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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 7/27/2007

File Folder ARGENTINA (05/21/1982-06/15/1982)

FOIA

F1637

Box Number 26

VEIGEL

14

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39574	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE FALKLANDS <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-1-2</i>	1	5/21/1982	B1
39575	CABLE	211353Z MAY 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-2-1</i>	2	5/21/2008	B1
39576	CABLE	212010Z MAY 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-3-0</i>	2	5/21/1982	B1
39577	CABLE	220110Z MAY 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-4-9</i>	1	5/22/1982	B1
39578	MEMO	JAMES RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE PROPOSED MEDIATION (PAGE 1 ONLY) <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-5-8</i>	1	5/26/1982	B1
39579	MEMO	JAMES RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE PROPOSED MEDIATION <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-6-7</i>	2	5/26/1982	B1
39580	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEMO FROM HAIG <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-7-6</i>	1	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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F1637

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VEIGEL

14

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39581	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE FALKLANDS CRISIS <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-8-5</i>	2	5/26/1982	B1
39584	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR, ET AL TO WILLIAM CLARK RE HAIG'S MEMO <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-9-4</i>	1	5/27/1982	B1
39585	CABLE	011309Z JUN 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-10-2</i>	1	6/1/1982	B1
39586	CABLE	032200Z JUN 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-11-1</i>	1	6/3/1982	B1
39587	CABLE	032200Z JUN 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-12-0</i>	1	6/3/1982	B1
39588	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE PEACE PLAN <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-13-9</i>	1	6/3/1982	B1
39589	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE CALL <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-14-8</i>	1	6/1/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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F1637

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14

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39590	TRANSLATION	RE PROPOSAL FOR SOLUTION <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-15-7</i>	2	ND	B1
39592	CABLE	090305Z JUN 82	1	6/9/1982	B1
39593	CABLE	131420Z JUN 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-18-4</i>	1	6/13/1982	B1
39594	CABLE	150305Z JUN 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-19-3</i>	1	6/15/1982	B1
214163	CABLE	151212Z JUN 82 <i>R 11/8/2017 NLR-748-26-15-19-3</i>	1	6/15/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

39575

2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 3214
SIT999 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 211353Z MAY 82 PSN: 038206
TOR: 141/1645Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS FONT RENT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: FYI

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NR-748-7-15-2-1
by CN RECLASS DATE 11/8/17

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA *3214 1401410
O 211353Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3841

INFO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 8182
AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 4895
USCOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN IMMEDIATE
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 3214
EXDIS
MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS
E. O. 12065: GDS 5/21/88 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W) OR-M
TAGS: AEMR, PTER, PINS, ASEC, AINF, AFSP, AR
SUBJECT: EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
REF: STATE 139138

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE SHALL COMPLY WITH THE REFERENCED INSTRUCTION. I EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO EVACUATE ALL THE DEPENDENTS AND THE REMAINING NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL OVER THE NEXT 72 HOURS AT MOST. WE WILL SEND ALONG THE REQUESTED PARTICULARS AS SOON AS THEY ARE AVAILABLE.
3. WE ARE LETTING THE GOA KNOW INFORMALLY THAT THERE WILL BE A FURTHER MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND FAMILIES OUT OF ARGENTINA IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WE ARE EMPHASIZING THAT THE EMBASSY REMAINS OPEN FOR BUSINESS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. WHEN THE MEDIA GETS WORD OF THIS, AS THEY WILL IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS, WE WILL SAY THAT THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF THE DRAWDOWN WE BEGAN SOME TIME AGO AND, AGAIN, THAT WE'RE STILL OPEN FOR BUSINESS.
SHLAUDEMAN

BUENOS AIRES 3214

DTG: 211353Z MAY 82 PSN: 038206

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 3214

DTG: 211353Z MAY 82 PSN: 038206

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

39576 4

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 3236
SIT992 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 212010Z MAY 82 PSN: 038940
TOR: 142/0208Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS FONT RENT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: RENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #3236 1412015
O 212010Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3856

INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 4869
AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 4268
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1313
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 8184
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 5905
BT

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3236

EXDIS

EO 12065: RDS-2 5/21/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M

TAGS: PBOR, MILI, FA, UK, AR

SUBJECT: CRISIS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: WILL OR CAN THE ARGENTINES
COME TO TERMS?

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: EXPECTATIONS THAT BRITISH MILITARY PRESSURE,
OR EVEN BRITISH MILITARY VICTORY IN THE FALKLANDS, WILL PRO-
DUCE AN ARGENTINE DISPOSITION TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE ON TERMS CON-
SONANT WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 502 COULD PROVE UNFOUNDED. WHETHER
OR NOT THE JUNTA SURVIVES, IT SEEMS TO US ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT
THE ARGENTINES WILL COALESCE AROUND THE MILITARY IN AN ATTITUDE
OF DEFIANCE. THE CRISIS COULD THUS BE CONSIDERABLY PROTRACTED.
END SUMMARY

3. THE BRITISH STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO APPLY GRADUALLY INCREASING
PRESSURE IN ORDER TO FORCE THE ARGENTINES INTO AN AGREEMENT THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RESOLUTION 502. THE STRATEGY
HAS NOT WORKED SO FAR, BUT IT IS STILL GENERALLY ASSUMED HERE,
EVEN WITHIN THE GOA, THAT THE CONFLICT WILL ULTIMATELY END WITH
SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT. I THINK THAT IS NOW OPEN TO
QUESTION.

4. MRS. THACHER'S VIEW THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE TO DATE NOT BEEN
NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH IS UNDERSTANDABLE. DESPITE THE VARIOUS
SHIFTS ON THE POINTS AT ISSUE, THE BASIC ARGENTINE POSITION
THAT THERE MUST BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER BE A PREDETERMINED OUT-
COME IN THEIR FAVOR HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED FROM THE OUTSET. THIS
IS BECAUSE OF THE UNDERLYING CONVICTION IN THE GOA THAT TO SETTLE
FOR LESS WOULD CAUSE AN UPHEAVAL IN THE ARMED FORCES AND PUT A
QUICK END TO THE GOVERNMENT AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED.

5. AT LEAST SOME IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE THOUGHT FOR SEVERAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLR-748-2675-30

~~SECRET~~

BY LN NARA DATE 11/21/7

~~TOP SECRET~~ (194)

3686 8

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 02

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 50

RELEASER G.W.

PRIORITY

FLASH

DEX #

DTG 262237Z

ROUTINE

TTY #

MAY 82

FROM/LOCATION/

1. BUD MCFARLANE / THE SITUATION ROOM / THE WHITE HOUSE

WPC HAS SEEN

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER FOR JUDGE CLARK / SANTA BARBARA

2. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER / SANTA BARBARA

} 262242Z MAY 82

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE/S

MSP
7/27/07

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1982 MAY 26 22 57 MAY 26 P 6: 48

SECRET

39577

6

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 0897 DTG: 220110Z MAY 82 PSN: 038884
SIT257 DATE 06/02/82 TOR: 142/0119Z

ROLES FILLED BY THE AMBASSADORS IN THE TWO CAPITALS.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WMLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #0897 1420116
O O 220110Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 5525

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4928
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7576
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 140897

NODIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 5/21/02 (ENDERS, THOMAS O.)

TAGS: PBOR, AR, FA, UK

SUBJECT: FALKLANDS - GALTIERI'S CONCERNS ABOUT US
SUPPORT FOR UK

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR TAKACS CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS MID-MORNING MAY 21. TAKACS SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM GALTIERI TO REFLECT GOA DISPLEASURE WITH USG ON ACCOUNT OF USG SUPPORT FOR UK. GALTIERI WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED BY REPORTS RECEIVING HEAVY PLAY IN BUENOS AIRES THAT USAF KC-135'S WERE ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT RAF IN EUROPE REPLACING BRITISH CRAFT COMMITTED TO SOUTH ATLANTIC. TAKACS SAID PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT LED GALTIERI TO CONSIDER RECALLING HIM AS A SIGNAL OF GOA CONCERN.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, ENDERS INFORMED TAKACS THAT ASSIGNMENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF USAF KC-135'S TO RAF SUPPORT WAS IN ACCORD WITH LONG-STANDING AGREEMENTS AND KEY TO RECIPROCAL AND COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ENSURE CONSTANT READ NESS OF WESTERN ALLIANCE STRATEG C FORCES. USAF AIRCRAFT ROUTINELY SUPPORTED RAF'S STRATEG C COMPONENTS AND VICE VERSA BEFORE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS AND WOULD

CONTINUE TO DO SO. NUMBER OF KC-135'S SO ENGAGED (NOW TWO) ENDERS ADDED, WAS VARIABLE AND COULD SHIFT. HE EMPHASIZED TO TAKACS THAT OUR KC-135 COMMITMENTS DID NOT REPEAT NOT CONSTITUTE PARTICIPATION BY US ELEMENTS IN UK'S SOUTH ATLANTIC OPERATIONS.

4. ENDERS ALSO ASKED TAKACS TO STRESS TO GALTIERI THE IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO MAINTENANCE OF OPEN COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS AT THIS JUNCTURE AND THE VITAL

5. FYI: THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY KC-135 DEPLOYMENTS--WE ARE STAYING WITH GUIDANCE OF REFUSAL TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF ANY BRITISH REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT OR USG RESPONSES TO THEM.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 0897

DTG: 220110Z MAY 82 PSN: 038884

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 147-748-26 15-49
BY CH NARA DATE 1/8/17

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority MLZ-740-76-15
 BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/87

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

May 26, 1982

5/26

*Judge read
and agrees.**H*

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JAMES RENTSCHLER/DENNIS BLAIR

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Mediation in the South Atlantic

Issue

Should the President call for a summit peace conference for the Falklands, inviting Mrs. Thatcher and General Galtieri to Washington or some neutral location to solve the dispute?

Pros

- If ground were properly prepared, could bring an end to hostilities (depends on readiness of two sides to compromise -- right now, little likelihood of success);
- Could, if properly timed, return the U.S. relationship with Argentina some distance toward what it was before the breakdown of the Haig mission;
- Could have a similarly restorative and/or reparative effect vis-a-vis our relations in the rest of the Hemisphere, improving our chances for resuming cooperative initiatives there;
- Would, if successful, enhance President's image as man of peace. Even if unsuccessful, could possibly enhance the image, as long as properly handled and did not end in U.S. and one country ganging up on the third.

Cons:

- If there were not a readiness to compromise on the two sides, the ~~President's attempt would go the way of the Haig mission, the Perez de Cuellar mission, the Peruvian president's mission:~~ just one more unsuccessful peace attempt with the difference that the President's personal prestige would be tainted with the stigma of failure;
- If the attempt were made before a British military victory, it would do great damage to relations with the U.K., amounting to another Suez (depriving U.K. of the fruits of success at the critical moment);

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
 Review on 5/26/88

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

39579
3686 10

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

May 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM: JAMES RENTSCHLER/DENNIS BLAIR
SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Mediation in the South Atlantic

WPG HAS SEEN

Issue

Should the President call for a summit peace conference for the Falklands, inviting Mrs. Thatcher and General Galtieri to Washington or some neutral location to solve the dispute?

Pros

- If ground were properly prepared, could bring an end to hostilities (depends on readiness of two sides to compromise -- right now, little likelihood of success);
- Could, if properly timed, return the U.S. relationship with Argentina some distance toward what it was before the breakdown of the Haig mission;
- Could have a similarly restorative and/or reparative effect vis-a-vis our relations in the rest of the Hemisphere, improving our chances for resuming cooperative initiatives there;
- Would, if successful, enhance President's image as man of peace. Even if unsuccessful, could possibly enhance the image, as long as properly handled and did not end in U.S. and one country ganging up on the third.

Cons:

- If there were not a readiness to compromise on the two sides, the President's attempt would go the way of the Haig mission, the Perez de Cuellar mission, the Peruvian president's mission: just one more unsuccessful peace attempt with the difference that the President's personal prestige would be tainted with the stigma of failure;
- If the attempt were made before a British military victory, it would do great damage to relations with the U.K., amounting to another Suez (depriving U.K. of the fruits of success at the critical moment);

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Review on: 5/26/88

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NUC-748-765-67
BY: CN NARA DATE 11/8/17

~~TOP SECRET~~

11

-2-

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- If the President's proposal, once the conference has convened, failed to meet the minimum conditions of either the U.K. or Argentina, that country could pull out of the conference with increased bitterness and resentment towards the United States.
- The President himself is not the sort of "detail" man who is best suited to negotiating personally a complicated peace settlement, as Carter did at Camp David..

Conclusion

A Presidential call for a summit peace conference is a good idea if we have reason to believe that the U.K. and Argentina are ready to compromise their differences and if we have prior assurance that both parties want the President in between. A call for a summit peace conference before British success on the ground, and before the two sides show signs of a readiness to compromise, would pose too many risks to be worthwhile.

Roger Fontaine concurs.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED 02 JUN 82 11

TO CLARK

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 26 MAY 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

BLAIR

26 MAY 82

*NY
7/27/07*

KEYWORDS: FALKLAND ISLANDS

GREAT BRITAIN

GALTIERI, LEOPOLDO F

ARGENTINA

SUMMIT

THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MEDIATION IN SOUTH ATLANTIC - SUMMIT PEACE CONF

ACTION: NOTED BY CLARK

DUE:

STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (H / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
_____	_____	_____	_____	<i>20, 73, 70, CT</i>
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1982

John,

Attached is a short note you might wish to put on top of Al's earlier memo on where we stand in the Falklands, in sending it on to the President.

WPC HAS SEEN

Bud

Judge HAS SEEN

The attached was not sent to the President per your instructions.

Overtaken

John

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED Package # 3891

MAY 27 12:07

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	<u>m</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

39580

15

3691

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

WPC HAS SEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Memo from Al Haig on the Falklands

Based on his most recent exchange with Francis Pym, Al concludes that "there is virtually no hope of productive negotiations before the British complete their re-occupation of the Islands." He recommends that we hold off on any new diplomatic move for the moment, with plans to weigh in once the British have retaken the islands. He points out that it is imperative that there be a negotiated solution at that point, to ward off both a protracted conflict and a complete breakdown in U.S. relations with Latin America.

I agree completely with Al's views. Desirable as a renewed U.S. mediation effort might be, it will stand no chance until and unless both parties are ready for it. The next favorable moment may well be immediately following a clear military decision on the ground, when we might have improved leverage with both belligerents. Working with Al, I will be bringing you ideas on the kind of offer we could make at that point.

Tab A Haig Memo

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLR 748-26 F-7-b

~~SECRET~~

BY CX NARA DATE 11/8/17

~~SECRET~~

5/27/82



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

cc Kent ✓
Faint ✓

May 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH for*
Subject: Falklands Crisis

Our latest exchanges with the British confirm that they are currently not of a mind to work toward a negotiated settlement which gives anything at all to the Argentines before they retake the Islands. After my conversation with you on Monday, I put to them the idea of a US-Brazilian peacekeeping force as a way of enabling them to contemplate withdrawal of British forces as part of an interim agreement. The reply I just received from my British counterpart, Pym, states that the ideas of mutual withdrawal and interim administration are "no longer realistic," given the major change in British mood resulting from their successful landing.

In the meantime, the UN Secretary General has asked the two parties for their positions on a ceasefire within 24 hours. The Argentines have replied that they could accept a ceasefire first, followed by discussions of mutual withdrawal. The British position, which has not yet been given officially to the Secretary General, is that a ceasefire is acceptable only if there is a simultaneous Argentine withdrawal. The two sides could not be further apart. The Secretary General has asked us to put pressure on the British to accept mutual withdrawal, warning that he will announce Thursday evening that a ceasefire is not possible if the British have not moderated their position.

It would be a major error for us to pressure the British at all at this point. Given the mood in London, American pressure would be in vain; we should conserve our leverage with Mrs. Thatcher until it can be used to produce results, i.e., when the islands are effectively in British hands.

At my suggestion, the British will try to delay responding to the Secretary General on the ceasefire question. At a

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLZ-748-76-1585

RDS-3 5/26/02

BY CA NARA DATE 11/8/17

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

minimum, we would hope to have the OAS meeting -- which begins Thursday and could last for several days -- behind us before the Secretary General declares that the British position makes a further effort on his part impossible. As it is, we will not find it easy to get through the OAS meeting without a bad resolution. If the latest UN effort aborts -- and the British are blamed -- our support from moderates in the OAS will disintegrate.

There is virtually no hope of productive negotiations before the British complete their re-occupation of the Islands. Even then, the British will be reluctant to offer anything to the Argentines. They will want a ceasefire, and they are sensitive to our concerns about further damage in the Hemisphere and new opportunities for the Soviets and Cubans. But they will not be flexible, at least in the short term, in the flush of victory.

At the right time, we should go back to the British with suggestions regarding the sort of offer they should make once they have retaken the Islands. A British victory on the Islands, unless followed by an effort to reach a negotiated solution, would lead only to further conflict and an unhealable wound in our relations with our Latin neighbors. We are now working on ideas for such an offer.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Florence

Please ask the Sit Room to dex Tab I
(only) to John with the attached note from
me.

Many thatnks

Bud
Bud

~~SECRET~~

3691 19

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 02

~~ROUTINE~~

DACOM # 64

RELEASER G.W.

PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG 270347Z

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM / THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER FOR JUDGE CLARK / SANTA BARBARA

2. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER / SANTA BARBARA

TO: 270441Z May 82

WPC HAS SEEN

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:



PLEASE NOTE:

THE ATTACHED MESSAGE SHOULD BE PUT IN THE MORNING FOLDERS FOR THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

WJN
7/27/07

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

1982 MAY 27 03 45

79584

mw
70

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3691

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~
ACTION

May 27, 1982

WPC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR/JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Secretary's Memo to the President on the Falklands

Al Haig's memo to the President concerning the current situation in the Falklands (Tab A) reports on his latest exchange with Pym and concludes that there is no chance of the British agreeing to a ceasefire or negotiations before they retake the islands. He recommends that we hold any peacekeeping efforts until after this event. His staff is working on ideas which we would advance at that point, the bottom line being negotiated settlement designed to avoid further deterioration of our relations with Latin America.

We agree with the Secretary's analysis, and are working ourselves on a similar track. Accordingly, your transmittal (Tab I) notes basic NSC agreement with the Haig analysis.

Roger Fontaine concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

<u>OK</u>	<u>NO</u>	
—	—	That you sign the transmittal to the President at Tab I.

Tab I Memo to the President
A - Haig Memo

~~SECRET~~
Review on 5/27/88

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
Auth: NIZ-748-265-9-4
BY: CN NISA DATE 11/8/87

RECEIVED 27 MAY 82 12

TO CLARK

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 27 MAY 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RENTSCHLER

27 MAY 82

*M70
7/27/07*

HAIG, A

26 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: FALKLAND ISLANDS

ARGENTINA

GREAT BRITAIN

LATIN AMERICA

SUBJECT: HAIG MEMO TO PRES RE FALKLANDS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 27 MAY 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 6/01

Clark noted

18, 20, 20

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(PA) (C)

~~SECRET~~

39585

22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE #1 BUENOS AIRES 3377 DTG: 011309Z JUN 82 PSN: 053158
SIT711 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 152/1728Z

POSITION WOULD BE AGREEMENT TO A CEASEFIRE-IN-PLACE, A PROPOSAL MRS. THATCHER HAS ALREADY CATEGORICALLY REJECTED.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS RENT FONT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #3377 1521330
O 011309Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3968

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3377
EXDIS

BUENOS AIRES 3377

DTG: 011309Z JUN 82 PSN: 053158

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/1/02 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: WAR IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: ARGENTINE REACTION TO DEFEAT
REF: ENDERS/SHLAUDEMANN SECURE TELECOM, 5/31/82

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I SHARE WITH SOME OF MY EC COLLEAGUES HERE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE BRITISH MAY BE HOPING THAT VICTORY IN THE FALKLANDS WILL PRODUCE THE DOWNFALL OF THE JUNTA AND A NEW GOVERNMENT WILLING TO PUT AN END TO THIS CONFLICT. MY COLLEAGUES AND I DOUBT THAT IT WILL WORK OUT THAT WAY. MORE LIKELY IS A REFUSAL BY THIS OR A SUCCESSOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. THE NOTION THAT A CIVILIAN CARETAKER REGIME MIGHT EMERGE AND DO SO STRIKES ME AS EVEN MORE IMPROBABLE. THERE MAY BE CIVILIANS AROUND PREPARED TO TAKE ON THE ONUS OF SURRENDER, BUT I DON'T KNOW ANY.

3. THUS, AS EX-PRESIDENT LANUSSE SAID THE OTHER DAY, THE WAR WILL GO ON. WHAT THAT WILL MEAN IN PRACTICE IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. MY BEST GUESS IS THAT THERE WILL BE A DE FACTO END TO HOSTILITIES WHILE THE ARGENTINES LICK THEIR WOUNDS, PROCLAIM THEIR DEFIANCE AND CONTEMPLATE THEIR REVENGE. SUCH AN UNSETTLED SITUATION WOULD MAKE THE BRITISH POSITION ON THE ISLANDS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNCOMFORTABLE TO SAY THE LEAST, WOULD THREATEN CONTINUING MILITARY INCIDENTS AND WOULD CREATE ENDLESS INSTABILITY IN OUR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA.

4. THE LOCAL FRENCH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS HAVE GOTTEN TOGETHER ON THE WORDING OF SEPARATE BUT ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL REPORTS TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS WARNING OF THE OBVIOUS DISASTERS AHEAD IF THE ARGENTINES ARE CRUSHED AT PORT STANLEY. THEIR HOPE IS THAT PRESSURE WILL BE BROUGHT TO BEAR AT VERSAILLES ON MRS. THATCHER TO MODIFY HER STAND. I AGREED ENTIRELY WITH MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE WHO BRIEFED ME ON THIS INITIATIVE THAT WE ARE LOOKING AT EXTREMELY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR WESTERN INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA AND ELSEWHERE IF THIS WAR GOES DOWN TO ITS FINAL MILITARY END. BUT THE ONLY PRACTICAL RESULT I COULD IDENTIFY OF A SHIFT IN THE BRITISH

5. THERE IS A RUMOR GOING AROUND THAT GALTIERI CALLED GENERAL MENENDEZ AND SUGGESTED HE THINK ABOUT SURRENDERING, TO WHICH MENENDEZ REPLIED WITH A SUGGESTION OF HIS OWN INVOLVING A CERTAIN PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANATOMY. I PUT NOT STOCK IN THE STORY, BUT IT DOES REFLECT THE BLACK MOOD NOW SETTLING OVER THE COUNTRY. THE LOGICAL THING FOR THE JUNTA TO DO AT THIS POINT, AS IT WAS WHEN I PUT IT TO GALTIERI ON APRIL 29, IS TO ANNOUNCE THE UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS. THIS WOULD SPARE THE MILITARY AND THE NATION THE HUMILIATION OF FINAL DEFEAT AND/OR SURRENDER. BUT THE JUNTA WOULD THEN HAVE TO TAKE PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CATASTROPHE -- WHILE, OF COURSE, IDENTIFYING US AS THE ULTIMATE VILLAINS OF THE PIECE. I DO NOT DETECT AMONG THOSE THREE MEN THE REALISM AND MORAL COURAGE REQUIRED TO DO SUCH A THING.
SHLAUDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLZ-748-26-15-10-2
BY CN NARA DATE 11/8/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39586 23

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 3432 DTG: 032200Z JUN 82 PSN: 000237
SIT108 DATE 06/11/82 TOR: 155/0040Z

4. I REALIZE THE FOREGOING BELABORS THE OBVIOUS. BUT THE TRAP BEING SET FOR US LOOKS TOO DEADLY TO ME NOT TO REGISTER MY CONCERNS.
SHLAUDEMAN

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT PUBS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

BUENOS AIRES 3432 DTG: 032200Z JUN 82 PSN: 000237

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #3432 154220Z
O 032200Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4008

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3432
NODIS

EO 12065: RDS-1 6/03/82 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS DISPUTE: NEXT STEPS AND THE U.S. ROLE
REFS: (A) LONDON 12289, (B) LONDON 12129

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. IT HAS BEEN CLEAR AT LEAST SINCE THE BRITISH VICTORY AT DARWIN AND GOOSE GREEN THAT THERE COULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES FOR SOME TIME TO COME AFTER THE ARGENTINES ARE EJECTED FROM THE ISLANDS. BUT HMG'S DECISION (REFTEL'S) TO FORECLOSE ANY POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS PUTS US IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. IT WOULD BE ONE THING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE ON THE BASIS OF AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROSPECT OF AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS OPEN AND THAT WE WILL BE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE EFFORT TO BRING IT ABOUT. IT WOULD BE SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY FOR US TO PARTICIPATE IN A PERMANENT GARRISON AND/OR A "SECURITY SYSTEM" DIRECTED AGAINST ARGENTINA AND HER ALLIES - AS SEEN IN LATIN AMERICA.
3. I FIND MRS. THATCHER'S STATEMENTS IN REF A ALARMING, PARTICULARLY THE PARALLEL SHE DRAWS BETWEEN THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE SINAI OPERATION AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUR FUTURE RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR HELP IN KEEPING THE HELPERS SAFE AND SOUND. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, MANY ARGENTINES ARE ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT WE WANT A MILITARY BASE ON THE FALKLANDS AND THAT THAT EXPLAINS OUR POSTURE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS. THIS IS A THEORY THAT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO SELL GENERALLY IN LATIN AMERICA IF WE TURN UP ON THE ISLANDS AS PART OF MRS. THATCHER'S GARRISON. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT NO FORESEEABLE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO DO LESS THAN CONTINUE TO PRESS THE CLAIM TO THE MALVINAS, USING WHATEVER METHODS ARE AT HAND. THE OUTLOOK WOULD THEN BE FOR A PRO-LONGED WAR OF NERVES AT THE VERY LEAST, WITH OURSELVES AND THE BRITISH ON ONE SIDE AND THE ARGENTINES AND AT LEAST SOME OF THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA ON THE OTHER.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT-74626-15-11-1

BY CN NARA DATE 11/11/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39587 24

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 3432 DTG: 032200Z JUN 82 PSN: 000237
SIT680 DATE 07/19/82 TOR: 155/0040Z

4. I REALIZE THE FOREGOING BELABORS THE OBVIOUS. BUT THE TRAP BEING SET FOR US LOOKS TOO DEADLY TO ME NOT TO REGISTER MY CONCERNS.
SHLAUDEMAN

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT PUBS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

BUENOS AIRES 3432 DTG: 032200Z JUN 82 PSN: 000237

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #3432 154220Z
O 032200Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4000

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3432
NODIS

EO 12065: RDS-1 6/03/82 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS DISPUTE: NEXT STEPS AND THE U.S. ROLE
REFS: (A) LONDON 12289, (B) LONDON 12129

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NL-74876-15-12-0

BY CN NARA DATE 11/8/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39588

MW
25

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3925

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

June 3, 1982

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS *DB* BLAIR

SUBJECT: Lami Dozo Peace Plan

Attached for your information is a State memo reporting a conversation between Tom Enders and Argentine Ambassador Takacs. Takacs was floating a peace proposal ("fathered by Air Force Chief Lami Dozo") providing for simultaneous military withdrawal from the Falklands, a four-power peace-keeping force, and negotiations to begin immediately concerning the status of the islands.

Al Sapia-Bosch believes the proposal is worth a try, but doubts that it will work.

Attachment:

Tab I State Memo

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Review on 6/3/88

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NUZ-748-15-13-9
BY CN NARA DATE 11/8/17



RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

02 MAY 1 P 5: 18

June 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Takacs Call

Argentine Ambassador Takacs met with Tom Enders late last night, to float the attached proposal, which he said was fathered by Air Force Chief Lami Dozo.

The proposal is like the "Peruvian" plan of May 5, except that it does not allow for a role for the local councils.

Enders told Takacs that he did not believe that London would accept simultaneous withdrawal, although it might accept sequential withdrawal, and that the restoration of the councils appeared essential to Britain.

Takacs, reflecting Lami Dozo, continues to have unrealistic news of the military situation. He believes the carrier was in fact seriously damaged, that Argentine troops on the islands can hold out for 3 or 4 weeks, and that "15 or 20" British ships more will be sunk. He is talking about continuing the war after the British win in the Falklands.

Takacs had learned (through a Senate staff source) that the President had called Prime Minister Thatcher, and that the call "had not gone well."

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Takacs Proposal.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

RDS-3 6/1/2002

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLT-74826-1574-8

BY

CN

NARA DATE

11/8/87

~~SECRET~~

39590

27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 106495
JF/BP
Spanish

Proposal for a Solution to the Conflict

Responding to Security Council Resolution No. 502 and to the United Nations Charter, both parties accept the good offices of the Secretary General for an agreement on resolving the conflict over the islands in the South Atlantic and agree to the following:

(1) Beginning at H Hour on D Day, the parties undertake to refrain from the use of firepower or other hostile actions.

(2) Immediate installation of an interim authority in the person of an Administrator, designated by the United Nations Secretary General, for the government of the islands during the negotiations. The Administrator will be assisted by an equal number of representatives designated by each party, as required by the Administrator. The latter will exercise his powers in accordance with the terms of this agreement; the parties agree to provide him with the necessary means for the normal daily life of the inhabitants.

(3) Immediately following the installation of the United Nations Administration in the islands, both parties agree to withdraw their forces an equal distance under the conditions established by the Administrator designated by the United Nations Secretary General.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NZ-740 26-15-15-7
BY CN NARA DATE 11/8/17

~~SECRET~~

23

- 2 -

(4) Both parties agree not to reintroduce any armed forces in the demilitarized zone in accordance with paragraph (3).

(5) Four countries will ensure that the forces are withdrawn and are not reintroduced; these countries will be the United States, Peru, and two other countries, one to be named by each of the two parties.

(6) Beginning on the date of signature of this agreement, the parties agree that the economic measures they have taken against the other party on their own initiative or through third countries will cease to have effect.

(7) Both parties will initiate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General to reach, on an urgent basis, a peaceful settlement of the dispute in which the definitive status of the islands will be agreed upon. For these negotiations the Secretary General will rely on the assistance of the representatives of the four countries referred to in paragraph (5).

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 01 JUN 82 18

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 01 JUN 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*m33
7/21/07*

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

ARGENTINA

ENDERS, TOM

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SUBJECT: PROPOSED SOLUTION TO FALKLAND CRISIS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 03 JUN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

FONTAINE

COMMENTS

REF# 8215423

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>IX 6/3</i>	<i>For info</i>		
	<i>C 6/5</i>	<i>McFarlane noted</i>		<i>DB</i>

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FILE

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(C) *m*

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ARGENTINA (05/21/1982-06/15/1982)

FOIA

F1637

VEIGEL

Box Number

26

14

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
39591	CABLE 090222Z JUN 82	1	6/9/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FOIA

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14

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
39592	CABLE 090305Z JUN 82	1	6/9/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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39593 32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE #1 BUENOS AIRES 3537 DTG: 131420Z JUN 82 PSN: 016566
SIT677 DATE 07/19/82 TOR: 164/1656Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /BB1

BUENOS AIRES 3537

DTG: 131420Z JUN 82 PSN: 016566

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP FONT SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUESBA #3537 1641440

O 131420Z JUN 82 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4094

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 3537

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/13/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M

TAGS: PBOR, MILI, FA, UK, AR

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RECALL OF TAKACS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IGLESIAS ROUCO IN HIS JUNE 11 LA PRENSA COLUMN ASSERTS THAT "DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY A DECREE WAS ALMOST SIGNED BY GALTIERI (TO) WITHDRAW OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WHICH LOGICALLY WOULD HAVE MOTIVATED THE WITHDRAWAL OF MR. SHLAUDEMAN FROM ARGENTINA. BUT THE INITIATIVE WAS POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER THE VISIT OF THE POPE."

3. THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SIGNALS FROM THE GOA IN RECENT DAYS HAVE SEEMED TO POINT THE OTHER WAY; I.E., TOWARD A DECISION TO LEAVE TAKACS WHERE HE IS FOR REASONS OF SYMBOLISM IF NOTHING ELSE. BUT UNDOUBTEDLY THERE REMAINS A STRONG PARTY IN THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT FAVORING A MORE TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF THE ARGENTINE REACTION TO OUR "BETRAYAL." AS THE BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY APPROACHES ITS CLIMAX THAT PARTY SHOULD GROW STRONGER. IN ANY EVENT, ALTHOUGH IGLESIAS ROUCO IS USUALLY UNRELIABLE, OCCASIONALLY HE HAS IT RIGHT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK IT ONLY PRUDENT THAT JOHN STEP UP HIS SCHEDULE AND PLAN TO BE HERE SOON. I UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS COMMITMENTS MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO LEAVE THIS MONTH. IF WE GET A CREDIBLE READING TO THE CONTRARY OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS HE COULD PUT OFF HIS TRAVEL. BUT OTHERWISE I THINK HE SHOULD ARRIVE BY EARLY NEXT WEEK. I WOULD REGARD IT AS MOST INADVISABLE TO TURN THE DIRECTION OF THIS MISSION OVER TO ANYONE ELSE HERE, EVEN FOR THE BRIEFEST PERIOD. SHLAUDEMAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NZ-748-7615-184

BY CIV NARADATE 11/8/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

39594 33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 3568 DTG: 150305Z JUN 82 PSN: 018753
SIT931 DATE 06/17/82 TOR: 166/05407

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #3568 1660325
O 150305Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4114

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3568
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/14/82 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) DR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, PEPR, FA, UK, AR
SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT FOR ARGENTINA?

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. TONIGHT IS A NIGHT OF MEETINGS IN THE GOA: THE JUNTA FIRST, LATER COSTA MENDEZ WITH THE JOINT STAFF IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND GALTIERI WITH THE ARMY GENERALS. THE MEDIA HAVE ANNOUNCED THE IMMINENT ARRIVAL OF GENERAL MENENDEZ, MILITARY GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER ON THE ISLANDS, BUT THAT IS AS YET UNCONFIRMED. TWO THINGS ARE CLEAR:
- THE JUNTA IS GOING TO HAVE TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SURRENDER ON THE ISLANDS. AT THIS POINT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MENENDEZ'S TRIP TO BUENOS AIRES CAME ABOUT, BUT, HOWEVER, THE JUNTA IS NOW STUCK WITH THE HUMILIATION, NOT THE COMMANDER IN THE FIELD. THAT IS A DEVELOPMENT OF CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL POLITICAL IMPORTANCE. THE THREE CHIEFS MUST BE NERVOUS ABOUT MENENDEZ AT THIS POINT. HE IS THE SENIOR ACTIVE-SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE OF A MILITARY FAMILY WITH ALMOST 40 YEARS OF HISTORY IN PLOTTING COUPS.
- THE MAJOR DECISION NOW RESTS WITH LAMI DOZO. GALTIERI AND ANAYA, IF WE GO BY WHAT THEY SAY, WANT TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT. BUT THE AIR FORCE WOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAVE TO BEAR THE BURDEN AND LAMI DOZO AND THE PILOTS MAY NOT BE THAT ENTHUSIASTIC. THEY CANNOT BE FORCED; THEY HAVE ALL THE HIGH CARDS COMING OUT OF THIS WAR AND WHAT THEY DECIDE WILL BE CRITICAL IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION IN THE TITLE OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME AS A MATTER OF COURSE THAT A PROLONGED AIR-GUERRILLA WAR AS AHEAD IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THAT IS WHAT GALTIERI HAS PROMISED, BUT I STILL THINK THAT A DEFACTO CEASE FIRE BEFORE VERY LONG IS A POSSIBILITY. THIS IS NOT SPARTA AND I HAVE NO SENSE THAT THE VAST THROGS THAT TURNED OUT FOR THE POPE ARE HUNGRY FOR THE SACRIFICES A CONTINUING WAR WOULD ENTAIL. WHATEVER WE CAN DO AT THIS POINT TO REFRAIN FROM ANY PUBLIC REMARKS INDICATING SATISFACTION IN

ARGENTINA'S DEFEAT AND TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO THE OTHER TWO ELEMENTS OF UNSC RESOLUTION 502 - CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS - WILL BE HELPFUL. HOW THE USG COMES ACROSS IN THIS MOMENT OF THE GREATEST HUMILIATION IN ARGENTINA'S HISTORY WILL BE IMPORTANT TO OUR RELATIONS FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. EVIDENCE OF QUIET SYMPATHY, GRIEF FOR THE YOUNG MEN WHO WERE SACRIFICED ON THOSE ISLANDS AND EVEN AN INDICATION OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE FRUSTRATED AMBITIONS OF THIS UNHAPPY COUNTRY WOULD BE HELPFUL.

4. THERE IS NO WAY TONIGHT TO CALCULATE WITH ANY ASSURANCE HOW THIS WILL ALL COME OUT IN TERMS OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE. AN URUGUAYAN RADIO STATION IS ALREADY REPORTING THAT COSTA MENDEZ IS RESIGNING. WHATEVER THE FACT, IN HIS CASE IT IS ONLY A QUESTION OF SOONER OR LATER. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR ROBERTO ALEMANN. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE AN UPHEAVAL IN THE ARMY, GIVEN THE PATHETIC PERFORMANCE OF THAT ARM ON EAST FALKLAND ISLAND. AS I WRITE THIS, GALTIERI IS MEETING WITH THE GENERALS AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS. HE IS NOT LIKELY TO HAVE AN EASY TIME. MEANWHILE, IT WILL TAKE A DAY OR TWO FOR THE FULL IMPACT OF THE CATASTROPHE TO SINK IN GENERALLY. THE PERONISTS, THE RETIRED GENERALS, MASSERA, GALTIERI'S ENEMIES IN THE ARMY AND ALL THE REST OF THE WOLVES WILL NEED TIME TO COLLECT THEM-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SELVES. BUT THE LONG KNIVES WILL BE OUT BEFORE LONG. OUR BEST COURSE, TO REPEAT, IS TO BE QUIETLY SYMPATHETIC. WE SHOULD HAVE A BETTER FIX TOMORROW.
SHLAUDEMANN

BUENOS AIRES 3568

DTG: 150305Z JUN 82 PSN: 018753

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4116

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ROME FOR VATICAN
E. O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PBOR, UK, AR, FA
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE: LONDON'S TERMS

1. AT 04:35 AM, JUNE 15, THE JOINT CHEIFS OF STAFF ISSUED COMMUNIQUE NUMBER 165 WHICH STATES "WOUTE: YESTERDAY, JUNE 14, 1982, THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE COMMANDER OF THE ENGLISH FORCES AND THE COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY GARRISON ON THE MALVINAS, BRIGADIER GENERAL MARIO BENJAMIN MENENDEZ. IN THAT MEETING, A DOCUMENT WAS DRAFTED IN WHICH THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES ARE ESTABLISHED. THE DOCUMENT MENTIONED WILL BE MADE PUBLIC ONCE ITS TEXT IS AVAILABLE. UNQUOTE."

2. ACCORDING TO LOCAL DYN WIRE SERVICE, HEREMY MOORE PRESENTED A LIST OF CONDITIONS "FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE TROOPS FROM THE ARCHIPIELAGO." DYN'S UN-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IDENTIFIED SOURCES CLAIM THAT THE CONDITIONS ARE : (1) IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WITH RETENTION OF PRISONERS AND ARMS CAPTURED UP UNTIL THE TIME OF THE CEASEFIRE, (2) PAYMENT OF REPARATIONS (NO FIGURE GIVEN - BUT RADIO IS SAYING BRITISH DEMAND 2.5 BILLION DOLLARS), (3) REINSTATEMENT OF THE FORMER ADMINISTRATION WITH A GOVERNOR DESIGNATED BY LONDON AND A KELPER COUNCIL, "WITH THE EVENTUAL SUPERVISION OF A THIRD COUNTRY", (4) WITHDRAWAL OF THE REMAINDER OF ARGENTINE TROOPS, THOSE NOT CAPTURED, TO THE MAINLAND. ACCORDING TO DYN'S MILITARY SOURCES, THE PROPOSAL IS "UNACCEPTABLE" AND THE SOURCES "ANTICIPATE CONTINUED ACTIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PLANES TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS." SHLAUDEMAN

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