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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 1/22/2016

**File Folder** USSR (7/13/84-7/18/84)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 25A

SKINNER

404

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172618	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS	1	7/18/1984	B1
172619	MEMO	K. DAM TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS	2	7/14/1984	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-2-0</b>			
172620	CABLE	MOSCOW 8863	11	7/13/1984	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-3-9</b>			
172621	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE STATUS OF NEGOTIATION OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS	1	7/14/1984	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-4-8</b>			
172622	REPORT	U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATING OPENERS	4	ND	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-5-7</b>			
172623	MEMO	W. RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET POLITICAL ACTION	1	7/17/1984	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-6-6</b>			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172624	MEMO	W. RAYMOND TO GEN. STILWELL, M. PALMER, ET AL. RE SOVIET POLITICAL ACTION MEETING	2	6/20/1984	B1
		<b>PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-7-5</b>			
172625	MEMO	W. RAYMOND TO A. KEEL RE USIA PROGRAMMING TO EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR	1	7/17/1984	B1
		<b>R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-8-4</b>			
172626	MEMO	C. COURTNEY TO W. RAYMOND RE PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR	6	5/10/1984	B1
		<b>R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-9-3</b>			
172627	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASE	1	7/18/1984	B1
		<b>R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-10-1</b>			
172628	MEMO	UNINITIALED COPY OF DOC #172627 (MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASE)	1	7/18/1984	B1
		<b>R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-10-1</b>			
172629	REPORT	SITUATION ROOM NOTE	1	7/17/1984	B1
		<b>PAR 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-11-0</b>			

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172630	MEMO	RE MONTHLY FORECAST AND WARNING REPORT - USSR-EASTERN EUROPE	1	7/18/1984	B1
		<b>PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-25A-7-12-9</b>			

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8490789

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 JUL 84 09

TO PRESIDENT

FROM DAM, K 1/22/14 005

DOCDATE 13 JUL 84

KEYWORDS USSR

CM

SUBJECT: US SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS - POSSIBLE SOVIET POLICY DECISION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 18 JUL 84 STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

KIMMITT

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS

REF# 8419854

LOG

NSCIFID

( C / K )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>X JUL 18 1984</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>JUL 21 1984</i>	<i>Mcfarlane approved Recon</i>		<i>JM</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council  
The White House

*cdh*

System #

11

Package #

90789

8 JUL 18 P 6:25

2

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>✓</u>		
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Do you wish to raise it 7/20 0930?* (Date/Time)

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84 JUL 18 P 6: 34

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172618	MEMO  J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS	1	7/18/1984	B1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 749-25A-72-0 July 14, 1984BY COJ NARA DATE 5/30/0~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Bilateral Relations:  
Possible Soviet Policy Decision

Although we will be focussing over the coming weeks on the issues involved in the Vienna talks, I wanted you also to be aware that we may be seeing a new pattern of developments emerge on non-arms control issues in the US-Soviet relationship.

Dobrynin told the Secretary about a month ago now that "there are no obstacles" on the Soviet side to progress on bilateral issues, and made optimistic noises about Soviet responses to our proposals on hotline upgrade, Pacific maritime boundary and the like. The general context was that the Soviets are not afraid to be seen negotiating with the Administration in this election year. That sounded fine, but at that point there was no way of telling how much importance to attach to these statements. The evidence since then is still not conclusive, but there has in fact been enough concrete follow-up on specific issues to suggest that he was reflecting policy guidance from Moscow:

-- Our hotline upgrade delegations have now reached substantive agreement, and the text could be initialled as early as Tuesday, July 17.

-- The Soviets agreed to extend the Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement on the basis we suggested, just before it expired at the end of June, and we have now followed up by proposing a Working Group of Experts meeting in late August in Moscow.

-- The Soviets agreed to the July 23-24 dates we proposed for another round on the Pacific maritime boundary, and State Legal Advisor Davis Robinson will lead our delegation to Moscow.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

-- Gromyko brought two deputy foreign ministers along for Art Hartman's presentation on southern Africa July 5, was notably non-combative, and undertook to get back to us about "where and when" a meeting with Assistant Secretary Crocker might take place, and "whether such a meeting would be worthwhile."

-- On July 6, the day after Art handed Gromyko our draft for a new exchanges agreement, the Soviets named the head of their negotiating team and promised to get back to us with a date for beginning talks some three weeks hence.

-- The same day, four weeks of consular review talks in Moscow resulted in agreement on the draft text of an exchange of notes resolving a number of technical problems involving diplomatic missions and personnel in the two countries. Of the four principal items on our agenda, we obtained full Soviet agreement on three, including an increase from three to five in the number of exit/entry points available to our personnel travelling to and from the USSR. These talks have gone on off and on for eight years without a mutually acceptable agreement being reached. At the last minute, the Soviets did not initial the draft notes, citing as a technical problem, the lack of the necessary higher-level authorization. Assuming this is indeed the case, the notes should be initialed this week.

We now have two pieces of evidence that this might reflect a gradual change in Soviet policy. A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade told us July 5 that "last month" Moscow had decided to move to "unfreeze" relations with the United States before the election. Somewhat more problematically, he added that the Soviets will send a delegation to Vienna to begin ASAT talks in September, and that it would be "unrealistic" not to expect other pressing arms control issues such as START and INF to surface in those talks. This man's record, though occasionally quite good, has been mixed, and on Vienna we will have to see. On unfreezing bilateral relations overall, however, a Hungarian Politburo member told our Ambassador in Budapest the same day that at the late-June CMEA Summit meeting Chernenko joined other leaders in stressing the need to put US-Soviet relations back on track, and said that they should improve "soon, or at least shortly after the US election."

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PAGE 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 8863  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 08863

EXDIS

EXDIS  
GENEVA FOR USCD  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, ASAT, UR, US  
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR SPACE WEAPON TALKS -  
- RAMPANT AMBIGUITY  
REF: (A) VIENNA 8820, (B) BELGRADE 5437, (C) MOSCOW 8757,  
- (D) MOSCOW 8459, (E) MOSCOW 8526

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AT LEAST FOUR SOVIETS WITH SOME CLAIM TO

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PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 8863

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INSIDE KNOWLEDGE HAVE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL PARTICIPATE IN SPACE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA IN SEPTEMBER. ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE SOVIET WITH AN EVEN GREATER CLAIM TO INSIDE KNOWLEDGE - GROMYKO - TOLD BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE THAT THEY WILL NOT. ACCORDING TO AN INTRIGUING ACCOUNT OF POLITBURO INFIGHTING, HOWEVER, GROMYKO HAS BEEN OPPOSED TO THE PROJECT FROM THE START. HE WAS ALLEGEDLY OVERRULED WHEN HE OBJECTED TO TABLING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF THIS ACCOUNT, REPUTEDLY SOURCED TO INFORMED SOVIET JOURNALISTS, AND FEEL THAT THE MOST THAT CAN BE SAID AT THIS POINT ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS IS THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO GAUGE PUBLIC REACTIONS AND AWAIT OUR NEXT MOVES BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES. MOSCOW REINFORCED THESE IMPRESSIONS WITH AN AUTHORITATIVE UNSIGNED PRAYDA ARTICLE ON JULY 13, CHARACTERIZING THE US APPROACH AS NEGATIVE AND NOT SERIOUS. END SUMMARY.

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GOING TO VIENNA -- SOME YESES...  
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3. THE KEY EAST-WEST ISSUE OF THIS SUMMER IS LIKELY TO BE WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS WILL JOIN US IN VIENNA IN SEPTEMBER. WHILE THE PICTURE IS BY NO MEANS CLEAR AT THIS STAGE, THE EMBASSY IS AWARE OF FOUR STATEMENTS BY SOVIET OFFICIALS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL PARTICIPATE. NONE CAN BE CONSIDERED AUTHORITATIVE:

-- WHEN ASKED ABOUT SOVIET PLANS FOR PARTICIPATING IN "ASAT TALKS", SOVIET MBFR AMBASSADOR MIKHAILOV TOLD AN AUSTRIAN OFFICIAL ON JULY 4 THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE IN VIENNA FOR "THE TALKS". (REF A)

-- A SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN BELGRADE TOLD AN AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICER ON JULY 5 THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD

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SEND A DELEGATION TO VIENNA TO BEGIN ASAT DISCUSSIONS  
IF THE U.S. WAS IN FACT SERIOUS ABOUT ITS OFFER TO  
UNDERTAKE THEM. (REF B)

-- IN THE COURSE OF JULY 3-5 MEETINGS WITH A DELEGATION  
FROM THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RETIRED  
GENERAL MIKHAIL MIL'SHTEYN OF THE USA/CANADA INSTITUTE  
TOLD AN AMERICAN PARTICIPANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION  
WOULD DEFINITELY BE IN VIENNA FOR SPACE ARMS TALKS.  
(REF C)

-- SOVIET JOURNALIST NIKOLAI PORTUGALOV RECENTLY TOLD  
A WESTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMAT IN MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIET  
UNION WOULD "SQUEEZE THE LEMON ONE MORE TIME" BUT WOULD  
BE IN VIENNA IN SEPTEMBER.

... A NO...  
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4. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE AWARE OF ONE COMMENT THAT  
THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT SHOW UP IN SEPTEMBER:

-- FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TOLD BRITISH FOREIGN  
SECRETARY HOWE ON JULY 3 THAT IF THE U.S. DELEGATION  
SHOWED UP FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER, IT WOULD  
HAVE ONLY ITSELF TO TALK TO. (MOSCOW 8459, REF D)

... AND AN INTRIGUING INSIGHT>  
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5. MUDDYING THE PICTURE FURTHER, A NON-AMERICAN  
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AMEMBASSY PARIS 6030  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0855  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2541

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 08863

EXDIS  
GENEVA FOR USCD  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, ASAT, UR, US  
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR SPACE WEAPON TALKS -  
WESTERN JOURNALIST HAS PASSED ALONG THE FOLLOWING  
ACCOUNT OF SOVIET DECISION-MAKING ON SPACE NEGOTIATIONS.  
IT WAS REPORTEDLY PROVIDED BY "YOUNG SOVIET  
JOURNALISTS":

-- REPORTEDLY A DECISION WAS MADE AT THE POLITBURO  
MEETING ON THURSDAY, JUNE 28, TO TABLE THE PROPOSAL  
FOR SPACE TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER.

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MOSCOW 8863

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THE DECISION WAS PRECEDED BY A SHARP DEBATE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IN WHICH GROMYKO OPPOSED TABLING OF THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE. HE WAS VOTED DOWN.

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-- PRESENTATION OF THE OFFER FOLLOWED ON FRIDAY, JUNE 29, AND TASS THEN CARRIED THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE OFFER. THE QUICK U.S. REACTION WAS RECEIVED IN MOSCOW ON THE WEEK-END, WHEN GROMYKO, UNHAPPY ABOUT THE EARLIER POLITBURO DECISION, HAD THE OPTION OF RESPONDING WITHOUT ANY PRIOR CLEARANCE FROM THE POLITBURO. THE TASS STATEMENT OF JULY 1 WAS ISSUED ON HIS SOLE AUTHORITY. THE SOVIET SOURCES SAID GROMYKO HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE TASS STATEMENTS ON HIS OWN, BUT NOT MORE AUTHORITATIVE "GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS."

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-- APPARENTLY NOT ALL IN THE LEADERSHIP AGREED WITH GROMYKO'S NEGATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE U.S. RESPONSE. THE SITUATION WAS AGAIN REVIEWED IN THE POLITBURO ON THURSDAY, JULY 5. THE RESULT WAS THE SECOND TASS STATEMENT, ISSUED ON JULY 6. THE "YOUNG SOVIET JOURNALISTS" CONSIDERED IT A RETREAT FROM THE HARD LINE OF THE JULY 1 TASS STATEMENT, OPENING THE DOOR FOR CONTINUED DIALOGUE.

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-- THE YOUNG JOURNALISTS ALSO MADE SOME RATHER NEGATIVE COMMENTS ON GROMYKO, CRITICIZING HIS INFLEXIBILITY. THEY SAID THAT MANY IN HIS OWN MINISTRY WERE UNHAPPY WITH HIM AND HOPED THAT HE WOULD LEAVE HIS POST. THERE WAS NO EXPECTATION THIS WOULD HAPPEN, THOUGH, EXCEPT THROUGH DEATH.

COMMENT -- ON THE "JOURNALISTS" ACCOUNT ...

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6. WE ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF THIS "INSIDE ACCOUNT".

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IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE POLITBURO WOULD OVERRULE GROMYKO ON A FOREIGN POLICY MATTER OF THIS NATURE WHEN SO MUCH OTHER INFORMATION SHOWS HIM FIRMLY IN CHARGE. IT IS SIMILARLY DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET SYSTEM WORKS QUICKLY ENOUGH TO TRANSLATE A THURSDAY POLITBURO DECISION INTO A DEMARCHE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE MORNING OF THE FOLLOWING DAY. WE ARE ALSO SKEPTICAL THAT GROMYKO WOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE JULY 1 TASS STATEMENT WITHOUT SOME COORDINATION WITH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND DEFENSE MINISTRY, PARTICULARLY IF HE HAD JUST BEEN OVERRULED IN THE THURSDAY POLITBURO MEETING ON THE SAME ISSUE. THE ACCOUNT ALSO IGNORES THE NEED TO RESPOND TO VARIOUS U. S. STATEMENTS IN EXPLAINING WHY THE JULY 6 TASS STATEMENT DIFFERED FROM THE JULY 1 STATEMENT.

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7. SOVIET "JOURNALISTS" ARE OF COURSE FREQUENTLY USED BY THE KGB, AND THIS STORY COULD BE A DISINFORMATION EFFORT, DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE U. S. CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SUPPOSED INTEREST IN "DIALOGUE" ON THE PART OF THE "POLITBURO MAJORITY." GROMYKO ALREADY HAS A BAD REPUTATION IN THE WEST, AND THIS ACCOUNT MAKES HIM THE SCAPEGOAT FOR SOVIET INFLEXIBILITY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS NOT EVIDENT WHY THE KGB WOULD WANT TO PUBLICIZE DIVISION WITHIN THE POLITBURO AND TO REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION THAT CHERNENKO IS A WEAK LEADER, UNABLE TO CONTROL GROMYKO. NOR IS IT EVIDENT WHY GROMYKO WOULD ACQUIESCE IN BEING PORTRAYED AS ISOLATED. WE ARE THUS INCLINED TO VIEW  
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AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0856  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, ASAT, UR, US  
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR SPACE WEAPON TALKS -  
THE SOVIET JOURNALISTS' ACCOUNT AS THEIR PERSONAL  
SPECULATION, OR EVEN WISHFUL THINKING.

... AND ON MOSCOW'S INTENTIONS...  
-----

8. THE SOVIET JOURNALISTS' ACCOUNT OBVIOUSLY BEARS  
ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE SOVIETS INTEND TO GO

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 8863

DTG: 131211Z JUL 84 PSN: 024382

EX  
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TO VIENNA. IF GROMYKO IS INDEED THE ODD MAN OUT, HIS NEGATIVE SIGNAL TO HOWE IS UNDERSTANDABLE AND SUBJECT TO BEING REVERSED BY HIS PEERS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE JOURNALISTS' ACCOUNT IS SPURIOUS, AND WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE IT IS, HIS REMARK, EVEN THOUGH MADE FAIRLY EARLY ON, IS PROBABLY MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN THE POSITIVE SIGNALS FROM LOWER-RANKING SOVIETS.

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9. WE ARE INCLINED TO TREAT THOSE POSITIVE STATEMENTS WITH CAUTION. WE DO NOT TAKE THEM TO MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY MADE A DECISION TO APPEAR IN VIENNA. WE THINK THAT THE SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS MAY HAVE UNDERSTOOD THEIR RESPONSE TO BE CONDITIONED UPON U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORIGINAL SOVIET PROPOSAL, OR SOMETHING CLOSE TO IT. WE ARE NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS INVOLVED WERE EVEN AWARE OF THE NATURE OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, GIVEN THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FLOW OF INFORMATION WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY.

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10. SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONTINUE TO CHARACTERIZE THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE PROPOSED TALKS AS "NEGATIVE." THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN FACT, GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO FIND AND ACCENTUATE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE. SOVIET COMMENTARY STRESSES THAT:

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-- THE U.S. IS ESTABLISHING "PRECONDITIONS" BY "LINKING" NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS TO THE SPACE TALKS.

-- THE U.S. ONLY WANTS TO DISCUSS, NOT NEGOTIATE, ON SPACE ARMS.

-- THE U.S. ONLY WANTS TO DISCUSS ASAT, RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 8863

DTG: 131211Z JUL 84 PSN: 024382

INCLUDING SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES DEFENSES.

-- THE U.S. IS "SIDESTEPPING" THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON THE TESTING OF SPACE WEAPONS TO ACCOMPANY THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. MANY OF THESE POINTS WERE MADE AGAIN IN AN AUTHORITATIVE UNSIGNED PRAVDA ARTICLE ON JULY 13. IT SAYS THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE CONDUCTED IN THE ABSENCE OF CLARITY ABOUT THEIR PURPOSE. IT DENIES THAT THE U.S. HAS GIVEN A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON "THE PROHIBITION AND LIQUIDATION OF THE ENTIRE CLASS OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS." ACCORDING TO PRAVDA, THE U.S. HAS ADOPTED A "NEGATIVE POSITION," INTRODUCING THE IDEA OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WISHING ONLY TO DISCUSS "SOME ASPECTS" OF ONE TYPE OF SPACE WEAPON -- ASATS. ECHOING GROMYKO'S REMARK TO HOWE, THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT WASHINGTON IS BEHAVING "AS IF IT PLANS TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH ITSELF."

12. ALTHOUGH SOVIET STATEMENTS STRESS THAT THE ORIGINAL SOVIET PROPOSAL REMAINS IN FORCE, THEY EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT ACCEPTED THAT PROPOSAL AND INSIST UPON

AN AGREED AGENDA BEFORE THE TALKS CAN BEGIN. UNRELENTINGLY HOSTILE SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE OF THE U.S. STAND SUGGESTS THAT, AT A MINIMUM, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY TRYING TO COME UP WITH A COMPROMISE AGENDA IN PRIVATE CHANNELS. HAVING GIVEN THEMSELVES AN EXCUSE FOR BOYCOTTING THE TALKS, THEY ARE LIKELY TO AWAIT THE USG'S NEXT MOVES AND TO MEASURE PUBLIC REACTIONS  
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PAGE 04 OF 04    MOSCOW 8863

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USMISSION GENEVA 8041  
AMEMBASSY BONN 7387  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8760  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 6032  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0857  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2543

EXDIS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 08863

EXDIS  
GENEVA FOR USGD  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, ASAT, UR, US  
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR SPACE WEAPON TALKS -  
BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ANY CLEAR-CUT COURSE.  
HARTMAN  
BT

RECEIVED 13 JUL 84 17

TO MATLOCK

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 13 JUL 84 18

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
1/22/16 GDB

KEYWORDS USSR

MEDIA

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE NOTE RE ARTICLE ON HOTLINE AGREEMENT

~~Hotline~~  
~~Hotline~~  
Cultural Agreements

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO TO MCFARLANE

DUE: 16 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( CT )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Mcfarlane IX 7/16 For Information  
C 7/16 McFarlane Notes JMA

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA JMA

National Security Council  
The White House

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System # I

ED Package # 5434

L16 A 8:00

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>19</u>
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



84 JUL 16 AIO: 01

5434

20

Jack Matlock  
 Where do  
 we stand  
 on the ~~the~~ Cultural  
 Agreement talks?

Bud

7-13-84



# SOVIET-U.S. ACCORD TO SPEED HOT LINE IS CLOSE TO SIGNING

Reagan Pressing Other Talks  
to Show Kremlin Will Work  
With Him on Key Issues

By LESLIE H. GELB  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 12.— The Soviet Union and the United States are expected to initial an agreement in the next few days to modernize the existing hot line for crisis communications between the two governments.

Administration officials and foreign diplomats said the accord was part of an expanding agenda of nonpolitical discussions between the two sides.

In coming weeks, the sources said, talks will resume on the Soviet-United States boundary in the Bering Sea, on Soviet fishing rights in American waters and on cultural exchanges.

While Soviet diplomats appear to be playing down the discussions as minor and technical, both sides recognize the broader implications. It is understood on both sides that the Reagan Administration will use the increased activity to argue that the Kremlin is prepared to work with President Reagan, contrary to Democratic accusations.

## Hot Line Dates from 1963

The initialing of the pact for modernizing the 21-year-old hot line is said to be planned tentatively for Friday or Monday.

Officials said that, in deference to Soviet wishes, the signing will not be portrayed as a breakthrough in relations. But the Soviet side has acceded to American wishes to have the document signed at a level higher than the heads of delegations.

It is to be signed by Viktor F. Isakov, the senior Soviet diplomat here in the absence of Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, and by Kenneth W. Dam, the Deputy Secretary of State.

The two countries have also worked out new arrangements on consular procedures such as new visa rules and exit and entry points and have agreed on the resumption of a 10-year umbrella accord on economic cooperation.

Administration officials said the Soviet Union has been informed that the plane of Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko will be allowed to land at Kennedy International Airport in New York when he attends the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Last year, permission was refused by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which operates the airport, in reaction to the Soviet shooting

Continued on Page A2, Column 3

PRESERVATION COPY

# Hot-Line Agreement Is Near; U.S. Seeks More Soviet Talks

Continued From Page A1

down of a South Korean airliner. Mr. Gromyko declined to use another airport and did not come.

Officials said the Federal Government had been assured by the local authorities that no obstacle would be put in Mr. Gromyko's way this year.

Still in abeyance and considered by both sides to be the most important current matter is the issue of the talks on space weapons proposed by the Soviet Union for Vienna in September.

The United States agreed to such a meeting, but reserved the right to bring up other arms control issues.

The Soviet Union said that this meant the United States was imposing preconditions and that the two sides would first have to agree on what they would talk about. Each side now insists that the ball is in the other's court.

[In Moscow, a statement Thursday by the Government press agency Tass reiterated the Soviet position that no "positive response" had been received from the United States.]

The original hot-line agreement was signed after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as a way of exchanging information to avoid nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

Last year, as part of a package of confidence-building measures, President Reagan proposed modernizing the equipment, which can handle only about 60 words a minute. The new equipment allows for almost instantaneous transmission of texts and can transmit graphics and pictures.

Technical differences were resolved in Moscow in April, but completion was delayed because of disagreement over who would sign and what kind of announcement would be made.

The Soviet Union remains reluctant to give the appearance of establishing a working relationship with the Reagan Administration. But the Russians appear to be responding to specific nonpolitical proposals.

Essentially, American officials said, the United States has been trying to revive a number of lesser accords that date from the Nixon Administration, but were shelved by President Jimmy Carter after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979.

The United States has also proposed renewing cultural exchanges, but the Soviet Union has responded that existing provisions do not deal adequately with the security of Soviet artists while on tour in the United States.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172621

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

July 14, 1984

~~INFORMATION~~

NLRR 748-254-7-4-8

BY COM DATE 6/5/13

*Frank*  
HGM HAS SEE

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Status of Negotiation of Cultural Exchange Agreement with Soviets

Art Hartman presented our draft agreement to Gromyko when they met July 5. Subsequently, the Soviets notified us of their negotiator (one Churlin, a decent type as Soviets go, who has worked on cultural affairs for MFA -- and on the UN Secretariat staff -- for many years). They have indicated that they will be prepared to begin negotiations shortly, but have not yet set a date.

At present, our PAO in Moscow, Ray Benson, is on leave. He will be Hartman's principal deputy for the negotiations, and will do the day-to-day stuff. Benson is prepared to return to Moscow immediately, however, to accommodate any date the Soviets suggest.

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National Security Council  
The White House

5434

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		Staff
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Action Matlack  
Memo to RCM  
due 7/16

# SOVIET-U.S. ACCORD TO SPEED HOT LINE IS CLOSE TO SIGNING

Reagan Pressing Other Talks  
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By **LESLIE H. GELB**

Special to The New York Times

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# Hot-Line Agreement Is Near; U.S. Seeks More Soviet Talks

Continued From Page A1

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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28

ID 8490791

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES RECEIVED 16 JUL 84 13

1/22/16 CDS

TO POINDEXTER

FROM ARMACOST, M

DOC DATE 14 JUL 84

KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: US - USSR NEGOTIATING OPENERS

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ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII  
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LEHMAN, R

MATLOCK

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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National Security Council  
The White House

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Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
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John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
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Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Staff info</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>Rehmann</u> <u>Matlock</u> <u>Kimmitt</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

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~~UNDER SECRETARY~~  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SYSTEM II  
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84 JUL 16 P 1: 03

July 14, 1984

TO: Admiral Poindexter

John:

This is a good review of the difficulties we have had in the past with the Soviets in negotiating agendas and other modalities preparatory to establishing new arms control fora.



Michael H. Armacost

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLR 748-264-757

BY COB NARA DATE 6/5/13US-Soviet Negotiating Openers

172622

On July 1, TASS criticized the US for attempting to change the agenda of the talks proposed by the Soviet Union for September in Vienna, and for suggesting that US and Soviet negotiators limit their exchanges on space-arms to studying some "approaches". TASS charged that the US position was designed to avoid serious talks on banning space weapons. On July 6, TASS declared that agreement would have to be reached on the agenda before negotiators could meet in Vienna.

Looking back at previous cases, however, the record shows:

- Most of the major arms control negotiations of the last fifteen years have started with sessions of an exploratory or preparatory nature, usually explicitly recognized and agreed to as such by Moscow.
- Usually there has been general agreement in advance on the agenda of the talks, but purposeful ambiguities have often been used to bridge divergent approaches.
- There have been major disagreements on definitional questions involving the agenda during the exploratory phase of several negotiations, sometimes unresolved and carried over into the formal negotiating phase.
- Finally, the use of working groups or separate tables on specific subjects under an over-arching negotiating rubric has been frequent.

SALT/START

The process of defining what SALT would be about began in 1966. Originally the U.S. wanted to include strategic weapons issues with particular reference to defensive systems. The Soviets initially were reluctant to include ABMs but eventually came around. The US-USSR joint statement of October 25, 1969, heralding the formal beginning of the SALT process, explicitly called the meetings set for Helsinki "preliminary discussions". They were to focus on curbing the "strategic" arms race.

There was general agreement from 1969 on that the discussions would be about central weapons systems, both offensive and defensive. Once the negotiations got underway,

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DECL: OADR

several separate working groups were established. For example, one worked out the treaty language for provisions referred to it by the Delegation heads, another negotiated the Hotline upgrade agreement, and a third negotiated the Accident Measures agreement.

The Soviets early on in SALT made clear that their definition of offensive systems that are "strategic" differed markedly from that of the US, and that it encompassed any US or Soviet weapons system capable of reaching the other side, e.g. including US FBS.

This difference is with us to this day, though it has not blocked the conclusion of several agreements. Moscow's basic proposal in START -- reductions on both sides to 1800 SNDVs -- was conditioned on no increase in US FBS, i.e. no PII or GLCM deployments in Europe. Moscow justifies its walk-out from START by citing the US INF deployments.

#### TNF/INF

In 1980, Soviet negotiators criticized the US for insisting that the October-November 1980 TNF talks were only "preliminary exchanges".

From the beginning, there was great disagreement over what nuclear arms would be discussed. The US saw the talks as concerning only US and Soviet land-based intermediate-range missiles world-wide. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, insisted the talks cover land and sea-based missiles and aircraft, but only in Europe, and take into account not only US and Soviet but also British and French systems.

The wide disagreement over the focus of the talks was reflected in the vagueness of the joint US-Soviet statements announcing them. The Muskie-Gromyko communique of September 25, 1980 spoke of "the beginning of discussions on questions of limiting nuclear arms which were raised in previous contacts between the parties." The Haig-Gromyko statement of September 23, 1981 said the two had agreed to negotiations on "arms control involving those nuclear arms which were already discussed earlier between the U.S. and USSR representatives in Geneva." A reader unfamiliar with the context could ascertain only that they would deal with nuclear arms, but could not be sure which. To this day, the two sides have entirely different names to describe the INF talks.

#### ASAT

President Carter mentioned anti-satellite weapons as one area of interest in arms control in his first meeting with Dobrynin in 1977. Subsequently, ASAT was one of the working

groups agreed to in March 1977 in an attempt to offset the failure of the Vance mission to Moscow with the Carter Administration's SALT II deep reductions package. (The other working groups were to discuss civil defense, CTB, missile test pre-notification, Indian Ocean security, RW and CW, conventional arms transfers, and non-proliferation.)

When the U.S. was prepared to negotiate in the spring of 1978, the initial meeting was arranged through an exchange of notes in Washington. Preliminary talks were held in Helsinki June 8-16, 1978 to arrange for discussions of anti-satellite weapons. The Helsinki talks were substantive from the very beginning. With the exception of disagreement over the formal name of the talks, there were few problems in making arrangements for negotiations. A joint press release on the initial talks pointed out that the "consultations were of a preliminary nature and enabled each side to understand better the views of the other..."

CSCE/MBFR

These two European security fora came into being in tandem. A series of notes between the US and the USSR from September 1972 to January 1973 set the stage.

Preparatory talks for CSCE opened on November 22, 1972, and for MBFR on January 31, 1973. In both instances, however, it took half-a-year to narrow differences over the prospective agendas to the point where formal negotiations could begin.

--In CSCE, the Soviets wanted recognition of post-WWII borders; the West pushed for an agenda which would allow it to pursue concessions from the East on humanitarian and other issues.

--In MBFR, there was agreement that the prospective negotiations would deal with force reductions in Central Europe. But going in to the preparatory consultations, there were disagreements over which countries should participate in the formal negotiations, whether the formal agenda should include associated measures, and what to call the talks. In fact, we have never agreed on the title of the talks. The Soviets initially called them MFR -- Mutual Force Reductions; we call the negotiation MBFR, adding the word "balanced."

CDE

The mandate reached at the CSCE review conference in Madrid was sufficient to get all the sides to Helsinki for the brief preparatory meeting which opened October 25, 1983.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

But when formal talks began in Stockholm in mid-January 1984, it was widely recognized that there were still unresolved disputes over interpretations of the mandate, especially over the nature of CBMs which should be discussed and over what geographical area they would cover. In Stockholm the present session has been largely devoted to the question of whether there should be one or more working groups.

Drafted by INR/SEE:JWParker/eur/sov:JFTefft  
7/9/84 Ext. 20821 Wang #0232S

Cleared:EUR:MPalmer  
EUR:JDobbins  
INR/SEE:RBaraz  
INR/PMA:DHowells  
D:JTimbie  
PM/SNP:EKunsmann

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# WASHFAX RECEIPT

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
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MESSAGE NO. 344 CLASSIFICATION INCLAS PAGES 3  
 FROM ADM. J. Randlekya (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION \_\_\_\_\_

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
B	C. Hill		
B	A. Rosenberg		
B	M. ARMA EAST		



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FBC-TALKS(COX)±

F(EXCLUSIVE: 6:30 P.M. EDT EMBARGO)

FREAGAN MAKES OFFER TO CHERNENKO

FBY JOSEPH ALBRIGHT AND ANDREW J. GLASS±

Fc. 1984 COX NEWS SERVICE±

WASHINGTON - PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS WRITTEN TO KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, THE SOVIET LEADER, OFFERING TO POSTPONE ANY SUPERPOWER NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS UNTIL DECEMBER TO KEEP THEM FROM BEING AN ISSUE FROM THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

THE NEW LETTER TO CHERNENKO WAS FIRST DISCLOSED BY WELL-INFORMED SOVIET SOURCES AND SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL.

IN THE LETTER, REAGAN STRIKES A CONCILIATORY TONE TOWARD THE SOVIET CHIEFTAIN, REFERRING TO THEIR JOINT OBLIGATION TO INSURE THE SURVIVAL OF HUMANITY. BUT HE DOES NOT BACK AWAY FROM THE ADMINISTRATION POSITION THAT BOTH THE TESTING OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG- AND MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES SHOULD BE PUT ON THE BARGAINING TABLE.

WELL-PLACED SOVIET SOURCES SAID THE CHANCES OF A DEAL LEADING TO THE OPENING OF ARMS TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO NUCLEAR GIANTS IN LATE SEPTEMBER IN VIENNA ARE 50-50.

ON JUNE 29, CHERNENKO SUGGESTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE HELD TO BAN THE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, KNOWN AS ASAT. HE WAS APPARENTLY CAUGHT OFF GUARD WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HAD OPPOSED SUCH TALKS, ACCEPTED THE NEXT DAY BUT CALLED FOR A BROADER AGENDA.

REAGAN IS KNOWN TO BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE WELL AHEAD OF THE UNITED STATES IN ASAT TECHNOLOGY, HAVING ALREADY TESTED AND INSTALLED THEIR OWN DEVICES. HE HAS TOLD FRIENDS THAT THE RUSSIAN AIM IS TO PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM TESTING A MORE SOPHISTICATED ASAT SYSTEM NOW UNDER DEVELOPMENT BY CALLING FOR A HALT IN TESTING WHILE THE ASAT TALKS GO FORWARD.

ONE SOURCE SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING CABINET MEMBERS AND WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE HELD TWO WEEKS AGO ON HOW REAGAN COULD GO TO VIENNA FOR TWO DAYS IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND THEN PERHAPS ADJOURN THE SESSION UNTIL DECEMBER.

BUT A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, ROBERT SIMS, DISCOUNTED THAT POSSIBILITY, SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT NOW "A VIABLE OPTION."

MEANTIME, IN VIENNA THE CONVICTION WAS GROWING THAT HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS WOULD ARRIVE THERE IN LATE SEPTEMBER TO BEGIN TALKS ON DEMILITARIZING OUTER SPACE.

THE RECENT LULL IN PRONOUNCEMENTS FROM MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON, PUNCTUATED BY THE PRIVATE REAGAN-CHERNENKO EXCHANGE, HAS SERVED TO STRENGTHEN THE IMPRESSION AMONG DIPLOMATS IN VIENNA THAT

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THOSE DESCRIBED AS LIKELY CANDIDATES TO HEAD THE AMERICAN MISSION WERE SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ; NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ROBERT MACFARLANE AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BRENT SCOWCROFT.

IN WASHINGTON, SIME NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION REMAIN DIVIDED ON WHETHER THE TALKS MUST BE LIMITED TO SPACE WEAPONRY, AS SOVIETS ORIGINALLY INSISTED, OR SHOULD RANGE MORE BROADLY, AS REAGAN HAS ADVOCATED.

"THE MATTER IS BEING DISCUSSED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS," HE SAID. "WE ARE STILL TRYING TO WORK THE DETAILS OUT."

OTHER OFFICIALS NOTED THAT DESPITE THE RUSSIAN LEAD IN ASAT WEAPONRY, BOTH SIDES SHARE A COMMON INTEREST IN THE DESIRE TO SAFEGUARD THEIR SPY SATELLITES AND COMMUNICATIONS GEAR FROM A SPACE ATTACK.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR OLEG KHLESTOV, THE SENIOR RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT SPECIALIST IN VIENNA, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW FRIDAY THAT HE HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR A MEETING.

KHLESTOV VOICED CONFIDENCE THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD MAKE PROGRESS ON DEMILITARIZING SPACE SO LONG AS THE AMERICANS DO NOT INTERPOSE THE "ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE" OBSTACLE OF TRYING TO BRING UP THE ISSUE OF RESUMING THE GENEVA MISSILE TALKS.

A U.S. EMBASSY SPOKESMAN IN VIENNA, HENRY BENNETT, SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNOWS, AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HELENE VAN DAN HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR A MEETING.

"WE HAVEN'T BOOKED ANY HOTELS OR CANCELLED ANY LEAVES," SAID BENNETT.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE ALREADY BOUND BY THE 1966 OUTER SPACE TREATY BANNING THE USE OF SPACE SATELLITES AS LAUNCHING PADS FOR ATOMIC WEAPONS.

IN 1972 AND 1974, THE TWO COUNTRIES SIGNED FURTHER AGREEMENTS RESTRICTING DEPLOYMENT OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SITES BUT ALLOWING ABM RESEARCH.

BUT IN THE LAST DECADE, PROGRESS IN BOTH COUNTRIES ON COMPUTERS, LASERS, SENSORS AND OTHER STAR WARE TECHNOLOGY HAVE OPENED THE POSSIBILITY NEW KINDS OF SPACE WEAPONS.

KHLESTOV, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN VIENNA, SAID HE AND FORMER AMERICAN NEGOTIATOR PAUL WERNKE HAD WORKED OUT "75 TO 80 PERCENT OF A TREATY" AIMED AT BANNING ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.

HE SAID HE AND WERNKE HELD THREE BARGAINING SESSIONS IN HELSINKI, BERNE, SWITZERLAND, AND VIENNA BETWEEN JUNE 1978 AND MAY 1979 ON HOW TO CONCLUDE EACH SIDE'S "CONTINUED" TALKS.

630

BUT KHLESTOV SAID THE ANTI-SATELLITE TALKS WERE BROKEN OFF BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WHEN SOVIET TROOPS ENTERED AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 1979.

"WE COULD HAVE REACHED SUCCESS ON THAT AGREEMENT," KHLESTOV MAINTAINED. "FROM MY POINT OF VIEW, THE OBSTACLES WERE ABSOLUTELY POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME."

(DISTRIBUTED BY THE N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERVICE)  
NYT-07-14-84 0953EDT

NSC/S PROFILE

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 19 JUL 84 1:5

TO MCFARLANE

FROM RAYMOND

1/22/16 CAS

DOC DATE 17 JUL 84

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT. SOVIET POLITICAL ACTION

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ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 21 JUL 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DW )

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DISPATCH

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National Security Council  
The White House

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Package # 5550

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Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

July 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*

SUBJECT: Soviet Political Action

*MJR*

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 748-25A-766-6

BY *CR* NARA DATE 6/15/03

In an effort to provide more focus I met with several key officials in the community. We agreed as our next specific course of business to take a detailed look at how the community develops a more substantive exchange of programming content and direction--in programming directed to the Soviet Union--over both RL and VOA. My small working group will meet with senior officials of the two major radio stations to discuss this in depth. Attached at Tab I is a copy of the agenda of our meeting on 2 July.

I have forwarded a memorandum to Al Keel (Tab II) which highlights a need for expanded funding of USIA programming in East Europe and the USSR. This memorandum was developed as a direct result of my meeting with PAOs from East Europe and the Soviet Union in Berlin this spring. It reflects a need to do a number of small things better. As an example, the USIA memorandum points out that for a very modest budgetary increase USIA will be able to facilitate placement of US TV programs on East European TV. A second area is to provide our East European PAOs with a significant inventory of compatible VCR equipment and video cassettes.

I am alerting you in case Al Keel should inquire of your support for this program. The total funding--which I would hope would be an addition to the overall USIA budget--is \$12.5 million.

Jack Matlock *JM* and Steve *URS* Sestanovich concur.

Attachment

- Tab I                    Agenda of 2 July meeting
- Tab II                  Letter to Al Keel

WR  
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June 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL RICHARD STILWELL  
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy  
Department of Defense

MR. MARK PALMER  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs  
Department of State

AMBASSADOR GERALD HELMAN  
Deputy to the Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs  
Department of State

[Redacted]

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency

MR. FRITZ ERMARTH  
National Intelligence Office, Soviet Union  
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. CHARLES E. COURTNEY  
Assistant Director for European Area  
US Information Agency

SUBJECT: Soviet Political Action Meeting, 2 July 1984

I have held three meetings of the Soviet Political Action Working Group (see attached). I would like to meet with you as a small group (addressees only) to discuss the direction this activity should go. We have a number of excellent ideas but we do need to provide sharper focus. Also we have to consider what is the proper composition of the group to assure effective follow-through and policy coherence.

In addition to this overview, I would like to discuss the following items in general terms and hope to task some work on the basis of our discussion.

-- Soviet-US Exchange. We will get a briefing on the June 26-27 Wilson Center conference and discuss what impact if any this should have on our programs.

-- Religion. The nascent religious revival in the Soviet Union should have some role in our programming. (The current

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National Council of Churches delegation shows how counterproductive increased contacts can be, however.)

-- VOA-RFE/RL Content. We have had no general discussion of themes and ideas which we might wish to encourage or of improving our mechanism for bringing these to the attention of the radios. I would like to discuss this in general terms.

-- Moral Equivalence. Do field cables provide us material relevant for discussion for the political action group.

-- Peace movements in the Soviet Union/Eastern European theater.

-- Review of international agreements, including PTT to determine whether we can develop a strategy to put pressure on the Soviets in this area.

It would be useful if the Department of State memorandum for the record of the political conference that took place with Vladimir Bukovsky in late April could be circulated to the addressees before our meeting.

I have scheduled a meeting for July 2, 1984, 1330-1430 hrs, room 248, OEOB. Let us know by 0900 July 2 if you plan to attend so that we can clear you for access.

Attachments (3)

cc: Matlock  
Sestanovich

*Walt Raymond*

Walter Raymond, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 17, 1984

172625

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MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL  
Associate Director  
National Security and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: *AL.* USIA Programming to Eastern Europe and the USSR

I discussed USIA programming with the PAOs for East and West Europe including the USSR at the PAO conference in Berlin in April. Following this discussion, I had a detailed conversation with the USIA Director of the Office of European Affairs, Sam Courtney. I asked Sam to put together his views on the way USIA programs could be more effectively carried out in the Soviet bloc. His memorandum (attached) points out that efforts to implement the President's program in East Europe and the Soviet Union have been severely impaired by budgetary limitations. In no way am I critical of OMB as I rather doubt that these issues have been brought to your attention. Nevertheless, the attached memorandum reflects a need totally consistent with the President's more recent statements on exchanges made on 27 June.

Some of the attached proposals are consistent with the overall thrust projected in NSDD-130 on international information. I have indicated to Pat Schlueter that I will be providing OMB a detailed package of materials reflecting community response to NSDD-130 tasking. Nevertheless, I think this specific program opportunity is one which should be considered as an add-on to the USIA budgetary submission and I would encourage you to try to treat it in this manner. I suspect if you go back to USIA and try to force a reprogramming within the Agency to accomplish these funding needs you will meet with opposition from vested interests. Nevertheless, it is our judgement that these programs are important and, subject to your own personal review, I would hope that the USIA budget ceiling could be raised sufficiently to provide expanded effort to be directed to East European and Soviet targets.

Please let me know what I may do further to assist you.

*Walt*

Walter Raymond, Jr.  
Senior Director, International  
Communications and Information

Attachment: Sam Courtney Memorandum

cc: Pat Schlueter

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EX-148-7-84  
BY GAO  
DATE 6/5/03

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May 10, 1984

172626

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.  
 Senior Director of International  
 Communications and Information and  
 Special Assistant to the President  
 National Security Council  
 The White House

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-254-793

BY CSB NARA DATE 6/5/03

FROM : Charles E. Courtney *Sam C.*  
 Director  
 Office of European Affairs

SUBJECT : Program Opportunities in Eastern  
 Europe and the USSR

As you requested, the following are some thoughts on the types of programs and activities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in which we believe there are additional programming opportunities in public affairs that we will be unable to take advantage of without major infusions of new funds. I will detail below the major opportunities as we see them, with estimates of the additional funding requirements.

Let me point out first, in a general way, that the GOE budgets for our posts in Eastern Europe and the USSR are inadequate to such an extent that our PAOs there have the feeling they are nearly always pinching and scraping to find money for worthwhile programming activities (GOE refers to the in-country Government Operating Expenditures of our overseas posts). Insufficient GOE funds also result in our posts not being able to keep their audio-visual and other program equipment up to date, to say nothing of the lack of funds for other necessary equipment and furnishings for their offices and residences. We are short of programming money even for our Press and Cultural Section in the Soviet Union, where we are not able to fund adequately the various cultural presentations planned for Ambassador Hartman's residence and that of the Consul General in Leningrad. However, increasing GOE funding for our posts is quite a complex procedure, so it is not appropriate for me to try to estimate the additional funding requirements for GOE in this memorandum.

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CLASSIFIED BY: CHARLES E. COURTNEY  
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Looking at the Washington side of the Agency's budget for the cultural and information activities that are implemented at our posts in Eastern Europe, major infusions of funds in several activities would be necessary to take advantage of program opportunities that otherwise would have to be foregone. These are: a) USIA's large thematic exhibits; b) "Arts America" programming in the performing arts and art exhibits; c) TV broadcast rights for U.S. TV series and films; d) videocassettes and VCR equipment; and e) American books for presentation.

### Thematic Exhibits

In recent years in Eastern Europe we have been showing USIA thematic exhibits, such as "American Theatre Today," only in the capital cities of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia because our exhibits budget precludes showing in more than one city per country. For example, the showing of "American Theatre Today" in Romania this coming fall will only be in Bucharest, even though our Ambassador to Romania wanted the exhibit to show in at least a second important city in Romania.

If we succeed in concluding an acceptable new exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union we will then be back in the exhibits business there, with each exhibit showing in a total of six cities for approximately a month in each Soviet city. If we succeed in concluding an exchanges agreement with Czechoslovakia we would also be budgeting for showing thematic exhibits there.

To provide for such additional showings in Eastern Europe and to include the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in the exhibits program, we estimate that the additional funding requirements for exhibits would be \$10,000,000 annually, net of the Agency's current budget for the thematic exhibits program. (The salary costs for additional positions that would be required to expand the exhibits program are not included in that estimate.)

### The "Arts America" program

Our Washington budgets (and, of course, the GOE budgets of our posts in Eastern Europe) are quite inadequate to serve our present Arts America programming opportunities in Eastern Europe. Opportunities for programming U.S. performing arts groups in East Germany, where we can engage in such programming without the severe restrictions the East Germans place on our other activities, are being foregone because of inadequate funds. Such opportunities are also open for us in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. We also ought to have a much stronger presence in Yugoslavia in performing arts and art exhibits, but we cannot now afford it.

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The Soviet Union again is a special case. If we conclude an exchanges agreement with the USSR, another major infusion of new money will be required to carry out the performing arts part of the agreement.

An annual budget that takes adequate advantage of cultural presentation opportunities in performing arts and art exhibits for Eastern Europe and the USSR would be on the order of \$2 million. Our present Arts America budget is \$400,000 a year -- for all of Europe. (The increase of approximately \$1,600,000 does not include the salary costs for some additional positions that would be required to expand the Arts America program in the indicated manner.)

TV Broadcast Rights

You will recall that I cited to you the fact that two high level officials from the Romanian Foreign Ministry had knowingly offered USIA the opportunity to show the United States postively on Romanian TV. Their problem is that Romania is extremely short of hard currency, so they cannot afford to pay for the TV rights for U.S. TV series and films. They specifically cited their willingness to show "How the West Was Won," "Little House on the Prairie." and "The Waltons" if we could get them the TV rights free, knowing that those three series also portray the United States in a positive light.

We cannot obtain free TV rights directly for Romania, but we have inquired into the possibilities of USIA buying the TV rights for such TV series for an Eastern European country such as Romania. To date, we have found that it depends on the U.S. distributor of any given series. The distributors of "Little House on the Prairie" and of "The Waltons" were in varying degrees not forthcoming, but the London distributor (MGM) of "How the West Was Won" was quite willing to sell the TV rights to USIA for Romanian showings (the series totals 48 hours, at \$1,000 per hour, for Romanian showings, with 16-hour segments possible).

We would like USIA to look into the possibilities for budgeting for such television opportunities in the Eastern European countries; we know that Yugoslavia and some other Eastern European countries are in situations similar to that of Romania. We estimate that an annual budget of \$600,000 to purchase TV broadcast rights for television placements in a number of the Eastern European countries would enable us to take advantage of such TV opportunities.

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### The Videocassette "Revolution" in Europe

Our Eastern European PAOs are giving careful consideration to the potential opportunities afforded by the expanding use of videocassettes in their different countries of responsibility. We see a great potential for videocassette programming in some of the East European countries -- by lending appropriate VCRs to audience members, by having viewing facilities in our libraries, and by representational showings in the residences of our officers. The investment in inventories of compatible VCR equipment and the videocassettes would be substantial, but very worthwhile. We estimate that the required increase in annual funding would be approximately \$200,000.

### Book Programs

As you well know USIA and USG overseas book programs are already under serious study. I would simply add a plea here for a substantially larger budget for acquisition of high quality books for our book presentation programs in the USSR and the Eastern European countries. Soviet, and Eastern European, art books are handsomely rendered, nicely bound with excellent quality paper, but even so they do not match the superb quality of U.S.-produced art books. Unfortunately, ours are much more expensive than theirs. As a result our presentation books budgets for our Eastern European posts are quickly exhausted. Other U.S.-produced books, on a wide range of important subject matters, also are very expensive within our current presentation budgets. To the extent we can, Eastern European PAOs also try to provide appropriate books for the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to present to their host country contacts. It is even more difficult for us to try to provide appropriate books for other Embassy officers, such as the Political and the Economic Counselors, to present to their host country contacts, but we accept that responsibility when we can afford it. We estimate that an increase of \$100,000 in our annual expenditure for presentation books for our posts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would put our Missions in those countries in a much better position to use presentation books effectively.

### Major Items of Expenditure

In summary, were we able to obtain a major infusion of funds for program opportunities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the major items would be as follows, amounting to a net increase above

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the current annual funding levels for those activities totalling \$12,500,000 (not including salary costs for additional positions, primarily in the staffing of the exhibits and the Arts America programs):

Thematic exhibits	\$10,000,000
Arts America programs	1,600,000
TV Broadcast rights	600,000
Videocassette programming	200,000
Presentation books	100,000

### USG Bilateral Exchanges Agreements

Looking ahead in respect to our bilateral exchanges agreements with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union raises first the question of the status of potential exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. As agreed with the NSC, USIA and the Department of State just recently sent to the U.S. Mission in Moscow, USG drafts of a 6-year general "umbrella" agreement on exchanges in cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields, and a 3-year specific program of cooperation and exchanges within the umbrella agreement. Similarly we have sent to the U.S. Mission in Prague USG drafts for a 4-year umbrella agreement and a specific 2-year program within the umbrella agreement, along with a USG draft agreement to establish a USIA branch post in Bratislava (we assess the chances of getting permission to establish a branch post in Bratislava as rather slim.)

The USG began its official bilateral exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union in 1958, the first such USG agreement with a Warsaw Pact country. We continued to renew and expand those agreements until December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

We have had bilateral exchanges agreements with Romania since 1960, with Hungary since 1977, and with Bulgaria since 1978. On the other hand, we have not had official bilateral agreements with Poland, Yugoslavia, East Germany, or Czechoslovakia, and the USG does not have diplomatic relations with Albania. Each of those countries' governments (except Albania) has at various times pushed for official exchanges agreements with the USG.

With Poland we have continued to say no to such requests because, at least up to the imposition of martial law in December 1981, we had been able to conduct many programs and activities reasonably free of impediments.

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We have continued to say no also to Yugoslavia regarding an official exchanges agreement. Our information resources in Yugoslavia are quite large, with a USIS office in Belgrade and separate American Centers, with libraries, in each of the six republics. We also have a large Fulbright program with Yugoslavia under the auspices of the only truly binational Fulbright Commission in a communist country. In 1980 we agreed to establish a U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Cultural Working Group which meets annually to discuss, plan and facilitate bilateral cultural activities, but we have refused Yugoslav requests to bring educational activities within the scope of the Joint Cultural Working Group.

The status of our bilateral exchanges agreements with Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria is as follows. Programs of Cooperation and Exchanges for 1984-85 were signed with the governments of Hungary and Romania, respectively, last December. The 2-year umbrella agreement with Bulgaria was extended recently for another two years, and the 1983-84 Program of Cooperation and Exchanges with Bulgaria will be due for renewal by the end of this calendar year. The 5-year umbrella agreement with Romania also will be due for renewal by the end of this calendar year.

Finally, in respect to the possibility of concluding an exchanges agreement with the GDR, there have been unsuccessful bilateral negotiations off and on since 1981. The current status is that Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway (in agreement with the Department of State and USIA) informed the GDR last December that the U.S. continues to seek an agreement, but our respective positions are too far apart, as evidenced by the most recent GDR draft. In the absence of a new draft from the GDR, which would have to take account of USG concerns, the Ambassador indicated that we support continuation of the present informal cultural program between our two countries.

Clearance: D - Mr. Charles Z. Wick

*RE for CW*

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 18 JUL 84 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK 1/22/16 *oob*

DOCDATE 18 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

EAST WEST ECONOMICS

SUBJECT: SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES

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ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION  
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FOR INFO

COMMENTS

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The White House

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1984

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JMM*  
SUBJECT: Soviet Grain Purchases

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25A-7(0-1)

BY 10/17 NA. A DATE 5/3-10

According to Agriculture's figures the Soviets have now purchased a total of 12,357,800 tons of grain for delivery in the crop year ending September 30, 1984. These purchases were almost equally divided between wheat and corn (6.3 and 6.05 million tons, respectively). In addition, the Soviets have purchased 416,200 tons of soybeans.

Regarding the crop year beginning October 1, 1984, the Soviets purchased 350,000 tons of corn yesterday and there are rumors that they will make substantial purchases of grain (1 to 3 million tons) within the next few days. They are obligated to buy at least 9 million tons of grain in each crop year.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1984

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172628INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*  
SUBJECT: Soviet Grain Purchases**DECLASSIFIED**NLRR 748-25A-7107BY KOB NARA DATE 5/30/13

According to Agriculture's figures the Soviets have now purchased a total of 12,357,800 tons of grain for delivery in the crop year ending September 30, 1984. These purchases were almost equally divided between wheat and corn (6.3 and 6.05 million tons, respectively). In addition, the Soviets have purchased 416,200 tons of soybeans.

Regarding the crop year beginning October 1, 1984, the Soviets purchased 350,000 tons of corn yesterday and there are rumors that they will make substantial purchases of grain (1 to 3 million tons) within the next few days. They are obligated to buy at least 9 million tons of grain in each crop year.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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SITUATION ROOM NOTE


*Jack*  
*What's the*  
*total for*  
*year now?*  
*7/17/84*

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet Purchase of U.S. Grain

A U.S. commodity analyst of a large grain exporter reports that on July 11, the USSR purchased approximately one million metric tons (MT) of U.S. hard red winter wheat following seven days of negotiating. Half of the wheat is to be shipped from October to December while the remainder is tentatively scheduled for January to February shipment. The Soviets paid cash.

- o The Soviets also purchased approximately 850,000 MT of U.S. corn earlier in the month with shipment scheduled for October to December. Half of this purchase is being financed by a U.S. firm.
- o During recent negotiations the Soviets also expressed interest in the purchase of 150,000 MT of U.S. barley for October to November delivery. (C)



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NLR *Coast*  
BY *Cil H. PARSONS* 1/13/12

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NIC# 04134-84  
18 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: David Y. McManis  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:   
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

25X1

SUBJECT: Monthly Forecast and Warning Report -- USSR-EE

1. Chernenko's Health

A. Discussion

The observations of recent  visitors to Moscow confirm our diagnosis of Chernenko's health. He suffers from emphysema--a disease which gradually gets worse--and an associated dilation of the right side of his heart which in turn produces arrhythmia--a condition which can be treated but which will reoccur periodically. As a result of these diseases, he has had much publicized spells of weakness which are caused by a lack of oxygen, sometimes has problems maintaining his balance, sometimes appears vacuous (another result of a lack of oxygen to the brain) and in general probably must follow a strictly limited work schedule. He would need special oxygen equipment to fly. At best his prognosis is that he has five to six years to live but will probably become completely incapable of playing a political role within two or three years. Chernenko's emphysema, however, increases the probability that he will experience other health problems, such as pneumonia, in the next few years and that he will either be completely incapacitated for a prolonged period or die of these additional complications.

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Even with his health as it is now, Chernenko is probably incapable of providing real leadership to the country. The limited number of hours he can work greatly limit his ability to run the apparatus and to shape decisions. His limited acumen and physical frailty make it unlikely that he can dominate either the Politburo or the Secretariat.

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