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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

**File Folder** USSR (7/9/84-7/11/84)

KDB 1/22/2016

**Box Number** 25A

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

SKINNER

403

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172607	NOTE	RE SOVIET NAVY (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	2	7/6/1984	B1
172608	MEMO	B. LINHARD TO BOB SIMS AND KARNA SMALL RE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR ROUND FOUR OF HOT LINE TALKS <b>R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-6-2-1</b>	1	7/9/1984	B1
172609	REPORT	PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR ROUND IV, U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON BILATERAL COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #172608) <b>R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-6-3-0</b>	2	7/6/1984	B1
172610	GUIDANCE	CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE (ATTACHMENTS TO DOC #172608) <b>R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-6-4-9</b>	8	ND	B1
172611	TALKING POINTS	DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL TALKING POINTS ON HOTLINE AGREEMENT <b>R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-6-5-8</b>	1	7/12/1984	B1
172612	TALKING POINTS	EARLIER VERSION OF DOC #172611, W/EDITS (DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL TALKING POINTS ON HOTLINE AGREEMENT) <b>R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-6-5-8</b>	1	7/12/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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172613	CABLE	MOSCOW 8757 <b>R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-6-6-7</b>	6	7/11/1984	B1
172614	MEMO	P. DUR TO R. MCFARLANE RE PROPOSAL	1	7/13/1984	B1
172615	MEMO	C. WEINBERGER TO ASST. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS RE PROPOSAL	1	7/11/1984	B1
172616	MEMO	RESULTS OF 1984 INCSEA REVIEW IN MOSCOW (INCL. COVER MEMO) <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-6-9-4</b>	1	6/6/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Bud,

7/9

Am interesting photos  
that I thought President  
might like to see.



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1/2/16 CAP

RECEIVED 14 JUL 84 14

TO MCFARLANE

FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 09 JUL 84 4

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR ROUND FOUR OF HOTLINE TALKS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: 14 JUL 84 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DW DW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>G 7/17</i>	<i>Not by [unclear]</i>		<i>2</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (c)

THE ~~WHITE~~ HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5

## HOTLINE

RCM HAS SEEN

*fl*

- 1100 Initiating of notes  
State Press Photo-op
- 1130 Reception at State
- - Backgrounders  
at State  
(no Vienna)
- 1300 Lunch at Soviet  
Embassy.

National Security Council  
The White House

System # I  
Package # 5441

84 JUL 14 12:59

6

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Handwritten mark]</i>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<del>3</del>		
Bud McFarlane	<del>4</del>	has seen	<del>E</del>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		N
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



~~SECRET~~

5441

7

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

July 9, 1984

172608

NLRR 748-26A-67-1

BY LCDB NARA DATE 5/29/13

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB SIMS  
KARNA SMALL

FROM: BOB LINHARD *Bob*

KCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Strategy for Round Four of Hot  
Line Talks

Attached is the package developed by the Interagency to support  
press guidance on the Hot Line Talks. Included is:

- a short paper outlining the general strategy we would  
recommend with respect to public affairs;
- a set of interagency press guidance for use should the  
talks become a press item prior to their completion;
- two alternative statements to be issued by the White House  
depending upon whether agreement is reached or not;
- a draft fact sheet supporting any White House announcement;  
and
- a set of contingency Qs/As for use in responding to  
detailed questions should the agreement be concluded.

All these materials have been coordinated and are provided to be  
used in accordance with strategy outlined in the first paper.  
In other words, we would really like to keep it low-key until  
the agreement is reached, so that we do not spook the Soviets.

Attachment  
Public Affairs package

cc: *Bob Kimmitt* ←

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8

HOTLINE

RCM HAS SEEN

*[Handwritten signature]*

- 1100 Initiating of notes
- State Press Photo-op
- 1130 Reception at State
- - Backgrounders  
at State  
(no Vienna)
- 1300 Lunch at Soviet  
Embassy.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

NLRR 7825A-630

172609  
6 July 1984

BY COB NARA DATE 5/30/15

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR ROUND IV  
U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON BILATERAL COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS

Overview:

Our public handling of the upcoming round of U.S.-Soviet discussions on bilateral communications improvements should be designed: (1) to avoid calling public attention to the discussions prior to signature of a Hotline upgrade agreement in order to preclude a negative Soviet reaction that might impede conclusion of an accord; and (2) to ensure the widest possible public attention to an agreement once it is signed.

We therefore recommend that the U.S. continue its low-key public approach to the discussions of a DCL enhancement agreement. Once such an accord is concluded, the White House should issue a public announcement--ideally timed so as to avoid conflict with other "newsworthy" events. We should continue our current low-key, general public affairs approach on the other communications improvements we have proposed, to prevent a shift in the focus of press attention from what we have accomplished.

Public Affairs Actions:

Following are specific actions recommended to implement that general strategy:

Before the Signature of a DCL Accord: Continuing previous practice, we will not announce the fact of Round IV until its completion. At the same time, we will have available contingency press guidance for use in Washington and by our posts overseas in case the press learns that the talks are taking place (or will open shortly). That guidance will give only limited, factual information on the discussions.

If agreement on a DCL upgrade is not signed during this round, the White House would give out a brief, general press statement at the conclusion of the round, just as it has in the past.

After the Signature of a DCL Accord: If we do conclude an agreement on enhancing the DCL, we will recommend to the Soviet side that the signature take place in the presence of the two delegations and of a State Department photographer. The press would not be invited.

A senior White House spokesman would announce the fact of the accord immediately after its signature. The chairman and deputy chairman of the U.S. delegation to the talks would then be available for a background press briefing. In addition, an unclassified background fact sheet on the DCL would be available

for the press, and we would have a contingency Q&A package for use by official spokesmen. We would cable that package, the White House statement and the text of the background briefing to our military and diplomatic posts overseas on the day of the announcement.

Draft Materials:

Attached are drafts of the public handling materials discussed above:

- Contingency press guidance for use before or during Round IV of the talks;
- End-of-round White House press statement for use if a DCL accord is not signed during the round;
- Text of a White House announcement of an accord;
- Unclassified fact sheet for public distribution if an accord is signed;
- Contingency Qs & As on a DCL agreement.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR 14825A-64-9

BY CDB NARA DATE 6/5/07

172610

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

FOR USE BEFORE OR DURING U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS TALKS  
JULY 1984

Q. Any comment on the U.S.-Soviet communications talks?

A. U.S. officials and a Soviet delegation from Moscow [are meeting] [will meet] here in Washington this week to discuss possible improvements in communications between our two governments.

This is part of ongoing discussions on this general subject that we initiated last summer on the basis of the proposals advanced by the President in May 1983. In developing those proposals, the Administration worked closely with key Congressional leaders, including Senators Nunn and Warner and the late Senator Jackson. During the [current] [forthcoming] meeting we [have presented] [will present] our views on the full range of the President's initiatives to improve U.S.-Soviet direct communications.

At our earlier meetings--August 1983 in Moscow, January 1984 in Washington, and April 1984 in Moscow--we made considerable progress toward agreement on technical improvements to the Hotline. [I cannot go into more detail about the present round because it is not yet completed, but I can say that the talks are moving forward in a positive and businesslike manner.]

Q. Who is participating in the U.S.-Soviet talks on communications improvements [currently taking place] [which will shortly take place in Washington]?

A. The chairman of the U.S. delegation is Mr. Warren Zimmerman of the State Department, until recently Deputy Chief of Mission of our Embassy in Moscow. The deputy chairman is Mr. Stuart Branch, who has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Communications. The delegation [includes] [will include] other officials of the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council Staff.

The Soviet delegation is headed by Mr. A.M. Varbanskiy, a Chief of Administration in the USSR Ministry of Communications. Other members of the delegation [include] [will include] officials of the Communications Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.

Q. Why are the Soviets willing to talk about communications improvements right now when they have refused to return to the START and INF talks, and have rejected the U.S. position on beginning talks on space weapons?

A. I do not want to speculate about specific Soviet motives behind individual actions. For our part, we welcome Soviet interest in pursuing any measures that might increase international stability and reduce the risk of misunderstanding and conflict.

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE PRESS STATEMENT  
CLOSE OF ROUND IV OF U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS TALKS:

IF NO DCL AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED

U.S. and Soviet officials met on 11-\_\_\_\_ July in Washington for discussions on improving communications between the United States and the USSR. Earlier meetings were held in Moscow in August 1983 and April 1984 and in Washington in January 1984.

Discussions at this week's meeting focussed primarily on enhancing the U.S.-Soviet Direct Communications Link, or "Hotline". We continued to make significant progress on important technical aspects of the proposed improvements to the Hotline. The two delegations will continue to meet. The United States hopes that these talks will result in agreement on measures which will enhance international stability and build mutual confidence, and which could lead to further steps in the future.

These U.S.-Soviet discussions arose from a series of proposals advanced by the President in May 1983, for measures to enhance international stability and reduce the risk that accident, miscalculation, or misinterpretation could lead to confrontation or conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those proposals included the addition of a facsimile capability to the Direct Communications Link, establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link, improvement of diplomatic communication facilities, and an agreement on consultations in the event of certain nuclear incidents precipitated by unauthorized individuals or groups. In developing these initiatives, the Administration worked closely with key Congressional leaders, including Senators Warner and Nunn and the late Senator Jackson. These initiatives were reflected in the Secretary of Defense's report to Congress on measures to enhance stability that was published in April 1983. During the talks with the Soviet Union, the U.S. side has presented its views on the full range of these proposals.

The U.S. delegation consisted of representatives of the National Security Council Staff, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. It was headed by Warren Zimmerman of the Department of State. The Soviet delegation included representatives of the USSR Ministry of Communications and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF DCL ACCORD

I am pleased to announce that the United States and the Soviet Union today signed an agreement to add a facsimile transmission capability to the Direct Communications Link, or "Hotline". This means that the American and Soviet heads of government will be able to exchange messages over the Hotline far more rapidly than they can now. For the first time they also will be able to send graphic materials such as maps or pictures which could play a crucial role in helping to resolve certain types of crisis or misunderstanding.

The negotiations which led to this agreement arose from a series of proposals made by President Reagan in May 1983, for measures to enhance international stability and reduce the risk that accident, miscalculation, or misinterpretation could lead to confrontation or conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those proposals included the addition of a facsimile capability to the Hotline, establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link, improvement of diplomatic communications facilities, and an agreement to facilitate consultations if any unauthorized individual or group precipitated a nuclear incident. In developing these initiatives, the Administration worked closely with key Congressional leaders, including Senators Warner and Nunn and the late Senator Jackson.

Delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union began discussing these proposals in Moscow in August 1983. Subsequent sessions have alternated between Washington and Moscow. The two delegations will continue to meet to arrange further technical details of the Hotline upgrade, [and to discuss additional communications measures which could enhance international stability and build mutual confidence.]



## DRAFT FACT SHEET

## U.S.-U.S.S.R. DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

The United States and the Soviet Union today formally agreed to add a facsimile transmission capability to the Direct Communications Link (DCL), commonly known as the "Hotline". This step--the second major technical improvement to the Hotline since it was established in 1963--will significantly enhance the capability of the system and thus its potential to help resolve crises and avert misunderstanding.

The addition of facsimile transmission capability to the Hotline will enable the U.S. and Soviet heads of government to exchange messages far more rapidly than they can with the existing teletype system. In addition, they will be able for the first time to send graphic material over the DCL. The precise, detailed, and often easily interpreted information offered by such graphic material as maps, charts, and drawings could be essential to help resolve a crisis or misunderstanding.

Prior Negotiating History

In June 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a Direct Communications Link for use in time of emergency. Each agreed to ensure prompt delivery to its head of government of any communications received over the DCL from the other head of government. The Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated and signed by the heads of the U.S. and Soviet delegations to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The DCL was activated in August 1963.

Eight years later, the DCL was updated by a 30 September 1971 agreement negotiated by a special working group of the two SALT delegations and signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. This agreement provided for the addition of two satellite circuits to the DCL, one using the Soviet Molniya II satellite system and the other the U.S. Intelsat system. Those two circuits became operational in January 1978.

A second special working group of the two SALT delegations simultaneously negotiated a related Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which was signed on the same day, 30 September 1971. This Agreement provided for each party to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launch extending beyond its national territory in the direction of the other, and for each to notify the other immediately in the event of certain situations which could create a risk of nuclear war. The parties agreed that they would use the DCL to transmit urgent information in situations requiring prompt clarification.

## The Reagan Proposals

In May 1983, President Reagan proposed to the Soviet Union three measures to improve the bilateral communications network between the two countries: the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the Hotline; the establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link (JMCL); and the establishment of high-speed data links between each government and its embassy in the other's capital.

The Secretary of Defense had recommended those proposals to the President following a full and complete study of possible initiatives for enhancing international stability and reducing the risk of nuclear war. That examination, which involved all concerned U.S. government agencies, was mandated by the Congress in the Department of Defense Authorization Act 1983. The Secretary of Defense transmitted its results and recommendations in his April 1983 Report to the Congress on Direct Communications Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability.

U.S.-Soviet negotiations on improving bilateral communications links opened in Moscow in August 1983. Subsequent rounds have been held in Washington in January 1984, in Moscow in April 1984, and in Washington in July 1984. Those discussions have now resulted in a U.S.-Soviet accord to add a facsimile transmission capability to the Direct Communications Link.

### DCL System

The Direct Communications Link will now consist of:

- three circuits (two satellite circuits plus one wire telegraph circuit);
- one earth station in each country for each satellite circuit;
- terminals in each country linked to the three circuits and equipped with teletype and facsimile equipment.

In keeping with the principle of confidentiality concerning communications between heads of government, the precise number of times that the two heads of state have used the system has not been disclosed. We do know that it has proved invaluable in major crises. U.S. Presidents have cited its use during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars.

6 July 1984

CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS  
FOR USE IN THE EVENT OF A DCL UPGRADE AGREEMENT

1. Why was this agreement signed by Acting Secretary Dam and the Soviet Charge d'Affaires? Why not by higher-ranking officials (e.g., Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko)?
2. The USSR has obviously been reluctant to show any progress in its relations with the United States at this time. Why do you think it was willing to sign this agreement?
3. You have said that you have also discussed the other communications improvements proposed by President Reagan with the Soviets. What has transpired with those discussions?
4. What new equipment is involved in adding a facsimile capability to the Hotline? Type? Nationality? Off-the-shelf or special purpose?
5. How can you attempt to restrict trade in microprocessors and other computer equipment with the USSR at the same time that you are willing to give the Soviet government a U.S. microprocessor for the Hotline?
6. It took the U.S. and USSR almost a year to reach agreement in this very limited, non-controversial area. Why did it take so long?
7. According to the New York Times, the United States insisted earlier that the Hotline agreement should be more formal than a simple exchange of notes. Why did you change your position? Weren't you just anxious to get some kind of accord before the election?
8. How often has the Hotline been used?
9. What difference will facsimile capability make in actual fact?
10. Why did the two delegations meet so infrequently? Doesn't that indicate that neither government thought this was a very important issue?
11. What exactly is the Hotline? I always thought it was a telephone.
12. What is the relationship between progress in this area and the congressional proposal for nuclear risk reduction centers?
13. When will the facsimile capability be implemented?
14. What arrangements are there to ensure secure message transmission?
15. Who maintains the DCL equipment?

16. Would the Hotline help to ensure U.S.-Soviet communications in the event of a nuclear war?

17. How can you say that adding a facsimile capability will increase the speed of the DCL system when it will not affect the speed of translation, the slowest stage in the process.

18. Have you considered adding a voice and or video capability to the Hotline?

17

Q1. Why was this agreement signed by Acting Secretary Dam and the Soviet Charge d'Affaires? Why not by higher-ranking officials like Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A. The U.S. and Soviet delegations to the discussions on bilateral communications improvements have met alternately in Moscow and Washington. The agreement to improve the Hotline was concluded during the latest round of talks, which was held in Washington. Since Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin is away on consultations and Secretary Shultz is participating in the ANZUS conference in Australia, Acting Secretary Dam and Soviet Charge \_\_\_\_\_ signed the agreement.

Q2. The USSR has obviously been reluctant to show any progress in its relations with the United States at this time. Why do you think it was willing to sign this agreement?

A. We do not want to speculate about the motives of the Soviet Union. However, we welcome Soviet interest in pursuing measures that might increase international stability and reduce the risk of misunderstanding.

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Q3. You have said that you have also discussed the other communications improvements proposed by President Reagan with Soviets. What has transpired with those discussions?

A. We have, in our meetings with the Soviets over the past year, explained in detail our other proposals for communications improvements, and have solicited comments from the Soviet side. While the Soviets have not yet been willing to discuss all of these proposals, we are continuing to pursue our efforts to enhance U.S.-Soviet bilateral communications.

Q6. It took the U.S. and USSR almost a year to reach agreement in this very limited, non-controversial area. Why did it take so long?

A. Upgrading the Hotline raised complex technological issues which required time to work out. It is not unusual for inter-governmental negotiations to go on for well over one year.



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Q7. According to the New York Times, the United States insisted earlier that the Hotline agreement should be more formal than a simple exchange of notes. Why did you change your position? Weren't you just anxious to get some kind of accord before the election?

A. There are several standard formats for a legal accord between two governments: exchange of notes, memoranda of understanding, treaties, etc. The United States and the Soviet Union explored various possible formats in which to express our agreement to add a facsimile transmission capability to the Hotline. We agreed on the memorandum form.

Q8. How often has the Hotline been used?

A. In keeping with the principle of confidentiality in communications between heads of government, we cannot disclose the precise number of times that the U.S. and Soviet leaders have used the system. It has proved invaluable in major crises. U.S. Presidents have cited its use during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars.

Q9. What difference will facsimile capability make in actual fact?

A. The addition of facsimile transmission capability to the Direct Communications Link will enable the U.S. and Soviet heads of government to exchange information far more rapidly than they can with the existing teletype system. It will also allow them for the first time to transmit graphic material over the DCL. The advantages of increased speed are obvious. In addition, the precise, detailed, and often easily interpreted information offered by such graphic materials as maps, charts, and drawings could be essential to help resolve a crisis or misunderstanding.

Q10. Why did the two delegations meet so infrequently? Doesn't that indicate that neither government thought this was a very important issue?

A. The time between rounds of the U.S.-Soviet discussions on bilateral communications improvements was necessary for each side to examine thoroughly the technical issues involved in the discussions. Far from indicating that the sides did not attach considerable importance to these discussions, therefore, the time between rounds demonstrated the seriousness with which they approached the task.

20

Q11. What exactly is the Hotline? I always thought it was a telephone.

The Hotline is a direct, highly reliable teletype link; the new U.S.-Soviet agreement will add a facsimile capability to the existing teletype. Its components include: three circuits (two satellite circuits plus one wire telegraph circuit); one earth station in each country for each satellite circuit; and terminals in each country linked to the three circuits equipped with teletype--and soon with facsimile--equipment.

Q12. What is the relationship between progress in this area and the congressional proposal for nuclear risk reduction centers?

A. The Reagan Administration has been working hard to build the foundation necessary for the kind of confidence-building regime--including nuclear risk reduction centers--which the Congress is advocating. This foundation includes the establishment of technical mechanisms and operational procedures to facilitate U.S.-Soviet dialogue, as well as explicit agreement on situations which warrant consultations.

The addition of facsimile capability to the Hotline will help to build part of that foundation. In addition, the Administration--in close consultation with the Congress--has proposed other important improvements to the U.S.-Soviet bilateral communications system: the establishment of a direct facsimile link below the level of head of government (Joint Military Communications Link), the improvement of diplomatic communications facilities, and an agreement to facilitate consultations in the event of a nuclear incident involving an unauthorized individual or group. Taken together, these measures would provide for the exchange of time-sensitive information in many of the kinds of contingencies of concern to the Congress.

Q15. Who maintains the DCL equipment?

A. The Department of Defense maintains the DCL equipment.

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Q16. Would the Hotline help to ensure U.S.-Soviet communications in the event of a nuclear war?

A. We have a variety of means by which we could communicate to the Soviet Union in the event that war ever broke out between us. But I would remind you that the purpose of a Hotline facsimile capability, as well as of the other communications improvements which we have proposed to the Soviet government, is to help ensure that war will never break out between the United States and the Soviet Union.



Q17. How can you say that adding a facsimile capability will increase the speed of the DCL system when it will not affect the speed of translation, the slowest stage in the process.

A. It is true that translation is the slowest step in the direct communication process. Nevertheless, the facsimile capability will allow a significant reduction in the time it takes for the two heads of state to exchange written materials. Equally if not more important, it will permit them to send graphic information which will require little or no translation.

Q18. Have you considered adding a voice and/or video capability to the Hotline?

A. The Department of Defense study which led to the President's proposals for improving bilateral communications between the United States and the Soviet Union thoroughly considered the possibility of adding a secure voice or video capability to the DCL. As a result of that examination, we concluded that this step would not help to enhance stability or reduce the risk of miscalculation.

Because voice communication is more difficult than written material to translate and long-distance voice communication is often difficult to hear clearly, it is far more subject to misunderstanding. In addition, a direct conversation could encourage instant response, thereby denying the head of state the necessary opportunity to consult with advisors and prepare a thoughtful and measured reply. For both reasons, emergency voice communications between the two leaders could reduce, rather than heighten, their ability to resolve a crisis. The same considerations apply, in heightened fashion, to the installation of video conferencing capability.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF C ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 12 JUL 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM LINHARD

1/22/16 09

DOC DATE 11 JUL 84

33

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPEECHES

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES REMARKS RE HOTLINE AGREEMENT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (C/R)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C JUL 12 1984	Mcfarlane Noted		RL

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

National Security Council  
The ~~White~~ House

System # II

Package # 90779

84 JUL 13 7:24

34

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>I</u>
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

John:

- ① Statement reviewed by Bud.
- ② Given to Damm with instructions to hold closely. Bud thinks there is chance Soviets may pull a surprise on this issue tomorrow and doesn't want a premature leak.

National Security Council  
The White House

System # II

Package # 90779

84 JUL 11 P 8: 22

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5/7</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>Have corrected, return to me</u>

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

Bud: Thought apparently is to use this at tomorrow's mini-press conference. Please advise of any changes needed.

Darman and speechwriters are requesting copies.

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II

90779

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 11, 1984

36

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: BOB LINHARD

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Remarks

Attached is a rework of the draft White House press statement so that it is in the form of Presidential remarks.

I have not discussed this rework with anyone else -- but I think it fills the bill and it tracks the material previously fully vetted of this subject.

This memo is UNCLAS with attachment removed.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

1/22/16 GDB

Attachment: Draft Presidential Remarks (S)

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90779  
July 12, 1984 37

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25A-6-5-8

Draft Presidential Talking Points  
on Hotline Agreement

172611

BY KOB NARA DATE 5/30/83

-- I am happy to be able to announce today that we and the Soviet Union have reached agreement to expand and improve the operation of the Direct Communications Link, or the "Hotline."

-- This agreement is a modest but positive step toward enhancing international stability and reducing the risk that accident, miscalculation or misinterpretation could lead to confrontation or conflict between the US and Soviet Union.

-- With the addition of a facsimile capability, we will not only be able to exchange messages faster, but for the first time we will be able to send graphic material such as maps or pictures which could play a crucial role in helping to resolve certain types of crises or misunderstandings.

-- The negotiations which led to this agreement began about one year ago (August 1983), based upon a series of proposals that we first made in May 1983.

-- In developing this and other initiatives designed to reduce the risk of war due to accident, misunderstanding or miscalculation, we had the benefit of excellent advice from a number of key Congressional leaders, including Senators Warner and Nunn and the late Senator Jackson.

-- I see this agreement as both an appropriate technical improvement to the Hotline, which has served both our governments well for over twenty years, and as a good example of how we can, working together, find approaches which can move us towards a reduction in the risks of war.

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Declassify on: OADR

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SYSTEM II 90779

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July 11, 1984

38

DECLASSIFIED

Draft Presidential Talking Points  
on Hotline Agreement

172612

NLRR 748-21A-6-5-8

BY KDB NARA DATES 130/13

-- I am happy to be able to announce today that <sup>the</sup> (the US and Soviet Union) have reached agreement to <sup>expand and improve the</sup> (add a facsimile <sup>operation of</sup> transmission ability to) the Direct Communications Link, or the "Hotline."

-- This agreement is a modest but positive step toward enhancing international stability and reducing the risk that accident, miscalculation or misinterpretation could lead to confrontation or conflict between the US and Soviet Union.

<sup>With the</sup> -- ~~Once this new~~ capability is added, we will not only be able to exchange messages faster, but for the first time we will be able to send graphic material such as maps or pictures which could play a crucial role in helping to resolve certain types of crises or misunderstandings.

-- The negotiations which led to this agreement began about one year ago (August 1983), based upon a series of proposals that we first made in May 1983.

-- In developing this and other initiatives designed to reduce the risk of war due to accident, misunderstanding or miscalculation, we had the benefit of excellent advice from a number of key Congressional leaders, including Senators Warner and Nunn and the late Senator Jackson.

-- I see this agreement as both an appropriate technical improvement to the Hotline, which has served both our governments well for over twenty years, and as a good example of how we can, working together, find approaches which can move us towards a reduction in the risks of war.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25A-6-6-7

BY GDB NARA DATE 5/3-13

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ITEMPO 4640613 1940518Z FRP]

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FRP: .2,3, . . . 8

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: CMASS-E ( ), CRU, DC/OOE/EI, DD/SOV,  
 NIO/WE, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, ODPW-W, OGI/EC/CM, OGI/ISI/WP, OOE/EEIN,  
 COE/EI/MA, OOE/EI/FS, OOE/EI/SI, OCE/FR, OPCTR/EEWE, PLANFAC-E ( ), IFF,  
 SOV/CS/CA, SOV/CS/E/E, SOV/CS/E/P, SOV/CS/S/I, SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/CS/Y,  
 SOV/DI/A, SOV/DI/HI, SOV/EA/FO, SOV/EAC, SOV/EAD, SOV/EAG, SOV/PA/C,  
 SOV/PA/D, SOV/PA/F/E, SOV/PA/F/S, SOV/PA/FO, SOV/PA/S, SOV/SE, SOV/SE/M,  
 SOV/SE/T, SOV/SF, SOV/SFD, SOV/SFE, SOV/SFO, SOV/TF, SOV/TFA, SOV/TWA/FO,  
 FILE, SE/ORP, SE/USSR, SE/XFR, AVAD, CRES/FIC/P, D/FBIS-2, D/OSWR-2,  
 DDET-2, DSD/ABM, DSD/DER, EPO/SE, FBIS/AG, IAD/IC, IAD/PEL, IAD/SO,  
 IADSEG-3, ICS/HC/UR, NED, NIO/DL/AL, NIO/ECON, NIO/GPF, NIO/SP, NIO/USSR,  
 NPIC/SSFD, ODI/ACIS, OGI/ISI/CA, OIA/CFWP, OIA/MSDB, OIA/MSPB, OIA/MSTB,  
 OSWR/CIG, SA/NPI, SAG/MEB, SAG/PPB-2, SSD/SMB, SSD/STAB, SSD/SWB,  
 (44/W)

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NC 4640613

TDR: 112158Z JUL 84

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 ZEN/AMCONSUL Leningrad POUCH  
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7369  
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8745  
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6020  
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6415  
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3455  
 RUDKFMG/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2775  
 RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2537  
 RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8034  
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GENEVA FOR USINF AND USCD  
STOCKHOLM FOR CDE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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STATE

84 4640613

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PAGE 002

NC 4640613

TOR: 112158Z JUL 84

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS SPECIALISTS ON  
SPACE WEAPONS TALKS, US-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE USA INSTITUTE HOSTED A TEN-MEMBER FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE DELEGATION FOR A VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, JULY 1-10. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, IRENEE GENERAL MILSHEYEN TOLD US PARTICIPANTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DEFINITELY BE IN VIENNA IN SEPTEMBER FOR SPACE ARMS TALKS. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES VICE-PRESIDENT VELIKHOV TOLD ANOTHER AMERICAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST WAS LIMITED TO A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS LITTLE INTEREST IN ANY AGREEMENT LIMITED TO LOW-ALTITUDE ASAT SYSTEMS. SOVIET PARTICIPANTS SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE REELECTED IN NOVEMBER WITHOUT QUESTION. END SUMMARY.

3. THE CENTERPIECE OF THE VISIT WAS A CONFERENCE HELD AT THE USA INSTITUTE JULY 3-5. THIS CABLE SUMMARIZES THE EMBASSY'S GLEANINGS FROM OBSERVATIONS OF AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING NOTES PROVIDED BY FORMER AMBASSADOR WILLIAM SULLIVAN AND WILLIAM PERRY. (AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN AND DR. PERRY HAVE NOT REVIEWED THIS CABLE.) OTHER MEMBERS OF THE US DELEGATION WERE: PAUL BRACKEN, YALE UNIVERSITY; LAWRENCE CHICKERING, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES; FORMER AMBASSADOR JONATHAN DEAN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT; GORDON MCCORMICK, MANAGING EDITOR, CRBS; THOMAS P. MELADY, PRESIDENT, SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY; LORD MORRICE ST. BRIDES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY; MARVIN WACHMAN, PRESIDENT, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE; AND NILS H. WESSELL, DIRECTOR, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

SOVIET "EXPERTS" ON SPACE ARMS TALKS

4. SOVIET PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE

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STATE

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PAGE 003  
TOR: 112158Z JUL 84

NC 4640613

ISSUE OF SPACE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS. U.S. PARTICIPANTS, HOWEVER, WERE STRUCK BY THE OVERALL LOW LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICS OF ARMS CONTROL EXHIBITED BY THEIR HOSTS. THE SOVIET COMMENTS SEEM TO REFLECT THE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS WHO ARE REMOVED FROM THE FORMULATION OF SOVIET POLICY.

5. IN HIS PRESENTATION, USA INSTITUTE ANALYST AND FBI DEF GENERAL MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT THE USSR WOULD DEFINITELY BE IN VIENNA IN SEPTEMBER FOR SPACE ARMS TALKS. IN SIDE CONVERSATIONS MIL'SHTEYN WAS EAGER TO HEAR U.S. PARTICIPANTS' SPECULATION ON A PROBABLE U.S. NEGOTIATOR. HE REACTED NEGATIVELY TO JEAN KIRKPATRICK AND FRED IKLE WHEN THESE NAMES WERE SUGGESTED, BUT WAS NON-COMMITTAL ON JAMES SCHLESINGER. (COMMENT: MIL'SHTEYN DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SENDING A DELEGATION TO VIENNA IN ANY CASE OR IF THEIR PRESENCE WAS CONDITIONED ON U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET OFFER TO NEGOTIATE.)

6. IN ANOTHER SIDE CONVERSATION, ACADEMY OF SCIENCES VICE-PRESIDENT VELIKHOV TOLD WILLIAM PERRY THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST IN THE SEPTEMBER TALKS WAS LIMITED TO A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS. PERRY REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WAS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO A COMPREHENSIVE BAN AT THIS TIME, SINCE THE TECHNICAL POTENTIAL OF SPACE WEAPONS IS STILL IN THE EARLY STAGE OF INVESTIGATION. VELIKHOV EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH INTEREST IN LIMITING ASATS TO LOW ALTITUDE CAPABILITY. HE ADDED THAT IF THE U.S. PROCEEDS WITH A SPACE-BASED ABM, A LIKELY SOVIET RESPONSE (AND ONE WHICH HE WOULD PERSONALLY ADVOCATE) WOULD BE TO DEVELOP HIGH-ALTITUDE ASATS TO ATTACK U.S. ABM SATELLITES. THEREFORE, HE ARGUED, A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS WAS THE WAY TO PROCEED. VELIKHOV REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION ON THE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR AN INTERIM

GENEVA FOR USINF AND USCD  
STOCKHOLM FOR CDE

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PAGE 004

NC 4640613

TOR: 112158Z JUL 84

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS SPECIALISTS ON  
AGREEMENT.

7. USA INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR ZHURKIN AGREED WITH U.S. PARTICIPANTS THAT ARRIVING AT A DEFINITION AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES "WEAPONS" WOULD PROBABLY BE THE CENTRAL ISSUE DURING THE SEPTEMBER CONSULTATIONS.

#### US-SOVIET RELATIONS

8. ON BALANCE, U.S. PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE FELT THAT SOVIET PRESENTATIONS EMPHASIZED THE NEGATIVE, WERE LIMITED IN SUBSTANCE AND WERE MARKED BY A RELUCTANCE TO BE DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION OF CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, WERE ON THE WHOLE LESS VEHEMENT IN THEIR CRITICISM OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAN THE U.S. PARTICIPANTS HAD EXPECTED. THERE WAS AN AIR OF RESIGNATION ON THE SOVIETS' PART REGARDING THE PROBABLE OUTCOME OF THE U.S. ELECTIONS. ZHURKIN, FOR ONE, STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REELECTION WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

9. THE SOVIETS PARTICIPATING GENERALLY AGREED THAT IMPROVEMENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS WAS POSSIBLE. THEY SEEMED AT A LOSS, HOWEVER, TO DEFINE WHAT CONCRETE STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TO GET THE RELATIONSHIP BACK ON A CONSTRUCTIVE PATH. SEVERAL MADE THE POINT THAT JOINT US-SOVIET STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE WOULD BE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, SINCE THEY COULD SERVE AS REFERENCE POINTS FOR THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY. THEY SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND CHERNENKO'S PROPOSAL FOR A "CODE OF CONDUCT" AMONG NUCLEAR STATES.

10. ON ARMS CONTROL, MIL'SHTEYN INSISTED THAT IT WOULD BE A SIMPLE MATTER TO RESOLVE MBFR AND URGED A FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING TO THIS END. (COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR IF MIL'SHTEYN MEANT A SHULTZ-GROMYKO BILATERAL AT THE OPENING OF THE UNGA OR A MULTILATERAL MEETING

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STATE

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PAGE 005  
TOR: 112158Z JUL 84

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JUST TO DEAL WITH MBFR.) AT THE SAME TIME, MIL'SHTEYN DOWNPLAYED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT STEPS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE DISMISSED THE HOTLINE IMPROVEMENTS AS A "LAXATIVE" TREATMENT FOR A PATIENT SUFFERING FROM CANCER.

ATMOSPHERICS

11. U.S. PARTICIPANTS SEEMED TO FEEL THAT THEIR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS WERE BETTER PREPARED AS PROPAGANDISTS THAN AS EXPERTS PRIMED TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. ON BALANCE, J.S. PRESENTATIONS WERE BETTER PREPARED AND MORE DETAILED IN SUBSTANCE. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, ONLY ZHURKIN AND USA INSTITUTE DEPARTMENT HEAD TROFIMENKO SEEMED TO SHOW ANY REAL GRASP OF THE ISSUES. MIL'SHTEYN CLEARLY HELD BACK. THE HEAD OF THE INSTITUTE'S U.S. POLICY IN EUROPE DIVISION, YURIY DAVYDOV, AND ANOTHER INSTITUTE DEPARTMENT HEAD, KREMENYUK, WERE MORE FORTHCOMING IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS.

12. SOVIET "OUTSIDERS" AT THE USA INSTITUTE CONFERENCE -- LITERATURNAYA GAZETA POLITICAL OBSERVER BURLATSKIY, IMEMO DEPUTY DIRECTOR BYKOV, AND ORIENTAL STUDIES INSTITUTE SECTION HEAD IKHOMIROV WERE PERFUNCTORY IN THEIR PRESENTATIONS. ANOTHER ORIENTAL STUDIES INSTITUTE SECTION HEAD, SARKISOV, WAS SO PROPAGANDISTIC THAT HE SEEMED TO EMBARRASS SOME OF THE OTHER SOVIETS PRESENT. USA INSTITUTE SECTION HEAD ALEXANDER KISLOV, HOWEVER, CAME ACROSS AS A COMPETENT INTERLOCUTOR.

13. WHILE THE SOVIET COMPONENT OF THE CONFERENCE SOMETIMES GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS "TREADING WATER," THE TWO SIDES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO DEVELOP AN INVENTORY OF CONCRETE ISSUES UNDER POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC HEADINGS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT FPRI-IUSAC CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED AN FPRI INVITATION

GENEVA FOR USINF AND USCD  
STOCKHOLM FOR CDE

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PAGE 006

NC 4640613

TOR: 112158Z JUL 84

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS SPECIALISTS ON

TO MEET IN PHILADELPHIA NEXT YEAR, WITH DETAILS TO BE  
ARRANGED AT A LATER TIME.

14. COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO THE FPRI GROUP, THE SOVIETS  
HAVE RECENTLY HOSTED THE US-UNA ASSOCIATION AND DELE-  
GATIONS OF US EXPERTS ON AFRICA AND ASIA. THE REGIONAL  
EXPERTS SEEMED THE MOST SATISFIED WITH THEIR TRIPS.  
THE OTHER TWO GROUPS FOCUSED ON BROADER ISSUES OF  
US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL, WHERE THEIR  
SOVIET HOSTS WERE RELUCTANT TO EXPLORE NEW IDEAS.  
THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS SPACE  
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT LENGTH. SOVIET HANDLING OF  
THESE DELEGATIONS REINFORCES THE IMPRESSION DERIVED  
FROM THE PRESS AND DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS THAT SOVIET  
POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL AND RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IS  
IN A HOLDING PHASE, EXCEPT ON SPACE ISSUES.  
HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8405381

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 12 JUL 84 14

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 11 JUL 84

1/22/16 (C)

45

KEYWORDS. INCIDENTS AT SEA

USSR

CM

SUBJECT US SOVIET RECIPROCAL SHIP VISIT PROPOSAL

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 13 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES PA  
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DUR

NORTH

MATLOCK

ROBINSON

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

THOMPSON

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8404858 8404282 NSCIFID (CM *CM*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>✓</i>	<i>For info</i>		
	<i>C</i>	<i>Mcfarlane Noted</i>		<i>pd</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

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System # I

Package # 5381

1251

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8 JUL 13 P 5: 41

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

SEP 1 1984

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



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84 JUL 13 P 8: 21

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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172614 MEMO

1 7/13/1984 B1

P. DUR TO R. MCFARLANE RE PROPOSAL

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

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172615 MEMO

1 7/11/1984 B1

C. WEINBERGER TO ASST. FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS RE PROPOSAL

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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172616	MEMO  RESULTS OF 1984 INCSEA REVIEW IN MOSCOW (INCL. COVER MEMO)	1	6/6/1984	B1

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350

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6 JUN 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Subj: ANNUAL INCSEA REVIEW IN MOSCOW 28 MAY-2 JUN 1984

Encl: (1) Results of 1984 INCSEA Review in Moscow

1. Enclosure (1) which contains a summary of the results of the INCSEA review in Moscow is provided for your information.

172616

*Very Resping  
J Lyons*

J. A. LYONS, JR.  
VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
(POLICY AND OPERATIONS)

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RESULTS OF 1984 INCSEA REVIEW IN MOSCOW

The annual review of the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement in Moscow 28 May - 2 Jun was conducted in a very positive, cordial, and professional atmosphere, in stark contrast to the harsh rhetoric and propaganda in state-sponsored news media associated with other bilateral discussions and negotiations, such as START and INF. Throughout all formal and informal contacts, the Soviet Navy representatives went out of their way to ensure that a harmonious and cooperative atmosphere pervaded. It was obvious that the Soviet Navy places a high value on the Agreement and on the contact with the U.S. Navy through the established communications channel.

During these discussions, the following main themes emerged:

- This is the only channel of communication between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that is working.
- The Soviet Navy wants the Agreement to continue to be effective in preventing serious incidents.
- The Soviet Navy representatives went out of their way to express their commitment to abide by the letter and the spirit of the Agreement.
- The Soviet Navy acknowledged the Agreement was seriously eroded during search operations for the Korean airliner in the Sea of Japan. They also concurred in the U.S. position that the Agreement needs to be applied consistently throughout the year, particularly during unusual situations involving high tension.
- In working level discussions, the Soviets accepted U.S. concerns with flare firing at U.S. ships, with hazardous approach to U.S. helicopters, and with generally poor adherence to the Agreement by Soviet Naval Auxiliaries.
- The Soviet Navy committed themselves to reissue instructions to commanders of naval auxiliaries, combatant ships, and aircraft to strictly abide by the Agreement.
- The Soviets expressed interest in returning to an atmosphere of cooperation such as that existing during WWII when we had a common objective to defeat Germany.
- The Chairman of the U.S. Delegation countered that we still have a common objective---to maintain the peace. He added that the INCSEA framework is a good example to

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all negotiators of what can be accomplished when the two sides come to the table with common objectives, equality of approach and treatment, and without thoughts of attempting to take advantage of the other.

In side discussions, the head of the Soviet delegation, ADM Navoytsev, indicated the Soviet Navy would have no problem with reciprocal ship visits such as had occurred in 1975, for example to Vladivostok and San Francisco. ADM Navoytsev also acknowledged the U. S. position that the VICTOR submarine which had collided with USS KITTY HAWK was obligated under International Rules of the Road to remain clear of KITTY HAWK and that no additional protocol was required.

A Soviet-proposed protocol to the Agreement to include military aircraft approach to civil aircraft was interesting in light of the downing of KAL-007. The proposal called for caution and prudence when approaching civil aircraft, and would prohibit simulated attacks. Simple verbal commands to civil aircraft were also included. It was interesting that this proposal contained language similar to that used in the past by the U. S. to argue against the need for an additional protocol. The U. S. side agreed to study this proposal.

As provided for in the Agreement, both sides concurred in a three-year renewal period. The next meeting will be held in Washington, May-June 1985.

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The twelfth annual review of the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement took place in Moscow 28 May - 2 June 1984. The discussion took place in a very upbeat, cordial atmosphere, reflecting the importance the Soviet Navy places on maintaining the agreement and the attendant official contact with the U.S. Navy.

The U.S. delegation expressed concern that among recent incidents, those occurring in connection with the Korean airliner salvage operations seemed to be especially at variance with the agreement. The large number of serious incidents, in particular those involving auxiliary naval vessels, raised the possibility of deliberate acts of violation thereby bringing into question the Soviet Navy's commitment to the future effectiveness of the agreement.

The Soviet Navy response to the U.S. concerns was professional and positive. During formal and informal discussions, Soviet delegation members acknowledged the U.S. concerns while strongly reaffirming Soviet commitment to the agreement. The positive tone of these discussions was in sharp contrast to Soviet attempts last year to shift blame equally to the U.S. side.

The proposal by the head of the Soviet delegation for a future exchange of ship visits was another positive indication of their interest in maintaining a good working relationship with our Navy. The U.S. delegation head supported such visits, and will look for an opportunity to pursue the proposal.