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VZCZCSNI *
 RI RUFHCP
 DE RUEHSN #3631 072 **
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH
 R 132026Z MAR 86
 FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
 TO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0019
 BT
 UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR 02077

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHRG: PROG 3/13/86
 APPRV: POL:JMACK
 DRFTD: POL:LALLISON
 CLEAR: NONE
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REF: COPENHAGEN 1353

FOL RETRANSMITTED PER REF:
 QUOTE

UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR 02077

USIA FOR AR/CENTAM
 GENEVA PASS TO UNHRC SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR DR. JOSE
 ANTONIO PASTOR RIDRUEJO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, PHUM, UNHRC, ES
 SUBJECT: 1985 VIOLENCE STATISTICS FOR EL SALVADOR

1. 1985 VIOLENCE STATISTICS

DURING 1985, THE EMBASSY REPORTED A TOTAL OF 335
 CIVILIANS (A) KILLED IN EL SALVADOR FOR MOTIVES WE
 ADDUCE TO BE POLITICAL IN NATURE. THEY ARE, BY CATEGORY:

	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL (ROUNDED OFF)
BY GUERRILLAS	152	45.4
POSSIBLY BY GUERRILLAS	33	9.9
BY EXTREME RIGHT	3	.9
POSSIBLY BY EXTREME RIGHT	13	3.9
BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANT	80	23.9
BY CIVIL DEFENSE	4	1.2
BY ARMY/SECURITY FORCES	9	2.7
CIVILIANS KIA	41	12.2
TOTAL	335(A)	100.0

(A) THIS FIGURE INCLUDES DEATHS WHICH, BECAUSE OF
 UNCLEAR CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CANNOT CONFIDENTLY DISMISS AS
 BEING PURELY CRIMINAL IN NATURE, BUT WHICH MAY WELL BE
 UNRELATED TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

2. THE EMBASSY ALSO REPORTED 397 ESAF AND 1123
 GUERRILLAS KILLED IN FIGHTING DURING THE YEAR.

3. SOURCES

THESE FIGURES ARE BASED ON VIOLENCE REPORTED IN THE
 SALVADORAN PRESS, GUERRILLA ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF ACTS OF

VIOLENCE AS REPORTED IN THEIR OWN MEDIA, AND OTHER SOURCES. THEY ARE INTENDED ONLY, AND IN COMPARISON WITH PAST REPORTS, TO PROVIDE AN INDICATOR FOR TRENDS IN VIOLENCE OVER TIME. EMBASSY SAN SALVADOR DOES NOT ENDORSE THESE FIGURES AS REFLECTING THE PRECISE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

4. FOR USMISSION GENEVA. PLEASE PASS CONTENTS OF THIS CABLE TO UNGA SPECIAL RAPORTEUR FOR EL SALVADOR, DR. JOSE ANTONIO PASTOR RIDRUEJO.

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 03629

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QUOTE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 02289

USIA FOR AR/CENTAM

GENEVA PASS TO DR. PASTOR RIDRUEJO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, ES

SUBJECT: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR

- 1980-85: A COMPARISON BETWEEN EMBASSY AND

- CATHOLIC CHURCH (TUTELA LEGAL) STATISTICS

1. SOURCE OF FIGURES

THE FOLLOWING IS A TABLE LISTING FIGURES FOR DEATHS DUE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR BETWEEN 1980 AND 1985, AS REPORTED BY 1) THE ARCHBISHOPRIC OF SAN SALVADOR'S OFFICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE (TUTELA LEGAL), AND 2) AS COMPILED BY THE EMBASSY FROM REPORTS IN THE LOCAL PRESS, GUERRILLA ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE AS REPORTED IN THEIR OWN MEDIA, AND OTHER SOURCES. TUTELA LEGAL (TL) INCLUDES IN ITS REPORTS INFORMATION FROM THE PRESS, INFORMATION COLLECTED BY OTHER "HUMAN RIGHTS" GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY, AND INFORMATION RECEIVED IN ITS OFFICES FROM PERSONS WHO COME TO COMPLAIN OF THE DEATHS OF FAMILY OR ACQUAINTANCES.

2. TUTELA LEGAL IS UNABLE TO INVESTIGATE THE VERACITY OF MANY OF THESE COMPLAINTS DUE TO LACK OF PERSONNEL. ALSO THE EMBASSY HAS FOUND MORE THAN ONE CASE IN WHICH TUTELA LEGAL HAS APPARENTLY BEEN DECEIVED BY THE GUERRILLAS INTO PUBLISHING STATISTICS ON CIVILIAN DEATHS WHICH IN FACT DID NOT OCCUR, OR INTO CITING GUERRILLA COMBAT DEATHS AS CIVILIAN DEATHS. THE EMBASSY CAUTIONS THAT ITS OWN FIGURES ARE INTENDED TO SHOW A TREND, AND MAKES NO CLAIM OF TOTAL ACCURACY (SEE FOOTNOTE 1). WHILE WE RECOMMEND AGAINST ACCEPTING ANY FIGURE AS AN ABSOLUTE AND ACCURATE NUMBER OF DEATHS DUE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR, WE NEVERTHELESS FEEL THAT THE INFORMATION IN THE TABLE IS INSTRUCTIVE.

3. DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE

- COMPARISON OF TUTELA LEGAL (TL) AND EMBASSY FIGURES

DATE	VICTIMS ATTRIBUTED BY TL TO DEATH SQUADS	VICTIMS ATTRIBUTED BY TL TO GUERRILLAS	TOTAL CIV. VICTIMS REPORTED BY TL	CIV. DEATHS ACCORDING TO PRESS AS REPORTED BY EMBASSY (A)
------	--	---	--	---

1980	N/A (B)	N/A	N/A	2173 (C)
1981	N/A (B)	N/A	N/A	5331
1982	1227	46	5339	2630
1983	1259	67	5142	1677
1984	218	66	2280 (D)	770
1985	133	66	1961	335

TOTAL				
1980-				
1985	2837	245	14,776(B)	12,916

4. DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN 1985

- COMPARISON OF TUTELA LEGAL (TL) AND EMBASSY FIGURES

- BREAKDOWN BY MONTH

DATE	VICTIMS ATTRIBUTED BY TL TO DEATH SQUADS	VICTIMS ATTRIBUTED BY TL TO GUERRILLAS	TOTAL CIV. VICTIMS REPORTED BY TL	CIV. DEATHS ACCORDING TO PRESS AS REPORTED BY EMBASSY (A)
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JAN	14	4	260	37
FEB	22	4	240	30
MAR	18	3	175	21
APR	11	8	201	41
MAY	12	2	114	19
JUN	5	18	187	40
JUL	10	6	119	29
AUG	7	3	133	21
SEP	7	5	87	24
OCT	9	7	163	32
NOV	12	3	130	24
DEC	6	3	132	17

1985				
TOTAL	133	66	1961	335

5. EMBASSY FIGURES: 1985 DEATHS BY CATEGORY

	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
BY GUERRILLAS	152	45.4
POSSIBLY BY GUERRILLAS	33	9.9
BY EXTREME RIGHT	3	.9
POSSIBLY BY EXTREME RIGHT	13	3.9
BY UNIDENTIFIED ASSAILANT	80	23.9
BY CIVIL DEFENSE	4	1.2
BY ARMY/SECURITY FORCES	9	2.7
CIVILIANS KIA	41	12.2
TOTAL 1985	335	100.0

FOOTNOTES:

(A) THIS FIGURE INCLUDES DEATHS PERPETRATED BY GUERRILLAS; POSSIBLY BY GUERRILLAS; BY THE EXTREME RIGHT; POSSIBLY BY THE EXTREME RIGHT; BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANT; BY THE ARMY, SECURITY FORCES, AND CIVIL DEFENSE OUTSIDE THE LINE OF DUTY; AND CIVILIANS KILLED IN THE COURSE OF MILITARY ACTIONS. THE READER SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THIS FIGURE ALSO INCLUDES DEATHS WHICH, BECAUSE OF UNCLEAR CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CANNOT CONFIDENTLY DISMISS AS BEING PURELY CRIMINAL IN NATURE, BUT WHICH MAY WELL BE UNRELATED TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

(B) TUTELA LEGAL WAS NOT FOUNDED UNTIL MAY 1982.

(C) EMBASSY STARTED TABULATING POLITICAL VIOLENCE FIGURES IN OCTOBER 1980. THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS THE DEATHS RECORDED OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1980.

(D) IN HIS HOMILY OF 12/31/84, AUXILIARY BISHOP ROSA CHAVEZ REPORTED THAT A TOTAL OF 3418 SALVADORANS

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SUFFERED VIOLENT DEATH IN 1984. HE LATER CLARIFIED THAT THIS FIGURE INCLUDED ESAF SOLDIERS AND GUERRILLAS KILLED IN COMBAT.

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**SUBJECT: THE "MASAS": THE FMLN'S ORGANIZED CIVILIAN
AUXILIARIES AT THE SERVICE OF THE REVOLUTION**

1. SUMMARY

"THE GUERRILLAS COULD NOT HAVE SURVIVED IN THE MOUNTAINS FOR A DECADE IF THEY HAD NOT HAD POPULAR SUPPORT."
(TOMMY SUE MONTGOMERY, "REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR," 1982)

"THERE WERE NO MOUNTAINS (POPULAR BASES OF SUPPORT IN RURAL AREAS). WE CONSTRUCTED OUR OWN MOUNTAINS: THE MASAS." (MIGUEL CASTELLANOS, FPL DEFECTOR, 1986)

IN VIEW OF THE RECENT CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE SALVADORAN ARMY'S EVACUATION OF GUERRILLA NON-COMBATANT CIVILIAN "MASAS" FROM GUAZAPA DURING OPERATION PHOENIX, WE HAVE REEXAMINED THE ISSUE OF MASAS, AND HAVE INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS, SOME OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED REF GG. A REVIEW OF RECENTLY-CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AS WELL AS PERSONAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY EMBOFFS PROVIDE VALUABLE INSIGHTS INTO THE ROLE THAT THE ESTIMATED 25,000-60,000 RURAL "MASAS" (THE MASSES, AS THE FIVE GUERRILLA GROUPS CALL THEIR ORGANIZED CIVILIAN SUPPORT STRUCTURES) PLAY IN THE INSURGENCY. THESE DOCUMENTS, WHICH REPRESENT ONLY A SMALL SAMPLING OF THE INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS OF THE FMLN -- IN THIS CASE MOSTLY THE FPL -- DEAL WITH THE MASAS' IMPORTANCE TO THE INSURGENCY, HOW THEY ARE USED, HOW THEY ARE RECRUITED AND INTEGRATED INTO THE INSURGENCY, HOW THEY ARE GOVERNED AND PROBLEMS THE GUERRILLAS FACE IN RETAINING THE LOYALTY OF THE MASAS.

2. ACCORDING TO DEBRIEFINGS OF FORMER GUERRILLAS AND INFORMATION CONTAINED IN CAPTURED GUERRILLA DOCUMENTS, "MASAS", IN ADDITION TO PERFORMING SUCH MUNDANE TASKS AS GROWING FOOD AND PROCURING SUPPLIES FOR THE GUERRILLAS, ALSO SERVE THE INSURGENCY IN SUCH POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ROLES AS INTELLIGENCE GATHERERS, MUNITIONS BEARERS, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT WORKERS, MESSENGERS, AND IN GUERRILLA CAMP SUPPORT WORKERS, SUCH AS COOKS. THE GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGE THIS EXPLOITATION OF THESE "INNOCENT CIVILIANS" AS CAMOUFLAGE AND PROTECTION AGAINST ESAF ATTACKS, AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE MASAS ARE THEIR POOL OF RECRUITS-IN-TRAINING, ALTHOUGH MANY NEVER PROGRESS BEYOND THEIR SUPPORT ROLE. THESE ACKNOWLEDGED MASA ACTIVITIES BELIEVE EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE LEFT TO PORTRAY EVERY CIVILIAN DEATH TO BE A RESULT OF INDISCRIMINATE GOES ATTACKS ON THE GUERRILLAS. THEY STAND AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES KNOWINGLY ENDANGER THE MASAS' LIVES TO GAIN TACTICAL AND PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE OVER THE ESAF AND THE GOES.

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R 072050Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 1951
INFO RUEHIA / USIA WASHDC 0530
RUEHGT / AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0439
RUEHMU / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0296
RUEHME / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0394
RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 9643
RUEHTG / AMEMBASSY TEGUCICALPA 0433
RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0048
RUEHGV / USMISSION GENEVA 0070
RUEOHA / USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
RUEOSEA / USAISO HOWARD AFB PN//LAI//
RUEOSBA / 24COMPW HOWARD AFB//DOI//
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3. THE FOLLOWING CHART OF FMLN ORGANIZATIONAL ACRONYMS IS MEANT TO HELP READERS UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FIVE FMLN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR POLITICAL FRONTS:

POLITICAL FRONTS

MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

PRS--SALVADORAN
- REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

ERP--PEOPLES
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

FPL--POPULAR FORCES OF
- LIBERATION

FAPL--POPULAR ARMED
FORCES OF LIBERATION

RN--NATIONAL RESISTANCE
-

FARN--ARMED FORCES OF
NATIONAL RESISTANCE

PCS--COMMUNIST PARTY OF
- EL SALVADOR
-

FAL--ARMED FORCES OF
LIBERATION

PRTC--REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
- OF CENTRAL AMERICAN
- WORKERS

FARLP--REVOLUTIONARY
ARMED FORCES FOR
POPULAR LIBERATION

END SUMMARY.

4. DEFINING THE MASA -- MORE THAN A CIVILIAN, A
"REVOLUTIONARY INSTRUMENT"

DURING THE INITIAL PHASES OF OPERATION PHOENIX, AN ARMY OPERATION BEGUN IN EARLY JANUARY, 1986 TO CLEAR INSURGENT COMBAT UNITS OUT OF THEIR TRADITIONAL REDOUBT OF THE GUAZAPA VOLCANO REGION, 15 MILES NORTHEAST OF SAN SALVADOR, LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN -- AROUND 500 -- WERE FOUND BY THE ARMY AND

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EVACUATED FROM THE ZONE AND TURNED OVER TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE. THESE EVACUATIONS PRECIPITATED A GUERRILLA ORCHESTRATED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AIMED AT HEIGHTENING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN OVER PURPORTED ARMY HARASSMENT OF "INNOCENT CIVILIANS" WHO, AS TESTIFIED TO BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHURCH AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS WERE, IN FACT, VERY WELL TREATED. THESE PARTICULAR CIVILIANS WERE ALMOST ALL GUERRILLA SUPPORTERS -- "MASAS" IN GUERRILLA PARLANCE. THE TERM "MASA" IS A BROAD ONE -- DENOTING A GUERRILLA CIVILIAN SUPPORTER WHO GENERALLY IS UNARMED, BUT WHO NONETHELESS HAS A CLEARLY DESIGNATED PLACE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE FORMAL GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.

IT IS WORTH NOTING AT THIS POINT THAT THE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE HIGHLY SELECTIVE GUERRILLA PARTY ELITE (REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD) AND THE ESTIMATED 25,000-60,000 MASAS -- LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF EL SALVADOR -- THAT ARE SYSTEMATICALLY EMPLOYED BY THE INSURGENCY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. (THIS PAPER DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF GUERRILLA EXPLOITATION OF MASAS IN URBAN FRONT ORGANIZATIONS.) MASAS BY DEFINITION ARE NOT MEMBERS OF ONE OF THE FIVE MARXIST-LENINIST GUERRILLA PARTIES, BUT RATHER BELONG TO SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS GUIDED AND USED BY THE PARTIES. AN FPL DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN JANUARY 1986 REFERRED TO MASAS, ALONG WITH THE GUERRILLA MILITIAS AND POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY, AS "REVOLUTIONARY INSTRUMENTS" OF OUR "MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY." A MASA WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN POLICY OR DECISION MAKING UNLESS, BY DINT OF RELIABILITY AND ACHIEVEMENTS, HE/SHE WERE ELEVATED TO PARTY STATUS. AT THAT POINT HE WOULD CEASE TO BE A MASA, BUT RATHER A PARTY ORGANIZER OF MASAS.

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INFO RUEHIA / USIA WASHDC 0531
RUEHGT / AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0440
RUEHMU / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0297
RUEHME / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0395
RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 9644
RUEHTG / AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0434
RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0049
RUFHGV / USMISSION GENEVA 0071
RUEOHA / USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
RUEOSEA / USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN//LAI//
RUEOSBA / 24COMPW HOWARD AFB//DOI//

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5. MASAS RANGE FROM UNEDUCATED CAMPESINOS WITH LIMITED
REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS, WHO ARE EXPECTED TO DO
LITTLE MORE THAN HAND OVER PART OF THEIR CROPS TO THE
GUERRILLAS, HELP CARRY THEIR SUPPLIES OR COOK THEIR FOOD
— TO ABLE BODIED YOUNG MEN WHO ARE VIEWED AS CANDIDATES
FOR PROMOTION INTO THE COMBATANT GUERRILLA RANKS. WE
HAVE SEEN DOCUMENTS INDICATING THAT MASAS INCLUDE PEOPLE
WHO ACCOMPANY ARMED GUERRILLAS ON MISSIONS TO BLOW UP
POWER PYLONS, DISTRIBUTE PROPAGANDA IN THE COMPANY OF
ARMED COMBATANTS, MANUFACTURE MINES, SERVE AS LOOKOUTS,
SPIES AND COURIERS, AND PURCHASE AND TRANSPORT MILITARY
AND OTHER SUPPLIES. MANY GUERRILLA ASPIRANTS ARE VETTED
FIRST THROUGH THE MASAS, OFTEN FOR A SIX MONTH PERIOD OR
MORE, TO KEEP THEM UNDER OBSERVATION AND TEST THEIR
POLITICAL RELIABILITY. THE GUERRILLAS BELIEVE A
GOVERNMENT SPY WILL NOT HAVE THE PATIENCE TO WAIT OUT A
LENGTHY AND INDEFINITE PERIOD OF PERFORMING MENIAL TASKS
BEFORE BECOMING A COMBATANT WITH ACCESS TO TACTICAL
INFORMATION. MASAS ARE BY AND LARGE ISOLATED FROM ANY
REAL INFORMATION OF VALUE ABOUT THE GUERRILLAS SUCH AS
LOCATIONS OF WEAPONS CACHES, MEDICAL FACILITIES, ETC.

6. WHERE THEY COME FROM

ALL MASAS BELONG TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ONE
OF FIVE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND FALL UNDER SOME KIND OF
DISCIPLINE; BUT THAT DISCIPLINE VARIES WIDELY FROM
GUERRILLA GROUP TO GROUP. THE FPL, FOR INSTANCE, PLACES
MUCH MORE EMPHASIS ON THE ORGANIZATION AND
POLITICIZATION OF THE MASAS THAN DOES THE ERP. (FOR
THAT REASON MOST OF THE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH
MASAS ARE FROM THE FPL.) MOST ARE RURAL "CAMPESINOS".
MANY ARE FAMILY MEMBERS OF ARMED GUERRILLA COMBATANTS
AND HAVE PHYSICALLY MOVED TO BE NEAR THEIR LOVED ONES.
SOME WERE RADICALIZED BY GOVERNMENT ATROCITIES OR

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LEFTIST PRIESTS YEARS AGO. OTHERS HAPPEN TO LIVE IN THE AREAS WHERE THE GUERRILLAS ARE STRONG AND, NOT WISHING TO LEAVE, IN CONTRAST TO MOST CAMPESINOS IN SUCH SITUATIONS, ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO THE GUERRILLA DOMINATED LOCAL POLITICAL REALITY. YET OTHERS, PROBABLY A MINORITY, ARE KIDNAPPED AND KEPT WITH THE GUERRILLAS. (EMBOFFS HAVE SPOKEN TO SEVERAL, MOST MEMORABLY A YOUNG TEENAGE GIRL TAKEN FROM A PUBLIC BUS AND FORCED INTO THE ROLE OF MISTRESS TO A GUERRILLA COMANDANTE.)

7. PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES: INDOCTRINATION, INSULATION,
- AND DEPENDENCY

THE GUERRILLAS USE ALL MANNER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES TO KEEP THE MASAS WITH THEM UNDER WHAT ARE MORE OFTEN THAN NOT HARSH ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. THEY PLAY ON MASA FEARS OF WHAT MIGHT BEFALL THEM IF THEY RETURN TO AREAS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL. (EMBOFFS HAVE SPOKEN TO MANY MASAS "LIBERATED" BY THE ARMY WHO SAID THEY WERE TOLD BY THE GUERRILLAS THAT THE ARMY WOULD EXECUTE THEM IF CAPTURED.) THEY ARE ENCOURAGED TO INFORM ON ONE ANOTHER. THEY ARE FORCED TO CONSTANTLY PARTICIPATE IN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING SESSIONS DURING WHICH THE GUERRILLA LINE ON GOVERNMENT REPRESSION, CLASS WARFARE, AND MARXIST DOGMA IS DRUMMED INTO THEM. THEIR ACCESS TO UNBIASED INFORMATION ON THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS HIGHLY RESTRICTED, AND ARE REQUIRED TO LISTEN DAILY TO THE TWO GUERRILLA RADIO STATIONS. THEY ARE COMMUNALIZED INTO PRODUCTION TEAMS AND MADE DEPENDENT ON THE GUERRILLAS FOR EVERYTHING FROM MEDICAL CARE, TO SCHOOLING FOR THEIR CHILDREN, TO THE VERY FOOD THE MASAS ARE THEMSELVES GROWING -- IN SUM, FOR A COMPLETE GAMUT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ALBEIT AT A VERY BASIC LEVEL, THAT A GOVERNMENT WOULD PROVIDE. (ACCORDING TO EMBOFFS)

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FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 1953

INFO RUEBIA / USIA WASHDC 0532

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RUEHMU / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0298

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INTERVIEWS WITH MASAS, CROPS ARE COLLECTIVIZED BY THE LOCAL GUERRILLA POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND THEN REDISTRIBUTED, OFTEN PROPORTIONALLY TO BOTH THE NEED AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE GROWERS, BUT ALSO ACCORDING TO POLITICAL RELIABILITY. NEW BOOTS, FOR INSTANCE, ARE OFTEN GIVEN BY THE FPL TO THE MOST LOYAL MASAS AS AN INCENTIVE TO OTHERS.)

8. THERE IS OTHER EVIDENCE OF THE COERCIVE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANY OF THE "PEOPLE" AND THE GUERRILLAS. MANY OF THE MASA BASES ARE FOUND IN AREAS OF DIFFICULT TERRAIN -- SUCH AS THE GUAZAPA VOLCANO -- AREAS THAT ARE GENERALLY INACCESSIBLE TO MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND USED AS SAFEHAVENS BY THE GUERRILLAS. A LIST OF GUERRILLA INSTRUCTIONS CAPTURED IN 1984 STATED THAT MASAS ARE PROHIBITED FROM LEAVING THE WAR ZONE INDIVIDUALLY, EVEN TO PURCHASE SUPPLIES, AND PREVENTED FROM TAKING FOOD OUT OF THE GUERRILLA CONTROLLED AREAS. (WE SPOKE TO ONE FORMER MASA WHO HAD NOT LEFT GUAZAPA IN FIVE YEARS.) THIS SAME DOCUMENT INCLUDED A GUERRILLA ADMONITION THAT "THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE (FOR CAMOUFLAGE, AND IN COVERT OPERATIONS) WILL GIVE US THE ADVANTAGE."

9. ONE CAPTURED GUERRILLA "COMANDANTE" TOLD US FLATLY THAT THERE ARE NO NON-COMBATANT CIVILIANS ON MT. GUAZAPA, AND THAT EVERYONE FROM 10 YEARS OLD AND UP IS ASSIGNED A FUNCTION RELATED TO THE GUERRILLA WAR EFFORT. HE NOTES THAT "CIVILIANS" CANNOT LEAVE GUAZAPA FREELY. THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT MASA CHILDREN ARE READILY INTEGRATED INTO COMBAT UNITS IN LARGE NUMBERS TO SERVE AS COURIERS AND TO PROVIDE OTHER SUPPORT SERVICES. A DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY ESAF IN OCTOBER 1984 LISTS 144 NAMES, AGES AND POSITIONS OF MEMBERS OF AN ERP COMBAT MILITIA SECTION. OF THE 144 NAMES LISTED, 40 BELONG TO CHILDREN AGED FROM 13-16. OF THE 40 CHILDREN,

32 ARE CARRIED AS "SOLDIERS," FIVE AS COOKS, TWO AS MESSENGERS AND ONE AS A MEDIC.

10. ILLEGALIZATION OF THE MASAS

MAKING THE MASAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE COMBATANTS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED ELSEWHERE AS A PROCESS OF "ILLEGALIZATION." MASAS CUT OFF FROM THE REAL WORLD FOR YEARS AND LIVING IN THEIR ISOLATED SUBCULTURES FALL EASY PREY TO THE GUERRILLA MYTH THAT THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS A NASTY PLACE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS THEIR NATURAL ENEMY. THUS IDIOLOGY IS ONLY A SMALL REASON MASAS REMAIN WITH THE GUERRILLAS.

11. STANDARD GUERRILLA PROCEDURE DURING MILITARY SWEEPS IS TO HIDE MASAS IN CAVES WHILE THEY THEMSELVES EVACUATE THE AREA. "CIVILIAN" DEATHS THAT RESULT FROM SOLDIERS FIRING INTO OBVIOUSLY HAND-DUG CAVES ("TATUS") OUT OF FEAR OF ENCOUNTERING GUERRILLA MINES OR BOOBY TRAPS ARE THEN POINTED TO BY THE GUERRILLAS AS EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE "DEATH SQUAD" MENTALITY OF THE ARMY. (OPERATION PHOENIX WAS PARTICULARLY SUCCESSFUL IN THAT NO DEATHS OF THIS TYPE ARE KNOWN TO HAVE OCCURRED.) THE INTENSITY OF THE ESAF PRESENCE ON GUAZAPA WAS SUCH THAT MASAS REMAINED IN CAVES, WITHOUT FOOD -- EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THEIR GUERRILLA MENTORS, WHO HAD FLED THE MOUNTAIN -- FOR UP TO EIGHT DAYS. THE MAJORITY TURNED THEMSELVES IN TO THE ARMY ASKING FOR FOOD AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

12. THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD -- IMPORTANCE

ONE OF THE SPECIFIC PURPOSES OF OPERATION PHOENIX WAS TO SEPARATE THE GUERRILLA COMBATANTS FROM THEIR MASAS

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 RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 9646
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BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY GUERRILLA RELIANCE ON THEM.
 INDEED, SHORTLY AFTER THE MASAS' REMOVAL, THE FPL
 GUERRILLA RADIO STATION URGED THE MASAS TO STRUGGLE FOR
 THEIR RETURN TO GUAZAPA. AN FMLN-FRONT "DISPLACED
 PERSONS" ORGANIZATION HAS LED A DEMONSTRATION OF GUAZAPA
 MASAS IN FRONT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE TO DEMAND THAT
 THEY BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO GUAZAPA.

13. SEVERAL CAPTURED DOCUMENTS PORTRAY THE HISTORICAL
 IMPORTANCE OF MASAS TO THE GUERRILLA INSURGENCY AND
 STRESS THE NEED FOR ORGANIZATIONAL WORK AND, IN SOME
 CASES, THE REACTIVATION OF THESE BASES. ONE UNDATED
 DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN LATE 1985, WHICH CONTAINS AN FMLN
 EVALUATION OF ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN WESTERN EL
 SALVADOR, NOTES THAT SINCE 1981 IN THAT AREA "THERE HAS
 BEEN A DECLINE IN ACTIVITY EXPRESSED IN LIMITED
 PARTICIPATION IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND IN THE
 ABSENCE OF A MOVEMENT OF MASAS. THE MAIN REASONS FOR
 THE DECLINE WERE PROBLEMS OF GUIDANCE BY THE FMLN AND
 THE ABSENCE OF ITS FORCES FROM THE WESTERN PART OF THE
 COUNTRY." THE THREE IMPLICATIONS IMPLICIT IN THIS
 STATEMENT ARE:

- MASAS ARE CRUCIAL AS A SUPPORT BASE FOR THE GUERRILLAS;
- THE MASAS ARE TO BE "GUIDED" (VICE BEING IN THE REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD), AND;
- THAT FMLN TROOPS MUST BE PRESENT TO ENSURE CONTINUED MASA PARTICIPATION IN THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.

14. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS CONSTANTLY REFER TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MASAS:

- "AMPLIFY AND HEIGHTEN THE AGGRESSIVE MOBILIZATION OF

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THE MASAS FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE AND BASIC INTERESTS" (A 1984 FPL DIRECTIVE).

—"CARRY OUT A POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN AMONG CONTROLLED MASAS TO INCREASE THEIR IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL, STRENGTHEN THEIR FAITH IN VICTORY AND AROUSE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT (AN FPL DOCUMENT DATED JUNE 1985).

—"REACTIVATE THE MASAS MOVEMENT. WE PROPOSE THAT THEY CONTRIBUTE POLITICALLY AND MATERIALLY TO THE SUPPLYING AND SECURITY OF THE GUERRILLA COLUMN" (IBID).

—"EXPANSION (PROSELYTIZATION) CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF FMLN STRATEGY. . . . EVERY MILITANT MUST WORK TO ORGANIZE THE MASAS" (FMLN MANUAL FOR EDUCATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MASAS, UNDATED).

15. HOW MASAS ARE USED: A KEY SUPPORT ROLE

GUERRILLA DOCUMENTS THAT REVEAL THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT ROLE PLAYED BY THE MASAS ALSO MAKE CLEAR WHY SO MUCH STRESS IS PLACED ON ORGANIZING MANY CAMPESINOS WHO OTHERWISE MIGHT REMAIN APOLITICAL AND INDIFFERENT TO THE CONFLICT. THESE DOCUMENTS INDICATE MASAS ARE USED TO:

—SUPPLY UNITS WITH CLOTHES, SHOES, MEDICINE, AND MATERIAL USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF MINES;

—MANUFACTURE MINES;

—GROW FOOD FOR COMBATANTS;

—PRODUCE PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS;

—PROVIDE SECURITY;

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RUEHME / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0398
RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 9647
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- ACT AS AMMUNITION BEARERS;
- MAINTAIN AN INFORMANT NETWORK; AND
- MAN OBSERVATION POSTS.

AN FMLN COMMAND DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN JANUARY 1985 STATED, "THE EFFORTS OF OUR ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE TO OBTAIN SHOES, CLOTHING, FOOD, MEDICINE, ETC. WILL MULTIPLY IF OUR PLANS INCLUDE DEPENDING ON MASAS TO HELP PROVIDE THEIR NEEDS. ONE PERSON CAN PROVIDE A PAIR OF SHOES, ANOTHER A PAIR OF SLACKS, ANOTHER A SHIRT, ANOTHER FIVE POUNDS OF SUGAR.... FOR EXAMPLE, IN SOME ZONES THE PEOPLE OPT TO GO BAREFOOT TO THE VILLAGES OR CITIES IN ORDER TO RETURN WEARING NEW BOOTS. IN THIS WAY THEY CAN OUTWIT THE ENEMY PATROL."

16. ANOTHER FPL DOCUMENT DATED APRIL 1985 STATES "WE PROPOSE THAT THEY CONTRIBUTE POLITICALLY AND MATERIALLY TO THE SUPPLYING AND SECURITY OF THE GUERRILLA COLUMN." LATER IT STATES THAT "THE MASAS AND MILITANTS SHOULD BE TRAINED IN THE MANUFACTURE AND THE USE OF ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS." MORE EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF CIVILIAN MASAS IN PARAMILITARY ROLES IS MENTIONED IN AN FMLN HIGH COMMAND DOCUMENT DATED JUNE 1985:

--"IN (GUERRILLA) CONTROLLED ZONES: MASAS ARE GOING BEYOND THEIR USUAL SELF DEFENSE ROLES, MAKING POSSIBLE THEIR INCORPORATION INTO MORE ACTIVE ROLES IN GUERRILLA WARFARE.

--IN DISPUTED ZONES: . . . INCORPORATION OF YOUTH IN CLANDESTINE MILITIA AND GUERRILLA UNITS HAS GROWN."

17. AN UNDATED FMLN MANUAL ENTITLED "EDUCATION AND ORGANIZATION OF MASAS" SPECIFIES SEVERAL GUERRILLA GOALS. IT INDICATES THAT "PEOPLE WHO AGREE TO PROVIDE FOOD TO THE GUERRILLAS THROUGH INCREASED PRODUCTION ARE

GIVEN INTEREST-FREE LOANS TO BE PAID BACK AFTER HARVEST." IN ADDITION, -IT PROVIDES A VALUABLE INSIGHT AS TO GUERRILLA METHODS OF RECRUITMENT, GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO YOUTH. THE MANUAL ARGUES THAT THE YOUNG ARE MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE "FMLN IDEA" BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE FAMILY OR ECONOMIC OBLIGATIONS -- "THEY SHOULD BE TAUGHT HOW TO USE A RIFLE, SINCE THIS SPARKS THEIR INTEREST AND PROVIDES MOTIVATION." AN FPL DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN NOVEMBER 1985 STATES, "TO OBTAIN INFORMATION USE MASAS, (GOVERNMENT) TROOPS AND ALL WHO COLLABORATE WITH THE FMLN. THE INFORMERS CAN BE A VOLUNTEER OR NOT, AWARE OF HIS COLLABORATION OR NOT. UNLESS NECESSARY, IT SHOULD NOT APPEAR THAT INFORMATION IS BEING COLLECTED."

18. A RECENTLY CAPTURED FPL CENTRAL COMMAND DOCUMENT CLEARLY STATES THAT ONE OF THE FPL'S PRIMARY AIMS IS THE INCORPORATION OF MASAS INTO THE FPL THROUGH "SUPPORT TASKS, SPECIFICALLY LOGISTICS AND PROVISIONING, PRODUCTION (OF CROPS), ENGINEERING TASKS, AND COMMUNICATIONS TASKS AS GUIDES AND COURIERS. THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF PROMOTING COLLABORATION WITH THE FPL IS TO ULTIMATELY INCORPORATE THE MASAS INTO FPL UNITS." IN ADDITION, THE DOCUMENT INDICATES MASAS ARE TO BE USED "TO CARRY OUT SABOTAGE, PROPAGANDA DISTRIBUTION, (BUILD) BARRICADES, AND (FOR) SELF DEFENSE TASKS." ANOTHER DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN JULY 1984, LISTS THE GUERRILLAS' SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES FOR THE SUPPOSEDLY CIVILIAN MASAS AS: "THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF SUPPORT BASES, OF COLLABORATOR OR INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS AND THE FORMATION OF LOCAL GUERRILLA MILITIAS."

19. A DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN THE FALL OF 1984 ENTITLED "MILITARY PLANS" INDICATES THE DEGREE TO WHICH MASAS ARE INCORPORATED INTO GUERRILLA ACTIVITY. IT IS, IN

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RUEHMU / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0301

RUEHME / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0399

RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 9648

RUEHTG / AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0438

RUEHET / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0053

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ADDITION, EVIDENCE THAT THE ULTIMATE FMLN OBJECTIVE IS TO TURN ALL PHYSICALLY FIT MASAS INTO COMBATANTS. THE DOCUMENT INDICATES THAT "MILITARY TRAINING SHOULD INCLUDE INSTRUCTION IN GUERRILLA TACTICS TO ENABLE THE MASAS TO PLAY A COMBATIVE ROLE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES." ACCORDINGLY, THE DOCUMENT INSTRUCTS THAT "WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE MUST ALSO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE REVOLUTIONARY RANKS."

20. A GUERRILLA COPYBOOK CAPTURED IN SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT IN MID-1984 CONTAINING AN OPERATION SCHEDULE FOR GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES INDICATES THE EXTENT TO WHICH MASAS ARE ALREADY EMPLOYED IN THE WAR. THE SCHEDULE -- COVERING APRIL 29-MAY 29, 1984 -- DESCRIBES 15 SEPARATE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS, INCLUDING DISSEMINATION OF PROPAGANDA, SABOTAGE, AND AMBUSHES. MASAS ACCOMPANIED REGULAR GUERRILLA UNITS INTO ACTION IN ALL BUT AMBUSHES.

21. RECRUITMENT: HOW THEY DO IT

A QUOTE FROM A DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY ESAF IN AUGUST 1984 SHOWS HOW THE GUERRILLAS ESTABLISH THEIR "CLOSE" RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE: "AT FIRST, IN THESE ZONES, WHEN WE OFFERED PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCTION, THE PEOPLE REFUSED. WE DID NOT SUCCEED IN INCORPORATING MORE FARMERS INTO PRODUCTION. SOMETIMES THEY TAKE THE COLLECTIVE DECISION TO HELP THE MOVEMENT. WHEN THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN, WE BECOME AWARE OF WHOM WE CAN LURE AND WHO ARE THE MOST UNSTABLE. WE VISIT EVERYONE, HOUSE BY HOUSE AND THE RESULTS ARE GOOD. ALSO WE HAVE COLLABORATORS WHO TELL US THAT SOMEONE IS GOING TO IDENTIFY THEM AS SUCH. WE CONFIRM THIS AND PROCEED TO VISIT AND INFORM THEM OF WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THEM. IF THEY CONTINUE WITH THEIR ATTITUDE IN FAVOR OF THE ENEMY,

WE ARE OBLIGED TO ACT APPROPRIATELY. BY DOING THIS WE CAN GAIN MORE TRUST FROM THE TOWN. LET THEM TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT WE, THE GUERRILLAS, ALWAYS FIND OUT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER WHO THE INFORMERS ARE.

22. AN ERP NOTEBOOK DATED FROM JULY-DECEMBER 1984 STRESSES THE NEED FOR CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING RATHER THAN INCITING THE MASAS TO REBELLION. "THEY MUST (FIRST) BE INCORPORATED (INTO THE GUERRILLA SUPPORT STRUCTURE) RATHER THAN RECRUITED AS COMBATANTS (AS)... THE MASAS SHOW NO INTEREST IN IMMEDIATE INSURRECTION." THIS THEME OF "INCORPORATION" (RECRUITMENT) OF MASAS IS A CHORD CONSTANTLY STRUMMED IN GUERRILLA DOCUMENTS. UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUOUS CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING, THE FMLN MANUAL ON MASAS MENTIONED ABOVE STATES: "IF THIS IS NOT DONE, THE MASAS MAY BECOME TIRED OF THE WAR AND APATHETIC TOWARD THE REVOLUTION. THE FMLN MAY LOSE ITS SOCIAL BASE COMPLETELY."

23. THIS SAME DOCUMENT DETAILS HOW THE GUERRILLAS ORGANIZE AND WORK WITH THE CIVILIAN MASAS: "UNTIL NOW CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE. IT IS NECESSARY . . . TO MOBILIZE ALL MILITARY UNITS, SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL TO VISIT INDIVIDUAL FAMILIES TO EXPLAIN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION." THIS EXPANSION/MOBILIZATION INVOLVES, ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT:

- DAY LONG "EXCURSIONS" TO ASSIGNED LOCATIONS;
- MEETINGS HELD BEFOREHAND AMONG THE PROSELYTIZERS TO DISCUSS "THE GUERRILLA ORIENTATION, WHAT QUESTIONS THE PEOPLE MAY ASK, AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSES, AND WHAT PROPOSALS FOR INTEGRATION SHOULD BE MADE;
- HALF OF THE MEMBERS OF EACH GUERRILLA ENCAMPMENT

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RUEHME / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0400
RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 9649
RUEHTG / AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0439
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SHOULD PARTICIPATE DURING EACH OUTING. DURING THE NEXT
"EXCURSION" THE OTHER HALF;

- NO MORE THAN TWO PEOPLE VISIT A HOUSE;
- GUERRILLAS GET TO KNOW EACH FAMILY AND ITS PROBLEMS;
- ALL MEMBERS OF THE VISITED FAMILIES, AGED 14 OR OLDER,
ARE FORCED TO ATTEND.

24. "PROPOSALS FOR INCORPORATION"

THE FMLN CAREFULLY ASSESSES THOSE IT INTENDS TO
INCORPORATE INTO THE MOVEMENT AS MASAS: "DEPENDING ON
THE LEVEL OF THEIR ENTHUSIASM, THE PEOPLE SHOULD BE
ASKED TO JOIN, PROVIDE (REGULAR) SUPPORT OR
(OCCASIONALLY) COLLABORATE." ACCORDING TO THE FMLN
MANUAL THIS INCLUDES PUTTING MASAS INTO VARIOUS
CATEGORIES:

- MILITIAS (ARMED, PART-TIME SECURITY UNITS FIXED TO ONE
LOCALE). (NOTE: MILITIAS ARE THE GUERRILLA EQUIVALENT
OF THE GOES CIVIL DEFENSE AND ARE NORMALLY DEPLOYED ONLY
IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.)
- LOCAL (FULL-TIME) GUERRILLA UNITS (WHO REMAIN IN ONE
AREA);
- POLITICAL BASES (ACTIVISTS): "FORMED BY THE MORE
(POLITICALLY) ADVANCED (MASAS), INTERESTED IN ORGANIZING
THEIR COMMUNITIES";
- INFORMATION (INTELLIGENCE) BASES (SOURCES): WHO
PROVIDE (LOW LEVEL) INFORMATION ABOUT ESAF (DISPOSITION
AND ACTIVITIES), AND;

--COLLABORATORS: BUYERS OF SUPPLIES, FOOD, CLOTHING AND SHOES.

25. THE MANUAL INSTRUCTS ITS RECRUITERS TO PROVIDE: "DETAILED LISTS OF FAMILY NAMES, AGES, SOURCES OF INCOME, ANY FAMILY MEMBERS THAT HAVE DIED BECAUSE OF REPRESSION AND CHILDREN OR RELATIVES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF ESAF." PEOPLE IN GUERRILLA ZONES OF INFLUENCE ARE THEN "ORGANIZED TO EXPRESS OPENLY GRIEVANCES AGAINST AND MAKE DEMANDS OF THE GOVERNMENT." (NOTE. THESE MANIFESTATIONS ARE CALLED "REIVINDICACIONES". MANY GUERRILLA DOCUMENTS SINCE MID-84 HAVE SPOKEN OF THE NEED TO DEVELOP "REIVINDICACION" (DEMAND) PLATFORMS, INCORPORATING THE SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS OF THE SECTOR AND ADDING THE STANDARD ONES THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE FMLN-FDR, OVERTURN DECREE 50 (LEGISLATION SETTING UP SPECIAL COURTS FOR SUBVERSIVES), FREE "POLITICAL PRISONERS", ETC. (NOTE: THE GUERRILLA EMPHASIS ON ORGANIZING MASAS TO EXPRESS DEMANDS AND COMPLAINTS GOES FAR TOWARD EXPLAINING, FOR INSTANCE, EVER READY "CIVILIAN" ALLEGATIONS -- DURING INSURGENT-CONDUCTED PRESS TOURS IN CONFLICTIVE ZONES -- OF INDISCRIMINATE BOMBING IN AREAS WHERE BOMBING HAS NOT BEEN DOCUMENTED FOR YEARS. THE SAME PHENOMENA OFTEN CAN BE SEEN IN CHURCH-RUN DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS WHICH FREQUENTLY HOUSE FAMILY MEMBERS OF GUERRILLA COMBATANTS. THERE, RESIDENTS ARE TRUNDLED OUT TO VISITING DELEGATIONS TO DELIVER WELL REHEARSED TESTIMONIALS OF ALLEGED GOVERNMENT ATROCITIES THAT OCCURRED YEARS AGO.) FINALLY, FMLN CADRE ARE ADMONISHED THAT "IT IS TO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE ORGANIZATION AND RECRUITMENT OF MASAS WILL NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FIRST MEETING."

26. HOW THE MASAS ARE GOVERNED

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IN THE ZONES OF GUERRILLA "CONTROL" THE FMLN ERECTS
COMPLICATED ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATI. AN UNDATED PPL
PAMPHLET ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT (CAPTURED JANUARY 1985)
DESCRIBES ITS ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE: "THE NEED EXISTS
TO FORM "LOCAL POPULAR POWER" (PPL), A GUERRILLA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. "THE PPL IS AN ORGANIZATION WHICH
IS ENTRUSTED WITH MANAGING THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL,
MILITARY AND LEGAL LIFE OF THE PEOPLE SITUATED IN
(GUERRILLA-CONTROLLED) ZONES." ACCORDING TO THIS
DOCUMENT "THE AMOUNT OF TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE PPL
VARIES ACCORDING TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE ZONE. THE PPL
MAY COMBINE TWO OR THREE VILLAGES OR CANTONS WITH THE
INTENT OF AMASSING A POPULATION OF NOT LESS THAN 100
ADULTS PER PPL." AS JUSTIFICATION FOR FORMING THESE
PPL'S, THE MANUAL STATES THEY ARE MEANT "TO DEFEND
THEMSELVES AGAINST THE IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR PUPPET
FORCES WHICH CONSTANTLY ASSAULT THEM BY MILITARY
OPERATIONS, BOMBINGS, FIRES, CONTAMINATION, ECONOMIC
DESTRUCTION, ETC."

27. "NOT NECESSARILY A PARTY OF THE MASAS"

IN FURTHER DEFINING PPL'S, THE PAMPHLET STATES "PPL IS
THE VEHICLE BY WHICH THE MASAS GOVERN THEMSELVES AND
WHERE THE LOCAL POLITICAL-MILITARY FORCES OF THE PEOPLE
ARE REPRESENTED. ALTHOUGH THE PPL MAINTAINS CLOSE
RELATIONS WITH THE REGULAR (INSURGENT COMBAT) FORCES, IT
IS THE MASAS AND THE (RESIDENT) MILITIA WHICH MAKE UP
THE ORGANIZATION." IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, BY READING
FURTHER, WHO IS CALLING THE SHOTS IN THE PPL'S:
"ELECTIONS OF PPL MEMBERS SHOULD BE BASED ON RECOGNITION
FOR THEIR WORK, LOYALTY TO THE PEOPLE, DEDICATION TO
THEIR WORK, ETC.", ALL PREREQUISITES DEFINED BY THE
PPL. POLITICAL RELIABILITY, THEN, IS A CRUCIAL

DETERMINANT OF WHO REPRESENTS THE MASAS. THIS POINT IS UNDERLINED SEPARATELY IN AN FPL DOCUMENT DATED FEBRUARY 1985: "THE PARTY IS COMPRISED OF THE REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD. ALTHOUGH IT GUIDES THE ENTIRE SOCIETY, IT SHOULD NOT . . . BE A PARTY COMPRISED OF THE MASAS (BROADLY DEFINED)." (FYI: SEE REF HH FOR AN ANALYSIS OF CAPTURED GUERRILLA DOCUMENTS IN WHICH THE FPL PROCLAIMS ITSELF A "MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY . . . A COMMUNIST PARTY.")

28. THE MASAS RELATIONSHIP TO LOCAL GUERRILLA GOVERNMENT (PPL)

THE FPL PAMPHLET FURTHER DEFINES THE ROLE OF THE MASAS: "THE MASAS' RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PPL IS ONE OF COOPERATION AND FORTIFICATION.... THE MASAS FIGHT TO DEFEND THE PPL SINCE IT CONSTITUTES THE GOVERNING BODY WHICH REPRESENTS THE NEED OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE.... THE PPL IS NOT AN ORGANIZATION OF THE (FPL) PARTY. AFTER FINAL VICTORY, THE PPL ANSWERS TO THE ORDERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT...." HOWEVER, "IN THIS PERIOD OF THE STRUGGLE, WHEN NO GOVERNMENT EXISTS TO CENTRALIZE THE PPL MANAGEMENT, IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE PARTY TO DO SO. THE PARTY WILL MANAGE THE PPL THROUGH ITS MILITANTS WHO ARE DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT ALL THE POLITICAL-MILITARY INSTRUMENTS IN THE AREA." AND FINALLY, LISTED AS THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF THE PPL'S IS: "ORGANIZED CONTROL OF THE POPULATION." TO FURTHER ENSURE PARTY CONTROL, THE PAMPHLET NOTES THAT: THE ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE PPL, WHO ARE "THE MOST POLITICALLY RELIABLE MEMBERS OF A ZONE," MUST HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT THE FPL REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL BECAUSE "THE PARTY SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH KEEPING THE BEST PEOPLE AT THE COMMAND LEVEL." THE BOTTOM OF THE PAMPHLET READS: "FOR MARXIST-LENINIST TRAINING!

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 R 072050Z APR 86
 FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 1959
 INFO RUEHIA / USIA WASHDC 0538
 RUEHGT / AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0447
 RUEHMU / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0304
 RUEHME / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0402
 RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 9651
 RUEHTG / AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0441
 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0056
 RUFHGV / USMISSION GENEVA 0078
 RUEOEHA / USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
 RUEOSBA / USAFSC HOWARD AFB PN//LAI//
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REVOLUTION OR DEATH!"

29. "... ACCORDING TO THE ORIENTATION WE GIVE THEM."

AN UNDATED ERP DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN MAY 1985 CORROBORATES THE FPL VIEW OF THE MASAS, NOT AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FATE, BUT RATHER AS NECESSARY COMMODITIES WHO REQUIRE MANIPULATION AND CONSTANT DIRECTION. UNDER THE HEADING "SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN FOR THE POLITICAL ORDER OF THE MASAS", THE FOLLOWING IS FOUND: "HAVING ONCE ACHIEVED THE GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN, WE WOULD EXPECT THE MASAS IN OUR ZONE TO ACT WITHIN THE LAW (GUERRILLA DOCTRINE) ACCORDING TO THE ORIENTATION WE GIVE THEM. THIS WOULD GIVE THE MASAS IN THE CONTROLLED ZONES A SENSE OF LOYALTY. IT WOULD MAKE THE MASAS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE RIGHTS OR INTERESTS WORTH FIGHTING FOR.... THEY SHOULD NOT IDENTIFY WITH INDIVIDUAL MATERIAL ASPECTS."

30. ...BUT, TROUBLE IN PARADISE

DESPITE CONTINUED FMLN EMPHASIS ON THE CRUCIAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE MASAS AND THE COMPLICATED ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE PUT IN PLACE TO CONTROL THEM, AN FPL DOCUMENT DATED FEBRUARY-JUNE 1985 INDICATES THE MASAS ARE NOT ALWAYS PLEASED TO BE "INCORPORATED" INTO THE STRUGGLE. THIS DOCUMENT LISTS THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS AS BEING ENDEMIC AMONG MASAS:

--LOW MORALE;

--LACK OF FOOD, CLOTHING, SHOES, HEALTH CARE; AND

--DESSERTION FROM (GUERRILLA) CONTROLLED AREAS, TAKING ALONG CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE.

TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS THE FPL BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD:

--"CARRY OUT A POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN AMONG THE MASAS TO INCREASE THEIR IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL, STRENGTHEN THEIR FAITH IN VICTORY AND AROUSE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT;" AND

--"INCORPORATE ALL THE PEOPLE INTO SELF-DEFENSE TASKS AND FPL SUPPORT TASKS."

31. AN RN DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN JULY 1985 SEEMS TO AGREE WITH THE FPL ASSESSMENT OF A SEEMING LACK OF DEDICATION AMONG MASAS: "OUR PARTY IS NOT PREPARED FOR WAR. THE LACK OF COHESION AND INTERNAL DISCIPLINE IS REFLECTED (AND) MUST BE GIVEN FORM, METHOD AND ACTION. AN FPL DOCUMENT DATED MAY 1985 LISTING ITS OBJECTIVES INCLUDED THE STATEMENT: "WE MUST PUT A STOP TO ALL INDICATIONS OF DIVISION WITHIN THE PARTY. WE CANNOT ALLOW THE ESAF (SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES) TO CONFUSE THE MASAS OR THE MILITIAS."

32. HISTORICALLY, CAMPESINOS HAVE OVERWHELMINGLY ELECTED TO LEAVE CONFLICTIVE ZONES IN FAVOR OF MORE TRANQUIL AREAS. THIS HAS IN EFFECT LEFT THE GUERRILLA ZONES, SUCH AS NORTHERN MORAZAN, NOW SEVERELY DEPOPULATED. THE GUERRILLA SOLUTION: "REPOPULATE CONTROLLED ZONES WITH REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS" (AN FPL DOCUMENT DATED APRIL-DECEMBER 1984). GIVING THE LIE TO MANY ASSERTIONS THAT THE "CIVILIANS" ON THE GUERRILLA RELOUBT OF MOUNT GUAZAPA ARE HELPLESS BYSTANDERS BUFFETED BY THE WINDS OF WAR, A PRTC DOCUMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1985 STATES AS AN OBJECTIVE: "TO

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CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
CHRG: PROG 4/7/86
APPRV:
DRFTT:
CLEAR:
DISTR:

R 072050Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 1960
INFO RUEHIA / USIA WASHDC 0539
RUEHGT / AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0448
RUEHMU / AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0305
RUEHME / AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0403
RUEHSJ / AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0552
RUEHTG / AMEMBASSY TECUCIGALPA 0442
RUEHLT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0057
RUEHGV / USMISSION GENEVA 0079
RUEOEHA / USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
RUEOSEA / USAFSC HOWARD AFB PN//LAI//
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ORGANIZE MASAS ON GUAZAPA INTO SQUADRONS AND ASSIGN
TASKS IN PRODUCTION AND SECURITY."

33. CONCLUSION

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MASAS TO THE GUERRILLAS IS QUICKLY
EVIDENT FROM THIS LIMITED SAMPLING OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
CONTAINING INFORMATION BEARING ON THE ISSUE. AN
IMPORTANT -- IF SOMEWHAT OBVIOUS -- POINT THAT EMERGES
IS THAT THE MASAS ARE NOT THE WELLSPRING OF THE
REVOLUTION, BUT ARE RATHER RECRUITED (KNOWINGLY OR
UNKNOWINGLY), GUIDED AND MANIPULATED TO SERVE THE ENDS
OF THE REVOLUTION.

34. AS THIS STUDY DEMONSTRATES, THE MASAS LIVE WHERE
THE GUERRILLAS WANT THEM TO LIVE, AND IT IS THEREFORE
THE FMLN WHO PUTS THE MASAS' LIVES AT RISK BY THEIR
INSISTENCE THAT MASAS "REPOPULATE CONTROLLED ZONES." IN
THIS LIGHT IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE A FEBRUARY 28, 1986
GUERRILLA RADIO VENCEREMOS INTERVIEW WITH CHANO GUEVARA,
DESCRIBED AS "A MILITARY LEADER OF FARN", WHEREIN
GUEVARA SAID, "WE ALSO CALL TO THE PEOPLE WHO WERE
DISPLACED FROM GUAZAPA TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO
RETURN TO THEIR HOMETOWNS (ON GUAZAPA)." THESE ARE
HARDLY INSTRUCTIONS THAT BEAR THE MARK OF A GUERRILLA
LEADERSHIP INTERESTED IN THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE, BUT
ARE NEVERTHELESS INDICATIVE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
MASAS TO THE GUERRILLAS FOR LOGISTICS AND PROPAGANDA
PURPOSES. AS LONG AS THE FMLN IS CONTENT TO ELUR THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN WOMEN, CHILDREN AND ELDERLY
CIVILIANS AND MAIN FORCE COMBATANTS, THE POTENTIAL FOR
CASUALTIES AMONG THE MASAS WILL REMAIN HIGH.

35. THE THEME OF "CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING" RUNS
THROUGHOUT THESE DOCUMENTS, INDICATING THAT IT IS NO

MEAN FEAT FOR THE GUERRILLAS TO RETAIN MANY OF THE MASAS -- WHO OTHERWISE WOULD LIKELY GO ABOUT QUIETLY TENDING THEIR FIELDS -- ON THEIR SIDE. PART OF THIS CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING, THOUGH NOT REFERRED TO IN THESE DOCUMENTS, IS MEANT TO CONVINCe THEM THAT CONDITIONS WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE INSURRECTION CONTINUE TO EXIST. FOR THE GUERRILLAS, ISOLATED COMMUNITIES IN CONFLICTIVE ZONES WITH LITTLE OUTSIDE CONTACT ARE EASIER TO CONVINCe AND MAINTAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY NOTED THE AMAZEMENT OF MASAS -- "FOUND" BY ESAF ON GUAZAPA -- THAT THEY WERE NOT SUMMARILY EXECUTED AS THE GUERRILLAS HAD TOLD THEM THEY WOULD BE. WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, THESE MASAS, HELPED ALONG WITH GUERRILLA PROPAGANDA, HAD TRANSLATED THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE WITH THE ARMY SEVERAL YEARS AGO INTO A WARPED REALITY OF TODAY.

36. THERE IS NO DENYING THAT THE GUERRILLAS RELY FAR LESS ON COERCION THAN PERSUASION TO ENLIST MASAS. FORMER FPL METROPOLITAN FRONT "COMANDANTE" AND LATER DEFECTOR MIGUEL CASTELLANOS ONCE TOLD POLOFFS THAT THE FPL ATTEMPTS TO AVOID COERCION ALTOGETHER, AND THESE DOCUMENTS TEND TO LEND CREDENCE TO THAT POSITION, AT LEAST IN THE FPL AREAS (THE FPL TENDS TO STRESS POLITICAL SPALWORK MUCH MORE THAN, SAY, THE ERP). AS INDICATED ABOVE, HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT ONCE HAVING CAUGHT THEM IN THEIR WEB, THE GUERRILLAS DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE MASAS THERE BY KEEPING THEIR CONSCIOUSNESS RAISED.

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1. SUMMARY

THIS CABLE REPORTS THE RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF 350 SALVADORANS PROCESSED AS IMMIGRANTS TO THE U.S. WHICH WAS MADE BY AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1985. THE FINDINGS INDICATE THAT 80 PERCENT OF SALVADORAN IV RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN LIVING IN THE U.S. PRIOR TO THE IV INTERVIEW. OF THESE, SOME 26 PERCENT ENTERED THE U.S. ILLEGALLY, I.E. WITHOUT A NON-IMMIGRANT VISA. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY FURTHER SHOWED THAT THE TYPICAL LEGAL SALVADORAN IMMIGRANT IS MARRIED, BETWEEN 18 AND 29 YEARS OF AGE, WORKS IN EITHER HOUSEKEEPING OR RESTAURANT WORK, EARNS BETWEEN DOLLARS 500 AND DOLLARS 750 PER MONTH, AND HAS BEEN LIVING ILLEGALLY IN THE U.S. FOR 4-5 YEARS. THE SURVEY ALSO FOUND THAT WHILE LOS ANGELES CONTINUED TO BE THE PRIMARY DESTINATION OF SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS, THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA AND THE WASHINGTON, D.C. METROPOLITAN AREA ALSO ATTRACTED A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS. SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE LEGAL IMMIGRANTS SURVEYED INITIALLY, ENTERED THE U.S. ILLEGALLY, THE TRENDS OBSERVED FOR LEGAL IMMIGRANTS MIGHT BE A GOOD PROXY FOR TRENDS IN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION. FINALLY, THE SURVEY SHOWED THAT ALTHOUGH SOME SALVADORANS EXPRESSED FEAR IN RETURNING TO EL SALVADOR TO PROCESS THEIR VISAS, NONE REPORTED PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT BY SALVADORAN AUTHORITIES. THIS APPEARS TO DISCREDIT SOME OF THOSE WHO REQUEST ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS BASED ON FEAR OF PHYSICAL HARM IN COMING TO EL SALVADOR. NINETY-SEVEN PERCENT OF THOSE SURVEYED REPORTED THAT THEY WOULD

RECOMMEND TO OTHER SALVADORANS IN THE U.S. THAT IT IS SAFE TO COME TO EL SALVADOR TO PROCESS THEIR VISAS. END SUMMARY.

2. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE EMBASSY IN PREPARING THE SURVEY WERE: TO IDENTIFY TRENDS IN SALVADORAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES WHICH MIGHT INTEREST U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKERS AND TO GAUGE THE ATTITUDES OF SALVADORAN LEGAL IMMIGRANTS AS TO PERCEIVED OR ACTUAL DANGER INVOLVED IN RETURNING TO EL SALVADOR TO PROCESS IMMIGRANT VISAS. SINCE THE IMMIGRANT VISA IN ITSELF DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION, A SPECIAL QUESTIONNAIRE WAS PREPARED. (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION IS PROVIDED AT END OF THIS TELEGRAM.) THE SURVEY COVERED THOSE IMMIGRANTS WHO CAME TO THE EMBASSY FOR IV INTERVIEWS BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 2 AND OCTOBER 7, 1985. SINCE THE PRIMARY INTEREST WAS IN SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS OF WORKING AGE, ONLY THOSE IV APPLICANTS BETWEEN 18 AND 65 YEARS OF AGE WERE REQUESTED TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE WAS VOLUNTARY AND THAT INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL. A TOTAL OF 350 VISA APPLICANTS RESPONDED TO THE SURVEY. ALTHOUGH THE VISA APPLICANTS WERE NOT SELECTED AT RANDOM, THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY CAN BE CONSIDERED REPRESENTATIVE OF IV RECIPIENTS AS A WHOLE BECAUSE MOST OF THE APPOINTMENTS WERE ALLOCATED BASED ON THE PRIORITY DATE THE PETITIONS WERE FILED IN THE U.S., A PROCEDURE WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY RANDOM. THE EMBASSY ISSUED 7,327 IMMIGRANT VISAS IN FY-1985.

3. THOSE APPLICANTS WHO HAD NOT BEEN LIVING IN THE U.S. WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO COMPLETE THE LAST THREE QUESTIONS, WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO MEASURE THE ATTITUDES OF SALVADORANS RETURNING TO EL SALVADOR AFTER HAVING LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR THIS REASON, AND BECAUSE NOT ALL QUESTIONNAIRES WERE FILLED OUT COMPLETELY, TOTAL RESPONSES FOR INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS THE SAME.

4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

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THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY ARE LARGELY SELF-EXPLANATORY. PERHAPS THE MOST SURPRISING FINDING WAS THAT 90.8 PERCENT OF THE IV RECIPIENTS HAD BEEN LIVING IN THE U.S. PRIOR TO THE INTERVIEW. OF THIS GROUP, 85.9 PERCENT HAD ENTERED THE U.S. ILLEGALLY. THIS CONFIRMS THAT THE BASIC PATTERN OF SALVADORAN MIGRATION IS FOR THE ALIEN TO GO ILLEGALLY TO THE U.S. AND THEN HAVE A U.S. RESIDENT OR CITIZEN FAMILY MEMBER OR AN EMPLOYER FILE AN IMMIGRANT VISA PETITION. THE UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN THEN TRAVELS TO EL SALVADOR FOR THE IV INTERVIEW AND RETURNS TO THE U.S. AS A LEGAL IMMIGRANT. THE FACT THAT 37.1 PERCENT HAD BEEN LIVING IN THE U.S. FOR MORE THAN FIVE YEARS INDICATES THAT IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO LIVE AND WORK AS AN ILLEGAL ALIEN WHILE WAITING TO BE LEGALIZED.

ANOTHER INTERESTING FINDING IS THAT 52.3 PERCENT OF THE IMMIGRANTS INTERVIEWED REPORTED HAVING LIVED IN SAN SALVADOR DEPARTMENT PRIOR TO IMMIGRATION. BY COMPARISON, ONLY 20.3 PERCENT HAD BEEN LIVING IN THE CONFLICTIVE EASTERN DEPARTMENTS OF SAN MIGUEL, USULUTAN, LA UNION AND MORAZAN.

THE SURVEY SHOWS THAT ALMOST HALF OF THE SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS WERE UNDER 30 YEARS OLD. THIS IS ALL THE MORE SURPRISING GIVEN THE FACT THAT CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OLD WERE NOT INCLUDED. THIS FINDING TENDS TO SUPPORT THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM THAT THE YOUNGEST AND MOST ABLE MEMBERS OF A SOCIETY EMIGRATE TO SEEK A BETTER LIFE. FURTHERMORE, IT INDICATES THAT SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE LABOR MARKET IN CERTAIN U.S. CITIES IN YEARS TO COME.

ACCORDING TO THE SURVEY, FEWER SALVADORANS THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT ARE IMMIGRATING TO THE WEST COAST OF THE U.S. AND MORE TO THE EASTERN CITIES OF NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, D.C. LOS ANGELES AND SAN FRANCISCO WERE THE REPORTED DESTINATION OF 39.1 PERCENT OF THE RESPONDENTS VERSUS 38.9 PERCENT FOR THE NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREAS. SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS APPEAR TO FOLLOW A PATTERN OF SETTLING IN AREAS WHERE RELATIVES OR FRIENDS ARE SETTLED. INTERESTINGLY, IMMIGRANTS FROM EASTERN SALVADOR, PARTICULARLY SAN MIGUEL, ARE OVERREPRESENTED IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA WHILE THOSE FROM SANTA ANA ARE OVERREPRESENTED IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA, INDICATING THAT THE REGION AN IMMIGRANT IS FROM IN EL SALVADOR MAY BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING THEIR INTENDED RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE OCCUPATION WHICH IMMIGRANTS HELD IN EL SALVADOR AND THAT WHICH THEY HOLD IN THE UNITED STATES REVEALS SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS IN EMPLOYMENT. WHEREAS IN EL SALVADOR 47.2 PERCENT WERE STUDENTS OR HOUSEWIVES WHO WERE NOT WORKING, IN THE UNITED STATES ONLY 8.9 PERCENT REPORTED THAT THEY WERE EITHER STUDENTS OR HOUSEWIVES. IN THE U.S. THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT OCCUPATIONS FOR SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS APPEAR TO BE HOUSEKEEPING/CHILD CARE, RESTAURANT WORK, AND INDUSTRY,

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WHICH TOGETHER ACCOUNTED FOR 46.7 PERCENT OF THOSE SURVEYED. THESE SAME CATEGORIES ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY ABOUT 11 PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT IN EL SALVADOR. COMMERCE, WHICH IN EL SALVADOR INCLUDES A LARGE NUMBER OF MARKET VENDORS, COMPOSED 14.1 PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT IN EL SALVADOR VERSUS 9.5 PERCENT IN THE U.S. SURPRISINGLY, ONLY ONE PERSON REPORTED WORKING IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S., WHEREAS 5.9 PERCENT REPORTED WORKING IN AGRICULTURE IN EL SALVADOR. THE ACTUAL PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHOSE LIVELIHOOD IN EL SALVADOR DEPENDED ON AGRICULTURE IS PROBABLY MUCH HIGHER THAN THE RESULTS INDICATE.


WITH RESPECT TO INCOME, THE MAJORITY (66.3 PERCENT) OF THOSE SURVEYED REPORTED EARNINGS OF BETWEEN DOLLARS 500 AND DOLLARS 1,000 PER MONTH. SIGNIFICANTLY, 26.6 PERCENT REPLIED THAT THEY EARNED IN EXCESS OF DOLLARS 1,000 PER MONTH. THE HIGHEST PAID OCCUPATIONS RECORDED IN THE SURVEY WERE MECHANICS AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, WHILE THE LOWEST WERE HOUSEKEEPERS. THE MAJORITY OF THE

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7.1 PERCENT WHO REPORTED EARNINGS OF LESS THAN DOLLARS 500 PER MONTH WERE NOT WORKING FULL TIME.

THESE IV RECIPIENTS WHO WERE RETURNING TO EL SALVADOR FROM THE U.S. WERE ALSO QUESTIONED ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DANGER THEY PERCEIVED IN MAKING THE TRIP. WHILE THE MAJORITY (70.3 PERCENT) CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE BEEN WORRIED ABOUT THEIR PHYSICAL SECURITY, 29 PERCENT SAID THEY WERE CONCERNED. ONLY ONE PERSON ACTUALLY CLAIMED MISTREATMENT. HOWEVER, UPON FURTHER QUESTIONING HE REVEALED THAT THE MISTREATMENT CONSISTED OF THE SALVADORAN IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES HAVING CONFISCATED HIS PASSPORT UPON ARRIVAL IN THE COUNTRY. THE LAST QUESTION HAD TO BE REWORDED BECAUSE IT CONFUSED MANY APPLICANTS. WHEN "NOT RISKY" WAS REPLACED WITH "SAFE", 97 PERCENT OF THE RESPONDENTS SAID THEY WOULD RECOMMEND TO OTHER SALVADORANS IN THE U.S. THAT IT IS SAFE TO RETURN TO EL SALVADOR TO PROCESS THEIR IMMIGRANT VISAS. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO CHALLENGE THE CLAIM BY SOME IV BENEFICIARIES THAT THEY SHOULD BE PERMITTED ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS BECAUSE OF DANGER INHERENT IN COMING TO EL SALVADOR.

SURVEY RESULTS

SAMPLE: 350

1. SEX: PERCENT

- MALE:	175	50
- FEMALE:	175	50

2. CIVIL STATUS:

- MARRIED	220	62.9
- SINGLE	121	34.6
- DIVORCED	5	1.4
- WIDOWED	2	.6
- NO ANSWER	1	.3

3. AGE:

- 18-29	171	48.8
- 30-39	113	32.3
- 40-49	35	10.0
- 50-65	28	8.0
- NO ANSWER	3	.1

4. LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN EL SALVADOR:

- SAN SALVADOR	183	52.3
- SAN MIGUEL	38	10.9
- SANTA ANA	33	9.4
- USulután	17	4.9
- LA LIBERTAD	15	4.3
- LA PAZ	13	3.7
- LA UNION	11	3.1
- SONSONATE	9	2.6
- SAN VICENTE	7	2.0

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-	CUSCATLAN	6	1.7
-	MORAZAN	5	1.4
-	CHALATENANGO	5	1.4
-	AHUACHAPAN	4	1.1
-	CABANAS	4	1.1

5. PLACE OF INTENDED RESIDENCE IN U.S.:

-	LOS ANGELES		
-	METROPOLITAN AREA	91	26.0
-	NEW YORK		
-	METROPOLITAN AREA	85	24.3

NEW CITY AND
SUBURBS (54)
NORTHERN
NEW JERSEY (29)
CONNECTICUTT (1)

- WASHINGTON DC

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-	METROPOLITAN AREA	51	14.6
-	WASHINGTON DC (11)		
-	NORTHERN VIRGINIA (23)		
-	MARYLAND SUBURBS (17)		
-	SAN FRANCISCO		
-	METROPOLITAN AREA	46	13.1
-	HOUSTON		
-	METROPOLITAN AREA	26	7.4
-	MIAMI		
-	METROPOLITAN AREA	7	2.0
-	DALLAS		
-	METROPOLITAN AREA	7	2.0
-	SACRAMENTO, CA	6	1.7
-	NEVADA (LAS VEGAS/ RENO)	6	1.7
-	BOSTON		
-	METROPOLITAN AREA	4	1.1
-	CHICAGO, ILL.	3	2.9
-	OTHERS	10	2.8
-	NO ANSWER/ INCOMPLETE	9	2.6

SAN ANTONIO, TX; AUSTIN, TX; HUNTSVILLE, TX;
JEFFERSON, LA.; FAYETTEVILLE, NC; HONOLULU, HI; PHOENIX,
AZ; ALTUS, OK; OLIN, NC; RICHMOND, VA.

6. HAVE BEEN LIVING IN U.S. PRIOR TO INTERVIEW:

-	YES	283	80.8
-	NO	67	19.2

SAMPLE 283

7. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED IN U.S.:

-	LESS THAN 1 YR.	5	1.8
-	1-3 YRS.	56	19.9
-	4-5 YRS.	113	39.9
-	6-10 YRS.	87	30.7
-	MORE THAN 10 YRS.	18	6.4
-	NO ANSWER	4	1.4

8. ENTERED U.S.:

-	WITH VISA	40	14.1
-	WITHOUT VISA	243	85.9

9. EMPLOYMENT IN UNITED STATES:

HOUSEKEEPING/CHILD CARE	63	20.5
RESTAURANT WORK	48	16.4
CLEANING/MAINTENANCE	28	9.5
COMMERCE	27	9.2
INDUSTRY	29	9.8
CONSTRUCTION	14	4.8
MECHANIC	15	5.1
SECRETARIAL	6	2.0
SEAMSTRESS/TAILOR	14	4.8
STUDENT	9	3.1
TRADESPERSON	9	3.1
OTHER	16	5.4
HOUSEWIFE	16	5.4
PROFESSIONAL	2	.7
-	---	
-	293	

10. MONTHLY SALARY IN U.S.:

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-	LESS THAN 500 DOLLARS	18	7.1
-	500-750 DOLLARS	91	35.7
-	751-1000 DOLLARS	79	30.6
-	1001-1500 DOLLARS	48	18.8
-	MORE THAN 1500 DOLLARS	20	7.8
-		<u>255</u>	

11. EMPLOYMENT IN EL SALVADOR:

-	STUDENT	101	29.6
-	COMMERCE	48	14.1
-	HOUSEWIFE	36	10.6
-	HOUSEKEEPER/MAID	25	7.3
-	AGRICULTURE	20	5.9
-	SEAMSTRESS/TAILOR	16	4.7
-	MECHANIC	15	4.4
-	PROFESSIONAL	11	3.2
-	SECRETARY/		
-	RECEPTIONIST	13	3.8
-	INDUSTRY	10	2.9
-	CHAUFFER/DRIVER	9	2.6
-	TEACHER	8	2.3
-	TRADESPERSON	11	3.2
-	CONSTRUCTION	6	1.8
-	OTHER	12	3.5
-		<u>341</u>	

SAMPLE 283

12. WERE YOU WORRIED ABOUT YOUR PHYSICAL SAFETY IN COMING BACK TO EL SALVADOR?

-	YES	82	29.0
-	NO	199	70.3
-	NO ANSWER	2	.7

13. WERE YOU MISTREATED BY SALVADORAN AUTHORITIES OR OTHERS ON YOUR ARRIVAL?

-	YES	1	.3
-	NO	280	99.0
-	NO ANSWER	2	.7

SAMPLE 82

14. WOULD YOU RECOMMEND TO OTHER SALVADORANS IN THE U.S. THAT IT IS NOT DANGEROUS TO RETURN TO EL SALVADOR TO PROCESS THEIR VISAS:

-	YES	72	87.8
-	NO	10	12.2

SAMPLE 201

14 A. WOULD YOU RECOMMEND TO OTHER SALVADORANS IN THE U.S. THAT IT IS SAFE TO COME TO EL SALVADOR TO PROCESS THEIR VISAS:

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 SAN SALVADOR 03915

10

- YES	195	97.0
- NO	5	2.5
- NO ANSWER	1	.5

EMBASSY COMMENT: THIS IS AN EXCELLENT SURVEY THAT IS APPLICABLE TO MANY OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ISSUES PRESENTLY FACING THE U.S. WHAT STRIKES AN OBSERVER IS THE ESSENTIAL SIMILARITY OF THE LEGAL IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS INTERVIEWED IN THE CONSULATE AND THE DEPORTEES RETURNING FROM THE U.S. WHO ARE INTERVIEWED BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION. WHILE ICM DOES NOT GO INTO AS MUCH DETAIL DURING THE INTERVIEWS, BOTH POPULATIONS EXHIBIT THE SAME GENERAL BACKGROUND AND TRAINING (OR LACK OF IT) AND BOTH OVERWHELMINGLY ADMIT THAT THEY WENT TO THE U.S. TO WORK. IT APPEARS THAT THE ONLY REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEPORTEE POPULATION AND THE IMMIGRANT VISA INTERVIEWEES IS THAT THE PEOPLE SEEN IN THE CONSULATE DID NOT GET CAUGHT BY IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES BEFORE THEY COULD ESTABLISH THE LEGAL TIES TO

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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 SAN SALVADOR 03915

UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 SAN SALVADOR 03915

THE U.S. THAT ARE NECESSARY TO LEGALIZE THEIR STATUS.
TERROR AND PERSECUTION DO NOT SEEM TO ENTER INTO THE
EQUATION. EMBASSY WILL PREPARE MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF
THE TWO POPULATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEPORTEE PROGRAM
IN SEPTEL.
CORR

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UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 SAN SALVADOR 03915



INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR MIGRATION
COMITÉ INTERGOUVERNEMENTAL POUR LES MIGRATIONS
COMITE INTERGUBERNAMENTAL PARA LAS MIGRACIONES

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440 National Press Building
529 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20045

ICM's Salvadoran Reception and Counselling Program

On the basis of ICM's 34 years of experience in facilitating refugee resettlement, national migration, and repatriation all over the world on behalf of its member governments, ICM was requested by the governments of El Salvador and the U.S. to provide a reception and counselling service for Salvadorans returning to El Salvador.

ICM established in December 1984 reception facilities at the San Salvador airport and in its office in the city of San Salvador. Through these facilities, ICM also offers inland transportation, temporary accommodation and food for the first 2-3 days and limited material assistance as necessary. If individuals so wish, they are channelled to existing camps for displaced persons (run by church or government authorities), or they can travel to their homes or other destinations of their own choosing. If they express an interest in migrating to another country, ICM will refer them to the appropriate embassies.

After carrying out a thorough interview of the returnees in the ICM office to ascertain their needs and personal situation, ICM also gives them a series of questionnaires which they are asked to mail back to ICM over a four months' period, in order to report on their whereabouts and well-being and let ICM know if they face any specific problems where ICM may be of assistance. Subsequently, reminder letters are sent to those who do not return the questionnaire within the period indicated. All facilities offered and all communications with ICM are on a voluntary basis. Personal information supplied by the returnees is kept strictly confidential. According to needs in individual cases, the program includes cooperation with the competent medical authorities of El Salvador, voluntary agencies such as Project Hope, the local office of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and with other relevant Salvadoran authorities.

The ICM staff at the airport meet all flights arriving from the United States, as they are not previously informed on which flight returnees will arrive. Approximately 400 returnees are thus received by ICM each month. From 1 December 1984 to 31 December 1985, for example, ICM met 4,822 returnees at the airport, of whom 4,365 were offered the ICM assistance mentioned in the two previous paragraphs.

As regards the 4,822 persons who had returned between 1 December 1984 and 31 December 1985, ICM maintained or re-established contact with 3,812 returnees, i.e. 79% of the total caseload. These contacts were made in certain cases up to eight months after return. Thus, from the 4,822 returnees, 1,887 returned spontaneously the questionnaire they had received from ICM upon arrival, and 1,925 returnees were contacted in person, or through relatives, friends and neighbors, in the course of three major surveys. These surveys were carried out, at the request of ICM, by a specialized polling agency which employed, on each occasion, over 40 interviewers and other specialists who travelled throughout the country for

the purpose of tracing and interviewing the returnees or their relatives, whenever feasible. Of those who could not be located in this follow-up action, the large majority had given inaccurate or incomplete addresses during their first interview and were thus untraceable.

The contacts between ICM and the returnees after the return are entirely voluntary on the part of the returnee and the findings of the surveys and the questionnaire replies cannot therefore be considered as a scientific data base upon which to construct definitive analyses of situations of returnees after a given period of return. The information gained does, however, permit the recognition of general trends in the situation of those returnees who could be located.

Taking into consideration the limitations of the data collected, it is possible to make the following general observations on the situation of the returnees, through 31 December 1985:

- During the first interviews at the ICM office the large majority of the returnees indicated as primary motives for their departure their poor economic situation in El Salvador and the wish to find employment abroad. This indication was confirmed through the survey and other follow-up action with the returnees.
- Of the 4,822 returnees, 35 alleged that they had problems relating to their security in El Salvador. ICM referred 13 persons to the relevant embassies for consideration under their special humanitarian resettlement programs and ICM's on-going emigration program in El Salvador. Two of these cases have so far departed from El Salvador, seven are pending decision, and four were rejected by resettlement countries on the grounds that they were economic cases. Of those remaining, in nine cases it turned out that their problems were of an economic nature or had otherwise been solved, six had again left the country by their own means, one did not re-establish contact with ICM and in six other cases, which had been contacted through the third survey, ICM is endeavoring to locate the persons concerned and ascertain their specific needs.
- Over the period from 1 December to 31 December 1985, it was reported to ICM that the death of four returnees had occurred, two from natural causes. The other two returnees had been killed, one in a dispute over a football game in a bar and the other in the process of robbing a store. In both the latter cases, specific investigations were made which corroborated these findings.
- Two returnees were arrested upon arrival in San Salvador in connection with the Zona Rosa incident during which four US marines were killed. These two returnees were never interviewed by ICM.
- Some 29% of those returnees located by ICM through relatives or friends had again left El Salvador for the United States or other countries. A number of returnees have gone through the ICM facilities more than once, and several have made the trip from the U.S. more than twice.

ICM has been unable to contact the rest of the deportees, even following a field survey to locate them or their relatives. Of those who could not be located in this follow-up action, the large majority had given inaccurate or false addresses during their first interview and thus were untraceable. Some of the deportees may have given false addresses out of fear, but it is also possible that a large number, having lived outside of the country for many years, may not have a true home address in El Salvador, or may not accurately recall it on the spur of the moment, when asked by ICM.

ICM makes repeated attempts, using various sources of information, to contact the deportee or relatives who know where the deportee can be located. Some 25 percent of those returnees located by ICM through relatives or friends had already returned illegally to the United States or had left El Salvador for third countries. A number of returnees have gone through ICM facilities more than once, with one individual deported to El Salvador three times in the last year.

(II) Sanctuary Argument:

People are killed when they return to El Salvador because the entire country is a war zone, with bullets flying everywhere and people dropping like flies from the random violence. Therefore it is inhumane to send people back to this environment, and they should be allowed to remain in the United States until the war is over.

Rebuttal:

-- The image of El Salvador as an impossibly violent place to live is more than a little exaggerated. The press in the U.S. reports what is happening in certain zones of the country, but to extrapolate from that to the idea that large numbers of innocent civilians are being killed everywhere is wrong.

-- But if these people are fleeing generalized war, as some say they are, why did they not go to the well known refugee camps in Honduras or Nicaragua? That is why the camps were established. Why did they have to flee 2,000 miles across three countries and enter the U.S. illegally to be safe? The Honduran and Nicaraguan camps, run by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, guarantee that anyone who wishes will be provided living quarters, food, medical care and clothing, for as long as the refugee feels it is not safe to return. But it is not surprising that U.S.-bound Salvadoran "refugee" behavior parallels exactly the behavior of any illegal economic

SANCTUARY ISSUE: SOME FACTS FROM EL SALVADOR

The following are points which Embassy has found useful for answering questions regarding "sanctuary" for Salvadorans illegally in the U.S. We have presented them in the form of the argument for sanctuary and the rebuttal.

(I) Sanctuary Argument:

People are killed shortly after being deported to El Salvador. The very fact of having sought political asylum marks them for murder by death squads merely because they have been deported. Therefore no one should be sent back.

While this argument used to be popular, it has become very discredited, and is rarely used now.

Rebuttal:

-- The Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICM), a Geneva-based refugee resettlement organization funded by Western governments, meets and assists deportees at the El Salvador International airport, providing transportation to San Salvador and beyond, as well as short-term food and lodging for those who need it. ICM tracks deportees for six months afterwards as well. The idea that people are killed as they leave the airport after being deported is absurd, and ICM's program absolutely protects against that. ICM has never reported any incident of that nature. None of the local human rights organizations here in El Salvador has ever mentioned this occurring, and they are not notably pro-government.

-- ICM has been tracking deportees for more than 14 months now, and has met and assisted every deportee who has arrived in El Salvador by air in that time, more than 6,500 deportees total. Through returned questionnaires and follow-up surveys ICM has checked on their continued well-being and offered assistance. By the end of the third survey, now in progress, ICM anticipates it will have contacted 70 percent of these deportees. Only 32 people of more than 6,500 have contacted ICM claiming fear of political persecution. ICM arranged resettlement in another country for 3 of these cases. Nine others are awaiting an interview with the consuls of other countries. The others were considered "economic migrants", were otherwise disqualified (illiterate, trying to avoid conscription, etc.) or wrote to say their problem had been resolved.

migrant from any Latin country. Few Salvadorans wish to stay in refugee camps, even if they are guaranteed safety and a place to stay as long as they wish, simply because they cannot earn money there and prosper. Their attitude seems to be: if it is not possible to be a refugee with a good paying job, why leave El Salvador?

-- Further, statistical evidence disproves the theory that Salvadoran deportees are dying from random violence. ICM, in tracking the people that come back, has found only two deaths among the more than 6,500 returnees. One of those killed was a man shot when he tried to hold up a liquor store. (He wounded the store owner in the robbery and was killed by him.) The second death took place during an argument in a bar following a soccer match. This suggests that the level of violence is much lower than the Sanctuary advocates would like to believe. If ICM figures are attacked because ICM has not been able to follow everyone that has come back, it is worth pointing out that there is no reason to believe that those ICM tracked are any less (or more) prone to fall victim to random violence than those deportees ICM was unable to track. In other words, if random violence is truly random, then the cases ICM tracks should reflect the population as a whole.

-- Further, the U.S. Embassy issued immigrant visas to 7,000 people last year, at least 80 percent of whom came down from the U.S. to be interviewed and processed. Most of that 80 percent had been living in the U.S. illegally until they established a claim to legal U.S. residence. We know of no case in which an applicant for legal immigration has been killed during his visit to El Salvador to receive his visa. We would hear of a case if it occurred because family members who were to accompany the applicant would still want the immigrant visa so they could go to the U.S. Furthermore our study of legal immigrants shows they come from exactly the same socio-economic strata as the deportees, the only difference being that the legal immigrants are able to establish (through familial relationship or job) a claim to legal U.S. residency under our immigration laws.

(III) Sanctuary Argument:

Many people are killed when they return because they are wanted by the death squads or the government. That is why they fled in the first place. If we send these people back, we are sending them to certain death. Therefore, people with legitimate fears should be allowed to seek political asylum in the U.S.

Rebuttal:

-- U.S. law on political asylum is very clear. U.S. immigration law, in conformity with the U.S. protocol relating to the status of refugees, permits any alien present in the U.S. to apply for asylum, and provides that it may be granted upon a showing of a "well founded fear of persecution" by the individual applicant. Under U.S. law, and under the international protocol relating to the status of refugees, to which we are a signatory, general conditions of poverty and civil unrest in one's country of nationality are not, repeat not, grounds for granting asylum. A Salvadoran must show that he would be targeted and therefore fears persecution, be it by the guerrillas, the government or right or left wing death squads.

-- Asylum determinations are made by the INS after a process which includes State Department review of each application. An individual who is denied asylum by the INS may renew his request with an immigration judge. The judge's decision may be appealed to the Board of Immigration appeals and from there into the federal court system. This is the legal way to seek asylum, not by breaking U.S. law under the guidance of Sanctuary movement members, who thus deny the illegal alien the protections offered to genuine asylees by U.S. law.

-- Sanctuary supporters will frequently quote statistics that show that far more political asylum cases are refused for Salvadorans than for Eastern Europeans. They purport this to show the political bias of the Reagan administration's interpretation of the law.

-- The statistics are true, but for the simple reason that many more Salvadorans, of the 750,000 illegally in the U.S., are there for economic reasons than Eastern Europeans. There is a long history of economic migration to the U.S. from Mexico and Central America, as U.S. residents must know. This migration from El Salvador is not only still going on, but has been increased by the substantial drop in the Salvadoran GNP since 1979 and the resulting higher levels of unemployment. The Salvadorans are free to leave their country legally and do so in great numbers. Approximately 50,000 have been leaving per year, and have been doing so since long before the war started in 1980. Eastern Europeans do not have this option. Thus, while there may be relatively few Eastern Europeans who wish to risk their lives by escaping from Eastern Europe to get to the U.S., there are many more Salvadorans who have no jobs and little future, who would like to take advantage of the comparatively enormously better economic conditions in the

U.S., only a short and easy three-day bus ride away from El Salvador. Thus, there is a much higher percentage of economic migrants to the U.S. from El Salvador. This was true long before the start of the war, and is equally true of Mexico where there is no war.

-- ICM questionnaires show that most of the Salvadorans deported admit forthrightly that they went because they had no work and wanted a job in the U.S. Interviews with Embassy immigrant visa applicants (80 percent of whom had been living illegally in the U.S.) support this. If these people were going to the U.S. for jobs before the war, why are they now all considered prospective political asylees who only wish to flee oppression and wait for the end of the war, at which time they will supposedly return happily to unemployment and poverty in El Salvador?

-- If Sanctuary supporters argue that people are killed daily by the death squads, our response is that killings have shown a very sharp drop from around 750 deaths a month for political (not criminal) reasons in 1980, down to around 28 a month currently for the entire country, according to press reports. Figures from local groups show the same downward plunge. And most of the current deaths are caused by the guerrillas (death squads of the left). Right-wing death squads are virtually inoperative.

-- While these figures are not all-inclusive, they do show a marked trend and give lie to contentions that thousands of people are dying. Human rights abuses are far fewer than before, and this fact has been recognized by many people, including the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Dr. Jose Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, a Spanish professor of law, in his yearly report.

-- While problems in El Salvador still exist, the legal political asylum procedures in the U.S. suffice for those few Salvadorans who have a well-founded, repeat, well-founded reason to fear persecution. The other 750,000 Salvadorans in the U.S. illegally simply cannot sustain specific claims of fear of targeted persecution in their homeland to justify their remaining in the U.S. They are economic, not political, refugees -- as are hundreds of millions of potential immigrants from poor countries all over the globe who would come to the U.S. if they could. Salvadorans, like Mexicans, just happened to have been blessed by geography so they can get to the U.S. more easily and in greater numbers.

The Sanctuary Movement

HUMANITARIAN ACTION, POLITICAL OPPOSITION OR LAWLESSNESS

By ALAN C. NELSON, *Commission, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service*

Delivered to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California, March 27, 1986

GOOD AFTERNOON. Returning to the Golden Gate, my home area, reminds me of another harbor and a beautiful statue . . . the Statue of Liberty, which has stood for 100 years in New York Harbor, is being rededicated this year and represents the heritage of America.

Since 1820 more than 53 million persons have immigrated to the United States. For many of them seeing the statue in the harbor was their first glimpse of America.

And still immigrants come, in ever increasing numbers. Never have more people been clamoring to immigrate to the United States than today. The backlog of persons awaiting immigrant visas is rapidly approaching two million. In the 1980s there have been an average of 600,000 new immigrants annually, plus 60,000 to 70,000 refugees. Add to that an estimated half million illegal aliens . . . for a total of more than one million each year . . . enough people to form nearly two cities the size of San Francisco every year.

In this one hundredth year of the statue which stands as a symbol of welcome to new legal immigrants, this Administration and Congress are working hard to reform our immigration laws. We need the help and support of the American people in achieving passage of a new law which will enable us to regain control of immigration.

Let there be no doubt that the Statue of Liberty represents legal immigration. Remember that the Statue faces an open harbor where new immigrants came in to openly disembark under her gaze. The torch gave light to those entering and the

book of laws held in the left hand represented adherence to the laws. The statue does not symbolize illegal entry, often done surreptitiously under cover of darkness with an intent to evade the laws of liberty.

Professor Edouard de Laboulaye, who first proposed the idea of the statue, said at its dedication on October 28, 1886 . . . "this statue, symbol of liberty, tells us at one and the same time that liberty lives only through truth and justice, light and law."

Our nation has been made great through respect for the law, and has stood proudly as a nation of laws. This concept applies to immigration law, as it does to others. The immigration policy of this nation is very basic: we support a continued high level of legal immigration; we are committed to deter and reverse the increasing illegal immigration problem.

We respect and encourage legal immigration, and we appreciate the great contribution that immigrants made and are still making to our nation, our economy, our culture and society. The immigration law is fair. The law is non-discriminatory, with everyone, regardless of color, creed, race, religion or nationality receiving the same opportunity to emigrate to America.

But the law places limits on the number of immigrants. It is a far more generous limitation than that of any other country in the world, but the limits exist, and must be respected. The law also establishes legal procedures — these likewise must be respected.

Unfortunately, the heritage of generous, but controlled im-

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migration to the United States is being threatened by illegal and uncontrolled immigration. There are three basic methods to deter illegal immigration: 1) border enforcement, 2) preventing illegals from working in the United States and 3) keeping illegals from accessing our benefit programs.

The Reagan Administration has made substantial progress in border enforcement, adding 1,000 additional personnel in 1985, the largest increase in history. Nevertheless, the flow of illegal aliens is outstripping the added enforcement resources.

Illegal aliens come for jobs. The United States is probably the only major country in the world which allows employers to freely hire illegal aliens. The legislation now before Congress would correct that and eliminate this major magnet.

Our generous benefit programs, such as welfare and unemployment insurance, also attract illegal aliens to come or stay in this country. The Reagan Welfare Reform Program in California in the 1970s had a provision to check the status of aliens, to prevent unentitled aliens from drawing benefits. The SAVE Program (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) would expand this to all states — an important element of immigration reform.

While most of the illegal immigration consists of individuals who wish to better themselves by living in America and are unwilling to wait their turn, some of it is organized and deliberate law violation.

I am speaking now of the so-called "sanctuary movement," which seeks to bring change not through legal means, but by deliberately breaking immigration law, and flaunting their violations before the public and the news media.

What is the "sanctuary movement? Is it humanitarian? Is it a political movement in opposition to this Government's Central American policies? Or is it simply lawlessness? The answer, I believe, is that it is some of all three.

Sanctuary has been referred to as a legal concept. Sanctuary has never had a place in the American legal system. We need to assess whether sanctuary is the best definition or whether it is better defined by other words:

—Sponsorship — The churches involved actually operate more as sponsors than as sanctuaries. The churches sponsor resolutions. Some may house individuals who pass through their area for a day or so. Not many perform sanctuary by providing full-time housing and care for the aliens.

—Smuggling — Clearly the sanctuary movement is involved in a smuggling operation. They are transporting people into this country from Mexico and other Central American countries in violation of specific United States laws.

In addition, we must determine if we can properly define this as a movement. Such a word connotes a great and growing operation. Sanctuary supporters now talk of 250 churches participating in or supporting sanctuary. That there are only 250 participants — taking the sanctuary movement's figure at face value — among the more than 339,000 churches in the United States offers a perspective on the overall impact of this movement.

We should also define the motives of those on both sides of this debate. What are the motives of this so-called movement?

What are the government's motives? Are we enforcing the laws that need to be enforced in a pure, honest way? Or, are we targeting our enforcement toward the sanctuary movement?

Last year, the U.S. Government apprehended and arrested 18,000 smugglers of illegal aliens. 5,000 of those arrested were actually convicted and sentenced to jail. In comparison, 20

people in the sanctuary movement have been indicted and prosecuted. It is important to keep these figures in mind when discussing the government's response to sanctuary and the allegations of "targeting."

The claim of the sanctuary activists is two fold: one, that everyone leaving parts of Central America is a "refugee." And, second that only they can save these "refugees" whom the United States government seeks to return to Central America, where they say they face certain death.

They are taking the law into their own hands by usurping the authority of the three branches of our Government to determine who meets the qualifications as a refugee, and to grant those persons asylum in this country. It is interesting that democracy has come to El Salvador, a significant credit to United States foreign policy. Yet the sanctuary activists do not deal with Nicaraguans, the one country in Central America with a military and Marxist government.

The Congress in the Refugee Act of 1980 carefully spelled out the qualifications for refugee and asylum. These are the same as the United Nations uses to determine who is a refugee. That is anyone who can establish they have suffered persecution or faces a well-founded fear of persecution based upon race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.

There is a legal system for making this determination, and it works well. It gives full consideration to the applicant, and includes a long series of appeals through the Administrative system and then the Federal courts. During this procedure the applicant may remain in this country and is usually granted permission to work.

One indication that this system works in the favor of the alien applying for asylum is the fact that of more than 66,000 El Salvadorans who have been found illegally in the United States over the past four years, more than 70 percent are still here . . . in the legal system exercising their rights of appeal under the law to remain in this country. Less than 30 percent have been returned to El Salvador.

The Refugee Act certainly does not authorize fraudulent entry into this country. The sanctuary movement, in transporting and sheltering illegal aliens, is violating refugee and immigration law. If the law — the Refugee Act or other pertinent law — isn't right or fair, it should be changed through Congress.

The "sanctuary" people would have the public believe that those returned face certain death, torture or other persecution. Yet the facts belie their claim.

Let me briefly address the issue of the safety of those involved. There are two aspects to this discussion: the safety of these people en route from El Salvador and Guatemala to the United States and the safety of those who are returned to their homeland.

When we speak of those en route to the U.S. we are talking most often about people who have already left El Salvador or Guatemala and are in other countries, particularly Mexico. Obviously, they are not in danger in Mexico, so entry into the U.S. is not necessary to protect people from alleged harm.

As for alleged danger upon return, in an interview which appeared on December 22, 1985 in the San Francisco Examiner, the head of an independent international agency, The Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, which tracks El Salvadorans returned from the United States, said there was no evidence of persecution against them.

To date, the most comprehensive study of what happens to

deported Salvadorans was done by the ACLU and was based on 8,500 Salvadorans deported between March 1981 and March 1983. Of the 8,500 deportees, the ACLU found 25 cases of deaths which had a "better-than-average" chance of being caused by death squad activity, military brutality, guerrilla assassinations, etc. That represents 1/3 of 1 percent of the 8,500.

A leading "sanctuary" organization, the Chicago Religious Task Force, quoted Amnesty International as saying that "30 percent of all refugees forcibly returned to El Salvador from the United States and Mexico have been tortured, maimed or murdered upon their return."

Yet Amnesty International publicly refuted this in a letter, which said, "none of the facts or figures attributed to Amnesty International by the Chicago Religious Task Force are accurate."

The Chicago Religious Task Force declares that humanitarian aid is not enough. Its publication states: "Some churches have declared themselves sanctuary and have done almost nothing to oppose U.S. military aid to Central America. We question whether this is adequate. What is the value of a sanctuary church that continues its support for U.S. policies in Central America?" The statement concluded with a ringing summons to intensified political work:

"In conclusion, we believe that at this time the sanctuary movement should emphasize the goal of stopping U.S. intervention in Central America . . . some sanctuaries will choose to focus on serving a limited number of refugees and protect them from being returned to their countries by the U.S. government. We support this response, but our primary attention is directed toward stopping U.S. intervention."

There is no question that some of the church groups involved in sanctuary have honest motives and believe they are helping people in need. The concern is that people with such honest motives have been captured by those with the political agenda as discussed above.

As we consider humanitarian issues let us remember that all Americans want to help our fellowman. The United States has the most generous immigration and refugee policies in the world. With five percent of the world's population, we account for over half of the total world immigration. We take twice as many refugees as the rest of the world combined. In terms of support for international refugee relief, the United States contributes close to \$300 million a year, the largest amount for any nation.

Note also that there are ample opportunities to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals *within* our system. These include: aiding aliens to prepare and present their asylum cases; finding lawyers to represent them; providing food, clothing and funds to refugees in facilities in Central America; seeking legal change through Congress; and finally, supporting democratic institutions and solutions in Central America.

Recently, as a way of casting its net wider, the movement has put sanctuary resolutions on the agenda of many of the nation's major cities. A few cities and towns have established their own self-asserted foreign policy by declaring that they will break the law, or, using their own distorted interpretation, declaring that it is the government which violates the law.

About a dozen cities have taken some kind of position on the issue, and one of them . . . Los Angeles . . . after a groundswell of public opposition, was forced to back down from its original resolution, which had been railroaded through without

an opportunity for all sides of the issue to be heard. On December 3rd, for example, an informal poll conducted by a Los Angeles television station showed that 90% of the more than 2,200 people polled were against the resolution. By December 19, the public's reaction had become so intense L.A. City Councilman Ermani Bernardi notified INS Regional Commissioner Ezell that he was considering sponsoring an initiative to repeal the resolution. After clear indications that a repeal initiative would easily qualify and pass, sanctuary activists decided to avoid a humiliating defeat. On February 7, 1986, a motion to rescind the sanctuary resolution was almost unanimously passed by the Los Angeles City Council.

A similar resolution was recently passed in San Francisco. Yet after passage Mayor Feinstein sent a message to each member of the Board of Supervisors which made it clear that the resolution had little effect, particularly regarding law enforcement cooperation on crimes committed by illegal aliens. While it is always difficult for us Northern Californians to follow Los Angeles, I believe the responsible leadership of San Francisco should also consider action to re-examine and perhaps withdraw the resolution passed in this city, as well.

The impact of "sanctuary" is more philosophical than it is practical. The authority of INS to apprehend illegal aliens is not effected by city resolutions. Yet such resolutions and publicity by church groups cannot help but encourage illegal aliens to come to the United States in the false belief that they have a basis of support here, and may in fact even be safe from apprehension in some areas.

Such city actions also tend to erode respect for the law and may lead others to believe they can be selective in which laws to obey and which to ignore. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, said in an editorial: "Civil disobedience in defiance of federal immigration regulations by religious groups on moral grounds is one thing; it is quite another for a local unit of government to refuse cooperation and assistance in the enforcement of such regulations. At the end of that road lies anarchy."

How should cities facing sanctuary resolutions respond? First, be sure the issue gets a fair hearing from all sides. Avoid the steamroller technique — set hearings well in advance, with ample publicity. Let constituents be heard. INS will be pleased to provide information to any city considering the issue.

Local elected officials known to be opposed to a sanctuary resolution should be encouraged to go to their constituents for support in fighting such proposals, or to work for their rescission once adopted.

Civic groups, veterans organizations and other interested bodies should also be encouraged to voice their disapproval through their own resolutions condemning pro-sanctuary actions, and to assist elected officials in their fight against these elements. The public in general should be invited to express their feelings to their elected representatives and to the media.

So in summary, I would conclude that the "sanctuary" movement is a political protest movement, involving lawlessness which takes advantage of the humanitarian instincts of many well intentioned people.

So called sanctuary is not in keeping with the meaning or the traditions of American immigration, nor is it in the spirit of law which governs our country. If anything, it is a threat to law and to the very people whom it purports to help . . . the immigrant in need of refuge.

The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-

gees), which coordinates many of the refugee programs in Central America, has stated that repatriation to the home country is the preferred solution to refugee problems. There are millions of refugees in the world. They cannot all come to the United States or find settlement in other countries. This philosophy — seeking repatriation for refugees — makes sense and should be supported. We should continue to support programs to promote democracy in Central America in order to increase the opportunities for repatriation.

Perhaps the ultimate irony is the sanctuary movement's linkage of concern for refugee issues with work to terminate U.S. assistance to democracies in Central America. If the twentieth century has taught us nothing else it should at least have taught

us that while war undoubtedly creates refugees, the peace that follows upon the victory of totalitarian political forces will create even more refugees and greater inhumanities than those that accompany war itself.

There are few institutions in America more important than our immigration heritage. As long as we remember and preserve and protect this tradition, it will continue endlessly. But if we allow it to be misused and abused, such as by the so-called sanctuary activists, it can fall into disrespect and the public will demand measures that are far more restrictive than any proposed in the past. We must ensure that we will continue to be a nation of legal immigrants who can proudly look up at that welcoming beacon from our Statue of Liberty.

Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Pays?

AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION

By JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.*, *Former United States Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare*

Delivered to the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan, April 7, 1986

A REVOLUTION in the American way of health is under way, and it is likely to be as far-reaching as any economic and social upheaval we have known.

At stake is who gets how much money out of one of America's top three industries, who suffers how much pain how long, and who gets the next available kidney, liver, or heart: in short, who lives, who dies, and who pays.

The revolutionary forces at work are profound. Science is serving up incredible biomedical breakthroughs that hold the promise of remarkable cures and the threat of unacceptable costs. The graying of America presents a burgeoning elderly population, who consume the most expensive high-tech medicine and who already strain our capacity to provide adequate medical and nursing care. In law and religion, our judges, ethicists and moral theologians are confounded by the Pandora's box of medical discoveries that insists they reexamine questions as fundamental as when life begins and ends.

Fed up with waste and inefficiency, the biggest buyers of health care — governments, corporations and unions — are changing the way doctors, hospitals, and other providers are used and paid, and reshaping financial incentives that encourage patients to seek unnecessary care.

Guiding this revolution is a delicate and treacherous business because there's so much of value to preserve. If the American health care colossus has become far too costly and mercenary, the American way of health has been miraculous.

The miracles are everywhere to be seen: vaccines that have virtually eliminated most childhood diseases; the high technology of microsurgery, kidney dialysis, vital-organ transplants, machines that scan the body and the brain and do the work of the heart, pharmaceutical inventions to remedy everything from headaches and depression to hypertension and epilepsy. We have conquered diseases that have killed millions over many centuries, and we have extended life expectancy beyond the wildest predictions of just a generation ago.

We have the most advanced medical technology on this earth, and an abundance of superb specialists and hospitals.

But the soaring cost of care threatens to deny even the affluent access to the miracles we have come to expect and the

billions we've spent have not given millions of uninsured Americans basic health care.

Medicine's high priests, the doctors, have said once too often, and with an arrogance we no longer accept, that only they know what to prescribe, where to treat us, and how they should be paid.

Corporations, unions, governors, mayors, legislatures, every president since Lyndon Johnson — all the institutions our people speak and act through — have attacked the profligacies of the American health care industry.

Examples of exorbitance and skewed values abound: a 75-year-old man dies after less than seven hours of emergency hours for a ruptured aneurysm. His widow gets bills for \$23,000. Another widow received a bill of \$250,000 for her husband's five and a half months in an intensive care unit battling emphysema that killed him. A California man spent ten days in a hospital for a mild heart attack, and received doctor and hospital bills totaling more than \$25,000 before the hospital reluctantly agreed to transfer him to a Veterans Administration facility where he was eligible for free care.

But there are signals of change:

—Hospital admissions, lengths of stay, and occupancy rates dropped in 1984 and again in 1985.

—Medicare, once predicted to go bust by the end of this decade, looks solvent until late in the next.

—Cigarette consumption has gone down.

The early results of America's health care revolution make it clear that we can provide quality health care to all at a reduced cost. To achieve that goal, we must recognize that the revolution is just beginning.

Three years ago at this Detroit Economic Club I announced Chrysler's plans to control health care costs. I said we would work with the United Auto Workers, our employees, and the hospitals and physicians who serve the Chrysler family, to change the structure of a health care system that had become supplier-dominated and inefficient, and was not delivering the best possible care to our employees.

Today I can announce that Chrysler has saved more than \$100 million in health care costs since that effort began and that