

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: COUNTRY
FILE: Records, 1981-1985
Folder Title: Argentina (04/28/1982-05/04/1982)
Box: RAC Box 26

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 7/27/2007

File Folder ARGENTINA (04/28/1982-05/04/1982)

FOIA

F1637

Box Number 26

VEIGEL

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39503	CABLE	280100Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-1-4	1	4/28/1982	B1
39504	CABLE	280302Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-2-3	1	4/28/1982	B1
39505	CABLE	281307Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-3-2	1	4/28/1982	B1
39506	CABLE	281916Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-4-1	2	4/28/1982	B1
39507	CABLE	290145Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-5-0	2	4/29/1982	B1
39508	CABLE	292156Z APR 82 R 2/22/2019 M1962/1	2	4/29/1982	B1
39509	CABLE	292022Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-7-8	3	4/29/1982	B1
39510	CABLE	300300Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-8-7	2	4/30/1982	B1
39511	CABLE	300544Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-9-6	2	4/30/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 7/27/2007

File Folder ARGENTINA (04/28/1982-05/04/1982)

FOIA

F1637

Box Number 26

VEIGEL

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39512	CABLE	300527Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-10-4	2	4/30/1982	B1
39513	CABLE	301433Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-11-3	1	4/30/1982	B1
39514	CABLE	301751Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-12-2	1	4/30/1982	B1
39515	CABLE	311606Z APR 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-13-1	3	4/30/1982	B1
39516	CABLE	031900Z MAY 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-14-0	1	5/3/1982	B1
39517	CABLE	031522Z MAY 82 PAR 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-15-9; R 3/19/2018 M1962 #39517	2	5/3/1982	B1
39518	CABLE	030411Z MAY 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-16-8	4	5/3/1982	B1
39519	CABLE	032036Z MAY 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-17-7	1	5/3/1982	B1
39520	CABLE	032111Z MAY 82 R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-18-6	2	5/3/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 7/27/2007

File Folder ARGENTINA (04/28/1982-05/04/1982)

FOIA

F1637

Box Number 26

VEIGEL

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39521	MEMO	JAME RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE THE FALKLANDS <i>R 11/7/2017 NLR-748-26-13-19-5</i>	3	5/4/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

39503

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 2567
SIT447 DATE 04/28/82

DTG: 280100Z APR 82 PSN: 002221
TOR: 118/0257Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP FONT RENT SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2567 1180103
O 280100Z APR 82ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3438

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2567

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1 4/27/02 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PSDC, AR, UK, US
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S MESSAGES: PRISONER REPATRIATION AND
EXCLUSION ZONE WARNING
REFS: STATE 113053; STATE 113054

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT

2. I SENT BOTH MESSAGES IN WRITING TO GALTIERI AND PASSED ON THROUGH HIS AIDE THE SECRETARY'S ORAL RESERVATION WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBLE BRITISH REACTION TO THE REQUEST ON THE EXCLUSION ZONE. WE ALSO MADE AVAILABLE TO THE NAVY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SECOND MESSAGE ON THE PRISONERS.

3. THE NAVY CONTINUES TO HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE PRISONER NUMBERS THE BRITISH ARE REPORTING. WE NOTE THAT UK AMBASSADOR GRAHAM IN NATO PUT THE TOTAL NUMBER AT 196, INCLUDING 38 CIVILIANS (USNATO 2784). SHLAUDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED

Auth: NLR-7487613-14
Cw NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39504

2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
SIT446

BUENOS AIRES 2569
DATE 04/28/82

DTG: 280302Z APR 82 PSN: 002279
TOR: 118/0343Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: FONT RENT SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUEHLA #2569 1180304
Z 280302Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3440

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2569

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS 1 4/27/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJ: FALKLANDS CRISIS: JUNTA CONTINUES DELIBERATIONS
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2566

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. MINISTER OF INTERIOR SAINT JEAN TELEPHONED ME AT 2345 HOURS LOCAL TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT, RECALLING HIS COMMITMENT TO ME, HAD ASKED HIM TO STEP OUT OF THE CONTINUING MEETING TO LET ME KNOW THAT UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS STILL NOT POSSIBLE TO GIVE ME A DECISION. SAINT JEAN DESCRIBED THE ONGOING DELIBERATIONS AS VERY "COMPLEX". HE SAID HE WOULD CALL AGAIN WHEN HE HAD SOMETHING.

3. THE DYN ARGENTINE NEWS AGENCY IS CARRYING A STORY THAT OUR PROPOSAL WAS DELIVERED TO THE ARGENTINES SIMULTANEOUSLY IN WASHINGTON AND BUENOS AIRES, HERE BY ME TO ENRIQUE ROS (SIC). AN ANONYMOUS SPOKESMAN FOR THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION IN WASHINGTON IS QUOTED DESCRIBING THE PROPOSAL AS "UNACCEPTABLE." SHLAUDEMAN

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLR-748-013-23

ON NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39505 3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 4/28 2571 DTG: 281307Z APR 82 PSN: 002687
SIT444 DATE 04/28/82 TOR: 118/1412Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: D. O. 'S: UL SAW LDX COPY

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUESBA #2571 1181308
Z 281307Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3441

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2571
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR ENDERS
E. O. 12065 RDS-1 4/28/02 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS DISPUTE

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. ROS JUST TOLD ME THAT COSTA MENDEZ WILL DELIVER THE GOA'S RESPONSE IN WASHINGTON. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, ROS SAID THAT THE RESPONSE MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING TODAY BUT HE CANNOT BE SURE. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BRITISH HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO RESPOND FROM THEIR SIDE. FINALLY, HE SAID HE HAD INFORMATION FROM LONDON THAT HMG WILL BE ISSUING AN IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT WITHIN HOURS.
SHLAUDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 748-0613-2
EX NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39506 4

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2584
SIT229 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 281916Z APR 82 PSN: 003483
TOR: 118/2108Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP RENT FONT SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2584 1181930
O 281916Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3451

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2584
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 4/28/02 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS CRISIS: ARGENTINE NEGOTIATING POSITION

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE STATEMENT THIS MORNING BY PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SPOKESMAN BALTIERREZ THAT "PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL IS UNDER STUDY, THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS REMAIN OPEN" FOLLOWED HEAVY MORNING PRESS PLAY OF STATEMENTS COMING FROM THE ARGENTINES IN WASHINGTON THAT THE JUNTA HAD REJECTED THE PROPOSAL AND THAT THE GOA COULD NOT NEGOTIATE FURTHER WHILE THE BRITISH FLEET CONTINUED ITS MENANCING ADVANCE. THE GOVERNMENT HERE DECIDED TO PLAY IT PRUDENTLY FOR THE MOMENT LEAVING THE DOOR SLIGHTLY OPEN WHILE TRYING TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF REASONABLENESS.

3. I HAVE NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESS ACCOUNTS FROM WASHINGTON ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE INITIAL REACTION HERE. BUT THE LENGTHY MEETINGS AND CONSULTATIONS THROUGH THE DAY AND NIGHT YESTERDAY EVIDENTLY PRODUCED A DECISION FOR CAUTION. THE PROPOSAL WAS STUDIED THROUGHOUT THE AFTERNOON AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF INTERIOR MINISTER SAINT JEAN (ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER); IT WAS HASHED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OVER BY THE STAFFS OF THE THREE ARMED SERVICES; THE JUNTA THEN MET FROM 2030 TO 2400 HOURS AND A WORKING GROUP INCLUDING THE SECRETARY GENERALS OF THE THREE SERVICES AND UNDERSECRETARY ROS CONTINUED ON AFTERWARD. I DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT ANY VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS WAS EVER GIVEN TO ACCEPTING THE PROPOSAL. RATHER, THE EFFORT MUST HAVE BEEN TO TRY TO COME UP WITH A RESPONSE AND A COURSE OF ACTION THAT WOULD KEEP THE NEGOTIATING OPTION OPEN AND BURNISH ARGENTINA'S IMAGE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. IT IS ALSO HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THE JUNTA WANTED TO AVOID ANY RESPONSE AT ALL UNTIL THE OAS RESULTS WERE IN.

4. WE HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF REPORTS EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON AND LONDON ABOUT PURPORTED DISARRAY AND CONFLICT WITHIN THE JUNTA. THERE CLEARLY HAVE BEEN DIFFERENCES, PARTICULARLY ON HOW FAR TO GO IN THE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 740-2613-41

BY GN NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2584

DTG: 281916Z APR 82 PSN: 003483

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. BUT THE THREE CINC'S HAVE FROM THE OUTSET BEEN IN AGREEMENT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL: ARGENTINA MUST BE SEEN AS ACHIEVING CERTAIN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS, PRESENT OR FUTURE. THEY HAVE CALCULATED THAT ANYTHING LESS WOULD MEAN THEIR OWN DEMISE. THE GOA'S CLUMSY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE NECESSITY TO CONSULT WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES HAS CREATED CONFUSION AND A SENSE OF INSTABILITY IN THE GOA. BUT AS LONG AS THE QUESTION IS SOVEREIGNTY, I WOULD EXPECT THE JUNTA TO HOLD PRETTY WELL TOGETHER.

5. WE HAVE SEEN NEWS ITEMS AND REPORTED OURSELVES ON EVIDENCE THAT GALTIERI HIMSELF IS ON SHAKY GROUND. IT IS TRUE THAT, UNLIKE MRS. THATCHER, HE IS SCARCELY RIDING HIGH (LONDON 9138). THE CRISIS HAS ERODED HIS PREEMINENT POSITION WITHIN THE JUNTA; THE GOA NOW SHOWS MORE THE APPEARANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP IT HAD UNDER VIOLA AND VIDELA. BUT GALTIERI IS PROBABLY SAFE ENOUGH AS LONG AS THE CRISIS PERSISTS AND HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO GIVE WAY. THIS GOES AS WELL FOR THE OTHER TWO MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA. IN SUM, I DO NOT THINK MUCH HAS CHANGED. SOVEREIGNTY IS STILL THE ISSUE. THE REST CAN BE NEGOTIATED, NO MATTER HOW HARD A LINE ADMIRAL ANAYA AND SOME OF THE OTHERS TAKE FROM TIME TO TIME. THAT WILL HOLD TRUE ONLY, OF COURSE, UNTIL THERE IS SERIOUS BLOODSHED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. I STILL THINK THE ARGENTINES WILL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FIGHT IF THEY HAVE TO, AND WILL GIVE A FAIRLY GOOD ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES. NEGOTIATIONS THEREAFTER WILL BE A WHOLE NEW GAME.
SHLAUDEMAN

BUENOS AIRES 2584

DTG: 281916Z APR 82 PSN: 003483

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39507

6

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5266
SIT220 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 290145Z APR 82 PSN: 004104
TOR: 119/0415Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT FONT RENT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5266 1190147
O O 290145Z APR 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 5174

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3860
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 115266
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 4/28/12
TAGS: PBOR, US, FA, UK, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH COSTA-MENDEZ

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SECRETARY MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 28. AMBASSADORS ENDERS AND FIGUEROA AND MR. SERVICE (NOTETAKER) WERE PRESENT.
3. THE ESSENTIAL MESSAGE COSTA-MENDEZ CONVEYED WAS THE FOLLOWING: THE GOA BELIEVES THE RIO TREATY MFM RESOLUTION STRENGTHENED ITS POSITION WITH ARGENTINE AND WORLD OPINION, BUT REALIZES THERE ARE ONLY TWO OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE: A CONTINUATION OF THE U. S. EFFORT OR THROUGH THE U. N. THE U. N. ROUTE WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR RE-ADJUSTMENTS IN ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY WHICH THE GOA DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE (AND COSTA-MENDEZ EVEN LESS), AND THE OUTCOME WOULD BE UNCERTAIN. THEREFORE, ARGENTINA WANTS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE U. S. EFFORT TO CONTINUE. HOWEVER, IT CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS; THE GOA HAS DIFFICULTIES WITH WHAT IT PERCEIVES AS LACK OF A DEADLINE FOR RESOLVING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE, WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD, AND WITH THE POLITICAL RESOLUTION ARTICLE, PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCE TO THE WISHES AND INTERESTS OF THE INHABITANTS.

4. THE SECRETARY TOLD COSTA-MENDEZ THAT ONLY THE U. S. IS IN A POSITION TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. HE UNDERSTOOD THE REFERENCE TO ADJUSTMENTS IN ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY, BUT DID NOT BELIEVE ANY ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT COULD UNDERTAKE A CLOSE ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIETS. AS FOR THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSAL, THE SECRETARY TOLD COSTA-MENDEZ THAT WE SEE NO PROSPECT FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 748-761350

CX NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

7

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5266

DTG: 290145Z APR 82 PSN: 004104

BEING ACCEPTED BY THE BRITISH. THE UK HAS SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH IT AS IT STANDS; HOWEVER, IF THE GOA AGREES TO THE PROPOSAL, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN PREVAIL UPON THE UK TO ACCEPT, PROVIDED FULL-SCALE FIGHTING HAS NOT YET BEGUN. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION (THE SECRETARY STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE BRITISH ARE KEEPING THEIR PLANS TO THEMSELVES), A BRITISH ATTACK COULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS FRIDAY.

5. THE SECRETARY AND ENDERS WENT OVER THE THREE POINTS COSTA-MENDEZ HAD LISTED AS STUMBLING BLOCKS, POINTING OUT THAT THE ESSENTIAL CONCERNS OF THE GOA HAVE BEEN PRESERVED WITH ONLY MINOR MODIFICATIONS FROM THE TEXT AT THE TIME THE SECRETARY DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES. IN OTHER RESPECTS, PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY, THE TEXT HAS BEEN IMPROVED. IT IS IN OUR JUDGMENT A FAIR AND REASONABLE PROPOSAL, ONE WHICH THE U. S. CAN STAND BEHIND. THE SECRETARY THEN TOLD COSTA-MENDEZ THE PROBLEM BOILS DOWN TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE GOA HAS CONFIDENCE IN THE ROLE OF THE U. S. HE TOLD COSTA-MENDEZ THAT THE U. S. DOES NOT ACT FOR THE U. K., THAT WE HAVE OUR OWN INTERESTS AT STAKE, BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN LATIN AMERICA, AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS WHERE THIS PROCESS WILL LEAD AND WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME PERIODS. HOWEVER, IF THE GOA CONCLUDES DEFINITELY THAT IT CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL, WHERE SHOULD ALSO BE NO DOUBT THAT THE U. S. WILL HAVE TO

SECSTATE WASHDC 5266
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 290145Z APR 82 PSN: 004104

COME DOWN STRONGLY ON THE SIDE OF THE UK.

6. COSTA-MENDEZ SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT AND GET BACK TO THE SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE MOST ESSENTIAL CHANGES THAT THE GOA REQUIRES IN THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT WE MUST HAVE THAT RESPONSE TONIGHT. HAIG-

SECSTATE WASHDC 5266

DTG: 290145Z APR 82 PSN: 004104

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

39508

8

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2637
SIT189 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 292156Z APR 82 PSN: 005563
TOR: 119/2323Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT FONT RENT PUBS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: R E D T A G

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2637 1192215
O 292156Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3482

S E C R E T BUENOS AIRES 2637
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 4/29/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, ECON, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS CRISIS: U. S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS THE DEPARTMENT NO DOUBT REALIZES, THE ARGENTINE REACTION TO THE IMPOSITION BY THE U. S. OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ORDER THAN THE RATHER MUTED RESPONSE TO THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE EC, AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND. THE GOA AND MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE ARGENTINES TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT WE WILL SUPPORT THE UK POLITICALLY IF THE SECRETARY'S EFFORTS FAIL. OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE BRITISH IN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND LOGISTICS IS ALREADY ASSUMED AND, ALTHOUGH GALLING TO THE ARGENTINE MILITARY, CAN CONTINUE TO BE SWALLOWED IF WE ACT QUIETLY.

3. BUT ANNOUNCEMENT OF U. S. ECONOMIC SACTIONS WOULD BE A TERRIBLE BLOW, EVEN MORE SYMBOLICALLY THAN MATERIALLY. THE ARGENTINES IN THEIR CURRENTLY AGITATED STATE WOULD TAKE IT AS A DECLARATION HOSTILITIES. IT MIGHT WELL DO ALMOST AS MUCH TO PRESERVE THIS COUNTRY'S FRAGILE NATIONAL UNITY AS THE ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH FLEET. IT WOULD CERTAINLY PUT AN END TO OUR CAPACITY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO ACT AS A NEGOTIATING INTERMEDIARY - AND SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED OUTCOME WILL BE REQUIRED, EVEN AFTER SIGNIFICANT FIGHTING. U. S. SANCTIONS WOULD ALSO IN MY JUDGEMENT PRECLUDE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME EXERCISE OF INFLUENCE BY OUR FRIENDS HERE - AND WE STILL HAVE QUITE A FEW, ALMOST ALL OF WHOM ARE MODERATES. OTHERS WILL MEASURE THE PROBABLE IMPACT ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA, BUT MY OWN EXPERIENCE IN THE REGION SUGGESTS THAT SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA WOULD DO US DAMAGE IN ALMOST EVERY COUNTRY.

4. ONE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF U. S. SANCTIONS IS THAT THEY WOULD BE THE FINAL BLOW TO A REELING ARGENTINE ECONOMY AND IN TURN WOULD BRING DOWN GALTIERI. THAT SEEMS TO ME HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE AND, IN ANY EVENT, I THINK THE ADVENT OF A GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY BITTER-

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1962

~~SECRET~~

BY FW NARA DATE 4/22/19

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

9

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2637

DTG: 292156Z APR 82 PSN: 005563

END WARRIORS THE MORE LIKELY OUTCOME SHOULD GALTIERI FALL IN THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. I DOUBT THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE GOING TO CAVE IN BEFORE THEY ARE SEVERELY BLOODIED IN BATTLE AND DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SANCTION BY US WOULD BRING THEM TO THEIR KNEES MORE QUICKLY.

5. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO GAUGE THE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS THAT MUST GO INTO A DECISION ON SANCTIONS. I AM AWARE THAT THEY ARE IMPORTANT. BUT I DO FEEL IT MY OBLIGATION TO CALL ATTENTION TO WHAT WILL SURELY BE THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR U. S. INTERESTS HERE IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A DECISION.
SHLAUDEMAM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39509 10

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 2629
SIT185 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 292022Z APR 82 PSN: 005719
TOR: 120/0047Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP FONT SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2629 1192100
O 292022Z APR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3474

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5186
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 8057
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1633
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2376
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1227
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 119
BT

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2629

EXDIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 4/29/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLAND CRISIS: THE PUBLIC AND MILITARY MOOD
REF: LONDON 9138

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE PUBLIC MOOD HERE IS INCREASINGLY PESSIMISTIC. BUT GLOOM AND SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE MALVINAS ADVENTURE DO NOT MEAN THAT THE JUNTA CAN BE SEEN AS BACKING DOWN -- QUITE THE CONTRARY. THE MILITARY ARE DIFIANT AND, IN THE CASE OF THE NAVY AT LEAST, ANXIOUS FOR GLORY. DESPITE THE DARK OUTLOOK, MANY ARGENTINES APPEAR GRATIFIED THAT ARGENTINA IS NOW ON CENTER STAGE. NATIONALIST HOPE THE CRISIS WILL BRING A NEW SENSE OF NATIONHOOD TO THIS FRUSTRATED COUNTRY. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. UNLIKE MRS. THATCHER (REFTEL), GALTIERI'S PUBLIC SUPPORT AT THIS JUNCTURE IS SHAKY AND HIS CAPACITY TO DETERMINE EVENTS SEVERELY RESTRICTED. IN THE ABSENCE OF OPINION POLLS AND IN AN INTIMIDATING CLIMATE OF INFLAMED NATIONALISM, THE UNDERLYING PUBLIC MOOD IS MORE DIFFICULT TO READ HERE THAN IN BRITAIN. BUT WE NOTE GROWING CYNICISM ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ACTIONS -- A FEELING AT FIRST CONFINED TO THE MORE SOPHISTICATED MODERATES BUT NOW QUITE WIDESPREAD THAT GALTIERI AND HIS COLLEAGUES BLUNDERED BADLY IN SEIZING THE MALVINAS FOR NARROW REASONS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. WE ALSO SENSE FEAR AND DEFEATISM AS THE BRITISH FLEET APPROACHES. NO ONE SEEMS TO BELIEVE THE NAVY'S TALES OF SPIRITED AND CONTINUING RESISTANCE ON SOUTH GEORGIA; AND THE CROWD AT TUESDAY NIGHT'S CGT RALLY WAS NOTABLY UNENTHUSIASTIC. MANY OF OUR SOURCES IN THE BUSINESS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLC-748-7613-78

BY CAS NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 2629

DTG: 292022Z APR 82 PSN: 005719

AND FINANCIAL COMMUNITIES ARE SUNK IN GLOOM, CONVINCED THAT THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY IS BEING WRECKED.

4. BUT THE SIGNS OF THIS DARK MOOD DO NOT MEAN THAT THE GOA COULD AFFORD TO BE SEEN AS BACKING DOWN UNDER THE THREAT OF THE BRITISH FLEET. MOST ARGENTINES, TAUGHT FROM CHILDHOOD THAT IT IS SO, BELIEVE THE MALVINAS RIGHTFULLY BELONG TO THIS COUNTRY. HOWEVER THE MORE SENSIBLE MAY QUESTION THE DECISION TO INVAD, WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT AFFIRMATION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE TAKEN AS BETRAYAL OF THE NATION BY THE MAJORITY HERE. GALTIERI AND THE REST OF THE JUNTA UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE UNPLEASANT VISIONS OF ANGRY PERONIST MOBS IN THE STREETS IF THAT WERE TO OCCUR.

5. THE JUNTA MUST CONCERN ITSELF MORE WITH THE STATE OF OPINION WITHIN THE MILITARY. ARGENTINA'S ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY THE KEY OFFICER CORPS OF THE ARMY, HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF ILL-DISCIPLINE AND REFUSAL TO ACCEPT WITHOUT CHALLENGE CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS FROM THE TOP. THE MOOD IN THE MILITARY, AS BEST WE CAN READ IT, IS AT THE MOMENT VERY HARD-LINE. ALTHOUGH THE GOA HAS TALKED ABOUT FULFILLING THE TERMS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AND OF WITHDRAWING ITS TROOPS FROM THE MALVINAS IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATED INTERIM SETTLEMENT, WE ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT AN ORDER TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE OBEYED -- NOR ARE WE CERTAIN THAT THE JUNTA HAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EVER SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATED WITHDRAWAL, DESPITE ITS PROTESTATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY AND THE DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. EVEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS NOW TELLING FOREIGN DIPLOMATS HERE THAT THE TROOPS COULD ONLY WITHDRAW IF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS WERE "GUARANTEED."

6. THE ARGENTINE NAVY IS IN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT SITUATION. THAT SERVICE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN UNSEATING EX-PRESIDENT VIOLA AND PUTTING GALTIERI IN HIS PLACE. ADMIRAL ANAYA PRESSED FOR THE MALVINAS ADVENTURE AND WAS PROBABLY INSTRUMENTAL IN MAKING UP GALTIERI'S MIND IN FAVOR OF THE RECKLESS MOVE. THE NAVY IS NOW THREATENED WITH IGNOMONY WHEN THE TRUTH OF WHAT HAPPENED ON SOUTH GEORGIA BECOMES KNOWN. GALTIERI WOULD BE TURNING HIS BACK ON A SOURCE OF CRITICAL SUPPORT IF HE WERE TO TRY TO DEPRIVE THE NAVY OF THE CHANCE TO REDEEM ITS HONOR.

7. CURIOUSLY MIXED WITH THE FEAR AND PESSIMISM HERE -- AMONG BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIANS -- IS NOTICEABLE SATISFACTION AND EVEN PRIDE AT FINDING ARGENTINA THE FOCUS OF SO MUCH INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION. THIS IS A COUNTRY THAT CONSTANTLY BEMOANS ITS FAILURE TO ACHIEVE THE GREATNESS THAT APPEARED TO BE ITS FUTURE 60 YEARS OR SO AGO. NATIONALISTS IN THE MILITARY AND ELSEWHERE HAVE IDENTIFIED ARGENTINA'S LACK OF TRUE NATIONAL INTEGRATION -- THE ABSENCE OF AN AWARENESS OF NATIONHOOD -- AS A PRIMARY CAUSE OF THAT FAILURE. THEY SEE THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE UK AS THE INSTRUMENT WITH WHICH TO FORGE NATIONHOOD. (WE FIND NATIONAL UNITY HERE STILL SUPERFICIAL AND DOUBT THAT THE PRESCRIPTION WILL WORK.) FINALLY, THE NATIONALIST HAVE SUDDENLY STOPPED DESCRIBING ARGENTINA AS EUROPEAN, AS SOMETHING OF AN ENCLAVE IN LATIN AMERICA. FOR THEM ARGENTINA HAS NOW RETURNED TO THIS CONTINENT AND IS DEFENDING ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. NONE OF THIS AUGURS WELL FOR PEACE. SHLAUDEMAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

12

PAGE 03 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 2629

DTG: 292022Z APR 82 PSN: 005719

BUENOS AIRES 2629

DTG: 292022Z APR 82 PSN: 005719

~~SECRET~~

13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


Mr President

Attached is a draft press statement
Al proposes for your consideration
on the Falklands.

He would deliver it from the State
Department at 11:30 today.

It will be discussed at the 9:30
NSC meeting today. Please note
in particular the sanctions listed
on page 4.

Bud McFarlane



Draft
9:45 PM
4/25/82
14

PRESS STATEMENT
BY
THE HONORABLE
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

MR

The South Atlantic crisis is about to enter a new and dangerous phase, in which large-scale military action is likely. I would like to bring you up to date on what we have done, and why, and what we must now do.

From the outset of the crisis, the United States has been guided by the basic principle of the rule of law. We have made a determined effort to restore peace through implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 502. That Resolution calls for:

- an end to hostilities;
- the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands; and
- a diplomatic settlement of the fundamental dispute.

The United States made this extraordinary effort because the stakes in human lives and international order required it. A fundamental tenet of United States foreign policy is that change in the world must not result from the use of force. The collapse of that principle could only bring chaos and suffering.

We also made this effort because the crisis raised vital issues of hemispheric solidarity at a time when Communist adversaries seek positions of influence on the mainland of the Americas and latent territorial disputes in much of the hemisphere call for unity and the resolute defense of principle.

We acted as well because the United States has the confidence of the parties. The United Kingdom is our closest ally, and Prime Minister Thatcher's Government looked to us to pursue a peaceful solution. We have also recently developed a better relationship with Argentina, as part of our success in revitalizing the community of American states. President Galtieri also requested our involvement.

Under the direction of President Reagan, I participated in many days of intense discussion with the parties -- in London, in Buenos Aires, and here in Washington -- in search of a framework for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 502. Our initial aim was to clarify the position of the parties and to offer suggestions on how those positions might be reconciled. We took no position on the merits of either the British or Argentine claims to the islands.

As the prospects for more intense hostilities arose we put forth an American proposal. It represented our best estimate of what the two parties could reasonably be expected to accept, and was based squarely on our own principles and concern for the rule of law.

We regard this as a fair and sound proposal. It involves: a cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of both Argentine and British forces; termination of sanctions; restoration of interim local Administration; procedures for encouraging cooperation in the development of the Islands; and a framework for negotiations on a final settlement, taking into account the interests of both sides and the wishes of the inhabitants.

We had reason to hope that the United Kingdom would consider a settlement along the lines of our proposal, but Argentina informed us yesterday that it could not accept it. Argentina's position remains that it must receive an assurance now of eventual sovereignty, or an expanding de facto role in governing the islands.

The United States has thus far refrained from adopting measures in response to the seizure of the islands that could have interfered with our ability to work with both sides in the search for peace. The British Government has

shown complete understanding for this position. Now, however, in light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the US cannot and will not condone the use of force to resolve disputes. The President has therefore ordered:

- the suspension of all military exports to Argentina;
- the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales;
- the suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees; and
- the suspension of Commodity Credit Corporation loans.

The President has also directed that the United States will respond positively to requests for materiel support for British forces. There will, of course, be no direct US military involvement.

American policy will continue to be guided by our concerns for the rule of law and our desire to facilitate an early and fair settlement. The United States remains ready to assist the parties in finding that settlement. A strictly military outcome cannot endure over time. In the end, there will have to be a negotiated outcome acceptable to the interested parties. Otherwise, we will all face unending hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic.

~~SECRET~~

39510

18

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6645
SIT183 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 300300Z APR 82 PSN: 005973
TOR: 120/0443Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT FONT RENT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6645 1200308
O 300300Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 116645
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 4-29-02 (BREMER, L. P.)

TAGS: AR, FA, UK

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER
COSTA MENDEZ

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE FOLLOWING LETTER FOR COSTA MENDEZ WAS DELIVERED
TO THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY AT 10:30 P.M. APRIL 29 FOR
TRANSMITTAL TO COSTA MENDEZ IN NEW YORK. THE EMBASSY
WILL ALSO TRANSMIT TEXT DIRECTLY TO BUENOS AIRES.
BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR NICANOR:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 29. I DEEPLY REGRET
THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS STILL NOT ABLE TO ACCEPT THE
PROPOSAL FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION THAT WE HAVE DEVELOPED
IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH YOURSELF AND PRESIDENT GALTIERI
AND WITH BRITISH LEADERS.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONTINUING CONCERNS. I HAVE COME
TO HAVE A DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE ARGENTINE COMMITMENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO THIS NATIONAL CAUSE, AND FOR THE FRUSTRATION YOU
HAVE FELT IN THE LONG YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IT
HAS ALWAYS BEEN CLEAR THAT A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO
BOTH SIDES COULD NOT SATISFY THE MOST BASIC DEMANDS
OF EITHER, AT LEAST DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD DURING
WHICH FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND PEACE REESTABLISHED.

I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EXPRESSIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND
SATISFACTION WITH THE EFFORT I HAVE UNDERTAKEN AT THE
DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN. WE DID SO NOT ONLY OUT
OF OUR FRIENDSHIP FOR BOTH COUNTRIES, BUT BECAUSE
OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRED US TO DO EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO PREVENT FURTHER CONFLICT. WE HAVE BEEN
GUIDED IN THIS EFFORT BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
502, BY OUR OWN FIRM PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE USE OF
FORCE, AND BY THE IMPERATIVES OF THE RULE OF LAW.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLR 740-26-13-8-7

~~SECRET~~

BY Or NARA DATE 11/11/7

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

19

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6645

DTG: 300300Z APR 82 PSN: 005973

IN CARRYING OUT THIS DIFFICULT TASK, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO TREAT BOTH COUNTRIES ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS. THE PROPOSAL WE PRESENTED TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON TUESDAY MORNING IS A FAIR AND REASONABLE SOLUTION. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BROUGHT PEACE AND THAT ITS LONG TERM RESULTS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

WHILE WE CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND, AND WILL DO EVERYTHING THAT WE CAN TO ASSIST SUCH A SOLUTION, WE HAVE NOW ENTERED A NEW PHASE IN THIS DIFFICULT AND TRAGIC CONFRONTATION. AS WE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE SETTLEMENT OF SUCH DISPUTES BY THE USE OF FORCE. IN THIS RESPECT, IT WAS YOUR GOVERNMENT WHICH PRECIPITATED THE CRISIS BY ITS USE OF FORCE APRIL 2.

ACCORDINGLY, I WILL MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT APRIL 30 EXPLAINING OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND NOTING YOUR GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL WE PUT FORWARD. I WILL POINT OUT THAT WE HAD REASON TO HOPE THAT THE UK GOVERNMENT COULD CONSIDER A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES WE PROPOSED. I WILL ALSO INDICATE THE STEPS THE U. S. BELIEVES IT MUST NOW TAKE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FIELDS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 6645

DTG: 300300Z APR 82 PSN: 005973

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN ADDITION, BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES, WE ARE TODAY ADVISING AMERICAN CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL TO ARGENTINA. IN THAT REGARD, I AM CONCERNED THAT UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION MAY NOT BE FULLY UNDERSTOOD IN ARGENTINA AND THAT SOME ELEMENTS MAY TAKE ACTIONS THAT COULD ENDANGER THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF U. S. CITIZENS. IF THAT SHOULD HAPPEN, THE REACTION IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE SWIFT AND OVERWHELMING. PRESIDENT GALTIERI ASSURED ME DURING MY MOST RECENT TRIP TO BUENOS AIRES THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ANY SUCH INCIDENTS AGAINST OFFICIAL OR PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS. WE DEPEND ON THAT ASSURANCE AND ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY THAT WE WILL BE CONSIDERING OTHER MEASURES IN THE COMING DAYS WHICH WOULD HAVE EVEN GREATER IMPACT ON YOUR COUNTRY AND OUR RELATIONS. I HOPE THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO TAKE SUCH ADDITIONAL STEPS, BUT YOU MUST KNOW THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING THEM AND THAT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, THEY WILL BECOME A VERY REAL POSSIBILITY.

I PRAY THAT YOUR PEOPLE AND THOSE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN BE SPARED THE HARDSHIP AND HUMAN TRAGEDY OF RENEWED CONFLICT. WE REMAIN PREPARED TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION AT ANY TIME YOUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WE COULD AGAIN SERVE THAT ROLE.

SINCERELY,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
END TEXT. HAIG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

39511

20

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6672
SIT181 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 300544Z APR 82 PSN: 006077
TOR: 120/0646Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP FONT SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6672 1200554
O 300544Z APR 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5194

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3929
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 116672

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4-29-02

TAGS: FA, UKUS, AR

SUBJECT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: COSTA MENDEZ LETTER

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM FOREIGN
MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR TAKACS
TO ENDERS APRIL 29.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. SECRETARY:

WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENT THAT YOU TRANS-
MITTED TO US, COMPARING IT WITH PREVIOUS PROPOSALS AND
WITH THE POINTS OF VIEW THAT WE HAVE MAINTAINED IN OUR
VARIOUS MEETINGS. THAT ANALYSIS REVEALS SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES, SOME OF WHICH RAISE PROBLEMS THAT MUST
BE OVERCOME.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY INDICATED TO YOU, ARGENTINA'S
OBJECTIVE IS THE RECOGNITION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER

THE MALVINAS ISLANDS. THAT CENTRAL ELEMENT OF OUR
DISCUSSIONS IS THE ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACTIONS
UNDERTAKEN BY MY COUNTRY AND. AS I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY
OF STATING TO YOU ON MANY OCCASIONS, IS FOR US AN
UNRENOUNCEABLE GOAL.

ALONG WITH THE QUESTION ON SOVEREIGNTY, THE CURRENT
CRISIS RAISES THE IMMEDIATE NEED TO ESTABLISH A PROVISIONAL
REGIME FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS AS AN ESSENTIAL
STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SEPARATING THE TWO MILITARY FORCES
AND AS A REASONABLE PAUSE IN VIEW OF THE LOGICAL IMPOSSI-
BILITY OF FORMALLY AGREEING UPON THEIR FINAL DESTINY
AT THIS TIME.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NUC-748-76-B-9-6

~~SECRET~~

BY CX NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

21

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6672

DTG: 300544Z APR 82 PSN: 006077

THE TALKS THAT WE HAVE HELD HAVE BEEN FUNDAMENTALLY BASED ON THESE TWO QUESTIONS -- RECOGNITION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIME OF PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION. THE REMAINING PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED MORE READILY IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE TWO POINTS THAT I HAVE JUST MENTIONED.

WHAT IS CERTAIN IS THAT BOTH ARE CLOSELY RELATED. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE RECOGNITION OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY ARE IMPRECISE, WE DEEM NECESSARY, IF WE WISH TO AVOID A RETURN TO THE FRUSTRATING SITUATION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO APRIL 2, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MECHANISM THAT GIVE US GREATER POWER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS.

IF, ON THE CONTRARY, IT WERE CLEAR THAT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY WILL ULTIMATELY BE RECOGNIZED, WE WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE WITH RESPECT TO PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION.

THE DOCUMENT THAT YOU SENT FALLS SHORT OF ARGENTINE DEMANDS AND DOES NOT SATISFY ITS MINIMUM ASPIRATIONS ON EITHER OF THE TWO POINTS. ON THE CONTRARY, UNFAVORABLE CHANGES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN BOTH. REGARDING ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS, THE NUMBER OF ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVES HAS BEEN REDUCED, AND THERE IS NO LONGER THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING MY COUNTRY'S CONTROL IN THE EVENT THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION DRAG ON WITHOUT A SOLUTION BEING FOUND. WE THUS FACE THE DEFINITE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POSSIBILITY THAT A PREDOMINATELY BRITISH ADMINISTRATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITH NO FIXED TIME OF EXPIRATION. AS CONCERNS THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, ALL PRECISION REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY HAS BEEN ABANDONED, AND A NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN INTRODUCED, A VITAL REFERENDUM TO DETERMINE THE "WISHES" OF THE INHABITANTS, IN OPEN OPPOSITION TO UNITED NATIONS

RESOLUTION 2065 AND TO THE POSITION UNWAVERINGLY MAINTAINED BY ARGENTINA.

YOU REALIZE, MR. SECRETARY, THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT THESE CHANGES. IN MY OPINION, OTHER FORMULAS MUST BE FOUND, - A TASK FOR WHICH WE WILL ALWAYS REMAIN AT YOUR DISPOSAL. THEY SHOULD REFLECT THE EQUILIBRIUM TO WHICH I REFERRED EARLIER IN ORDER TO BALANCE ADEQUATELY THE DATA REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY WITH PROVISIONS FOR THE PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS. THESE PROVISIONS SHOULD BE OF FIXED DURATION AND ALLOW FOR PROGRESSIVE ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION OR, FAILING THAT, OF SUCH PRECISION THAT THEY ASSURE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF ARGENTINA WITHIN A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME.

IF THIS ARGENTINE POSITION WERE UNDERSTOOD, AGREEMENT WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY FACILITATED, AND THE FINAL DRAFTING OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD PRESENT NO INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES.

I THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR ARDUOUS EFFORTS, AND ASSURE YOU, MR. SECRETARY, OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ. END TEXT. HAIG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39512

22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2640
SIT182 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 300527Z APR 82 PSN: 006080
TOR: 120/0647Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT PUBS RENT FONT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUEHLA #2640 1200529
Z 300527Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3485

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2640
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-2 4/30/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJ: FALKLANDS CRISIS: PRESPECTIVE US MEASURES
REF: GILLESPIE/KING SECURE TELEPHONE CALL

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF SUBJECT PHONE CALL, I ASKED TO SEE PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND WAS RECEIVED AT MIDNIGHT. ARMA ACCOMPANIED ME AS HE HAS THROUGHOUT THESE CRITICAL MEETINGS.
2. I TOLD GALTIERI THAT WE CAME WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH THE ONLY PRUPOSE OF SEEING WHAT WE COULD DO TO HEAD OFF A FATAL CONFRONTATION. I POINTED OUT TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL AND THAT WE WOULD ANNOUNCE TOMORROW SEVERAL MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. DURING MORE THAN AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION, HE DEMONSTRATED NO GIVE WHATSOEVER ON THE PROPOSAL.
3. I REPEATEDLY ASKED HIM WHAT HE SAW AS A WAY OUT OF THIS IMPASSE. HIS RESPONSE WAS, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STAND DOWN TO GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I JUST AS REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT SUCH A BACK OFF WOULD GIVE ARGENTINA THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
VICTORY IT SOUGHT.

4. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, AND ON MY OWN INITIATIVE, I SUGGESTED TO GALTIERI THAT THE GOA MIGHT ANNOUNCE UNILATERALLY A WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM THE MALVINAS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH. HE SEEMED TO TAKE THIS SUGGESTION SERIOUSLY, WROTE IT DOWN, BUT SAID AGAIN, AS HE HAD SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE, THAT HE WAS ONLY ONE OF THREE WHO MADE THESE DECISIONS.

5. I RECOMMEND MOST STRONGLY THAT WE NOT REPEAT NOT ANNOUNCE THE MEASURES CONTEMPLATED UNTIL I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO FOLLOW UP WITH GALTIERI TOMORROW MORNING. I THINK THERE IS STILL A CHANCE, ALTHOUGH A SLIGHT ONE, THAT WE CAN HOLD THESE PEOPLE OFF.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MLI 748-761310-4
by CN NARA DATE 11/2/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

23

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2640

DTG: 300527Z APR 82 PSN: 006080

6. BOTH ARMA AND I (AND GALTIERI PARTICULARLY LISTENED TO THE FORMER) BORE DOWN VERY HEAVILY ON THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR ARGENTINA NOT REPEAT NOT TO TAKE THE FIRST OFFENSIVE ACTION. GALTIERI SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY STOPPED SUCH ACTIONS THREE TIMES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, BUT INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT DO SO FOR MUCH LONGER. HE MADE A POINT, AS WE ALL KNOW, THAT THE NAVY IS HUNGRY FOR ACTION. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES PLAN TO RE-SUPPLY THE ISLANDS TOMORROW (APRIL 30) BY AIR ESCORTED BY MILITARY AIR CRAFT.

7. GALTIERI SEEMED TO ME AND TO ARMA ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY OUT WITHIN THE VERY TIGHT CONSTRAINTS IN WHICH HE OPERATES. HE SAID AGAIN THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST ONE TO FIRE AND EMPHASIZED TO US THAT HE HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL IN PREVENTING THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES FROM GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE. HE CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY PROMISING TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ME, PARTICULARLY ON THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MALVINAS. I THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE GOTTEN THROUGH TO HIM AND IF WE ARE ABLE TO OFFER HIM A LITTLE TIME THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD.

SHLAUDEMANN

BUENOS AIRES 2640

DTG: 300527Z APR 82 PSN: 006080

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

34513

24

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 2658
SIT178 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 301433Z APR 82 PSN: 006656
TOR: 120/1507Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUESBA #2658 1201434
Z 301433Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3494

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2658
NODIS

EO 12065: RDS-1, 3 4/30/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS CRISIS: GALTIERI'S POSITION
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2640

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WENT BACK TO SEE GALTIERI THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE HAD THOUGHT OVER MY SUGGESTION OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL AND HAD DISCUSSED IT EARLY THIS MORNING BY TELEPHONE WITH THE OTHER TWO MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA. THEIR CONCLUSION WAS THAT ARGENTINA COULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE SUCH A STEP UNILATERALLY BECAUSE IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE CEDING TO U. S. PRESSURE. GALTIERI MADE A POINT OF SHOWING ME THE HEADLINE IN TODAY'S "CONVICCION," WHICH READS "REAGAN OPTS FOR MRS. THATCHER." IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, HE CONFIRMED THAT THIS REFLECTED THE NAVY'S POSITION.

3. GALTIERI SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS FROM THE LAMVINAS IF HE COULD GET SOMETHING SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM THE OTHER SIDE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THAT MIGHT BE BUT THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A STATEMENT FROM LONDON INDICATING A BRITISH DISPOSITION TO MATCH HIS MOVE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. I SAID THIS APPEARS UNLIKELY BUT I WOULD PASS IT ON. GALTIERI LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT HE WANTS PEACE. HE ALSO LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT HE IS UNDER EXTREMELY HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE NAVY. I SHOULD NOTE THAT HIS NAVAL AIDE IN THE CASA ROSADA TRIED TO PREVENT ME FROM SEEING THE PRESIDENT BY REFUSING TO PASS ON THE CALL ASKING FOR AN INTERVIEW.

5. WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION BY GENERAL MEYER, I THINK THAT WOULD ONLY BE USEFUL IN THE EVENT WE HAD SOMETHING TO OFFER FROM THE BRITISH SIDE. IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL INDEED.
SHLAUDEMAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NZ-748-2613-113

BY CA NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

39514 25

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 2674 DTG: 301751Z APR 82 PSN: 007178
SIT651 DATE 05/11/82 TOR: 120/2035Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB FONT RENT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2674 1201759
O 301751Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3503

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2674
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR ENDERS
E.O. 12065: GDS 4/30/88 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBQR, MILI, ASEC, AR
SUBJ: EMBASSY SECURITY

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, I INTEND TO KEEP THE EMBASSY AS EMPTY AS POSSIBLE TOMORROW AND SUNDAY. THIS MEANS THAT WE WILL SUSPEND OUR SITREPS FOR THE NEXT TWO DAYS AND REPORT ONLY ESSENTIAL, URGENT ITEMS.
SHLAUDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NZ 748-763-12-2

BY CN NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

39815

26

PAGE 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 2668
SIT170 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 311606Z APR 82 PSN: 007188
TOR: 120/2041Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS FONT RENT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2668 1201726
O 311606Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3498

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 2668

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS: 4:30/97 (RUSER, C.W.) OR-M

TAGS: PBOR, MILI, AR, FA, UK

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF JUAN GARCIA

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM, AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF GARCIA STATED:

- ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO OPEN FIRE;
- THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RESPONSE WOULD BE GRADUATED; I.E., IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE BRITISH ATTACK;
- AN ATTACK ON PORT STANLEY AIRPORT WOULD TRIGGER A FULL-SCALE ATTACK ON THE FLEET ITSELF;
- ALMOST ANY ENGAGEMENT WAS LIKELY TO LEAD TO RAPID ESCALATION.

3. UNDER QUESTIONING GARCIA SEEMED TO RULE OUT A MAJOR PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST THE BRITISH TASK FORCE AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH NOT COMPLETELY SO.

GARCIA REITERATED THE FAMILIAR ARGUMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT PRESENT A PEACE PLAN TO ITS PEOPLE THAT DID NOT ASSURE SOVEREIGNTY. CLEARLY, GARCIA WAS NOT CANDID CONCERNING PRESSURES BY THE NAVY FOR A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST THE BRITISH FLEET. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 29, DCM WAS INVITED BY AIR FORCE CHIEF JUAN GARCIA, A LONGSTANDING FRIEND, FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. GARCIA SAID THE BRITISH HAD ALREADY LANDED SOME COMMANDOS FROM SUBMARINES. THE ARGENTINE FORCES WERE TRYING TO FIND THEM. IF THESE TROOPS WORE UNIFORMS, THEY WOULD BE TREATED ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PRISONERS OF WAR. IF THEY TRIED TO MINGLE WITH THE ISLAND POPULATION MEASURES TO CONTROL CIVILIANS WOULD BECOME NECESSARY. GARCIA ALLEGED TE ARGENTINE FORCES DID NOT HAVE AN IDENTITY SYSTEM FOR CIVILIANS IN PLACE AND THUS THE FORCES COULD NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ISLANDERS AND BRITISH TROOPS. DCM EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT GARCIA STATEMENT, THE ISLAND POPULATION WAS SMALL AND CERTAINLY THE ARGENTINE TROOPS KNEW THE ISLANDERS BY NOW, WHETHER THERE WAS A FORMAL IDENTITY SYSTEM OR NOT. GARCIA REMAINED FIRM. ANY MILITARY AUTHORITY WOULD TAKE MEASURES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NR-748-2013-13-1

BY CN NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

27

PAGE 02 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 2668

DTG: 311606Z APR 82 PSN: 007188

TO PROTECT ITS FORCES UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. GEN. GARCIA CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT INITIATE HOSTILITIES. WAS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO STOP THE BRITISH AND TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. IF ATTACKED, THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE WOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE BRITISH OPERATIONS. ARGENTINA WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BEGIN ITS OWN MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH A FULL-SCALE ATTACK AGAINST THE BRITISH FLEET SUCH AS IF THE BRITISH ESTABLISHED A LIMITED BEACHHEAD OF 100,5000 OR 1,000 MEN, HE CLAIMED. MUCH DEPENDED ON CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A HIGH RISK OF RAPID ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING. (GARCIA PROFESSED CONSIDERABLE RESPECT FOR THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE HARRIER AIRCRAFT AND HE ALSO SHOWED AWARENESS THAT THE SHIPS WERE HEAVILY DEFENDED WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILERY.) AN ATTACK ON PORT STANLEY AIRPORT WOULD TRIGGER A GULL-SCALE RETALIATORY ATTACK ON THE FLEET.

6. DCM SAID THAT IF THE ARGENTINES WISH TO AVOID A BRITISH ATTACK THERE MUST BE A LEAP FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS--ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECRETARY'S PLAN. A WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT ENOUGH; WE COULD NOT STOP THE BRITISH. GARCIA (WHO WAS WELL VERSED WITH THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE DRAFT) SAID HE WAS CONVINCED ACCEPTANCE OF TUESDAY'S DRAFT WAS IMPOSSIBLE; THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT GO TO ITS PEOPLE WITH AN AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT EXPLICITLY ENSURE SOVEREIGNTY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. GARCIA ADMITTED THAT THE BRITISH THREAT OF INTRODUCE VULCAN WAS AN ELEMENT NEVER FORESEEN BY THE ARGENTINES WHEN THE INVASION WAS PLANNED. HE TOOK IT SERIOUSLY. HE WONDERED, HOWEVER, ABOUT BRITISH ABILITY TO REFUEL ON ITS OWN THESE AIRCRAFT TWICE DURING THE FLIGHT. (COMMENT: THIS MAY HAVE REFLECTED CONCERN THAT THE US MIGHT PROVIDE REFUELING OR THAT CHILE MIGHT PROVIDE ACCESS.) IF THE VULCANAS ATTACKED MAINLAND AIRBASES, THE ARGENTINE MIRAGES WOULD TRY TO TAKE THEM DOWN. THEY ALSO COULD WITHDRAW TO BASES IN THE INTERIOR NEARER THE CHILEAN BORDER. GARCIA CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA HAS CMNI-DIRECTIONAL RADAR AT THESE AIRFIELDS. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ARGENTINAS HAS A 200-MILE RADAR CAPABILITY OUTWARD FROM THE COAST, IN FACT, ARGENTINA PERFORMED VERY POORLY AGAINST ELECTRONIC OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES DURING LAST YEAR'S UNITAS EXERCISES.) HE WARNED THAT SUCH ESCALATION WOULD BRING "OTHER POWERS" INTO THE CONFLICT, AT LEAST INDIRECTLY. DCM EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD IN ANY WAY INVOLVE THEMSELVES MILITARILY IN THE CONFLICT.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION, GEN. GARCIA DISCLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA WAS CONSIDERING AT THIS TIME A MAJOR PREEMPTIVE STRIKE WITH ALL ITS FORCES AGAINST THE BRITISH TASK FORCE.

9. COMMENT: THE THESIS THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT FIRE THE FIRST SHOT IS THE PRESENT OFFICIAL LINE. ALTHOUGH GARCIA SEEMED CINDID, THERE EVIDENTLY IS CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINA NAVY TO ATTEMPT A MAJOR STRIKE BEFORE ALL THE UNITS OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE HAVE REACHED THE SCENE. FURTHERMORE, A FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCE QUALIFIED THIS POSITION IN STATING THAT IF THE BRITISH VESSELS COME "TOO CLOSE" TO THE ISLANDS, ARGENTINA WOULD OPEN FIRE. DCM IN HIS COMMENTS SOUGHT TO DISCOURAGE A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH WERE EXCEEDINGLY CONSCIOUS OF SUCH A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT.
SHLAUDEMANN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27A

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 2668

DTG: 311606Z APR 82 PSN: 007188

BUENOS AIRES 2668

DTG: 311606Z APR 82 PSN: 007188

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

39516 28

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDAO BUENOS AIRES 0324 DTG: 031900Z MAY 82 PSN: 011049
SIT888 DATE 05/11/82 TOR: 123/2101Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEKJCS #0324 1232048
O 032048Z MAY 82
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
O 031900Z MAY 82
FM USDAO BUENOS AIRES AR

TO DIA WASHDC//AT-5/RHR-3C//

INFO PERSUPDET ANACOSTIA WASHDC//
AFIS FT BELVOIR VA//INH//
CDRUSAINSCOM ADMIN SVY DET FT MEADE MD
CDRSTUDET FT B. HARRISON IN
USDAO MONTEVIDEO UY
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NOFORN 0324 MAY 82
SUBJ: EMERGENCY EVCUATION OF DOD DEPENDENTS
REF: A. DIAM 100-1
B. JTR VOL I, CHAP 12

1. (C/NOFORN) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFS A AND B, EMERGENCY EVCUA-TION OF DOD DEPENDENTS TO MONTEVIDEO UY HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY COM.
2. (C/NOFORN) THE FOLLOWING DOD DEPENDENTS WILL BE EVCUATED TO MONTEVIDEO LATE 3 MAY 1982:
JULIE PITT, WIFE OF COL ROBERT W. PITT, USAF
GAIL D. SMITH, WIFE OF COL JACK C. SMITH, USA
JACK C. SMITH III, SON OF JACK C. SMITH, COL, USA
DONALD M. SMITH, SON OF COL JACK C. SMITH, USA
DOUGLAS C. SMITH, SON OF COL JACK C. SMITH, USA

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMY ANNE W. SMITH, DAU OF COL JACK C. SMITH, USA
MARY MITCHELL, WIFE OF CAPT RICHARD F. MITCHELL, USN
MICHAEL S. MITCHELL, SON OF CAPT RICHARD F. MITCHELL, USN
DAVID H. MITCHELL, SON OF CAPT RICHARD F. MITCHELL, USN
JAMES R. MITCHELL, SON OF CAPT RICHARD F. MITCHELL, USN
ANA MARIA SMITH, WIFE OF MAJ LAWRENCE A. SMITH, USAF
ANA MARIA J. SMITH, DAU OF MAJ LAWRENCE A. SMITH, USAF
RUTH L. ROMERO, WIFE OF SMSGT ARMANDO P. ROMERO, USAF
TIVO M. ROMERO, SON OF SMSGT ARMANDO P. ROMERO, USAF
PATRICIA LEIGH SHOUM, WIFE OF MSGT ROBERT SHOUM, USAF
TERI L. MCCABE, WIFE OF IS2 MARTIN P. MCCABE, USN
MARY GUTIERREZ, WIFE OF MAJ RODOLFO D. GUTIERREZ, USA

3. (C/NF) ESTIMATE TIME OF DEPARTURE: 1700L THRU 2100L, 3 MAY 82.
REVW ON 3 MAY 2002

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ME-748-76-73-110
BY CN NARA DATE 11/7/97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

39517 29

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2708
SIT889 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 031522Z MAY 82 PSN: 010803
TOR: 123/1819Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS RENT FONT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2708 1231540
O 031522Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3529

INFO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 8077
AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 4793
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2708

EXDIS
MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/3/02 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: AEMR, PTER, PINS, ASEC, AINF, AFSP, AR
SUBJ: EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2248

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. AS I TOLD AMBASSADOR ENDERS ON THE TELEPHONE, WE HAVE A REPORT FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE THAT THE MOOD IN THE TOP LEVELS OF THE MILITARY HAS TURNED VERY UGLY AGAINST THE U.S. THE STORY IS THAT THE CRUISER "BELGRANO" WAS "PULVERIZED" WITH HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE. ALLEGEDLY, THE U.S. LOCATED THE SHIP FOR THE BRITISH AND GAVE ITS PERMISSION FOR THE USE OF A "SPECIAL WEAPON" AGAINST THE "BELGRANO" (THE IMPLICATION BEING A NUCLEAR WEAPON). THE SOURCE ADVISED ONE OF OUR ATTACHES "TO GET OUT OF TOWN."
3. WE ARE MAKING APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIONS TO REMIND THE GOA OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THIS MISSION AND ITS PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE "BELGRANO" INCIDENT AND WHAT SEEMS TO ME THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEW NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, I REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO DECLARE THE POST IN PHASE II OF THE RELEVANT EMERGENCY LEVELS. I ASK FOR AUTHORIZATION FOR THE DEPARTURE OF DEPENDENTS OF OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL, BOTH DAO AND MILGP, GIVEN THE UNDERSTANDABLE ANXIETY AMONG THESE OFFICERS. I ALSO REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO PREPARE FOR THE REDUCTION IN NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS AS INDICATED IN PARA TWO REFTEL. THE DEPENDENTS OF OUR MILITARY WILL DEPART BY ROAD OR FERRY FOR MONTEVIDEO ONCE THE DEPARTMENT HAS GIVEN ITS APPROVAL. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT ON THE METHOD AND TIMING FOR THE LARGER EVACUATION.
SHLAUDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1962 # 39517

BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/18

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

30

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2708

DTG: 031522Z MAY 82 PSN: 010803

~~SECRET~~

39517

29

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DOS REVIEWED 15-May-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2708
SIT889 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 031522Z MAY 82 PSN: 010803
TOR: 123/1819Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION: REFER TO CIA

SIT: CKLS RENT FONT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE: CIA REVIEWED 16-May-2013: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA *2708 1231540
O 031522Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3529

INFO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 8077
AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 4793
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN IMMEDIATE
BT

SECRET BUENOS AIRES 2708
EXDIS
MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/3/02 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: AEMR, PTER, PINS, ASEC, AINF, AFSP, AR
SUBJ: EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2248

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS I TOLD AMBASSADOR ENDER^{25x1} IN THE TELEPHONE [REDACTED]

THE MOOD IN THE TOP LEVELS OF THE MILITARY HAS TURNED VERY UGLY AGAINST THE U.S. THE STORY IS THAT THE CRUISER "BELGRANO" WAS "PULVERIZED" WITH HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE. ALLEGEDLY, THE U.S. LOCATED THE SHIP FOR THE BRITISH AND GAVE ITS PERMISSION FOR THE USE OF A "SPECIAL WEAPON" AGAINST THE "BELGRANO" (THE IMPLICATION BEING A NUCLEAR WEAPON). [REDACTED] 25x1
ONE OF OUR ATTACHES "TO GET OUT OF TOWN."

3. WE ARE MAKING APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIONS TO REMIND THE GOA OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THIS MISSION AND ITS PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE "BELGRANO" INCIDENT AND WHAT SEEMS TO ME THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEW NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, I REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO DECLARE THE POST IN PHASE II OF THE RELEVANT EMERGENCY LEVELS. I ASK FOR AUTHORIZATION FOR THE DEPARTURE OF DEPENDENTS OF OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL, BOTH DAO AND MILGP, GIVEN THE UNDERSTANDABLE ANXIETY AMONG THESE OFFICERS. I ALSO REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO PREPARE FOR THE REDUCTION IN NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS AS INDICATED IN PARA TWO REFTEL. THE DEPENDENTS OF OUR MILITARY WILL OEPART BY ROAD OR FERRY FOR MONTEVIDEO ONCE THE DEPARTMENT HAS GIVEN ITS APPROVAL. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT ON THE METHOD AND TIMING FOR THE LARGER EVACUATION. SHLAUDEMANN

SECRET
CN PARA DATE 1/7/17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

30

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2708

DTG: 031522Z MAY 82 PSN: 010803

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8584
SIT133 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 030411Z MAY 82 PSN: 009956
TOR: 123/0431Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS FONT RENT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8584/01 1220429
O O 030411Z MAY 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 5234

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7497
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 118584
EXDIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 5/2/02 (ENDERS, THOMAS O.)
TAGS: AR, FA, UK, US
SUBJECT: LETTER OF FORMAL PROTEST FROM COSTA MENDEZ TO
SECRETARY OF STATE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. THERE FOLLOWS THE UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION SUPPLIED BY THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY OF ORIGINAL SPANISH LANGUAGE LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ TO SECRETARY OF STATE DELIVERED EVENING OF MAY 2.

3. BEGIN TEXT:
- - - - - MAY 2, 1982

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS MYSELF TO THE STATEMENT MADE ON APRIL 30, BY YOUR EXCELLENCY ON BEHALF OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT REGARDING TH CONFLICT BETWEEN MY COUNTRY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION.

'HE STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONTAINS ASSERTIONS AND ANNOUNCES MEASURES THAT MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT OVERLOOK WITHOUT STATING THE OBJECTIONS WE DEEM PROPER.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BESIDES BEING HIGHLY UNFRIENDLY, IS SURPRISING. ONLY HOURS BEFORE SAID STATEMENT WAS DELIVERED, THE UNITED STATES WAS ACTING IN THE ROLE OF A FRIEND OF THE PARTIES, ASSISTING THEM IN THE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NUC-748763-168
IN PARADATE 11/7/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

32

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8584

DTG: 030411Z MAY 82 PSN: 009956

SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED, JUST AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT. NOW, INVOKING THE FAILURE OF ITS ENDEAVORS, THE UNITED STATES TAKES UP THE UNILATERAL DEFENSE OF ONE OF THE PARTIES AND IMPOSES UNACCEPTABLE SANCTIONS UPON ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE OBVIOUS GOAL OF BENDING OUR RESOLVE, TENDS TO IMPOSE BY FORCE ON US THOSE SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD SUIT THE VERY PECULIAR OBJECTIVES (MUY PARTICULARES MIRAS) THE U. S. GOVERNMENT UPHOLDS ON THE ISSUE.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE ATTRIBUTES TO ARGENTINA THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, REMARKING OUR INABILITY TO REACH A COMPROMISE. HE SAYS NOTHING ABOUT THE BRITISH INTRANSIGENCE NOR ABOUT THE AGGRESSIVE WAY IN WHICH IT IS BEING EXPRESSED. IT IS IRRELEVANT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT -- CONTEMPORARY TO HIS STATEMENT -- A POWERFUL AIR AND NAVAL BRITISH FORCE WAS COMPLETING PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK MY COUNTRY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SECRETARY OF STATE DEEMS EQUITABLE TO COOPERATE WITH THE AGGRESSION BY PROVIDING THE BRITISH FORCES WITH THE MATERIAL SUPPORT THEY WOULD REQUEST. THIS CONSTITUTES A CURIOUS WAY TO COOPERATE IN AVOIDING THE AGGRAVATION OF THE CONFLICT.

SECSTATE WASHDC 8584

DTG: 030411Z MAY 82 PSN: 009956

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I CANNOT DO ANYTHING LESS THAN TO REJECT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS WELL AS THE ATTITUDE WHICH IS ITS CONSEQUENCE. MY GOVERNMENT CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS GONE FAR BEYOND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN ITS WILL TO COMPROMISE AND ITS PREPAREDNESS TO NEGOTIATE ; DISPOSICION NEGOCIADORA'. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS BE TRANSFORMED IN AN EXERCISE THE RESULT OF WHICH MUST NECESSARILY BE OUR SURRENDER AND THE RENUNCIATION OF OUR MOST FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

ARGENTINA DID NOT REJECT THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT. DURING A MEETING, THE SECRETARY OF STATE HIMSELF ADMITTED THAT WE WERE NOT BOUND TO ACCEPT THOSE PROPOSALS AS A PACKAGE DEAL AND THAT OUR COMMENTS WOULD BE WELCOME. WE PROCEEDED TO DO SO HOURS BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ISSUED HIS DECLARATION. WE STATED THEN OUR DISPOSITION FOR A DIALOGUE AND OUR GOOD WILL TO EXPLORE FORMULAS LEADING TO A SOLUTION.

THE U. S. ATTITUDE TAKES PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN NATIONS, MEETING IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA'S POSITION AND CALL FOR AN END TO HOSTILITIES. IT IS THEREFORE SURPRISING THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8584
SIT132 DATE 05/03/82

DTG: 030411Z MAY 82 PSN: 009959
TOR: 123/0432Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS RENT FONT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8584/02 1220429
O O 030411Z MAY 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 5235

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7498
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 118584
EXDIS

; HIMSELF, REFERS TO HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY AS
BEING ONE OF THE BASIC GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
(US) CONDUCT, WHEN IN FACT HIS ATTITUDE IS ONE
OF PLAINLY IGNORING SUCH SOLIDARITY.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE CANNOT IGNORE THAT HIS
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WILL LEAVE DEEP TRACES ON
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE
ARGENTINE PEOPLE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND -- NOR
FORGET -- THAT IN ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL HOURS
OF ITS HISTORY, AND IN CONTRAST WITH THE
SOLIDARITY RECEIVED FROM ALL ANGLES OF THE
CONTINENT, THE UNITED STATES HAS CHOSEN TO TAKE
SIDES WITH A NON HEMISPHERIC POWER, BY
COOPERATING WITH ITS AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS. I DO
NOT BELIEVE GOING BEYOND MY COMPETENCE BY ADDING
THAT THE UNITED STATES' ATTITUDE WILL ALSO
SERIOUSLY DAMAGE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER
NATIONS OF AMERICA.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED, I EXPRESS TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, IN THE NAME OF MY
GOVERNMENT, THE MOST FORMAL PROTEST FOR THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TERMS INCLUDED IN THE DECLARATION OF APRIL 30,
WHICH I JUDGE UNFRIENDLY AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH
THE GOOD RELATIONS OUR COUNTRIES MAINTAINED UP
TO THE PRESENT.

ACCEPT MR. SECRETARY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

- - - (SIGNED) NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ

END TEXT. HAIG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

34

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8584

DTG: 030411Z MAY 82 PSN: 009959

SECSTATE WASHDC 8584

DTG: 030411Z MAY 82 PSN: 009959

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

39519

35

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
SIT879

SECSTATE WASHDC 8988
DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 032036Z MAY 82 PSN: 011784
TOR: 123/2234Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB FONT RENT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: FYI

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8988 1222045
O O 032036Z MAY 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 5252

INFO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 6616
AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 3398
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN IMMEDIATE 2683
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 118988
EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADOR SHAUDEMAN FROM UNDERSECRETARY KENNEDY
E.O. 12065; GDS 5/3/88 (KENNEDY, RICHARD T.)
TAGS: AEMR, PTER, PINS, ASEC, AINF, AFSP, AR
SUBJECT: EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2708

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE DEPARTMENT APPROVES YOUR REQUEST TO DECLARE THE POST IN PHASE II OF YOUR EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN AND AUTHORIZES THE DEPARTURE OF DEPENDENTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, BOTH DAO AND MILGRP, TO MONTEVIDEO. THE EMBASSY SHOULD ADVISE MONTEVIDEO, INFO THE DEPARTMENT, OF THE NAMES OF ALL EVACUEES, METHOD OF DEPARTURE AND ETA MONTEVIDEO.
3. FOR MONTEVIDEO: CONFIRM EVACUEES ACTUAL ARRIVAL IN MONTEVIDEO, EXACT LOCATION AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS.
4. YOU SHOULD ALSO PREPARE TO RELEASE NON ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND THEIR DEPENDENTS. WE WILL AUTHORIZE THEIR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEPARTURE DEPENDING ON YOUR ASSESSMENT OF ANY FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE THREAT LEVEL. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 8988

DTG: 032036Z MAY 82 PSN: 011784

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NR-748-76, 13, 17-7

CN NARA DATE 11/7/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

39520 36

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2726
SIT887 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 032111Z MAY 82 PSN: 011211
TOR: 123/2301Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG FONT RENT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #2726 1232114
O 032111Z MAY 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3540

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A L BUENOS AIRES 2726

EXDIS
FOR ENDERS FROM SHLAUDEMAN
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/3/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, AMER, PTER, PINS, ASEC, AINF, AFSP, AR
SUBJECT: SINKING OF "BELGRANO"
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2724

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS REPORTED REFTEL, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SINKING HAS NOW BEEN MADE. WE UNDERSTAND THE ARGENTINE NAVY IS BACKGROUNDING THE PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DETECTION AND SINKING OF THE SHIP WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY SATELLITE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY US TO THE BRITISH. THIS IS NOT YET ON THE WIRE HERE AND MAY NOT APPEAR BECAUSE OF MEDIA FEAR THAT TO PUBLISH THE STORY WOULD VIOLATE SELF-CENSORSHIP DECREES IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. I HAVE DENIED THE ALLEGATION IN AN OFFICIAL NOTE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AND WE WILL TRY TO KNOCK IT DOWN WITH THE PRESS WHEN AND IF RAISED WITH US. I THINK THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DENY IT FORMALLY IF THE STORY CROPS UP THERE. AS I INFORMED YOU EARLIER, THE NAVY SIMPLY REFUSES TO ACCEPT OUR DENIAL. BUT WE HAVE TO DO WHAT WE CAN. THE LOSS OF SO MANY MEN AND THE ATTEMPT TO PIN THE TRAGEDY ON US PUT THIS MISSION IN JEOPARDITY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. WE NOTE PYM'S COMMENTS AND OTHER REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW U. S. MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. I URGE THAT WE REFRAIN FOR THE TIME BEING. SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD IN MY JUDGMENT BE LIKELY TO MAKE THE ARGENTINES MORE INTRANSIGENT RATHER THAN MORE MALLEABLE AT THIS POINT, AND IT WOULD HIT HERE IN WHAT WOULD BE AN INFLAMED ATMOSPHERE.
SHLAUDEMAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: MLR 74076-3-18-6

BY EX NARA DATE 11/7/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

37

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2726

DTG: 032111Z MAY 82 PSN: 011211

BUENOS AIRES 2726

DTG: 032111Z MAY 82 PSN: 011211

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

May 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES RENTSCHLER/DEMNIS BLAIR/ROGER FOMMINE

SUBJECT: The Falkland Islands: What Now?

Situation

The sinking of the Belgrano brings the South Atlantic conflict to an alarmingly new and perhaps desperate stage, one which throws into sharper relief the negative strategic factors which the U.S. will increasingly confront as the hostilities persist. We are in a situation where only an act of sanity may now save not only the belligerents from further loss, but larger U.S. strategic interests as well.

With this in mind, your own private "Falklands Task Force" provides a rundown of judgments we consider relevant and outlines what we consider to be the necessary act of sanity (which really depends on the U.K., by far the saner of the two disputants at this point). In brief, we feel the moment has been reached in this conflict when the Brits can declare victory on the military level and demonstrate some magnanimity with a political offer designed to stave off an Argentine Götterdämmerung (in which we would all substantially suffer). Urgency is now the issue: as this goes to press the wires are reporting another Vulcan attack on Port Stanley

Key Judgments

- Contrary to British hopes, tightening the screws on Argentina will not make them more amenable to negotiations. On the contrary, Galtieri is a high-stakes gambler who will keep putting chips on the table as long as he has them, hoping for the lucky strike to bail him out;
- What is true of Galtieri is probably also true of anyone who succeeds him (with the possible exception of Orfila, who might favor a diplomatic route but whose margin of maneuver would be tightly constrained by the military).
- Continuation of the British blockade with sporadic military action will result in a grave setback to all our policies

DECLASSIFIED (11/10/95)

Authority: NUC-748-26-19-5

CN NARA DATE 11/7/17

in this hemisphere as Latin American positions harden, while tying the Royal Navy down 8,000 miles away from its NATO responsibilities.

- Now that we have come down on the British side, our leverage with Mrs. Thatcher is greatly increased; we are a de facto partner in the enterprise and can use that position to push our own interests in ways denied to us in our previous "honest broker" role.

Proposal

- That the United States initiate another peace offer, this time through the OAS. The offer would link ultimate Argentine sovereignty after a reasonable protracted period (say, 20 years) with immediate withdrawal of Argentine troops and a third country or mixed administration during the transition between now and then.

Rationale

- To the U.K., the plan offers a chance to escape from having to defend the Falklands forever, should the Brits succeed in retaking them. The 20-year grade period will allow the Falklanders sufficient time to make up their minds to become Argentinian or emigrate, or otherwise take advantage of whatever resources and options the Brits can put at their disposal during the period in question -- a kind of qualified self-determination (the Brits must -- and probably do understand that the desires of 1800 shepherders cannot eternally dictate the larger strategic interests of the United Kingdom, let alone the United States). Part of the agreement could also be a bill of rights for the Falklanders.
- To Argentina, the plan offers a way to realize its core objective of ultimate sovereignty. It will not have the sovereignty by the end of 1982, as it had wished, but that is the price it pays for losing a war Argentina itself precipitated. Galtieri (or a successor regime) is implored to accept this plan by a unanimous resolution of the OAS, it will have a face-saving way to do so.

Implementation

- We need to clear this plan with the Brits first. It should be done by private message to Mrs. Thatcher -- we do not need more shuttle diplomacy now.

-- We then need to send a message from the President to Galtieri once it looks as if the plan is gaining momentum.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK NO

— — That you discuss the above outline with Secretary Haig, with a view toward gearing the diplomatic machinery in that direction.

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 3074

22 MAY 4 P 1: 24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

RECEIVED 04 MAY 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 04 MAY 82

BLAIR

04 MAY 82

FONTAINE

04 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: FALKLAND ISLANDS

GREAT BRITAIN

ARGENTINA

SUBJECT: PRESENT SITUATION IN FALKLAND ISLANDS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 06 MAY 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

5/5 Clark noted

RE DB, G

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

FILE

(C)

11-