguments are bound to lead, for it is hard to see any other currently feasible alternative to the Reagan Doctrine.

The term "Reagan Doctrine" was coined to give coherence to Reagan's inchoate impulse to make America "stand tall again." The administration's policy had evolved as the administration came to see the Nicaraguan rebels as contestants for power rather than merely an instrument to harass the Sandinistas. The administration also embraced Jonas Savimbi's struggle in Angola and eventually recognized that these conflicts, like those in Cambodia and Afghanistan, provided the basis for its new strategy.

Reagan had made it clear he intended to eschew both Jimmy Carter's national self-abnegation and the accommodations of Henry Kissinger's *détente*. But although he called America's Vietnam War "a noble cause," neither he nor anyone else was prepared to return to the policy of containment, under which America sought to ensure, by force if necessary, that no additional countries would go Communist. Rebels in Nicaragua and Angola permitted a new global strategy: although some countries might fall to communism, this could be counterbalanced by overthrowing Communist regimes elsewhere.

What can be offered in place of the Reagan Doctrine? Surely not a return to containment. Although in spirit more venturesome than containment, the Reagan Doctrine is far less ambitious in practice. The former entailed sending a half million men to Southeast Asia; the latter requires sending a few million dollars to Central America. A public unwilling to sustain the latter will not for a moment countenance the former. Nor are people prepared for a return to

Carteresque national penitence. The very depth of Reagan's fall reveals how much the public has come to approve the unapologetic posture that people thought Reagan represented.

Nor is there much prospect of a return to Kissingerian *détente*, which offers sticks as well as carrots. Kissinger's "sticks" consisted of covert military aid to the likes of Savimbi, and massive military aid along with the use of American air power in places such as Indochina. Why should the country accept in the name of *détente* the kinds of foreign entanglements it rejects under the Reagan Doctrine?

What do critics of the doctrine propose? Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argues, "It is time for America to tend to economic resources. . . . Political economy is the name of the next task, not geopolitics." He acknowledges that "between now and the year 2000 between four and 11 [new Leninist] regimes will come to power." But he argues that we may view such developments with a measure of equanimity because "the one enormous fact of the third quarter of the 20th century . . . is the near complete collapse of Marxism as an ideological force in the world."

While Moynihan calls us home to repair our economy, others fret about our political system. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. writes that "Vietnam and Iran/Nicaragua were the direct consequences of global messianism," which threatens to "burst . . . the limits of our present constitution." The remedy is a "prudent balance-of-power foreign policy confined to vital interests of the United States." He appeals for "the revival of realism, sobriety, and responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs." A recent lead article in *Foreign Policy* expresses the hope that the next administration will "stop feeding the international illusions of the American public and . . . expose it instead to the finite nature of what foreign policy can accomplish."

Ironies abound in these criticisms. "Realism" is the theory that argues that the behavior of states is governed by their inherent interests more than by the voluntary choices or ideals of statesmen. The essential rule is that geography is destiny. The decision to sell arms to Khomeini was the administration's quintessential act of foreign policy "realism" and a betrayal of the ideological tenets of its foreign policy. Iran's oil and its strategic location, between the U.S.S.R. and the Persian Gulf were deemed more important than the principle of not yielding to terrorist blackmail.

In U.S. foreign policy, "balance of power" can only mean counterbalancing the power of the Soviet Union. As the

Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Kremlin extends the reach of its empire to four continents, the Reagan Doctrine is a balance-of-power policy. It is hard to take comfort in Moynihan's assurance that communism has collapsed ideologically when in the same breath he predicts a new Communist takeover every one to three years.

THE CROWNING IRONY is the conservative tone and spirit of these liberal critiques. But liberals are not the only ones acting out of character. Whether they realize it or not, conservatives who support the Reagan Doctrine are supporting a policy that is profoundly unconservative.

One conservative who has seen this clearly is Robert W. Tucker, co-editor of the *National Interest*, who argues:

While freedom is the highest of political values, this does not make its universalization a proper interest of foreign policy in the sense that its pursuit justifies the sacrifice of blood and treasure. There are many things of value that are not the proper interests of foreign policy. Conservatives, despite their deep attachment to liberty, should be the first to recognize this.

To those who argue, as does Tucker's colleague Irving Kristol, that "the basic conflict of our times—that between the U.S.S.R. and the United States—is ideological," Tucker replies: "The ideological contest with the Soviet Union has largely been won." Tucker acknowledges the perdurance of geopolitical, as opposed to ideological, contest, but even here he believes the United States is comfortably ahead and could get by with limited or selective containment.

There are signs that other conservatives are beginning to entertain doubts about current policy. Paul Weyrich called recently upon conservatives to begin "thinking deeply and carefully about America's role in the world":

In pursuit of containment, we still thrust ourselves into everything that happens around the world. But what we put forward, increasingly, is weakness, not strength. In a world where we control far less of the total sum of power than we did 40 years ago, we cannot do otherwise. The real strength is no longer there. We are propping up a hollow facade, vast commitments unsupported by either capabilities or popular will.

Kristol, writing about human rights, reiterated that the U.S.-Soviet competition is an "ideological conflict," but argued that it is nonetheless

both a simplification and a distortion to describe it as a conflict about "human rights." It is, rather, a conflict over the very definition of "human rights," and the point of this conflict is to determine who will have the power to define "human rights" for future generations. In that sense, the United States cannot evade the urgencies and the ambiguities of "power politics."

It is "quixotically futile to criticize [the Soviet Union] for not sharing our traditional-liberal political philosophy." He finds it quixotic, too, to try to foster democracy in Third World countries ruled by traditional authoritarian dictatorships. What Kristol seems to be saying is that although the U.S.-Soviet conflict is motivated by ideology, it cannot be waged with ideological weapons, but only with real ones. Efforts to promote the democratic idea will have little part in it.

Thus liberals offer nothing but empty conservative pieties: prudence, pragmatism, balance of power, sobriety, and above all "realism." Paralyzed by their suspicions of power and of national self-assertiveness, they have been unable to come to terms with the fact that every cherished liberal value, be it liberty, democracy, peace, or national independence, depends ultimately upon American power. Conservatives, on the other hand, have an unconservative strategy, the Reagan Doctrine, which makes America the sponsor of revolutions.

It also deepens the inherent conflict between the conservative's distrust of strong government and his wish for a strong defense. The Reagan Doctrine implies a degree of government activism that goes beyond maintaining a military establishment. To win, we will have to do more than arm anti-Communist rebels. We will have to train them; help them develop political organizations and strategies; teach them the art of public relations and to launch social welfare programs in liberated areas. In short, social engineering.

It is easy to understand why it took so long for this administration to stumble onto the Reagan Doctrine, and why so many of its key promoters have political roots outside conservatism—including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, and Ronald Reagan. It was doubtless the natural conservatism of many of Reagan's advisers that made them discourage him from spending political capital on this issue, leading to the congressional ban on aid to the Nicaraguan rebels in 1984. When that ban came, it was perhaps also a natural conservatism that led to reliance on contributions from Saudi Arabia and other secret donors rather than any attempt to launch a public, grass-roots movement of non-governmental support for the rebels, much as the left raises funds for the Nicaraguan government and the Salvadoran guerrillas.

KRISTOL, Weyrich, Tucker, Schlesinger, and Moynihan are an unlikely united front. But what they share suggests a foreign policy alternative to the Reagan Doctrine. This alternative will eschew ideological commitment in favor of invocations of "the national interest." It will seek to scale back foreign commitments, and perhaps to play down foreign affairs altogether in favor of domestic concerns. Yet it will avoid the breast-beating anti-Americanism of 1970s liberals, and will even insist, at least in rhetoric and perhaps in reality, on maintaining a strong military. Almost any candidate in 1988 in either party could adopt this stance.

But it will not make good strategy. Since World War II we have faced an ideologically hostile superpower bent on global pre-eminence. Containment compiled a mixed record in responding to that challenge before collapsing in Vietnam. Détente, whether the muscular Kissinger kind or the limp Carter kind, also has failed. "Prudence," "pragmatism," "sobriety," and "realism" (in the sense of being realistic) should guide the execution of any strategy, but are not themselves strategies.

What else is available? There is always pure isolation-

ism. Perhaps a Finlandized Europe would still trade with America. But would it trade strategic commodities if the Kremlin said no? More to the point, Star Wars, whatever its prospects for technological success, reminds us that eventually nuclear weapons will be overtaken by new technologies. The United States has always maintained a lead in weapons technology, but would this lead endure if the Kremlin were able to use the talents of Europe and Japan to its purposes? And what would be the spirit of political and social life in America with our vision of man's destiny defeated and our adversaries free to foment subversion from our very borders? The case against complete disengagement need not rest on moral grounds alone. If we accept the illusion that we have Fortress America to fall back on for our ultimate safety, the result will be a retreat from the broader commitments safety actually requires.

Tucker proposes the only other strategy in these debates. He would have us return to a policy of containment, but limited to a few selected areas of vital interest—say, Western Europe, Japan, and the Persian Gulf. He challenges the critics of containment: "It will not do to say that we cannot indefinitely play a defensive role. We have now played that role for over a third of a century and, on balance, have played it quite well." He means, I think, that though we have lost ground, we have lost it slowly—a Cuba here, an Indochina there, a Nicaragua there—and it would take generations before the losses would accumulate to perilous proportions. In the meantime, who knows what else might happen that might improve the picture?

FAIR ENOUGH. But the reason we have lost ground so slowly is that we have done our best to resist everywhere. And that is precisely what we are no longer willing to do. Which is why Tucker would have us make the radical shift to defending only a few selected areas. But wouldn't the announcement of such a shift tempt our adversaries to much bolder efforts in all those areas that we defined outside of our containment sphere, just as Acheson's exclusion of South Korea invited aggression in 1950? And how will we insulate the areas within this containment sphere from those without? Tucker includes the Persian Gulf in his list not because of its own value but because its oil makes it critical to the defense of Europe. But can we defend the Persian Gulf while turning a blind eye to the rest of the Middle East and South Asia? Can the security of Japan be separated from that of the rest of East Asia? Can we define Mexico as outside our containment sphere, and if not, can Mexico's fate be severed from that of Central America? Selective containment only exacerbates the problems of containment.

The essential problem of containment is that we don't have the power to forestall Communist advances everywhere. But to pre-emptively abandon most of the world is no solution. The real solution lies in a policy that combines maximum feasible containment (recognizing that in various places the tools available to us are limited) with an "active defense" that seeks to counterbalance future Com-

munist gains with Communist losses. That is the Reagan Doctrine.

If the fallacy of Fortress America shows that we must have a forward defense and the fallacy of selective containment shows it must be an active defense, the question remains: Can it be a defense of mere "power politics," as Kristol suggests? It is true that everywhere that communism has triumphed it has come by force of arms, but in almost every case the way to that triumph has been paved by the manipulation of ideas—to divide, immobilize, and demoralize its opponents. If it is true, as Mao said, that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, it is also true, as Communists seem often to understand better than their adversaries, that guns are useless without people to pull the triggers.

TUCKER AND MOYNIHAN are wrong when they say the ideological battle has been won. The appeal of communism has always rested at least as much on its claim to represent history's appointed destiny as on its claim to provide a just society. Victory by anti-Communist uprisings is an irreplaceable step if communism is ever to be ideologically defeated. They also misconceive the nature of the ideological threat. Communism never won by converting the masses, but by inspiring selfless, disciplined cadres, manipulating masses with tactical slogans, and undermining opponents—by a combination of force and guile, where politics serves as an adjunct to violence. That is the essence of Leninism, and it remains a potent strategy. Communist guerrillas are making serious bids for power in El Salvador and the Philippines. Communist cadres are exercising dominance in broader liberation movements in places such as South Africa.

Kristol supports aid to the *contras*, but objects to framing the struggle in ideological terms. He believes the strategic considerations are all-important. But what is this struggle if not a struggle for democracy? Merely a struggle against communism, say, to restore *somocismo*? Who would support such a cause? Prospects for preventing the spread of communism in Central America would be much poorer today if Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador were still (or once again) ruled by military strongmen and ossified oligarchies.

The West knows little about ideological war. But the place to start is with the assertion that democracy is our creed; that we believe all human beings are entitled to its blessings; and that we are prepared to do what we can to help others achieve it. The Reagan Doctrine, which offers military aid to anti-Communist insurgents, is one part of what we need to do. We need also to assist democratic movements throughout the world—and where there are no democratic movements, to assist democratic individuals. Such activities, along with the Reagan Doctrine, can constitute the pillars of a foreign policy strategy that we might call "engagement." Such a strategy may lack a natural domestic constituency, but unlike any available alternative, it can serve our deepest values and protect our long-term security. □

NATO: Do We Still Need It?

Irving Kristol and Eugene V. Rostow

THE CASE AGAINST

Irving Kristol: NATO was a necessary arrangement when instituted in 1949. For much of the postwar period it served its purpose and contained the Soviet thrust into Western Europe. Now we must ask: Does NATO (North American Treaty Organization) still serve a useful purpose, or has it become counterproductive?

I contend that in its present form, NATO subverts Western Europe's will to resist and interferes with America's responsibilities as a global power. Western Europe and the United States would be better off if NATO were reconstructed as an all-European entity with which the U.S. would remain on friendly terms. There would be no formal alliance, but the U.S. would be ready to assist this new entity in accord with the American national interest.

Important changes have transformed Western Europe in the last 37 years. Recovering from the devastation of World War II, Western Europe has become economically healthy and politically stable. It has the technical, economic and human resources needed to manage a defense---at least on the conventional level---against Soviet aggression. However, nations that wish to defend themselves must be prepared to pay the costs of defense. The present terms of NATO have made Western Europe unduly dependent on the U.S. and ill-prepared to address the requirements of an independent strategy of deterrence.

NATO's present structure has corrupted Western European governments and demoralized the people they lead. Believing they can rely on U.S. support, Western European governments do not make the expenditures required for a defense that could deter or resist any Soviet aggression. Such a defense is not an impossible dream. There is no reason why France, Germany, Italy and Britain could not establish a sufficient and independent conventional deterrent to Soviet aggression.

Such a deterrent could only be built by restraining expenditures on social services, which are very popular. The governments of Western Europe believe they need not consider such a path because they live under something called the "American umbrella." Consequently, they have not taken the necessary steps to build an army, an air force or a tank corps of a size and quality necessary to repel a Soviet thrust.

This path of dependency has undermined the self-reliance of the Western European people. Their governments do not persuade them to assert their national independence and affirm their national identity. But soldiers do not fight and

die for something called NATO. Soldiers fight and die for their country. But today many Germans, French, British and Italians are convinced that they are fighting for the United States. America has its finger on every trigger and the Europeans wonder: Who is serving whom, who is being used by whom?

Many Europeans believe that NATO exists to serve the United States. America should resolve this confusion. The Europeans' fingers should be on the triggers. Europeans should defend their countries with U.S. assistance but not with U.S. troops. American troops should not be stationed in Europe. What are they there for? They are not there simply to repel Soviet aggression. Dutch, German and French troops can do that just as well. American troops are stationed in Western Europe as *hostages*. If there were a successful Soviet incursion into West Germany and 300,000 U.S. troops were either killed or imprisoned, the assumption is that the U.S. would engage in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. The conflict might begin with battlefield nuclear weapons. But it would promptly escalate into long-range missiles. So America has made a very peculiar commitment to NATO: if the Soviets invade Western Europe, the U.S. will stand ready to escalate the conflict---even if this escalation results in the mutual incineration of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

America should never have agreed to such a commitment. But it was made when the U.S. enjoyed a

Irving Kristol is Professor of Social Thought at the New York University of Business and Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Co-editor of *The Public Interest* and publisher of *The National Interest*, he is author of *On the Democratic Idea in America* and *Two Cheers for Capitalism*.

Eugene V. Rostow, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University, is, currently, Distinguished Visiting Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy at the National Defense University. The former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1981-83, Rostow also served under President Johnson. He is a founding member of the Committee on the Present Danger and the author of *The Ideal in Law and Peace in the Balance*.

This is used by permission of The East-West Round Table, an independent organization of men and women in their 20s and 30s who seek to promote a high level of analyses of East-West affairs.

clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Today the U.S. can claim, at best, nuclear parity with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, one day an American president could be presented with the choice of watching several hundred thousand U.S. troops get slaughtered, or engaging in mutual incineration with the Soviet Union.

Kristol: Western Europe and the United States would be better off if NATO were reconstructed as an all-European entity with which the U.S. would remain on friendly terms.

Europe should defend itself at the conventional level. If Europe wants to defend itself at the nuclear level as well, it could also do so. Britain and France both have nuclear weapons. But if the Europeans are short on nuclear weapons, the U.S. can give them Trident submarines. If they want a nuclear deterrent of their own, let them have it.

America should not, however, make a commitment to Western Europe that involves our possible destruction. A withdrawal from that commitment and the reconstitution of NATO as an all-European organization would boost the morale of Western European nations by affirming their independence and national identity.

THE CASE FOR

Eugene V. Rostow: I have great respect for Irving Kristol as a social critic and as a man. But his proposal that the U.S. withdraw from NATO recalls a remark Mayor LaGuardia once made about himself. "I don't often make a mistake, but when I do, it's a *beaut*."

In logic, an argument can never be proven but it can be disproven by a single fact inconsistent with its premises or the deductions drawn from them. Professor Kristol's argument for withdrawing from NATO---and, inferentially, from America's other security arrangements around the world---is completely destroyed by simple arithmetic: the arithmetic of power, and the logic of the national interest based on the arithmetic of power.

Professor Kristol did not address these subjects systematically. His statements were a confused mixture of friendly feelings for Europe (which are irrelevant to our topic), and unresolved contradictions about the significance of Europe to American security. In today's world and in the world that looms ahead, the U.S. does not have the power to defend its national security single-handedly.

America's world position for the indefinite future is like that of Great Britain for the 400-year period between the two Elizabeths. In that era, Great Britain was at all times weaker than its main rivals and much weaker than these rivals in combination. Britain achieved and maintained its national independence by acting as the arbiter of the European balance of power, the only constellation of power that mattered in

the political universe of the time. Britain accomplished that goal, not only by its own exertions at sea and on land, but by organizing coalitions of allies which prevented the predator states of the day from achieving mastery.

Now in a different world, the U.S. is the only nation that could lead in attaining a balance of world power. Only the U.S. can neutralize the nuclear power of the Soviet Union. Americans do not want the task, but we must accept it if we wish to preserve, enrich and pass on our magnificent heritage. The alternative is infinitely worse.

It is a moral imperative of the American culture that the U.S. government should send its armed forces into combat only to protect its national security interests. As a democracy, the U.S. is concerned with security, not with conquest. However, what is required to assure the country's liberty and independence shifts constantly with changes in the distribution and dynamics of power in the world. The ultimate goal of American foreign policy is the achievement of a reasonably stable balance of power in world politics and a peaceful state system based on the balance of power.

The balance of power is the oldest and most familiar idea in the study and practice of foreign relations. The driving force of the principle of the balance of power is a basic instinct: never allow an adversary or a potential adversary to become too strong. That principle is the key to freedom and autonomy for the individual within the pluralist state, and for a state within the society of nations.

Today the logic of balance of power requires the U.S., and other states that seek to retain their sovereignty, to resist and, if necessary, to defeat the Soviet Union's drive for hegemony. Moscow's goal is to gain control of the entire Eurasian-African land mass. If the other great powers of the world allow the Soviet Union to rule over that immense region, it would dominate world politics without a major war.

Rostow: If the U.S. withdrew from NATO, Moscow would never allow Europe to unite and become an independently strong nuclear power---it would be too risky for the Soviet Union.

Control of Western Europe is the first step in the Soviet strategy. Moscow is rightly convinced that if Western Europe falls under Soviet control, Japan, China, India and many smaller countries will draw their own conclusions and make their own accommodations with the Soviet Union. Confronting such an aggregation of power---nearly 90 percent of the world's population, and 75 percent of the world's land surface and resources---the defense of the liberty and independence of the U.S. would become impossible.

It is therefore absolutely vital to American security to prevent Western Europe from falling under Soviet control. The world is no longer Euro-centered, but Europe is and will remain a critically important component of the world

balance of power. It is a region with a formidable reservoir of skills, capital and science, and its geographical position is crucial to U.S. security. Europe has immense specific gravity in the calculus of power.

Mr. Kristol, half-recognizing and half-denying these geopolitical realities, proposes that instead of a united NATO alliance based on the American nuclear guaranty, the U.S. should encourage the creation of a European NATO and sell it nuclear weapons to assure its complete independence in security affairs.

This is an absolute fantasy. It does not correspond to the arithmetic of power and the nature of Soviet policy. Given the Soviet and American lead in nuclear weapons, there is no force on earth except the American nuclear arsenal---and no prospective force---that could deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe, China, Japan or any other nation.

Professor Kristol's argument for supplying nuclear arms to a European NATO is a denial of reality. The United States has failed to maintain the bilateral nuclear balance between itself and the Soviet Union. How does Professor Kristol think the United States could double or triple its production of nuclear weapons to help establish a European nuclear force capable of deterring the Soviet Union? Considering that such a force could fall into the hands of the Soviet Union, or of some future Hitler or Mussolini, why does he think it would be in the American national interest to do so?

It is difficult to imagine any reason why America would want to have an independent European nuclear deterrent operating as a third force. That is a risk the U.S. should never have to contemplate. America fought two wars to prevent the unification of Europe under German control. Soviet resistance to the development of an independent European nuclear deterrent would be even stronger. If the U.S. withdrew from NATO, Moscow would never allow Europe to unite and become an independently strong nuclear power---it would be too risky for the Soviet Union.

If keeping Europe out of Soviet hands and preventing Japan and China from shifting into the Soviet camp are vital American interests, indispensable to the creation of an adequate balance of power, why should the U.S. withdraw its troops? If America wants to defend its interests in Europe, it is infinitely better to have forward deployment than deployment from America. The possibility of slow reinforcement from the U.S., in the pattern of 1917 and 1942, no longer exists. Modern weapons technology will make the first few days of a war between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries decisive---even if the war remains on the conventional level. The great American armored divisions are much more powerful both for deterrence and combat if stationed in Germany rather than in Texas. And if the U.S. could be drawn into war to prevent Soviet control of Western Europe, we should surely participate in the diplomacy that might lead to war.

Professor Kristol is not alone in proposing a U.S. withdrawal from NATO. The climate of opinion on the

subject recalls the mood of the 1930s throughout the West. The present mood derives from both a revulsion against the U.S. experience in Korea and Vietnam, and a fatigue after forty costly years of containment. Above all, it arises from a paralyzing fear of the implications of the Soviet-American military balance, and especially of the Soviet-American nuclear balance. People are frightened, as they were during the 1930s, and they are not rationally calculating the American national interest.

So long as Americans accept Soviet policy for what it is, and do not delude themselves that there are simple or easy solutions, there is no objective reason for panic. For the U.S. to survive this period and prevail, Americans must control what is essentially animal fear.

Questions from *Morton Kondracke*, moderator, and panelists from The East-West Round Table:

John Fox, chairman of The East-West Round Table

Joan Frawley, editor of *The East-West Papers*

Nicholas Eberstadt, Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute

Roger Kaplan of *The Readers' Digest*

Fox: Mr. Rostow, isn't NATO really a suicide pact: the Soviets cross the line in Germany and the nuclear balloon goes up over the U.S.?

Rostow: The Soviet Union has no intention of committing suicide. Great states, America included, do not commit suicide. That is why the U.S. has attempted to restore the nuclear balance that we foolishly allowed to deteriorate during the 1970s. Forty years of experience have demonstrated that the nuclear deterrent works, at least among the great industrial powers. As long as a credible nuclear retaliatory capacity exists, the deterrent encourages prudence.

One of the most important military lessons of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis is that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union can use conventional force against the other unless the aggressor state possesses a clear-cut nuclear retaliatory capacity. When the U.S. prepared to invade Cuba with conventional force in 1962, the Soviet Union backed down. It follows that the U.S. would require exactly the same nuclear capacity to deter a conventional attack on New York, Frankfurt or Tokyo. Militarily, both "extended deterrence" and deterrence against direct attacks on the U.S. present identical problems.

Britain and France do not have a credible nuclear retaliatory capacity and the U.S. cannot transfer its nuclear stock or make weapons fast enough to give Europe that capacity. So let us be prudent, which means maintaining an adequate retaliatory deterrent.

Fox: But is the U.S. protecting itself against the risk of Soviet attack, or is it protecting the Europeans?

Rostow: It is protecting itself because it has an absolutely vital stake in keeping Europe out of Soviet hands. The U.S.'s most fundamental national interest is to prevent the Soviet Union, the predator of this age, from

becoming so powerful that resistance to its political will would become unthinkable.

Kaplan: Mr. Kristol, twice in this century America has found it necessary to enter a European conflict. Both times the U.S. had pursued a go-it-alone strategy in the years immediately preceding the conflict. Isn't the present structure of NATO, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a way to save American lives by deterring aggression?

Kristol: The U.S. nuclear umbrella is a deterrent---of course it is. But America must decide whether or not it is prepared to *use* nuclear weapons to retaliate against aggression. Today the question haunting both Western Europeans and Americans is: Will the U.S. engage in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union if Warsaw Pact troops succeed in invading Western Europe?

This question makes Americans nervous. It also makes Europeans nervous because they too will probably be annihilated. It makes the Soviet Politburo less nervous. I am not against a nuclear deterrent with a second-strike capability, should the Soviets launch a first strike. I do not know what would happen if the Soviets launched a first strike. I doubt they would do it. Nonetheless, Western Europe should have a sufficient nuclear capability that would deter the Soviet Union from even considering an invasion. The Europeans do not need parity with the Soviet Union, just the ability to inflict considerable damage.

Kristol: NATO poses an obstacle to the development of a more assertive American role beyond the borders of Western Europe.

Kaplan: Can America base its foreign policy on the calculation of how nervous such a policy makes its adversaries? In terms of national security, isn't it better to have a foreign defense that permits the U.S. to avoid what would be the equivalent of a nuclear Pearl Harbor?

Kristol: I believe in a forward defense. I even believe the U.S. should take an offensive position when and where it is able. Obviously, in a nuclear world a nation must carefully consider the consequences of an offensive strategy. In pursuing its national interest, the U.S. should be as cautious as the Soviet Union, not more cautious.

NATO, however, poses an obstacle to the development of a more assertive American role beyond the borders of Western Europe. Our allies are thoroughly adverse to risks. They want the U.S. to defend Western Europe, and are not interested in the U.S. pursuing its national interest elsewhere in the world.

What is an ally? An ally provides help when it is needed. The U.S. has agreed to come to the aid of Western Europe, when required. But has Western Europe reciprocated? During the air strike against Libya, the U.S. was not permitted to use NATO bases or to fly over Western European countries. At that time, Americans were shocked

to discover that the bases in Europe are not American bases, but NATO bases.

Crouching beneath the American nuclear umbrella, the Europeans have lost the will to behave like great powers. If NATO is not restructured, Italy, Holland, Germany and Britain will never develop a sufficient and independent deterrent. Indeed, if the U.S. does not prudently disengage itself from the alliance, the Europeans will abruptly disengage the U.S. from NATO. Some day a labor government will come to power in Britain or in Germany. Then the U.S. will discover it is no longer wanted because it has created such dependency, and fear of nuclear war is so great.

Eberstadt: Mr. Rostow, some people have argued that what is missing in the European theatre is not Western tanks or bombs but Western resolve. Is it possible to substitute American power for European backbone?

Rostow: That is a very unfair statement. The notion that the Europeans have no backbone, and that they are unwilling to defend themselves, is a self-congratulatory American fantasy. It is common, of course, for allies to abuse allies. But what the Europeans are worried about is us and the occasional irrationality of our foreign policy.

Mr. Kristol asked: When have America's allies come to its aid? The Europeans backed the U.S. during the Cuban missile crisis--firmly and immediately. They did not help with Libya because of Suez and because of the Lebanese affair, which happened just two years ago and was a disaster created entirely by us. America had no command and no definition of its mission in Beirut. The U.S. did not deploy its troops in the right place and it did not have enough troops. During the air strike against Libya, the Europeans said, almost publicly: If you come up with a good plan we will be with you, but another bombing raid? The Israelis do that all the time and it does not stop terrorism.

An effective and realistic U.S. policy would reassure the Europeans. However, an evaluation of American policy over the past 30 years---Suez, Hungary and Indochina---would suggest that the U.S. has a great deal to be apologetic about. When organizing and running an alliance it is a good rule to refrain from criticizing your allies and, instead, to criticize yourself.

Eberstadt: Mr. Rostow, through NATO, the U.S. is committed to battling the Red Army in Europe to a draw, at best. If the U.S. is called to that test, will that military commitment be any more morally acceptable to the American people than was our role in Vietnam?

Rostow: The American people did not understand the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. When I worked in the Johnson administration, congressmen, doves and hawks, would tell me their constituents wanted the U.S. to win or get out in Vietnam. A very sensible position.

The U.S. commitment to defend Europe against aggression is not simply to defend it to the frontiers. A more active forward defense is exactly what General [Bernard] Rogers [Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe and

the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO], has been developing with great success in Europe. The U.S. must break out of the restraints of the containment period when America waited patiently for Soviet policy to mellow.

Rostow: If it is in the American interest to prevent Western Europe from falling under Soviet control, then the expense of maintaining sufficient forces to deter a Soviet attack---nuclear or conventional---will not drop if the U.S. pulls out of Europe.

Frawley: Mr. Kristol, the Soviets have worked incessantly to get the U.S. out of Europe. Why doesn't your proposal hand them this historical goal on a platter?

Kristol: It all depends on *how* the U.S. pulls out of NATO. Professor Rostow is right: the European people do have backbone. But that backbone needs a little exercise. It has become weak through dependence on the U.S.

The U.S. is Israel's ally. America provides Israel with military aid. If that country was threatened America would come to its assistance---though the breadth of that assistance would depend on the circumstances. America has not made a commitment to engage in mutual assured destruction on behalf of Israel. Israel is prepared to defend itself against all enemies. If the U.S. treated its NATO allies as it treats Israel, the Europeans would be able to defend themselves, and they would be willing to sacrifice some of their social services to improve their armed forces.

If the U.S. withdraws from the alliance, Western Europe will not fall like ripe fruit into the Soviet basket. Of course, some Western Europeans will want to make a deal with the Soviet Union. But it is not easy to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with Moscow, and there would be great resistance to any accommodation with the Soviet Union: France and Germany are nations with great military histories and a strong national spirit, which can be revived.

Frawley: Mr. Kristol, some of your arguments for a U.S. withdrawal from Europe would seem to apply to American alliances in Asia. Japan pays less than 1 percent of its GNP for defense. The U.S. pays for the Philippines' defense. Should Japan pay for its own defense, and should the U.S. withdraw from Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base as well as from NATO?

Kristol: There is no direct parallel between the U.S. role in NATO and the American presence in Subic Bay. The installations in the Philippines are *American*. In Western Europe, the NATO bases are not under U.S. control.

Should the U.S. withdraw from the Philippines bases? It would be very expensive to transfer the military establishment to another area of the Pacific. Perhaps, like the base in Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. should retain the

bases in the Philippines under any circumstances. Or perhaps the U.S. should withdraw. That is a prudential matter to be determined by circumstances.

Japan is a very different case. There are a hundred million people in Japan; it should be a significant military power, as it was during World War II. When the U.S. won the war in the Pacific, it was determined that Japan should not be a military power. It is unrealistic and absurd to think that Japan will not develop a strong national defense. Japanese nationalism is real. At some point, it will be revived and the country will build up its armed forces. The mutual interests of both countries will determine Japan's future collaboration with U.S. foreign policy.

Kondracke: Mr. Kristol, how do America's European allies prevent it from acting in the world?

Kristol: The Europeans do not directly prevent the U.S. from acting in the world, but they do pose a continuing obstacle to a more aggressive and assertive American foreign policy.

American foreign policy has always been a divisive issue in this country. And whatever U.S. policymakers want to do---bomb Libya, invade Grenada---there will always be arguments that such actions are wrong or unwise. The Europeans do not have an actual veto over U.S. military actions in the world, but when they are uneasy, they can introduce their concerns into the domestic debate. Every time the U.S. takes an assertive position in the world, American newspapers and television report the Europeans' reaction. Then congressmen who oppose a vigorous foreign policy assert that the U.S. is alienating its allies.

Kristol: If America does not act to change the present structure of NATO and encourage the creation of an all-European alliance, the U.S. will one day be driven out of Europe.

Kondracke: Mr. Rostow, what can the U.S. do to encourage the Europeans to bear a more equal share of the defense burden?

Rostow: I do not think the burden for NATO is borne unequally. I have been over the statistics on defense spending dozens of times and the question of equality and burden sharing is far more complicated than most people realize.

It is common to compare the share of the GNP allotted for military expenditures by the U.S. and by the Western European nations. However, a comparison of those figures is not entirely fair, because the U.S. is *the* nuclear power. In the past, even the British and the French have been discouraged from developing their own nuclear weapons. For important reasons of national policy, America is the only major nuclear power in the West, and it wants to remain that way. The U.S. is also far ahead of its NATO

allies in expenditures for troop pay and retirement allowances. But the U.S. does not have military conscription. Instead, it has an all-volunteer army which costs a great deal.

Europe has, of course, become a regional power. With the exception of France's interventions in Africa, Western European countries no longer take part in Afro-Asian affairs. Thus, the U.S. military burden is by definition much greater.

Seeking to defend its interests in the Far East and the Middle East, the U.S. tries to encourage more collaboration with its NATO allies. The allies also want to protect their interest in the security of the Middle East and other areas outside the definition of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

Fox: Mr. Rostow, the American national interest increasingly extends beyond the borders of Europe. Yet the U.S. still commits one-half of its defense budget to NATO. In an era of tightening budgets, how long can the U.S. sustain this flow of dollars to its European allies?

Rostow: It is a fantasy to suppose America can save money by withdrawing from the alliance. If it is in the American national interest to prevent Western Europe from falling under Soviet control and the ensuing political damage that would cause, then the expense of maintaining sufficient forces to deter a Soviet attack---nuclear or conventional---will not drop if the U.S. pulls out of Europe. America will still need both conventional forces that can be rapidly deployed and the same number of nuclear weapons. That is why the 50 percent figure cited in the question is so misleading. A withdrawal from Europe might save balance of payments costs, of course, but those costs can be offset by arrangements with the allied countries where the troops are based.

It is a tough world. The Soviets are spending a great deal on defense and on maintaining huge conventional forces in Northern Europe, Central Europe and Asia. NATO allies have to build a successful deterrent, or they must shift to a much more aggressive strategy. However, budget constraints are not going to control events. People thought that World War I would end by Christmas because nobody could afford it. But nations do not stop fighting for their independence because it costs "too much" money.

Kaplan: Mr. Kristol, doesn't your view of nationalism as an invigorating motivation for foreign policy comport some risks? Would you, for example, be in favor of letting Germany have the bomb?

Kristol: The French or the British should have a nuclear capability and Germany should be given a nuclear guarantee. If Germany had the bomb, it would frighten the Soviet Union and possibly provoke a confrontation. The Germans understand that. They do not want to take that risk. However, a European NATO would need sufficient conventional force and nuclear weapons to establish a serious deterrent.

Eberstadt: Mr. Kristol, if the U.S. withdraws from

the alliance, it will be harder for America to project force into the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Are you satisfied with the prospect of European countries filling that vacuum?

Kristol: NATO's forward bases are *supposed* to help project force into the Middle East. The question is: Can the U.S. use those bases? What if there is the threat of a war with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf and the Europeans decide it is not in their interest to allow the U.S. to use the bases? It would be better to have *American* bases in Europe and even in the Middle East, as long as the host countries are willing to tolerate them.

Frawley: Mr. Rostow, some political parties in NATO countries have already called for a withdrawal from the alliance. What sort of NATO can we expect if these parties come to power?

Rostow: My general policy is not to criticize allies. In the U.S., the Democratic party and many Republicans are going through the same anguish. In Europe and in America---across the political spectrum---there is a desire to retreat to what people fondly, but incorrectly, imagine was an isolationist policy before 1914. It is all part of the normal friction and irritation of conducting an alliance. But it is also prompted by fear of the change in the nuclear balance.

Kristol: *So long as European governments can depend on U.S. nuclear weapons to deter a conventional Soviet attack, they will never build up their own defenses.*

Kristol: The nations of Western Europe are fatigued and demoralized by their dependence on the U.S. If America does not act to change the present structure of NATO and encourage the creation of an all-European alliance, the U.S. will one day be driven out of Europe.

NATO's present defense strategy is folly: implicitly, even a conventional Soviet attack would provoke retaliation with nuclear weapons. An American military field manual for infantry captains on the German front outlines NATO's strategy in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion. According to the manual, after Soviet tanks break through the German border, the U.S. air force would bomb the tanks. Then the Soviet air force would promptly bomb all the American tanks. Soviet troops, which are far more numerous, would advance into West Germany. The U.S. would then rely on tactical nuclear weapons. That is the last sentence of the field manual for American officers in Western Europe, because after that who knows?

The only way the U.S. can encourage its allies to accept the sacrifices necessary to build a credible conventional deterrent is by making the defense of Europe the primary responsibility of Europeans. It is a disgrace that NATO's conventional forces lag so far behind the Warsaw Pact.

The present structure of the alliance is to blame. So long as European governments can depend on U.S. nuclear

weapons to deter a conventional Soviet attack, they will never build up their own defenses. If the U.S. prudently disengages itself from NATO, the Europeans will do what they can and should do: not only repel but actually defeat the Soviet Union at the conventional level.

Rostow: Our debate has neglected to address what we witnessed at Reykjavik: Moscow's exploitation of the political effect of nuclear weapons and of the changed military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At Reykjavik, Soviet negotiators essentially told President Reagan: Look, the future of world politics will be determined by the correlation of forces, and they are to our advantage now. Why don't you draw the necessary conclusions and concede that we have a right to nuclear superiority? This would mean a paralysis of any attempt to defend the West with conventional arms.

Exploiting the political effect of weapons is a very familiar idea in world politics. Before World War I, the Germans did not build up their navy to fight the British navy, but to persuade Britain to remain neutral in the event of a war on the continent. Today, the Soviet Union seeks to extract political benefit from the changing state of the nuclear balance.

Of course, the Kremlin fears a nuclear war. It fears the possibility that the U.S. might dare to retaliate, despite Soviet superiority, and it fears the desertion of Warsaw Pact troops. Nevertheless, Moscow has intensified its campaign to instill fear and a desire for accommodation. We can see the effects of that campaign throughout the Western world; we see its effects tonight.

Professor Kristol believes that the Europeans can match the Warsaw Pact forces at the conventional level. Quite apart from the disparity in numbers, this point is not relevant. Even if Western Europe was able to beat Warsaw Pact troops to a standstill in a conventional war, superior European troop strength could not prevent the Soviet Union from using chemical and nuclear weapons at the very start of an attack. As Robert McNamara remarked in a press conference several years ago, no one can be confident that the Soviet Union would confine an attack in Europe to the conventional level. So far the Soviet Union has refrained from engaging in an armed attack in Europe. However, if it came to a war through accident or through Soviet agitation, there is no reason to suppose Moscow would not use these extraordinary weapons. The West should be ready for this possibility. Thus, the U.S. must not withdraw from the alliance, but strengthen its preparedness. □

Helsinki Accords--- Hostage to Human Rights

John W. Riehm

The second part of the current review of the Helsinki Accords opened recently in Vienna. The thirty-five-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe turned to security and economic affairs, having spent seven weeks, beginning on 4 November, also examining the implementation of human rights pledges under the 1975 agreement.

Critics complained in advance that the Helsinki Process should be abrogated because violations of human rights are endemic in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. To this participant at Vienna, the human rights "basket" of the CSCE is a valuable tool--particularly as the conference focuses on security and economics. For all three baskets are related and, in effect, hostage to one another.

We have just seen highly publicized symbols of change in the Soviet Union, following concerted pressure in and out of the CSCE (see advisory, p. 33). Anatoly Shcharansky and Yury Orlov, long-oppressed monitors of the Helsinki Accords, were permitted to emigrate. And the release of Andrei Sakharov from internal exile in Gorky coincided with the close of the first phase of the CSCE meeting in Vienna.

During that phase, the Soviets made it clear that they seek primarily to expand the scope of the recently signed Stockholm agreements on confidence and security building in Europe (flowing from the 1983 CSCE "concluding document"). They are also interested in expanding trade, and in scientific and technological changes. To come to that, however, the Helsinki Process requires the Soviets and their friends to hear an extensive recitation by Western delegates of Soviet and East-bloc failures to implement human rights pledges.

The unanimity of Western delegates insisting on the direct linkage between human rights and security was never broken by the Soviets. It was evident that most East-bloc allies were impressed by the Western case, and disturbed by the Soviets' unproductive attacks on the West. Only Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria echoed Moscow.

The Soviets, challenged to discuss their failure to

John W. Riehm, president of Freedom House, is a public member of the U.S. delegation to the Helsinki review conference in Vienna.

comply with human rights pledges, did not answer queries about specific incidents or particular individuals. Instead, they charged Western delegates with engaging in polemical and disruptive conduct. The Soviets maintained there are no problems in their sphere because state socialism guarantees rights and provides material benefits, viz. food, housing and work (no comment on how inadequate these may be). Freedom of the mind seems to be beyond the comprehension of the Soviet delegation.

After the barrage of criticism, capped by the death in a Soviet prison of Anatoly Marchenko, the Helsinki monitor, I believe Moscow concluded it failed again to drive wedges between Western delegations. This was reminiscent of the Soviets' major propaganda loss after failing to keep Pershing cruise missiles out of NATO countries. The Soviets obviously have decided to change tactics. We will soon know whether the release of Sakharov and others is only a gesture, or the first breath of a fresh breeze blowing across the USSR. For the West has made it clear that Soviet proposals concerning security will not be considered without real improvement in human rights.

The United States is dealing with the Soviets on many

fronts---direct negotiations at the highest level, meetings in Geneva, activities at the U.N. etc., but we should recognize that the unique forum provided by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is of great importance. Continuing discussions among the thirty-five nations on the interdependent ten principles of Helsinki have a significant effect. Discussions in the working bodies on economic, scientific and ecological affairs proceed with surprising unanimity between East and West, and constructive agreements for improvement of the European environment may be anticipated. Similarly, much sound work is being done in educational programs, language training, cultural exchanges and the like.

These benefits must be weighed as we measure progress on security and individual human rights. Anyone who suggests that the United States is wasting its time engaging in such multilateral diplomacy does not appreciate the benefits that accrue to Europe and to the United States. Despite the surface impression of impasse, progress is being made toward human rights goals. Moving the Soviets is like moving a glacier---but it moves---and the Vienna Conference is an important driving force. □

Sovereignty or Development: The Choice for (Some) Small Countries

Raymond Lloyd

In early 1960, prior to the first U.N. Development Decade, there were some eighty sovereign entities, members of the United Nations system. By 1985, halfway through the Development Decade-3, there were some 164, with perhaps 10-20 more to come. During those twenty-five years some \$500 billion may have been spent on aid, yet there are large areas of the developing world, as in Africa and Central America, which are worse off than before: for example, 20 of Africa's 50 states, according to the World Bank Atlas of May 1986, had negative growth rates in per capita GNP between 1973 and 1983. And yet other states, in the Caribbean, Pacific and Arab world, are better off only because of disproportionately massive injections of overseas or regional aid.

The conventional wisdom of the mid-1980s is that such aid has been wasted because it has gone through governments, which have frittered it away on external wars, internal repression and bureaucratic corruption. But a prior question seems not to have been asked, and applies to all forms of aid and trade, governmental and commercial, voluntary and private: can many of the national entities

now receiving aid, be politically viable units now, in 10, 50 or 100 years' time, and if not, will not aid continue to be wasted?

Britain and the U.S., for example, are currently giving aid, bilaterally or through the U.N. or regional institutions, to some 92 sovereign entities with less than 10,000,000 people, or less than the population of metropolitan London or New York. Specifically, aid is being given to six sovereign entities with less than 100,000 people, or the population of Oxford or Albany; to eight others with less than 200,000 people, or the citizens of Southampton or Dayton; to twelve more with up to 500,000, or those of Edinburgh or Seattle; to seven others with less than 1,000,000, or the population of Glasgow or Dallas; to another 10 with less than 2,000,000, or less than the population of Philadelphia; to twenty-three others with less

Raymond Lloyd, who worked for many years in the United Nations, is editor of Women and Men, "founded to encourage men to share in woman's advancement," published in London.

Foreign policy

“Human Rights”: The Hidden Agenda

Irving Kristol

TO THE BEST of my knowledge, the first time the issue of “human rights” became a focus for a major foreign policy debate in a Western democracy occurred a little more than a century ago in Britain, when Gladstone divided the country because of the massacre of some 12,000 Bulgarians by their Turkish rulers.

Gladstone was a believing Christian, with an intensity of religious commitment that, in the United States today, would surely be regarded as a disqualification for high office. He was appalled that the British government, under Disraeli, seemed unmoved by the massacre of Bulgarian Christians by Turkish Muslims. And Disraeli was indeed unmoved. Though nominally a Christian, he could hardly be called a believer, much less a true believer. What he did care very much about was preventing Russia, the self-appointed Slavic “protector” of Bulgarians and other Balkan peoples under Turkish rule, from liquidating the Turkish empire and acquiring Constantinople and the Dardanelles in the process. He saw this as a serious threat to the new British empire he was in the process of creating—an empire

that would include India and Cyprus, with the area in between (Afghanistan, Egypt, etc.) a British sphere of influence. For Disraeli, Russia’s imperial ambitions were the main enemy, and it was to frustrate these ambitions that he tried to preserve the integrity of the Turkish empire—even if it meant a war with Russia, which he was prepared to contemplate. In the event, the Turkish empire was beyond salvaging, but at the Congress of Berlin Disraeli was still able to come away with “peace with honor”—i.e., with Cyprus in hand and the Dardanelles out of Soviet reach. As a concession to the Tsar, the Bulgarians did get some dilution of Turkish sovereignty, but for Disraeli this was distinctly a minor matter.

In the brief period that intervened between the original Bulgarian massacre and the Congress of Berlin, Gladstone did more than denounce Disraeli for lack of Christian compassion. He elaborated an alternative view of Britain’s role in the world and of an appropriate British foreign policy. It was, quite simply, an anti-imperialist view, a candidly “little England” view. He thought it ridiculous for Queen Victoria to become Empress of India, saw no point in having Cyprus as a colony or in establishing military outposts in Afghanistan. He believed in self-determination for the Christian peoples of the Balkans and did not give a damn for the Turkish empire, which he regarded as a

Irving Kristol, the publisher of *The National Interest*, is John M. Olin Professor of Social Thought at the Graduate School of Business, New York University.

barbaric relic—but he was not about to do anything to “liberate” those Christian peoples. And while he did not like the idea of Russia acquiring the Dardanelles, he did not think it was worth a war to prevent it. This was not just a point of view, it was a program.

When Gladstone returned to office in 1880, however, the “facts” that Disraeli had created, the public opinion that had been solidified behind them, as well as the coercive necessities of international power politics, prevented Gladstone from carrying out his program. He never left any doubt as to what he would have preferred to do, had he been free to do it. But he was not free, and the issue of “human rights” slid once again to the distant margins of British foreign policy.

When one looks back at this episode, one is struck by what one can only call the “innocence” with which the issue was raised and debated. Ever since the end of World War II, in contrast, when “human rights” again became of international concern, the entire discussion has been tainted with disingenuousness. For the past four decades, a concern for “human rights” has not simply and mainly been opposed to a hardheaded and hardhearted *realpolitik*. On the contrary, despite the sea of sentimentality on which the issue of “human rights” has floated, that issue has, as often as not, been an accessory to a certain kind of ideological politics.

Today, most discussions of “human rights” are misleading because beneath the surface there is almost always a hidden agenda. An issue of “human rights” today is all too likely to be an issue exploited in bad faith.

Am I questioning the sincerity of the thousands of “human rights” activists in the United States and elsewhere? Well, sincerity in politics is a tricky affair. It is more common in politics than cynics think, but even political activists can have difficulty knowing what it is they are being sincere *about*. It is not always easy to distinguish between sincerity and a passionate self-righteousness that cares only for the purity of conscience which inhabits a posturing self. Many of the most

ardent Northern abolitionists, prior to the Civil War, were so offended by slavery that they urged that the South be encouraged to secede. Were they being sincere about slavery, or about their own moral fastidiousness? God only knows.

There is no doubt that most Americans who exhibit a passionate interest in “human rights” are moved primarily by humanitarian motives—usually by an understandable, even commendable, outrage at one particular abuse directed against a particular person or group of persons. It is then very easy for them to slide into a feverish humanitarianism which disorients their senses when they confront issues of foreign policy. In such a condition, they are easily manipulable by those who have a professional, as distinct from a simple, humanitarian interest in “human rights.”

Yes, one must certainly respect the courage of those human rights activists who live and operate in countries and under circumstances where self-sacrifice is a possible consequence of their commitment. Yet it also has to be said that even some of those who make this exemplary commitment do not necessarily care about “human rights” in any general sense. Thus, I do not share the widespread admiration for Archbishop Tutu of South Africa, because I am reasonably certain that if and when the African National Congress comes to power, he will be a vocal apologist for its tyranny and brutality. My certainty on this score derives from his placid acquiescence in the brutality and tyranny of existing black African regimes.

On the whole, then, I think the question of “sincerity” is best left aside when discussing “human rights” agitation. Much human rights agitation today appears to exemplify what Hegel called “negative activity”—a fanaticism of the abstract that assaults the actual without having in mind any practical plans for improving the actual. In politics such “negative activity,” whatever its motivation, always ends up serving a positive political purpose. It seems to me that the key question today is whether such activity is

linked to a "hidden agenda." Much of the time, I would argue, this is the case. Moreover, it is this linkage that explains why the issue of "human rights" has achieved such extraordinary prominence in our time.

THE ERA of bad faith in "human rights" began soon after the conclusion of World War II, with the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This document has been widely criticized for the bland way it equates "social and economic rights" (the right to a job, the right to medical care, vacations with pay) with the kinds of traditional political rights (government by consent of the governed, due process of law, etc.) that have prevailed in the liberal democracies. But there was more than intellectual error or enthusiastic idealism at work here. The document was an important first step in establishing something like a moral equivalence between liberal capitalist democracies and communist or self-styled socialist regimes. This was the hidden agenda that gave birth to this text.

It is probable that most of those in the West who endorsed the Declaration did not realize what was happening. They shortsightedly perceived only immediate advantages to their own political agendas. The trade unions were delighted to see their longstanding demands elevated to the level of "human rights." Liberals eager to construct a welfare state were pleased to think that they were now enlarging the sphere of "human rights." So, naturally, were social democrats, for whom the welfare state is a necessary transitional regime toward some kind of socialist society. To the degree that these groups shared a common ideological purpose it was the denigration of "old fashioned" property rights in order to create a more egalitarian society—and to this same degree, they were complicitous with the "hidden agenda," even if they didn't fully realize its implications. On the other hand, some of those involved in the composition and promulgation of this text knew exactly what they

were doing, and were fully aware of its implications.

Those implications, spelled out over the succeeding decades, have been momentous. To begin with, the Declaration legitimized the notion that totalitarian or authoritarian societies that emphasize "social and economic rights" as part of an official egalitarian ideology have their own distinctive virtues as well as their obvious vices, to be balanced against the virtues and vices of liberal-capitalist societies. While this did not usually result in a literal "moral equivalence," it did frustrate any effort at a strong comparative moral judgment. It is not too much to say that what was involved was nothing less than a firm step toward the *moral disarmament* of the West.

Perhaps an even more important intellectual consequence of this new conception of "human rights" was the near-magical transvaluation of a venerable political idea: the idea of tyranny. Clearly, any authoritarian or totalitarian regime officially dedicated to an egalitarian ideology and officially committed to the entire spectrum of "social and economic rights" could not simply be described as a tyranny, even though the kinds of political rights distinctive of liberal societies were nonexistent. This helps to explain what to many thoughtful people is otherwise a mystery, or a sheer perversity: why the majority of liberals in the West extend such an extraordinary tolerance toward "left-wing" tyrants.

Traditional liberalism spoke not of "human rights" but of *individual rights*, these being almost exclusively rights vis-à-vis government. It explicitly recognized only one "social or economic right": the right to property, including the "property" of one's labor power. This right was thought to be the cornerstone of all those political rights that collectively defined a liberal order. In and of itself, of course, it was not a sufficient basis for those rights—but it was deemed a necessary basis for those rights. Nothing in the experience of the past three centuries has invalidated this thesis. Political liberties exist only in societies that respect individual rights, including property rights. True, the

degree of respect (or non-respect) will vary from country to country, and from time to time. Moreover, in all liberal societies today, property rights have been limited by various entitlements that some would call "social and economic rights," although they are never constitutionally defined as such. But wherever these entitlements are given a massive priority as part of an egalitarian ethos, a liberal society either will not exist or will not endure for long.

To put it bluntly: the effect of the "hidden agenda" was to help delegitimize the market economy ("capitalism") that is an indispensable precondition of a traditional liberal ("bourgeois") society. It had the further implication of casting into doubt the moral status of American foreign policy, which has never thought it appropriate to concern itself with "social and economic rights" in other countries. The importance of this latter implication has been gradually revealed over the course of the past two decades. It is today the primary "hidden agenda" of most activist organizations concerned with "human rights."

I have to emphasize (lest I seem paranoid) that many of the people involved in these organizations are naive innocents. But among the organizers and leaders there are always some full-time professionals who are sophisticated enough to know exactly what they are doing. "Human rights" indeed is only one aspect of their endeavors. It has been documented—though little notice has been taken of this—that many of the same people who are among the leaders of "human rights" agitation are also active in anti-nuclear agitation, arms control agitation, extremist environmentalist agitation, unilateral disarmament agitation, anti-aid-to-the-*contras* agitation, radical feminist agitation, as well as all sorts of organizations that sponsor "friendship" programs with left-wing regimes. Since these are not only energetic people but very intelligent as well, they have been very successful in giving the issue of "human rights" a special "spin" in a certain direction.

Take, for instance, the question of "tor-

ture" which has become so prominent in "human rights" agitation. Note that I put the word in quotation marks, because one of the successes of the "human rights" movement has been to broaden the definition of "torture" to include what would otherwise be classified as "police brutality." Americans would be disapproving of but not outraged at police brutality or the use of third-degree methods against prisoners in distant lands; we are, after all, familiar enough with this phenomenon at home, and would not be surprised to learn that it is far more common in "less civilized" (i.e., most other) countries. But torture, real torture, is an abomination to the bourgeois-liberal sensibility, a violation of that sense of human dignity which is at the very root of our liberal individualism. So a focus on torture is a brilliant bit of public relations.

The question that should be asked, but isn't, is: Why is torture such an issue now, when in years past it never even entered any discussion of international relations? Is torture more common today than it was, say, thirty years ago? There is no reason to think so. In a country like Turkey there has always been a thin line between sheer brutality and outright torture in its prisons. But Turkey, a member of Nato, is an important military ally of the United States. Are we really willing to help destabilize its government in the interest of prison reform? And are those who are so willing really more interested in prison reform than in such destabilization?

In fact, torture (and police brutality, too) may well be less common in the world today because of the power of the media to expose such abuses. In general, actual torture is used today mainly in countries where it has been a traditional practice for centuries. It is also likely to be used in circumstances of a guerrilla insurrection (urban or rural) where the police and military—themselves targets (and often victims) of assassination—are determined to acquire information that might help them suppress the rebellion. That there is provocation to torture is not, of course, a justification, since civilized opinion properly

decided long ago that there is no justification, whatever the circumstances. But by focusing on instances of torture (or of police brutality now counted as torture) the "human rights" activists score an important point: They help legitimate the insurrection that today generally comes from the left, while doing their bit to discredit those governments that are trying to suppress the insurrection.

CRITICS of the "human rights" organizations assert that these organizations operate on a double standard—they seek out authoritarian governments that are on good terms with the United States and emphasize the violations (real or supposed) of "human rights" that occur there, but tend to be relatively unexcited, or at least much less excited, about violations of "human rights" by authoritarian or totalitarian anti-American governments. Indeed, the government that gains this privileged status need not even be left-wing, so long as it is clearly anti-American. Note the disproportionate lack of interest in the state of "human rights" in Syria or Iran, as contrasted with the intense interest in Israel.

To this the "human rights" activists reply, with plausibility, that it makes sense for them to direct their energies to situations where it is reasonable to assume that the United States government is capable of exercising some benign influence—and where, therefore, it bears a degree of moral responsibility for failing to exercise this influence. To which the critics retort that the "human rights" activists are themselves guilty of moral turpitude because of their failure to distinguish between what Joshua Muravchik calls "individual abuses" and "systemic deformities," the latter characterizing totalitarian communist regimes as distinct from merely authoritarian regimes. To which the "human rights" spokesmen then reply that this distinction between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes is a species of "cold war" sophistry, since the suffering of the victim of torture or police brutality under either regime is unvarnished, indistinguishable suffering.

I must confess that, though my sympathies are all with the critics of the "human rights" movement, I find this debate to be essentially sterile. To begin with, the perspective of the victim—whether in war or peace—is the stuff of which poetry (or perhaps theology) is made, not politics, and certainly not foreign policy. To invert Tolstoy's aphorism, all victims are alike in their suffering and humiliation. But not all political regimes in which suffering and humiliation exist are alike. The difference between totalitarian *societies* and authoritarian *governments* is obvious enough—though one of the purposes of focusing on the individual indignities suffered under both regimes is precisely to blur this obvious distinction. True, not all totalitarian societies are identical—there are important national differences that create shades and hues of totalitarianism—nor are they immune to change. But though there may arise an occasional instance where the distinction between an authoritarian and totalitarian policy is less easy to make, the distinction is of crucial significance for an understanding of twentieth-century history and politics.

Authoritarian governments have existed throughout history and may fairly be regarded as *pre-liberal* realities. Whether they are "destined" to become liberal or totalitarian societies, or to evolve into some social form still unimaginable, is an interesting question of political philosophy. But no one can seriously claim that the numerous authoritarian regimes now scattered all over the world constitute any kind of threat to liberal America or the liberal West. Totalitarian societies, on the other hand, are *post-liberal* realities—they emerge out of an explicit rejection of the Western liberal tradition, are the declared enemies of this tradition, and aim to supersede it. It is impossible to write a history of international relations in the twentieth century without making the rise of post-liberal totalitarianism (whether of the right or left) *the* central event of the era, or without making the "cold war" between the liberal democracies and the new totalitarian

states the central focus around which everything else revolves. It is, in contrast, perfectly possible to write a history of international relations in the twentieth century without ever bothering to mention something called "authoritarianism." In fact, the histories that have been written all do exemplify both this impossibility and this possibility.

It is not an accident that most "human rights" activists, and all "human rights" publicists or theorists, insist on denying either the existence or the importance of the totalitarian-authoritarian distinction. In the abstract, there would seem to be no need for them to do so. There are actually some "human rights" activists who do ignore this whole issue—like the clergy of yesteryear, they are impelled by the simple desire to alleviate human suffering, without paying attention to politics. But these are a minority, even among the clergy of today. The "human rights" *movement* is decidedly political. Its need to obfuscate the totalitarian-authoritarian distinction flows from its political intentions, its desire to deny that the "cold war" is anything but a paranoid fantasy of a bourgeois-capitalist establishment, to minimize the totalitarian threat to liberal-democratic nations, to unnerve American foreign policy by constantly exposing the "immorality" of its relations with authoritarian allies, etc. In short, to repeat: Its purpose—the hidden agenda of its "negative activity"—is the moral disarmament of the bourgeois-capitalist West.

It is interesting, by the way, to note that the "human rights" movement is far less influential in Western Europe, and is taken far less seriously by governments there, than is the case in the United States. No European foreign office has to engage in the idiotic political arithmetic which Congress has imposed on our State Department, whereby every year it solemnly tots up the "human rights" situation in dozens of countries. It is an inherently absurd enterprise. If women in Switzerland don't have the vote, while they do in Rumania, does that make Rumania in any way more respectful of "human rights"

than Switzerland? And how does one even apply the concept of "human rights" to Saudi Arabia—a medieval nation rather than a modern state? Why are we so silly as to get involved in this sort of thing, while European governments do not? Are the peoples across the Atlantic less concerned with human rights than we are?

I don't think so. I believe, rather, that the difference is that Western Europe has real, live, important socialist parties, while the United States does not. The result is that those Americans who, in Europe, would belong to socialist or social-democratic parties are forced to channel their political energies into "causes" which, in sum, approximate as closely as possible to those parties' programs. The upshot is that the European left is far more candid than its American counterpart, and has less need for any hidden agendas. When one reads books by European socialists on foreign affairs—the recent writings of Regis Debray can serve as an example—"human rights" is, at most, a very subordinate theme and the theme is sometimes not struck at all. These writings suffer from all kinds of illusions, but they are illusions that flow from avowed ideological convictions. In the United States, where it is imprudent to avow a socialist ideology, those convictions go underground and then emerge in "causes" such as "human rights" or "arms control" or "unilateral nuclear disarmament," which present themselves as apolitical or transpolitical.

Precisely because they seem so non-political or transpolitical, they can actually be more radical in substance. No European country has an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose function is presumably to thwart the militarist proclivities of our Defense Department. Similarly, no European country has an Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, whose function is presumably to thwart the immoral proclivities of our State Department. True, the notion of negotiating an "arms control" agreement with the Soviet Union is at least as popular in Western Europe as in the United States. But in Western Europe this notion is

often based on a real (or not-unrealistic) anxiety, that a conflict between the two superpowers could easily and quickly result in Western Europe becoming a devastated nuclear battlefield, even if the source of this conflict lies outside Western Europe itself or is marginal to Western European interests. It is this fear that motivates many of the more serious "anti-nuclear" activists over there. In the United States, however, "anti-nuclear" and "arms control" publicists are more akin to the anti-American, pro-Soviet left in Europe. They are persuaded that it is a "cold war" American foreign policy which threatens the world with nuclear devastation, and that a more "conciliatory" (i.e., appeasing) posture toward the Soviet Union and its allies will avert such a catastrophe. They display little fear of Soviet intentions, much fearful anxiety about our own White House, Pentagon, and State Department. It is this distrust of the United States and of its status as a world power—what in Europe would be called "anti-Americanism"—that motivates our more passionate "anti-nuclear" advocates and impels them to support *any* formula acceptable to the Soviets, and to adopt an appeasing mode in foreign policy. Such appeasement is their hidden—not deeply hidden, it must be said—agenda.

There is no other explanation, so far as I can see, for the pertinacity of various leading "arms control" advocates, when by now one would have expected them to be thoroughly disillusioned with the whole affair. This includes many who were involved in the negotiation of the SALT I agreement, an agreement that never would have been signed, never could have been signed, if it had been understood beforehand that the Soviets would promptly install over 500 intermediate-range warheads aimed at Western Europe—something that, it turned out, was permitted (though certainly never envisaged) under the SALT I agreement. The lack of subsequent disillusionment among such knowledgeable people, the fact that their passion for the "arms control process" remains undiminished, is something that requires interpretation.

WHAT MAKES American foreign policy so vulnerable to "human rights" agitation? The explanation is not far to seek: This foreign policy has—must have—an ineradicable moral-ideological component. We are indeed engaged in a profound ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, a conflict that dominates world politics. But it is both a simplification and a distortion to describe it as a conflict about "human rights." It is, rather, a conflict over the very *definition* of "human rights," and the point of this conflict is to determine who will have the *power* to define "human rights" for future generations. In that sense, the United States cannot evade the urgencies and the ambiguities of "power politics."

The relation of such "power politics" to the American "public philosophy" makes for tension and complications in our foreign policy. Realpolitik à la Disraeli is unthinkable in America, since it runs against the very grain of our political ethos. Ours is a nation based on a universal creed, and there is an unquenchable missionary element in our foreign policy. We do aim to "make the world safe for democracy"—eventually, and in those places and at those times where conditions permit democracy to flourish. Every American administration in our history has felt compelled—though some have been more enthusiastic than others—to use our influence, wherever possible, to see that other governments respect our conception of individual rights as the foundation of a just regime and a good society.

On the other hand, only two presidents in our history have tried to emulate Gladstone in making the missionary element the very centerpiece of American foreign policy. The first was Woodrow Wilson, who believed that his enterprise would achieve its success by creating a world organization that in turn would form a "community of nations" pledged to respect the principles we hold dear—with disrespect being curbed by a broadened (Wilson would have said "heightened") definition of international law, to be enforced by this new "world community." It

was a utopian vision to which many eminent Americans still pay lip service, but which no serious person can any longer take at face value. Today, all that is left of the Wilsonian dream is a host of international organizations that are at best debating societies, at worst sinks of corruption. There is also an array of treaty obligations that the United States thoughtlessly entered into and from which we are now gingerly trying to free ourselves.

The second president, of course, was Jimmy Carter, who fully accepted the expanded version of "human rights" (including social and economic rights) and who then tried to give the American missionary impulse a unilateralist thrust. But he soon was forced to recognize that the world is a complex and recalcitrant place, full of other peoples with other ideas, and that while proclaiming high-minded principles was one thing, unilateral American efforts to reshape world realities according to our national vision were an enterprise necessarily limited in scope—often very limited. The rights of individuals in other lands are a matter of concern for Americans. One may even say it is an integral part of our national interest. But it is usually a concern that claims no centrality in our foreign policy, since it has to be weighed against all those other interests which make up our national interest.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, one of the original "human rights" enthusiasts, was not in office more than a month before he felt constrained to issue the following statement:

We will speak frankly about injustice both at home and abroad. We do not intend, however, to be strident or polemical, but we do believe that an abiding respect for human rights is a human value of fundamental importance and that it must be nourished. We will not comment on each and every issue, but we will from time to time comment when we see a threat to human rights, when we believe it constructive to do so.

Well—yes. If one is willing to stipulate that by "human rights" one means pretty much what used to be called "individual rights," then any American president could

have endorsed that statement. Ronald Reagan, I am certain, would be happy to endorse it. The United States (in this respect like the Soviet Union) does *stand* for something in the world and its foreign policy must, to the degree that the world permits, respect the principles of its establishment. But it is the nature of foreign policy to operate, most of the time, in the realm of necessity rather than the realm of freedom. So while it is fair to assert that the ideological basis of American foreign policy gives it a permanent moral dimension which itself delimits the scope of any purely "realistic" policy, these limits have to be broad enough to permit foreign policy to be effective.

Just how broad or narrow these limits are will depend on circumstances. Probably the "purest"—most moral, least self-interested—foreign policy action ever taken on behalf of "human rights" was the British navy's suppression of the slave trade in the nineteenth century. This action was made possible by many factors: Britain's massive superiority in sea power, the unimportance of the "Third World" countries involved, the non-existence (as compared with today) of a complex structure of international law and international organizations. So while Britain's action was wholly admirable, one also has to point out that it was costless, or as close to costless as makes no matter.

It is conceivable that the United States might, one of these days, find itself in a more or less comparable situation, and it is certainly to be hoped that it would then take a comparable action. But such situations are likely to be rare. Like all great nations, the United States does conceive itself as having some kind of "civilizing mission." But, lacking an "imperialist" impulse, we are not usually inclined to accomplish this mission through forceful intervention. Presumably if a Pol Pot regime came to power in Central America and began a genocidal campaign against its own people, we might very well intervene. On the other hand, we did not intervene in Cambodia, nor have we even dreamed of intervening in Africa, where tribal

genocide is not uncommon. Unilateral military intervention by the United States on behalf of "human rights" would have to overcome resistance from both our enemies and our allies. And steps short of military intervention will almost always be more symbolic than real. True, symbolic action may sometimes be better than no action at all. But over time the impact, both at home and abroad, of a series of mainly symbolic actions will be negligible. Worse, they will be interpreted as a sign of weakness, not strength, of moralistic impotence rather than moral energy.

If this is our situation today—and the experience of the Carter administration has confirmed that it is—why has the message failed to get through to the "human rights" constituency? The reason, I suggest, is that this constituency has its own agenda, and that "human rights" is a useful rhetoric in which to promote it.

A final point: There are some conservative (or non-left) "human rights" activists who feel that this theme can be exploited for purposes of anti-communist and anti-totalitarian propaganda. It is impossible not to admire the diligence with which they expose the sufferings of people under communism, and this kind of candid ideological warfare does serve to remind us of the nature of the enemy—a reminder that is always timely. But there is reason to wonder whether this strategy, on its own, can be effective over the longer term. There cannot be many people who do not already know about conditions in the Soviet Union. The question is: Why don't they care? Why are most of the major Christian churches in the United States so utterly indifferent to the persecution of Christianity in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe? If this be ignorance, it is a special kind of willful ignorance.

Such willful ignorance, I would suggest, has two sources. First, since the Soviet Union has its own (Marxist) conception of "human rights," about which it is brutally assertive

and in no way apologetic, it does seem quixotically futile to criticize it for not sharing our traditional-liberal political philosophy. Second, and more important, there are many who believe the Soviet model is flawed but who nevertheless regard it as a respectable alternative to our own, which they perceive as at least equally flawed, or even flawed to a greater degree. The sad and simple truth is that, once one has lost faith in the traditional-liberal model, one feels deprived of the moral authority to challenge the Soviet model and one then loses all interest in doing so. It is this loss of faith that feeds the organized "human rights" movement, and gives it an "anti-American" bias. To this loss of faith, mere anti-communism is no answer.

There is also a significant cost involved in such an anti-communist "human rights" campaign. To avoid accusations of unprincipled conservative bias, it is inevitably pushed toward making "human rights" a central issue in determining American policy toward South Korea, Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc.—which is, after all, exactly what our anti-American "human rights" activists wish. In effect, the conservative campaign has the unintended consequence of legitimating the "human rights" efforts of the left.

The so-called "human rights" activists inside the Soviet Union—or at least the more sophisticated among them—understand this problem well enough. They certainly do appreciate efforts in the West to alleviate the suffering of those who oppose particular policies of the Soviet system. This is justification enough for such efforts, whatever their limited success. But those activists inside the Soviet Union also have a hidden agenda, one of which I thoroughly approve. To the extent that the "human rights" issue offers them some protection as well as some leverage, they are morally entitled to use it. It is also politically prudent for them to emphasize it. Unfortunately, such hidden agendas are easily read by the Soviet authorities, who have had so much experience in writing them.

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, before the Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden, May 18, 1987.

It is somewhat of a challenge for an official of the U.S. Government to come to Sweden and deliver a talk on aspects of U.S. foreign policy. It is a challenge, I believe, not because we are in fundamental disagreement. On the contrary, I believe we are in fundamental agreement, but there are misunderstandings between us. The challenge, it seems to me, is to use this opportunity to make a contribution, be it ever so slight, to the efforts to clear up our misunderstandings.

There is, of course, one basic difference between your approach to world affairs and ours, which is directed by our relative size. Anyone who knows the American people well is aware of the fact that we do not particularly relish our position of leadership in the world. But our numbers—in terms of population, economic strength, and military power—have thrust a role on us from which we cannot escape. Our actions can powerfully affect the course of history. We must live with that fact and act accordingly.

Let me now focus on the specific topic of this talk: human rights as an aspect of foreign policy. In recent years we have become so accustomed to human rights discussions at the international level that we sometimes do not focus on the fact that the introduction of human rights into foreign policy debates is of very recent origin.

The concept of human rights, the notion that the powers of government are limited by the inherent rights of the individual, stems in its modern setting from the writings of the thinkers of the 18th century. But for two centuries the issue of human rights was deemed a matter of purely domestic concern, to be asserted by political groups within a given country in the context of demands for democratic government. Diplomats, even the diplomats of democracies, shied away from involvement in such matters. They continued to adhere to the notion that what a sovereign power does within its borders to its own citizens is not appropriately a matter of concern to other countries.

It was only in the wake of World War II that consideration came to be given to the idea that the issue of human rights should be elevated to the international level. Language to that effect was incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations. But it takes a long time for diplomatic traditions to die. The prevailing view after the adoption of the Charter was that the language contained therein was hortatory rather than operational. Nor did adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 effect an immediate change in this outlook. The barrier was finally broken a few years later, when the United Nations began to discuss the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa.

In retrospect it may not be surprising that, of all the human rights violators of that time, the United Nations would single out South Africa for special opprobrium. After all, the commitment to the cause of human

rights in the Charter had been prompted largely by Nazi atrocities, which had been based on a racist ideology. South African racist practices were uncomfortably reminiscent of Nazi prewar policies even if not of the wartime murders.

As it is, it took the United Nations a long time to progress beyond its single-minded attention to South Africa as the one domestic human rights violator. Other human rights violations were approached most gingerly until the Soviet bloc, after 1973, pounced on Chile, not really for violations of human rights but because of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The rest of us, who sincerely do believe in human rights, joined the effort because of that belief. Thus you can say that an East-West consensus was established even though there was a fundamental difference in motivation.

It was only toward the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s that the list of states subjected to comprehensive criticism in international fora was lengthened to include some as to whose inclusion there was no overwhelming majority consensus.

Beginning with the Belgrade followup meeting under the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the scope of discussion was, indeed, extended to include human rights violators within the Soviet bloc. The precedent set in the CSCE process was thereafter followed in the United Nations as well. Thus, only within the last 10 years can we speak of a full-scale, across-the-board discussion of human rights violations in international fora, discussions in which a good many

participating states have put aside the traditional inhibitions against such discussion.

In the United States the 1970s also witnessed the development of and, even more significantly, the application of a bilateral human rights policy, a human rights policy which would not only be reflected in speeches at international gatherings but in direct contacts between the United States and the country in question. The Congress of the United States passed a series of laws which linked human rights conditions in specific countries to specific actions by the U.S. Government. Statutory linkage was thus established to most-favored-nation status with regard to tariffs, U.S. governmental credits and credit guarantees, economic and military assistance, U.S. votes on loans from international banks, licenses for the export of equipment used by law enforcement agencies, etc.

In order that it be guided in voting on foreign assistance programs, Congress also enacted a law during the 1970s which required the State Department to submit an annual report reviewing human rights practices throughout the world, country by country. As I have just noted, the objective of the law was to provide the Congress with fuller information on the state of human rights in specific countries. However, this law had, in my opinion, a highly significant and perhaps totally unintended impact on the U.S. State Department.

It was decided early on that the first draft of a country human rights report was to be prepared by the U.S. embassy located in that country. This resulted in ambassadors appointing, in each of our embassies, persons responsible for the preparation of such reports. These persons became known, over time, as our "human rights officers."

Preparing a human rights report on a country such as, for example, Sweden is a rather simple task. It can be done quickly prior to the annual deadline set for the submission for such reports.

But the situation is vastly different in many other states. Where massive human rights violations take place, it may be necessary to have a full-time human rights officer. As the information on human rights violations will often not be readily available, the human rights officer will have to go out to look for it. This will necessarily mean that he must be in contact with persons not particularly well liked by the government in power. Here we have, thus, another break with tradition. Throughout the world in states in which human rights

violations occur, the U.S. embassy is consistently in touch with persons who are in disagreement with the policies of their governments. In many locations the U.S. embassy is the only foreign mission that is regularly in touch with these dissenting individuals or groups.

Though the reports are prepared only once a year, a human rights officer in a country which does have human rights problems must necessarily keep watch across the year. He will try to collect information on human rights violations so as to be able, when the time comes, to write a report that is both comprehensive and accurate. Keeping watch does not, in our State Department, mean writing notes to oneself for ready reference at the time the annual report is written. A Foreign Service officer responsible for a particular subject matter will tend to report on matters in his field as they develop. Human rights officers will, therefore, send telegraphic messages to Washington, which we usually call "cables," letting the State Department know about the latest developments in the human rights field in the country in question. He might even add a recommendation as to what we should do in light of the latest development. And so, day in, day out, throughout the year, there arrive at the State Department in Washington messages from embassies throughout the world, messages prepared by human rights officers, reporting on human rights violations.

Whether or not the embassies recommend specific steps to be taken in consequence of these human rights violations, a report of such a violation will cause the responsible officers in Washington to reflect on these developments and try to reach a conclusion as to what to do about the problem. Through this process, as you can readily see, the entire bureaucracy is sensitized to the human rights issue, sensitized to the point that it almost instinctively seeks to respond.

A report of a human rights violation will occasionally cause us to make a public statement critical of the violating country. In many other instances it will cause us to deliver a demarche or make a less formal representation in the capital of the country in question or with the country's ambassador in Washington or both. The latter type of practice has become known as "quiet diplomacy." Let me emphasize to you that quiet diplomacy concerning human rights can be quite forceful. The term "quiet" means in this context merely that we do not make a public statement on the

subject. Quiet diplomacy, I can assure you, is being pressed by the United States most actively and is a truly effective tool in advancing the cause of human rights.

I must emphasize that injection of human rights considerations into the practice of foreign policy in the United States has not meant that our national security concerns can or should be put aside or relegated to second place. Like every other country, we must, in the first instance, be guided by our need for self-preservation. As, because of our size and status, our security can be affected by developments anywhere in the world, security implications must necessarily be weighed in *all* our foreign policy moves. What might be needed to protect our security can and is on many occasions the subject of argument. However, few people will argue over the basic principle that we have a right to preserve our security.

Having made the point about the supremacy of national security concerns, let me add that the United States consistently subordinates commercial concerns to human rights considerations. Beyond that, I would say that there are times when we put security considerations at risk in order to advance the cause of human rights. This may be hard to believe, but I can think of a number of situations which would prove the correctness of the observation I have just made.

I recognize that not only this last remark but a good deal of what I may have said to you today runs counter to the description of American foreign policy methods and objectives as described in the media. Let me simply say that that is where our misunderstandings may start. I, for one, believe in and respect the idealistic motivation of Swedish foreign policymakers. As we share these motives, I believe there is a sound basis for dialogue between us and for action along parallel lines. Ambassador Newell [U.S. Ambassador to Sweden], too, fully subscribes to this belief. That is why he urged me to visit Sweden, and that is why I am here today. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • June 1987
Editor: Colleen Sussman • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.



As requested. Ted
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 8, 1986

Mr. John G. Plumides
Supreme President
American Hellenic Educational
Progressive Association
Suite 200
1707 L Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Plumides:

I am responding to your letter of August 22 to Secretary Shultz regarding the foreign assistance allocation for Cyprus.

The Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act had specified that \$12.35 million should be drawn from existing Economic Supporting Funds appropriations for the International Fund for Northern Ireland and Ireland. After a thorough review of the options and consultations with Congress, the Department decided to reprogram the necessary funds from the Sudan account and not to reduce the \$14.355 million earmarked for Cyprus.

Sincerely,

Mark C. Lissfelt
Director
Office of Southern European Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs

U.S. Foreign Policy: Opportunity and Risk



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is the last address by Robert C. McFarlane as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, before the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C., December 9, 1985.

I welcome the opportunity to speak to the Washington World Affairs Council this evening. I accepted your invitation, at the time as a public official, out of a firm conviction regarding the vital contribution that is made to shaping public policy by outside centers of analysis and debate. You may be still more confident today of my ever stronger belief that the government should be always attentive to the enlightened views of those of us in the private sector.

I have a second reason for valuing the chance to speak to you. We are at a historic moment of opportunity and risk in American foreign policy, particularly regarding East-West relations. It is important that we understand where we are, how we reached the current plateau, and the alternative paths before us. In this way we can, with vision and care, seize the opportunities at hand, create the ones that have not yet matured, and avoid the pitfalls of naivete.

Last week, in making my departure from the President's staff, I observed that numerous philosophers throughout history have argued the weaknesses of democracy. The harsher critics have asserted that democracies are fragile, fated first to decline, and ultimately to disintegrate. Even some of the less

severe analysts have written that democratic nations have inherent failings in the conduct of foreign policy.

I said then, and again now, that America's extraordinary renewal over the past 5 years is a historic phenomenon that such pessimistic political theorists will have to acknowledge as important evidence of their error. Our nation has rallied, soberly but with clear-eyed determination. The President and the American people share the credit. I'll return to the details of this achievement in a moment—I think it amounts to far more than a change in mood—but first let me give the pessimists their due.

There have, remember, been other moments of buoyancy in our history and other times when our foreign policy seemed even more blessed than today. There have, in fact, been at least two in my lifetime. Forty years ago, Americans hoped that in the wake of war a world order could be created that was freer of conflict than during the preceding generation of tumult. Others, it was hoped, would take their cue from our nation's prosperous example and from the self-evident advantages of our political system.

A little more than 20 years ago marked another national high. The surging economies of the Western world seemed likely to solve many global problems through the impact of steady growth. There was no euphoria about

East-West relations then, but the tensions of cold war had certainly subsided. It seemed that perhaps Soviet-American relations were not an area of such intractable difficulty after all.

From both these peaks of opportunity and confidence, we descended for a time into disappointment. In 1945, we launched into peace, thinking that would be easy compared to what was already behind us. In 1965, we launched into war, and many people thought *that* would be easy. Both turned out to be a lot harder than we expected, and, in fact, naivete and inconstancy of this kind are central to the indictments against the foreign policy skills of democracies—naivete to start with, followed by disappointment and confusion, followed by despair.

After reflection on this history, what can we say about what lies ahead? Who can say that America's mood won't unravel, that we have carefully thought through the huge tasks before us and that we have the resources, material and spiritual, to perform them?

Well, tonight *I* will. I want to argue that this Administration's success is not a transitory anomaly on a path of inevitable decline. The effort we're making is sustainable, the achievements of the past few years are solid, the strategy for the next few years is sound. But—in democracies there's always a "but"—nothing could be more dangerous than complacency. The tasks before us *are* huge, and, from leaders and citizens

alike, we will need unusual clear-headedness and commitment.

Nothing makes clearer America's ability to sustain a leading role in international affairs than the results already achieved.

Recall where our nation stood just 5 years ago. In the late 1970s we seemed to be in a state of decline on almost every front. The economy was chaotic, suffering inflation and stagnation at the same time—something the economists had told us was impossible. Confidence in our political system had been shaken by assassination, by the trauma of a president resigning from office, by weak leadership, by conflict and stalemate between the branches of government. This coincided with a half decade or so in which the defense budget was flat or falling. We had lost a war. We saw many of our politicians and pundits tempted by isolationism and many of our allies unsure of our pledges to them.

Concurrently, Soviet power and willingness to take risks rose dramatically. Despite arms control agreements designed to create nuclear stability, the Soviet Union steamed steadily ahead in acquiring new strategic nuclear forces. And despite the conclusion of many academic writers that force had become irrelevant in international politics, the Soviets showed they thought quite differently. We witnessed increased Soviet involvements, both direct and indirect, both close to home and far away.

When this trend culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan, suddenly Western worries boiled over. But worry was one thing, national strategy was another. What were we to do?

Restoring U.S. Strength

President Reagan came into office determined to reverse this decline. To do so meant understanding how pervasive it had become. We had to restore not only our military power—the foundation of deterrence—but also our moral, political, and economic strength and, in the process, our sense of purpose and our self-confidence. Through 5 years of steady rebuilding, he has accomplished just that. You all know the dimensions of the economic recovery, but it has also provided the underpinning for a revival in foreign policy that has been just as impressive.

Critics have said that in foreign policy the Reagan Administration does

just what it rejects in domestic policy: throw money at problems and, above all, defense dollars. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what has happened over the past 5 years. For the rebuilding of our military strength, however important, is not the sole source of President Reagan's foreign policy success.

Our defense budget could not have counted for half so much had the President not also been committed to restoring our reputation for reliability, to showing steadiness under pressure, to expressing our devotion to democratic principle, to developing imaginative long-term approaches even though results wouldn't be seen immediately, and finally to mustering energy and shortening our response time when quick results were essential.

This surely sounds like a long list of self-plaudits, so let me give you some specific examples.

By reliability, I mean that when Pakistan comes under increased pressure from cross-border bombing attacks, the United States responds with a solid long-term program of political and military support.

By steadiness, I mean a 3-year balanced strategy on the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, exploring every possible avenue for a negotiated solution but not letting the Soviets bully NATO into backing down.

By democratic principle, I have in mind bolstering El Salvador's best hope for a humane future, even though many in our country have called Central American Leninist revolutions inevitable.

By imagination, I mean the careful combination of private and official efforts in Secretary Baker's strategy for coping with LDC [less developed country] debt. I might just as easily refer to the ground-breaking proposals for a Middle East peace embodied in the Reagan plan, which is still the most promising approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Finally, by energy and quick reaction time, I am thinking of Ethiopian famine relief and of the Grenada rescue operation.

The achievements I've described here are important in themselves. But they are also the firm anchor for other efforts, in particular, for one of the most hopeful possibilities in years—the prospect of more stable and, in time, maybe even more constructive East-West relations.

Building More Constructive East-West Relations

You have all heard a great deal about the President's meetings last month with General Secretary Gorbachev. Let me add one piece to the story that has not always received enough attention. What he achieved in Geneva last month would simply not have been possible without the firm foundation of his foreign policy as a whole, put in place over the last 5 years. There are new opportunities before us now not because the President is changing his approach but precisely because he *isn't* changing it.

Those who want further progress between Washington and Moscow—and that should include all of us—need to understand that this is what it takes: realism, patience, and determination. Otherwise, the hopes that have been raised will be quickly dashed.

I have said that President Reagan came into office recognizing that more than a military buildup was needed to prevent a permanent American decline. His strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union has had the same breadth. In one of his most important speeches on this subject, in January 1984, he set out three objectives that continue to govern the Administration's approach.

- The first was to do everything possible to reduce the danger of nuclear war. He has said this many times: whatever our differences, and whether or not they can be resolved, they should stay peaceful. It is essential that both sides design their military forces, and negotiate arms reduction agreements, with this goal in mind.

- Second, he spoke of the need to deal with a disturbing pattern in the Soviet Union's international conduct—the use, promotion, or exploitation of force and subversion to extend its influence beyond its borders. This pattern of conduct was as important as anything else in shattering the prospects for mutually beneficial relations in the postwar period.

- Finally, the President said that he hoped to construct what he called a better "working relationship" between the two sides.

These three goals express the deep realism on which the Reagan revival has been based. It is a realism that

recognizes what sometimes seem like conflicting truths:

- *Both* that few things could contribute more to peace than real internal change in the Soviet Union, *and* that it can't be our job to bring that change about; it's the Soviets' job.

- *Both* that our most profound differences cannot be resolved, *and* that they must remain peaceful.

- *Both* that nuclear weapons aren't the source of Soviet-American disagreement, *and* that they're the part of the conflict we must try hardest to control.

- *Both* that Moscow does not invent all the world's ills, *and* that more responsible Soviet behavior in the Third World is essential if the world's new nations are to have a chance of peace, freedom, and progress.

These have been—and, I am sure, will remain—the Administration's goals and principles. I think that the meeting in Geneva made clear that they're exactly the right ones. It is true that in managing the affairs of a great nation, you get only so much credit for having the right goals and principles. Now that we're already anticipating another summit, are we, in fact, moving any closer to concrete results? And if we aren't, what other steps are we taking to do so?

Reducing the Danger of Nuclear War. Over the past several years, no issue has been the subject of more inflamed political debate than nuclear weapons: what kind we should have, how many, where, at what price, and then, if possible, how to get rid of them. For a time, in fact, the Soviet Union seemed to want to make a whole foreign policy out of inflammatory rhetoric on this question.

President Reagan has had a different approach. He has pursued the most practical of negotiating approaches—to focus first on the most dangerous weapons, ballistic missiles—while concurrently exploring ways in which the nuclear danger could be radically reduced in the future. That's reflected in his call for a 50% reduction in ballistic missile warheads. That's why we've put forward a series of flexible formulas for limiting the number of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and so forth. But it's also why the President is committed to the research program of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Over the past 5 years, we have found precious little agreement with the Soviet side in discussing these issues. That was perhaps inevitable. Was it not to be expected that given the trends of

the late 1970s they would wait us out for 4 years? Indeed, the wait may not be over. Since the Geneva talks, we have heard a lot of familiar talk from the Soviet side—raising objections to American decisions that haven't even been taken and can't even be considered for years, objections to weapons that aren't weapons at all, and objections to aggressive intentions that simply don't exist.

And yet what happened at Geneva was not simply an articulate and forceful repetition of old positions on each side. We also arrived at a document at the end, and its language may prove to be a small glimmer of daylight in this process. In the joint statement issued by the two leaders after 15 hours of discussion, they agreed that their negotiating teams should accelerate efforts for progress. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev said they wanted—and here I quote—"early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground."

The meaning of that phrase, "common ground," should be perfectly clear. It refers to those issues on which the long spadework of the past has paid off, above all to our agreement that there should be 50% reductions, appropriately applied, in offensive strategic nuclear weapons. It refers to the possibility of an interim agreement on INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces]. The leaders' joint statement explicitly identified both these issues.

Now the mere fact that the Soviets agreed to this language on reductions represents a fundamental change from the days of March 1977 or even of January 1981. No one should pretend it's the millennium. But it does identify the way in which a breakthrough just might be made in the future: by concluding agreements on those issues where we do have a meeting of the minds and continuing to work on other issues where disagreements obviously remain.

Churchill had a phrase for such a moment. After the battle of El Alamein, he said that it wasn't the beginning of the end but the end of the beginning. It may be, of course, that the Soviets will not live up to the words of the joint statement. A cautious man might have to predict that this is what will happen. But it may be that, ever so slowly, the ground is starting to move.

One of the tell-tale signs that movement is underway in any negotiation (particularly on a subject as complex as on nuclear weapons) is that some issues begin to be eased off the agenda. The two sides stop talking about theory and start talking about details. If we're approaching such a moment, the next

round of talks in Geneva should tell us a lot.

Dealing With Soviet Involvement in Regional Conflicts. Of course, the Soviet weapons that are going off in the world today are not nuclear missiles but mortars and land mines. And the men, women, and children that these weapons are killing are Afghans; they're followers of Jonas Savimbi in Angola; they're the brave Khmers who won't accept the crushing of Cambodian national independence. And they're the innocent victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism. They include Major Arthur Nicholson.

That's why President Reagan said so often before the summit that he was determined to raise the issue of Soviet global conduct that troubles us and threatens peace. That's why at the United Nations he proposed a formula for resolving a series of dangerous regional conflicts. A thoroughgoing change in Soviet-American relations has to mean a change on issues like these, too.

Unfortunately, there are very few signs of such change. All of us present at the meetings in Geneva heard a businesslike, reasonable-sounding tone on the subject of Afghanistan. Since then, however, General Secretary Gorbachev has spoken again on the subject. What he told the Supreme Soviet on November 27 left little room for encouragement. It was, point for point, the established Soviet position, maintained over 6 years of occupation. That is, the United States is the problem, and the *mujahidin* resistance is simply "counterrevolutionary gangs" hired from the outside.

This is discouraging. But when we continue to raise such problems anyway, it is not out of sheer stubbornness. It is because in the end we believe there is a kind of common Soviet-American interest that can and should be strengthened.

Everyone knows that the chronic instability of much of the Third World provides recurrent opportunities for Soviet involvement. But, in point of fact, such involvements simply will not bring substantial benefit to the Soviet Union. They will not, because in practice they will not be allowed to. Too many other states have too large a stake in preventing it. And working together, they can succeed.

Helping others to protect themselves requires that we spend the very scarce resources of the Federal budget, but few dollars are better spent than on security assistance. Few dollars contribute more in the end to our own defense. This is a point that Soviet con-

duct has helped to make for us over the past several years. Nothing, I might also add, has done more than Soviet conduct, or than 25 years of experience with socialism, to reopen a dialogue between the United States and states of the Third World who for years seemed to speak an utterly different ideological language.

It is clear that if the Soviets persist in seeking to expand their influence by military action and subversion, then over the long run the outstanding result will be an increased risk of military confrontation. This problem has to be addressed. In keeping it a live part of Soviet-American discussions on the Third World, our goal is not to pull the superpowers in more deeply. It is to find the practical means of disengagement, at least in military terms.

If we succeed, let me point out how large the benefits could be—for us, for Moscow, for states of many of these unsettled regions. As the destiny of South Africa, to take an important example, is played out over the next few years, it will be far easier for the United States to play the kind of economic role that many black African states would like if we do not have to worry at the same time about a growing Soviet-bloc army in Angola.

Constructing a Better Working Relationship. Finally, where do we stand in meeting the President's third goal—a better working relationship with the Soviet Union? Certainly there is a faster pace, more points of contact be-

tween our societies, and many more channels of communication. But I think there is perhaps no better answer to the question than what anyone could see of the summit itself. It certainly looked as though two strong leaders were laying the basis for very practical dealings with each other in the future. General Secretary Gorbachev, you'll recall, came into the summit saying that U.S.-Soviet relations were at their lowest point ever. And he came out telling a press conference that as a result of the meeting the world had become a "more secure place."

We don't have to take either of his statements too literally. But we should see in them a recognition, which the Soviet leadership did not have just a year or two ago, that the West will not be knocked off course by threats. That was the lesson of Geneva, and it's a lesson well-learned. If the Soviet leaders have decided there's no alternative to doing business in a sober, serious way, then the world *has*, in fact, become a safer place. And a working relationship can then begin to do what it should do—work.

Overcoming Illusions

I have referred throughout these remarks to the kinds of choices that will face Americans, and the citizens of the other democracies, in the future. The

choice is, above all, whether to see our renewal through, whether to stick with the policies that can bring us results both at home and abroad. The progress we have already made may seem easy to sustain, but, of course, it will not be easy. In contrast to those peaks of confidence, that I mentioned earlier, 20 and 40 years ago, we face the opportunities of the present under the constraint of tight budgets, under public pressure for early results, but also—let us pray this is true—under no illusions.

At home and abroad, the achievement of the Reagan Administration, in which it has been an honor for me to serve, could perhaps be put this way: overcoming illusions, so as to rediscover the real basis of hope.

We have tried to overcome the illusion that the great goals of our nation can be easily or quickly achieved. But we have also tried to show that real effort can begin to create a world in which those goals of peace and freedom are not just slogans or mirages but truly within our grasp. This is the wisdom on which our nation was founded; it is the message we have for the world; it is the realism that allows us to attain our ideals. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • January 1986
Editor: Colleen Sussman • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.

Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501



Official Business

If address is incorrect
please indicate change.
Do not cover or destroy
this address label. Mail
change of address to:
PA/OAP, Rm. 5815A

THE WASHINGTON PAPERS
Volume III

29: The Foreign Policy of American Labor

Carl Gershman

THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.



SAGE PUBLICATIONS
Beverly Hills / London

While other democratic trade union federations spent four years learning the hard way about communist trade union tactics, the AFL moved quickly to frustrate Soviet efforts to dominate the labor movements—and through them, the governments—of Germany, France, Italy, and Greece. The AFL's FTUC which was established by the 1944 Convention achieved its greatest success in Germany, where the WFTU was also hard at work.³ The AFL received little cooperation from the American Military Government (AMG) whose trade union policy was influenced to no small degree by well-placed procommunist officials. Most prominent of them was George Shaw Wheeler, who headed the Allocations Branch of the Manpower Division and subsequently defected to Czechoslovakia. The military government accepted, for example, the recommendations of a WFTU committee to impose restrictions on union representation above the plant level. The WFTU claimed to be furthering the cause of grass-roots democracy, but somewhat more important in its thinking was the fact that the socialists and Christian Democrats in Germany had gained leadership of the state-wide unions that had been established along industrial lines immediately after the war. By restricting representation to the plant level, the communists hoped to take over union leadership by disqualifying experienced noncommunist trade unionists who had been blacklisted from the factories by the Nazis. Communist trade union strategy suffered a severe setback after a series of AFL protests led to the removal of these restrictions.

Among its other activities in Germany, the AFL provided CARE packages for union officials who were living on rations on only 1,100 calories a day, and it pressed the American authorities to furnish free trade unions with printing materials, to return property that had been taken from them by the Nazis, and to take measures that would protect union funds against currency devaluations.

Communist influence was by no means the only factor responsible for the myopia of the AMG. A pro-business bias and

bureaucratic impatience with democracy were important reasons for the AMG's failure to cooperate with the AFL. Matthew Woll criticized the AMG officials whose anti-union decisions are "seized upon by the Soviet... lackeys to arouse German labor against America." Were the communists to gain control of the unions, Woll warned Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, "then the country will fall into the hands of the enemies of democracy." In the end, the free trade unionists won the battle for leadership of the West German labor movement. Almost unnoticed in America, this victory had a far-reaching impact on the development of postwar Germany and, given the importance of Germany, on the security of all Europe, and of the West.

In France and Italy the AFL had to be satisfied with denying the communists complete control of the trade unions. The major federation in France, the CGT, was the product of a merger in 1936 between the communist CGTU and noncommunist CGT federations. The merger had been the key objective of the communists since 1922 when Profintern Commissar Losovsky, at a meeting in Paris, had told CGTU leaders that their first objective had to be to gain access to the CGT by proposing "unity of action" on "immediate economic demands for the workers." The CGT expelled the communists in 1939 following the Nazi-Soviet pact, but four years later they were invited back in by the free trade unionists who hoped that labor unity would strengthen the underground struggle against the Nazis.

The communists tried to gain control of the CGT to help further Moscow's political objectives. By 1946 they had taken over most of the key positions in the CGT; Irving Brown advised the FTUC to aid the CGT's noncommunist militants, many of whom had been part of the *Resistance Ouvrière* during the war. "*Amis de Force Ouvrière*," as this element in the CGT was called, was led by Robert Bethereau who joined forces with Leon Jouhaux, an old syndicalist and former head of the CGT. A formal split came in 1947 following a series of political strikes called by the communists to paralyze the French economy and overthrow the government.

With financial support from the AFL, the CGT *Force Ouvrière* was established with a membership of 800,000, drawn mostly from civil servants, white collar, and railway workers close to the Socialist Party. The membership of the CGT itself dropped from six to under two million, but it still remained the most powerful trade union federation in France. Working closely with Brown and Lovestone, the FO made its presence felt during 1948-1949 when it helped defeat efforts to close the French ports to incoming economic and military aid from America, a move aimed at prolonging economic chaos in France and undermining the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact (see Taft, 1973: 164-167; Goulden, 1972: 128).

In Italy the AFL was faced with a similar situation. After the fall of Mussolini, Italian unions developed along Socialist, Communist, and Christian Democratic political lines. The Pact of Rome, signed on June 3, 1944, brought the unions together into a single, politically neutral Italian Labor Federation, the CGIL. But as in France, the communists soon became the dominant force in the federation, and the AFL undertook to assist the noncommunist opposition, as it had done in France. After the communists called a general strike in 1948 to protest the attempted assassination of Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti, the Christian Democrats and Socialists withdrew to form their own separate labor federations. In May 1950, the two dissident groups achieved a brief unity in the Italian Confederation of Labor Unions (CISL), but the anticlerical socialists soon pulled out to form their own federation, the Italian Labor Union (UIL). The AFL tried unsuccessfully to reunite the two groups. But the CISL turned down an invitation to join the ICFTU, fearing it would lose its "specific individuality" by joining a secular labor international, and the UIL continued its opposition to unity with its Christian Democratic rival (see Taft, 1973: 167-172).

In Greece, backward labor laws and a right-wing government made the AFL's task of fostering democratic unionism and of

blocking communist infiltration exceedingly difficult. From 1947-1949, following Brown's advice, the AFL helped finance the reorganization of the General Confederation of Labor under the leadership of Secretary-General Fotis Makris. In the early 1950s, Brown consistently tried to exert whatever pressure he could on the Greek government to allow unions greater freedom of action. But his warning that the denial of trade union democracy by the right would only increase the possibilities for subversion by the communist left generally went unheeded (Taft, 1973: 172-175).

The work of the AFL could not by itself undo the Soviet trade union strategy in Europe. Though Brown as early as 1947 sensed among the British unionists "an undertone of complete disillusionment" with the WFTU, he correctly predicted that "there can be no break until and unless the relationships between the four powers change basically." The Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe, particularly the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, set the stage for the break; and the Western communists' opposition to the Marshall Plan—which demonstrated beyond any doubt that their first loyalty was not to the European workers but to the Soviet policy of promoting economic chaos in the West—made it final. Trade union separation accompanied the collapse of the coalition governments of De Gaulle and de Gaspari, leaving the communists isolated in Europe except for the French CGT and the Italian CGIL. As the British trade union leader Victor Feather later said, the walkout of the noncommunists unions from the WFTU "left the Soviet representatives and their satellites holding an empty shell."

Just as the creation of the WFTU had been a major victory for the Soviet trade union policy, the split and the establishment of a rival free federation, the ICFTU, was a significant defeat. The Free Labor Conference, at which the ICFTU was established, opened in London on November 29, 1949. It was attended by representatives of 59 trade union centers in 53 countries, representing a membership of over 48 million workers (Taft, 1973: 149). Among the delegates to the conference were William

Green, George Meany, Matthew Woll, and David Dubinsky. For them it was a very special moment, for the creation of the ICFTU was in many ways *their* victory, a vindication of the unpopular position they had taken four years earlier. It was a bright moment, but also a fleeting one, for the challenges that lay ahead were more formidable than those that had just recently been overcome.

t
a
P
re
a
u

th
L
E
ce
at
A
W
on
re
se
Tr
re
Pi

of

The Reagan Doctrine after Iranamok.

MAXIMUM FEASIBLE CONTAINMENT

BY JOSHUA MURAVCHIK

U.S. Foreign Policy

THE IRAN/CONTRA scandal has prompted an intellectual offensive against the Reagan Doctrine and the very notion of an ideologically animated foreign policy. Thus far the assault has been clearer in its denunciations than in its recommendations for new strategies purged of ideological excess. Yet certain dominant themes can be discerned. What they add up to is a new conservative isolationism.

I use the adjective "conservative" to distinguish these views from the liberal isolationism that followed the Vietnam War. Then, the impetus for disengagement was the conviction that America was a malign force in the world. The idea now is that engagement will be harmful to America. Just as many of the voices in this chorus are not conservative, some are not isolationist. Yet this is where their arguments are bound to lead, for it is hard to see any other currently feasible alternative to the Reagan Doctrine.

The term "Reagan Doctrine" was coined to give coherence to Reagan's inchoate impulse to make America "stand tall again." The administration's policy had evolved as the administration came to see the Nicaraguan rebels as contestants for power rather than merely an instrument to harass the Sandinistas. The administration also embraced Jonas Savimbi's struggle in Angola and eventually recognized that these conflicts, like those in Cambodia and Afghanistan, provided the basis for its new strategy.

Reagan had made it clear he intended to eschew both Jimmy Carter's national self-abnegation and the accommodations of Henry Kissinger's détente. But although he called America's Vietnam War "a noble cause," neither he nor anyone else was prepared to return to the policy of containment, under which America sought to ensure, by force if necessary, that no additional countries would go Communist. Rebels in Nicaragua and Angola permitted a new global strategy: although some countries might fall to communism, this could be counterbalanced by overthrowing Communist regimes elsewhere.

What can be offered in place of the Reagan Doctrine? Surely not a return to containment. Although in spirit more venturesome than containment, the Reagan Doctrine is far less ambitious in practice. The former entailed sending a half million men to Southeast Asia; the latter requires sending a few million dollars to Central America. A public unwilling to sustain the latter will not for a moment countenance the former. Nor are people prepared for a return to

Carteresque national penitence. The very depth of Reagan's fall reveals how much the public has come to approve the unapologetic posture that people thought Reagan represented.

Nor is there much prospect of a return to Kissingerian détente, which offers sticks as well as carrots. Kissinger's "sticks" consisted of covert military aid to the likes of Savimbi, and massive military aid along with the use of American air power in places such as Indochina. Why should the country accept in the name of détente the kinds of foreign entanglements it rejects under the Reagan Doctrine?

What do critics of the doctrine propose? Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argues, "It is time for America to tend to economic resources. . . . Political economy is the name of the next task, not geopolitics." He acknowledges that "between now and the year 2000 between four and 11 [new Leninist] regimes will come to power." But he argues that we may view such developments with a measure of equanimity because "the one enormous fact of the third quarter of the 20th century . . . is the near complete collapse of Marxism as an ideological force in the world."

While Moynihan calls us home to repair our economy, others fret about our political system. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. writes that "Vietnam and Iran/Nicaragua were the direct consequences of global messianism," which threatens to "burst . . . the limits of our present constitution." The remedy is a "prudent balance-of-power foreign policy confined to vital interests of the United States." He appeals for "the revival of realism, sobriety, and responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs." A recent lead article in *Foreign Policy* expresses the hope that the next administration will "stop feeding the international illusions of the American public and . . . expose it instead to the finite nature of what foreign policy can accomplish."

Ironies abound in these criticisms. "Realism" is the theory that argues that the behavior of states is governed by their inherent interests more than by the voluntary choices or ideals of statesmen. The essential rule is that geography is destiny. The decision to sell arms to Khomeini was the administration's quintessential act of foreign policy "realism" and a betrayal of the ideological tenets of its foreign policy. Iran's oil and its strategic location between the U.S.S.R. and the Persian Gulf were deemed more important than the principle of not yielding to terrorist blackmail.

In U.S. foreign policy, "balance of power" can only mean counterbalancing the power of the Soviet Union. As the

Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Kremlin extends the reach of its empire to four continents, the Reagan Doctrine is a balance-of-power policy. It is hard to take comfort in Moynihan's assurance that communism has collapsed ideologically when in the same breath he predicts a new Communist takeover every one to three years.

THE CROWNING IRONY is the conservative tone and spirit of these liberal critiques. But liberals are not the only ones acting out of character. Whether they realize it or not, conservatives who support the Reagan Doctrine are supporting a policy that is profoundly unconservative.

One conservative who has seen this clearly is Robert W. Tucker, co-editor of the *National Interest*, who argues:

While freedom is the highest of political values, this does not make its universalization a proper interest of foreign policy in the sense that its pursuit justifies the sacrifice of blood and treasure. There are many things of value that are not the proper interests of foreign policy. Conservatives, despite their deep attachment to liberty, should be the first to recognize this.

To those who argue, as does Tucker's colleague Irving Kristol, that "the basic conflict of our times—that between the U.S.S.R. and the United States—is ideological," Tucker replies: "The ideological contest with the Soviet Union has largely been won." Tucker acknowledges the perdurance of geopolitical, as opposed to ideological, contest, but even here he believes the United States is comfortably ahead and could get by with limited or selective containment.

There are signs that other conservatives are beginning to entertain doubts about current policy. Paul Weyrich called recently upon conservatives to begin "thinking deeply and carefully about America's role in the world":

In pursuit of containment, we still thrust ourselves into everything that happens around the world. But what we put forward, increasingly, is weakness, not strength. In a world where we control far less of the total sum of power than we did 40 years ago, we cannot do otherwise. The real strength is no longer there. We are propping up a hollow facade, vast commitments unsupported by either capabilities or popular will.

Kristol, writing about human rights, reiterated that the U.S.-Soviet competition is an "ideological conflict," but argued that it is nonetheless

both a simplification and a distortion to describe it as a conflict about "human rights." It is, rather, a conflict over the very definition of "human rights," and the point of this conflict is to determine who will have the power to define "human rights" for future generations. In that sense, the United States cannot evade the urgencies and the ambiguities of "power politics."

It is "quixotically futile to criticize [the Soviet Union] for not sharing our traditional-liberal political philosophy." He finds it quixotic, too, to try to foster democracy in Third World countries ruled by traditional authoritarian dictatorships. What Kristol seems to be saying is that although the U.S.-Soviet conflict is motivated by ideology, it cannot be waged with ideological weapons, but only with real ones. Efforts to promote the democratic idea will have little part in it.

Thus liberals offer nothing but empty conservative pieties: prudence, pragmatism, balance of power, sobriety, and above all "realism." Paralyzed by their suspicions of power and of national self-assertiveness, they have been unable to come to terms with the fact that every cherished liberal value, be it liberty, democracy, peace, or national independence, depends ultimately upon American power. Conservatives, on the other hand, have an unconservative strategy, the Reagan Doctrine, which makes America the sponsor of revolutions.

It also deepens the inherent conflict between the conservative's distrust of strong government and his wish for a strong defense. The Reagan Doctrine implies a degree of government activism that goes beyond maintaining a military establishment. To win, we will have to do more than arm anti-Communist rebels. We will have to train them; help them develop political organizations and strategies; teach them the art of public relations and to launch social welfare programs in liberated areas. In short, social engineering.

It is easy to understand why it took so long for this administration to stumble onto the Reagan Doctrine, and why so many of its key promoters have political roots outside conservatism—including Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, and Ronald Reagan. It was doubtless the natural conservatism of many of Reagan's advisers that made them discourage him from spending political capital on this issue, leading to the congressional ban on aid to the Nicaraguan rebels in 1984. When that ban came, it was perhaps also a natural conservatism that led to reliance on contributions from Saudi Arabia and other secret donors rather than any attempt to launch a public, grass-roots movement of non-governmental support for the rebels, much as the left raises funds for the Nicaraguan government and the Salvadoran guerrillas.

KRISTOL, Weyrich, Tucker, Schlesinger, and Moynihan are an unlikely united front. But what they share suggests a foreign policy alternative to the Reagan Doctrine. This alternative will eschew ideological commitment in favor of invocations of "the national interest." It will seek to scale back foreign commitments, and perhaps to play down foreign affairs altogether in favor of domestic concerns. Yet it will avoid the breast-beating anti-Americanism of 1970s liberals, and will even insist, at least in rhetoric and perhaps in reality, on maintaining a strong military. Almost any candidate in 1988 in either party could adopt this stance.

But it will not make good strategy. Since World War II we have faced an ideologically hostile superpower bent on global pre-eminence. Containment compiled a mixed record in responding to that challenge before collapsing in Vietnam. Détente, whether the muscular Kissinger kind or the limp Carter kind, also has failed. "Prudence," "pragmatism," "sobriety," and "realism" (in the sense of being realistic) should guide the execution of any strategy, but are not themselves strategies.

What else is available? There is always pure isolation-

ism. Perhaps a Finlandized Europe would still trade with America. But would it trade strategic commodities if the Kremlin said no? More to the point, Star Wars, whatever its prospects for technological success, reminds us that eventually nuclear weapons will be overtaken by new technologies. The United States has always maintained a lead in weapons technology, but would this lead endure if the Kremlin were able to use the talents of Europe and Japan to its purposes? And what would be the spirit of political and social life in America with our vision of man's destiny defeated and our adversaries free to foment subversion from our very borders? The case against complete disengagement need not rest on moral grounds alone. If we accept the illusion that we have Fortress America to fall back on for our ultimate safety, the result will be a retreat from the broader commitments safety actually requires.

Tucker proposes the only other strategy in these debates. He would have us return to a policy of containment, but limited to a few selected areas of vital interest—say, Western Europe, Japan, and the Persian Gulf. He challenges the critics of containment: "It will not do to say that we cannot indefinitely play a defensive role. We have now played that role for over a third of a century and, on balance, have played it quite well." He means, I think, that though we have lost ground, we have lost it slowly—a Cuba here, an Indochina there, a Nicaragua there—and it would take generations before the losses would accumulate to perilous proportions. In the meantime, who knows what else might happen that might improve the picture?

FAIR ENOUGH. But the reason we have lost ground so slowly is that we have done our best to resist everywhere. And that is precisely what we are no longer willing to do. Which is why Tucker would have us make the radical shift to defending only a few selected areas. But wouldn't the announcement of such a shift tempt our adversaries to much bolder efforts in all those areas that we defined outside of our containment sphere, just as Acheson's exclusion of South Korea invited aggression in 1950? And how will we insulate the areas within this containment sphere from those without? Tucker includes the Persian Gulf in his list not because of its own value but because its oil makes it critical to the defense of Europe. But can we defend the Persian Gulf while turning a blind eye to the rest of the Middle East and South Asia? Can the security of Japan be separated from that of the rest of East Asia? Can we define Mexico as outside our containment sphere, and if not, can Mexico's fate be severed from that of Central America? Selective containment only exacerbates the problems of containment.

The essential problem of containment is that we don't have the power to forestall Communist advances everywhere. But to pre-emptively abandon most of the world is no solution. The real solution lies in a policy that combines maximum feasible containment (recognizing that in various places the tools available to us are limited) with an "active defense" that seeks to counterbalance future Com-

unist gains with Communist losses. That is the Reagan Doctrine.

If the fallacy of Fortress America shows that we must have a forward defense and the fallacy of selective containment shows it must be an active defense, the question remains: Can it be a defense of mere "power politics," as Kristol suggests? It is true that everywhere that communism has triumphed it has come by force of arms, but in almost every case the way to that triumph has been paved by the manipulation of ideas—to divide, immobilize, and demoralize its opponents. If it is true, as Mao said, that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, it is also true, as Communists seem often to understand better than their adversaries, that guns are useless without people to pull the triggers.

TUCKER AND MOYNIHAN are wrong when they say the ideological battle has been won. The appeal of communism has always rested at least as much on its claim to represent history's appointed destiny as on its claim to provide a just society. Victory by anti-Communist uprisings is an irreplaceable step if communism is ever to be ideologically defeated. They also misconceive the nature of the ideological threat. Communism never won by converting the masses, but by inspiring selfless, disciplined cadres, manipulating masses with tactical slogans, and undermining opponents—by a combination of force and guile, where politics serves as an adjunct to violence. That is the essence of Leninism, and it remains a potent strategy. Communist guerrillas are making serious bids for power in El Salvador and the Philippines. Communist cadres are exercising dominance in broader liberation movements in places such as South Africa.

Kristol supports aid to the *contras*, but objects to framing the struggle in ideological terms. He believes the strategic considerations are all-important. But what is this struggle if not a struggle for democracy? Merely a struggle against communism, say, to restore *somocismo*? Who would support such a cause? Prospects for preventing the spread of communism in Central America would be much poorer today if Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador were still (or once again) ruled by military strongmen and ossified oligarchies.

The West knows little about ideological war. But the place to start is with the assertion that democracy is our creed; that we believe all human beings are entitled to its blessings; and that we are prepared to do what we can to help others achieve it. The Reagan Doctrine, which offers military aid to anti-Communist insurgents, is one part of what we need to do. We need also to assist democratic movements throughout the world—and where there are no democratic movements, to assist democratic individuals. Such activities, along with the Reagan Doctrine, can constitute the pillars of a foreign policy strategy that we might call "engagement." Such a strategy may lack a natural domestic constituency, but unlike any available alternative, it can serve our deepest values and protect our long-term security. □