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Curtis
Grenell

**The Sandinistas and
Middle Eastern Radicals**

United States Department of State




THE SANDINISTAS AND MIDDLE EASTERN RADICALS

An unclassified report on Sandinista ties to Middle Eastern radicals, including Sandinista participation in Middle East aircraft hijacking and terrorism in 1970, and their continuing relations with these groups and states in the 1980s.

United States Department of State

August 1985



CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	i
THE FIRST CONTACTS: TRAINING AND ARMS	1
SANDINISTA PARTICIPATION IN MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM IN THE 1970s	2
THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION AND PLO INVOLVEMENT IN THE LATE 1970s	6
REVOLUTIONARY SOLIDARITY: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC TIES	7
THE SANDINISTAS AND LIBYA	8
THE SANDINISTA-IRAN-LIBYA AXIS	10
A HAVEN FOR SUBVERSIVES	13
CONCLUSIONS	13
NOTES	15

"I am very happy to meet you for the third time. We consider your revolutionary country as our own home."

Mirhussein Musavi (Iranian Prime Minister) to Comandante Daniel Ortega, January 23, 1985 (FBIS, Central America, p. P 20, January 24, 1985)

"Libyan fighters, arms, and backing to the Nicaraguan people have reached them because they fight with us. They fight America on its own ground."

Muammar Qadhafi, September 1, 1984,
The New York Times

"Our friendship with Libya is eternal.... Libya is a people which, in accord with our experience, has developed solidarity without frontiers. Even before the triumph of the Nicaraguan Revolution, we received the solidarity of the people of the Libyan Jamahiriya and after it we had the chance to speak and deal with our great friend, [Muammar] el Kadafi."

Sandinista Interior Minister Tomas Borge,
speech in Tripoli, Libya, September 1, 1984

"There is no anti-Semitism in Nicaragua."

Sandinista Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto at New York headquarters of the National Council of Christians and Jews ("Nicaragua without Jews," ADL Bulletin, September 1983)

"Nicaragua cannot have Judaism without Jews, even though it has demonstrated, like Poland, the possibility of anti-Semitism without Jews."

Rabbi Morton M. Rosenthal, Anti-Defamation League's International Affairs Division, ADL Bulletin, September 1983

"We say to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is his land and the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinistas."

Tomas Borge, July 22, 1980


"The triumph of the Nicaraguans is the PLO's triumph."

Yasser Arafat, July 23, 1980 (FBIS, Central America, p. P 10, July 24, 1980)

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy analysts and the news media have noted Sandinista relations with the Cubans and Soviets and Sandinista dependence on Eastern-bloc aid, arms, and advisers. It is recognized that those relations are inimical to United States and hemispheric interests. This report notes a different yet related aspect of Sandinista policy: the relationship between the Sandinistas and radical Middle Eastern groups and states, including terrorist elements supported by those groups and states. Their ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reach back more than ten years before the revolution in Nicaragua. Libya has given the Sandinistas both pre- and post-revolution aid, at first in conjunction with or through the PLO, and eventually through its own agreements with the Sandinista government. More recently, the Sandinistas have developed closer ties with Iran.

Relations between the Sandinistas and Middle Eastern radicals result from years of carefully developed contacts between radical forces in Central America and the Middle East. This report describes how the relationships started, the mutual assistance that the PLO and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) have given each other, and the Sandinistas' relationships with Libya and Iran.



THE FIRST CONTACTS: TRAINING AND ARMS

The PLO made its international debut in 1966 in Havana, Cuba, at the First Conference of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (also known as the Tri-Continental Conference).¹ At this conference, Fidel Castro brought together 500 delegates from radical leftist groups around the world to devise a strategy for what they called the global revolutionary movement.²

Results of that conference soon became apparent. In the months following the conference, guerrilla training camps appeared in various countries, with major clusters in Cuba, the Soviet Union, Lebanon, and Libya.³ Members of the PLO were among the first to be trained in the Cuban and Soviet camps, thanks to the close ties developed at the Tri-Continental Conference.⁴

Training courses at these camps generally lasted six months and included ideological indoctrination as well as practical training in the use of weapons and explosives. The indoctrination focused on the theories of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Lecture topics included: "Russian Ties to the Third World," "The Struggle Against Imperialism," "The Soviet Contribution to Palestinian Liberation," "Zionist Ties to Imperialism," and "The Reactionary Nature of North Yemen and Saudi Arabia." Practical training in techniques of warfare included blowing up munitions dumps, bridges, and vehicles; planting personnel mines; the rudiments of biological and chemical warfare; marksmanship and camouflage; urban and field tactics; and the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment such as rockets and shoulder-borne missile launchers.⁵

Upon graduation, PLO guerrillas set up camps of their own for training terrorists, at first in Lebanon and later in Libya. Reportedly among the Nicaraguans trained in the Lebanon camps in 1969 was Tomas Borge, Interior Minister and one of the nine comandantes on the FSLN National Directorate.⁶

Sandinista representative Benito Escobar arranged with three PLO representatives in Mexico City, also in 1969, for joint PLO-Cuban training in Lebanon for a contingent of 50-70 Sandinistas.⁷ Subsequently, other contingents of Sandinistas were sent to PLO camps in Libya.⁸ Present Vice Minister of the Interior Rene Vivas, the late Telecommunications Minister Enrique Schmidt, and Henry Ruiz, Minister for External Cooperation, also were among those trained by the PLO during 1969-70.⁹


SANDINISTA PARTICIPATION IN MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM IN THE 1970s

The investment in training Nicaraguans had some immediate dividends for the PLO. When the PLO and its radical component groups, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), attempted to overthrow the government of King Hussein of Jordan in 1970, PLO-trained Sandinistas participated.


One PLO-Sandinista operation was discussed in an interview by Sandinista spokesman Jorge Mandi with al-Watan, a Kuwaiti newspaper: "A number of Sandinistas took part in the operation to divert four aircraft which the PFLP seized and landed at a desert airfield in Jordan. One of our comrades was also wounded in another hijack operation in which Leila Khaled was involved. She was in command of the operation and our comrades helped her carry it out." He continued, "Many of the units belonging to the Sandinista movement were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan.... Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and other places during the 'Black September battles.'"¹⁰ Mandi's reference to a "hijack operation" concerned the hijacking of an El Al airliner en route from Tel Aviv to London, on September 6, 1970.¹¹ Sandinista Patrick Arguello Ryan was killed in this hijacking attempt; he had been trained at one of the PLO camps.¹² Arguello is now revered by the Sandinistas as a hero and a large dam under construction has been named in his honor.

During that same period, Tomas Borge, one of the founders of the FSLN, reportedly was the major contact between the Sandinistas and the PLO. Borge became a familiar figure in both Damascus and Beirut, not only because of his trips there on behalf of the Sandinistas, but also on behalf of Fidel Castro. Borge appeared to be functioning as Castro's envoy in the Middle East during the early 1970s because of his good relationship with the PLO and his earlier guerrilla training in the area.¹³

Thus began the symbiotic relationship between the Sandinistas and the PLO. From the PLO, the Sandinistas got training in guerrilla warfare and an opportunity to practice their skills by aiding the PLO in terrorist acts such as airline hijackings and a campaign against King Hussein in Jordan. The PLO got help from the Sandinistas in operations that brought the PLO to world attention and served as an example for countless other terrorists.




Guerrillas described as Palestinians photographed with the BOAC jet they hijacked in September 1970. According to a Sandinista spokesman, Sandinistas participated in the triple hijacking, which climaxed with the destruction of all three aircraft. (Wide World, 1970)



The hijackers completely destroyed the aircraft pictured above, along with two others. Some 40 passengers were held hostage after the destruction of the airliners, but eventually were released. Sandinista participation in these acts of terrorism was not publicized at the time. (Wide World, 1970)



Leila Khaled, a guerrilla leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Under her command, Sandinistas trained in Palestinian training camps in Lebanon and Libya participated in terrorist acts. (Wide World, 1970)



A commando group led by Leila Khaled and including Sandinistas attempted to hijack an El Al airliner enroute from Tel Aviv to New York via London on September 6, 1970. During the unsuccessful hijacking attempt, Khaled was captured, and a Sandinista, Patrick Arguello Ryan, was killed. The airliner is shown here after its safe arrival in London. (Wide World, 1970)

THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION AND PLO INVOLVEMENT
IN THE LATE 1970s

The Sandinistas who trained in PLO camps in the Middle East gained an asset almost as valuable to them as their guerrilla training: contacts with sources of aid and arms.¹⁴ Again, Tomas Borge was the major go-between in aid and arms negotiations. While acting in his dual capacity as the Sandinista's PLO liaison and as Castro's emissary, the wide range of contacts he amassed in the radical Middle East served him well as he prepared for the Sandinistas' own revolution.

Borge used PLO assistance to obtain arms from North Korea and Vietnam for the Sandinistas. Libyan money helped pay for some of these arms.¹⁵ Reportedly, other shipments of supplies and arms came from the PLO itself.¹⁶ In July 1979, one planeload was intercepted when it stopped in Tunis. This PLO-chartered aircraft, ostensibly carrying medical supplies from Beirut for Nicaraguan refugees, was found instead to hold 50 tons of arms, including an anti-aircraft gun. The Tunisian government did not allow the shipment to go through.¹⁷

At the same time, the Sandinistas were formalizing their ties with the most radical PLO elements. Benito Escobar, who had earlier made arrangements with the PLO to train Sandinistas in PLO camps, met in Mexico City in February 1978 with Issam Ali, Latin American liaison of the PLO, and members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The PLO and the Sandinistas issued a joint communique on February 5, 1978, affirming "the bonds of solidarity which exist between the two revolutionary organizations."¹⁸ This communique was followed by a DFLP-FSLN joint declaration from Havana on March 6, 1978, which expressed a mutual declaration of war against "Yankee imperialism, the racist regime of Israel," and the Nicaraguan government.¹⁹

PLO-Sandinista relations intensified in 1978 and the beginning of 1979, with a substantial assist from Libya.²⁰ In 1979, Qadhafi invited the leaders of Central American guerrilla groups, including the Sandinistas, to a meeting in Benghazi during which he pledged financial and political support for their movement.²¹

REVOLUTIONARY SOLIDARITY: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC TIES

Shortly after the Sandinistas seized power, they rewarded the PLO for its assistance in their revolution by granting it unprecedented "government to government" ties.²² In most countries the PLO was at best permitted to open an "office"; in Managua it was permitted to open an "embassy," with the ranking representative holding the title of "ambassador." The PLO ambassador and his staff were accorded full diplomatic privileges.²³

In July 1980, Yasser Arafat made a four-day "state visit" to Nicaragua to formalize full diplomatic ties between the Nicaraguan government and the PLO. On July 22 at a reception in his honor Arafat praised "the strategic and military ties between the Sandinista and Palestinian revolutions." Interior Minister Borge responded, "We say to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is his land and the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinistas." Arafat replied: "The links between us are not new. Your comrades did not come to our country just to train, but also to fight. Your enemies are our enemies."²⁴ Arafat expanded on this theme in an interview with Radio Sandino the same day: "the Nicaraguan people's victory is the victory of the Palestinians.... The freedom in Nicaragua is the same in Palestine.... The only way, then, is for increased struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism." He closed the broadcast by reiterating, "Together against imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism."²⁵ In a speech at the Cesar Augusto Silva Convention Center (also on July 22), standing with Borge and several other of the nine comandantes, Arafat said, "Anyone who threatens Nicaragua will have to face Palestinian combatants."²⁶

Arafat's talk about "strategic and military ties" was not mere diplomatic pleasantries. Shortly after his Nicaraguan visit, he sent Colonel Mutlag Hamadan of the PLO, at the head of a contingent of 25 military technicians, to instruct the Sandinistas in the use of Eastern-bloc weapons.²⁷ In November 1980, the PLO provided the Sandinistas with a \$12 million loan.²⁸ In January 1981, a group of PLO pilots were sent to Nicaragua to assist the Sandinistas in flying helicopters and transport aircraft.²⁹ By May 1981, the PLO was deeply involved in military and guerrilla training activities in Nicaragua.³⁰ Reports in mid-1982 indicated that PLO officers were involved in special guerrilla training in Nicaragua.³¹ Although the breakup of the PLO power base

in Lebanon in 1982 reduced the PLO's ability to project itself aggressively and to finance radical regimes and movements around the world, the PLO presence, training, and other activities in Nicaragua have continued.

The Sandinistas' anti-Zionist rhetoric, close relations with radical Arab groups, and efforts to organize Nicaragua's society and economy according to Marxist-Leninist precepts all contributed to the departure from Nicaragua by 1981 of nearly all of Nicaragua's Jewish community.³²

THE SANDINISTAS AND LIBYA

Although the PLO, serving as an intermediary, had helped to develop the early Sandinista ties with the Libyan government, by the time the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, they had developed close direct relationships with the Qadhafi regime.³³ Tomas Borge and Construction Minister Moises Hassan were key figures in working with Libya. Both were instrumental in obtaining a \$100 million loan in 1981. Borge made an unpublicized visit to Libya in late 1980 to complete arrangements for the loan agreement and to discuss Libyan offers for joint agricultural ventures in Nicaragua.³⁴

On June 20, 1981, the Sandinistas had a lavish celebration in Managua marking the eleventh anniversary of Qadhafi's ouster of U.S. air bases from Libyan territory. Junta member Sergio Ramirez stated in his speech at the public ceremony: "The ties between the Libyan people and the Nicaraguan people are not new, but were consolidated when the Sandinista Front struggled in the field of battle to win the liberty of our homeland. The solidarity of the Libyan people, of the Libyan government and comrade Muammar Khaddafi [Qadhafi] was always patently manifest. This solidarity has been made real, has been made effective, has been made more fraternal since the triumph of our revolution."³⁵ The representative of the Libyan "People's Bureau" (as their embassies are called), Ibrahim Mohammed Frahat, returned these sentiments in his response, with references to Libya's "particular friendship" with Borge.³⁶

As with the PLO, Libya's support for the Sandinistas has not been purely economic. The Libyans have sent arms shipments to the Sandinistas. One huge arms shipment was intercepted in Brazil during April 1983. Four Libyan planes



Soviet-manufactured Libyan transport sits under Brazilian military guard at Manaus, Brazil, in April 1983. Search of the aircraft and three others accompanying it revealed large arms shipments which had been falsely described as "medical supplies for Colombia." The intended destination was Nicaragua. (Wide World, 1983)

had made a stop in Brazil for technical reasons. The crew claimed that the planes were carrying medical supplies to Colombia. The Brazilians became suspicious when the pilots could not produce cargo manifests. The planes were searched by skeptical Brazilian authorities, who found about 84 tons of arms, explosives, and other military equipment. Reports have indicated that the planes, three of Soviet manufacture, contained: two dismantled fighter planes, wire-guided missiles, rifles, machine guns, mortars, bazookas, 90mm cannons, eight multiple rocket launchers, five tons of bombs, eight anti-aircraft guns, 600 light artillery rockets, and other unspecified crates of military equipment.³⁷ This was just one of a number of shipments of Libyan military supplies to the Sandinistas.³⁸

The Sandinistas' initial reaction to the discovery of this arms shipment was almost as noteworthy as the shipment itself. The Nicaraguan ambassador to Brazil, Ernesto Gutierrez, stated: "It was a donation from our Libyan comrades, but I do not know what it was."³⁹ Subsequently Rafael Solis, then Secretary of the Nicaraguan National Council, and now FSLN delegate in the National Assembly, admitted that the arms were destined for the Sandinista army. He added that it should be no surprise that the Sandinista government received arms from Libya and Soviet-bloc countries, and further emphasized that such arms supply relationships are discussed openly in Managua. Asked why the shipment was labeled "medical supplies," Solis said the Libyans would have to answer that.⁴⁰ Qadhafi's response was that the planes were indeed carrying arms to Nicaragua and he was sorry for any problems the incident caused for Brazilian authorities.⁴¹

Reports have indicated that Libyan pilots and mechanics have also been involved in training Sandinistas.⁴²

THE SANDINISTA-IRAN-LIBYA AXIS

Recently the Nicaraguan relationship with Libya has strengthened both in deed and word.⁴³ For example, on September 1, 1984, Tomas Borge represented the Sandinista government at the fifteenth anniversary celebration of



Comandante Daniel Ortega (left) bidding farewell to Iranian Prime Minister Mirhussein Musavi at Sandino Airport in Managua after the Iranian's visit to Nicaragua in January 1985. Some observers believe that Musavi controls Iran's terrorist operations. (Wide World, 1985)

Qadhafi's overthrow of King Idris of Libya (an event ignored by prominent moderate Arab leaders). Qadhafi, acknowledging Borge's attendance, stated: "Libyan fighters, arms, and backing to the Nicaraguan people have reached them because they fight with us. They fight America on its own ground."⁴⁴ Qadhafi's reference to "fighters" can be taken literally, as there have been reports of Libyans assisting the Sandinistas in the fight against the armed democratic resistance as well as serving as advisers and pilot trainers.⁴⁵

Economic ties between Libya and the Sandinista government continue. On January 16, 1985, the Sandinistas announced a trade agreement regarding Libyan oil. The amount of the agreement is \$15 million.⁴⁶

Nicaragua's relationship with Iran goes back several years, including the May 1983 visit of Ernesto Cardenal to Iran. Cardenal, the Sandinista Minister of Culture, was given a private audience with the Ayatollah Khomeini, a rarity for Westerners. In March 1984, junta member Sergio Ramirez went to Iran to discuss trade and other matters.⁴⁷ This visit resulted in a \$23 million trade agreement between Nicaragua and Iran.⁴⁸

In 1985, high level contacts increased. Mohammed Mirmehdi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, met with Sandinista Comandante and President Daniel Ortega on January 14, 1985.⁴⁹ Although the meeting was ostensibly to congratulate Ortega on his inauguration (Nicaraguan radio still refers to him as "Comandante Ortega"), the talks almost certainly involved planning for the Iranian prime minister's visit a week later.

On January 23, 1985, Prime Minister Mirhussein Musavi went to Nicaragua and met with Daniel Ortega (their third meeting), and other members of the Sandinista government. Reports varied on the content of the meeting between Ortega and Musavi; most observers agreed that shipment of small arms from Iran and an oil deal were discussed.⁵⁰ An ABC news report stated that Prime Minister Musavi is believed to control Iran's terrorist operations.⁵¹

The Sandinistas admit that an oil deal with Iran was discussed, but they deny that arms shipments were agreed upon. Nevertheless there were reports that on January 25, 1985, two shiploads of arms were under way from Iran, to be transferred to Nicaraguan ships at some point, and that there may be some Iranian funding for the international terrorist presence in Nicaragua.⁵²

A HAVEN FOR SUBVERSIVES

The FSLN government has issued Nicaraguan passports to radicals and terrorists of other nationalities, including radicals from the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe, thus enabling them to travel in Western countries without their true identities being known.⁵³ PLO agents working in Central America and Panama use Nicaragua as their base of operations. The Sandinistas' willingness to provide new documentation and a base from which to travel is undoubtedly one reason why Nicaragua has become a haven for terrorists and radicals from Europe as well as Latin America. Groups with a known presence in Nicaragua include the Basque Homeland and Liberty organization, known as ETA, the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, and Italy's Red Brigades.⁵⁴ As in the case of the PLO, some members of these groups use Nicaragua as a base for carrying out regional work of their organizations. Others are in Nicaragua for "revolutionary solidarity" and participate in the war against the armed groups of the democratic anti-Sandinista resistance. Still others, usually professionals and technicians who because of their fugitive status could not work in their homelands, went to Nicaragua to find jobs, replacing the technical and managerial class that is fleeing the imposition of a communist system in Nicaragua.

CONCLUSIONS

The Sandinista connection with the PLO and radical Middle Eastern states is more than a decade and a half old. Sandinistas received PLO training in Lebanon and Libya, and fought beside the PLO against King Hussein of Jordan well before the Sandinista revolution was under way. In building their own capacity for revolution, the Sandinistas relied on the PLO and Libya for arms, money for arms, and help in transporting of arms.

Once the Sandinistas were in power, these relationships continued. The PLO sent them loans and military trainers; the Libyans sent them millions of dollars in financial assistance, plus arms, pilots, and military advisers. The PLO was granted full diplomatic status and was allowed to participate in military and guerrilla training camps in Nicaragua. The political ties between the Sandinistas and the PLO, and the Sandinistas and Libya, are strong, and the political solidarity manifest in deeds and during visits and anniversaries underlines the strength of these ties.

Beyond Sandinista political, military, and economic cooperation with Middle East radical states and the PLO is Nicaragua's connection with international terrorism. The Sandinistas have not been able to conceal the fact that Nicaragua has become safe haven for international terrorist groups such as the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Basque Homeland and Liberty organization (ETA). The Middle Eastern entities Nicaragua has chosen to deal with--the PLO, Libya, and Iran--have had known involvement in terrorist activity, including the planning, training, financing, and implementation of terrorist acts. Sandinista ties with this network pose increasing danger of violence for the Western Hemisphere.

NOTES

1. Eileen Skully, The PLO's Growing Latin American Base (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, August 2, 1983), p. 2.

2. David J. Kopilow, Castro, Israel, and the PLO (Washington, D.C.: The Cuban-American National Foundation, 1984), p. 5.

3. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), p. 115; Center for International Security, The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World (Washington, D.C.: February 1984), p. 2.

4. Eileen Skully, The PLO's Growing Latin American Base, p. 2.

5. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 279.

6. Center for International Security, The Sandinista-PLO Axis, p. 2.

7. Ibid. Also mentioned in Anti-Defamation League, PLO Activities in Latin America (New York: May 1982), p. 9 (hereinafter ADL).

8. Eileen Skully, The PLO's Growing Latin American Base, p. 4.

9. Juan O. Tamayo, "Sandinistas Attract a Who's Who of Terrorists," The Miami Herald, March 3, 1985, p. 3.

10. Jorge Mandi, quoted in al-Watan (Kuwait), August 7, 1979; quoted by David Kopilow, Castro, Israel, and the PLO, p. 11.

11. Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman, The PLO and International Terror (n. pl.: March 1981), p. 7.

12. Center for International Security, The Sandinista-PLO Axis, pp. 2, 15.

13. "The Arab-Israeli Contest for Influence in Latin America," Business Week, May 3, 1983, p. 52.
14. Ibid.
15. Eileen Skully, The PLO's Growing Latin American Base, p. 4.
16. John J. Tierney, Jr., Somozas and Sandinistas: The US and Nicaragua in the Twentieth Century (Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security, 1982), p. 62.
17. Christopher Dickey, "Palestinians Challenging Israel for Influence in Central America," The Washington Post, May 29, 1982, p. A14; see also U.S. News and World Report, July 23, 1979, for a report closer to time of occurrence.
18. Melech Ben-Moshe, "Nicaraguan Status as Israel's Friend May Be Jeopardized by Latin-PLO Tie," The Detroit Jewish News, December 29, 1978, p. 18.
19. Ibid.; ADL, PLO Activities in Latin America, p. 9.
20. Eileen Skully, The PLO's Growing Latin American Base, p. 4.
21. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 270.
22. Christopher Dickey, "Palestinians Challenging Israel...", The Washington Post, May 29, 1982, p. A14.
23. Center for International Security, The Sandinista-PLO Axis, p. 3.
24. Ibid.
25. Transcript of Arafat interview, Managua Domestic News Service, 4:00 GMT, July 22, 1980, FBIS, Central America, July 23, 1980, p. P 7.
26. San Jose Radio Reloj, 17:30 GMT, July 22, 1980, FBIS, Central America, July 23, 1980, p. P 8.
27. ADL, PLO Activities in Latin America, p. 10; Christopher Dickey, "Palestinians Challenging Israel...", The Washington Post, May 29, 1982, p. A14.

28. Robert F. Lamberg, "The PLO in Latin America," Swiss Review of World Affairs, June 1982, p. 12.

29. "The PLO on the Wing in Nicaragua," Newsweek, March 15, 1982, p. 19; Robert F. Lamberg, "The PLO in Latin America", p. 12; speech by Arafat, January 11, 1982 Beirut Arab University broadcast over the clandestine Voice of Palestine, January 12, 1982, at 11:35 (Arafat under nom de guerre of "Abu Ammar"), FBIS, Middle East, January 13, 1982, p. A 1. See also The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1982, p. 4.

30. Robert F. Lamberg, "The PLO in Latin America," p. 122; "The Arab-Israeli Contest for Influence in Latin America," Business Week, May 3, 1982, p. 52; Clifford A. Kiracofe, "The Soviet Network in Central America," Midstream, May 1981, p. 5.

31. "The Arab-Israeli Contest for Influence in Latin America," Business Week, May 3, 1982; Robert F. Lamberg, "The PLO in Latin America," Swiss Review of World Affairs, June 1982.

32. Within 18 months of the July 19, 1979, revolution, the Sandinistas had confiscated the Managua synagogue, and most of the country's small Jewish community had left Nicaragua. Nicaraguan Jews in exile have described their harassment by the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas claim that they are not anti-Semitic, that Nicaragua's Jews had a "bourgeois mentality" which prevented them from adjusting to a socialist revolution. Whether it was anti-Semitism or the Sandinistas' Marxist/Leninist ideology, the result was the same: harassment of Jews, confiscation of their properties and synagogue, and the Jewish community's departure from Nicaragua. For information on the Sandinista treatment of Jews, see "The Jews and the Nicaragua Issue," statement by Jaime Daremblum at the White House, March 13, 1985; "Nicaraguan Jews feel the Sting of Ouster," The Miami Herald, July 2, 1982, p. 16A; "NJC Statement on Nicaragua;" issued by the National Jewish Coalition, Capitol Hill Office, March 1985; "Religious Repression in Nicaragua," statements by Rabbi Morton Rosenthal and Mr. Isaac Stavisky, Congressional Record, August 4, 1983, p. E4021.

33. David J. Kopilow, Castro, Israel and the PLO, p. 3; Christopher Dickey, "Palestinians Challenging Israel...", The Washington Post, May 29, 1982, p. A14.

34. ADL, PLO Activities in Latin America, p. 9. A Washington Post report indicated that this offer of investment had a top figure of \$3 billion. See Christopher Dickey, "Arab States Help Nicaragua Avoid Ties to Superpowers," The Washington Post, July 19, 1981, p. A18.
35. Christopher Dickey, "Arab States Help Nicaragua....," The Washington Post, July 19, 1981, p. A18.
36. Ibid.
37. Richard House, "Brazilians Study Libyan Arms Cargo: Reports Vary on Contents," The Washington Post, April 26, 1983, p. A14; Richard House, "Brazil Acts To Wind Down Planes Affair; Libya Seeks to Fly Out Arms," The Washington Post, April 27, 1983, p. A17. "Italians to Return Arms to Libya from Brazil," The Washington Post, May 1, 1983, p. A24.
38. James Gerstenzang, "Libyan Arms, Bound for Nicaragua, Called 'Tip of the Iceberg,'" Buffalo News, April 26, 1983, p. A6 (AP report).
39. "Brazil To Seize Arms from Libyan Planes," Buffalo News, April 21, 1983, p. A4 (UPI report).
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A WHITE PAPER ON THE SANDINISTAS AND THE JEWS

Central
America

- published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
March 19, 1986

INTRODUCTION

Members of the Jewish community-in-exile came to the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith to tell of their experience of Sandinist anti-Semitism in Nicaragua and seek assistance. In 1981, a League representative raised this issue in New York with Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto. Despite assurances that the government would investigate, the ADL received no reply to queries about anti-Semitism, the status of the synagogue and private properties.

In May, 1983, after 19 months of futile quiet diplomacy, the ADL publicized the plight of Nicaraguan Jewry. Only then did the government of Nicaragua react. It denied charges of anti-Semitism, and falsely claimed that four cabinet members are Jews. It also claimed that the synagogue was a private home, legally confiscated. When ADL provided documents proving that the synagogue was built by the congregation, the government offered to return the building.

At that time only two or three members of the congregation were still in the country. The small Jewish community, its members fearing for their lives, had fled in the face of anti-Semitic threats and harrassment.

Since then, various individuals and organizations have attempted to distort the facts and deny that Jews, as Jews, had reason to fear or flee the country. This paper sets forth basic facts about the Sandinistas and Jews.

ANTI-SEMITISM

"Anti-Semitism was one of the major factors, though not the only one, which caused the Nicaraguan Jews to leave Nicaragua."

Federation of Jewish Communities of Central America (FEDECO), May, 1984

* * *

X Nuevo Diario, a Managua newspaper which closely adheres to the government line, charged (July 17, 1982), that "the world's money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism. Consequently, controlling economic power, they control political power as now happens in the United States."

* * *

X "I remembered that it was the Levites in the synagogue who crucified our Lord."

Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto
Washington Post 1/27/85

THE SYNAGOGUE

The synagogue in Managua was firebombed in 1978 while the congregation was worshipping inside. When congregants attempted to flee, they were confronted with armed Sandinistas who ordered them not to leave the burning building.

* * *

"I remember one day, one evening, on a Shabbat evening while we were singing, two bombs hit the door. We had a big wooden door in the synagogue, where a big Star of David was, and all of a sudden, the whole place was on fire.

"I remember running, getting the fire hose, and started running to the entrance of the synagogue, when I stopped because two other members that used to be in concentration camps in Europe, they had already reached the outside of the synagogue. We were met by a jeep and another small car with eight members that had handkerchiefs on their faces, and they identified themselves as members of the FSLN, means the Sandinista movement, guerilla movement. They said that they were the FSLN and the PLO and that they were going to burn all the Jews. So we were forced back into the synagogue."

Oscar Kellerman, Washington, July 20, 1983

* * *

Mauricio Palacio is a non-Jew who lived among the Jews and served as a Sandinista informant.

"I let them know where....the Jewish people would gather so that a little burning of the cars of these Zionists could be done and tell them all "JEWS GO HOME."

Mauricio Palacio
Managua, March 3, 1980

"The purpose of this operation, was intended to intimidate the community and, in that way, to stop the flow of arms from Israel. It was determined that the best place to carry out the operation was the synagogue....the synagogue was attacked and they attempted to set fire to the doors; a verbal message was given to the congregation...."

Mauricio Palacio
Chicago, April 15, 1986

THREATS AND INTIMIDATION OF INDIVIDUAL JEWS

"I, together with my brother-in-law, Mr. Saul Retelny, ran a complex of factories manufacturing textiles and candy which employed at peaks, over 1,200 heads of families. For a period of 18 months prior to July, 1979 anonymous

callers would contact Mr. Retelny and threaten his life and that of his wife. These calls came to his business office and to his home, now also confiscated, at all hours of the night. One favorite tactic was to call around three in the morning and tell my brother-in-law that I had been shot and killed! At the same time, I would get a telephone call claiming that my brother-in-law was shot and killed.

"In addition, there were writings on the walls inside and outside the factories: 'Death to the Jews; Isaac will be killed. Beware of Sandinista Justice.' My runs of abduction attempts were made. In one instance, I was stopped, with my son inside the car, and at gun point my life was threatened. I was warned that my businesses were to be taken over when the Sandinistas came to power. Although Mr. Retelny and I were both born in Nicaragua, we never participated directly or indirectly, in politics."

Isaac Stavisky, Washington, July 20, 1983

* * *

"Three times I was followed, and they tried to kill me three times. With gasoline, they tried to burn the car. Other times, I did not take the path or the road that they thought I was going to take, because every day we would take a different road. We know already that we were being followed. We were all receiving, not only myself, but the rest of the Jewish families, receiving harassment, threats, phone calls. And all this made us little by little, one by one, leave Nicaragua."

Oscar Kellerman, Washington, March 14, 1985

CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY

The government of Nicaragua informed the ADL in December, 1983 that only two members of the Jewish community faced the possibility of criminal charges, but that 17 had had their properties confiscated by degrees. The others are caught in the "Catch 22" situation of being out of the country for fear that their lives are in danger and, therefore, falling under the Nicaraguan law providing for the confiscation of property of those who remain outside the country for more than six months.

SANDINISTAS' RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

After coming to power in 1979, the Sandinistas maintained minimal relations with the State of Israel, never permitting the Israeli ambassador to present credentials. In 1982, the Nicaraguans broke relations with Israel.

Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations announcing that his country was breaking relations with Israel, used the Israeli move into Lebanon as a pretext for that action. He told

the U.N. body, "Never since the time of Hitler has such mass genocide been witnessed...." D'Escoto said that his government, since it came to power, had "suspended all contact with the Zionist regime...all that remained was to break off diplomatic relations formally."

In the last two sessions of the General Assembly, Nicaragua has actively supported efforts to expel Israel from that world body.

SANDINISTA LINKS TO P.L.O.

The P.L.O.-Sandinist relationship involved P.L.O.-supplied weapons, training and funds. Sandinist guerillas and P.L.O. terrorists have also fought side by side. Jorge Mandi, a Sandinist spokesman, told a reporter for the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan (Aug. 7, 1979), "There is a longstanding blood unity between us and the Palestinian revolution....Many of the units belonging to the Sandinist movement were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970's, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places during the 'Black September' battles."

In August, 1980, the Kuwaiti press reported that P.L.O. members had gone to Nicaragua to supervise military training. This was done in accord with an agreement reached with Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. chieftain, who had gone to Managua in July to celebrate the first anniversary of the revolutionary Government. The Sandinists paid their debt by authorizing the opening of a P.L.O. "embassy" in Managua.

BRIEFING PAPER

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*Central
America*

STATE OF SIEGE: NICARAGUA'S PROTESTANTS

a press conference with

JIMMY HASSAN

Until December 1985, Jimmy Hassan, a native Nicaraguan, was National Director of Campus Crusade for Christ in Nicaragua, as well as Associate Pastor of the First Central American Church in Managua and one of the directors of "Ondas de Luz," the evangelical radio station in Nicaragua. Although Hassan has been involved in Christian work for most of his life, he was a practicing lawyer before joining Campus Crusade for Christ. After the Sandinista revolution of 1979, he became a judge in the district of Masaya. He held this position for three years before resigning to devote himself full-time to an evangelistic ministry.

Although there have been reported instances of harassment in the past, Protestant churches in Nicaragua have refrained from speaking out in protest, preferring instead to stress their total dedication to evangelism and the apolitical nature of their ministry. However, the new wave of harassment and intimidation of evangelical Christians in the wake of the recent suspension of civil liberties has forced the Protestant community to be more outspoken about Sandinista attempts to undermine the autonomy of their pastoral ministry.

This latest attack on independent Christian witness provides a revealing portrait of Nicaragua's "Christian-Marxist" revolutionary regime. Hassan's account of the arrest and torture of prominent evangelicals by State Security officials should serve as a warning about the future of the Protestant Church in Sandinista Nicaragua.

Mr. Hassan and his family managed to escape from Nicaragua in December 1985.

The following is a transcript by the Institute on Religion and Democracy of a press conference Mr. Hassan held at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, on December 19, 1985. The press conference was sponsored by the National Association of Evangelicals in cooperation with the Campus Crusade for Christ.

— Maria H. Thomas

STATEMENT BY JIMMY HASSAN

I would like to thank the American evangelical community for the solidarity that it has shown towards the evangelicals of Nicaragua in these difficult times.

On October 31, 1985, at six o'clock in the morning, my family and I were awakened by loud knocks on our door. Upon opening the door, we found 15 - 20 State Security officers, headed by Captain Charlotte Baltodano. She informed me that they were arresting me for possession of counter-revolutionary literature. I told her that she must be mistaken, because I have dedicated myself totally to the preaching of the Gospel and was in no way involved in political activities. As a sample of the counter-revolutionary material that I supposedly had, she showed me a booklet that we call "The Four Spiritual Laws." I must tell you that the only thing this booklet contains is the Gospel.

I was then taken in a State Security jeep to the Campus Crusade office, where I was ordered to give them all the evangelistic booklets that we had: 2,000 copies of "The Four Spiritual Laws" booklets and hundreds of books, including New Testaments and Bibles. I was then ordered to take them to the commercial printer, who was in the process of printing some more "Four Spiritual Laws" for us. The State Security officers confiscated 50,000 such booklets and warned the owner of the press that if he ever again printed something for us or for any evangelical organization, he would be arrested and his printing press confiscated.

I was then driven to the offices of the Directorate of Mass Media Communications, in the Ministry of Interior, where I was held in an isolated room for about four hours, before being called to the office of Captain Charlotte Baltodano. She, in the company of various State Security officers, warned me that if anyone ever heard about what they had done, I would be sorry, because the Interior Ministry would take measures to punish me. She put a pistol to my head and asked me if that was clear. I answered in the affirmative; however, I reminded her that they had publicized the whole incident by taking me out of my house with a large military procession to my office, to the printer, and to other places in Managua. I was released at about four in the afternoon.

That evening, several people who visited me at home said that they had been told that to be involved with me would be dangerous. At about eleven that night, the door of my house was again shaken by violent knocking. When I came out, it was another State Security officer, who handed me a summons to appear at House 50, one of the offices of State Security, the next morning at eight. Immediately thereafter a police patrol car parked in front of my house.

The next day, when I arrived at House 50, they made me go into a small room. Three State Security lieutenants entered, and said, "Let's start by establishing the rules of the game. First, you are a dog, and your life has no value to us. Any of us would kill you with pleasure, because you are an enemy to us and to the revolution." I denied the charges. Then they told me that they would not kill me if I cooperated with them. The cooperation that they requested was that I answer the questions they asked -- questions such as: "Who was my CIA director in Nicaragua?" "How much did the CIA pay me for working in Managua?" "With

which political party was I affiliated?" "Why didn't I speak out publicly in favor of the Sandinista revolution?" To all of these accusations I responded negatively, because the only activity to which I dedicate myself is the preaching of the Gospel. They then threatened to beat me and told me that they would take me to El Chipote, the State Security jail, where they would keep me imprisoned. Then a very tall State Security officer entered. When he was told that I had refused to cooperate, he put his pistol to my head and said, "With me he won't play around." A State Security officer named Luis Mendez told me that they would give me another opportunity to confess my activities. When I replied that my only activity was preaching the Gospel, the tall man took out his pistol again, put it against my forehead and pulled the trigger. The chamber was empty; that's why I'm able to be with you today.

I was then taken to El Chipote. Until that moment I had not been arrested, but had simply been in the Public Relations Office of State Security, having a "cordial interview," as they define it. I was taken to El Chipote in a jeep, with my face on the floor. When I arrived, I was ordered to look only at the floor and was pushed into a small room two feet by two feet. It was totally closed, without air or light. After approximately four hours, I was taken to another room to be fingerprinted, photographed, measured and weighed. Then they put me back into the small room.

About a half hour later, I was taken to another room, larger, but extremely cold. The first thing the officer told me was that they were going to arrest my wife immediately because I had not been cooperative. They began to question me again. They asked me about my friendship with Alberto Motessi, an international preacher, about my preaching of the Gospel among the youth of Nicaragua, about my opposition to the revolution. I continued to answer that we were not involved in partisan politics.

They took me back to the small room. Before putting me in, they opened the door, and there was a Campus Crusade staff member, with his clothing on. They shut that door and opened another with another staff member, completely naked. They shut that door and opened another with a young woman who is active in our movement, also naked. Then they took out the man who was dressed, and put me in that room. About a half hour later they put me back in the cold room. Within a few minutes I began to hear a woman weeping. The officer who was interrogating me told me that it was the voice of my wife. About 6:30 in the evening they took me out and put me in a jeep, alongside another Campus Crusade staff member. They took us to the Campus Crusade office, where for three hours they went through all of our files. They took all the items owned by Campus Crusade and released us. The others who had been arrested were released at two in the morning.

That same day they had also arrested Rev. Ignacio Hernandez, Director of the Nicaraguan Bible Society; Modesto Alvarez, Director of Child Evangelism Fellowship; Roberto Hernandez and Benedicto Hernandez, both staff members of Campus Crusade; and Maria Teresa Madrigal, of Child Evangelism Fellowship. The next day Boanerges Mendoza, Pastor of the First Central American Church in Managua, was arrested. On November 3 they arrested Juan Simon Videa, Superintendent of the Assemblies of God in Nicaragua.

On November 5, they arrested Felix Rosales, who is President of the National Council of Evangelical Pastors of Nicaragua, and Saturnino Serrato, Vice-Superintendent of the Assemblies of God in Nicaragua. On November 7, they arrested Rev. Gustavo Semilla, who is President of the Council of Pastors in Managua. On the same day, they arrested Rev. Manuel Duarte, who is President of the Council of Pastors in the department of Chontales, east of Managua.

After receiving permission from the government, an evangelistic campaign began on November 5, in the western part of Managua. An hour after the service had begun, a mob arrived. They struck women and children, leaving many injured. These "Divine Mobs" are groups which are directed by Sandinista organizations for the purpose of destroying, ransacking, and beating up religious and other groups whom they consider enemies. There is nothing "divine" about them, but they are definitely mobs. That same night they arrested the preacher, Guillermo Sandoval.

On November 17 they arrested Rev. Guillermo Ayala, the President of the Pentecostal Baptist Church of Managua, at the Sandino International Airport, as he was returning from the United States. On November 18 they detained Rev. Rolando Mena, President of the evangelical radio station, at the airport, as he also was returning from the United States. On November 11 they arrested Boanerges Mendoza again and confiscated his car and all his personal belongings. Based on conversations I have had with those who were arrested, I have concluded that I may have been one of those better treated.

I would like to summarize everything by saying the following: We evangelicals in Nicaragua respect the laws of the Republic. We conform ourselves strictly to what the law says. Never -- neither personally nor as organizations -- have we conspired against the Sandinista government. All the evangelicals of Nicaragua recognize our unavoidable duty to evangelize our country. And no matter what the circumstances, no matter what the threats, no matter what the tortures, no matter what the persecution, we will not stop preaching Jesus Christ to Nicaragua. Our message is a biblical message. It is not designed to create problems for the Sandinista government. We are working so that, no matter what happens, Jesus Christ may be the Lord of Nicaragua.

In the most difficult moments of persecution, it has helped us greatly that the evangelical church of the whole world has said that it is with us. The campaign of the government has caused us many more problems. They have made false accusations against us in order to justify what they have done. But none of the charges they have made are true, because the evangelical Christian leaders who have been arrested are innocent and respect the laws of Nicaragua.

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

Q: Have the evangelical pastors of Nicaragua ever preached against Nicaragua's Patriotic Military Service or counseled young people how to avoid the draft? Have you or has anyone else you know done that?

HASSAN: I have never preached against compulsory military service in Nicaragua, and I dare say that no evangelical leader has preached against compulsory military service. We fully respect the laws of Nicaragua. The discontent felt by Nicaraguan young people with regard to military service cannot be blamed on us, because we have not violated any law. If they had had even one person who could have pointed out that we had preached against military service, certainly they would have presented him. They didn't.

Q: I would like more clarification, because I still don't understand why they are so aggressively persecuting the evangelical church. For example, they accuse you of having CIA contacts or other connections with anti-Sandinistas. It seems to me that they have the impression that you're a serious contra-Sandinista force. I would ask you, is it just that you haven't publicly supported the Sandinistas, or do you think they have other things in mind?

HASSAN: In State Security, as I described earlier, at the end of our conversation, Lt. Luis Mendez told me: "Let's sum up everything. Your problem is that you preach to young people about Jesus Christ. And because of that they distance themselves from Marxism, and this we will never permit here in Nicaragua." On November 11, the newspaper La Prensa of Managua published an interview with Tomas Borge, who said in that interview that the Sandinista revolution was strong militarily, but weak ideologically, and this gave them problems. On the other hand, the religious people were very strong ideologically, and the Sandinistas were going to use all the power they had to overcome that disadvantage. I believe that Comandante Borge answered your question very well in that interview.

Q: Are you afraid of reprisals for what you have said here if you go back to Nicaragua?

HASSAN: We are trying to say with clarity what we have experienced, and we are also trying to say with clarity that no matter what happens, no matter what the situation, we Nicaraguan evangelicals will continue firmly to preach Christ. Our duty to preach Him is unavoidable. And from this podium we are calling upon the Sandinista government to reflect and cease this campaign. We hope that they will do so.

Q: Other religious leaders in Nicaragua, like Fernando Cardenal and CEPAD, seem to be able to get along with the Sandinista government. What's the difference between them and you?

HASSAN: The case of the priest, Fernando Cardenal, can be answered better by the Catholic authorities, because he is under their hierarchy. Yes, there are some evangelicals, like CEPAD, who are not suffering the harassment that we have mentioned. But, in my opinion, that is due to the partisan position that they have taken. We evangelicals have remained firm in absolute fidelity to Jesus Christ.

Q: Do you have a statement that you would like to make to American Protestants who are financially supporting CEPAD and other pro-Sandinista groups?

HASSAN: I would rather make a statement to all American evangelicals. First, I would like to thank them for the solidarity that they have shown with the evangelical church during this time of persecution. Second, I would urge them to weigh carefully the information they receive, because possibly some of them have been misinformed, and on the basis of this misinformation they have sometimes made incorrect decisions.

Q: You said earlier that you were one of the best-treated prisoners. What did you see or hear about others who were treated worse?

HASSAN: Earlier I mentioned the two persons whom I saw in the small rooms completely naked. I was dressed. Just based on that, I was better treated than they were. And many other people, according to what they recounted, were also stripped and harassed. They were stripped and made to walk in front of a row of soldiers, who made lewd jokes about them. Other leaders were stripped and sprayed with a hose and then put in the cold room. Boanerges Mendoza was detained for eleven days, with only one spoonful of beans as his daily food. Those situations were much worse than mine.

Q: What is it that you want the Christians of North America and Europe and other parts of the world to do for the Christians in Nicaragua, aside from pray?

HASSAN: In the first place, we believe that being well informed is extremely important, because then you can pray intelligently. And we think that if they are well informed, they will know how to make decisions which truly support the evangelical church of Nicaragua. And we believe that if those who for some reason have been mistaken get correct information, such as we are giving you today, they will know how to make correct decisions. And God will put in their hearts that which is right.

Q: I would like to ask you, just to get some perspective, to briefly describe government intervention, or lack of it, in your religious activities for the year prior to these events you have described?

HASSAN: In general terms, even before the state of emergency the situation had been very difficult. For example, the evangelical radio station was under complete censorship. There have been prohibitions, such as praying for prisoners. All messages given over the radio had to be approved in advance by the Ministry of Interior. A number of foreign preachers who had come to Nicaragua have been expelled. So the situation has been very difficult.

INSIDE THE SANDINISTA REGIME:
A SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR'S PERSPECTIVE

Central
America

Office of Public Diplomacy for
Latin America and the Caribbean
United States Department of State

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Office of Public Diplomacy for
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CONTENTS

	PAGE
SUMMARY	1
INTRODUCTION	2
BALDIZON'S PERSONAL HISTORY	2
ASSASSINATIONS, 1979-81	4
"SPECIAL MEASURES" -- GOVERNMENT ASSASSINATIONS OF FSLN OPPONENTS, 1982 TO THE PRESENT	7
DECEIVING OF VISITING INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS	13
TIES TO DRUG TRAFFICKING	16
USE OF CRIMINALS	18
THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY	20
TRAINING OF COSTA RICAN GUERRILLA GROUP	23
THE "TURBAS DIVINAS," OR "DIVINE MOBS"	23
INTIMIDATION OF THE CHURCH	25
APPENDICES	28
APPENDIX A, BALDIZON'S IDENTIFICATION	29
APPENDIX B, LETTER FROM MINISTER TOMAS BORGE	30
APPENDIX C, PORTIONS OF ATLANTIC COAST INVESTIGATION	32

SUMMARY

Alvaro Jose BALDIZON Aviles, formerly Chief Investigator of the Special Investigations Commission of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior has provided a wealth of information about the Sandinistas' deliberate attempts to hide the truth about their human rights record. The Special Investigations Commission was created by the Nicaraguan government in late 1982 to conduct internal investigations of reported governmental abuses about which the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and others had made inquiries. In his debriefings by United States Government officials, and during discussions with members of Congress, and human rights groups, Mr. Baldizon has described:

- A. The Nicaraguan government's policy of human rights abuses and cover-ups of those abuses, linking such figures as Interior Minister Tomas Borge and Vice Minister Luis Carrion with the executions of political opponents of the Sandinista regime. How the Nicaraguan government regularly uses murder and torture to control the internal opposition and to confront the armed opposition.
- B. Methods used by the Nicaraguan government to deceive visiting international delegations as to the real objectives of the Sandinista regime.
- C. The involvement of Interior Minister Tomas Borge and others with international drug trafficking.
- D. The Nicaraguan government's employment of criminals in the police.
- E. How the more than 200 Cuban advisers in the Interior Ministry are involved in the day-to-day operation of the Ministry.
- F. The Nicaraguan government's training of foreign guerrillas.
- G. The way the government of Nicaragua uses the "turbas divinas" as shock troops to neutralize opposition gatherings.
- H. How the Nicaraguan government attempts to intimidate the Catholic Church and other religious groups.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1970's, Marxist-Leninists took power in two Caribbean countries, Grenada and Nicaragua. The seventeen and one half tons of documents found in the Grenadian government archives after the landing of the joint East Caribbean-United States forces in October 1983 revealed the glaring difference between the moderate facade the Maurice Bishop government sought to present to the world and the grim reality of what the committed Marxist-Leninists in that government were actually saying and doing. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have been less discreet in public about their commitment to "revolutionary internationalism" and their strong ties to the Soviets and Cubans. But they have successfully hidden from the outside world many of the harsh realities of their internal repression. Nicaraguans who continue to live in Nicaragua cannot speak out while they travel abroad without running the risk of being jailed upon their return. A few former Sandinista officials whose consciences demanded they speak out have been forced to seek asylum outside Nicaragua. One of these Nicaraguans is Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles, a former special investigator in the notorious Ministry of Interior headed by Tomas Borge Martinez. This paper contains information that Baldizon provided during September and October 1985 in interviews with representatives of human rights groups, the press, members of Congress, and representatives of the United States Government.

The information which Baldizon has provided confirms reports by other sources of widespread human rights abuses committed by the Sandinistas. Reports from other Nicaraguan defectors such as Mateo Guerrero, the Executive Director of the GON-sponsored National Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (CNPPDH); Bayardo Jesus Payan Hidalgo, ex-CNPPDH finance officer; and former Nicaraguan State Security officer Miguel Bolanos Hunter, have shown how the Sandinista government has attempted to hide its involvement in human rights abuses and to mislead international public opinion as to the true nature of life in post-revolutionary Nicaragua. Baldizon's story is unique in that he has "inside" information on many specific cases, thanks to his highly sensitive position in the Interior Ministry.

BALDIZON'S PERSONAL HISTORY

On July 1, 1985, Lieutenant Alvaro Jose BALDIZON Aviles of the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry crossed the Honduran border to escape from Nicaragua. Baldizon had been with the Interior Ministry for more than five years and a full member of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) for two years. Baldizon began working with the Sandinistas in early 1979, before the overthrow of Somoza, when he was twenty years old. At that time he was a truck driver and served as a clandestine

courier for the Sandinistas. In 1983, he achieved the status of militant, or full member, in the FSLN. He joined the Sandinista Police in April 1980 and was later named Chief of Police at Station 15 in Ciudad Sandino, a suburb of Managua. Baldizon says that he first joined the Sandinista Police and the Interior Ministry because he had a "romantic belief" that the new Sandinista regime would be much better than the Somoza regime and that civil and human rights would be respected.

In September 1980 Baldizon was sent to Volgograd in the Soviet Union to attend a ten-month course in criminology. Upon his return to Nicaragua in July 1981, he began to work in the Interior Ministry's Department of Economic Investigation. He briefly worked for the Managua Reconstruction Board and in April 1982 he joined the Sandinista Police's office for internal investigations.

In December 1982 Baldizon was named the chief investigator of the Interior Ministry's Special Investigations Commission. The commission was formed to investigate reports that the government of Nicaragua (GON) had begun to receive from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding abuses reportedly committed by government officials. In 1982 the IACHR began sending lists of missing Nicaraguans, with information alleging what the GON had done to them, to the Multi-Lateral Affairs office of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry and requesting a reply to the charges. When replies were not received, the IACHR would send a second request noting that if no reply were received within a given time, the IACHR would assume that the charges against the GON were correct.

As the requests mounted, the Foreign Ministry decided to send them to the Ministry of Interior (MINT) for reply, since MINT was the organization involved in the alleged actions. Baldizon has stated that Interior Minister Tomas Borge was worried that unless explanations and plausible cover stories were provided, the IACHR complaints would discredit the GON with the governments of countries that had supported it. Borge therefore ordered the establishment of the Special Investigations Commission to look into the charges.

Baldizon says that the Special Investigations Commission soon concluded that 90 percent of the IACHR accusations were in fact correct. The Interior Ministry would use the reports from Baldizon's office to later concoct cover stories to explain away abuses committed by GON authorities. Baldizon personally investigated many of the cases and also reviewed the reports of other investigators. His work thus gave him unusual access to highly sensitive information regarding the GON's human rights abuses.

Baldizon realized that his earlier romantic notions about the FSLN had been wrong and decided that he had to leave the

Interior Ministry. Baldizon believed that he had been used by the FSLN to cover up their misdeeds and that he had a moral obligation to expose them. He asked for release from his job in July 1984 but was told that since he possessed such sensitive information he would have to be sent to a military detention camp for at least a year before he could be released so that his information would lose much of its currency and sensitivity. Baldizon quickly withdrew his request, apparently convincing his superiors that he had only wanted to attend the university and that he was still committed to the Revolution. Nevertheless, believing that he was a marked man, and realizing that he might be murdered to ensure his silence, he made plans to flee the country. While in northern Nicaragua on an investigation, Baldizon waited until he was unobserved and then slipped across the border into Honduras. Baldizon had arranged for his brother to get his wife and son out of Nicaragua after his flight. His brother was unsuccessful. Baldizon's wife was arrested after it became known that he had fled. She was held for some weeks and then released and placed under house arrest. His brother was also arrested and is still being held for complicity in treason (charges deriving from Baldizon's defection).

The following examples Baldizon has provided show the nature, range, and, to some extent, the number of human rights abuses committed by the Sandinista government as well as its ties to international drug trafficking and the corruption within the GON.

ASSASSINATIONS 1979-81

Some of the first cases Baldizon's office was called upon to investigate dealt with assassinations reported to have occurred soon after the Sandinistas took power in July 1979. For some time the Nicaraguan government had received inquiries from various human rights organizations regarding these cases but had never given an official response explaining the events.

-- Between July 1979 and March 1980, more than 80 opponents of the new Sandinista regime were captured and killed in the Granada area of Nicaragua under the personal authority of FSLN Comandante Reinerio Ordonez Padilla. When relatives of the missing persons complained to the military Judge Advocate's office in Managua, Ordonez was arrested and taken to Managua. He was never brought to trial, in spite of the extensive evidence against him, and was released 15 days later by order of Captain Montealegre, the Judge Advocate at the time, who followed instructions received from the National Directorate of the FSLN. The FSLN excused Ordonez's actions by saying that he was suffering from psychosis because of his outstanding military performance during the victories at Masaya and Jinotepe during the revolution. Inspectors in Baldizon's office reviewed the Judge Advocate's file on this case in 1983 and found that it contained more than 150 pages of solid

evidence against Ordonez. Furthermore, Ordonez frequently talked about his actions in Granada and said that he had personally killed the people with his automatic rifle. The independent Permanent Commission for Human Rights has also investigated this case and its report verifies much of what Baldizon has reported.

-- In 1980, officers of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) held a meeting to plan the murder of Jorge Salazar, a Nicaraguan businessman who was at that time the leader of the private sector group COSEP. Among those present at the meeting were Comandante Guerrillero Juan Jose Ubeda; Captain Oscar Loza, Chief of Department F-1 (Operations), of the DGSE; Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales, chief of a section of Department F-1; and two members of the patrol and shock force of Department F-1. It was agreed that the DGSE personnel would ambush Salazar and then plant weapons in his vehicle to give the appearance that he had first fired on a DGSE patrol. The operation was carried out on November 17, 1980. The DGSE fired several shots to make it appear that there had been an exchange of fire, and then put several M-16s into Salazar's vehicle. The Sandinistas have publicly admitted to killing Salazar but claim that he had fired on security forces. An ex-official in the Interior Ministry's General Directorate of State Security (DGSE), Miguel Bolanos Hunter, has also provided information regarding the death of Salazar. Bolanos confirms that the Sandinista leadership was involved in the planning of Salazar's death.

-- In 1981, the DGSE, under orders from Borge, prepared a plan to assassinate a group of Nicaraguans who had taken asylum in the Guatemalan Embassy. The asylees were former Nicaraguan National Guard and government personnel who had lived in the embassy since the Sandinista takeover in July 1979, and to whom the Nicaraguan Government had refused to issue safe-conduct papers so that they could leave the country. The DGSE planted a false asylee in the Guatemalan Embassy who said that friends of his, who visited him at the embassy, were in reality counter-revolutionaries preparing an escape plan for him. The false asylee invited the other asylees to join him, and some accepted.

The DGSE plant and the asylees he had tricked left the embassy by climbing a wall. They proceeded to a ranch in the foothills of the mountains near Managua where they were then captured and assassinated by members of Department F-1 under the command of Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales, chief of the department. Castro had planned the operation in conjunction with officers of Department F-2 which monitors diplomatic establishments and personnel.

-- In mid-1981, eight prisoners in the Zona Franca Penitentiary disarmed three prison guards and sparked an uprising in one of the prison buildings. After gunfire was

exchanged between the guards and the prisoners for several hours, Borge talked the prisoners into giving up their weapons and surrendering by promising them their lives would not be endangered. As soon as the prisoners were back in their cells, Borge ordered the execution of the eight who started the riot. Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales of the DGSE took the eight men behind one of the prison blocks and machine gunned them while Borge and Humberto Ortega Saavedra, the Minister of Defense, looked on. Later, the Ministry of Interior published an official communique in which it reported that the prisoners had been killed while fighting during the riot.

The incident described above illustrates a common practice of the Sandinistas in which they arrest a number of people, then after interrogation, frequently involving torture, separate those among the detainees who have the most potential to be leaders and kill them. The remainder, knowing nothing of the fate of the murdered group are sent to prison. If the Sandinistas later receive inquiries from the IACHR about the persons who have disappeared, the government locates those in prison to show that they are still alive. Government officials deny that those captured were killed, or they allege that they were either killed in combat or joined the contras.

-- In December 1981 the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and DGSE forces in Leimus, northern Zelaya, launched an operation against the MISURA Indian organization. They had previously taken seven prisoners and from one, a Sumo Indian who had crossed the Honduran border alone, learned of plans to disarm government guards at the resin processing plant in La Tronquera and along the border. The Sumo Indian also gave them the names of 60 people involved in "counter-revolutionary" activities. The authorities stopped a launch on the Rio Coco which contained 25 people named by the Sumo and took them prisoner. Later, in an action in San Carlos, Rio Coco, two government officials were killed. When the Sandinista authorities in Leimus heard this, nine of the previously captured prisoners were taken out and killed. On December 23, 1981, two prisoners escaped and Gustavo Martinez, Commander of the frontier area, ordered the execution of seven more prisoners. Second Lieutenant Chester Enrique Dicarrio, the DGSE counter-intelligence chief in the area, participated in the assassination along with soldiers from EPS battalion 90-15. The two escapees were caught and killed, and a day or two later six more prisoners were killed by a squad from the 90-15 Battalion, commanded by Second Lieutenant Juan Soza. Eventually the authorities assassinated a total of 30 prisoners.

Lieutenants Soza and Dicarrio and five soldiers were tried by military tribunals, found guilty of murder, and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. They were shortly freed, however, by order of Comandante Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, Chief of Staff of the EPS.

Steadman Fagoth, the leader of MISURA at that time, denounced this incident to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which in turn made inquiries of the Nicaraguan government, and included a list of names of those who were killed. By error, the list included two Miskitos, Asel Mercado and Luis Fajardo, who were alive. The government presented Mercado to a delegation from the IACHR to support its argument that the MISURA complaint was unjustified and simply a propaganda maneuver to denigrate the Nicaraguan government. Baldizon's office reviewed the case in 1984 and found that the MISURA complaint was correct, except for the two names incorrectly included, and obtained a statement from Dicarrio substantiating the charges.

"SPECIAL MEASURES" --GOVERNMENT ASSASSINATIONS OF FSLN OPPONENTS

Immediately after the 1979 takeover and through late 1981 assassinations of political opponents of the Sandinista regime had been carried out in a mostly ad hoc manner as shown in the previous cases. In late 1981 Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge signed a secret order which standardized the application of "special measures," i.e., the illegal execution of political enemies of the Sandinista regime and habitual criminals. There is only one copy of this document which is classified as a "state secret" and is entitled "The Standardization of the Application of Special Measures Against Elements of the Enemy Potential and Criminal Potential Throughout the National Territory." Baldizon reports that this order states that the application of "special measures" may be effected only with the approval of Borge and the First Vice Minister of the Interior, Luis Carrion. Baldizon says that the document ordered that the phrase "special measures" be used in all references to assassinations and that only a select group of long time Sandinista militants would be involved in the executions. He says that only chiefs of general directorates and MINT regional delegates could request the application of special measures and that they only be applied to people whose detention was not public knowledge.

The following are examples of "special measures" carried out by Ministry of Interior forces after the issuing of the order, as well as other reports Baldizon investigated of assassinations and other human rights abuses.

-- In early June 1982, the DGSE office at the Rosita Mine in northern Zelaya, under the command of Captain Evaristo Vasquez, received information on the possible appearance of "counter-revolutionary" groups in the Musawas-Espanolina-Salto Grande area. On July 19, 1982, a vehicle belonging to the Ministry of Interior was ambushed by anti-Sandinista forces at the Salto Grande bridge. Two DGSE officials were killed and one was wounded. The Sandinista People's Army (EPS) and the MINT launched combined operations in the area, which included repressive occupation of the towns, massive arrests of

Miskitos, many of whom were taken to the DGSE operations prisons in Rosita and Puerto Cabezas, assassination of male prisoners, and the raping of women. On July 19, 1982, combined forces under the command of MINT Captain Alvaro Herrera and EPS Lieutenant Erwing Caldera entered the town of Musawas. After taking the town they reportedly assassinated seven prisoners and raped five women.

The Nicaraguan Government repeatedly received queries and complaints about this affair since it had been given considerable publicity in Europe. In May 1984 Baldizon's office was ordered to investigate. The investigator reviewed a copy of a report from Captain Herrera to Jose Gonzales, the MINT delegate in northern Zelaya, in which Herrera said he had ordered the execution of seven prisoners. The investigator also spoke to other personnel who had been at Musawas and who confirmed the report. Since many of the towns in the area were deserted because of government relocation policies for the Miskitos, the investigator could not find any former residents to talk to. Since those officers questioned would not admit to rape, the second complaint could not be proved.

No action was taken when the report was submitted. Furthermore, the complaints had named nine persons as having been killed. The government again found two of them, who had not been at Musawas, and produced their photographs to show that they were alive. The GON used this to cover the murders of the others by saying that they, too, must have left the area.

-- In early July 1982, the MISURA Indian organization launched a military offensive throughout northern Zelaya, with its greatest activity centered in the area around Seven-Bank, where the EPS sustained 25 killed and many wounded. The EPS and the DGSE countered this with military and repressive civil actions in the Miskito Indian communities in the Seven-Bank and Puerto Cabezas areas. During the military actions, large numbers of Miskitos fled from their towns and many of them were captured and then killed by the army; others were interrogated first and then shot. In Kligna Landing, for example, 12 Indians who had taken refuge in the mountains were captured by the army and turned over to the operations section of the DGSE in Puerto Cabezas where they were interrogated and tortured by Second Lieutenant Lobo, and later killed. Of those who stayed in their town, hundreds were taken prisoner.

In December 1982 various foreign governments and international organizations, including the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, repeatedly questioned the Nicaraguan government about the fate of hundreds of missing Indians. The government was pressured to the point that Tomas Borge ordered Baldizon's office to investigate the situation.

The investigators found evidence that the EPS and the DGSE had killed many Indians after they were captured and had taken

hundreds of others prisoners in the towns and removed them from their homes. The investigators also found that the Ministers of Interior and Defense had established a special commission to determine the fate of the Miskito prisoners. The commission's work was coordinated by Comandante Julio Ramos, Chief of Intelligence of the EPS. The other members were EPS Comandante Omar Hallesleven; EPS Sub-Comandante Masis; Sub-Comandante Jose Gonzales, the senior MINT representative in Puerto Cabezas; and MINT Captain Alvaro Herrera. The investigation revealed that the commission ordered the release of 70 prisoners, the transfer of 200 to the penal system for imprisonment, and the execution of more than 100. The investigators also found a copy of an October 1982 report from Sub-Comandante Gonzales to Vice Minister Luis Carrion in which Gonzales reported that 40 Miskitos had been killed in combat, 200 imprisoned and 150 executed by the EPS and DGSE as a result of the commission's decisions. The Miskitos were executed near the Wawa River by troops led by EPS Captain Santana. Lieutenant Jose Dolores Reyes, Second Lieutenant Lobo, and MINT officers Chester Enrique Dicario and Jimmy Wopel, also participated. The investigation report was submitted to Interior Minister Borge June 27, 1983, but he took no further action.

-- In September 1982 the Sandinista Army (EPS) engaged in military operations in the Prinzapolka, Northern Zelaya area to counter an uprising of the Misura Indian organization. The EPS captured Jonathon Cristobal Willies and three other Miskito Indians who were members of MISURA, as they were traveling on the Prinzapolka River in a canoe. The EPS confiscated four Chinese AK-47 rifles and took the four prisoners to Sub-Comandante Santana, EPS Chief of Operations in the area, who then ordered their execution.

As a result of repeated demands for information on the whereabouts of Willies from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the non-governmental Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights, Baldizon's office assigned Raul Castro Gonzales as the investigator for the case. Castro found a report from Santana to Captain Alvaro Herrera, the chief of the Puerto Cabezas office of the DGSE, in which Santana referred to the execution of Willies and three other unnamed Miskitos. Castro also took a declaration confirming this from William Gonzales, the DGSE counter-intelligence officer for the Prinzapolka area who was with Santana at the time, and found a file in the headquarters of Special Region I that listed Willies as having been killed by the EPS on September 11, 1982. Despite the report the ministry took no action against Santana.

-- In early December 1982, officers of the Directorate General of State Security (DGSE) arrested Ramon Heberto Torrentes Molina, a 20-year-old youth, in Chinandega and imprisoned him there in police cells under the jurisdiction of First Lieutenant Donald Escampini. He was arrested because of

allegations that he was involved with recruiting for the armed opposition; had served as a courier; and was an active opponent of the regime. Later, Comandante Guerrillero David Blanco Nunez, the MINT Delegate for Region II, asked Vice Minister Luis Carrion for permission to apply "special measures" (i.e. execution) to Torrentes. Carrion approved the request and Lieutenants Banegas, DGSE operations chief in Region II, and Jose Maria Benavides, DGSE counter-intelligence chief in Chinandega, carried out the sentence in a dry stream bed off the highway between Chinandega and Leon.

On January 2, 1983, after receiving a complaint from the IACHR, Tomas Borge ordered Baldizon's office to investigate Torrentes' death. When Baldizon submitted his report, Borge said that he had ordered the investigation because he forgot that Carrion had approved the use of special measures. The Ministry's official explanation was that Torrentes had been killed "while attempting to escape."

-- In late 1983, a "counterrevolutionary" guerrilla force ambushed a MINT special forces patrol in Jalapa in the northern department of Nueva Segovia killing four of its members. Borge ordered the MINT's special forces to take strong reprisal measures against the peasants in the area. Twelve people were killed as a result of those actions, including an evangelical minister named Alvarenga, in Las Uvas, Jalapa. The MINT forces arrested approximately 50 peasants and took them to the headquarters of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) in Esteli. Ten of the prisoners were separated from the others and later taken to the special forces base on the Chiltepe peninsula near Managua where they were executed by order of Borge and secretly buried. The rest of the prisoners were later released in Esteli and Jalapa where Borge told the public that the missing ten (who had been executed) had been killed in combat. Substantiating evidence was obtained from Sub-Comandante Mayorga, MINT chief of staff in Region I, Comandante Cristian Pichardo, MINT delegate for Region I, and from DGSE Lieutenant Herrera, chief of the DGSE operations department in the region.

-- In February 1983 Paster Cruz Herrera, a Nicaraguan farmer, was arrested by DGSE forces near the town of Pantasma, Jinotega. He was held for three days in Jinotega by order of First Lieutenant Mario Noguera, the DGSE counter intelligence commander there, then transferred to the DGSE Operations Department prison for Region IV in Las Tejas, Matagalpa, and put at the disposal of First Lieutenant Vallecillo, the commander of the prison. After being interrogated and tortured, Cruz was returned to a cell occupied by two other farmers from the Pantasma region who knew him. Those two were later released, but Cruz was executed along with three other prisoners in April, 1983. The execution was ordered by Sub-Comandante Javier Lopez Lowerli, the MINT Delegate in Region VI, and had the approval of Vice Minister Luis Carrion.

Lopez sought approval because he did not have a legal case against Cruz and wanted to apply "special measures." In November 1983 Baldizon investigated this case because of requests for information from various human rights groups. The results of his investigation were submitted to the Minister of Interior in December 1983, but no further action was taken.

-- During 1983 the EPS and DGSE forces carried out a campaign to counter the effects of anti-government guerrilla activities in the departments of Jinotega and Matagalpa. More than 300 farmers suspected of having collaborated with the counter-revolutionaries were executed by DGSE personnel in the Cua, Pantasma, Waslala and Rio Blanco areas. Many family members of the farmers who had been killed reported their family members has having "disappeared" to the non-governmental Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) and to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States which published lists of the names of the people who were missing from the region.

Residents of the two departments continued to complain and manifest their discontent to the government. This, combined with pressure from the CPDH and the IACHR, caused Borge to order an investigation by Baldizon's office. The investigators reported in June 1984 that more than 300 farmers had been executed and that in 80 percent of the cases the execution was proposed by Sub-Comandante Javier Lopez Lowerli, the MINT Delegate in Region VI, who asked for and received permission to apply "special measures" from Vice Minister Luis Carrion. The investigators also found that Comandante Guerrillero Alonzo Porras, the Political Chief of the FSLN in the Region; Javier Carrion, the EPS Commander in Matagalpa; and Wilfredo Barreto, the government delegate in Region VI, were also involved in the executions.

Borge ordered the creation of a special prosecutor's office for Region VI to take legal action to satisfy the complaints. The office, however, only brought charges against EPS Second Lieutenant Rodriguez and three DGSE officers. The three regional chiefs principally responsible for the executions--Lopez, Porras, and Barreto--were merely transferred to other regions. The four charged officers were freed shortly thereafter, and Rodriguez, even though he had received a prison sentence, was sent to study in Bulgaria. The Nicaraguan government continued to take action to maintain control over the region and forced hundreds of rural families to abandon their homes, cattle and cultivated lands in the mountains of Jinotega and move to designated resettlement areas. Although the people in the affected area knew about the assassinations, the killings did not become public knowledge in the rest of Nicaragua because the government censored any publications that might have reported on the slaughter.

-- On July 19, 1983, DGSE officers Guillermo Lugo Marengo and Moises Rivera and First Lieutenant Victor Romero, Chief of the

Regional Special Troops in the area, met in a bar on the outskirts of San Miguelito, Rio San Juan, and planned the capture of Guillermo Lorio and his wife, Jamilett Sequeira. The three officers had received information that Lorio and Sequeira were the principal authors of "counter-revolutionary" campaigns in San Miguelito because they were the coordinators of a religious movement called "Delegates of the Word."

Baldizon received orders on July 25 to investigate the deaths of Lorio, Sequeira, and Juan Luz. Their hastily buried bodies had been found by campesinos who reported this to the authorities in San Miguelito. The investigation had been requested by Sub-Comandante Saul Alvarez, the MINT representative in the region. Baldizon learned that the three MINT officers and a soldier from Lieutenant Romero's command went to the Lorio house at 3 A.M. on July 20, 1983, took the couple prisoner, and began to ransack the house. In the process they disturbed the Lorios' three children who screamed so loudly they woke up the next door neighbor, Luz, who left his house to see what was wrong. The MINT officers picked up Luz, since they did not want a witness, threw him and the Lorios into the back of a Construction Ministry truck they had requisitioned, and took them to an area called Los Pantanos, about five kilometers from San Miguelito. The three officers each tortured and interrogated one prisoner in different parts of the Los Pantanos area. Romero, after torturing Lorio, cut his throat with a bayonet. Rivera did the same to Luz, and Lugo cut Sequeira's throat.

The three officers then left but returned at 7 A.M. to bury the three bodies with tools they obtained from a construction company. When they found Sequeira still alive, on her knees with a crucifix in her hand, trying to pray, Lugo killed her with three shots. They buried the three bodies. During his investigation Baldizon personally dug up the remains of the three. This case has also been described by Humberto Belli, former editorial page writer of "La Prensa," the remaining independent newspaper in Nicaragua, in testimony before the Congressional Task Force on Central America. During his testimony Belli presented a letter signed by the President of the Nicaraguan Council of Bishops, Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, which listed the names of lay Christian leaders who had been killed by the Sandinistas. According to Bishop Vega's letter, the officers had tried to recruit Sequeira as an agent of state security. She refused and several days later, she, her husband, and another man (Luz) were found dead in the San Miguelito area.

-- On March 6, 1984, a company of the Sandinista army, under the command of Second Lieutenant Rios Torres, occupied La Pan, a Miskito Indian community in Northern Zelaya. The troops locked all the men in the church while the women were left outside. The EPS remained in the town for about a month. During that time, the male citizens were kept locked up, some

of the women were manhandled and raped, the houses sacked, and most of the community's cattle slaughtered.

Second Lieutenants Marvin Vallejo, of the Operations Department of the DGSE, and Manuel Salazar, a DGSE counter-intelligence officer, visited La Pan while the EPS was there and reported the circumstances. Second Lieutenant Carlos Espinosa of Baldizon's office was sent to investigate the situation. He found that although Rios Torres, who had personally participated in these acts, and other officers had been arrested as a result of the reports, they had been released by order of Comandante Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, the Chief of Staff of the EPS. They were never punished, and no further action was taken.

-- At the end of 1984, residents of some of the mountain communities of Jinotega and Matagalpa departments reported the existence of clandestine cemeteries to the special prosecutor's office. Investigators sent to the area found these cemeteries in La Sompopera, municipality of El Cua; in the neighborhood of Pantasma; and at a place called Cascajera in the municipality of Rancho Grande. The investigators believed these cemeteries were used to bury some of the victims of "special measures."

-- During testimony October 9, 1985 to the House Subcommittee On Human Rights, Baldizon was asked about human rights abuses reported committed by the armed Nicaraguan opposition, or the "contras." He said that from what he had seen during his work the contras did not have a policy of committing abuses while the Sandinistas did. He said that when contra abuses occurred they appeared to be motivated by revenge. He said that in some instances cases where civilians who were accompanying military convoys were caught in an ambush were reported as abuses. He estimated that for every contra abuse there were ten committed by the government.

DECEIVING OF VISITING INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS

As part of its international political strategy, the Sandinista government seeks to use foreign visitors and religious groups as instruments of support for its public posture that the FSLN and the Nicaraguan government respect religion and human rights. Baldizon said that the GON carefully orchestrates such visits whenever possible in order to obtain the greatest propaganda value. Many of the visiting delegations are organized by Nicaraguan solidarity groups in the United States and Western Europe. These group tours of Nicaragua are often prepared in conjunction with Sandinista organizations to show only what the Sandinistas want to be seen. In many cases the members of such groups are told by the organizers that they have an obligation when they return to their countries to speak out on the "Nicaraguan reality" that they have experienced. In truth what they have experienced and seen is merely a carefully prepared facade which masks the real situation in Nicaragua.

Baldizon explained that when the Nicaraguan government learns that a foreign delegation wants to visit certain areas in the country, MINT officials are sent out to prepare the way. People who appear on MINT's list of "potential enemies" receive visits by the officials and are told to stay away from the visiting delegation. Other "potential enemies" are locked up during the visit as a warning to others of what could happen to them if they do not cooperate.

Security agents pretending to be photographers, journalists, or relatives of people in the region to be visited frequently join the delegations to accompany them on their trips. In this way the MINT can monitor the attitudes of the groups' members, and subtly steer them to particular places or people. They report to the Ministry on the groups' travel itinerary. Using advance notice of the groups' travel plans, Borge sends teams of people to be on the routes used and in the localities to be visited. These are called "casual encounter" teams and when a delegation arrives at a location, MINT personnel, pretending to be local residents, "just happen" to be available to talk with the delegation's members. They describe alleged contra atrocities and the benefits of the Sandinista revolution for Nicaragua's peasants and workers.

During a meeting on October 3, 1985 with representatives of religious and human rights groups, Baldizon was asked for some examples of this type of operation. He cited a trip in 1983 by members of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Nicaragua's Atlantic coast to investigate reported human rights abuses of the Nicaraguan Indian population. Lieutenant Raul Castro from Baldizon's office accompanied the group posing as the nephew of Leonte Herdocia, the president of the FSLN sponsored National Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. In another incident, in October 1984, the Nicaraguan Indian leader Brooklyn Rivera returned to Nicaragua to discuss with the government the possibility of autonomy for the Atlantic coast region. Rivera's group included a representative of Senator Edward Kennedy's staff as well as several other U.S. citizens. A lieutenant from the Puerto Cabezas office of State Security accompanied Rivera's group, posing as a photographer from the FSLN official newspaper "Barricada." During the same meeting Baldizon added that the MINT also maintains dossiers on international media representatives who cover Nicaragua. These files contain whatever biographic material is available on the reporters, copies of articles they have written about Nicaragua and lists of personal habits and vices.

Baldizon says that within the FSLN, Interior Minister Tomas Borge has taken on the responsibility for exploiting religion for propaganda purposes. Borge, a hard-line Marxist, has been studying the Bible because, as he explained to Baldizon and other party members, "There is no more effective way to combat the enemy than with his own weapons."

Baldizon reports that Borge prepares himself for visits from foreign Christian religious organizations or speeches to these groups by studying the Bible and extracting appropriate passages for use in his conversations or addresses. When the foreign visitors have departed he scoffs at them in front of his subordinates in the Interior Ministry, bragging about his ability to manipulate and exploit the "deluded" religious group. Baldizon says that Borge refers to the visiting religious and human rights groups as "temporary allies" and "tontos utiles" (useful fools).

In internal FSLN circles Borge insists he cannot confide in religious persons because they are misguided idealists who have a reactionary nature. Such persons can only be temporary tactical allies of the Revolution. For this reason, Borge said, one must exercise great care with FSLN members who show signs of this type of idealism because such persons are ideologically weak and might one day betray the Revolution.

To impress foreign religious groups that visit Nicaragua, Borge has decorated his Ministry of Interior office with large pictures of poor children and prominently displayed religious objects such as crucifixes, tapestries with religious motifs, a large wooden statue of Christ carved by local artisans, and a Bible. Borge has another office, his favorite, in the Reparto Bello Horizonte where he conducts most ministerial business and where he also lives. This office contains pictures of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Augusto Cesar Sandino and Carlos Fonseca and there are no religious objects to be seen. Copies of the Communist Manifesto, Das Kapital, The State and the Law, and various volumes of Marxist/Leninist philosophy are in evidence. Borge uses this office to receive delegations from socialist countries and for official ministerial functions.

In late May 1985, all personnel from the principal MINT offices were instructed to come to work in civilian clothes the following day and to assemble at the Silvio Mayorga Building (MINT headquarters). There they were told that they were to participate in the closing ceremony of an International Young Baptist Convention of the Baptist Church in Managua, pretending to be Nicaraguan Evangelicals. The ceremony was to be presided over by Borge. At about 6:30 P.M. the ceremony began and, as planned, some 70 percent of those present were military or Ministry of Interior personnel dressed in civilian clothes. In addition to some 600 military/Interior Ministry personnel, there were delegations from the United States, Puerto Rico, and several Latin American countries. The affair was covered by Sandinista television for showing only outside Nicaragua since the local citizenry would have recognized the many MINT employees among the alleged Nicaraguan Baptists.

In January 1985, Tomas Borge ordered Baldizon's office to seek out and provide him with names of persons in dire economic straits or with serious health problems who would then be used

in staged "shows" before visiting foreign political or religious groups. A quota of six such persons was to be furnished every 15 days.

Minister Borge arranged his reception of these unfortunate or needy persons to coincide with the arrival in his office of a foreign delegation or group and ensured that the ministry TV film crew was on hand to record the apparently spontaneous event. As the foreign delegation was ushered in, Borge would be seen engaged in earnest conversation with one of the needy or handicapped persons, promising help that Baldizon says was rarely delivered. Borge would apologize in sanctimonious fashion to the delegation for the delay in his meeting with them and would make much of the burdens placed on him as a result of his responsibilities and dedication to the downtrodden.

In May 1985, such a show was staged for the benefit of a visiting delegation of the West German Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU). In this show, a blind man who had earlier requested an accordion so he could entertain to earn his living, was presented with an instrument. He thereupon entertained the German guests with several numbers. During the planning of this show by the ministry, it was learned that a new accordion could cost over 100,000 cordobas. It was decided to buy a slightly used instrument for 75,000 cordobas and the seller was given only a 15,000 cordoba downpayment. The instrument was to be repossessed from the blind man after his show appearance and returned to the seller.

In another case, Borge was provided with an old man who had been severely crippled some months earlier when struck by a hit-and-run driver who, as it later transpired, was a drunken Cuban adviser. The Sandinista Police covered up for the Cuban and placed the blame for the accident on the old man. The man had, up to this point, received no aid beyond medical attention from Nicaraguan or Cuban authorities and was reduced to begging in order to survive. He and his wife were given food by the nearby Catholic Church. In his staged interview with the invalid in the hearing of a visiting group, Borge emphasized that the man had not been aided by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo but rather by himself, the Minister of Interior. After the ceremony Borge criticized the office for having furnished a person with a background such as the old man's because the fact that a drunken Cuban adviser was responsible for the man's accident might have surfaced in the presence of a foreign delegation and could have caused an awkward situation for Borge and the ministry.

TIES TO DRUG TRAFFICKING

Baldizon's office received a report in mid-1984 linking Interior Minister Borge with cocaine trafficking. Jorge

Avequeira, a Chilean living in Nicaragua, heard at a party at his house, from David Miranda, another Chilean who is a Second Lieutenant in the Nicaraguan police, that Tomas Borge was involved in smuggling cocaine from Colombia to the United States via Nicaragua. Borge's office instructed Baldizon to investigate this as a compromise of a state secret. Baldizon thought that this was a mistake, since he could not believe that the government would be involved in narcotics trafficking, so he asked the chief of his office, Captain Charlotte Baltodano Egner, if it should not be investigated as a slander against the Minister. Baltodano was taken aback and said that the office should not have received the report since the fact that Borge had involved the government in narcotics trafficking was known in the Ministry only to Borge, his assistant, the chiefs of police and state security and to herself. Outside the Ministry it was known only to members of the FSLN's National Directorate. Baltodano reported the exchange she had with Baldizon to Borge who then ordered that Baldizon be given an official explanation of why the ministry was involved in trafficking.

Baltodano told Baldizon that Borge had made contact with the Colombian cocaine dealers through Captain Paul Atha, the director of "H and M Investments," a MINT dependency controlled by Borge, which handles business activities in Nicaragua and abroad in order to obtain U.S. dollars. Baltodano told him that the GON supplies the cocaine traffickers with Aero Commander and Navajo planes and access to the Montelimar Airport as a refueling stop between Colombia and the United States. She said that the Ministry had become involved in drug trafficking in order to obtain money for mounting clandestine operations by the Intelligence and State Security Department outside of Nicaragua.

The office later received an order from the office of the Minister countermanding the instruction to investigate the leak of information, and a few days later Captain Franco Montealegre, Borge's personal assistant, went to Baldizon and said that if he received any further information about cocaine trafficking in the future, it should be passed to the Minister without investigation.

Several months later Baldizon saw a small plane being fired at by the anti-aircraft emplacements around Diriamba, Carazo. Baldizon then went to Borge's office to wait to report the results of the case he had been investigating. Borge, who was in a meeting in his office with MINT Department Chiefs, left immediately for the airport. Baltodano, who accompanied Borge, later told Baldizon that Borge had ordered everyone away from the plane, which had landed at Los Brasiles airport, and put it under custody until he arrived and personally removed several bags of cocaine.

Baldizon says that in 1982 a MINT directive was issued which stated that all cocaine, precious metals, and U.S.

dollars recovered during MINT operations, must be sent to Tomas Borge's office. The proceeds from the sale of these objects were to be used to help finance MINT's international activities. Baldizon says that as a result of this order, there are no longer any trials for possession of cocaine as there is no longer any evidence which can be presented.

USE OF CRIMINALS

Baldizon reports that upon the victory of Sandinista forces in July 1979, the FSLN established the Sandinista Police and incorporated into its ranks numerous former criminals because they had fought with the Sandinistas against the government of Anastasio Somoza. Many were appointed to positions in the Department of Criminal Investigations (DIC) because it was assumed they knew the criminal field better than anyone else. As a result, key positions in the Department are currently occupied by persons who were formerly engaged in the very crimes they are now called on to investigate. Baldizon mentions as examples a former armed robber who works in the robbery section of the DIC and the many drug users and traffickers who are now DIC operations officers.

The presence of this criminal element in the police has had the following effects:

A. Part of the marijuana and other drugs confiscated by these criminals is sold again to enrich them and part is consumed by them.

B. Some of the drugs confiscated by the police are sent to the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) where they are consumed by some of the chiefs or used in operational activities, including being planted on innocent persons whom the DGSE intends to compromise. Confiscated cocaine is sent directly to Borge's office who uses it for commercial purposes.

C. The networks of secret police informants have a dual function: they inform the police about individuals who use or deal in drugs and they resell drugs confiscated by the police. Thus, they have a significant influence on the local drug market, in some cases controlling and managing it in an almost monopolistic fashion.

D. Most of the chiefs of police units have their homes furnished with stolen objects, in contrast to the chiefs of other Ministry of Interior offices, who furnish their homes with items confiscated by the Sandinista government.

Department F-6 (Specialized Techniques) of the Nicaraguan State Security (DGSE) has as its mission the furnishing of technical support for operational activity carried out by other departments of the directorate. Much of its activity consists of surveillance of movements and activities of persons

suspected of opposition to the Sandinista regime. To carry out its mission, Department F-6 makes extensive use of a group of common criminals recruited because of their special technical skills. These include armed robbery, burglary, safecracking, auto theft and the neutralization of watchdogs. Many of the criminals were recruited while in prison.

The criminal group within Department F-6 is used mainly for:

A. Stealing cars, especially taxis, to be used by the DGSE in operations such as the clandestine and forcible detention of suspects. After their operational use, these vehicles are usually painted a different color and are incorporated into the directorate's motor pool or are sometimes cannibalized for parts.

B. Nocturnal clandestine incursions to homes of opponents of the Sandinista regime to plant "evidence" of anti-government activity such as arms, drugs, explosives, etc., or to obtain documents, valuables, etc.

C. Clandestine entries into homes of opponents of the regime to install microphones and/or still or movie cameras.

These criminals are also permitted to operate on their own in their chosen trade with DGSE protection and, if arrested by the police, they are promptly released on the orders of DGSE Chief Lenin Cerna.

Since the second half of 1982, Captain Raul Cordon Morince, the head of the National Penitentiary System (SNP) of the Ministry of Interior has sponsored and presided over widespread corruption and human rights abuses at all levels of the SNP. Cordon has compromised and now dominates the senior officers of the SNP and has thus created a group of persons who fear to speak out or act against his corrupt practices in the SNP. He pursues and entraps those officials who at first are not willing to participate in his illegal or immoral activities. Investigations into this state of affairs were conducted by Baldizon's office. The following specifics concerning Cordon were developed as a result of those investigations.

A. Cordon for himself the considerable funds earned from the agricultural labor or handicraft production of prisoners.

B. He has appropriated for himself and his cronies almost all donations from international institutions which he receives in the name of the SNP. Among such were gifts from OXFAM of Mexico which gave thousands of dollars on several occasions. He rents out large numbers of prisoners to private farmers or to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform to harvest coffee, cotton, and sugar cane and keeps for himself the bulk of the

proceeds paid to him for the use of these prisoners. In 1983 or 1984, a foreign nun who works with the Nicaraguan National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (CNPPDH) gave Cordon a number of television sets and video cassette recorders which she had obtained in Europe for inmates of the SPN. The sets were turned over to Cordon during a special ceremony. When the nun departed, Cordon summoned his subordinates and distributed the items among them, keeping a TV and VCR for himself. Not one item reached the prisoners.

C. He appropriates for his own use or resale the cigarettes and toothpaste contained in individual packages sent to prisoners by the Red Cross. He extracts sexual favors from wives of former National Guard personnel who are incarcerated in the SNP system by offering in exchange visits to the prisoners or their transfer to a less strict facility.

In addition to his own transgressions, Cordon overlooks, condones, and/or covers up misdeeds of his subordinates, thus binding them to him in an enforced loyalty. Some examples of these activities are as follows:

A. He allows the chiefs of prisons to mistreat and torture prisoners. In the Zona Franca prison in Managua, recalcitrant prisoners are put into a small metal enclosure, formerly the enclosed body of a small, non-serviceable truck, which is then left exposed to the sun, resulting in severe dehydration of the occupants. The enclosure is referred to by the prisoners as "El Chupis," (the sucker), the brand name of a popular sherbet.

B. He allows his subordinates to build houses using state materials and prison labor.

C. He allows his subordinates to obtain sexual favors from wives of prisoners by using blackmail or extortion.

The final report on Cordon's activities was never forwarded to the Minister and remains filed at Baldizon's old office because it was quashed by senior ministry officials beholden to Cordon. These same officials had also stopped interim reports on Cordon's actions.

THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY

Through mid-1985 when Baldizon left Nicaragua, the presence of Cuban advisers and instructors at many levels within the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior was pervasive. Baldizon reports that there are Cuban advisers assigned to the Minister and to each of his three vice ministers, one assigned to the chief of the central general staff, one to each of the three chiefs of general directorates, one to each of the 13 chiefs of directorates and 43 at the level of chiefs of department. When developments of interest to the Cubans occur

at the section level, they may insert advisers there as well.

The mission of these Cuban advisers is to:

- A. Furnish substantive advice to the senior ministry personnel.
- B. Implement in Nicaragua the security system and methods employed in Cuba.
- C. Increase the effectiveness of ministerial forces by supporting the ministry's leadership in the planning and execution of combat actions.
- D. Oversee and encourage the ideological development of ministry members along Cuban lines.
- E. Ensure close coordination between the Nicaraguan and Cuban security services.
- F. Prepare war plans and, in the event of hostilities, participate in the Sandinista defense effort.

The Cuban influence on decision making in the ministry is extensive and Cuban advice and observations are treated as though they were orders. The Nicaraguans assume that the Cubans also act as collectors of information on Nicaraguan matters for the Cuban mission in Nicaragua. Cuban instructors are assigned to the schools of the ministry as follows:

	Cuban Instructors
Walter Mendoza Police School	10
German Pomares Infantry School	10
Directorate of Special Operations	10
Franklin Garcia Counter-Intel School	6
Francisco Moreno Cadre School	5
Enciphered Communications School	5
Personal Security School	5
Communications School	2

Cuban advisers are also to be found in the regional offices of the ministry including:

- 1 adviser for each of the ministerial delegates of the six regions and three special zones;
- 1 adviser for each chief of internal order of the six regions.
- 2 advisers for each of the six chiefs of State Security of the six regions and Special Zones I and II (one is a specialist in counter-intelligence, the other in operations);
- 1 instructor attached to the special troops in each of the Regions II, VI, and Special Zone I.

The ministry also has Cuban technicians assigned to it as follows:

- 20 auto mechanics for LADA, ZIL, and UAZ vehicles at the central automotive repair shop;
- 5 armorers at the Department of Armament of the Directorate General of Financial Services;
- 2 technicians in bank security alarm systems;
- 2 dentists, 1 dental technician, 3 doctors and 2 psychologists assigned to the ministry's medical department.

Baldizon also reports that advisers and technicians from other communist countries are also present in the ministry as follows:

- 1 East German adviser in the Political Directorate;
- 1 North Korean adviser in the Directorate of Personnel;
- 1 Bulgarian adviser in the data processing section of the Department of Information and Analysis;
- 5 East German auto mechanics from the IFA plant in the central automotive repair shop;
- 2 Bulgarian fork lift mechanics from the Balkan car plant at the central automotive repair shop;
- 2 Soviet mechanics for LADA, ZIL AND URAL vehicles at the central automotive repair shop;
- 2 Bulgarian telephone technicians in communications;
- 1 East German doctor and 1 East German orthodontist in the medical department.

The massive Cuban presence has caused some dissatisfaction among officials of the ministry. Some 25 percent of them complain vocally, in the presence of colleagues, in disparaging terms about what they refer to as the "Cubanization of the Ministry." They believe the Cubans are trying to impose on Nicaragua a system that is not applicable to the current Nicaraguan reality. The remaining 75 percent of the Nicaraguan officials vary from neutral to enthusiastic about the Cuban presence.

In September 1984, two push-pull airplanes and a rocket-armed helicopter raided a Nicaraguan army base at Santa Clara, Nueva Segovia Province, near the Honduran border. Captain Alberto Valdez Argudin, the Cuban adviser to Baldizon's office, told office head Captain Charlotte Baltodano Egner and other office personnel that three Cubans who were operating an electronic intelligence collection facility there had been killed during the attack.

Sub-Comandante Mayorga, chief of the Directorate of State Security for the first region, later told Baldizon that three

Cuban communications intelligence advisers and a Libyan army officer had been killed during the attack on the Santa Clara base.

In November 1984, the office was told that another Cuban electronic intelligence expert had been killed in the Costa Rican border area by Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary forces.

TRAINING OF COSTA RICAN GUERRILLA GROUP

In March 1983, a group of approximately 45 members of the Costa Rican Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) were training for guerrilla warfare on the property of the African Oil Palm Cultivation Project near El Castillo in southern Nicaragua. Six of the Costa Ricans were lodged in the guest house of the project which they used as a headquarters for their operation. The chief of the Costa Ricans, "Ramiro," was always accompanied by a First Lieutenant of the Nicaraguan Army. A Costa Rican physician was also at the headquarters where she operated a small dispensary. The rest of the Costa Ricans were located about 12 kilometers away on a hill called El Bambu on the San Juan River, in the Costa Rican border area. Their activities were controlled from the headquarters by two-way radio communications.

The Costa Ricans, who explained their presence in El Castillo by claiming to be members of a military reserve battalion comprised of African Palm Project workers, were there for six months. They were then to return to Costa Rica and be replaced by another group for another six months. Some of the troops carried FAL rifles with telescopic sights and were being trained as snipers to kill the San Juan River boatmen who transport and supply the Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista insurgents. The Sandinistas were conducting this training because they reasoned that there are only a limited number of boatmen who know the river well and they would be hard for the anti-Sandinistas to replace. (For more information about Sandinista training of foreign guerrillas see State Department publication "Revolution Beyond Our Borders", September 1985.)

FSLN USE OF THE "TURBAS DIVINAS," OR DIVINE MOBS"

In 1981, Department F-8 (Mass Organizations) of the Nicaraguan State Security (DGSE) began to organize, prepare, and use groups of collaborators to break up or neutralize anti-government demonstrations, including strikes, and to demonstrate in favor of the Sandinista government when appropriate. These groups consist in large measure of toughs and/or persons with criminal records because they are considered to be ideal material for use as civilian shock troops. The groups, referred to as divine mobs (turbas divinas), are organized in the districts of all major Nicaraguan cities and are trained and directed in mob tactics and political indoctrination by those DGSE officers who also

run the local Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS). These mobs constitute a DGSE instrument for violating the rights of Nicaraguan citizens without the overt use of uniformed government security or military personnel, while giving the appearance of spontaneous actions by the masses. Their use is effective in that many opponents of the regime fear being lynched by the divine mobs. Any time the government believes a hostile demonstration is imminent, the DGSE alerts and prepares the mobs.

The first use of these mobs was in mid-1981 when they were employed to neutralize an anti-government demonstration organized by the opposition leader Alfonso Robelo in Nandaime. On that occasion divine mob action consisted of blocking access roads to the city; stoning vehicles carrying demonstrators; beating up demonstrators; painting slogans; and strewing sharpened, tire-puncturing metal devices on roadways to halt vehicular traffic.

In September 1984, shortly before national elections in Nicaragua, an anti-government demonstration was being planned at a political meeting in the offices of the Social Democratic Party in front of the Aguerri Theater. An officer of Department F-8 requested of Captain Charlotte Baltodano Egner, chief of Baldizon's office of investigation, the use of an office to be used as a command post for the divine mobs which, he said, were being activated to stop a mass demonstration of the Democratic Coordinating Board. Baltodano furnished a small office in the People's Office for Complaints of the Ministry of Interior, only two blocks from the offices of the Social Democratic Party. The mobs were to be directed from this office. A small white bus was sent to the office and more than a hundred small flags of the Vatican and the Social Democratic Party were unloaded. The staffs of these flags were about a yard long and consisted of half inch diameter steel reinforcing bars used in concrete construction. The bars were wrapped in paper to conceal their metallic nature. About 90 men dressed in civilian clothes were stationed in the office's parking lot awaiting instructions to go into action with the flags. Their plan was to infiltrate the Social Democrats' demonstration under cover of Vatican and Social Democratic Party flags and then physically assault the real demonstrators, thus disrupting the demonstration. On this occasion, however, the mobs were not used because the government was successful in pressuring the Social Democrats to abandon their plans for a demonstration.

During the first half of 1985, demonstrations against compulsory military service took place in numerous Nicaraguan cities including Concepcion in the Department of Masaya, San Rafael del Sur in Managua, and Nagarote in the Department of Leon. The aroused citizenry erected barricades in the streets and demonstrated against compulsory military service, but the divine mobs were set upon them and broke up the demonstrations by stoning and beating the demonstrators with clubs, threatening them with death, and vandalizing homes or burning vehicles of the participants.

INTIMIDATION OF THE CHURCH

Early in 1982, the sacristan of a small church in a rural area in central Nicaragua became a national figure when he recounted to the news media that the Virgin Mary had appeared to him and told him that peace and brotherhood were needed among Nicaraguans. People from all over the country began to visit the church. This annoyed the leaders of the FSLN and they considered the pilgrimages to be a counter-revolutionary movement prejudicial to the FSLN's Marxist policies. Further they feared the incident would help unify the Church, which they were trying to split. They decided to take action to destroy the sacristan's popularity.

Toward the end of October 1982, Walter Ferretti Fonseca, chief of the General Directorate of the Sandinista Police (DGSP), told several of his officers, including Lieutenant Reinerio Ordonez Padilla and Felix Rios that they were to assist in an operation. The DGSP officers met with two officers of Department F-4, (Ideological Orientation), of State Security (DGSE) and were told that they were to act as though they were a regular police mobile patrol and go that night at 9 P.M. to a designated hotel suite in the hotel Las Mercedes where they would find the door ajar, a table with various bottles of liquor, some marijuana, and two men engaged in a homosexual act at the foot of a statue of the Virgin with several candles lit. The police officers followed their instructions and found the situation exactly as described. They arrested the two men, one of whom appeared to be in a semi-intoxicated state, and took them to a police station where they were met by the two DGSE officers. One of the officers told the police that the intoxicated person was the sacristan, whom they had first drugged and then taken to the hotel where he had been raped by the other man before the lenses of the DGSE's video cameras. The DGSE told the sacristan that they would disclose the affair and expose him to public ridicule if he did not stop making his anti-government public talks. The sacristan pulled back and the affair was never publicized. The faithful still stream to the area, however, and a new church is being built.

In the spring of 1982, Interior Minister Borge, Vice Minister Carrion, and DGSE chief Lenin Cerna formulated a plan to discredit Father Bismark Carballo, the spokesman for the Curia and the director of the Church station, Radio Catolica, by implicating the priest in a sex scandal. Various MINT sections, including F-1 (Operations) headed by Captain Oscar Loza; F-4 (Ideological Orientation) headed by Captain Sam Ki; and F-8 (Mass Organizations) headed by Lieutenant Aguilar; all became involved in the elaborate plot.

The plan was activated when Maritza Castillo Mendieta, an agent in F-4, contacted Carballo and requested spiritual guidance. She told Carballo that she was undergoing a severe

emotional crisis because her husband had left her and her two children, and she claimed that she had attempted suicide. Later in August, after a series of spiritual visits by Carballo, she phoned him, saying that she was despondent and urging him to come to her home to provide counselling. (The home had been confiscated earlier by the government and given to Castillo.)

Shortly after Carballo arrived at Castillo's home, a DGSE agent burst in, striking Carballo on the head and forcing him at gunpoint to disrobe. The DGSE agent then fired shots, signalling other DGSE agents outside dressed as Sandinista Police that the trap had been sprung. (Lenin Cerna had insisted that only DGSE agents be involved in the actual arrest but that they should be disguised as regular policemen in order to conceal the DGSE's connection with the operation.) The "policemen" rushed into the house and took Carballo prisoner. Meanwhile, a "turba" (Sandinista mob) supplied by F-8, a Sandinista television crew and reporters from the Sandinista press who were waiting nearby converged upon the house. The "policemen" then paraded the nude Carballo from the house through the jeering crowds and cameramen to their police car and took him to jail. The Sandinista television stations and newspapers subsequently brandished photographs of the naked priest, alleging that he was involved in an illicit sexual affair.

After the operation Castillo protested vigorously when the government wanted to take her home for use as an official protocol house. Borge satisfied her by giving her a luxury apartment in Managua where she still resides.

Ex-DGSE officer Miguel Bolanos Hunter has provided a similar account of how the Sandinistas arranged this incident in an attempt to discredit Father Carballo and the Catholic Church.

COMMENT: Nicaraguan officials and knowledgeable Nicaraguans from all walks of life are aware of some incidents of repression and abuses committed by Sandinista authorities. Foreigners visiting Nicaragua for a few days, especially if they are part of the "organized tour" groups are presented a totally false picture of the nature of the Sandinista regime. "Shows" are organized for their benefit, with State security agents posing as witnesses. Many visitors are deceived by the Sandinistas' charades.

United States government files contain numerous reports of abuses and incidents such as those described by Alvaro Baldizon. But his position within the Interior Ministry gave him access to extremely sensitive information and details that most other accounts lack. This paper is not an attempt to present an exhaustive account of all of the information which Alvaro Baldizon has provided. Mr. Baldizon has more details on

the incidents which he has described in this paper. This paper has been, rather, an attempt to show the scope and magnitude of the Sandinistas violations of human rights and their attempts to hide their involvement as reported by Mr. Baldizon . Baldizon believes these incidents had to become known so that the world would know of the true nature of the Sandinista regime. When he fled Nicaragua he took with him his identification documents which prove that he is who he says he is and had the job he described, and also a lengthy Interior Ministry investigation file which describes, in the words of Nicaraguan officials who participated, some of the human rights abuses he recounted. He has presented irrefutable proof of a systematic disregard for human rights on the part of the Sandinista regime.

APPENDICES

The following are some of the documents which Mr. Baldizon brought out of Nicaragua. Appendix A consists of copies of his personal identification as an Interior Ministry officer and as a member of the FSLN. Appendix B is a copy (and a translation) of a letter signed by Interior Minister Tomas Borge, asking that all Nicaraguan civilian and military authorities cooperate fully with any request made by Mr. Baldizon.

Appendix C consists of copies (and translations) of a small portion of an internal report prepared by the Special Investigations Commission concerning reported human rights abuses which occurred on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. The report was the only one which Baldizon was able to take with him when he left the country. This report, while neither the final word nor the only evidence, helps substantiate claims that the Sandinista regime has been involved in a concerted campaign of human rights abuses. The investigation dealt with only a portion of the reported human rights cases in the area. The documents included in this appendix include a secret preliminary report on a series of assassinations which occurred in the Atlantic coast village of Leimus in 1981, a confession by a Nicaraguan Army Second Lieutenant in which he admitted that he participated in the executions in Leimus, a secret report from two investigators about the terrorizing of an Indian village in 1984 in which the women were raped while the men were held prisoner in the local church, and the secret final report by the investigator which admits to the application of "special measures" to (i.e. assassinations of) opponents of the Sandinista regime on the Atlantic coast with the knowledge of high ranking members of the Nicaraguan government. Baldizon states that despite its shocking contents this "final report" was, in effect, an internal whitewash which toned down what actually happened and in some cases reported people as being released by GON authorities when in fact they were never seen or heard from again.

APPENDIX A
Baldizon's Identification




FSLN Membership Booklet



Special Police Pass



Interior Ministry Identification



Interior Ministry License
To Bear Arms



State Security Permanent Pass

APPENDIX B
Letter from Tomas Borge

"YEAR OF UNITY AGAINST AGGRESSION"

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

The carrier of this, comrade Second Lieutenant Alvaro Baldizon Aviles, is a member of the Special Investigations Commission of the Ministry of Interior, directly subordinate to the undersigned, who orders that civilian and military authorities present all necessary collaboration that comrade Second Lieutenant Baldizon requests.

Given in the city of Managua on the twenty-eighth day of the month of December 1982.

A FREE FATHERLAND OR DEATH

Commander of the Revolution

(signed)
Tomas Borge
Minister of Interior



MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR

" AÑO DE LA UNIDAD FRENTE A LA AGRESION "

A quien concierne,

El portador de la presente, compañero Sub-Tnte. ALVARO BALDIZON AVILES, es miembro de la Comisión de Investigaciones Especiales del Ministerio del Interior, subordinada directamente al suscrito, por lo que pedimos a las autoridades civiles y militares prestarle toda la colaboración necesaria que el compañero Sub-Tnte. Baldizón solicite.

Dado en la ciudad de Managua, a los veintiocho días del mes de diciembre de mil novecientos ochentidos.

PATRIA LIBRE O MORIR

Comandante de la Revolución

Tomas Borge
TOMAS BORGE
Ministro del Interior



APPENDIX C
Portions of Atlantic Coast Report

"SECRET"

"At 50 Years...Sandino Lives"

To: Second Lieutenant Alvaro Baldizon, Chief of Area I
From: Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzalez, Special Office
Ref: First Special Work Report
Date: February 9, 1984

By this means I am informing you of the results of the investigation that are being carried out in the present case.

INTERVIEW WITH SECOND LIEUTENANT CHESTER ENRIQUE DICARIO

In reference to what occurred in Leimus in December 1981 (Red Christmas), he said the following:

1. That there were only EPS (Sandinista army) troops operating in that community. There were a reserve battalion and two MINT comrades at the border post. The MINT comrades were in charge of the immigration office.
2. In those days the situation was very critical. The counter-revolutionary activity had grown very strong and they had killed two comrades from the armed forces in an ambush.
3. Days earlier the EPS had detained a citizen of Sumo descent who during his interrogations revealed a series of information, among which the names of 60 people who were also involved in counter-revolutionary activities. Twenty five of them were detained.
4. According to comrade Javier Duran, on December 20, 1981 nine of the detainees were tried. (Duran can be found in the Managua immigration office.)
5. During the night of December 23, moments after two of the detainees had escaped, the chief of the border post ordered the trail of seven other counter-revolutionaries in which the declarant directly participated. (report of declarant attached.)
6. You should note that the comrades who participated in the operation were sentenced to prison but were released after six months by order of Comandante Joaquin Cuadra, according to the declarant.

NOTE: It is necessary to continue the investigation with comrades Javier Duran, Gustavo Martinez, ex-border chief (in Leon), and to have interviews with the comrades of the 90-15 reserve battalion.

" A 50 AÑOS.... SANDINO VIVE"

A :CRO SUB-TNTE ALVARO BALDIZON
JEFE DEL AREA UNO.

DE :CRO TNTE RAUL CASTRO GONZALEZ
OFICIAL ESPECIALISTA.

REF :PRIMER INFORME ESPECIAL DE TRABAJO.

FECHA 9/2/84

Por medio de la presente te estoy informando los resultado de las investigaciones que se estan practicando en el presente caso.

ENTREVISTA CON EL CRO SUB-TNTE MASTER ENRIQUE DICARIO

Con relación a los sucesos de Leymus para Diciembre de 1981 (navidad Roja) manifestó lo siguiente:

1. Que en dicha comunidad se encontraban operando solamente cros del EPS, en el puesto fronterizo, un batallón de reserva y dos cros del Ministerio del Interior los cuales se encargaban de la oficina de migración y extranjería.
2. Que en esos días la situación se encontraba muy crítica, la actividad contrarrevolucionaria se había incrementado cada vez mas fuerte y habian matado a dos cros de las Fuerzas armadas en una emboscada.
3. En días anteriores se habia detenido por parte del EPS a un ciudadano de origen Sumo y en los interrogatorios que se le practicaron manifestó una serie de informaciones y entre las cuales los nombres de 60 personas que tambien andaban en actividades contrarrevolucionarias, de los cuales detuvieron a 25 personas.
4. Para fecha del 20 de diciembre del 81 conoce por medio del cro JAVIER DURAN que han sido ajusticiado 9 de los detenidos. (Durán se encuentra en Migración Managua).
5. Para fecha tambien de diciembre exactamente el 23 por la noche, momentos después que se habian escapado dos de los detenidos, por orden del jefe fronterizo se ajustician a 7 CR mas en la que el declarante tiene participación directa. (Informe del declarante adjunto).
6. Es de hacer notar que los cros participantes en el Operativo fueron sancionados a prisión, pero a los seis meses fueron puestos en libertad por el cro Cmdte Juquin Cuadras, versión del declarante.

NOTA: Es necesario continuar las investigaciones con los cros Javier Duran, Gustavo Martines ex-jefe fronterizo (en León), y hacer tambien entrevistas con los cros del batallón de reserva 90-15.

"1984...At 50 Years Sandino...Lives"

To: Capt. Alvaro Herrera
From: Second Lieutenant Chester Enrique Dicario
Ref: Report About What Happened in Leimus in 1981
Date: February 8, 1984

Before all else, receive our customary Sandinista salute, in the moment in which our Revolution is being attacked by counterrevolutionary bands and North American Imperialism.

Continuation of the Information

One month before people began to be detained, a Sumo who had worked on military construction in La Tronquera had been detained. He had a plan to disarm the sentries on guard in La Tronquera. Sixty people had already been detained for counterrevolutionary activities. Fifteen days before what happened in San Carlos, Rio Coco, 25 other people who had wanted to travel up the river had been detained. These people had been rounded up using the information from the Sumo. On December 20, a MINT Jeep arrived which brought comrade Rene Cordobas. They told him that by order of the chief of the frontier post, Comandante Manuel Calderon, he was to take Mercado, who was also a prisoner, with him in the Jeep. Two days after the occurrence in San Carlos, Rio Coco it was confirmed that the two had fought and fallen. When their deaths were confirmed, the first nine people were tried, even though I did not know anything of the case until a comrade told me at 8:00 p.m. On that same day, December 23 at 9 P.M. two prisoners escaped while a soldier named Napoleon was on duty. While the escape was going on, some bursts of fire were heard. When we arrived there they told us two prisoners had escaped and that therefore the chief had given the order to try the other prisoners. They first took out seven and I participated in that one by order of the chief, given that I was under his direction. They were taken to the balsa where we tried them. There were also seven participants who were under the command of a militia member named Mascotita and five members of the 90-15 Battalion. I cannot remember who they were as it was dark. Later they took out the last seven that were under the control of Second Lieutenant Juan Soza Elias and other troops. I do not know who they were and I was no longer taking part.

A : CAPT. LUIRO HERRERA
DE : SUB-TNTE, CHEFE DE SECCION ENRIQUE SINDIC.

REF : INFORME SOBRE SUSESO EN LEINUS DE 1981:
FECHA 8-2-84.

ANTES TODOS RECIBA NUESTRO ACOSTUMBRADO SALUDO SANDINISTA, EN EL MOMENTO EN QUE NUESTRA REVOLUCION ESTA SIENDO AGREDIDA POR BANDAS CONTRAREVOLUCIONARIAS Y EL IMPERIALISMO NORTEAMERICANO.

AGUENTACION LA INFORMACION.

UN MES ANTES QUE SE COMENZO A DETENER A LAS PERSONAS QUE ESTUVO PRESO FUE SACADO INFORMACION DE UN SUMO QUE FUE DETENIDO, ~~DE~~ ESE MISMO, INDIVIDUO TENIA PLAN PARA DESARMAR A LOS SENTINELA QUE ESTABAN DE POSTA ~~EN~~ EN LA TRONQUERA, YA QUE EL TRABAJABA EN LA CONSTRUCCION MILITAR EN LA TRONQUERA, YA DETENIDO EL SUMO MARROJO MAS O MENOS DE (60) PERSONAS, QUE ESTABAN INVUGRADO EN ACTIVIDAD CONTRAREVOLUCIONARIO, DESPUES (15) ^{dias} ANTES QUE SUCEDIA LO SUCESO EN SAN CARLOS RIO COCO, FUERON DETENIDO (25) PERSONAS QUE QUERIAN VIAJAR PARA RIO ARRIBA, QUE ESA PERSONAS ESTABAN CIRCULADO POR LA MISMA INFORMACION LE HABIA DADO EL SUMO. EL 20 DE DICIEMBRE LLEGA UN JEEP DEL MINT DONDE LLEGARON A TRAER AL CRO. RENE CORDOBAS Y A LA VEZ POR HORDEN DEL COMANDANTE MANUEL CALDERON, LE DIJERON AL J' DEL PUESTO FORTERIZO QUE TAMBIEN ENVIEN CON EL JEEP A MERCADO QUE EL TAMBIEN SE ENCONTRABA DETENIDO. CUANDO SUCEDE EL SUCESO EN SAN CARLOS RIO COCO, CUANDO LOS CROS, ROY Y LUCHO QUE SE DAN CUENTA QUE CAEN, DESPUES QUE PASA DOS DIAS SE CONFIRMA LA MUERTE DE ELLOS, SE DAN LOS PRIMEROS NUEVE PERSONAS A JUSTICIARLOS, YA QUE YO NO ME DI CUENTA SOBRE EL CASO ^{HASTA} QUE UN CRO, MID ME CUENTA EL CASO, YA COMO LAS OCHO DE LA NOCHE ME DI CUENTA, EN ESE MISMO DIA A LAS NUEVE DE LA NOCHE EL DIA 23 DE DICIEMBRE SE FUGA DOS REOS YA QUE EN ESE MOMENTO SE EN CONTRABA DE POSTA UN TAL NAPOLION DICHO APELLIDO NO LO SE, AL FUGASE LOS REOS EL POSTA DEJA IR ~~DIAS~~ RAFAGAS, CUANDO NOSOTROS LLEGAMOS DONDE HABIA SUCEDIDO LA ACCION EL POSTA NOS DIJOS QUE SE HABIA FUGADOS DOS REOS EN LA CUAL EL J' DEL PUESTO DIO LA HORDEN QUE LOS JUSTICIARAN A LOS DETENIDOS QUE PRIMEROS SACARON A SIETES EN LA CUAL YO PARTICIPE EN ESE, POR HORDEN DEL J', YA QUE YO ESTABA A MANDO DEL EL, FUERON LLEVADO DONDE ESTABA LA Balsa AHI SE JUSTICIO, LOS PARTICIPANTES TAMBIEM ERAN SIETES CRO QUE IVA A MANDO DEL TAL LLAMADO MILICIANO, MASCOTITA Y CINCO CRO DEL BATALLON 90-15, YA QUE NO LO PUDE RECONOCER PORQUE ERA BIEM HOSCURO. DESPUES SACARON A LOS ULTIMOS SEIS QUE AL MANDO HIVA UN SUB-TNET, LLAMADO JUAN SOZA, ELIAZ Y OTROS CROS DE LA TROPAS YA QUE NO SE QUIENES ERAN LOS DEMAS YA QUE YO NO ME ENCONTRABA EN LO SUCESO.

FRATERNALMENTE.

... "TU EJEMPLO VIVE ENTRE NOSOTROS"

SOMOS INVENCIBLES PORQUE SOMOS SANDINISTAS".

COMANDANTE... CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR... ESTA PRESENTE EN LA DEFENZA Y LA PRODUCCION.....

"SECRET"

To: Second Lieutenant Edgar Sanchez, Chief of Operations,
Special Region 1
From: Second Lieutenant Marvin Vallejos and Second Lieutenant
Manuel Salazar, O.F. C.I.
Ref: Special Report
Date: March 3, 1984

Comrade, receive a fraternal revolutionary salute and by this means I would like to inform you of all that took place during the operation in the community of Lapan and the surrounding areas.

On March 13 of the current year we, Manuel Salazar, O.F. de C.I., Marvin Vallejos, O.F. instructor, and Encarnacion Albares, interpreter, left in the direction of Lapan. While en route we were joined by 20 comrades of the Patriotic Military Service who were taking cold rations to the comrades who were in the place previously mentioned (Lapan). We left at about 2 P.M., beginning to walk toward the community of Sakatpin. We arrived at our objective at 7:30 P.M. Upon arriving in Lapan we found that Second Lieutenant Rios Torres of the Popular Sandinista Army (EPS) had concentrated all of the males of the community in the Catholic Church, while the women were alone in the houses. During the night some of the women were taken advantage of, for example, Mrs. Leonicia Garcia Rosales, wife of the campesino Juan Rosales. We can also mention that the cited comrade, Rios Torres, abused his power by killing a cow which was five months pregnant. The cow, which cost 5000 cordobas, was killed without the authorization of its owner, Mr. Agustin Garcia, brother of Anistiado who had been assassinated by counter-revolutionaries. They also killed a cow which belonged to the sister of the afore mentioned which was worth 3000 cordobas, but they only paid her 1500 cordobas.

A witness told us that the troops placed the women who cooked for them in a house next to the kitchen and told them to take off their under clothes and then they proceeded to make love without their consent. We can also mention the abuse of the truck which belonged to Mr. Marvin Walter. They used the truck to partially destroy the front of the community commissary. We can also add the way in which (Rios Torres) consciously underestimated the second lieutenant who was in charge of the company of troops, sending him to do things which were outside his area of responsibility. Comrade Rios Torres showed various troops of the company how to make love to the campesino women using obscene phrases such as (obscenity deleted). The rest of the troops used phrases like this to keep the girls of the community constantly in fear.

.....(passage deleted)

Observations: We suggest that a constructive criticism be given to the comrade, making him see the errors he committed so we will be able to continue raising the prestige of our armed forces as well as the Revolution. So that they know how to do their jobs without contradictions within these same comrades with which we all fight for the same cause.

SECRETO

A : Sub Tnte Edagar Sabchez
 J. de Opones Reg Esp 1

DE : Sub Tnte Marvin Vallejos L. y Sub Tnte Manuel Salazar O.F. C.I.
 O.F. Instructor.

MEF : Informe Especial

FECHA : 20-3-84.

Cro se iba un fraternal "aludo" "evolucionario por este medio tengo a bien informarle todos los pormenores que se dieron durante el Operativo que se dio en la Comunidad de Lapan y zonas aledañas.

El día Trece de marzo del corriente año salimos en direccion a Lapan los siguientes Cros Manuel Salazar O.F. de C.I. Marvin Vallejos O.F. instructor y Encarnacion Albarez interprete en el trallecto del camino se nos agregaron veinte Cros del E.M.P. los cuales llevan la mision de de entregar raciones frias a los Compañeros que se encuentran ubicados en la comunidad antes mencionada, Salimos alrededor de las Dos de la tarde Empesando a caminar desde la Comunidad de Sukatpin, llegando hasta nuestro Objetivo a las Ciete y Media de la Noche, al llegar a la Comunidad de Lapa nos encontramos con la siguiente situacion que el Sub Tnte Rios Torres del E.P.S. tenia reconcentrado a todos los Varones de la Comunidad en la Iglesia Catolica mientras que en las casas, quedaban las Mujeres Solas aprovechandose de esta circunstancia para en algunas ocasiones aprovecharse de ellas, en horas de la Noche.

Asi tambien podriamos mencionar el de la Señora Leoncia Garcia Regales esposa del campesino Juan Regales, asi tambien podriamos mencionar que el Citado Compañero Rios Torres Busca de su poder al matar una Vaca Carpada con cinco meses, Costando la Vaca \$5000 Cordobas Sin Autorizacion del Dueño, el Señor Agustin Garcia hermano del Anistiado Asesinado por la C... Molinas Garcia, y una casa Propiedad de la Hermana del Mismo valorada en \$3000 Cordobas, Remunerando Solamente \$1500 Cordobas, ademas un Colaborador nos manifestó que a las Campesinas que cocinaban a la Tropa las mataban en una casa Contigua a la Cocina y les decia que se bajaran el alson y procedia hacer el Amor sin consentimiento, Tambien podemos mencionar los Abusos sobre el Camion del Señor Marvin Walter, con el Cual destrulló Parcialmente el frente del Comisariato de la Comunidad podemos agregar que demanera Conciente Sub "stimo" al Cro Sub Tnte J. de Compania tomando sus atribuciones y haciendose cargo de la Tropa, mandando al Cro antes Señalado a Operativos que realmente estaban fuera de sus funciones el Cro Rios manifestó delante de varios Compañeros de la Tropa como hacia el Amor con las Campesinas utilizando frases buenas como la "Leoncia chupa bien el Pene" lo cual comulleba a que el resto de los Compañeros constantemente mantenian acosadas a las muchachas del pueblo.

Por otro lado hacerea del Trabajo especifico de Operaciones al llegar el detenido Bernarde Paskier lo tenian con demasiada confianza andandose este escoltado por un Soldado escuchando las conversaciones y en algunos casos hasta mantenerlo cerca de la Radio de Comunicaciones al momento de llegar nos reunimos con el Cro Rios y los Miembros de la Seguridad del Estado para pedir Referencia del "se" y poder empesarlo a trabajar con su debida Instruccion como resultados del Interrogatorio se Obtubo que el 15-3-84 se recuperó un Busca que tenia escondido el "se" antes mencionada como un E.P.O. 7 con 4 prolectiles con sus cargas impulsoras y un A.K.A. chino con un Cargador y 7 cartuchos de municion Como resultado el Cro Rios decide poner en manos del E.P.S. custodia para el detenido y perjudico en la continuidad del trabajo de Instruccion, lo cual no se cumplio en su totalidad, Por otro lado segun manifestaciones del detenido al momento de su captura fue golpeado por un Bate sin llegar al extremo lla al benirnos el detenido fue conducido por los Compañeros de Operaciones hasta la comunidad de Sukatpin, al momento de llegar a la comunidad fue que armamos un momento, nos Arrestramos a los compañeros de la Seguridad el Detenido.... delante de toda la Tropa y Cibilis que nos acompañaban haciendo alarde y abusos de Anterida manifestando que el Abia Capturado al detenido y que el tenia que llevarlo hasta la Ciudad de Puerto Cabezas a sus mandos superiores, junto con las armas que se recuperaron ordeno a dos Soldados que se le llevaran donde el (Rios) estuviera nos lo quito y se lo llevo Como resultados tubimos que proceder a no seguirle brindando Informacion-


SECRETO


ya que cada vez que lo hacemos en un momento algunos de los Comunitarios-
conocia de la Misma, caso concreto podemos señalar cuando estabamos pidiendo,
Autorizacion al Mando de dejar 30 Compañeros Emboscados en los Alrededores
de Tapan, antes de recibir la Respuesta el campesino Julio Españales
lo sabia

Observaciones : Sugerimos que al Compañero se le aga una Critica Constructiva
haciendole ver en las fallas que cometic para poder seguir elephando -
Nuestro Prestigio que tienen Nuestras Fuerzas Armadas asi como los evolucionarios
Consecuente lo aben desempeñar sin que ayga Contradicciones dentro de los Mismos
Compañeros los cuales todos luchamos por la misma Causa.

Confeccionados	:	4
Ejemplar 1	:	Sub Tnte Edgar Sanchez
Ejemplar 2	:	Archivo.
Ejemplar 3	:	Tnte Rafael Soza.
Ejemplar 4	:	C.I.M.
R.D. I.	:	134-0
R.S.	:	161-P
Ejec y Meca	:	M.V.L.

Fecha ; 20-3-84
Sin mas a que tener que hacer Referencia
Nos despedimos siempre Preterno


Cro Sub Tnte Manuel Salazar
O.F. C.I.


Sub Tnte Marvin Vallejos
O.F. Operaciones
Reg Esp 1

"SECRET"

"At 50 Years...Sandino Lives"

To: Capt. Charlotte Baltodano, Chief of Special Investigations
From: Lt. Raul Castro Gonzalez, Official Investigator
Ref: Final Report
Date: April 30, 1984

By this means I am informing you of the final results of the current case.

MOTIVES FOR THE INVESTIGATION

This investigation was made with the object of clarifying a series of cases which had been denounced since 1982 and to which there had not been an organized and registered response.

I say not organized or registered given that in some cases a general response had been given to this problem, but only as if these responses were for international organizations and not for internal use.

Make note that many of these cases were reviewed on various opportunities by national and international organizations.

All of the cases came to our office of investigation by way of the legal adviser of the Interior Ministry, the National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and in a minimal part from the office of First Vice Minister of Interior Comandante Carrion.

Also make note that both the legal adviser as well as the CNPPDH sent us the package to investigate in such a way as to make it practically impossible to give a satisfactory response to them.

1. Lists of persons that were reported by the Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH) as missing. These do not appear in the control books of prisoners detained in State Security operations in Puerto Cabezas. This list was given to the CPDH by the Moravian Church.

- Ignacio Martinez Teofilo
- Alvina Vargas
- Anibal Mac-lean
- Salitan Pasquier
- Harold Warman
- Paul Teylo Jr.
- Pinley Armstrong
- Plutarico Ronas
- Gabriel Anderson
- Gregorio Joel Alfius
- Jose Salvador

- Andres Soza
- Emiterio Dixon
- Harold Jerry
- Jose Michelle
- Electerio Picktan

2. List of persons who were reported missing by the CPDH. They do not appear in the prisoner control books of State Security or in any other registry.

- Harold Davis
- Ambrosio Thompson Bigman
- Unecio Usyan Amadias
- Mostemos Bentan Daysi
- Leytran Teofilo Humberto
- Ricardo Zamora Warman
- Alberto Zamora Warman
- Justiniano Natialian
- Carlos Amadias Williams
- Manuel Thompson Clark
- Alfonso Flores Frank

NOTE: I must note that there exists a list of counter-revolutionaries with whom special measures were taken with the knowledge of the superior officers. The list, which was prepared in Special Region 1, is in Comandante Luis Carrion's office.

3. Lists of persons who were detained in State Security's jails and who were freed. Of these, the CPDH and the Moravian Church have registered accusations and said that they were detained by State Security in different communities.

NAME	WHO DETAINED	DATE FREED
Agustin Zamora Zamora Reyes Agustin	EPS 7-14-82	8-2-82
Nicolas Zamora Zamora Nicolas Nicolas	EPS 7-20-82	8-12-82
Rene Arthurs McDonald	SM *	
Candido Urbina Urbina German Candido	7-10-82	7-18-82
Alfonso Wilson Teofilo Wilson Barberino Teofilo	EPS 10-10-82	11-28-82
Vernon Webster Silvano Webster Sivano Bernat	EPS 7-9-82	7-20-82

* SM refers to "special measures."

Cipriano Omier Prado Omier Prado Cipriano	EPS 10-6-82	12-1-82
Carlos Hama Berry Carlos Chul Berry	DGSE 6-26-82	7-20-82
Jose Saiman Tacio Saimon Tacio Jose	EPS 7-11-82	7-20-82
Antonio Manzanares Lackwood Manzanares Lagos Antonio	EPS 7-6-82	7-20-82
Feliciano Arthur Lopez Artola Lopez Feliciano	EPS 8-12-82	NPS 11-20-82
Lorenzo Pasquier Pasquier Renaldo Juan L.	EPS 9-15-82	7-28-82
Merando Zeledon Lackwood Lackwood A. Zeledon	3-18-82	4-30-82
Napoleon Joel Joel Francis Zapoleon	CI 6-22-82	12-1-82
Justo Herbacio Lampson	EPS 9-15-82	21-1-82
William Lopez Lopez Samuel William	2-1-83	3-5-83
Agapito Almanza Almanza Jose Agapito	EPS 7-21-82	7-31-82
Rosa McWilliam William Rosa Mac	EPS 7-12-82	NPS 9-25-82
Nicolas Hernandez Hernandez Salvador Nicolas	EPS 1-12-82	NPS 9-25-82
Guadalupe Romero Romero Lazman Gaudalupe	EPS 10-4-82	NPS 11-27-82
Daniel Lopez Daniel Lopez Colomba	EPS 7-21-82	NPS 9-25-82
Celsitino Armstrong Anstran Jacobi Celstino	EPS 7-21-82	NPS 9-25-82
Concepcion Rosales Rosales Plucha Concepcion	EPS 7-13-82	NPS 9-25-82
Bernardo Martinez David	SM-EPS (Masis)	
Alberto Flores Frank	SM-EPS (Masis)	

Delmira Blanco de Suares
Delmira Blandon de Suares
Wife of Benigno Suares (Ex-Mesta judge) who was killed in 1978 by the FSLN for being responsible for the deaths of many comrades. Currently Delmira is with her sons in the counter-revolution where she works in supply. She was seen on June 19 or 20 by an FSLN militant named Ambrocio Blandon.

Janatan Cristobal Willies SM-EPS 9-11-82 and three other counter-revolutionaries.

Tomas Pinnfer Rechinal SM Counter-revolutionary collaborator. This measure was taken after he misinformed the EPS.

Bernard How Jacube SM For the above reason.

Julio William Godoy SM (commission)

Askin Reginal Francis DGSE 7-3-82 8-6-82
His family members, in a sworn statement in Jan. 1984, said they had been told that he had been freed, but they have never seen him.

4. List of persons from Musawas who were supposedly shot behind the community's church. Also a list of women reportedly raped. These acts occurred July 29, 1982.

This denouncement was publicized in various European countries by the Council of Indian Elders of Nicaragua.

At 5:30 A.M., June 19, 1982, the chief of counter intelligence of Bonanza received information that a counter-revolutionary group had kidnapped a citizen from Salto Grande (not far from Musawas). He therefore traveled with three other comrades to that community to verify the information.

They were ambushed at the Salto Grande bridge. Two of the counter intelligence members were killed (Julio Down and Ilario Blandon) and one was wounded (Marvin Castro).

The next day a platoon of reservists went there but had no contact with the enemy.

Make note of an important fact, that on two occasions the community of Musawas had been evacuated by the counter-revolutionaries.

One month after the ambush there was a new attack on Salto Grande by the counter-revolutionaries, resulting in the deaths of seven militia members and the case of comrade Brenda.

On September 27, 1982 EPS troops created a sub-sector with its troops in Musaguas. It is known that on entering there the troops had some small combats.

State Security in Bonanza did not know that there were counter-revolutionaries there at that time, and also knows nothing of the shootings and rapings of the population.

LIST:

	Reported	Shot
Jorge Anastasio	"	"
Laurencio Anastasio	"	"
Arturo Hernandez	"	"
Antonio Indalecio	"	"
Emilda Ricardo	"	"
Julio Huete	"	"
Mauro Simon	"	"
Anselmo Lopez	"	"

With this case the following is known: that his true name is Anselmo Gilberto Lopez and he was kidnapped by a counter-revolutionary band together with his brother Mario Gilberto Lopez, his wife, and a daughter. They were taken to the Tapalwas camp in Honduras. Make note that this family escaped from the camp and turned itself in at the Espanolina camp on October 14, 1983.

Names of women reported raped.

Aquelina Robin
Virginia Benajamin
Mařia Hernandez
Casilda Lopez
Lodena Lopez

With this case there is the problem that we cannot develop the information given that there are no more civilian inhabitants of the village since they were totally evacuated. I also believe that we cannot confirm anything regarding the aforementioned incidents because the facts leave doubt as to the results of the investigation in this specific case. The only source we had were the comrades who said they did not know exact dates or said that they did not know anything or at least they claimed they did not.

On the other hand, I believe that it is convenient that you know while you read the following that this should not be interpreted as constantly committed errors or that it confirms the accusations which we have investigated, but rather that the possibility remains that in other cases, abuses have been committed. The concrete case is that of EPS Second Lieutenant Rios Torres who on March 13 sexually abused the women in the town of Lapan, besides committing other abuses of the belongings of the community.

(see the information in the secret document)

NOTE: Rios Torres was demoted and sent to the military tribunal.

5. The Cases of Kligni Landing

There is the denouncement about Miskitos reportedly captured by the DGSE in this village. The chief of counter intelligence, Cesar Pais, affirms that he assured people that those whom they were looking for were dead, without giving them

any sort of explanation. He said this in the presence of Comandante William Ramirez.

In the interviews and investigations the Special Investigations Office did it was found that at 10 A.M. on December 29, 1983, Comandante Ramirez called Lieutenant Cesar Pais to the regional headquarters of the FSLN where FSLN zonal member Oscar Hodgson was.

When Pais arrived at the headquarters, the Comandante [said] that the women who were there were looking for family members who could not be found anywhere. He asked that if Pais knew anything about them, he should tell the family members the truth.

Comrade Pais said that the DGSE had not detained anyone in Kligni Landing and that the information he had, had been given to him by Sub-Comandante Santana. He said that on that date, in that place, a group of counter-revolutionaries had been exterminated, those who had escaped from Seven Bank. He said that from them they had captured military supplies such as an RPG-7, home made weapons, canteens, and bayonets. He said that some of the arms could not be recovered because they been lost in the river when they had tried to escape.

LIST:

Larry Wellington August (Counter-revolutionary chief)
Ricardo Estriano Chico
Neman Wellington August
Emilio Wellington August
Alberto Wellington August
Martin Francis Wuerman
Milton Hodgson Wilson
Maikel Amadias William
Roberto Alfred Josepa
Ricardo Zamora Waman
Alberto Zamora Waman
Rodriguez Garth Wilfredo

There are two versions in this case:

-In the registry control of State Security prisoners they appear as being captured by the EPS on July 10, 1982 and freed by the operations chief of the DGSE on July 29, 1982.

-In the recent declaration given to the Permanent Commission for Human Rights, the family members said that they were notified by comrade Cesar Pais that their relatives were dead.

Note the contradiction between the registry books of prisoners and Pais' version.

6. WHAT HAPPENED IN LEIMUS

An allegation was made by the Inter American Commission for Human Rights about reported testimony gathered by this organization from the refugees Leonel Martinez and Luis

Fajardo, in Mocoron, Honduras. The same was denounced by the counter-revolutionary Steadman Fagoth and MISURA. Note that with these three allegations there are certain coincidences in the names but there are differences in the abuses reportedly committed. In the denouncement these acts can be reduced to reported captures, the version given by MISURA, shootings as reported by the IAHRC, and the buried alive version.

The following was discovered during the investigations of the Special Investigation Office:

1. What happened in Leimus during December 1981 took place during the counter-revolutionary offense known as "Red Christmas." In those days in that village, the military situation was very delicate given that counter-revolutionary activities had increased in the area and there had already been several EPS troops killed in ambushes.

2. At the end of November the EPS detained a Sumo counter-revolutionary who identified during his interrogations 60 people whom he said were also with the counter-revolution. Twenty five of them were later arrested.

3. It was also discovered that the troops who were there were from the EPS and the 90-15 reserve battalion. Two comrades from the Interior Ministry, who were in charge of the border immigration post, were also there.

4. On December 20, Second Lieutenant Chester Henrique Dicarío found out from Javier Duran (both were in charge of immigration) that Duran had participated in the "trying" of nine prisoners.

5. In the early hours of the 23rd, after the reported escape of two prisoners, the border chief ordered the "trail" of seven other counter-revolutionaries who were prisoners. Later the same night, six other prisoners were "tried." (See the attached report.)

6. It must be pointed out that the comrades involved in these acts were judged by the military tribunal, the EPS as well as the MINT members, but six months after being arrested they were freed.

NOTE: This case has been seen at various times, including by international organizations. When a human rights commission from the OAS visited Special Region 1, it saw this case and seven people were presented who had been reported as killed.

LIST:

NAMES	VERSION	ACCUSERS
Julio Henley	Buried alive	IACHR
Sergio Ingranm	"	"
Simonet Ingranm	"	"
Loren Ingranm	"	"
Luis Fajardo	"	IACHR
This is one who reportedly gave the previous testimony, showing the intention of creating harm, when someone listed as "buried alive" is their own source.		
Asel Mercado	Captured	"
	Buried alive	Fagoth
	Shot	MISURA
It was shown that this one currently works for CEPAD and is in Puerto Cabezas.		
Celso Flores	Captured	IACHR
	Shot	Fagoth
	Buried alive	MISURA
Justo Martinez	Buried alive	MISURA
Juan Poveda	"	"
Jose Lin Mercado	"	"
Carlos Perez	"	"
Victor Perez	"	"
Simon Castro	"	"
Rogelio Castro	"	"
Mayra Lacayo	Captured	MISURA
	Buried alive	Fagoth
Cristina Lacayo	"	"
Efrain Poveda	"	"
Gomez Rocio	"	"
Simpar Alargon	Shot	IACHR
Ponier Escobar	"	"
Natalio Jose	"	"
Napoleon Wilson	"	"
Gerado Collins	"	"
Atil Carlos	"	"
Leyman Frederick	"	"
Rogers Piteurs	"	"
Eugenio Morales	"	"
Esteban Antonio	"	"
Ricardo Mercado	"	"
Nando Mora	"	"
Ramiro Donacio	"	"
Norman Castro	Captured	MISURA
	Buried alive	Fagoth

CONCLUSIONS:

1. This situation has created a national and international political problem. Because of the war situation in which that region lives, some drastic but necessary measures have been taken. However, this problem has come about because of many abuses committed by EPS comrades with low political and ideological levels, as shown by the case of Lapan. It also shows that this erroneous behavior reflects the lack of attention by the middle level supervisors.

2. Generally, it is the members of the EPS who have caused discontent and problems with the civilian population due to their bad treatment and abuses.

3. A special political program, directed at the heads of EPS operations is needed, which will show how the problems they cause reflect on the Revolution.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Since this theme has been the focus of counter-revolutionary attacks from the ideological point of view, using the Nicaraguan Council of Elders as the means of attack, it would be worthwhile to develop a parallel revolutionary organization which could also work on the national and international levels about the missing and kidnapped. This would also serve to pressure the Moravian Church to involve them directly with the problem.

2. A special political program, directed at the heads of EPS operations is recommended, which will show how the problems they cause reflect on the Revolution.

3. It is necessary to recommend that the military tribunal in Special Region 1 be more drastic with the military comrades who commit crimes, given that this is another arm which should be used to overcome the current problem.

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

1. Second Lieutenant Jose Gonzalez
2. Captain Evaristo Vasquez
3. Captain Alvaro Herrera
4. Lieutenant Otilio Duarte
5. Lieutenant Moises Herrera
6. Lieutenant Cesar Pais
7. Lieutenant Dimas Vargas
8. Lieutenant Hodgson
9. Second Lieutenant Octavio Rocha
10. Chester Enrique Dicario
11. Lieutenant Jose Dolores Reyes
12. Second Lieutenant Edgar Sanchez Aguilar

" A 50 ANOS ... SANDINO VIVE"

A :CRA CAPT CHARLOTTE BALTODANO
JEFE DE LA SEI.
DE :CRO Tnte RAUL CASTRO GONZALEZ
OFICIAL INVEST.
REF :INFORME CONCLUSIVO.
FECHA :30/4/84

Cra por medio de la presente le estoy informando los resultados conclusivos en el presente caso.

MOTIVOS DE LA INVESTIGACION

La presente investigación se hace con el objetivo de aclarar una serie de casos que venían siendo denunciados desde el año 82 y a los cuales no se les había dado una respuesta ordenada y registrada.

Se dice no ordenada ni registrada dado que en alguna medida se le había dado respuesta de manera general a este problema, pero como se estas respuestas fueran sólo para organismos internacionales y no a lo interno.

Notándose por lo tanto en esta situación que muchos de estos casos fueron revisados en varias oportunidades tanto por organismos nacionales como internacionales.

Todos estos casos llegan a nuestras oficinas de investigación por via de Asesoría legán del Ministerio de Interior, la Comisión Nacional de Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos, y en una mínima parte de la oficina del Primer Vice-ministro del Interior CMDTE Carrión.

Es de hacer notar que tanto Asesoría Legal como la CNPPDH nos pasaron el paquete a investigar dado que por sus características de trabajo les fue practicamente imposible darles una respuesta satisfactoria a los mismos.

1. Listas de personas que fueron reportadas por la Comisión Permanente de los Derechos Humanos CPDH como no localizados y estas no aparecen en los libros de control de detenidos en operaciones de la Seguridad del Estado de Puerto Cabezas.

El presente listado fue suministrado a la CPDH por la Iglecía Morava.

- Ignacio Martínez Teófilo.
- Alvina Vargas.
- Anibal Mac-lean.
- Salitan Pasquier.
- Harold Warman.
- Paúl Teylo JR.

- Pinley Amstromg.
- Plutarío Ronas.
- Gabriel Anderson.
- Gregorio Joel Alfius.
- José Salvador.
- ~~Andres~~ Soza. *v. Andino*
- Emitterio Dixon. *v.*
- Harold Jerry. *v.*
- Jose Michelle. *v.*
- Electerio Picktan. *v.*

2. Listado de personas que fueron reportados por la CPDH como no localizados, y los cuales no aparecen en los libros de control de detenidos de la Seguridad del estado y tampoco en ningún otro tipo de registro.

- + Harold Davis. *v.*
- + Ambrosio Thompson Bigman. *v.*
- + Unecio Usyan Amadias. *v.*
- + ~~Mo~~stemos Bentan Daysi. *v.*
- + Leytran Teófilo Humberto. *v.*
- + Ricardo Zamora Warman. *v.*
- + Alberto Zamora Warman. *v.*
- Justiniano Natialian. *v.*
- + Carlos Amadias Wuilliams. *v.*
- Manuel Thompson Glak. *v.*
- Alfonso Flores Frank. *v.*

NOTA: Hay que señalar que existe un listado de contrarrevolucionarios con los cuales se tomó medida especial y es del conocimiento de los mandos superiores.

En oficina del Cmdte de la Revl Luis Carrión existe ese informe el cual fue elaborado por la Reg Especial Uno.

3. Listados de personas que estuvieron detenidas en las cárceles de Operaciones de la Seguridad del estado y fueron puestos en libertad.

De estos la CPDH y la Iglesia Morava pone denuncia y los califica como no localizados y que fueron detenidos por la SE en diferentes comunidades,

NOMBRE	ORGANO Q'DETUVO	FECHA LIBT.
1. Agustin Zamora Zamora Reyes Agustin <i>X</i>	EPS 14/7/82	2/8/82
2. Nicolas Zamora Zamora Nicolas Nicolas <i>v.</i>	EPS 20/7/82	12/8/82
3. Rene Arthurs Mc-Donald <i>v.</i>	ME	
4. Candido Urbina. Urbina German Candido	10/7/82	18/7/82
5. Alfonso Wilson Teófilo. Wuilson Barberino Teófilo	EPS 10/10/82	SPN 28/11/82

6. Vernon Webster Silvano. Webster Silvano Bernat.	EPS 9/7/82	20/7/82
7. Cipriano Omier Prado Omier Prado Cipriano	EPS 6/10/82	1/12/82
8. Carlos Hama Berry Carlos Chul Berry	SE 26/6/82	20/7/82
9. Jose Saiman Tacio Saimon Tacio Jose	EPS 11/7/82	20/7/82
10. Antonio Manzanares Lackwood Manzanares Lagos Antonio	EPS 6/7/82	20/7/82
11. Feliciano Arthurs López Artola López Feliciano	EPS 12/8/82	SPN 20/1/82
12. Lorenzo Pasquier Pasquier Renaldo Juan L	EPS 10/7/82	28/7/82
13. Merando Zeledón Lackwood Lackwood A Zeledón	18/3/83	30/4/82
14. Napoleón Joel Joel Francis Napoleón	CI 22/6/82	1/12/82
15. Justo Herbacio Lampson Justo Herbacio Lampson	EPS 15/9/82	1/12/82
16. William López López Samuel William	1/2/83	5/3/83
17. Agapito Almanza Almanza Jose Agapito	EPS 21/7/82	31/7/82
18. Rosa Mac-William William Rosa Mac	EPS 12/7/82	SPN 25/9/82
19. Nicolas Hernández Hernández Salvador Nicolas	EPS 21/1/82	SPN 25/9/82
20. Guadalupe Romero Romero Lazman Guadalupe	EPS 4/10/82	SPN 27/11/82
21. Daniel López Daniel López Colomba	EPS 21/7/82	SPN 25/9/82
22. Celistino Amstrongz. Anstran Jacobi Celestino	EPS 21/7/82	SPN 25/9/82
23. Concepción Rosales Rosales Plucha Concepción	EPS 13/7/82	SPN 25/9/82
24. Bernardo Martínez David	ME=EPS (Masis)	
25. Alberto Flores Frank	"" ""	
26. Delmira Blanco de Suares Delmira Blandon de Suares. Esposa de Benigno Suares (Ex-juez de Mesta) en 1978 es ajusticiado por el FSLN por ser responsable de la muerte de muchos cros. Actualmente Delmira se encuentra alzada con sus hijos, las tareas que tiene en el grupo es de abastecimiento. Para el 19 o 20 de junio de 1983 fue vista cerca de la comunidad de Casquita por un cro militante del FSLN de nombre AMBROCIO BLANDON.		

- 27. Janatan Cristobal Willies ME (EPS) 11/9/82 y 3 CR mas.
- 28. Tomás Pinnfer Rechinal ME Colaborador CR se tomó esa medida al querer desinformar al EPS.
- 29. Bernard How Jacube ME motivos anteriores.
- 30. Julio William Godoy ME (comisión)
- 31. Askin Reginal Francis SE 3/7/82 6/8/82
Sus familiares en declaración jurada dada en enero del 84 aseguran que se les comunicó que había sido puesto en libertad, pero que jamás lo han visto.

32

4. Lista de habitantes de la comunidad de Musawas quienes supuestamente fueron fusilados tras la Idolecia de ese mismo pueblo, tambien lista de mujeres supuestamente violadas, sucediendo estos hechos el 29 de julio de 1982.

Esta denuncia fue difundida en algunos países de Europa por el denominado consejo de Ancianos de los Indios de Nicaragua.

En fechas anteriores y posteriores al 29 de junio de 1982 se dan los siguientes hechos:

El día 19 de junio de 1982 a las 5.30 horas, el J'CI de Bonanza recibe una información de que una banda CR habia secuestrado a un ciudadano de salto Grande(a poca distancia de Musawuas), por lo que decide junto con tres cros mas viajar a dicha comunidad y comprobar la información.

A la altura del puente del Salto Grande caen en una emboscada, habiendo como resultado la muerte de 2 cros de la contra inteligencia (JULIO DAOWN e ILARIO BLANDON) y un cro mas herido (MARVIN CASTRO O).

Al día siguiente entra a dicho lugar un pelotón de reCervistas en persecución de la banda, sin lograr hacer contacto con ellos.

Hay que señalar un hecho bien importante, es de que para esra fecha la comunidad de Musawas ha sido evacuada en dos oportuñidades por la contrarrevolución.

Un mes después de la emboscada se da un nuevo ataque de los CR a Salto Grande habiendo como resultado 7 compañeros milicianos caídos y el caso de caso de la croq Brenda.

Para el 27 de septiembre del mismo año las tropas del EPS y la LCB crean un sub-sector con sus fuerzas en Musaguas, pero se conoció tambien que para entrar a dicho lugar los cros tuvieron combates de poca relevancia.

Para la Seguridad del Estado de Bonanza, se desconoce que hayan cido contra en ese lugar para esa fecha y tambien desconocen de violaciones o fusilamientos en contra de la población.

LISTA

1. Jorge Anastacio	Supuestamene Fusilado	
2. Laurencio Anastacio	""	""
3. Arturo Hernández.	""	""
4. Antonio Indalecio	""	""
5. Emilda Ricardo	""	""
6. Julio Huete	""	""
7. Mauro Simón	""	""

8. Anselmo López

Supuestamente Fijilado.
Con respecto a este se conoció lo siguiente: Que su nombre verdadero es Anselmo Gilberto López y fue secuestrado por una banda CR junto con su hermano Mario Gilberto López, su esposa y una niña, siendo trasladados al campamento Tapalwas Honduras. Hay que hacer notar que esta familia se escapó del campamento y se entregó en el asentamiento de españolina en fecha 14/10/83 (Fotos Documentales).

Nombres de mujeres supuestamente violadas.

- | | |
|------------------------|---------|
| 1. Aquelina Robin | Violada |
| 2. Virginia Benajamin. | "" |
| 3. Maria Hernández. | "" |
| 4. Casilda López. | "" |
| 5. Lodena López. | "" |

En cuanto a este problema no se pudo profundizar dado que en dicha comunidad no hay habitantes civiles ya que fue evacuada totalmente.

Tambien creo que aunque no podemos afirmar nada en torno a los hechos señalados anteriormente dejo una duda en cuanto a la exactitud de los resultados de las investigaciones en este caso específico, pues como única fuente se tuvo a los que no logran precisar fechas exactas y desconocen o así lo declaran sobre los hechos investigados.

Por otro lado, creo que es conveniente que se conozca lo que a continuación se leerá, pero que esto no se interprete como errores que se cometen constantemente o que confirmen lo que se plantea en las denuncias que investigamos, sino que con ello queda abierta la posibilidad de que esto se haya cometido en otras oportunidades refiriéndonos al caso de las violaciones.

El caso concreto es del Cro Sub-tnte del EPS Ríos Torres quien en fecha del 13 de marzo del presente año abuso sexualmente de mujeres d del poblado de LAPAN a parte de cometer otros abusos en bienes de la comunidad.

(ver información en documento secreto)

NOTA: El Sub-tnte Ríos Torres fue degradado en formación y pasado a auditoría Militar. - ya esta here

5. CASOS DE KLIGNI-LANDING

Se conoció denuncia sobre miskitos supuestamente capturados por la Seguridad del Estado en esta comunidad, donde tambien se afirma que Cesar País (J'CI PTO) aseguró que estas personas buscadas ya estaban muertas, sin darles ningun tipo de explicación, dándose esta noticia en presencia de madres de no localizados y del Cmdte Wuilliam Ramires. Z

En las entrevistas e investigaciones realizadas por la Sección Especial de Investigaciones se conoció que para fecha del 29/12/83 a eso de las 10 am el Cmdte Ramirez llamó al Cro Tnte Cesar País a casa del Comité Regional del FSLN. lugar donde se encontraba el cro Osca Hodgson (Miembro del Zonal del FSLN).

Cuando País se hizo presente al Zonal, el Cmdte que las mujeres que se encontraban presentebuscaban a unos familiares y que no apare-

SIAN POR NINGU

sian por ningún lado y que si sabía algo dijera la verdad delante de los familiares.

Constestándole el Cro País que de la comunidad de Klingni-Landing la Seguridad del Estado no detuvo a nadie, y que la información que ellos tienen es dada por fuente del hoy Sub-cmdte Santana y es que para esa fecha en ese lugar se exterminó a un grupo CR los cuales habían escapado de Seben-Bens.

Que a estos se les había capturado pertrechos militares mencionando un RPG-7, Armas de cacería, 2 fajones, 2 cantimploras y bayonetas, y que algunas armas no se pudieron recuperar ya que se fueron dentro de un río por donde pretendían escapar los CR.

LISTADO

1. Larry Wellinton August (Jefe CR)
2. Ricardo Estriano Chico.
3. Neman Wellinton August.
4. Emilio Wellinton August.
5. Alberto Wellinton August.
6. Martín Francis Wuerman.
7. Milton Hodgson Wilson.
8. Maikel Amadias Willian.
9. Roberto Alfred Josepa.
10. Ricardo Zamora Waman.
11. Alberto Zamora Wamam.
12. Rodríguez Garth Wilfredo.

En este caso existe una dualidad de versiones diendo las siguientes:
- En el control de registro de detenidos de la Seguridad del Estado aparece que fue capturado por el Ejército Popular Sandinista el día 10 de julio de 1982 y que fue puesto en libertad por el jefe de operaciones de la seguridad del estado en fecha 29 de julio de 1982.

- En la declaración reciente que dieran los familiares de Garth ante la Comisión permanente de los derechos Humanos para el mes de enero de 1984; señalan que fueron notificados por el Cro César País que sus familiares estaban muertos.

Notándose una contradicción entre los libros de registro de detenidos y la versión del Cro País.

13. Gervin Maikel Castillo.

Skirvin Maikel Castillo. aparece con la misma versión anterior.

6. SUCESOS DE LYMUS.

Se conoció denuncia por parte de la comisión Interamericana de Derechos humanos sobre supuestos testimonios recogidos por este organismo de boca de los refugiados LEONEL MARTINEZ y LUIS FAJARDO, en Mocoron Honduras.

Lo mismo que denuncias puesta por el CR Steadman Fagoth y los Misurasatas.

Notándose entre estos tres denunciantes sierta coincidencia en los nombre de afectados pero diferencias en los supuestos abusos cometidos.

En la denuncia estos hechos se reducen a supuestas capturas, versión dada por los Misuras, Fusilamientos versión dada por CIDH, enterrados vivos versión.

En las investigaciones realizadas por la Sección Especial De Investigaciones se conoció lo siguiente:

1.- Los hechos de Leymus para el mes de diciembre del 81 se enmarcan en la ofensiva contrarrevolucionaria conocida como Navidad Roja.

Para esos días en dicha comunidad la situación militar se encontraba bien delicada dado que la acitidad contrarrevolucionaria se había incrementado en sus alrededores y a esas altura ya habían varios cros del EPS caídos en emboscadas puestos por los CR.

2.- A finales de noviembre el EPS detuvo a un contrarrevolucionario de origen Sumo, quien en los interrogatorios señaló a 60 personas que también estaban ligadas a la actividad CR y de los cuales se detuvieron a 25.

3.- Se conoció también que las tropas que estuvieron fueron las del EPS y un batallón de reserbacon el nro 90-15 y dos cros del Ministerio del Interior los cuales se encargaban de el puesto de migración y extranjería.

4.- El 20 de diciembre del mismo año el Sub-tnte Chester Henrique Dicarrio, conoce a través del cro Javier Duran (Ambos encargado de Migración) que este último participó en el ajusticiamiento de nueve detenidos.

5.- El día 23 del mismo mes, en las tempranas horas de la noche y después de una supuesta fuga de dos detenidos, el cro jefe fronteriso ordena se ajusticien a 7 contrarrevolucionarios que estaban detenidos y posteriormente en la misma noche fueron ajusticiados los 6 reos restante.
NOTA: Ver Informe Adjunto.

6.- Hay que señalar que los cros involucrados en estos hechos fueron juzgados por Auditoría Militar tanto los cros del EPS como los del MIIN, pero a los seis meses de estar detenidos fueron puestos en libertad.

NOTA: Este caso ha sido visto en varias oportunidades, inclusive por organismos internacionales.

Cuando una comisión de los Derechos Humanos dela OEA visitó la Región Especial Uno se miró este caso y les fueron presentados a 7 personas que los organismos denunciantes los daban como muertos.

LISTADOS:

NOMBRES	VERSION	DENUNCIANTES
1. Julio Henley	Enterrado vivo	CIDH- Luis Fajardo.
2. Sergio Ingramm	""	""
3. Simonet Ingramm	""	""
4. Loren Ingramm	""	""
5. Luis Fajardo <i>vwb</i>	""	CIDH

Este es quien supuestamente dio los testimonios señalados anteriormente, dejando ver la intencionalidad de hacer daño, cuando denuncian como "Enterrado vivo" a su misma fuente.

"SECRETO"

UNICO

HOJA OCHO

6. Asel Mercado	- Capturado. - Enterrado vivo. - Fusilado.	CIDH FAGOT MISURA.
	De este se comprobó que actualmente trabaja para el CEPAD y se encuentra ubicado en Puerto Cabezas.	
7. Celso Flores	-Capturado -Fusilado. -Enterrado vivo.	CIDH FAGOT MISURA.
8. Justo Martínez	""	""
9. Juan Poveda	""	""
10. Jose Lin Mercado	""	""
11. Carlos Pérez	""	""
12. Víctor Pérez	""	""
13. Simion Castro	""	""
14. Rogelio Castro	""	""
15. Mayra Lacayo	- Capturada - Enterrada viva	- MISURA FAGOT
16. Cristina Lacayo	""	""
17. Efrain Poveda	""	""
18. Gómez Rocio	""	""
19. Simpar Alargón	FUSILADO	CIDH- Leonel Martínez.
20. Ponier Escobar	""	""
21. Natalio Jose	""	""
22. Napoleón Wilson	""	""
23. Gerardo Collins	""	""
24. Atil Carlos	""	""
25. Leyman Frederick	""	""
26. Roger Pifers	""	""
27. Eugenio Morales	""	""
28. Esteban Antonio	""	""
29. Ricardo Mercado	""	""
30. Nando Mora	""	""
31. Ramiro Donacio	""	""
32. Norman Castro	Capturado Enterrado vivo	Misura Fagot.

CONCLUSIONES

1.- Toda esta situación nos ha creado un problema político nacional e internacional, obedeciendo en gran medida a la situación de guerra que se vive en dicha región, y por ende sehan tomado algunas medidas

drasticas pero necesarias.

Mas sin embargo tambien este problema obedece a muchos abusos cometidos por cros del EPS de bajo nivel político e ideológico como el señalado en el caso de Lapán.

Es de señalar tambien que estos comportamientos erróneos es el reflejo de la falta de atención por parte de los jefes intermedios.

2.- Que generalmente son cros de las tropas del EPS los que ocasionan problemas y descontentos en la población civil originado esto por mal tratos y abusos.

3.- Es necesario un programa Especial de atención política dirigido a los cros Jefes operativos del EPS, donde se les refleje los problemas que se ocasionan ala Revolución con una conducta impropia.

4
RECOMENDACIONES

1.- Dado que este tema ha sido el eje de ataque de la contrarrevolución desde el punto de vista ideológico, es conveniente que así como los CR tienen un Consejo de Ancianos de Indios de Nicaragua (CAIN) y lo utilizan en esta vía de ataque, se puede crear un organismo paralelo revolucionario y que tambien reclame a nivel internacional y nacional sobre los desaparecidos y secuestrados, lo mismo que serviría para presionar a la Iglesia Morava para involucrarlos directamente en el problema,

2.- Es recomendable un programa especial de atención política dirigido a los compañeros jefes operativos del EPS, donde se les refleje los problemas que se ocasionan a la revolución con una conducta impropia.

3. Es necesario que se recomiende a Auditoria Militar de la Región Especial Uno que sea mas drástica con los cros militares que cometen delitos, ya que esto debe de ser una arma más que se debe utilizar para superar la presente problemática.

LISTA DE PERSONAS ENTREVISTADAS

- 1.-Sub-Cmdte Jose González
- 2.- Capt Evaristo Vásquez.
- 3.- Capt Alvaro Herrera.
- 4.- Tnte Otilio Duarte.
- 5.- Tnte Moises Herrera.
- 6.- Tnte Cesar País.
- 7.- Tnte Dimas Vargas.
- 8.- Tnte Hodgson.
- 9.- Sub-tnte Octavio Rocha.
- 10.- Chester Enrvque Dicario.
- 11.- Tnte Jose Dolores Reyes
- 12 - Sub-tnte: Edguez Sanchez Aguilera.

EJEMPLARES: UNICO
EJEMPLAR 1: EXP
EJEC Y MECA: RCG
R . D . I . : 460-A
FECHA : 1/5/84

