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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

MJD 7/26/2007

File Folder ARGENTINA (04/03/1982-04/06/1982)

FOIA

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VEIGEL

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39315	CABLE	031958Z APR 82 <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-1--3</i>	2	4/3/1982	B1
39316	CABLE	ALEXANDAR HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE FALKAND ISLANDS DISPUTE <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-2-2</i>	2	4/3/1982	B1
39317	PAPER	RE FALKLAND ISLANDS <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-3-1</i>	12	7/1/1964	B1
39318	MEMO	NORMAN BAILEY TO WILLIAM CLARK RE ARGENTINE-UK DISPUTE <i>R 11/2/2017 NSC WAIVER</i>	1	4/5/1982	B1
39319	CABLE	062053Z APR 82 <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-5-9</i>	2	4/6/1982	B1
39320	CABLE	032204Z APR 82 <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-6-8</i>	1	4/3/1982	B1
39321	CABLE	031540Z APR 82 <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-7-7</i>	1	4/3/1982	B1
39322	MEMO	NORMAN BAILEY TO WILLIAM CLARK RE FALKLANDS <i>R 11/2/2017 NSC WAIVER</i>	1	4/6/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39323	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE FALKLAND ISLAND DISPUTE <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-9-5</i>	2	4/6/1982	B1
39324	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE US ROLE <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-10-3</i>	2	4/5/1982	B1
39325	MEMO	JIM RENSCHLER/ROGER FONTAINE TO WILLIAM CLARK RE US ROLE <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-11-2</i>	1	4/6/1982	B1
39326	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE US ROLE <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-12-1</i>	2	4/6/1982	B1
39327	MEMO	ALEXANDAR HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE US ROLE (DUPE OF 39324) <i>R 12/5/2017 NLR-748-26-5-10-3 (DUPE)</i>	2	4/5/1982	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To: ADM Boardman 4/15

~~Jim Bentschler,~~

Do you suppose
this detail came
from State?

John

John

It's quite possible and
even likely. Mont has reason
to be upset, even though on balance

The converse made the P call back to you.

4/3/82 NY Times

Reagan, in a Phone Call, Tried to Deter Invasion

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 2 — President Reagan, in a 50-minute telephone call, tried and failed to persuade the head of the Argentine junta to call off the invasion of the British-controlled Falkland Islands.

Mr. Reagan told President Leopoldo Galtieri that such an invasion would be regarded as aggression by the American people and would probably lead to a military response by Britain.

An Administration official said Mr. Reagan, in a last-minute effort to forestall the landing of Argentine forces, warned General Galtieri that he was convinced that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would retaliate with military force to an invasion of the lightly populated string of islands. Mr. Reagan also told the Argentine junta leader that an invasion would wreck relations between the United States and Argentina, according to the official.

'Wish It Had Not Gone Forward'

The telephone call from the White House to Buenos Aires began at 8:21 P.M. Thursday, with interpreters at either end. Mr. Reagan, speaking briefly to reporters today, said of the invasion: "I wish it had not gone forward. I did talk to the President of Argentina, trying to persuade him not to go forward with that."

The State Department, which set up a special crisis task force to deal with the situation, issued this brief but sharply worded statement:

"We have told the Government of Argentina that we deplore the use of force to resolve this dispute. We call on Argentina to immediately cease hostilities and to withdraw its military forces from the Falkland Islands."

Administration officials said they were aware for several days, from reports supplied by the American Embassy in Argentina as well as from the British Government, that an Argentine military force, headed by that country's single carrier, was headed for the islands.

No U.S. Position on Sovereignty

It was only on Thursday, however, that the Administration became convinced that Argentina intended to use force to settle its 149-year-old dispute with Britain over sovereignty of the islands, which the Argentines call *Islas Malvinas*. The United States takes no position on the sovereignty question, the State Department said today, but has long recognized British administration and control of the islands.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., who was in touch with Sir Nicholas Henderson, the British Ambassador, and with British officials in London, spent most of Thursday on the crisis, officials said today.

Mr. Reagan, in his phone call Thursday to General Galtieri, said he was calling because he was disturbed to find out that Argentina was preparing to invade by this morning. Out of deference to the junta leader, he referred to the islands as the "Malvinas."

An Administration official, paraphrasing the conversation, said Mr. Reagan called the situation "an extremely serious matter" since it threatened the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

Foresees a British Response

The official said Mr. Reagan told General Galtieri that he was also concerned because he knows Prime Minister Thatcher well and that she was a determined person who would not give in when she knew she was right.

Mr. Reagan then said that he was convinced the use of force by Argentina would be met by force on Mrs. Thatcher's part.

Mr. Reagan's 50-minute conversation with General Galtieri was unusual on two counts, officials said. It was one of the rare times that Mr. Reagan had directly intervened in an international crisis, and it was said to be the longest call he had had with any foreign leader.

Much of the conversation was taken up by Mr. Reagan's reflections on the traditional friendship of the United States with Argentina and Britain.

As for Argentine-American relations, Mr. Reagan noted that his Administration had taken steps — by getting Congress to end the ban on arms sales to Argentina — to improve those ties. But a conflict between Britain and Argentina would be a "heavy blow." The official said Mr. Reagan felt he had to tell General Galtieri that if Argentina used force to take over the islands it would wreck the friendship between Argentina and the United States because the American people and Congress would regard it as an "act of Argentine aggression."

A sign of the improved relations with Argentina was the presence in that country this week of Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations. A Pentagon spokesman, Benjamin Welles, said Admiral Hayward's visit was coincidental and not related to the crisis.

Mr. Reagan, the official said, said he was appealing to General Galtieri not to invade the islands and to avoid a conflict. Without explicitly offering to mediate, Mr. Reagan said he was ready to act to promote Argentine-British negotiations to demonstrate his friendship with both countries.

'Time Has Run Out'

The American official said General Galtieri replied that he appreciated Mr. Reagan's concern but that for 149 years the British had not relinquished sovereignty over the islands, and that "time has run out." He said the United States appeal was overtaken by events.

According to White House officials, Mr. Reagan was told at 7 A.M. today by William P. Clark, the national security adviser, that the invasion had taken place.

State Department officials said a task force under Robert E. Service, director of Southern Cone Affairs in the Inter-American Affairs Bureau, had been set up.

A State Department spokesman, Alan D. Romberg, said that of the approximately 1,800 inhabitants of the Falklands, there were believed to be five American citizens with nine dependents.

3

27

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

John - Here are the NYT
and NBC reports on the
President's phone call to Argentina.
It was my firm understanding these
points would not be used and we
followed that guidance thru the day -
thereby upsetting a good number of folks who
wanted more and couldn't understand
why only NBC and Gwertzman got it.
I'm all for using as much as we
can, but only when that's decided upon
for substantive reasons -
West



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20530

HIGHLIGHTS OF APRIL 2
TV NEWSCASTS AND PROGRAMS

CBS EVENING NEWS

1. FALKLAND ISLANDS - An estimated 4,000 Argentine Marines today invaded and seized the British Crown Colony the Falkland Islands. An Argentine Lt. Commander was killed; two other officers were wounded in the fighting. Britain immediately broke off all diplomatic relations. One reason for Argentina's action today may be the islands' potential oil wealth. The region could be another North Sea type oil field. (Dan Rather)

The Argentinian task force, led by a secondhand aircraft carrier that once belonged to Britain, took the Colony and the British Government by surprise. The British Governor General was arrested along with his family. The eighty Royal Marines, who constituted the colony's only regular defense force, were captured and reportedly flown off the islands. News from the islands was fragmentary. There was no word of the reaction of the 1800 islanders who make up the entire population. Their representative in London said they would not give in easily. There were signs of activity at military installations around Britain, but it became clear tonight that the Government had been bluffing when it hinted earlier this week that a British Naval task force was already on the way. Prime Minister Thatcher held several urgent cabinet meetings while opposition politicians were comparing her government's humiliation to the 1956 Suez fiasco. Any help the Royal Navy could now send is days, if not weeks, away. (Tom Fenton)

The invasion finds President Reagan uncomfortable and embarrassed. Uncomfortable because both Argentina and Great Britain are close allies. Embarrassed because the President took the unprecedented step of telephoning the President of Argentina for 50 minutes last night to personally urge him not to go ahead with the invasion. (Footage of Reagan statement: "I wish it had not gone forward. I understand they have landed there, and I did talk to the President of Argentina in trying to persuade him not to go forward with that.") At the State Department the Administration formally endorsed Britain's position. (Footage of Romberg statement: "We've made clear that we deplore the use of force by the Government of Argentina to resolve this dispute. And we've called on Argentina to cease immediately hostilities and to withdraw its military forces from the Falkland Islands.") An Administration source says that President Reagan was disturbed when Argentina went ahead with the invasion after he warned the Argentine President such a move could compromise relations with the U.S. Mr. Reagan has taken several steps to improve relations with Argentina, and reportedly is cooperating with the Government of Buenos Aires in establishing a paramilitary force to combat

John -
see p. 1
and particularly
p. 5 -

1. **Communism in Central America**. Even though the U.S. has treaty obligations with both Argentina and Britain, White House officials say the U.S. has no commitment in this case to take action and has no plans to. (Leslie Stahl)

2. **BREZHNEV CONDITION** - The Washington Post reported that 75-year old Leonid Brezhnev may have suffered a mild stroke last week while returning from a hectic 4-day trip to Tashkent (phonetic). The report said Brezhnev was taken on a stretcher from the Moscow Airport to a hospital. Unidentified sources are quoted by the Post as saying that Brezhnev's health had deteriorated seriously during the trip and that he is expected to remain in the hospital "for weeks". (Dan Rather)

3. **BOB JONES, JR. BLASTS HAIG** - Ian Paisley was to address a bible conference today at the fundamentalist Christian Bob Jones University in South Carolina. Paisley's visa was denied at the last minute, and that brought down the wrath of University Chancellor Bob Jones, Jr. on Secretary Haig. Jones asked the school's 6,000 students yesterday to remember Haig in their prayers, but not in the usual way. (Footage of Jones statement: "I'm going to pray that God will get rid of that man. And I hope you pray too. The Lord will smite him hip and thigh, bone and marrow, heart and lungs, and all there is to him, that he shall destroy him quickly and utterly.") At today's bible service Jones continued the offensive, saying he believes the prayers against Haig will be answered. (Footage of Jones statement: "I'm quite sure the Lord's going to deal with that man and I want you to watch and see what happens in the days ahead. God's judgments are sometimes slow, but they are very certain.") Bob Jones refused CBS's request for an interview, and CBS was not allowed to interview students to get a sense of whether they agree with Jones and may now be fervently praying for the divine destruction of Alexander Haig. (John Chayan)

ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

1. **FALKLAND ISLANDS** - Argentina claimed recovery of the Falklands hours before the British Government admitted the invasion had taken place. Only a handful of 60-70 Royal Marines and an additional civilian defense force protect the Islands' 1800 residents. The Argentinians sent a fleet of warships loaded with an estimated 4,000 troops. Argentina said the islanders surrendered as meekly as the sheep they have raised for generations. In London the first response by some members of Parliament was anger. Parliament meets again tomorrow for an extraordinary weekend session, the first of its kind since the 1956 Suez crisis. Margaret Thatcher cancelled a visit with the Queen to spend the day with her cabinet. In terms of military response, the British are sending their own warships, including a nuclear powered submarine to the South Atlantic, but no one in authority seems willing to say what the British armada will do once it reaches the Falklands. There is a growing feeling in official circles in London that Britain's most viable and perhaps only weapon is diplomacy. Seismic surveys show the Falklands may be rich in offshore oil reserves. (Bob Dyke)

The Falkland invasion is being taken seriously by the U.S. and has personally involved President Reagan. (Footage of Reagan statement: "I wish that it had not gone forward. I understand they have landed there and I did talk to the President of Argentina in trying to persuade him not to go forward with that.") Actually, Mr. Reagan spent 50 minutes on the phone last night with the Argentine President. Among other things, he said, "We will do anything to be of help." But by that time the Argentine Navy was already on its way. Today the international community is also taking the incident seriously and Britain raised the matter at the U.N. Security Council. A Resolution calling for Argentina's withdrawal and negotiations to settle the dispute is now under consideration. But the Argentines say they will stay put. As international incidents go, it is hard to get too worked up about this one, except that it does illustrate once again that the power of the big powers is not what it used to be. (Barrie Dunsmore)

2. CENTRAL AMERICA - It is the position of the U.S. that the civil war in El Salvador is maintained by the supply of arms to the guerrillas from Cuba and Nicaragua. Yet it is now clear the U.S. is willing to negotiate with Nicaragua. Peter Collins reports the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua has been recalled to Washington possibly to prepare for those negotiations. (Frank Reynolds)
3. NICARAGUA - It's been almost three years since the revolution in Nicaragua, but you would think it just happened yesterday. The Sandinistas are still in charge and just as anti-American as ever. Nicaragua has cried "invasion" so often the rest of the world is starting to worry about it. Washington's response is usually something like, "The same to you, Nicaragua." Nicaragua is nearly \$2.5 billion in debt; inflation is at 25% and rising. Per capita income is \$650 per year and falling. Nicaragua has been getting a lot of weapons and lip service from the Soviet Bloc, but so far nobody has shown the slightest interest in shelling out the million dollars a day it will cost to keep that country afloat. So, Nicaragua's 2.7 million people are suffering a case of the post-revolutionary blahs. The Reagan Administration views Nicaragua as a Communist cancer that is likely to spread, though it has been trying to teach the Nicaraguans a lesson. Washington has cut off economic aid, though it is still bankrolling private businesses and opposition groups there. It is looking the other way while Nicaraguan exiles use American soil to train for a military comeback. And it has plans on the drawing board for a covert action force to sneak around Nicaragua and make trouble. Somebody is already doing that. A series of bombings had rattled the countryside in recent weeks, and the Sandinistas are getting very nervous. They have declared a state of emergency, suspended civil liberties and put the whole country in a kind of yellow alert. If Washington sees a Russian behind every bush there, the Nicaraguans see a U.S. Marine. Washington insists Nicaragua is building the biggest army in Central America--much more war power than it needs unless it has designs on its neighbors. The Sandinistas deny that and say they are just taking precautions against Washington's designs on Nicaragua. There are a couple of thousand Cuban military advisors there, but there are also thousands of Cuban doctors, nurses and teachers. Public health is better; public housing is going up for the poor. About the best Washington can hope for is

that Nicaragua will keep its Marxist cancer to itself and become a kind of Yugoslavia--non-aggressive and non-aligned. If in fact Nicaragua is really prepared to leap into the arms of Moscow Cuba-style, Washington is just making it that much easier for them. (Richard Threlkeld)

4. U.S. VETOS RESOLUTION - At the U.N. tonight the U.S. vetoed a Security Council Resolution that appealed to all states not to use force against any Central American or Caribbean country. The vote on the draft was 12 in favor and 1 against. (Frank Reynolds)

8

NBC Nightly News

1. FALKLAND ISLANDS - In Washington, there was concern over what was happening in the Falkland Islands today. Other than deploring, urging and condemning, there was very little the U.S. could do in the Islands dispute. The White House did announce that last night, President Reagan put in a telephone call to Buenos Aires in an attempt to reverse the Argentine invasion. (Roger Mudd)

The President spent fifty minutes on the phone with the Argentine President. Reagan tried to talk him out of the invasion, warning that the use of force would be met by force from the British--stressing that Prime Minister Thatcher was determined and would not give in. He added that use of force would wreck recently improving U.S. relations with Argentina because the American people and the Congress would regard it as an act of aggression. The Argentine President thanked Reagan but said that time had run out since the British refused to give up sovereignty. Today, Reagan expressed regret, that his efforts to stop the Argentinians had failed. What action would the U.S. take? REAGAN: "Just to be of help if we can in this dispute." At the State Department, Spokesman Romberg called on the Argentinians to pull out. ROMBERG: "(inaudible)... we deplore the use of force by the government of Argentina to resolve this dispute. We've called on Argentina to cease immediately hostilities and to withdraw its military forces from the Falkland Islands." Officials refuse to say publicly who the U.S. believes has claim to the Falklands, but, as one official put it, we wish the British had pulled out some time ago. The President got involved because the Administration was anxious to avoid having two of its key allies in military conflict: the British, our strongest ally in Europe; and Argentina, a key supporter of American policy in Central America. (Judy Woodruff)

As an example of how the Administration is trying to play the episode down the middle, State Department Spokesman Romberg tried to avoid using either the British name--the Falkland Islands--or the Argentinian name--the Malvinas Islands. He simply called them "The Islands": (Roger Mudd)

2. BOB JONES BLAST AT HAIG - Ian Paisley was denied permission to visit Bob Jones University in South Carolina on grounds that his presence might be inflammatory. When the news reached Bob Jones today, the Chancellor of the fundamentalist school, Bob Jones, Jr., urged the students to pray that the Lord "smite" Secretary of State Haig--"smite" him hip and thigh, heart and lung, and all there is to him. At last report, the Secretary was "unsmitten." (Roger Mudd)
3. BREZHNEV - Soviet officials refused to comment today on a report that Leonid Brezhnev may have had a mild stroke a week ago on his way home from a trip in Soviet Asia. (John Chancellor)

Brezhnev's health has deteriorated visibly on his exhausting four day tour last week. Western diplomats say that he may have undertaken the demanding trip just to prove that he could.

Soviet television was forced to show crowd shots frequently to avoid picturing the ailing Soviet leader. Several official meetings were cancelled because of his fragile health. He was last seen publicly at an airport ceremony as he departed for Moscow. There is no confirmation of reports that Brezhnev grew seriously ill during the flight to Moscow. Western diplomats believe that he is hospitalized and that Churneynko (sp) a Polit Bureau member, is in controll for the time being. Churneynko is widely expected to take power if Brezhnev cannot continue in office. (James Compton)

- 4. D'AUBUISSON - D'Aubuisson, leader of the most popular right-wing party in El Salvador, was talking today about the left-wing rebel groups which are fighting there. He said "we will pass an amnesty law, but we won't accept a dialogue with people who won't accept democracy." D'Aubuisson also promised to carry out the reforms which had been started in El Salvador. (John Chancellor)

Other Notes

There were no U.S. foreign policy related items on MacNeil-Lehrer Report or on ABC Nightline:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9865
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FOR AMBASSADOR
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 4/2/12 (ENDERS, THOMAS)
TAGS: UK, AR
SUBJECT: UK USE OF ASCENSION ISLAND AIRFIELD

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS MESSAGE ALERTS YOU TO A DECISION WE HAVE MADE REGARDING UK OPERATIONS ON ASCENSION AND ASKS THAT YOU INFORM THE GOA.
3. ON APRIL 2 WE RECEIVED A BRITISH REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF UP TO TWELVE RAF C-130'S TO ASCENSION DURING THE PERIOD OF APRIL 3-7. THE BRITISH INFORMED US THEY PLANNED TO FERRY TROOPS BY AIR TO ASCENSION FOR EMBARKATION ABOARD SHIPS THERE EN ROUTE TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. WE NOW HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT HMG HAS PROCEEDED WITH THIS MOVEMENT AND THAT IT WILL SOON BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. YOU SHOULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE GOA OFFICIAL AND INFORM HIM THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U. S. AND THE UK WITH REGARD TO THE BASE ON ASCENSION REQUIRES A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO UK REQUESTS FOR FACILITIES, SUCH AS IN THE PRESENT CASE. ASCENSION ISLAND IS A BRITISH POSSESSION. THE U. S. AIR FORCE OPERATES AN AIRFIELD (WIDE-AWAKE AFB) ON THE ISLAND AS PART OF ITS EASTERN SPACE AND MISSILE RANGE. THERE IS ONE U. S. MILITARY PERSON AT FIELD. PANAM, UNDER CONTRACT TO NASA, EMPLOYS ALL OTHERS. THE UK HAS THE CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO LAND UK MILITARY AIRCRAFT THERE AFTER NOTIFYING THE USAF COMMANDER AT THE AIRFIELD. THE USG IS OBLIGATED UNDER A 1962 AGREEMENT GOVERNING ITS USE OF WIDE-AWAKE TO COOPERATE IN UK USE OF LOGISTIC, ADMINISTRATIVE OR

~~SECRET~~

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BY Cx NARA DATE 12/5/17

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9865

DTG: 031958Z APR 82 PSN: 024275

OPERATING FACILITIES. THUS, SUCH USE OF THE AIRFIELD DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CONSTITUTE U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE UK/ARGENTINE DISPUTE.

5. IF PRESSED REGARDING THE PURCHASE BY THE UK OF U. S. FUEL STOCKS ON THE ISLAND, YOU MAY SAY THAT OUR 1962 TREATY WITH THE BRITISH REQUIRES SUCH SALES. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9865

DTG: 031958Z APR 82 PSN: 024275

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MFR,

415

President was
verbally briefed
on the contract.

Dr. 4/2/54

JH

39316
8209152
2265
13

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 13, 1982 3:24

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
SUBJECT: Falkland Islands Dispute

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

The Falklands crisis presents us with difficult issues. We will continue to be dependent upon our close ties with the U.K. as we work a wide range of global issues. If Moscow, the Allies, and the Third World believe we have failed to support the British against an overt use of force, our position as a global power will have been adversely affected. At the same time, we also have much at stake in our relations with Argentina. Our steps in the weeks ahead will have to be carefully nuanced to take into account these conflicting interests.

On the Falklands dispute, the British have no reason to complain about our support to date: your personal intervention with Galtieri; our strong public statements; and our support for the British in New York. London has asked for three other immediate actions from us.

-- Withdraw our Ambassador from Buenos Aires. I will tell them we consider it unwise to cut off our most effective and possibly influential channel of communication.

-- Consider taking the issue to the OAS. We believe this would severely damage U.K. (and our) interests since their case would elicit little support in that body (which is already on record in support of the Argentine claim).

-- Stop arms shipments to Argentina. U.K. is unaware we have not yet made the required certification of Argentina's human rights record to allow shipments. We will continue our hold on the certification and so inform the U.K.

At the same time we must bear in mind our important interest in retaining as much as we can of the new relationship you have forged with the government in Buenos Aires. They have been a key supporter of our broader regional goals, especially

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in Central America. Also, Argentina is already heavily dependent on Soviet grain purchases; we must avoid giving the USSR new opportunities such as the establishment of an arms supply relationship.

Our calculated policy of balance will become increasingly difficult to sustain if the British are forced to take military action. It will therefore be important for us to use our influence in both capitals to seek a non-military solution before the British fleet arrives in about two weeks. But if diplomatic maneuvers fail, and if the U.K. requires greater support from us, we should be prepared to consider ways to be responsive while bearing in mind our interests in Argentina.

~~SECRET~~

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WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

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Clark	
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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Bm was original -
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
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USE
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 00495 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 2

FROM: LPBremer, III S/S 22540 (Room number)
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SecPres "Falkland Islands Dispute"

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	MR. ROBERT MC FARLANE	456-2257	

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: *[Signature]*

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This document consists of 12 pages.
No. 4 of 7 copies. Series A.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

History of United States Policy on Conflicting
Argentine-British Claims

Research Project No. 682
July 1964

Historical Studies Division
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority NZ 78-76531

BY CW NARA DATE 12/6/17

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Summary

The United States has repeatedly insisted that it takes no position in the Argentine-British dispute concerning possession of the Falkland Islands. But while it has stressed again and again that it recognizes the claim neither of the British nor of the Argentines, it has as a practical matter dealt with British authorities on many occasions in commercial matters pertaining to the Falkland Islands and has even been party, at times, to agreements which list the Falklands among British territorial possessions.

The United States became involved in the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands as early as 1831, when Argentina seized United States vessels which refused to recognize an Argentine-decreed fisheries monopoly in the area. The USS Lexington, under Commander Silas Duncan, thereupon destroyed the Argentine colony briefly ensconced on the Islands, and the United States later demanded restitution and indemnity for the captured vessels and insisted on its right to a share in the Islands' fisheries. Argentina, however, replied that consideration of United States liability for Duncan's actions must precede consideration of the fisheries question. Argentina continued to demand reparations for decades afterwards. The United States, in a reply of 1841, said that it was suspending a decision on the Argentine request because it did not wish to pass judgment on the Anglo-Argentine dispute over sovereignty. In 1885, however, President Cleveland, defending Duncan's destruction of the "piratical" Argentine colony, publicly rejected the Argentine claim as "wholly groundless". Argentina reacted to Cleveland's comments by alluding to the Monroe Doctrine, but the United States replied that the British claim antedated the Doctrine and that the United States held to its policy of passing no judgment on the issue of sovereignty.

As for relations with the British in matters involving the Falkland Islands, the United States in the mid-nineteenth century issued a notice to whalers that the British on the Falklands would proceed against trespassers. Afterwards, to stop misuse of this notice, the United States stressed that it had said nothing about the question of sovereignty and was conceding no right "to Great Britain or any other power". Yet, during the second half of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the twentieth, United States commercial agents, and then consuls, located on the Falklands

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dealt officially with British authorities. Moreover, the United States listed the Islands as a British possession in a "Note by the Department of State" appended to a Convention of 1902 with Great Britain.

This dichotomy in United States policy regarding the British claim to the Falklands continued during the succeeding decades. Thus, the United States became a party to various multilateral conventions to which Great Britain acceded on behalf of the Falkland Islands; it listed the Falklands as British in a consular instruction of 1926; and it listed them as British in a press release of 1938 analyzing a trade agreement with the United Kingdom. On the other hand, apparently to avoid implying United States acceptance of the British claim, there was no mention of the Falkland Islands in the 1938 agreement itself.

In rejecting a request by Argentina in 1945 for support of its claim, the United States said that it did not and would not support the claim of either nation and that non-claimant nations would only encumber a final settlement by prejudging the case. Moreover, when resolutions opposing European colonies in America were adopted at inter-American conferences after World War II, the United States either abstained or cast a negative vote because it did not want to support "any resolution which would appear to prejudge the conflicting claims of friendly nations."

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Falkland Islands Before the 19th Century¹

The Falkland Islands, situated off the southern coast of Argentina, were touched by two English expeditions in the 1590's and by a third in 1690. In 1764 French Captain Antoine Louis de Bougainville claimed them for France and left a small group of settlers. The following year, British Commodore John Byron claimed them for England and also left settlers. In 1766 the British ordered the French to leave. In the meantime, with French approval, Charles III of Spain negotiated with Bougainville for the transfer of his rights to Spain, and Spain formally received possession of the Islands in 1767. They were placed under the Captaincy-General of Buenos Aires.

Subsequent negotiations between England and Spain resulted in reciprocal declarations which provided for the return of the captured English settlement with no effect on prior rights of sovereignty. At the same time, the British orally and secretly agreed to withdraw their settlement, which they did on May 2, 1774. They left behind (1) a plaque that stated that the Islands and all improvements thereon remained British possessions and (2) a flag that stood as a symbol of sovereignty. Spaniards remained on the Islands, and in 1777, by order of the Viceroy of Buenos Aires, the British buildings were destroyed.

United States Policy in the Nineteenth Century²

There was no occasion for the United States in the early years of its independence to take a position concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The Argentine revolt against Spain, however,

¹The information in this paper for developments before 1940 has been drawn largely from three papers prepared in the Historical Office in the 1940's: Research Project No. 35 (n.d.), restricted, "The United States Position Respecting Argentine-British Claims to the Falkland Islands"; Research Project No. 58 (March, 1948), top secret, "United States Policy Regarding European Colonies in the Americas", pp. 34-37; and Research Project No. 81 (September, 1949), restricted, "Relations Between the United States and Argentina, Vol. I, 1810-1910", pp. 55-62. Sources used in these papers include Department of State files and standard secondary works on the subject.

²Concerning sources, see preceding footnote.

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produced changes in the Islands which, in the 1820's and 1830's, directly affected the United States. In 1811, during the Argentine struggle for independence, the inhabitants on the Islands were moved to the mainland, and in 1820 the independent government of Buenos Aires took formal possession of the Islands and so notified 50-odd sealers and whalers found in the harbors. The Argentines established a colony in 1826, appointed a governor three years later, and, after two more years, granted him a fisheries monopoly in the archipelago. United States sealing vessels refused to recognize the monopoly, with the result that the governor, in 1831, seized three American ships. Before any settlement could be reached, Silas Duncan, commander of the USS Lexington, sailed to the Falklands, attacked and looted the colony, declared the Government of the Islands at an end, and then returned with prisoners to Montevideo (December 1831-January 1832).

Argentina thereupon refused to deal with Consul George W. Slacum, who had been in charge of United States affairs in Buenos Aires since the death (June 1831) of Chargé John M. Forbes. The United States commissioned Chargé Francis Baylies in January 1832 to settle the dispute and, in instructions which referred to the "lawless and piratical" acts of the Argentine Governor of the Islands, directed Baylies to demand restitution and indemnity for the captured United States vessels and to insist on the right of the United States to a share in the fisheries of the Islands. Argentina replied that the question of United States liability for reparations for Duncan's depredations must precede the question of United States right to fisheries. But Baylies on August 18, 1832, unwilling to entertain the question of Duncan's conduct as a basis for claims of reparations, demanded his passports, which, after further fruitless negotiations, he received on September 3, 1832. A new United States Consul was sent to Buenos Aires in 1834, after a two year interval without even a commercial representative there, and the dispute fell into abeyance until 1839.

no presumption

Meanwhile, the British again occupied the Islands in January 1833, and they have continued in occupation to the present day, though their claim to the Islands has repeatedly been challenged by the Argentines. This second occupation by the British, in 1833, clearly violated the Monroe Doctrine, if Argentine title to the Islands was admitted; but the United States did not relate the Doctrine to this action. Among the obvious factors affecting the United States policy were the following: (1) the United States did not possess sufficient information to judge title decisively; (2) admission of Argentine

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title would have made the United States liable for claims arising from Duncan's action; (3) the islands were remote; (4) British possession offered no threat and might facilitate the activities of American sealers, and (5) in 1833 diplomatic relations with Argentina were entirely suspended.

The Lexington claims were the subject of Argentine-United States diplomatic exchanges in 1839-1841 and in 1885-1886, and then the subject was apparently dropped. In December 1841, Secretary of State Daniel Webster replied to a renewed Argentine request for indemnity by suggesting the propriety of suspending a decision on the question of liability until the question of jurisdiction over the islands was settled, thus intimating that any action by the United States Government on the request would be tantamount to passing judgment on the disputed title to the islands, which would constitute a departure from "the cardinal policy of this government." After Argentina renewed its request in 1884, President Cleveland in his annual message (1885) justified Duncan's actions, described the colony which Duncan had destroyed as "piratical", and stated that the Argentine claim for damages was "wholly groundless". The Argentines took issue with this and, in their reply, alluded to the Monroe Doctrine. In 1886 Secretary of State Bayard answered that the Monroe Doctrine was not retroactive and was therefore inapplicable to the British claims to title, which were antecedent to 1823; he reiterated Webster's statement of 1841 that the reparations question should be suspended until the question of sovereignty over the Islands was settled.

provision | Thus the United States stood away from the Argentine claim and also stopped short of accepting the British claim to the Falkland Islands. In 1854 Secretary of State Marcy issued a statement to stop misuse of a notice he had given whalers that the British on the Falklands would proceed against trespassers; he pointed out that he had "said nothing about the sovereignty of them" and had conceded "no right ... to Great Britain or any other power". On the other hand, United States commercial agents appointed to the Falklands after 1851 dealt with British authorities, and between 1874 and 1908, when the consulate was closed, United States consuls there regularly obtained exequaturs from the British Government.

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United States Policy Before World War II (1900-1939)³

After the turn of the century there was a similar dichotomy in United States policy with respect to the British claim to the Falklands. In a "Note by the Department of State" which was appended to a convention of 1902 with Great Britain, the United States listed the Falkland Islands among "British colonies and possessions which have acceded to the convention of March 2, 1899". Similarly, the Department listed the Falkland Islands among "British dominions and possessions" in a consular instruction of 1926. In addition, Great Britain acceded on behalf of the Falkland Islands to a number of multilateral conventions to which the United States was a party;⁴ the Department's Treaty Division suggested in 1938 that this indicated that parties to these Conventions did "not seriously question Britain's authority to conduct the foreign relations of the Islands. In connection with our bilateral trade agreement with the United Kingdom of November 1938, however, mention of the Falkland Islands by name as being included within its scope was omitted, according to a Departmental memorandum, "for the reason that the United

³Concerning sources, see footnote no. 1.

⁴International Wireless Telegraph Convention, Nov. 3, 1906 (Treaty Series 568 and Redmond, Treaties, III, 2889); International Wireless Telegraph Convention, July 5, 1912 (Treaty Series 581 and Redmond, Treaties, III, 3048). The British accession in behalf of the Falklands to these treaties does not appear in Treaty Series, but is noted in Redmond. The Argentine Republic is a party to both these conventions.

See also list of accessions to Conventions between the United States and Other Powers on the following subjects: Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Aug. 25, 1924, signed on the part of the United States, June 23, 1925 (Treaty Series 931); International Air Transportation, Oct. 12, 1929 (Treaty Series 876); Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931 (Treaty Series 863); and Sanitary Aerial Navigation, Apr. 12, 1933, signed on the part of the United States, with reservations, Apr. 6, 1934 (Treaty Series 901). Complete lists of accessions to these conventions are of record in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaty Affairs, but are not printed in the Treaty Series.

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States desired to avoid a statement of its position on the controversy on this occasion." (But the Islands did appear in a list of British territories in a Departmental press release analyzing the trade agreement.)

In the meantime, both the United Kingdom and Argentina continued to advance their claims to sovereignty in various ways. By Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917, Great Britain designated groups of islands in the South Atlantic and a portion of the Antarctic Continent as the Falkland Islands Dependencies,⁵ with the Governor of the Falkland Islands to serve as administrator of the Dependencies.⁶ As for Argentina, there was a revival in the 1930's of Argentine agitation for the return of the Falkland Islands.

The Falkland Islands During and After World War II

Anglo-Argentine rivalry for possession of the Falklands sharpened with the outbreak of the Second World War. British efforts to fortify the Islands and to recruit young Britons there were construed by Argentina as a violation of their neutrality and sovereignty.⁷ In addition, at meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics

⁵In 1935, after negotiating an agreement governing Pilot Licenses to Operate Civil Aircraft (Executive Agreement Series 77), the U.S. made a reservation as to British title to the "Dependencies" but made no mention of the Falkland Islands themselves.

⁶By a British Order in Council issued in 1962, those islands and territories lying south of 60 degrees south latitude were constituted a separate colony known as the British Antarctic Territory. This order was intended to implement in certain respects the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, which had gone into effect on June 23, 1961. For text, see Statutory Instruments, Part I (Her Majesty's Stationary Office publication, 1962), pp. 356-367.

⁷Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (New York, 1964), p. 119. HM Ships Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles were based in the Falklands at the time when they participated in the destruction of the Graf Spee in the battle of the River Plate at the beginning of the war; The Falkland Islands (United Kingdom Overseas Information Services publication, April 1958).

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in 1939 and 1940, Argentina, in approving certain resolutions concerning European colonies in the New World, included reservations calculated to protect Argentina's rights to the Falklands. Again, on December 15, 1941, the Argentine Foreign Minister told the United States Ambassador to Argentina, Norman Armour, that the Argentine naval defense plan envisaged an area in the South Atlantic which included the Falkland Islands, and intimated that his Government would probably request that the United States use its good offices to induce the British to consider acknowledging Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. The Department took no action on this tentative approach, and Argentina failed to pursue the matter further.⁸

Argentina reiterated its claim to the Falkland Islands at several inter-American conferences following World War II, including Rio (1947), Bogotá (1948), Washington (1951), and Caracas (1954). It also raised the question at various times at the United Nations.

The United States, however, persisted in its professions of impartiality. It stated this attitude with especial force when, on the eve of the inter-American Conference at Bogotá in 1948, Argentine Foreign Minister Juan Atilio Bramaglia, referring specifically to the Falkland Islands, told United States Ambassador James Bruce that Argentina would raise the question of European colonies in America. Bruce replied along the lines of an instruction, which he had received a few days earlier, reading in part:

* { US has many times expressed and demonstrated its devotion to general principle that peoples of dependent territories should be helped to attain increasing measure of self-govt. ... Certain these territories have for long been in dispute between American and non-American powers. US is party to none of those disputes, and continues, as in past, follow a scrupulously objective and impartial position in regard to claims of any parties. This Govt deeply regrets that recent developments with respect to certain disputed areas in Americas

⁸From Buenos Aires, tel. 1470, Dec. 15, 1941, strictly confidential (810.20 Defense/1771) and desp. 3840, Jan. 9, 1942, no classification indicated (844L.014/24).

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never assumed a contentious character. It will continue to be policy US to maintain that such disputes should be settled by peaceful means available to all parties and consistent with Charter UN.⁹

Bramuglia responded by stressing the validity of the Argentine claim to the Islands and disparaging the British claim. He then explained the strategic necessity for Argentine possession of the Islands: the Soviet Union could otherwise use them to attack Argentina, which would join the United States on the first day of war with that country. Bramuglia expressed at length the hope that the United States would support Argentina on the Falklands question, a matter of real importance and entirely separate from the negotiable Antarctic question. He asserted, in conclusion, that a word from the United States on the question of the Islands would determine the final position of the United Kingdom, whose socialist government applied principles so contrary to those of the United States and was dependent for its existence on United States generosity. Bruce told the Department that Bramuglia's arguments made "considerable sense" and should be given "every possible consideration."¹⁰

Soon after receipt of Bruce's account of this conversation, the Department suggested that he speak with Bramuglia, and any other Argentine Government official sharing his views of United States-British relations, along the lines that the United States did not support the claims of either Britain or Argentina regarding the Falklands and did not intend to do so. "It is opinion this Government," the instruction continued, that the "dispute should be settled by peaceful means under recognized procedures international law and that it would be disservice to final settlement for any country apart from nations involved prejudge case." Bruce was to state that the Department would not act in a way which would weaken United States-British collaboration and, with regard to Bramuglia's comment on Britain's socialist Government, that the United States recognized

⁹Cirtel, Mar. 5, 1948 to American Diplomatic Offices in all the other American Republics except Nicaragua, secret (710.J/3-548).

¹⁰From Buenos Aires, tel. 256, Mar. 10, 1948, secret (710.J/3-1048).

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any nation's right to choose its own form of government. The instruction concluded by urging that the Embassy "should not permit any hope to linger in minds Arg officials that US would support their position against Brit."¹¹ Bruce reacted immediately to this instruction by expressing his entire accord with the policy of the Department, which could "rest assured that neither Bramuglia or anyone else in Argentine Government is under any illusions re our neutral attitude in Falkland matter."¹²

At Bogotá Guatemala advanced a proposal declaring it to be the just aspiration of the American republics to end colonialism in the Americas. Argentina, in strongly supporting this proposal, suggested that it refer not only to colonies but to any American territory occupied by non-American powers, and reiterated its claim to the Falkland Islands. The Guatemalan proposal, together with the Argentine suggestion, were embodied in resolution XXIII of the Conference, which also provided for the establishment of the American Committee on Dependent Territories to study the situation and to seek peaceful means for eliminating colonialism and the occupation of American territories by extracontinental countries. The United States, together with Brazil and the Dominican Republic, abstained in the vote on this resolution. In advance of the vote, Secretary of State Marshall pointed out that the proposed resolution would not afford an opportunity to hear the other party or parties to the disputes and that the United States would not support "any resolution which would appear to prejudge the conflicting claims of friendly nations." He stressed the repeatedly declared opposition of the United States to the extension of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere, reaffirmed the devotion of the United States to the principle of helping the peoples of dependent areas attain a constantly increasing measure of self-government, and expressed his Government's earnest desire for the peaceful settlement of disputes by means consistent with the United Nations Charter.

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3 principles

The United States used substantially the same arguments six years later at the Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1954. It abstained when the Conference approved resolutions declaring

¹¹To Buenos Aires, tel. 231, Mar. 17, 1948, secret (710.J/3-1048).

¹²From Buenos Aires, tel. 205, Mar. 18, 1948, secret (710.J/3-1848).

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(1) that colonialism in the Americas should "be definitively ended" and (2) that the extracontinental countries having colonies in the territory of America not delay in completing measures to enable the respective peoples to exercise self-determination. The United States voted against a resolution providing that the American Committee on Dependent Territories should be convoked by the OAS Council whenever advisable.

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE/S

RECEIVED 05 APR 82 14

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

man
7/20/07

DOCDATE 03 APR 82

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

ARGENTINA

CM

SUBJECT: FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

ACTION: PRESIDENT BRIEFED VERBALLY

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

WHEELER

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COMMENTS

REF # 8209152

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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NB
Pat. B.

16

NSC/S

Please close out, per Roger Fontaine

Thanks

Sally Sherman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 5, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *AB*

SUBJECT: Argentine-U.K. Dispute

Argentina and the U.K. are two of our staunchest allies. Argentina in fact has a good legal claim to the Falklands but of course military conquest cannot be condoned despite British refusal to negotiate seriously. It is by no means clear that the British can retake the Falklands by conventional military means.

The closest recent parallel was the December 1961 Indian military takeover of Goa, Damao and Diu from Portugal and the Indonesian conquest of East Timor in 1975, also from Portugal. At least in the latter case, it is clear that the takeover was contrary to the desires of the inhabitants. In neither case did the UN, the "international community," etc. do anything effective.

Taking all the above factors into consideration, I recommend the following course of action: call the OAS Council into session as provisional organ of consultation under the terms of the Rio Treaty to propose a solution consisting of the referral of the dispute to the World Court or binding arbitration with a decision in not more than one year, Argentine evacuation of the islands and reestablishment of the British civil but not military authorities in the meantime.

This might not be acceptable to one or both of the parties, but at least it would demonstrate our concern to be constructive and objective.

Roger Fontaine concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you recommend the above proposal to the President, Secretary Haig and OAS Ambassador Middendorf.

OK _____ No _____

cc: Tom Reed
Don Gregg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review April 5, 1988

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NSC Walker*
BY *CN* DATE *11/26/77*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM BAILEY

*MJD
7/26/07*

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
DOC DATE 05 APR 82

TO CLARK

KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA GREAT BRITAIN
FALKLAND ISLANDS

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION ON FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA



FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS MEMO DID NOT GO FORWARD --> CLOSE PER FONTAINE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2037
SIT280 DATE 04/14/82

DTG: 062056Z APR 82 PSN: 027981
TOR: 096/2348Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS FONT RENT
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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3081

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1081
BT

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 2037

EXDIS
EO 12065: GDS 4/6/88 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, PINT, PEPR, FK, UK, AR
SUBJECT: GOA'S NEGOTIATING ROOM
REFS: (A) BUENOS AIRES 2006, (B) BUENOS AIRES 2000, (C) BUENOS
AIRES 1981, (D) LONDON 7541

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE NOW HAVE CLEAR ENOUGH IDEA OF WHAT THE ARGENTINES ARE PREPARED AT THE MOMENT TO GIVE IF A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WERE TO GET UNDERWAY (REF B). I THINK THESE CONCESSIONS, ESSENTIALLY HAVING TO DO WITH THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE FALKLANDERS, COULD BE SOLD TO MILITARY AND PUBLIC OPINION HERE. AN AGREEMENT TO PERMIT ON-SITE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS MIGHT BE OBTAINABLE. A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS IN RETURN FOR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY (REF C) WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, BUT STILL CONCEIVABLE. A STRAIGHT BACKDOWN AND RESTORATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, AS HMG SEEMS TO BE AIMING FOR, IS UNATTAINABLE IN MY JUDGMENT, ABSENT A BRITISH MILITARY VICTORY. NO ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, LEAST OF ALL THIS ONE, COULD POSSIBLY SURVIVE SURRENDER.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. AS WE HAVE REPORTED (REF A), THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF SECOND THOUGHTS HERE AMONG THE POLITICIANS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF GALTIERI'S ADVENTURE. WE SENSE RISING NERVOUSNESS IN THE GOA AND AMONG THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL AS IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE CHEAP VICTORY SO CONFIDENTLY EXPECTED IS NOT TO BE. "RECUPERATION" OF THE MALVINAS HAS BEEN A PRIMARY NATIONAL GOAL FOR GENERATIONS. BUT CERTAINLY THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE DID NOT BARGAIN FOR AND DO NOT WANT A WAR. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE BRITISH TASK FORCE APPROACHES, WE EXPECT A STATE OF FRENZIED NATIONALISM HERE IN WHICH REASON AND SKEPTICISM WILL BE SUBMERGED. WE ARE GETTING A NUMBER OF REPORTS NOW FROM GOOD SOURCES OF UNHAPPINESS IN THE ARMED FORCES OVER THE FACT THAT SENIOR OFFICERS, INCLUDING KEY CORPS COMMANDERS IN THE ARMY, WERE EXCLUDED FROM AND NOT INFORMED OF THE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority N47C-748-265-59

BY CN NARA DATE 12/5/17

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 2037

DTG: 062056Z APR 82 PSN: 027981

DECISION TO INVADE THE MALVINAS. GALTIERI MAY HAVE PROBLEMS AHEAD IN THOSE QUARTERS. BUT AGAIN, THE MILITARY WILL SURELY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RALLY AROUND IF IT LOOKS AS IF A FIGHT IS IN THE OFFING.

4. THE PRESSURE THE BRITISH ARE EXERTING IS HAVING ITS DESIRED EFFECT. THE ARGENTINES ARE CONSIDERABLY MORE DISPOSED TO NEGOTIATE AND CONSIDER CONCESSIONS THAN THEY WERE THREE OR FOUR DAYS AGO. BUT IF THE PRESSURE IS APPLIED FOR TOO LONG WITHOUT A BREAK-THROUGH TO A NEGOTIATING PROCESS, THE FATALISM AND INTENSE FEAR OF APPEARING COWARDLY THAT ARE SUCH STRONG ELEMENTS IN THE ARGENTINE MAKEUP COULD WELL TAKE OVER AND PRODUCE A DISASTER. WITH RESPECT TO REF D, IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY TO ME THAT WE COULD PLAY ANY ROLE AT ALL WITH THE GOA IN PROMOTING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IF WE WERE TO JOIN IN APPLYING FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC PRESSURE AS HMG WISHES.
SHLAUDEMAN

BUENOS AIRES 2037

DTG: 062056Z APR 82 PSN: 027981

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 4/6 1960 DTG: 032204Z APR 82 PSN: 024333
SIT003 DATE 04/06/82 TOR: 093/2306Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
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O 032204Z APR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3035

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1062
BT

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 1960

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 4/3/12 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M

TAGS: UK, AR

SUBJECT: UK USE OF ASCENSION ISLAND AIRFIELD

REF: STATE 089865

1. I CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY ROS ON RECEIPT OF REFTEL AND GAVE HIM THE INFORMATION IN IT. ROS DID NOT RESPOND EXCEPT TO THANK ME. WE ARE ALSO INFORMING KEY MILITARY CONTACTS WHO MAY NOT REACT SO PASSIVELY.

2. DURING OUR BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN NEW YORK, ROS OBSERVED THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS THERE TO SEE IF THERE MIGHT BE ROOM FOR NEGOTIATIONS. TWO OF ROS' SUBORDINATES VOLUNTEERED SEPARATELY TO THE DCM THAT EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE EXCEPT SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PRESENCE OF THE TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS. SHLAUDEMANN

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Author: NLR-748-26-5-6-8
BY CN IIRBA DATE 12/5/17

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 1955
SIT004 DATE 04/06/82

DTG: 031540Z APR 82 PSN: 024200
TOR: 093/2027Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF, WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESBA #1955 0931600
O 031540Z APR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3030

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 1955
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 4/3/02 (SHLAUDEMANN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, AR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF VAQUERO HAS SUGGESTED TO ME BY WAY OF A VERBAL MESSAGE THROUGH ARMA THAT I SEEK AN INTERVIEW WITH GALTIERI. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT GALTIERI HAS ANYTHING TO SAY TO US OF SIGNIFICANCE THAT WE ARE NOT ALREADY HEARING FROM OUR CONTACTS IN THE MILITARY AND THE GOA. BUT THIS WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY IF WE HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY TO HIM. PLEASE ADVISE.
SHLAUDEMANN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW-748-765-77

~~SECRET~~

BY CW NARA DATE 12/5/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34322

MW
97

MEMORANDUM

2283

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 6, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Falkland Fallout

Should no diplomatic settlement of the penguin war be reached by the time the British fleet reaches Argentina, a British blockade of mainland Argentina makes more sense than trying to retake the Falklands by force, for two reasons -- lives would be saved, and in any case it's not clear that the British can retake the islands by direct assault.

Should the British opt for blockade, this action would have one major benefit for the U.S. -- it would prevent Argentine grain from getting to the USSR. Subsequent to final resolution of the dispute, Argentina might be more amenable to the formation of a feedgrain cartel.

cc: Roger Fontaine
Tom Reed
Horace Russell

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review April 6, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NSC 11/21/7*
BY *CS* NARA DATE *11/21/7*

114

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 2283

APR 6 8:55

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 06 APR 82 17

TO CLARK

FROM BAILEY

*non
7/20/07*

DOC DATE 06 APR 82

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

ARGENTINA

SUBJECT: FALKLAND FALLOUT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

FONTAINE

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 4/9 Noted by Clark NB

DISPATCH

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39323

RCM HAS SEEN

40

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1982: 39

SENSITIVE

WINTER USE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. *AMH*

SUBJECT: FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

In keeping with the initiatives you have taken with both Prime Minister Thatcher and President Galtieri and your offer of our good offices to help settle this most unfortunate dispute, I have begun to explore what we might be able to do. Today, I have talked personally with the UK and Argentine Ambassadors, as well as with the new UK Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, by phone following receipt of a letter from him. Tonight I met with the visiting Argentine Foreign Minister. My objective in these discussions has been to listen to both sides and look for opportunities for diplomacy. I believe we have found a few.

We need now to move quickly, while there is still uncertainty on both sides and while each is having second thoughts. Furthermore, we should act before we are placed in an untenable position of having to compromise our impartiality if we are to be responsive to escalating British requests for assistance. In this connection you have just received a letter from Thatcher asking us to take a range of economic measures on their behalf.

Subject to your approval, and an indication from the British that they agree, I propose to go to London and Buenos Aires, leaving tomorrow or Thursday. The principal objective of this mission would be to test our understanding of each side's minimum requirements for a solution to the immediate problem of a prospective

~~SECRET~~

RDS 1,3, 4/6/02

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLR-718-2659-5

BY CJ NARA DATE 12/5/17

41

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

armed conflict in this hemisphere between two friends. If we are correct that the greatest concerns of the British are withdrawal of Argentine forces and respect for the rights of its subjects, and that the Argentines must have at least a change from UK administration of the Islands with the clear prospect of ultimate sovereignty, we will have a base on which we may be able to build at least a temporary settlement. Only a beginning, but an essential step to avert hostilities and lay the groundwork for a lasting solution.

Neither the British nor the Argentines want the OAS or the UN involved. Consequently, we are thinking of the formation of a neutral force to administer the Islands while the sovereignty issue is settled. This might include ourselves (the British will not accept less), the Canadians and two Latin countries. This will be a high risk mission but one I believe we must take if we are not to suffer a major setback to our policies in this hemisphere.

~~SECRET~~

42

6 April 1982

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: State Memo 8209280 re
UK-Argentine Clash

Attached for implementation is a copy of your memorandum with the original Presidential approval of your recommendation.

John Poindexter

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NODIS

39324 43

8209280

DECLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

02 APR 5 1982 P 8: 21

Authority: NLZ-748-765-103
BY: CV NARA DATE 12/5/17

April 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *(Signature)*
Subject: US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
SIGNED

You have made clear publicly that the US is willing to serve as an honest broker between the UK and Argentina. With the British fleet on its way south, we have at most two weeks before possible conflict, although a UK submarine may reach the area by April 12.

A military clash between these two friends of ours would be a major setback to our national interests. It would engage British forces far from the European theater. An unsuccessful endeavor by the British to retake the Islands could bring down the Government, resulting in a government in London that would be much less supportive of US interests than that of Mrs. Thatcher. We remain dependent upon close ties with the UK as we pursue our global objectives. Moreover, a clash would divert world attention from the real threats to peace and jeopardize our belief that disputes should be settled without recourse to force whether they be in the Middle East or the South Atlantic. At the same time, a clash could result in closer Argentine-Soviet ties and further undermine the new relationship we have forged with the government in Buenos Aires.

Superficially, a UN role might appear to be attractive. However, while we are satisfied with the UN vote on the UK resolution on the Falklands, we see little chance that the issue can be resolved in a UN context. This is particularly true because of the Soviet veto.

We believe the best hope for preventing further fighting and for keeping the Soviets out lies in an OAS peacemaking role. This would be consonant with the collective approach to security we have tried to encourage in Central America. Inevitably there would be both dangers and opportunities in invoking the Rio Treaty. If the Treaty is invoked, and we block the process, the OAS would be damaged at the same time we are trying to reinforce it. This would detract from our ability to turn to it in the Central America context. Conversely, if it can be used successfully, we will have strengthened the Pact and made it a good example of ways in which a regional security treaty can benefit all nations.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
RDS-3 4/5/12

~~SECRET~~

44

Such an OAS initiative could include a separation of forces, as well as withdrawal of Argentine forces now on the Falklands and OAS administration of the Islands while a permanent solution is negotiated. In order to make such an OAS role acceptable to the British, we would have to put Americans on the Islands as part of an OAS mission. If this proposal prospers, it may be desirable for you to name a distinguished American to play a lead role under OAS auspices in achieving a negotiated settlement.

At this point we should keep our role as unstructured as possible. We need to determine the interest of both sides before making a more specific proposal. It is clear that the UK will scrutinize carefully an initiative that involves an organization of which it is not a member.

Recommendation:

Following up on your expressed willingness to see the US be an honest broker, that you authorize us to sound out the British and Argentine governments quietly. While we would wish to keep our options open, we would intend to explore initially an OAS peacemaking role in which we would play a leading part.

Approve *Ronald Reagan*
Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 2274

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

Send Tab A back to State

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JIM RENTSCHLER *JR*
ROGER FONTAINE

SUBJECT: US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash

Your memo to the President (Tab I) transmits Secretary Haig's recommendations (Tab A) on how to deal with the impending clash between the UK and Argentina and supports the idea of a possible US initiative through the OAS, preceded by quiet bilateral exploration. Your memo also points up the risks involved in this enterprise. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

YES NO

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

Review on April 6, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NUZ-798-205-11-2

BY CN NARA DATE 12/5/17

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MEMORANDUM

39326

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ~~112-74876-5-12-1~~

BY ~~CA~~ NARA DATE ~~12/5/17~~

April 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *opk*
SUBJECT: US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash

Issue

What should be the US role in preventing a UK-Argentine clash?

Facts

Secretary Haig believes and I concur that an armed conflict between the UK and Argentina would be seriously damaging to US interests. Accordingly, we have a major stake in doing what we can to avert such conflict and contribute to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. (S)

Discussion

Al Haig believes that our best hope for a constructive role which also keeps the Soviets out of the picture lies in an OAS peacekeeping initiative. His memo (Tab A) sets forth an "honest broker" scenario whereby we quietly sound out both the British and the Argentines with an eye toward assessing the chances of a successful OAS role. (S)

I think Al's recommendation is useful. He recognizes the risks of such an undertaking, which at this point seem significant (given likely British reservations about the OAS, together with the inflexible domestic politics driving Argentina's present course, I would rate our chances of success less than 50-50.) Nevertheless, the initiative is certainly worth trying. (S)

Though Al's proposal is only a first step, an unstated premise of this approach is that the United States may well play a major role in resolving the dispute. It will not be easy and the chances of alienating both countries are possible. Nevertheless, no one else can or will play this role, and without substantial US involvement, the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of the dispute diminishes substantially. You should thus be aware that we could be poised on the brink of a major commitment and that a decision to go forward ought to be taken deliberately - fully aware of possible costs and consequences. (S)

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Review on April 6, 1988

~~SECRET~~

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48

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION

Yes No

— — That you approve Al Haig's recommendation (Tab A)
subject to careful monitoring as we process with
the problem.

Prepared by: James Rentschler
Roger Fontaine
Dennis Blair

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~~SECRET~~

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2274-49
8209280


DECLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
82 APR 5 NODIS P 8: 21

Authority MIC-748-265-103
BY [signature] DATE 12/5/77 JACF

April 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Subject: US Role in Preventing UK-Argentine Clash

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

You have made clear publicly that the US is willing to serve as an honest broker between the UK and Argentina. With the British fleet on its way south, we have at most two weeks before possible conflict, although a UK submarine may reach the area by April 12.

A military clash between these two friends of ours would be a major setback to our national interests. It would engage British forces far from the European theater. An unsuccessful endeavor by the British to retake the Islands could bring down the Government, resulting in a government in London that would be much less supportive of US interests than that of Mrs. Thatcher. We remain dependent upon close ties with the UK as we pursue our global objectives. Moreover, a clash would divert world attention from the real threats to peace and jeopardize our belief that disputes should be settled without recourse to force whether they be in the Middle East or the South Atlantic. At the same time, a clash could result in closer Argentine-Soviet ties and further undermine the new relationship we have forged with the government in Buenos Aires.

Superficially, a UN role might appear to be attractive. However, while we are satisfied with the UN vote on the UK resolution on the Falklands, we see little chance that the issue can be resolved in a UN context. This is particularly true because of the Soviet veto.

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RDS-3 4/5/12

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At this point we should keep our role as unstructured as possible. We need to determine the interest of both sides before making a more specific proposal. It is clear that the UK will scrutinize carefully an initiative that involves an organization of which it is not a member.

Recommendation:

Following up on your expressed willingness to see the US be an honest broker, that you authorize us to sound out the British and Argentine governments quietly. While we would wish to keep our options open, we would intend to explore initially an OAS peacemaking role in which we would play a leading part.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

min 7/20/67

RECEIVED 06 APR 82 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 05 APR 82

RENTSCHLER

06 APR 82

FONTAINE

06 APR 82

KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA

GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJECT: US ROLE IN PREVENTING UK - ARGENTINE CLASH OVER FALKLAND ISLANDS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG

DUE:

STATUS P FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# 8209280

LOG

NSCIFID

(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*#6 has approved Review
C #6 Memo Returned to State To, to, DB*

DISPATCH

ok by PDM

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C) down