

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:

Green, Max: Files, 1985-1988

Folder Title:

Eastern Europe

Box: Box 9

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

100TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1953

2901
E-124 I

To deny certain trade benefits to Romania unless that country recognizes and protects the fundamental human rights and freedoms of all citizens of that country, particularly Hungarian-speaking and other ethnic minorities, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 6, 1987

Mr. KONNYU (for himself, Mr. PORTER, and Mr. LANTOS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To deny certain trade benefits to Romania unless that country recognizes and protects the fundamental human rights and freedoms of all citizens of that country, particularly Hungarian-speaking and other ethnic minorities, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

4 The Congress—

5 (1) notes that the Department of State, in the
6 publication entitled "Country Reports on Human
7 Rights Practices for 1986", determined that "In the

1 area of human rights, major discrepancies exist be-
2 tween generally accepted standards, for example as
3 embodied in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference
4 on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Romanian
5 practice . . .” in that “. . . The party, through the
6 Government, continues to limit and often deny the
7 right to free speech and free assembly and association,
8 and to apply restrictions to religious practice . . .”;

9 (2) is aware that the Romanian Government has
10 committed severe infractions with regard to the Consti-
11 tution of the Socialist Republic of Romania which
12 states, in Article 17 thereof, that “The citizens of the
13 Socialist Republic of Romania, irrespective of their na-
14 tionality, race, sex or religion shall have equal rights in
15 all fields of economic, political, juridical, social and cul-
16 tural life.”, and, in Article 22 thereof, that “In the So-
17 cialist Republic of Romania, the coinhabiting nationali-
18 ties shall be assured the free use of their mother
19 tongue as well as books, newspapers, periodicals,
20 theatres and education at all levels in their own
21 languages”;

22 (3) finds the Socialist Republic of Romania in fla-
23 grant violation of the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 with
24 specific regard to the human rights provisions in clause
25 VII which states that “The participating States on

1 whose territory national minorities exist will respect
2 the right of persons belonging to such minorities to
3 equality before the law; will afford them the full oppor-
4 tunity for actual enjoyment of human rights and funda-
5 mental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their
6 legitimate interests in this sphere.”; and that “They
7 will promote and encourage the effective exercise of
8 civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other
9 rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inher-
10 ent dignity of the human person and are essential for
11 his free and full development.”;

12 (4) finds the substantial and growing trade deficit
13 of Romania with the United States to be an indirect
14 but meaningful indication of support by the United
15 States for Romania’s continuation of human rights
16 violation; and

17 (5) finds that the desire of Congress to reduce and
18 eventually eliminate Romanian human rights violations
19 is based on the right of the United States to choose its
20 friends and, therefore, choose which countries shall be
21 granted nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-
22 nation treatment).

23 **SEC. 2. PURPOSES OF ACT.**

24 The purposes of this Act are to effect, notwithstanding
25 any other provision of law—

1 (1) the eventual termination and the annual pro-
2 gressive amelioration of the current policies and prac-
3 tices of the Government of Romania under which the
4 citizens practicing their religion and Hungarian-speak-
5 ing and other ethnic minorities are limited in their
6 rights (as accorded by the Helsinki Act of 1975 and
7 the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania)
8 to express their cultural heritage, as is illustrated by
9 the attempts of the Romanian Government to repress
10 such cultural expression by progressively eliminating,
11 on a yearly basis, Hungarian churches, schools and
12 publications (including Bibles printed in the Hungarian
13 language) from the Romanian society; and

14 (2) to highlight the historical commitment of the
15 United States to basic human rights and to express this
16 country's concern for these rights within Romania.

17 **SEC. 3. INITIAL SUSPENSION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY**
18 **TREATMENT (MFN).**

19 (a) **IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION.**—(1) Notwithstanding
20 any other provision of law, but subject to subsection (b), the
21 products of Romania that are entered during the 1-year
22 period (hereinafter referred to as the “initial suspension
23 year”) beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act
24 may not be accorded nondiscriminatory treatment (most-
25 favored-nation treatment).

1 (2) As used in this Act, the term "entered" means en-
2 tered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, in the
3 customs territory of the United States.

4 (b) PRESIDENTIAL STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—
5 If the President submits to Congress, before the 181st day of
6 the initial suspension year, a study containing—

7 (1) the annual objectives of the United States
8 toward achieving the gradual reduction of Romanian
9 human rights violations during the remainder of the
10 initial suspension year and the 5-year period following
11 the initial suspension year, to the end that such viola-
12 tions will cease before the close of such period;

13 (2) recommendations regarding the actions to be
14 taken by the United States within such 5-year period
15 (and stated on an annual basis within such period) to
16 effectuate such reduction and cessation; and

17 (3) a statement of Presidential commitment re-
18 garding the achievement of the actions referred to in
19 paragraph (2);

20 the President may extend nondiscriminatory treatment to the
21 products of Romania that are entered during the remaining
22 days of the initial suspension year.

1 SEC. 4. NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT DURING 5-YEAR
2 PERIOD.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b),
4 the President may extend nondiscriminatory treatment to the
5 products of Romania that are entered during each of the 5
6 successive 365-day periods that occur after the close of the
7 initial suspension year if the President submits to Congress,
8 not later than 30 days before the first day of such 365-day
9 period, a report stating that the Romanian Government is
10 achieving, on a timely basis, the applicable human rights vio-
11 lation reduction objectives stated in the study required under
12 section 3.

13 (b) TERMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREAT-
14 MENT.—The extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the
15 products of Romania during any 365-day period referred to in
16 subsection (a) shall be terminated with respect to products
17 entered after the day within that period on which there is
18 enacted a joint resolution of the Congress stating that “The
19 Congress disapproves the application of nondiscriminatory
20 treatment (MFN) to the products of Romania that was rec-
21 ommended by the President to the Congress in the study
22 submitted on _____ with respect to the period
23 _____”; with the first blank containing the
24 date of the study submitted under section 3(b) and the second

- 1 blank containing the beginning and closing dates of the 365-
- 2 day period in which the disapproval applies.

100TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2175

To suspend most-favored-nation trade privileges to Romania until that government recognizes and protects fundamental human rights, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 27, 1987

Mr. KONNYU (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, and Mr. PORTER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To suspend most-favored-nation trade privileges to Romania until that government recognizes and protects fundamental human rights, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.**

4 The Congress—

5 (1) notes that the Department of State, in the
6 publication Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
7 tices for 1986, determined that “In the area of human
8 rights, major discrepancies exist between generally ac-
9 cepted standards, for example as embodied in the Hel-

1 sinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
2 operation in Europe, and Romanian practice. . . . The
3 party, through the Government, continues to restrict
4 and control the right to free speech and free assembly
5 and association, and to apply restrictions to religious
6 practice.”;

7 (2) is aware of numerous accounts from the De-
8 partment of State, congressional delegations, and vari-
9 ous human rights organizations, that Romanian citizens
10 are being arbitrarily harassed, interrogated, and arrest-
11 ed by Romanian Government authorities for the exer-
12 cise of civil and religious liberties;

13 (3) finds that official Romanian harassment of reli-
14 gious believers has not only been extended to the
15 arrest of persons for carrying Bibles and other religious
16 materials, but even carried to the point of destroying
17 places of worship, including most recently the coun-
18 try’s largest Seventh Day Adventist Church and the
19 Sephardic synagogue in Bucharest;

20 (4) further finds that the United States trade defi-
21 cit with Romania (which continues to be high) is a
22 result of our extension of nondiscriminatory treatment
23 (most-favored-nation treatment) to that country and
24 can be construed as an endorsement of that nation’s
25 abusive internal practices;

1 (5) is aware that during 1986, overall emigration
2 from Romania to Israel and other nations declined for
3 the second consecutive year;

4 (6) is also aware of the severe limits placed on the
5 rights of Hungarians and other ethnic minorities within
6 Romania to express and maintain their cultural herit-
7 age, as is illustrated by the attempts made by the Ro-
8 manian Government to eliminate systematically Hun-
9 garian churches, schools, traditions, and even the Hun-
10 garian language from Romanian society;

11 (7) recognizes and emphasizes the continued dedi-
12 cation of the United States to fundamental human
13 rights (as noted in section 402 of the Trade Act of
14 1974) and is concerned with Romania's lack of com-
15 mitment to those rights; and

16 (8) commends the President for withdrawing Ro-
17 mania's eligibility for duty-free treatment under the
18 Generalized System of Preferences because of Roma-
19 nia's violation of "internationally recognized worker
20 rights".

21 **SEC. 2. SUSPENSION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT**
22 **FOR ROMANIAN PRODUCTS.**

23 The products of Romania shall not receive nondiscrim-
24 inatory treatment (most-favored-nation treatment) during the

1 six-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this
2 Act.

3 **SEC. 3. REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONDI-**
4 **TIONS IN ROMANIA.**

5 Not later than sixty days after the date of enactment of
6 this Act, and every sixty days thereafter, the President shall
7 submit to the Congress a detailed report on the human rights
8 situation in Romania, including an assessment of—

9 (a) whether free emigration continues to be
10 denied; whether more than a nominal tax continues to
11 be imposed on emigration or on the visas or other doc-
12 uments required for emigration; and whether more than
13 nominal taxes, levies, fines, fees, or other charges con-
14 tinue to be imposed on citizens as a consequence of
15 their desire to emigrate;

16 (b) the degree to which the Government of Roma-
17 nia continues to persecute its citizens on religious and
18 political grounds, and to repress Hungarians and other
19 ethnic minorities in Romania; and

20 (c) the progress Romania is making toward fulfill-
21 ing its promise to facilitate the printing, importation,
22 and distribution of several thousand Bibles in both the
23 Hungarian and Romanian languages, and toward pro-
24 viding building permits or acceptable alternative places

1 of worship to churches and synagogues which have
2 been destroyed or expropriated by the Government.

3 The President shall continue to submit such reports as sched-
4 uled, whether or not nondiscriminatory treatment (most-fa-
5 vored-nation treatment) is restored to Romanian products
6 after the six-month suspension period.

7 **SEC. 4. NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF ROMANIAN**
8 **PRODUCTS AFTER THE SIX-MONTH SUSPEN-**
9 **SION.**

10 If, after expiration of the six-month suspension, the
11 President exercises his authority under the Trade Act of
12 1974 to restore nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-
13 nation treatment) to the products of Romania, his next report
14 to the Congress pursuant to section 3 of this Act shall con-
15 tain an assessment as to whether such restoration will also
16 substantially alleviate the concerns denoted in the reporting
17 requirement in sections 3(b) and 3(c) of this Act.

○

benchmark for benefits, an ingeniously simple change which should make sure that nobody loses money by taking a job or a rise in pay. Some will not seem virtues to the Treasury, although they may appeal to the humanity of the electorate: like the improvement in the amount of help given to poor families, both in and out of work.

Because the social-security offices say they cannot digest these reforms quickly, the timetable for introducing them has slipped a year. They should now come into effect in April 1988. To legislate to alter the pattern of income distribution immediately after (or just before) the general election of 1987 or 1988 is a dangerous business. The government will not be able to go to the polls promising, say, a new family credit to help the poor. All those cards are now on the table, and two

others will join them: the government's promised proposals for the reform of local government and of personal taxation, both due early in the new year. Perhaps, by the end of it all, the electorate will be too confused to work out who will gain and who will lose. If so, most people will tend to assume the worst.

If a government with a parliamentary majority of 143, with two five-year terms in office, and with a clear mandate to restrain the role of the state, cannot put through reforms such as these, who can? If Mr Fowler fails, it will be many years before any government has the courage to try again, let alone to tackle important issues like the removal of tax relief on mortgage interest or the end of tax privileges for institutional savings. The pity is that the government did not embark on these exercises in 1983, instead of waiting so long.

The other side of the moon

Eastern Europe

An apparent twentieth-century Bulgarian atrocity shows how dark the other half of Europe remains



Imagine that several hundred civilians are killed by security forces in a modern European country. Imagine, too, that the international outcry this would normally provoke is muted because nobody can establish the true extent of the killings, or whether they took place at all. Impossible? It should be. But that is precisely what seems to have happened in Bulgaria in the past year. If indeed it did, the Bulgarian case is a striking example of how, even in today's Europe, massacre can still hide behind masquerade.

The presumed victims were Bulgaria's ethnic Turks, believed to number about 800,000, or nearly 10% of the population. A year ago reports began to reach the West of a systematic campaign of assimilation against these people, beginning with the demand that they change their Turkish names to Bulgarian ones. Many of those who tried to resist being "Bulgarised" were beaten up; some—nobody can tell for sure whether the figure is closer to 40 or 400, or more—are said to have been killed. There have since been threats to resettle any complainers away from their native towns and villages, and there are fears that resettlement may eventually be in store for the 5,000 or more Bulgarian Turks who are believed to have been put in prison.

The Bulgarian version of events rings, to put it mildly, hollow. The official word in Sofia is that Bulgarian Turks do not exist: those who Bulgarised their names were merely ordinary Bulgarians whose ancestors had been forced to convert to Islam and adopt Turkish names during five centuries of Ottoman rule. Yet in the past the same government has admitted to a clear distinction between Bulgarians of Turkish origin and the so-called Pomaks—120,000 or so Muslims of Bulgarian origin, whose own name-changes were arranged in the 1970s in an earlier Bulgarisation campaign. The government insists that the latest bout of name-changing was "voluntary and spontaneous". If

so, why were western diplomats and journalists refused access to the alleged trouble-spots?

Some of the stories may well be exaggerated—accounts of atrocities often are—but there is little doubt that something nasty has been going on. The problem is proving it, given the Bulgarian government's state monopoly of information. Result: case unproven, scandal largely ignored. Examples of the case-unproven-and-ignored variety can occur all too readily in such countries. Outsiders can learn little about prison camps in Albania, or the unpleasant things that have been happening in President Ceausescu's Romania. A deep murk still hangs over much of the Soviet Union. None of this would be possible anywhere in Western Europe, even in Spain and Portugal when they were under Franco and Salazar. That is one of the meanings of the word totalitarian.

The dangers of deceit

The lesson from the Bulgarian affair, however, is not entirely discouraging. A little light leaked through the official news screen. It may in the end be enough to embarrass Mr Todor Zhivkov's government.

The affair has undermined Bulgaria's attempt to cut a better figure in the West. Its relations with Turkey, so carefully cultivated in recent years, have turned sour. The Russians have been notably reluctant to support their close ally on the Turkish question, and the awkwardness they feel about it may be one reason for Mr Mikhail Gorbachev's visible coolness towards Mr Zhivkov. And if the Bulgarians are seriously hoping to wipe away the national identity of their ethnic Turks, the history of the Balkans is against them. All of that history—not least Bulgaria's own re-emergence as a nation in 1878 after Ottoman rule—shows that the sense of ethnic identity tends to outlive the regimes which attempt to suppress it.

lar decisions easier, because the people do not have a chance to object. The army has the chance to object instead. In Nigeria, as throughout the world, army officers' friends and families own cars, like imports, keep shops and are defter at currency fiddles than more ignorant neighbours are. The middle class has sound reasons of self-interest for wanting the currency kept dear. Soldiers also sometimes think, as President Reagan once did, that a strong currency is a mark of national strength.

So General Babangida and Mr Kalu decided to appeal over the army's head, by organising a great national debate on the IMF loan. Unfortunately the people who write for the newspapers, in Nigeria as almost everywhere, come from much the same class as army officers. There was a huge anti-IMF campaign in the press. The general's hands were tied. If, on taking power four months ago, he had done the necessary

things fast and blamed them on his predecessor, he could have been his country's saviour.

Until the naira is devalued, Nigeria's energy will go to waste. The web of corruption will grow stronger. The more the soldiers try to sweep it away, the bigger will be the risks, and the bigger the bribes for taking them. Down that road lie the shooting of speculators, and the transformation of benign and patriotic generals into African dictators. There is one chance of putting things right. Christmas is budget time in Nigeria. General Babangida and his finance minister, having denounced the IMF, could now do some of the things the Fund wants—insisting that the cause is not outside pressure but patriotic necessity. That is the politics of military rule, as devious as, but no less necessary than, that of vote-seeking democrats. It would save 100m Nigerians from the corrupt poverty which this ingenious and entrepreneurial people so little deserve.

Paying for Britain's poor



Mr Fowler's proposed passbook pensions are a welcome reform, and his other welfare proposals are modest but humane

It was all much easier for Sir William Beveridge, that famous father of Britain's welfare state. He worked alone, he was pulling together strands in the social security benefits of the 1930s, and he cared little for the public-expenditure implications of his ideas. By contrast, Britain's present social security secretary, Mr Norman Fowler, has had to thin down and replant the thicket of ad hoc benefits which has grown up to fill the gaps in Beveridge's scheme, while the Treasury tells him he must restrain the rise in the cost of welfare benefits, now almost a third of public spending. Within these constraints, his white paper is a modest and humane attempt to improve the lives of the poor. He has had to try to make two sorts of changes at the same time: to alter future pension provision, and to restructure current income support.

Like many other rich countries, Britain has seen a sharp increase in the real incomes of its pensioners: from about 40% of disposable income per head of the rest of the population in 1951, to about 70% now. There are still lots of poor pensioners. Britain's state earnings-related pension is not the most effective way to help the poorest when they retire, yet it may deter some workers from making pension provision for themselves. So, like several foreign pensions ministers, Mr Fowler has been hunting for ways to reduce the role of the state and encourage private provision.

His first proposal earlier in 1985, to abolish the state earnings-related scheme and replace it by compulsory private provision, was shouted down by employers and by most of the pension funds, partly because it would have cost them a lot to provide and administer a close substitute for the state scheme. Now he has offered something more modest. The state scheme stays, but cut down; and there will be more financial incentives for

private provision. The most important new idea will be a splendid revenge on the recalcitrant pension funds: banks, unit trusts and (best of all) building societies will now be able to provide personal pensions.

The passbook pension, modelled on American individual retirement accounts, could revolutionise the pattern of personal finance. It could be as important and irreversible as this government's other two privatising innovations, the sale of council houses to their tenants and of nationalised industries to individual investors. The minister needed a bright idea like that. It will not be easy to make his party enthusiastic about the other features of a pension plan which will not save a penny of public money until the next century. Why should I care about posterity?, the electors will ask with Groucho Marx: what's posterity ever done for me?

The part with political pain

There will be a bigger political row about Mr Fowler's simplification of the machinery of income support. Because it reduces public spending by perhaps £500m a year, the package redistributes cash among the poor. If electors ever fight their way through the technical annex which accompanies the white paper (commentators asked for some illustrative numbers, and have got a flood), they will discover that these structural reforms may leave 3.8m voters worse off, and only 2.2m better off. Lots more will be led by the vociferous poverty lobby to think that they will be worse off even though they won't be.

Mr Fowler will need the help of his colleagues (who have been notably silent about his proposals) if he is to convince people of the virtues of his changes. Some of these virtues seem technical but are in fact radical—like the use of net income, rather than gross, as the

East
Europe

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Telling Embarrassment

On Friday in Rome, Christian Roulette was laughed out of court; he was to have been a star witness for the Bulgarians on trial for conspiring to shoot the pope. Instead, the Communist disinformation network was caught, shall we say, red-handed.

The fundamentals of the story were spelled out by our Gordon Crovitz last Wednesday. Mr. Roulette is author of "La Fière" or "The Connection," a book that suggests the CIA got Agca to shoot John Paul II. In recent weeks he was quoted by the Bulgarian press agency as saying that he had received files proving Agca was coached to blame the Bulgarians. These files were said to have come from Francesco Pazienza, a former Italian military secret service agent jailed in New York while fighting extradition on bank fraud charges stemming from the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano. Interviewed in New York, Mr. Pazienza said no such files existed. And reached at an unlisted suburban Paris number supplied by the Bulgarian Embassy in Washington, Mr. Roulette admitted he had not actually seen any files.

This drama played itself out in Judge Severino Santiapichi's courtroom. Mr. Roulette had requested to testify, writing a letter talking of files belonging to Mr. Pazienza. By the time of his appearance Friday, The Wall Street Journal/Europe had printed the Crovitz story, which was then reported in the Friday editions of the important Rome daily Corriere Della Sera. Judge Santiapichi, it developed, was well prepared.

The judge first asked what Mr. Roulette was doing in his courtroom. Mr. Roulette began to mention "files," at which point Judge Santiapichi asked what files. Mr. Roulette said he hadn't actually seen any files. Well, the judge asked, what had he seen? He said he had a letter from Mr. Pazienza.

Judge Santiapichi then held up a copy of Mr. Pazienza's letter and asked a startled Mr. Roulette if this was the letter he meant. Yes, it was. Judge Santiapichi then informed the court and Mr. Roulette that there was no reference to any files that would clear the Bulgarians or any files in any Paris bank vault.

Mr. Roulette was then asked what Mr. Pazienza had written but refused to answer. The judge said to have Mr. Roulette "reticence." He r

a client of his, Luigi Cavallo, had written to Mr. Pazienza asking about the pope plot and that he'd passed the letter on to Mr. Roulette. At the mention of Luigi Cavallo, the court press reporters began hooting. Mr. Cavallo is a renowned propagandist and accused blackmailer who is in a French jail awaiting extradition to Italy. He is also a former Communist leader and the editor of a newsletter that has blamed the CIA for the pope shooting.

It's rare to uncover so blatant an effort at disinformation. Either Mr. Roulette said he'd seen files that don't exist or the Sofia Press Agency chose to report that he had seen such files. Whichever, the ploy managed to attract articles in important Italian and American newspapers. The trick of disinformation, of course, is to get credible sources to print lies that they believe to be true. We did not notice Mr. Roulette's embarrassment reported over the weekend on this side of the Atlantic, which is regrettable, since Western journalists have a clear interest in untangling disinformation when it occurs.

More broadly, it's instructive to ask why disinformation is flying so furiously over the pope plot trial. While Agca has in the end stuck by his charges that the Bulgarians assisted and directed him in the shooting, his bizarre testimony clearly hinders a courtroom conviction. But for the Bulgarians and their Soviet sponsors, the nagging question has been, who had a motive to kill the pope?

The Soviets clearly resented the elevation of a Polish pope just when they were faced with Solidarity and general resistance in Poland; for them he was a clear problem. No one any longer believes Agca acted alone out of some anti-Christian fervor. The disinformation effort has been pointed at creating some other motive out of the murky scandal involving the P2 lodge, Banco Ambrosiano and Western intelligence. But in this effort the disinformation experts had little to work with, and had to invent the far-fetched tale that exploded in Judge Santiapichi's court Friday.

Whatever the courtroom verdict, should be kept in mind what happened with the

Mr. Pazienza had written but refused to answer. The judge said to have Mr. Roulette "reticence." He r

By ION MIHAI PACEPA
For many Americans, Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu is the leader of the plucky little country that defied the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. For the U.S. government, he presides over the communist country whose "most favored nation," or MFN, trade status should be renewed when it comes up for its annual review. In Washington's misguided view, MFN status can help improve human rights in Romania and encourage a degree of political independence from Moscow. But for Mr. Ceausescu, the 1975 granting of MFN status crowned 10 years of intense propaganda and influence operations aimed at realizing his grand plan of strengthening Romanian communism by getting financial and technological help from capitalism.

Devotion to Stalinist Marxism
In October, Rep. Chris Smith (R., N.J.) and Sen. Paul Trible (R., Va.) introduced legislation that would deny Romania MFN status for six months. However, even this modest step is opposed by the State Department. In fact, during his visit last month to Romania, Secretary of State George Shultz said that "The U.S. would like to see trade [with Romania] flourish to the extent that it can. I believe that it can increase more in the future—and I hope it does."

Meanwhile, average Romanians—who receive few, if any, of the benefits of MFN status—face another bitter winter without adequate heat or light. The near-collapse of the Romanian economy has led to rumors that the Soviets would not at all mind if the army toppled Mr. Ceausescu and installed a military government similar to the one that has run Poland since 1981. However, any such move is unlikely. For all of his economic bungling, Mr. Ceausescu still delivers valuable exports to the Soviet Union and serves as a conduit for the transmission of embargoed Western technology to Moscow.

Continuing to renew Romania's MFN status will not make that nation more independent of the Kremlin. Mr. Ceausescu's devotion to Stalinist Marxism is clear even to naive observers. I worked with him for many years, and the one thing I came to



Ceausescu: America's Most Favored Tyrant

understand was that his position toward Moscow was never influenced by the U.S. Rather, it was primarily determined by the nature of his personal relationship with the Kremlin's top man, Yuri Andropov, whom I met, seemed to show less rigidity toward Mr. Ceausescu than Leonid Brezhnev had; Mikhail Gorbachev is apparently following the same policy.

According to recent reports, relations with Moscow are getting closer again, with a large Soviet presence once more in Romania. In addition, secret bilateral agreements with Moscow, such as those between the two intelligence services for the procurement of Western technology, are sacred obligations for Mr. Ceausescu. Human rights in Romania have been

strangled since the granting of MFN status in 1975. The proportion of security personnel in the population has steadily increased over the years, reaching a ratio of 1:15—the world's highest—by the time of my break with Bucharest in 1978. Selective mail censorship was replaced in 1976 with total censorship, with every single letter and package from abroad being opened. In February 1977 a secret Communist Party decision approved the complete monitoring of all international telephone calls. At the same time, Mr. Ceausescu personally ordered that the only legally permissible telephone device to be used was one developed by the security police that can be instantly converted into a microphone to monitor people's private conversations.

During the mid-1970s electronic monitoring devices were secretly installed in every Roman Catholic church and Jewish synagogue. In March 1978 a top-secret decision by Mr. Ceausescu required that all but a few token Jews be quietly removed from the military and security forces as well as from sensitive posts in the party and government.

Bucharest's terrorism against the West has also increased substantially. In the mid-1970s there was a surge in the secret training given in Romania to Western communists, especially Spaniards and Greeks, in sabotage and other forms of guerrilla warfare. In 1975 the DIE, the Romanian foreign intelligence service, made secret agreements with Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists, providing them with

significant logistical support and using them in operations against Romania's own political opponents in the West. In 1975, only days after receiving MFN status, Romania had its DIE secretly kill three militant anti-communists in the West, one of whom, Vasile Zapartan, was a priest. The DIE later organized assassination attempts and savage beatings of emigres who had publicly criticized the cult of personality in Romania, using PLO terrorists in France in 1976 and criminal mercenaries in both West Germany in 1976 and France in 1977. In July 1978 I personally received the order to arrange unattributable assassinations of emigres working for the U.S. government in Radio Free Europe, and to bomb the radio's Munich

Mr. Ceausescu's last visit to the U.S. in 1978 was used to set the stage for an attempt to develop and recruit President Carter's brother, Billy, as an agent of influence.

headquarters (an action that finally took place in February 1981). On July 28, 1981, Emil Georgescu, a senior editor at Radio Free Europe in Munich, was stabbed 22 times by criminals hired by Bucharest and barely escaped with his life. (He was one of the people I had been ordered to have killed.)

Nevertheless, Bucharest has always considered itself able to outwit Washington in obtaining the annual renewal of MFN. The only significant step I saw Mr. Ceausescu take to ensure the renewal was his August 1975 appointment of a permanent MFN task force, consisting of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, and the deputy chief of the DIE (at that time myself). Because the U.S. indicated that Romania's emigration policy was the key to MFN renewal, Mr. Ceausescu decided to maintain emigration from Romania (mostly Jews and ethnic Germans) at the minimum level but no higher. "We should make as much money as possible on our vanishing national resources—oil, Jews and Germans," he told the task force.

As part of the task force, the DIE was also responsible for selling the West on the myth of Mr. Ceausescu's domestic popularity and persuading the U.S. government to like Romania. The DIE paid for the Western publication of hundreds of articles and books about Mr. Ceausescu's accomplishments. It mounted successful operations to develop sources of influence at the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest and to exert pres-

sure through agents and contacts in the U.S. It created and financed Romanian emigre organizations in the U.S.; which paid for thousands of emigres to come periodically to Washington from all over the U.S. and Canada to demonstrate and lobby on Capitol Hill for MFN renewal.

Nor will the most recent renewal of MFN status improve U.S.-Romanian relations. Bucharest is now apparently pressing for a new official visit by Mr. Ceausescu to Washington, but its Oriental-rug-merchant approach to bilateral relations is entirely different from the American one. I personally was responsible for preparing Mr. Ceausescu's last visit to the U.S., in April 1978, and I also then accompanied him as a member of his official delegation.

Mr. Ceausescu assigned the visit a more pragmatic mission besides its political significance: setting the stage for the secret development and eventual recruitment of President Carter's brother, Billy. Because I broke with Bucharest shortly thereafter, the only tangible result of this planned operation was the Romanian commercial office opened in Atlanta as a first step.

Bucharest Outfoxes Washington
The tactic of recruiting close relatives of foreign heads of state is one in which Mr. Ceausescu excels. On one official visit to Iran, he himself spotted the corrupt brother of the late shah as a likely prospect, and in Syria he saw potential in the then-powerful brother of President Hafez Assad. Both were later recruited, royally rewarded by fat payments into Swiss bank accounts, and used for promoting Romanian political and economic interests. Perhaps someday another Romanian defector will tell us what Mr. Ceausescu's ulterior motive is for his next visit to Washington. In any case, we may be sure that he has more than the exchange of mutual compliments in mind.

Bucharest is successfully outfoxing Washington day after day. The U.S. now has 10 years' worth of proof that MFN does not produce the desired effect in Romania, and enough is enough. America must stop supporting a communist regime that is scornful of American democratic principles and hostile to U.S. interests.

Mr. Pacepa was the personal adviser to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu and deputy director of the Romanian foreign intelligence service until July 1978, when he was granted political asylum in the U.S. He is the highest-ranking intelligence officer ever to defect to the West.

Corporate Strategies for a Shrinking Market

Regardless of upswings or downswings in the economy, there will always be certain businesses that have to restructure to reflect a shrinking demand in their particular markets. It is understandably difficult—and may be impossible—for managers to accept that their business has leveled off or is 30% to 40% below prior peaks, or that their market has been eroded by competitors and/or

ness." The study showed that many manufacturers (ourselves included) have been operating at a 30% to 55% cost disadvantage to foreign competitors and are losing ground on productivity by a factor of 2 to 1. Some of this disadvantage is obviously due to our hard currency and the stronger government support of some foreign competitors. But it should also be obvious that you cannot be cost competitive

rate advertising, corporate manufacturing, corporate planning or corporate development group. Of course, any company has to have some staff to fulfill legal and financial requirements carry out special projects. But generally be done with a group than you find in. Certainly this war here com

more strategic options because more people are thinking strategically about what they can do to accelerate the profit growth in their particular business. An overdependence on old products that offer anything new or don't begin to lure up to current competitive offerings of these products cost more than you find in. On the demand curve capacity was not only not cost

ONE YEAR ON THE NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER LIST

FINALLY IN PAPERBACK!

Σαδιν
Europe

A Way of Hope


Continued from page 3

Be swept away!

The blockbuster novel from the author of *The Great Santini*, *The Lords of Discipline* and *The Water is Wide*

THE NATIONAL BESTSELLER

THE PRINCE OF TIDES



PAT CONROY

THE LORDS OF DISCIPLINE AND THE GREAT SANTINI

Also available on BANTAM AUDIO CASSETTE, read by Richard Thomas

BANTAM

What's happening now to the Class of '65?

Twenty years after his high school graduation—and ten years after his landmark bestseller, *What Really Happened to the Class of '65*—David Walleckinaky has crisscrossed America to create a vivid portrait of the children of the '60s confronting the challenges of the '80s.

"Sit back and be fascinated—and moved—by all the tragic, weird, and/or delightful things that have happened." —*Stamour*

Class Reunion '65

Tales of an American Generation

David Walleckinaky



For the best in paperbacks look for the PENGUIN

For other Penguin books of interest write to: Dept. P, Penguin Books, 250 Murray Hill Parkway, East Rutherford, New Jersey 07073-2112

order seems to be on the verge of collapse and large masses of people actively question its legitimacy. The leaders seem then to spring out of nothing, catapulted onto the historical stage by a number of strange accidents. This impression is only partly true. "Revolutionary situations" cannot, of course, be produced by an effort of will; they invariably result from an unpredictable coincidence of various forces and to this extent the leaders they call into existence may be seen as historical accidents. This does not mean, however, that anybody can assume this role; it requires extraordinary personalities who, apart from being shrewd, self-controlled and not prone to panic, have the unusual gift which enables them both immediately to feel and to articulate the aspirations of huge crowds and to inspire confidence.

LECH WALESA'S autobiography does not—predictably—convey to us a perfect replica of the figure the Western audience knew from television coverage and the Poles from direct experience (and the public in Communist countries not at all, of course): a spontaneous, cheerful but calm leader dominating the crowds on large squares. The book is inevitably a political document and not only personal reminiscences; it is safe to assume that other people were involved in shaping it, aside from the author. It includes both Lech Walesa's life story and his reappraisal of the role Solidarity has played in the last seven years of Polish history. It cannot replace the historical analysis we find in other works on the subject (especially those by Timothy Garton Ash and by Jerzy Holzer), but it provides us with an enlightening supplement to them.

However, the reader of the book realizes that both Mr. Walesa and the Solidarity movement need to be understood against the background not merely of postwar Polish history but within patterns of tradition which have been shaping Polish mentality since time immemorial.

Lech Walesa came from a peasant family. Some of his ancestors were sent to Siberia after the Polish uprising against Russia in 1863. And men in the next two generations of the family fought against Russians in the First World War, against Bolsheviks in 1920 and then against Germans in World War II. Mr. Walesa's father, taken to a Nazi labor camp, died just after the war when the son was barely 18 months old. The mother used to read Polish patriotic novels to her children, and brought them up in the spirit of Catholic devotion which shaped Lech Walesa's mind and was to remain, as he says, his main source of spiritual strength. They lived in utmost poverty, the children being compelled, from the age of 5, to do various jobs to help the family survive. After vocational technical school and a few years as an electrician in a tractor station, Mr. Walesa moved in 1967 to Gdansk which has been his home until now.

Although skilled workers in the shipyard where he was employed were well off by comparison with many other segments of the population, the picture Mr. Walesa draws in his autobiography reminds one vividly of the early Victorian period: salaries on the bare subsistence level, miserable housing conditions, appalling carelessness about work safety resulting in many horrible accidents and death, filthy and crowded hostels, drunkenness, all sorts of outrageous tricks devised by the authorities to squeeze out of workers more and more effort for the same salary (all the immutable characteristics of capitalism, according to the Communist state ideology), mismanagement, impossible plans, fake productivity achievements, etc. The overall conditions were in fact worse than in the early stages of capitalism, when there were always many people who could publicly and aloud plead the cause of the exploited, and when workers themselves could struggle and build their self-defense organs—unions and then political parties—



Lech Walesa, center, leaving a Solidarity meeting in Szczecin, northwest Poland, 1980

whereas all attempts to organize independent labor unions (as opposed to the party-owned pseudo-unions) were met in all socialist countries with brutal and merciless police repression.

Mr. Walesa mentions only briefly the 1968 student revolt: the workers failed to support it, which many of them were later to regret. He tells us that he went through a real political baptism in December 1970 when the strikes, following a massive rise in prices of basic commodities, ended with a blood-bath in coastal cities (the number of workers killed in those days is still uncertain, as the authorities buried the victims secretly during the night in unmarked graves). At that point, the workers were not yet prepared for an organized resistance; apart from harboring a few remaining naive illusions ("Could the Polish soldiers shoot Poles? Perhaps they are Russians disguised in Polish uniforms?"), they had no experience, after a quarter of a century of helplessness, to prepare them for fighting in a coordinated way. The massacre ended the Gomułka era and the powerful party chief, who in 1956 had been hailed by most Poles as a savior, left the political scene in shame, to the general relief. There followed a period of a new faint hope. When his successor, Edward Gierek, made a number of promises, soon to be broken, as usual, by the ruling party. Then the year 1976 came; a new wave of desperate strikes and of repressions was followed by the event whose importance Mr. Walesa duly stresses in the book: establishment of the KOR, or Workers' Defense Committee, consisting of a group of intellectuals who decided to set up an openly operating body ("illegal," of course, in the eyes of authorities) that was to bring material, medical, moral and legal help to workers who were persecuted, tortured and sacked after the strikes. The committee enlarged its scope of activities step by step, thus becoming the main organ of social self-defense against the Communist lawlessness; it survived, despite innumerable arrests and police harassment, until the birth of Solidarity, which it certainly did not create but to whose rise it enormously contributed by its underground journals for workers, by providing the movement with a body of advisers and by changing the whole political climate of Poland. The election of the Polish Pope in October 1978 and his voyage to his native land the next year gave an enormously powerful boost to the Poles' self-confidence; the history of Solidarity has to be seen against the background of this event.

The historical meaning of Solidarity consisted in that it showed how a totalitarian regime might possibly, under strong social pressure, yet peacefully (whatever violence was used all those years was used by the police and the military), assume a new, more humane and economically more reason-

Mr arc of seu Gil twe for sub ple the acc his whi doc Wn pec in l a c 197 fe c.

PRESERVATION COPY

able form by allowing some room for pluralism in social life.

A 10-million-strong movement that swept like fire over the country could not, of course, be unanimous in all matters; it absorbed all kinds of people who were divided on many political and ideological issues. Mr. Walesa does not conceal the internal dissent within Solidarity and criticisms of which he was himself the target, especially from more radical factions which considered him too conciliatory in the negotiations with the Government. We cannot say with any certainty what would have happened if Solidarity had taken a more pugnacious line; it is, however, safe to say that if it had been more prone to concessions than it actually was, it would have only encouraged the Communist Government to more aggressive moves and probably to an earlier assault. The whole story of the relationship between the Government and Solidarity, as told by Mr. Walesa (and known, for that matter, to all observers) is a long series of lies, cheating and broken promises, culminating in the massive rape of Poland on Dec. 13, 1981, and the establishment of the military dictatorship.

MASS arrests, repressions, murders and the dissolution of not only of Solidarity but of many associations which proved too rebellious (groups of students, writers, actors, etc.) could neither erase those 14 months from human memory nor restore the previous order. Today's Poland is a profoundly transformed society which, though temporarily defeated, learned that it is possible successfully to defy the oppressive system and to extort from it significant concessions. "The normalization," Czechoslovak style, did not succeed and if Poland is now, exactly six years after the declaration of "martial law," the least oppressive and the most culturally tolerant country by Communist standards (though far from "liberal," let alone "democratic" in any sense), it owes that condition to the living legacy of Solidarity and the resistance it put into movement. The rulers occasionally try various devices to appease the population without, however, meeting the essential requirement necessary to raise the country from the abysmal economic decline: the legalization of pluralism, at least at the level of labor unions. They will probably drag on their inconsistent policy until the next explosion which may be more dangerous than the previous one. The recent national referendum on political and economic measures — which Mr. Walesa and Solidarity leaders encouraged people to boycott — is not likely, given its ambiguous outcome, to change the situation for the better or for the worse.

Mr. Walesa's work has a most interesting supplement: an interview, recently published in the Paris-based, Polish-language monthly, *Kultura*, with Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, who was an officer in the very operational military center that organized the "coup" which imposed so-called martial law and who, as it turned out, worked for the C.I.A. and escaped from Poland only a couple of weeks before

Dec. 13, 1981. His departure and report confirms that the preparation for military dictatorship started even before Solidarity's legalization, thus exposing the Communists' mendacious assertions about their will to compromise. He denounces as well the excuse — which the Polish Government still tries to sell to the world — that it saved Poland from Soviet invasion; in his view (better substantiated than anybody else's), if the Government had had enough courage to defy the Soviet Union, it could have avoided both the invasion and the December calamity. But why should the Government have wanted to avoid it? After all, any other

"Because of Solidarity's legacy, today's Poland is a profoundly transformed society."

solution would have inevitably resulted in giving up a part of its power.

To speculate on the future of Solidarity would be risky. Certainly, after it was outlawed, it could not keep its mass character. But it survives not only in the form of a clandestine union but in a great variety of political, educational, cultural and publishing initiatives which it brought to life, even though they became independent from the union. The democratic resistance it embodies compelled the Government last year to release political prisoners and to take various paths — so far rather inefficient — to endear itself to the population. Trapped between their fear of the Polish people and the need to satisfy both the Kremlin and their own desire to survive, the rulers are oscillating between attempts to intimidate Poland and to cajole it. They proved to be incapable of doing either but they will probably continue trying.

The English edition of "A Way of Hope" is not quite flawless, though the translation reads smoothly enough. The publishers state first that it is a translation from the French translation, published earlier on by Librairie Arthème Fayard, and then, on the same page, that they used both the French text and the Polish manuscript (not yet published). If they had the original text at their disposal, why should they have used the French as well? The French version is apparently larger than the English, but the editors fail to mention any deletions. In the list of main events in recent Polish history, which the editors inserted at the beginning, one of the crucial moments — October 1956 (when Gomulka returned to power) — is inexplicably missing; the Warsaw ghetto uprising in 1943 is mentioned but not the Warsaw uprising of 1944. This suggests sloppy work. □

The Day Night Fell

On December 13 [1981], General Jaruzelski reappeared on the national scene in a completely new role. Martial law had been declared the previous night. . . .

I knew that our movement had been stopped cold, for the time being. It was something I had to accept, like the rules of a game. When your opponent's turn comes around, you have to know how to fall back, to think things over calmly, to keep up your morale and summon your resources to face whatever comes next. Panic and disorganized struggle are worse than inactivity. . . .

That night, our doorbell never stopped ringing. The first wave of visitors arrived at around one A.M., members of the Young Poland Movement who had come to announce that some of their friends had been arrested. . . . Fiszbach [the party first secretary in

Gdansk] and Kolodziejski [the district governor] were driven to my house in Zaspka, where they found the apartment block on Pilotow Street surrounded by militiamen. . . . Once inside the apartment, they delivered their message about going to Warsaw for the supposed negotiations with Jaruzelski.

I refused to consider their proposal until the authorities had first released all those who had been arrested. The two men went off to report to the Party Central Committee on their direct line. In the meantime, a "combat detachment" armed with crowbars appeared in front of the building demanding entrance. . . . When Kolodziejski told me that I'd be better off going to Warsaw of my own accord than being taken there by force, I realized that I had no choice.

From "A Way of Hope."

Sierra Club Books

FREEMAN PATTERSON

Portraits of Earth

The renowned photographer and author of *Photography for the Joy of It* shares his philosophy and technique in an informative text that counterpoints more than 100 compelling "earthscapes" — a stunning series of color portraits of the elements, patterns, and designs of nature.



"Readers who are interested in nature will enjoy these fresh views of natural landforms; nature photographers will be ecstatic."

\$35.00 cloth.

—Publishers Weekly

GALEN ROWELL

Mountain Light

In Search of the Dynamic Landscape



Now in paperback, this acclaimed work presents Galen Rowell's finest full-color images with the dramatic and informative stories behind the photographs.

"A splendid blend of autobiography, personal philosophy and superb color photographs of high, wild places."

—New York Times


\$19.95 paperback.

ROBERT WENKAM

The Edge of Fire

Volcano and Earthquake Country in Western North America and Hawaii

More than 100 spectacular color photographs are combined with the history, lore, and latest scientific information on earthquakes and volcanoes in a lavish work by a noted photo-journalist and conservationist.



"The peace and tranquility of great mountain peaks and tropical islands hide frightening episodes of death and destruction... We live on the edge of fire."

—Robert Wenkam

\$35.00 cloth.

At your bookstore now.

Sierra Club Books

Distributed by Random House, Inc.

WORLD FEDERATION OF HUNGARIAN JEWS

Magyar Zsidók Világszövetsége — U.S.A. Division

AMERICA-ISRAEL FRIENDSHIP HOUSE • 136 EAST 39th STREET • NEW YORK, NY 10016 • 683-5377 — 725-1211, Ext. 5 1

President

NORMAN N. GATI

Chairman of the Board

GABOR NEWMARK

Co-Chairman of the Board

ZOLTAN LEFKOVITS

Exec. Vice President

ERVIN FARKAS

Treasurer

LESLIE NANASI

Comptrollers

THEODORE KOEVARY

JOSEPH WHITE

Chairmen of the Committees

DR. RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM

(Cultural)

SANDOR A. BRUMMER

(Memorial)

GABOR CARELLI

(Arbitration)

ARTHUR BURNS

(Ways and Means)

LESLIE BOKOR

(Financial)

STEVEN KALDOR

(Membership)

COLEMAN K. KAHAN

(Press)

VIKTOR KLEIN

(Social Affairs)

RITA RAYMEN

(Entertainment)

JENO NOGRADI

(Public Relations)

President Emeritus

DR. FREDERIC GOROG*

Spiritual Leader

RABBI ARTHUR SCHNEIER

Honorary Presidents

ODON ANTIL*

MICHAEL BERGER

DR. RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM

JOSEPH FETTMAN*

NICHOLAS NANASI

JOSEPH ROTH

MRS. ALBERT SPEED

OSCAR SUNSHINE*

TIBOR J. WALDMAN

IMRE WEITZNER, SR., M.D.

* Deceased

Honorary Vice Presidents

JOSEPH M. BIACH

LESLIE KELLER

JOSEPH SOMLO

MARTIN WEISS

Vice Presidents

SANDOR BRUMMER

TIBOR FOGEL

LESLIE KARDOS

ANDRE POLLATSIK

BELA RADNAI

BILL J. SEREGI



Members of the Board

DR. MOSES W. CARMILLY

AGI CHASE

IMRE CSENGERI

BELA FOTI

ANDREW FREEMAN

JOSEPH J. FRIED, M.D.

LASZLO FRIED

MARTIN GERHARDT

MICHAEL GERHARDT

DEZSŐ GERŐ

JOHN GORDON

SANDOR GROSS

VERA HONT

LESLIE KARSON

SANDOR KOVACS

EUGENE MARKOVITS

MIMI MAUTNER

HEDY MERZON

JOLIE NANASI

HERMAN RIEDERMAN

CAROLE ROTH

LEON RUBACH

ROBERT RYAN

MARCEL SAND

LEO L. SCHEIBER, M.D.

LESLIE SINGER

LOUIS SIPOS

GABOR SOMJEN, M.D.

OSCAR SRETER, M.D.

EVA TEICHOLZ

SUSAN UNGAR

MIKLOS VARKONY

FRANK VARNAI

ROBERT WALDMAN

M.D. WEINSTOCK

ERNEST ZELIG

Easter Europe

September 24, 1986

Mr. Max Green
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison
The White House - Rm. 196
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Green:


On behalf of the delegation of Hungarian Jewish leaders who recently visited this country, we wish to thank you for your warm reception and for playing a key role in an extremely successful day in Washington.

We all left with a sense that you understood the opportunities that exist today in Hungary for reviving Jewish culture in a land with such a rich history of Jewish scholarship and learning. The delegation feels very strongly that Jewish education is one of its foremost priorities, for it is the only hope of a future for the more than 100,000 Hungarian Jews. In addition, their baggage of problems includes maintaining the basic communal services such as its restaurant and public kitchen as well as the only hospital in Eastern Europe under Jewish auspices. Preserving the Hungarian Jewish heritage is yet another concern, including the restoration of the more than 1300 cemeteries in the country and the rapidly aging and decaying synagogues.

We know that we will be able to count on
you for your future support.

Best wishes.


Leslie Keller

Sincerely,

Andor Weiss

LUBICOM

LUBINSKY COMMUNICATIONS INC.

August 21, 1986

TO: Max Green

RE: Hungarian Jewish Delegation

I think that this is an excellent opportunity for the Vice President to show his concern for the welfare of Jews behind the Iron Curtain. I know that it will also mean a great deal to Hungarian Jews in this country.

Please let me know as soon as possible about the arrangements for this visit.

Wenach

WORLD FEDERATION OF HUNGARIAN JEWS

Magyar Zsidók Világszövetsége — U.S.A. Division

AMERICA-ISRAEL FRIENDSHIP HOUSE • 136 EAST 39th STREET • NEW YORK, NY 10016 • 683-5377 — 725-1211, Ext. 5 1

President

NORMAN N. GATI

Chairman of the Board

GABOR NEWMARK

Co-Chairman of the Board

ZOLTAN LEFKOVITS

Exec. Vice President

ERVIN FARKAS

Treasurer

LESLIE NANASI

Comptrollers

THEODORE KOEVARY

JOSEPH WHITE

Chairmen of the Committees

DR. RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM

(Cultural)

SANDOR A. BRUMMER

(Memorial)

GABOR CARELLI

(Arbitration)

ARTHUR BURNS

(Ways and Means)

LESLIE BOKOR

(Financial)

STEVEN KALDOR

(Membership)

COLEMAN K. KAHAN

(Press)

VIKTOR KLEIN

(Social Affairs)

RITA RAYMEN

(Entertainment)

JENO NOGRADI

(Public Relations)

President Emeritus

DR. FREDERIC GOROG*

Spiritual Leader

RABBI ARTHUR SCHNEIER

Honorary Presidents

ODON ANTL*

MICHAEL BERGER

DR. RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM

JOSEPH FETTMAN*

NICHOLAS NANASI

JOSEPH ROTH

MRS. ALBERT SPEED

OSCAR SUNSHINE*

TIBOR J. WALDMAN

IMRE WEITZNER, SR., M.D.

* Deceased

Honorary Vice Presidents

JOSEPH M. BIACH

LESLIE KELLER

JOSEPH SOMLO

MARTIN WEISS

Vice Presidents

SANDOR BRUMMER

TIBOR FOGEL

LESLIE KARDOS

ANDRE POLLATSIK

BELA RADNAI

BILL J. SEREGI



Members of the Board

DR. MOSES W. CARMILLY

AGI CHASE

IMRE CSENGERI

BELA FOTI

ANDREW FREEMAN

JOSEPH J. FRIED, M.D.

LASZLO FRIED

MARTIN GERHARDT

MICHAEL GERHARDT

DEZSÓ GERÓ

JOHN GORDON

SANDOR GROSS

VERA HONT

LESLIE KARSON

SANDOR KOVACS

EUGENE MARKOVITS

MIMI MAUTNER

HEDY MERZON

JOLIE NANASI

HERMAN RIEDERMAN

CAROLE ROTH

LEON RUBACH

ROBERT RYAN

MARCEL SAND

LEO L. SCHEIBER, M.D.

LESLIE SINGER

LOUIS SIPOS

GABOR SOMJEN, M.D.

OSCAR SRETER, M.D.

EVA TEICHOLZ

SUSAN UNGAR

MIKLOS VARKONY

FRANK VARNAI

ROBERT WALDMAN

M.D. WEINSTOCK

ERNEST ZELIG

August 20, 1986

Vice President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Vice President Bush:

We are writing to respectfully suggest that you extend us the courtesy of meeting with a delegation of visiting leaders of the Hungarian Jewish community, during their brief stay in this country on Monday - Friday, September 8 - 12.

The delegation consists of Dr. A. Losonci, President of MIOK - Hungarian Jewish Community Council, Mr. Lajos Bakos, Vice President of the Hungarian Jewish Community Council and Mr. H. Fixler, President of the Orthodox section of MIOK.

This mission of the responsible and recognized leadership of the Hungarian Jewish community is anxious to give you a first-hand report of the condition of Hungarian Jewry, the growing cooperation between the Hungarian Jewish community and the government, the condition of Jewish cemeteries in that country and the role that our country can play in helping the remnants of the once thriving Jewish community survive religiously and culturally.

All Contributions are Tax Deductible

The delegation of Hungarian Jewish leaders will be accompanied by top American leaders of the World Federation of Hungarian Jews, among them Mr. Leslie Keller and Mr. Andor P. Weiss of New York, and Menachem Lubinsky, a well known Jewish activist in New York, formally the director of government affairs of Agudath Israel.

We would be grateful if you were to give them several minutes of your valuable time on any one of those days. Please let us know whenever will be most convenient for you.

Sincerely,

Norman N. Gati
Norman N. Gati
President