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Administration agrees on a new ABM policy

By Warren Strobel and James M. Dorsey
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Reagan administration has agreed that the ABM treaty must be broadened to allow more realistic testing of Strategic Defense Initiative weaponry and is laying the groundwork to implement the new policy, government officials said yesterday.

The preparations likely will include consultations with U.S. allies around the world, discussions with key members of Congress, further reviews of documents associated with the anti-ballistic missile treaty and a timetable for moving toward the less restrictive view of the pact, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

"There was a consensus to shift" at last Tuesday's meeting of the National Security Planning Group, one administration official said yesterday. "They've now got more thorny issues — how to do it, how to sell it to the Hill, consulting with the allies."

A second White House meeting on the topic is scheduled for today.

"It's more than just 'Do we conduct it [the SDI research program] within the broader interpretation' of the accord, said a defense consultant close to the SDI program, adding that policy-makers agree NATO allies must first be consulted.

"That realization has occurred," the consultant said. "The requirement has always been there."

Meanwhile, Pentagon sources yesterday said the administration is considering adoption of a "conditional deployment decision" to "put some order into the [SDI] research."

Officials defined the proposed policy as a decision to deploy but to implement that decision "at a certain point in time, assuming certain events occur or a certain success in the development of SDI is achieved."

The policy "assumes full-scale developmental engineering and testing" under a broad interpretation of the treaty, one official said. "It is actively under consideration."

A "conditional deployment decision" would not violate the ABM treaty so long as the deployment did not actually take effect, the official said, adding that the administration would not necessarily have to announce its decision publicly.

The remarks about laying groundwork for a less restrictive assessment of the treaty appear to square with Secretary of State George Shultz' assertion during a television interview Sunday that the allies and Congress would be consulted before a final decision is made.

Earlier, Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, had

warned that switching treaty interpretations without consulting lawmakers would "provoke a constitutional confrontation of profound dimensions."

Today's White House meeting is "Part II of the one last week," the administration official said. "They just ran out of time [last Tuesday]."

"The most concrete thing that'll come out of the meeting is a timetable," the official said.

Several sources emphasized that while top policy-makers have reached a consensus on the treaty, Mr. Reagan has not made a final decision.

At the White House yesterday, spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said, "The issue before the president is not one of deployment" but of the proper configuration of SDI tests.

The 1972 ABM treaty generally bans even development and testing of defenses against ballistic nuclear missiles, except for a few fixed, land-based systems.

However, in October 1985, the Reagan administration decided that, correctly interpreted, the treaty allows for testing and development of exotic anti-missile devices based on "other physical principles" discovered after it was signed.

That decision was based on an analysis by State Department legal adviser Abraham Sofaer, who is conducting a second review of the treaty negotiating record and other documents.

So far, the administration has conducted the SDI program within the older, narrower reading of the pact. Switching to the broader reading would allow a radically wider range of tests.

The current debate, officials said,

has been spurred by unexpected successes in the SDI research program, the strong advocacy of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and by Mr. Shultz' acceptance, after initial opposition, of the broad treaty interpretation.

"That's his current position. There's nothing more to it than that," the administration official said. "He's said it on TV and he's said it in meetings."

A congressional source disagreed, however, saying Mr. Shultz "is pretending to [change his stance], but he really doesn't."

Both said special arms control advisor Paul Nitze remains steadfastly opposed to any change in the U.S. position.

Mr. Nitze is "counterattacking through Nunn," the congressional source charged.

A second Pentagon official said yesterday that managers of the SDI program already are contemplating what sort of tests could be conducted under a revised reading of the treaty, although no contingency plan has been drawn up pending the switch.

"I wouldn't say it's anything that definite," the official said. "Obviously, we've looked at what aspects of the program would change if the policy changed."

Such a change would allow tests "of certain devices with more capability," the defense official said.

It also would permit engineers to integrate different components "in more realistic tests of [the] interrelationships of different parts of the system ... sensors with kill mechanisms, that kind of thing," the official said.

Jeremiah O'Leary contributed to this report.

Reagan's SALT II Folly

By Dale Bumpers

WASHINGTON — President Reagan's reaffirmation, in his State of the Union Message, of the importance of protecting our country was deeply ironic, coming on the heels of his decision to violate the SALT II treaty. This decision marked the first time either superpower has violated the treaty sublimit on missiles and bombers, thereby risking an accelerated nuclear arms race. Few Americans want the Russians to have thousands of extra nuclear warheads, yet that is where our current course will take us.

In late November, the President ordered the deployment of another B-52 bomber with cruise missiles, without any offsetting dismantling. This caused us to exceed the treaty limit of 1,320 multiple-warhead weapons. We have violated this limit twice since then and, under current plans, will do so 22 more times in 1987 alone.

What do we gain from breaking the limit? A tiny increase in our strategic forces and an extra four to five years of service from two missile subma-

lines, after which they will be scrapped anyway because they will hit their 30-year life limit. What will the results be? An unrestricted nuclear arms race.

To date, abiding by strategic arms agreements has required us to dismantle only 48 operational missiles while the Kremlin has had to dismantle 550 missiles and bombers. SALT would force the Russians to dismantle hundreds more missiles — about 130 this year alone as against our 32. Of course, they will be under no constraints if we continue to violate the treaty's numerical limits. Even the Central Intelligence Agency admits that without the treaty the Soviet Union by 1995 can have about 5,000 more nuclear warheads than it would otherwise have.

America has legitimate concerns about some aspects of Soviet compliance, and Congress has approved giving the President authority to respond to Soviet violations. But exceeding the 1,320 multiple-warhead-missile limit effectively trashes the treaty and guarantees a new arms race. Even critics of the treaty con-

cede that the Soviet violations certainly do not alter the strategic balance. Scrapping the accord because of our compliance concerns is like scrapping the criminal code because of the existence of crime. Scrapping the treaty does not end Soviet violations: it legalizes them.

Ironically, one of the first effects of our violating the numerical limits will be to allow the Soviet Union to increase its quantity of precisely those weapons that the Administration has consistently labeled as the most destabilizing: ICBM's with multiple warheads. The treaty's limit of 820 such ICBM's would force the Soviet Union to dismantle some of its existing 818 multiple-warhead ICBM's almost immediately after it began deploying its new SS-24 later this year — but not without the treaty.

Scrapping the accord signals the triumph of those in the Administration with a record of unremitting hostility to arms control. This is right-wing ideology run amok, given the major increase in Soviet nuclear forces brought on by the treaty's demise and the problems for American security this creates. It magnifies the difficulties confronting the "Star Wars" program by multiplying the number of warheads that it must de-

fend against. And violating the accord diverts defense dollars from our real defense needs, like conventional forces, toward still more nuclear weapons. It is no wonder that Brent Scowcroft, the President's former strategic weapons adviser, six former Defense Secretaries (three Republicans and three Democrats) and all our Atlantic alliance allies support staying within the limits.

Does it really make sense to release the Soviet Union from restraints that have already forced it to dismantle more than 500 missiles and which will force it to dismantle about 250 more by the end of Mr. Reagan's term? Who can believe the world will be better off by adding 10,000 to 20,000 more nuclear warheads over the next eight to nine years than it would be if we continued the pact? Who believes our national security is enhanced by inviting Moscow to add 5,000 extra nuclear warheads to its arsenal?

Mr. Reagan can strengthen our security interests and keep at least some limits on the Soviet nuclear threat — but only if he puts America back into compliance with SALT. □

Dale Bumpers, Democrat of Arkansas, has introduced legislation to bind President Reagan to the missile limits contained in SALT II.

Lawyers in Marine guard's spy case to go to Moscow

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Defense and prosecution lawyers in the case of a Marine sergeant accused of espionage were taking their investigation to Moscow, where he had served as a guard at the U.S. Embassy, a defense attorney said yesterday.

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps again postponed deciding on the level of access to classified materials that will be accorded the civilian attorneys defending Sgt. Clayton Lonetree.

Michael V. Stuhff, a Las Vegas attorney who is heading the defense team for Sgt. Lonetree, said the Marine Corps failed to announce a decision on the matter yesterday despite pledges last week that it would attempt to do so.

Mr. Stuhff said preliminary hearings in the case have been recessed at least for a week and possibly longer, although he added a decision

on interim security clearances could be announced before the next hearing.

The lawyer also disclosed that Maj. David H. Henderson, a military attorney assigned to Sgt. Lonetree's defense, and Maj. Frank Short, one of three prosecuting attorneys, were planning to leave by next week for a visit to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to pursue preparation of their cases.

Mr. Stuhff said he might join the two in making the trip, depending upon when the Marine Corps ruled on the security access issue.

"The hearings have been recessed until two days after [the two military lawyers] return from Moscow," Mr. Stuhff said. "And that's an uncertain date at this point."

Last week, the Marine Corps agreed to declassify much of the documentary evidence in the case against Sgt. Lonetree and provide it

to his civilian attorneys. But the service added it could not rule immediately on whether Mr. Stuhff and New York attorney William Kunstler would be provided interim clearances to review the evidence that remained classified.

Mr. Stuhff and Mr. Kunstler have said they cannot prepare an adequate defense for Sgt. Lonetree without access to all the evidence.

Sgt. Lonetree was arrested in mid-December after allegedly acknowledging to military officials at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, Austria, that he had been passing information to Soviet agents.

On Jan. 30, the Marine Corps announced it would attempt to persuade a hearing officer to recommend a court-martial of Sgt. Lonetree on 19 different violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including a single count of espionage and three counts of conspiracy to commit espionage.

The charge of espionage carries a maximum sentence of death.

The Marine Corps has charged that Sgt. Lonetree, while working as a guard at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1985 and 1986, provided the Soviet Union with the names and photographs of American intelligence agents attached to the embassy staff.

The Marines have also accused Sgt. Lonetree of passing to the Soviets descriptions of the floor plans and office assignments for the embassies in Moscow and Vienna. Although not spelled out in the formal charges, Pentagon sources have said Sgt. Lonetree's espionage began after he became involved in an affair with a female Soviet agent who worked at the embassy as a translator.

Ist War Games Observed Under East-West Pact

By DON COOK,
Times Staff Writer

BRUSSELS—The first military exercise to be held under the 1986 Stockholm agreement on security and confidence-building measures in Europe took place last week in western Czechoslovakia not far from the West German border, watched by at least a dozen official observers from Western countries, NATO authorities said Sunday.

In addition, Warsaw Pact nations have officially notified all North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers and all other European nations except Albania of the dates, size of forces and map locations for 31 other sets of maneuvers or field exercises that they will be holding during 1987. Eighteen of these will be in the Soviet Union.

For their part, the NATO countries have given similar notices of 19 major field exercises that are planned during the year, and neutral and nonaligned states have given notice of five, three of the latter in Switzerland and one each in Austria and Yugoslavia.

Some Nations Excluded

Nations with no military maneuvers planned, or with exercises that are too small to require notification under the Stockholm agreement, include Romania, Belgium, Canada,

Denmark, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands.

The notifications were all given under terms of the Stockholm agreement concluded last September after nearly two years of negotiations.

The accord requires all nations with military forces in continental Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals to give notice by Nov. 15 each year of any military exercises planned for the coming year that involve more than 13,000 ground troops. They are then required to invite military observers from all other signatory countries to attend any exercises in which more than 17,000 men or 300 tanks will be used.

Last week's maneuver by the Czechoslovak army was the first to take place in the "observable category." It involved units of a motorized infantry division against an armored division in what was officially described as "opposed forces divisional tactical exercise to improve combat readiness." The maneuver took place in the vicinity of the town of Karlovy Vary (formerly Karlsbad), about 75 miles west of Prague and within 25 miles of the West German border.

This is an area of heavy military deployment on both sides, with a major American training area in West Germany at Grafenwoehr, about 20 miles from the border on the Western side.

Since arrangements to send observers to attend the maneuvers are a bilateral matter between governments, it was not yet known at NATO headquarters in Brussels exactly how many observers from NATO countries were actually in

the field during the Czechoslovak maneuver, but it was believed that at least six NATO countries sent the permitted two observers each. Eventually, these observer reports are expected to be circulated to the NATO military committee, the coordinating and planning body of the alliance.

Until there has been some solid experience by observers over a full year of attending exercises in various Warsaw Pact countries, it will be impossible to say how well the "confidence building" is actually working. But in the meantime, sources at NATO headquarters say that the notification procedures have gone very well. In fact, the Warsaw Pact powers have given notice of slightly more exercises than the NATO military authorities had expected.

The Soviet Union will be holding 13 exercises in the "notifiable category" of 13,000 men or more and five exercises with more than 17,000 to which observers will be invited. One of these will be deep in Soviet territory in Transcaucasia, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, to be held in September, 1987.

Bulgaria and Hungary will each be holding two exercises without observers. Czechoslovakia will hold three in all, with observers attending two of them. East Germany plans five exercises, three to be attended by observers, and Poland will hold two exercises, both with observers present.

On the NATO side, the United States has announced five exercises, all to be held in Germany, with observers from the Warsaw Pact to be invited to four of them. France

First U.S.-Made F16Cs Delivered to Israel

Reuter

JERUSALEM, Feb. 9—The Israeli Air Force today received the first of 75 advanced F16C fighter-bombers from the United States, making it the only other nation equipped with the warplane.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir attended a welcoming ceremony at the air base where the planes landed after a flight from Texas and said they were an important contribution to Israel's defense. Israeli military censors would not allow reporters to name the base or give its location.

and West Germany will each hold two exercises in the lower 13,000 category and two above 17,000 men, with observers present. Norway will stage one exercise without observers. Turkey will have one exercise with observers present. Britain will hold four exercises, three of them to be attended by observers.

Everything now depends on what actually happens in the field, but at least for the first time it is going to be possible for any country in Europe to send its own military officers all the way to Transcaucasia to watch the Red Army perform. How much they will be allowed to see when they get there is another matter, but at least they will see more than they have ever seen before.

Taking Soviet Defenses Seriously

*aim
rule*

Carnes Lord

SINCE THE LATE 1960s, understanding the Soviet doctrinal and programmatic commitment to strategic defense and its implications for the strategic posture of the United States has hardly been a high priority for strategic analysts. This is due partially to the doctrinal disfavor in which strategic defense has come to be held in the United States, in part to the stringent limitations on ballistic missile defense created by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 and the curtailment or elimination of ballistic missile defense (BMD) forces on both sides, and in part to the lack of good information concerning Soviet activities and intentions in this area. The assumption that the ballistic missile will always get through has become a virtual fixture of U.S. strategic analysis. Even when some attention is given to possible offense-defense interactions, analysts tend to think in terms of purely notional ballistic missile defenses, with little reference to the actual doctrine, posture, and operational characteristics of the defensive forces the Soviets possess now or are likely to acquire in the future.

A number of relatively recent developments suggest the desirability of

a comprehensive reassessment of the Soviet strategic defense posture and its implications for the United States. Continuing Soviet activity at and beyond the margins of the ABM Treaty raises new questions concerning Soviet intentions in this area. Improving air defense technologies are increasingly blurring the distinction between surface-to-air missile (SAM) and BMD systems. Shifts in Soviet doctrinal thinking in the 1970s, the full import of which is only now becoming apparent, seem to have imposed more stringent requirements for strategic defenses. And the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) enunciated by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983 has almost certainly provided an additional impetus for intensification of Soviet efforts both in pursuing current generation defensive systems and in research and development of exotic defensive technologies.

Any analysis of Soviet thinking on the question of strategic defense must begin with a consideration of basic Soviet attitudes toward the defense as a form of warfare. The Soviet view of defense is a complex one, shaped in part by Russian geography and history, in part by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and in part by the nineteenth century military tradition derived from Clausewitz. At its most fundamental level, the Soviet strategic outlook (in sharp contrast to that of the United States) is an essentially of-

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fensive one. Both traditional Russian imperialism and Communist ideology rest on an offensive dynamic; and Soviet military doctrine takes its overall orientation from a Clausewitzian understanding of victory in war and the role of the offensive in securing it. At the same time, the geographical exposure of the Soviet homeland and the historical experience of invasion have made the Soviets sensitive to the importance of defenses, both for the sake of protecting the population and governing apparatus of the nation and for the sake of maintaining a secure rear for the support of offensive military operations. Soviet military writers regularly emphasize the reciprocal interaction of offense and defense, which is sometimes characterized as a "dialectical unity of opposites": the defense is at once a form of the offense, just as the offense can and necessarily does serve defensive purposes. And because defense is fundamental and integral to warfare generally, the development of defensive countermeasures to new offensive means and methods of war is an inevitable feature of the dialectical movement of history.

The "revolution in military affairs" created by the deployment in the 1950s of large numbers of nuclear weapons seems to have caused some questioning of traditional views within the Soviet ruling hierarchy. When the Soviets completed revision of their fundamental military doctrines in the early 1960s, however, they reaffirmed the general validity of these views. Although admitting and even emphasizing the central role of nuclear weapons in modern offensive military operations, Soviet theorists insisted that the atomic bomb was in no sense an absolute weapon. In the authoritative work on Soviet military strategy assembled by Marshal V.D. Sokolov-

skiy, which appeared in three editions in 1962, 1963, and 1968, it is stated that there is a need for a "countermeasure for each type of new weapon developed by the enemy."¹ In an important article in 1964, which was intended in large measure as a response to developing Western skepticism concerning the desirability of ballistic missile defense, General Major N.A. Talenskiy argued that "every decisive new means of attack inevitably leads to the development of a new means of defense." According to Talenskiy,

every rationally designed arms system tends to be a harmonious combination of the means of attack and the means of defense against it, of offensive and defensive armaments. This law appears to be operating in the age of nuclear rockets as well. It goes without saying that these weapons have worked a radical change in the nature of any possible armed struggle, but the law governing the search for reliable defense against nuclear-rocket attack continues to be in full effect, and antimissile systems will have an important part to play in this respect.²

It is often argued or assumed that Soviet attitudes on this score have changed fundamentally since the ABM Treaty of 1972. In fact, however, authoritative Soviet spokesmen have continued to affirm the inevitability and legitimacy of defensive countermeasures to all offensive force developments. In a pamphlet published as recently as 1982, for example, then-Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov asserted that "the experience of past wars convincingly demonstrates that the appearance of new means of attack has always invariably led to the creation of correspond-

ing means of defense. . . This applies fully even to the nuclear-missile weapons."³

The dialectical relationship of offense and defense is particularly apparent in Soviet thinking about the role of strategic offensive forces. Soviet doctrine over the years has consistently emphasized the primacy of a damage-limiting, counterforce mission for Soviet nuclear weapons. Although Soviet theorists do not have a term equivalent to damage limitation, they refer explicitly to a defensive mission of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), and there is every reason to assume their acceptance of the strategic concept underlying this term.⁴ Such a view of nuclear missile weapons is also consonant with the Soviet tendency to regard these weapons as an extension of traditional artillery geared to counterbattery and other defense-suppression missions in direct support of the battle.

In the early 1960s, the Soviets acknowledged that ballistic missiles were virtually invulnerable to existing means of air defense. Accordingly, the requirements of defense of the Soviet homeland—preservation of the vital functions of the government and economy as well as essential support for the armed forces—had to be met primarily by the strategic offensive forces, that is, through “annihilation of the enemy’s means of nuclear attack in the regions in which they are based.”⁵ This mission could be accomplished most effectively in a preemptive strike that took enemy forces by surprise and destroyed them before launch. Numerous Soviet statements through the 1960s suggested that a counterforce first strike, launched on strategic warning of enemy attack, was the approach preferred in Soviet operational nuclear doctrine.

There can be little doubt that this doctrinal preference continues to provide the fundamental framework for Soviet nuclear strategy today, although more recent treatments of these issues have been significantly toned down in comparison with those of the 1960s and early 1970s. The Soviets recognized from an early point, however, that an approach based on offensive forces had critical limitations and was insufficient by itself to satisfy Soviet defensive requirements. Apart from the possibility of a surprise first strike by the United States, there could be no certainty that a successful surprise attack could be mounted under all circumstances by the Soviet SRF. The second (1963) edition of *Military Strategy* already acknowledged the decreasing opportunities for strategic surprise resulting from improved intelligence and warning on both sides. Enhanced capabilities for timely tactical warning of ballistic missile attack created the possibility of launch-on-warning (LOW) as an important option for nuclear planners. There is evidence of serious Soviet interest in the LOW option for their own forces beginning in the late 1960s, and it is not impossible that the renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons by Soviet General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev in 1982 had some operational consequences in reducing the scope for preemption in nuclear contingency planning.⁶

Although the United States has never endorsed a nuclear posture based on LOW, official statements have cultivated a degree of ambiguity on this score. This fact, in combination with aspects of the U.S. posture such as high alert rates and command, control, and communications (C³) vulnerability, is likely to have discouraged any Soviet tendency to discount

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the possibility of U.S. recourse to LOW. In addition, the Soviets admitted that the survivability of nuclear forces could be considerably enhanced by measures such as camouflage and hardening of missile launchers. In any event, Soviet doctrine soon recognized that active defenses would be necessary as insurance against the failure of a damage-limiting offensive nuclear strike.

In the period 1963–1968, ballistic missile defense emerged in Soviet military doctrine as a critical element in the overall military relationship between the Soviet Union and its Western adversaries. At the end of this period, a Soviet writer noted that a nuclear balance had been established that could be disrupted only by a “sharp change” in offensive capabilities or by “the creation by one of the sides of highly effective means of antiballistic missile defense while the other side lags considerably in solution of these tasks.”⁷ Throughout much of this period, a number of authoritative Soviet spokesmen discussed the technical progress of the Soviet Union in antiballistic missile systems in such a way as to assert or suggest that the Soviets had achieved a decisive advantage in this realm over the United States. In light of the evidence that has since become public concerning the actual state of Soviet ABM developments at that time, it is clear that these Soviet claims formed part of a systematic campaign of strategic deception designed to mislead the West about Soviet capabilities in a number of areas.⁸ This unavoidably complicates interpretation of the statements about BMD—in any event, never very abundant—that were made by Soviet officials during these years. But it confirms the basic importance assigned BMD in Soviet thinking about nuclear war.

Perhaps the most interesting discussion of the role of ballistic missile defenses in Soviet strategy occurs in the Talenskiy article cited earlier. This article is free of deceptive exaggeration of Soviet BMD capabilities, though the involvement of its author in Western strategic and arms control debates indicates that it too should be used with caution. Talenskiy is fundamentally concerned with arguing for the benign character of ballistic missile defenses in the hands of a peace-loving state (a qualification worth noting), in opposition to advocates of deterrence based on mutual vulnerability to attack by strategic offensive forces. Talenskiy emphasizes that ABM systems are purely defensive weapons in the sense that their use would be unambiguously defensive in a “political and international law context.” He further argues, against already familiar Western criticisms, that BMD is not “destabilizing” in the sense that it encourages offensive action by the side possessing it, and that it is not a fundamental cause of the arms race. He effectively criticizes Western ideas of deterrence by stressing the irrational element in nuclear decision making and the tendency of aggressive regimes to underestimate the strength of the enemy. “In such conditions, the creation of an effective antimissile system enables the state to make its defenses dependent chiefly on its own possibilities, and not only on mutual deterrence, that is, on the goodwill of the other side.”

Talenskiy’s emphasis on the unambiguously defensive character of BMD systems can perhaps be taken as a response not only to Western arms controllers, but also to Soviet strategists who preferred to assign the damage-limiting mission primarily to strategic offensive forces. However this may be, there can be little doubt that

BMD developed a powerful constituency in the Soviet political-military leadership during the 1960s. The visceral appeal of BMD to Soviet leaders was clearly evident in the spontaneous remarks of Prime Minister A.N. Kosygin at a news conference in London on February 9, 1967, echoing Talenskiy's view of BMD as a purely defensive system and denying that it should be considered a cause of the arms race.⁹

It is sometimes argued that the Soviets underwent a fundamental change in attitude toward ballistic missile defense at the end of the 1960s in connection with their decision to seek negotiated limitations on defensive as well as offensive strategic forces and their eventual adherence to the ABM Treaty.¹⁰ The evidence for such a change in attitude remains, however, highly questionable. It seems more likely that the Soviet decision to accept severe limits on BMD reflected both the technological deficiencies of the Soviet program at this time (together with the development by the United States of MIRVed ICBMs), and progress on the U.S. side toward deployment of a first generation ABM system. Although the evidence is scant, there are some indications in Soviet doctrinal writings of the 1970s that BMD continues to play a significant role in Soviet thinking. Indeed, it would seem that developments in Soviet strategic doctrine in this period support, if anything, an increased requirement for BMD or strategic defenses generally.

Modern Soviet military doctrine has consistently stressed the importance of the initial period of a global nuclear war, while acknowledging the possibility that such a war might be prolonged for a considerable period of time beyond the first exchanges. However, there have been important shifts

in emphasis in Soviet thinking concerning the prospects for protracted conflict and the priority to be assigned to preparations for it. As first publicly enunciated by then-Premier N.S. Khrushchev in January 1960, Soviet doctrine for nuclear war heavily stressed the central role of nuclear missile exchanges at the outset of a conflict with the West, and served to justify both the creation of a separate service (the Strategic Rocket Forces) for the conduct of missile warfare and dramatic cutbacks in Soviet conventional forces. As early as 1962-1963, however, a marked shift occurred in the direction of protracted war assumptions. There appears to have been renewed debate on this question during the 1970s. The evidence suggests that additional emphasis has since been given to protracted war in Soviet thinking, and higher priority to the operational requirements from it.¹¹

The shift toward protracted war in the early 1960s may well have been motivated to some degree by the resistance of military traditionalists to Khrushchev's sharp downgrading of the role and resources assigned to the Soviet ground forces, and by Khrushchev's weakened political position following the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. However, other factors may have been at work as well. It is striking that the period 1962-1963 also witnessed a marked change in Soviet assessments of the prospects for successful surprise missile attack—and in stated Soviet requirements for anti-missile defenses, as well as evaluations of the potential effectiveness of such defenses. If or to the extent that either side is incapable of delivering a crippling initial nuclear strike, a protracted war is more likely and strategic defenses are more necessary. Strategic defenses are particularly important for protection of the political and military

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leadership essential to the prosecution of a protracted war. But they are also important for protection of the support structure and mobilization base of the conventional air, naval, and ground forces necessary to conduct offensive operations and achieve ultimate victory. The Soviet emphasis on combined-arms operations under conditions of protracted general war logically entails an emphasis on strategic defense.

Soviet military writings of the 1970s and early 1980s suggest an effort to reinforce and make operational the turn to protracted war assumptions in the 1960s. At the same time, important new elements make their appearance in Soviet thinking on this subject.

The Soviet commitment to fulfilling the requirements of protracted global conflict was authoritatively reaffirmed in 1979 by Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, then Chief of the General Staff:

It is considered that with the contemporary means of destruction, world nuclear war will be comparatively short. However, considering the enormous potential military and economic resources of the coalitions of belligerent states, it cannot be excluded that it may also be prolonged. Soviet military strategy proceeds from the view that should the Soviet Union be thrust into a nuclear war, then the Soviet people and their Armed Forces need to be prepared for the most severe and protracted trial. . . . [Victory in such a war requires] timely and comprehensive preparations of the country and the armed forces.¹²

Ogarkov's statement emphasizes the broad continuity in Soviet policy in this area; yet there are nuanced differences with important operational

implications. His reference to the economic resources of the combatant states suggests a belief that modern economies could continue to function and produce military equipment under conditions of nuclear war. This belief appears to represent a significant change from the prevalent Soviet view in the 1960s that a new world war would have to be fought with the forces and equipment on hand at the outset. Such optimism seems to reflect an increased Soviet interest in protection of the population and critical economic assets through civil defense measures.¹³ But it also suggests an increased requirement for active strategic defenses. Ogarkov's use of the phrase "comprehensive preparations" could also be taken as pointing in this direction.

A recent book by current Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General M.A. Gareyev represents the clearest challenge to the older Soviet view. Gareyev is critical of the heavily nuclear emphasis associated with the Sokolovskiy volume and the early literature on the revolution in military affairs, and returns, in important respects, to more traditional Soviet military thinking. This is, in part, a reflection of the increased willingness of Soviet strategists during the 1970s to contemplate the possibility of a prolonged conventional phase in a general war, or indeed a general war that would not escalate to nuclear use (owing to the deterrent effect of the growing Soviet strategic and theater nuclear arsenal). In part, Gareyev's book is a reflection of a greater Soviet emphasis on the role of strategic deployment, strategic maneuver, and strategic reserve forces in protracted general war.

Gareyev reaffirms in strong terms the need "to be prepared for a protracted, stubborn and fierce armed struggle," and hence the continuing

validity of the classic military principle of "economy of forces." This implies the need for strong reserve forces and their effective deployment and maneuver in the course of protracted conflict. Somewhat later Gareyev says explicitly that "forms of strategic action such as strategic offense and defense" have not lost their importance, "although one must naturally take into account the new methods of their preparation and execution."¹⁴

In view of the widespread assumption that Soviet interest in strategic defense declined with the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, it is worthwhile emphasizing the evidence for continued and even increased Soviet commitment to nationwide civil and air defense in the 1970s. There are also occasional indications in the doctrinal literature of this period that the Soviet Air Defense Forces (*Voiska PVO*) recognized a continuing military requirement for comprehensive anti-missile defense. Indeed, there are very probably important clues to Soviet BMD doctrine and plans to be derived from a close analysis of Soviet air defense doctrinal writings of the last 10 to 15 years.

Within several months of the signing of the initial SALT agreements, the Soviet civil defense program was apparently elevated to a status fully coequal with that of the individual military services. In 1973, a thorough review was undertaken of Soviet efforts in this area and a series of sweeping measures implemented to restructure and improve them. This review seems to have responded in part to the new doctrinal requirement to provide for continued wartime production of military matériel.

Regarding air defense, Soviet spokesmen in the 1970s have typically stressed the strategic importance of the mission of the national air defense

forces and suggested that this importance is growing. A number of spokesmen, particularly but not only from the PVO itself, have indicated that the PVO's mission is not limited to air defense narrowly understood. According to General V. G. Kulikov, then Chief of the General Staff, the PVO "must ensure the protection of the country and armed forces from air and nuclear missile attack, inflict maximum destruction on the air opponent, and prevent his strikes on the most important objectives, force groupings and naval forces." Other high-ranking officers variously stated that the PVO must maintain the "inviolability" of Soviet borders "from even one missile or plane" or be "capable of destroying any modern means or forces of the air opponent." The most explicit statements along these lines appear in a collection published in 1976 under the signature of Marshal of Aviation G.V. Zimin, Chief of the Military Command Academy of the National Air Defense. According to Zimin, "the enormous destructive power of nuclear warheads raises the necessity of destroying all targets without exception, which accomplished a breakthrough into the interior of the country from air or space." Because "the activity of the opponent in contemporary war will be carried out in the form of a unified air-space operation with the use of aviation, ballistic missiles, and space equipment," it is necessary to utilize "the coordinated activity by anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-space defense."¹⁵ Particularly noteworthy is the reference to the coordination of air defense, BMD, and ASAT activities, which represents the full spectrum of the responsibilities historically assigned to the PVO. The seriousness of the Soviet commitment to such coordination was dramatically illustrated by the comprehensive exercise of So-

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viet strategic offensive and defensive forces carried out in June 1982.¹⁶

The early history of Soviet air and ballistic missile defense remains imperfectly understood and controversial in some crucial respects.¹⁷ Construction of an ABM system for the Moscow area began in 1962. This system, subsequently known as the ABM-1b or Galosh, involved the very long-range exoatmospheric Galosh interceptor missile, large phased array radars for target acquisition (the HEN HOUSE radars on the periphery of the Soviet Union) and battle management (the DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE radars in the Moscow area), and smaller radars (the TRY ADD) for missile tracking and guidance. By the late 1960s, 64 Galosh missiles were deployed at four complexes around Moscow.

At the same time, the Soviets were developing systems based on air defense technologies that appeared—and which the Soviets claimed—to have ABM capabilities. The so-called Leningrad system, based on the Griffon high-altitude interceptor missile (evidently a forerunner or variant of the SA-5), was under construction by 1960, though work ceased and the system was dismantled by the mid-1960s. The Tallinn system, based on the SA-5 missile, soon made its initial appearance in the same area (astride the primary attack route for bombers and missiles originating from the United States), and was subsequently deployed throughout the Soviet Union.

A major debate occurred toward the end of the 1960s concerning the capabilities of these Soviet systems and their intended missions, and disagreement about them persists within the intelligence community. A good, if not conclusive, case can be made that the Leningrad and Tallinn systems were designed from the beginning as dual-

capable systems for air and antiballistic defense, whatever the deficiencies in their actual capabilities against the rapidly developing U.S. offensive strategic threat throughout the 1960s. It has been argued that the Soviets have consistently employed two distinct approaches to ballistic missile defense, reflected in the differences between the original Moscow and Leningrad systems and their successors—the first, a dedicated BMD system geared to exoatmospheric interception at very long ranges, and the second, an upgraded air defense system designed against the full range of threats in the high-altitude endoatmospheric regime.

Perhaps the strongest argument on behalf of an ABM capability for the SA-5 system is the fact that the Soviets not only retained but expanded this system throughout the 1970s, long after cancellation of the only U.S. air-breathing weapons program (the B-70) that posed a high-altitude threat. That the Soviets may have wanted a residual deterrent capability against reconnaissance aircraft as well as bombers in high-altitude flight profiles is understandable, but it fails to explain why the number of SA-5 launchers doubled during the period 1971–1981. In addition, it has been reported that over a period of some 18 months in 1973–1974, the Soviets conducted some 60 tests of the SA-5 radar in an ABM mode (that is, against ballistic targets). Recently, in his second report to Congress on Soviet arms control violations, President Reagan formally stated a U.S. government finding that the Soviets have probably continued to test SAM components concurrently with ABM systems, also in violation of the ABM Treaty prohibition on testing nonstrategic systems in an ABM mode.

By the early 1970s, the Soviets had

begun development of a somewhat different kind of BMD system. Subsequently known as the ABM-X-3, this system incorporated a new high-performance endoatmospheric missile and a transportable phased array radar (the FLAT TWIN) apparently designed to be rapidly deployable (months rather than years). It has been widely held that FLAT TWIN violates the ABM Treaty prohibition against development of ABM systems that are not fixed types, and more generally, that it is suggestive of a Soviet intent to lay the groundwork for eventual deployment of a nationwide BMD capability. Also of critical importance in this connection is the construction by the Soviets of a large phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk in southern Siberia that appears identical to the Pechora-class early warning radars constructed during the 1970s on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The Krasnoyarsk radar has been formally determined to be a clear violation of the ABM Treaty prohibition against deployment of early warning radars other than on the national periphery and oriented outward. Soviet willingness to violate the treaty openly in this area would appear to suggest that the Krasnoyarsk radar may be intended to fulfill ABM battle management functions in addition to early warning, and hence may be a critical long lead-time item in the creation of the elements of a comprehensive defense of Soviet national territory.¹⁹

The ABM system currently deployed around Moscow has been undergoing a major upgrade since 1980.²⁰ When completed, the new system will be a two-layer defense consisting of a modified Galosh missile for long-range interception and a shorter-range, high-acceleration interceptor designed to operate within the atmosphere. The full 100 missiles permit-

ted under the ABM Treaty are expected to be deployed in silo launchers, which may be reloadable. A new phased array radar for battle management is being constructed at Pushkino; this will presumably supplement rather than replace the existing DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE radars.

Several aspects of the Moscow system are worth stressing. First, the range of the Galosh missile and the capabilities of its radars from the beginning have given the system the potential to defend an area much larger than the city of Moscow—indeed, at the outer margins, much of the European USSR. The mission of the system has been officially assessed as defense of the Soviet civil and military command authorities in the Moscow area rather than defense of the city of Moscow as such. Second, the combination of hardening and reloadability of missile silos suggests that the Soviets intend the system to function in an enduring mode under conditions of protracted conflict. While the large phased array radars supporting the system are clearly very vulnerable to nuclear effects, it must be assumed that the Soviets have some confidence in their ability to ensure the survival or reconstitution of relevant radar capabilities. It seems likely that Soviet operational doctrine for the Moscow system calls for the retention of some interceptor missiles to deal with follow-on strikes and the employment of selective and preferential defense tactics. The large number of hardened relocation sites the Soviets have evidently prepared throughout this area, and other passive measures for protection of leadership cadres, could substantially enhance the effectiveness of the Moscow system in performing the mission indicated.

The ABM-X-3 system, utilizing the

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FLAT TWIN tracking radar and PAWN SHOP missile guidance radar as well as a high-acceleration interceptor, appears to have been designed for rapid deployment to provide area defense for critical portions of the USSR. Because it would not be truly mobile and would utilize above-ground launchers, the system appears to have been conceived as providing effective defense only against an initial strike. In view of the limitations of the FLAT TWIN in acquiring targets with low-radar cross sections and in tracking many targets simultaneously, the system seems designed to operate with handoff data from the Pechora-class radars now under construction as well as the older early warning and battle management radars and possibly the Pushkino radar. However, the extent to which the system might be able to operate autonomously is, and is likely to remain, uncertain.²¹

The Soviets currently have some 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers for strategic defense at over 1,200 sites; in addition, they possess more than 4,000 launch vehicles for tactical SAMs.²² Progress in the relevant technologies is inexorably narrowing the gap between SAM and BMD systems, and current generation SAM systems can be expected to be much more capable at least against certain types of ballistic missiles than their predecessors.

There is every indication that the Soviets plan to retain large numbers of SA-5s in their inventory, and to upgrade the system's general capabilities in the high-altitude regime. The other principal modern strategic SAM system is the SA-10, which is now beginning to be deployed. The SA-10 is an all-altitude SAM system that appears to be designed primarily against the low-altitude, air-breathing threat. Coupled with an anticipated Soviet

AWACs system and a new generation of air superiority fighters with look-down, shoot-down capabilities, the SA-10, for the first time, should provide the Soviets with an effective capability against penetrating bombers and cruise missiles. At the same time, it appears that the SA-10 may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles.

Of equal if not greater interest in this connection is the mobile SA-12. This system, which has reportedly been tested against SS-4 medium-range ballistic missiles, has apparently been designed as a dual-capable SAM and antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system for theater missions.²³ As such, it possesses some inherent capability against strategic ballistic missiles—particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the reentry vehicles (RVs) of which generally have larger radar cross sections and slower reentry speeds than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).²⁴

Analyses of the effectiveness of all these SAM systems against ballistic missiles depend decisively on assumptions concerning their ability to accept handoff data from larger battle management or target acquisition radars. If properly supported by such radars, it would appear that both the SA-10 and the SA-12 could add significant point-target coverage to a widespread ABM deployment.²⁵ Even in the absence of such a deployment, there is reason to suppose that they could act as a valuable adjunct to the existing Moscow system, utilizing data from the Pushkino radar as well as DOG HOUSE, CAT HOUSE, and some or all of the peripheral phased array acquisition radars. The mobility of these systems would give them at least some capability to act as an enduring terminal defense capability in protracted war.

In addition to the conventional BMD and air defense systems just discussed, the Soviets are engaged in intensive research and development of a variety of exotic technologies with applications for strategic defense. The cumulative evidence provided by the prominent place of strategic defense in Soviet military doctrine, the history of Soviet strategic defense programs, and current investment in weapons procurement and R&D in this area strongly suggest that strategic defense against ballistic missiles is and will remain a fundamental requirement of Soviet military strategy. There are, of course, many questions relating to the Soviets' understanding of the effectiveness of their current BMD capabilities, their operational doctrine for BMD, the extent of Soviet concealment and deception relative to BMD and strategic defense generally, Soviet arms control strategy relative to BMD, and the like, which are difficult or impossible to answer given the current state of our knowledge. Nevertheless, prudence would seem to require that Soviet activities in this area be taken with the utmost seriousness, and that special efforts be made to understand, if only in a speculative fashion, the capability afforded the Soviets now and in the near term by existing and prospective strategic defenses.

There is strong circumstantial evidence that the ABM Treaty of 1972, far from dampening Soviet interest in BMD, has been seen by the Soviets as an opportunity to reach parity with the United States in conventional BMD and achieve technological surprise through research and development of exotic BMD. It has also provided a cover for the gradual upgrading of the BMD capabilities of existing defensive systems, particularly strategic SAM systems but also relevant radar, communications, and

data processing capabilities. Whatever their actual intentions, the Soviets appear to have positioned themselves to "break out" (or "creep out") of the ABM Treaty regime should the appropriate circumstances materialize. Whether these circumstances would be determined more by Soviet progress in BMD technology or by the activities of the United States and other international considerations is not easy to say.

The possibility should be considered that the Soviets have developed two basic options for long-range planning regarding BMD: no arms control and overt territorial defense of the Moscow region, and covert territorial defense with dual-capable SAMs. The Soviets may well have felt that the advantages foregone by banning dedicated BMD for nationwide defense were more than made up by the constraints placed on U.S. BMD activities across the board. Clearly, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative has radically altered Soviet calculations regarding the likely constraining effect of arms control on U.S. actions in the long run. In the short term, however, the Soviets may still feel it is to their advantage to minimize their own demonstrated interest in strategic defense and maintain the ABM Treaty constraints on the United States. At the same time, for a number of reasons (notably, the continuing inability of the United States or the West generally to respond effectively to Soviet arms control violations or near-violations), the Soviets are likely to exercise greater latitude in pursuing their own BMD efforts whether or not these raise treaty-related issues.

This suggests that in the near term the Soviets are likely to engage in creepout rather than breakout from the ABM Treaty, and are likely to concentrate their efforts on upgrading the

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Moscow system and their strategic SAMs rather than preparing for deployment of the ABM-X-3 system. Such a strategy might also call for rapid development of a ground-based laser weapon with capabilities against ballistic missiles as well as penetrating bombers and cruise missiles.

That this is the most likely direction of Soviet strategy would seem to be reinforced by recent trends in Soviet doctrine relative to nuclear war. As discussed earlier, increasing emphasis has been given by the Soviets throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s to the requirements of protracted nuclear war. Soviet spokesmen have stressed the need to maintain powerful and secure strategic reserve forces and to engage in strategic maneuver with these and other forces. These requirements would seem to place a premium on concealment (strategic-operational as well as tactical), dispersal, mobility, and flexibility of operations—qualities associated more readily with strategic SAM systems than with dedicated BMD (particularly, as noted earlier, the ABM-X-3 system, which does not seem designed for endurance in conditions of protracted war).

There is a long tradition of discounting the effectiveness of Soviet efforts in the BMD area. Historically, the Soviets have had severe difficulties in overcoming some of the key technical obstacles to effective BMD—notably, in developing a high-acceleration interceptor missile, in phased array radar technology, and in computing capacity for battle management. However, it is also clear that the Soviets have made considerable progress in these areas. At least as important, though, is an understanding of the strategic and operational context in which Soviet BMD can be expected to function, and this element of the analysis is regularly slighted.

Most fundamental is the question of the nature of the basic attack that Soviet strategic defenses are likely to have to sustain. There is a vast difference between a coordinated and massive U.S. nuclear strike and a degraded, ragged attack that followed absorption of a Soviet strike. As discussed earlier, the Soviets have never been certain of their ability to execute a preemptive nuclear strike that would effectively cripple U.S. offensive strategic forces. They are almost certainly not convinced of their ability to inflict an essentially preclusive blow against the U.S. ICBM force, not to speak of the problems they would face in attacking U.S. ballistic missile firing submarines (SSBNs) and strategic bomber forces. However, they may be confident enough of their ability to deliver a serious preemptive blow against U.S. ballistic missiles to model the fundamental structure and doctrine of Soviet strategic defense on this assumption. In other words, the criteria of effectiveness used by the Soviets in evaluating their own BMD may differ radically from the criteria usually employed by Western analysts, who tend to assess the performance of Soviet systems against an undegraded attack maximized for penetration and/or destruction of Soviet defenses.

When coupled with a damage-limiting Soviet first strike against U.S. strategic forces and C³, then, Soviet strategic defenses look much more formidable than when confronting an undegraded U.S. ICBM strike. ICBMs, both because of their trajectory characteristics and because of the simultaneity of attack that they afford, pose by far the greatest problem for BMD. In addition, of course, ICBMs pose a direct threat to BMD and its supporting infrastructure, particularly because of their ability to execute highly precise sequenced attacks. If the U.S.

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ICBM force is seriously degraded, it can be safely assumed that most if not all sequenced ICBM attacks could no longer be carried out, that saturation attacks against highest-priority hard targets could decline radically in effectiveness, and that synergistic effects from the thorough destruction of certain kinds of target sets (particularly C³) would be largely lost. Failure to suppress effectively Soviet defenses in an initial strike, it may be added, could afford the Soviets important leverage in a protracted war, disproportionately reducing the effectiveness of follow-on strikes by withheld U.S. forces and complicating U.S. retargeting and re-fire efforts. Yet for the United States to place a high priority on assured suppression of Soviet defenses could create exorbitant requirements for prompt ballistic missile warheads.

It is also essential to bear in mind the possibility that Soviet operational and tactical concepts for BMD may differ markedly from those assumed by Western analysts. The Soviets are likely to have fewer inhibitions than U.S. military planners, for example, about detonating nuclear warheads over their own territory. Thus, deficiencies of current Soviet BMD systems in reaction time and accuracy may not seem as disabling to Soviet planners as might otherwise be supposed. For that matter, one cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that the Soviets, under some circumstances, might use their own ICBMs for BMD missions.²⁶

What are the implications of all this for U.S. strategy? It is, to begin with, doubtful under any circumstances that a severely degraded U.S. ICBM strike could support the objectives of current U.S. nuclear strategy—in particular, that it could meaningfully threaten the essential instruments of Soviet politi-

cal and military control. This becomes more than doubtful when account is taken of the current Moscow ABM system. With its new endoatmospheric layer, the Moscow system will have the capacity to discriminate between RVs and decoys-penetrating the atmosphere, and its hardened, reloadable launchers will provide interceptors in significant numbers and a capability to deal with sequenced attacks. Even assuming that the system is technically limited in its ability to engage current generation ICBM RVs, the numbers of attackers will be relatively small, and preferential defense tactics could greatly increase the chances of protecting specifically chosen targets. In view of the limitations in our (current or prospective) knowledge of the target base and Soviet plans for mobility and dispersal of key cadres, the chances of inflicting disabling damage on Soviet political and military leadership elements in the Moscow region under these conditions seem distinctly poor.

Beyond the area covered by the footprint of the Moscow system, a degraded ICBM attack would be less than devastating even without especially effective defenses. Assuming that a substantial percentage of the remaining ICBMs would be targeted against Soviet ICBM silos and other hardened targets in relatively remote areas, collateral damage to the Soviet economy and population would probably be limited in any event. If the Soviets were then able to pose even a modest BMD threat, payoffs might be substantial. Even a system marginally effective against ICBMs, such as the SA-10 or SA-12, could maximize its effectiveness if faced with a very ragged attack in a narrow and predictable flight corridor and if mission requirements could be satisfied by degradation in the accuracy of the attacking

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RV rather than its complete destruction.

The capability of Soviet strategic defenses against U.S. SLBMs must be considered a vital issue in Soviet eyes, given the essential invulnerability of (at sea) SSBNs to a damage-limiting Soviet preemptive strike. It seems possible, if not likely, that to the extent that Soviet strategic SAMs have a BMD mission, they are optimized to deal with the SLBM threat. As Soviet strategic SAMs become increasingly mobile, they will become increasingly capable of endurance in a protracted nuclear conflict and of dealing with attacks by U.S. SLBMs in strategic reserve. It seems likely that the Soviets count heavily on the ability of these SAMs to afford substantial protection, particularly of economic targets, from SLBM (as well as bomber and cruise missile) attack, and may consider this protection—in conjunction with civil defense and other emergency preparations—sufficient to provide a realistic possibility of continued wartime military production and ensure the viability of the Soviet economy in the postattack environment. Even a modest degradation of U.S. SLBM attacks by Soviet defenses, however, would impose added burdens on U.S. strategic forces, and could disproportionately reduce the confidence of U.S. planners in the ability of a U.S. retaliatory strike to inflict disabling or systemic damage on the Soviet economic and war-supporting infrastructure. In 1984, one U.S. official estimated, in the course of a discussion of the SA-12 and Soviet strategic defenses generally, that the Soviets would within four years “stand a good chance” of intercepting on the order of 17 percent of U.S. strategic missiles. He added: “When you approach the 20 percent line, this causes

grave uncertainty of penetration and will force alteration of the single integrated operational plan.”²⁷

The foregoing analysis is meant to apply to U.S. and Soviet strategic forces as they are constituted at the present time. Obviously, the anticipated modernization of the U.S. strategic triad should significantly improve the U.S. position. In particular, the advent of a counterforce-capable SLBM with improved range and payload (the D-5) and of two new advanced strategic bombers incorporating low observable technologies should greatly improve the ability of the United States to pose an enduring offensive threat to the Soviet homeland and to the highest value Soviet targets in a protracted war.

As regards the U.S. ICBM force, the projected acquisition of two new ICBMs over the next decade will also alter the current picture, though perhaps less drastically. A deployment of 50 MXs in current Minuteman silos and an additional 50 in a more survivable basing mode would cause significant problems for Soviet defensive planners. The possible employment of a substantial number of MXs in a strike geared to suppression of Soviet defenses (particularly in the Moscow region) and to prompt high-value leadership and C³ targets would severely stress the Moscow ABM system and could eliminate those components (the battle management radars) that could be vital for the enduring effectiveness of Soviet BMD assets throughout Soviet territory; it would also have a chance of seriously disrupting Soviet command and control of a protracted nuclear conflict. Further, the possibility of retention of as many as 50 survivably-based MX, or several hundred new small Midgetman ICBMs, in a reserve role would

pose a qualitatively new enduring threat to hardened or high-value assets throughout the Soviet Union.

Whatever other advantages may be offered by the mobile, single warhead ICBM currently under development, it would have significant liabilities in comparison with MX in terms of its reciprocal relationship to Soviet strategic defenses. Even though Midgetman is expected to use the same warhead that has been developed for MX, its operational characteristics are such that it would lack certain of the MX's unique advantages. At least as currently conceived, Midgetman would be too small to permit inclusion of significant quantities of penaids (decoys or chaff) in its reentry vehicle. Its one warhead creates a heavy premium on the targeting of undefended targets; differently stated, the existence of even marginally effective Soviet defenses could exact a high price in terms of U.S. attack planning by forcing the commitment of more than one missile to ensure the destruction of a single high-value objective. For this reason, however, Soviet defenses will tend to exercise a deterring effect. Other things being equal, it is less likely that Midgetman will be targeted against targets in heavily defended areas such as Moscow (unless in tandem with other attacking missiles) than against lower value, less defended targets elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

Of course, much would depend on the exact mix of ICBM forces eventually available to the United States as well as the extent of their survivability. An eventual deployment of 100 MXs, of which 50 were survivably based, would considerably alleviate the liabilities that might be associated with a survivable ICBM force consisting only of Midgetman. At the same

time, the Soviets cannot be expected to stand still while the United States debates its strategic future. There is every reason to believe that the Soviets will continue and indeed accelerate current efforts to enhance the Soviet strategic defense posture. Whether the deployment of a new generation of U.S. offensive systems posing a qualitatively new threat to Soviet military and societal values will provide the impetus for a fundamental rethinking of the strategic role of Soviet BMD is difficult to say, though it is certainly possible. What does seem certain is that the future of U.S. strategic forces can no longer be sensibly debated without reference to the Soviets' ability—and commitment—to prevent those forces from executing their mission.

NOTES

1. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, ed., Harriet Fast Scott (New York, N.Y.: Crane, Russak and Co., 1975), p. 255.
2. General Major N.A. Talenskiy, "Anti-missile Systems and the Problem of Disarmament," *International Affairs*, No. 10, (October 1964); reprinted in *Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists* (February 1965), pp. 25-29.
3. Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v Gotovnosti K Zashchite Otechestva* [Always Ready to Defend the Motherland] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), p. 36.
4. It is worth noting that a straightforward explication of the U.S. notion of "damage limitation" was added in the third edition of Sokolovskiy (pp. 62-63)—well after it had ceased to reflect declaratory U.S. policy. This discussion also treats "assured destruction" merely as an aspect of a U.S. warfighting nuclear strategy. For the defensive mission of the SRF see Sokolovskiy, p. 284. See generally Michael J. Deane, *Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami

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- Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980).
5. Sokolovskiy, p. 391, n. 31. Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov's defense of the Brezhnev pledge in *Pravda* (June 12, 1982) is frequently taken as endorsing a LOW posture for Soviet forces. But Ustinov seems to leave the door open for a preemptive option when he remarks that "the imperialist forces will not succeed in ensuring for themselves military superiority either at the stage of preparing a nuclear war or at the moment when they try to start the war."
 7. General V.I. Zemskov, "Wars of the Contemporary Era," *Military Thought*, No. 5 (May 1969), p. 59.
 8. On the history of Soviet deception relative to BMD, see Michael Mihalka, "Soviet Strategic Deception, 1955-1981," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 5 (March 1982), pp. 40-93.
 9. See the account of Raymond L. Garthoff, "BMD and East-West Relations," in *Ballistic Missile Defense*, eds., Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 295-296.
 10. See particularly Garthoff, pp. 298-314.
 11. On this subject see generally Richard S. Soll, "The Soviet Union and Protracted Nuclear War," *Strategic Review* 8 (Fall 1980), pp. 15-28, and Richard B. Foster, "On Prolonged Nuclear War," *International Security Review* 6 (Winter 1981-1982), pp. 497-518.
 12. Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, "Military Strategy," in *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopedia* [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol. 7 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), p. 563.
 13. A drastic upgrading of the Soviet civil defense program was undertaken beginning in 1973, apparently in response to decisions taken in the late 1960s regarding the potential importance and effectiveness of civil defense measures in overall Soviet strategy. See Leon Goure, *War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976); Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 52.
 14. Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, *M.V. Frunze-voyenny teoretik: vzglyady M.V. Frunze i sovremennaya voyennaya teoriya* [M.V. Frunze-Military Theoretician: The Views of M.V. Frunze and Contemporary Military Theory] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 236-246, as translated in *Strategic Review* 13 (Fall 1985), pp. 102-106. See William E. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," *Problems of Communism* 34 (July-August 1985), pp. 1-14, and James M. McConnell, "The Irrelevance Today of Sokolovskiy's Book *Military Strategy*," *Defense Analysis* 1 (1985), pp. 243-254.
 15. Marshal of Aviation G.V. Zimin, *Razvitiye protivovozdushnoy oborony* [Development of Anti-air Defense] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 192, 105. See generally Deane, pp. 77-94.
 16. "Soviets Stage Integrated Test of Weapons," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 28 June 1982, pp. 20-21.
 17. For what follows see John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength* (New York, N.Y.: The Dial Press, 1982), pp. 151-171, and Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Program," in Carter and Schwartz, pp. 189-209.
 18. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Soviet Noncompliance* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 4. For an early discussion of the SA-5 tests and other questionable Soviet ABM-related activities, see Colin S. Gray, "SALT I Aftermath: Have the Soviets Been Cheating?" *Air Force Magazine*, November 1975, pp. 28-33.
 19. The U.S. government has formally found that Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility are "ambiguous" but a "potential violation." See generally *Soviet Noncompliance*, pp. 1-6, and Thomas K. Longstreth, John E. Pike, and John B. Rhinelander, *The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty* (Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, March 1985), pp. 52-61.
 20. For what follows see *Soviet Military Power*, pp. 46-48.

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21. Stevens, pp. 212-213.
22. See *Soviet Military Power*, pp. 48-49, and Gordon MacDonald, Jack Ruina, and Mark Balaschak, "Soviet Strategic Air Defense," in *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics*, ed., Richard K. Betts (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 53-82.
23. George Schneider, "The ABM Treaty Today," in Carter and Schwartz, p. 239. The Director of DARPA has testified that the SA-12 is being deployed in two configurations, one for air defense and one for BMD (*Defense Daily*, 9 March 1984).
24. Stevens, pp. 215-216.
25. *Soviet Military Power*, p. 48.
26. Consider "Viktor Suvorov's" report that shortly after the signing of the SALT I agreements the Soviets gave the "largest" of their strategic missiles (presumably the SS-9) a covert defensive mission or capability: *Inside the Soviet Army* (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan, 1982), p. 105.
27. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Making Gains in Air Defense," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 2 April 1984, p. 23.

U.S. ASAT: Whither Now?

William H. Langenberg

DURING THE PAST year, an increasingly rancorous debate has developed regarding the U.S. antisatellite weapon (ASAT). These arguments have focused on whether testing of the U.S. ASAT is desirable, or whether an immediate halt to such tests would be more beneficial. Much of the recent debate over ASAT testing, unfortunately, has created more heat than light. Only by becoming fully informed on the ramifications of the issue can one evaluate it on a more intellectual and rational plane. The primary purpose of this article is to provide essential facts about the U.S. ASAT and its Soviet counterpart, to describe testing done by both countries to date, and to present major arguments pro and con as to whether continued U.S. ASAT testing is necessary or desirable. The article follows with an objective analysis of these arguments and concludes with a recommendation as to how the United States should proceed.

The U.S. ASAT

The U.S. ASAT is a direct ascent weapon that is relatively compact and capable of being air launched. It consists of a two-stage rocket, on the nose of which is mounted an infrared min-

ature homing vehicle (MHV). The first-stage rocket is a standard short-range attack missile (SRAM), while the second stage is the Altair III. The entire ASAT assembly is about 17 feet long, 18 inches in diameter and weighs 2700 pounds. It is launched from a specially equipped U.S. Air Force F-15 fighter aircraft.

The crucial component of the U.S. ASAT is the miniature homing vehicle (MHV). Cylindrical in shape, it measures only 12 inches in diameter by 13 inches in length. Jammed inside this compact, state-of-the-art device are an infrared sensor that tracks the target satellite, eight infrared telescopes that pick up and focus the infrared radiation from the target to the sensor, a laser gyroscope, a computer, and a set of 56 steering rockets around the periphery that guide the MHV on a collision course with the target. For stability the cylinder rotates around its axis of symmetry. The gyroscope determines which rockets are to be fired to adjust the MHV's trajectory.¹

In operation, the target satellite is tracked by ground-based radar, and an F-15 carrying the ASAT assembly is launched on an interception path. The F-15 fires the ASAT when it reaches an altitude of 5-10 miles, and the two-stage rocket then boosts the MHV out of the atmosphere and into space. Here the nose cone separates from the assembly, exposing the MHV mounted in a frame which spins the system to 20 revolutions per minute before release. This rotation both sta-

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OFFICIAL TEXT

Arms Control

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC. 20451

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 647-8714

United States and Soviet Union NST Proposals -- Round VII

ELEMENTS

UNITED STATES

SOVIET UNION

START

General Approach

50% reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner and completed by the end of 1991.

50% reduction of strategic offensive arms by 1991 and total elimination of remaining strategic offensive arms by the end of 1996.

This agreement not contingent upon resolution of other issues outside START negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva Summit.

Agreement on 50% reductions by 1991 contingent upon resolution of Defense and Space issues, commencement of negotiations on a CTB and US acceptance in principle to elimination of all strategic offensive arms by 1996.

SNDVs

1600 ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

1600 ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

Warheads

6000 ceiling to include ICBM and SLBM warheads, long-range ALCMs, and with each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs counting as one warhead.

6000 ceiling to include ICBM and SLBM warheads, long-range ALCMs, and with each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs counting as one warhead.

Sublimits

Sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

Withdrew proposals for sublimits of 80-85% of warheads on ballistic missiles and 60% on warheads on any one leg of the Triad.

Heavy ICBMs

There must be substantial reductions in heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBMs would be included in 1650 sublimit.

Overall cuts would include significant reductions in ICBMs.

Throw-weight	50% reduction from current Soviet level to be codified by direct or indirect limits.	Soviets claim approximately 50% reduction would result from the Soviet 50% reduction proposal.
Mobile ICBMs	Banned	Permitted
Heavy Bombers/ Bomber Weapons	Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in 6000 limit. Each ALCM carried on a heavy bomber would count as one warhead in the 6000 ceiling.	Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in 6000 limit. Each ALCM carried on a heavy bomber would count as one warhead in the 6000 ceiling.
Verification	Include an exchange of comprehensive and accurate data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site observation of elimination of weapons, and effective monitoring of remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.	The sides shall agree on reliable methods and means of comprehensive verification involving national technical means, as well as a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data on arms, both prior to reductions and thereafter, and effective monitoring (including on-site inspection) of the remaining nuclear missile systems, aircraft and relevant facilities.

ELEMENTS

UNITED STATES

SOVIET UNION

INF

LRINF Warhead ceiling

Phased reductions to a global ceiling of 100 LRINF warheads for each side by the end of 1991. U.S. LRINF warheads permitted in U.S. territory (including Alaska) and Soviet LRINF warheads permitted in Soviet Asia. Zero for each side in Europe by the end of 1991.

Agreement on INF not contingent upon resolution of other issues outside INF negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva Summit.

Zero for each side in Europe within 5 years. Reduction within unspecified timeframe to 100 in Soviet Asia beyond striking distance of U.S. and 100 in U.S. beyond striking distance of USSR territory (i.e. no deployments in Alaska).

Agreement on INF contingent upon resolution of Defense and Space issues and commencement of negotiations on a CTB.

SRINF Missiles Global constraints limiting U.S. and Soviet SRINF within range band of SS-23 to Scaleboard to the current Soviet level. Ban on SRINF missiles between range band of Scaleboard and Pershing II. Negotiations on reductions of SRINF to begin within 6 months after initial INF agreement is reached.

Verification Include an exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site observation of the elimination of the weapons, and an effective monitoring arrangement for facilities and sites following elimination of the weapons. Should negotiate verification details now.

ELEMENTS

UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Mutual commitment through 1996 not to withdraw from ABM Treaty for the purpose of developing, testing or deploying advanced strategic defenses and to strictly observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Above commitment conditioned upon 50% reductions of strategic offensive arms by the end of 1991 and the total elimination of all remaining offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996.

Acknowledgment that either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.

The right to withdrawal for reasons of supreme national interests or material breach which would not be forfeited by the above commitment.

Above elements to be incorporated in a new treaty. Alternatively, the U.S. proposal in President's July letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on table.

U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe with ranges less than 1000 km frozen at existing levels, leaving U.S. at zero, Soviets with substantial number. No constraints on SRINF in ASIA. Negotiations on SRINF reductions in principle to follow immediately after initial INF agreement, but no schedule for negotiations provided.

Agreement in principle to many aspects of U.S. proposal, but have since declined to confirm their acceptance of on-site observation of elimination of weapons. Want to defer negotiating details.

SOVIET UNION

Mutual commitment for 10 years not to withdraw from ABM Treaty for any reason while strictly observing all its provisions; and, agreement on an additional ban on testing in space of all space elements of an anti-missile defense, with the exception of research and testing conducted in laboratories.

After 1996, the sides would begin special talks to reach a mutually acceptable decision on how to proceed further.

Agreement in Defense and Space contingent upon resolution of START and INF issues and commencement of negotiations on a CTB.



OFFICIAL TEXT

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 647-8714

Arms Control

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 5, 1987

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE
KENNETH L. ADELMAN
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
AT THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
GENEVA
FEBRUARY 5, 1987

Mr. President:

Two years ago, when I first addressed the Conference on Disarmament, Donald Lowitz sat by my side here; he was serving as your President that month. Since then, you have had the good fortune to know Don as I've known him for my adult life: a warm and wonderful person, who served his country whenever called upon -- and who believed in this Conference and its goals, and who believed in all of you. You saw this side of Don. I had seen him as a marvelous husband to Shana -- herself such a perfect embodiment of what's fresh and caring about America -- as a fabulous father to Amy, Teddy, Josh and a loving grandfather to David. How they will all miss him. How we will all miss him.

I understand that you have already heard President Reagan's tribute to Don. Let us, as the President said, pursue the goals Don pursued and, by so doing, give living monument to his work here. I would like now to convey to you the President's greetings at the opening of this session.

As the Conference on Disarmament resumes its work in 1987, I would like to extend my wishes for a productive session. Although the opening of the conference has been darkened by the sad and untimely loss of our Ambassador Donald Lowitz, I am certain we can join together in making progress in this forum as a fitting testimonial to his memory.

Your work constitutes an important and integral part of efforts undertaken by the international community to make our world a more peaceful place. The issues with which you deal are complementary to those being addressed bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. The promise of Reykjavik, which has given us the vision of a world with significantly reduced levels of nuclear weapons, has become an indicator of what is possible. It inevitably draws attention to the issues on your agenda and should encourage you in your efforts to increase international stability and cooperation.

One of the most important tasks facing you is the working-out of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. This task is made even more difficult by the fact that capabilities for chemical warfare are increasing and that, contrary to international agreement, chemical weapons are being used in various parts of the world. You have a heavy responsibility. For as you consider the provisions of a convention, you must make sure that a global ban will, in fact, eliminate the capability for chemical weapons to be used against future generations. An effective convention will require an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all states.

I reaffirm the commitment made by the United States in 1984 when we tabled our draft convention banning chemical weapons worldwide. The United States delegation will make every effort to work for the total elimination of these terrible weapons and for the verification provisions necessary to ensure that they

never again enter the arsenal of the world's armies.

Your efforts in this and in other fields are to be commended. We are committed to working with you in the herculean task of bringing stability to a still insecure world and in achieving responsible solutions to the problem of reducing the world's arms.

Mr. President, in the two years since I last spoke to this forum, the world has witnessed some dramatic developments in arms control. I would single out especially the remarkable meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik last October. From the United States perspective, Reykjavik marked an historic turning-point in our arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union. Why? Because for the first time, we engaged the Soviet Union in serious negotiations -- not just public initiatives, but serious, hands-on negotiations -- on the subject of deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

This is a goal that President Reagan has been striving for since he first proposed the "zero-zero" option for intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and deep strategic arms reductions (START) in 1981 and 1982. At that time, you may remember, there were many people in our own country and elsewhere who argued that such ambitious arms reduction proposals had no real place in the arms control dialogue. Many claimed that these deep-cuts proposals were too far-reaching and could never be the basis for productive negotiations with the Soviet Union. And when the Soviet Union walked out of the arms talks at the end of 1983 -- totally unjustifiably, I might add -- many of these same critics reiterated their arguments, believing that events had vindicated their views.

But President Reagan persisted. And his persistence has paid off in a real shift in the arms control agenda. Now at last the two sides are talking in nuclear arms control about agreements that if signed -- and if complied with fully -- would effect real and deep reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals, particularly in the most destabilizing systems. No more are we looking at arrangements like the SALT accords of the 1970s, which permitted vast growth in the arsenals of both sides -- a fourfold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons -- in strategic ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons -- since SALT I was signed in 1972. Thanks to President Reagan's persistence, the agenda in nuclear arms control is now, irreversibly, deep offensive weapons cuts.

There is another development to which I would call your attention -- a development that has occurred outside the field of arms control proper but which, if it were to come to pass, could have potentially broad ramifications for arms control and even for the deliberations of this forum. That is the increasing discussion of "openness," of Glasnost, in the Soviet Union. Indeed, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov addressed it here two days ago. It is not clear yet where this focus on openness might lead. It is not clear yet what Glasnost is to mean, or if openness in the Soviet context will be genuine

openness by the standards of truly open societies. Experience warns us to temper hope with skepticism.

But we can speak conditionally. We can express hope. We can say that if this Glasnost, this development, were ever to come to real fruition, we could very well find ourselves standing on the threshold of a new era for the cause of arms control and disarmament.

For openness and arm control go together, on two levels. First there is a clear connection between openness and international trust, between peace and the open society. Andrei Sakharov, that great world hero and a Soviet hero, has spoken of "the indissoluble bond between international security and trust on the one hand, and respect for human rights and an open society on the other." Societies that respect the rights of their citizens, that respect freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom to travel and to emigrate, freedom of assembly -- that defend the rights of individuals to criticize their leaders and to vote them in and out of office -- such societies also keep their international treaty commitments. Such societies can be expected to behave in a fashion that promotes world peace. Such societies do not crave new territory. Such societies do not menace their neighbors. Conversely, as President Reagan said not long ago, "A government that breaks faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers."

Second, there is a direct, practical link between openness and progress in arms control. That link lies in the problem of verification. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of what we can achieve in arms control. We can control effectively only what we can effectively verify. But verification is often directly limited in turn by the degree of openness permitted by the states that subscribe to an arms control agreement.

In open societies like the United States, relevant information on defense programs is readily available. That is why, when dealing with open, democratic societies, one would not have to rely exclusively on so-called "national technical means" of verification or elaborate verification mechanisms to verify arms agreements. I have often said that the Soviet Union could tell if we ever were engaged in violating arms agreements simply by subscribing to half a dozen publications -- The New York Times, The Washington Post, Aviation Week, and a handful of others.

That is one reason why the United States has called for greater openness in all nations. Since 1982, the United States has consistently pressed for resolutions on disarmament and openness in the United Nations General Assembly. In 1982, our resolution on disarmament and openness was adopted by the General Assembly. It explicitly stated the connection between advancing disarmament and openness and free discussion and free dissemination of information in all nations. It

encouraged all nations to advance the cause of openness as a way of advancing the cause of disarmament and arms control.

And that is my message to you today: the path to more ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gate of greater openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, the issue here "is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust and security."

The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which is one reason why arms control remains a very difficult, very painstaking business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defense spending. In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the Soviet Union each devoted the equivalent of approximately \$250 billion to defenses. Figures on United States defense spending are of course widely available in open sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed and scrutinized in the United States congress and elsewhere. Figures for Soviet defense spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis. Why? Because published Soviet figures bear no relation to the reality of the Soviet defense effort.

In 1985, the Soviet Union claims to have spent 20.3 billion rubles on defense. Assuming the official exchange rate of approximately \$1.50 per ruble, that comes to about 35 billion dollars. Now, that is a ridiculously small sum for the declared defense budget of a state regarded as a military superpower. It bears no relation to the \$250 billion figure I mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defense effort. There is no way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defense effort on its declared budget of 20.3 billion rubles. It is spending many times that.

Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of strategic defenses. The United States Strategic Defense Initiative is an openly declared program. Its budget is published and voted on by the United States Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses this program in his speeches.

Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defense and space issues with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the equivalent of an SDI program. We know this denial to be false. We know that it began investigating several advanced strategic defense technologies before we did. We know it is extensively engaged in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example, that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research program involving about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately one billion dollars a year. And it is researching a host of other technologies as well.

Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control is often slow and halting when there is a lack of openness and honesty between governments about even such elementary facts as this?

There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not open the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to meaningful agreement. Thus, unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about, accomplishments are limited, if not thwarted altogether. That movement is necessary for progress on an issue before this Conference now.

Of the tasks before you, my government considers the negotiations on achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons to have the highest priority. International negotiators have been striving to remove the chemical weapons threat since the late nineteenth century. Here it is 1987. Nearly a century has passed since the Hague Conference prohibited use of chemical projectiles in 1899. Yet the problem of chemical weapons remains. Indeed, as the world edges toward the twenty-first century, the chemical weapons danger continues to grow. Shockingly, we have witnessed use of chemical weapons by some nations in this decade and even during the past year.

It is high time that chemical weapons use be rendered a thing of the past. It is high time that these barbaric weapons were banished from the face of the earth. But it is obvious that if these weapons are to be banned, a thorough and effective mechanism of verification is necessary. My country will not accept, and no free nation should accept, a ban without sound machinery of verification.

A chemical weapons ban without confidence of compliance will be no more effective than the Hague Conference's 1899 prohibition on use of artillery containing poison gas, which did nothing to prevent extensive use of chemical weapons in the First World War. It will be no better than so many of the misguided disarmament measures of the 1920s and 1930s, which in Walter Lippman's famous formulation, were "tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament" while permitting aggressor nations to maintain and expand their arsenals. Until an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban is in place, the American people will insist, rightly, that the United States maintain adequate chemical forces to deter use of these heinous weapons by an aggressor.

While the establishment of procedures for the effective verification of arms control agreements is often extremely demanding both technologically and politically, in the case of chemical weapons, the challenges are especially great.

The toxic chemicals which are or could be used as agents of warfare are in general not very different from a variety of substances having legitimate civilian use. Similarly, the chemical process equipment used in their production can be found in the legitimate manufacture of pesticides or corrosives. Chemical agents can be stored in bulk, facilitating transportation as well as concealment. Chemical munitions have no particular characteristics which distinguish them from other types of munitions. They too are small and easily

transported and concealed.

Thus, as I mentioned before, the issue of openness goes to the heart of achieving a chemical weapons ban. Article III of the rolling text of the draft convention on chemical weapons (CD/734) requires each state party to declare whether it possesses chemical weapons. And yet today the United States is the only country in this room, or in the world, that publicly admits to having chemical weapons and has made public its stockpile locations. That, to me, is astonishing -- especially when so many countries are pressing the urgency of a chemical weapons ban. Some are even criticizing the United States for developing chemical weapons.

The production of chemical weapons is not illegal. The use of chemical weapons is illegal. Since it signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the United States has never used chemical weapons; others have-- others, who don't even publicly admit to possessing chemical weapons; others, with representatives in this very room. The world expects better than this.

The United States openly declares its possession and development of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union, along with other nations, does not. The world expects better than this.

The United States has presented publicly an extraordinary amount of information concerning its binary weapons program. The details are known to everyone. The Soviet Union has told us nothing about its chemical weapons program. The world expects better than this.

The United States invited all members of this body to Tooele, Utah, to examine procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has yet to accept the invitation. The world expects better than this.

The United States will devote some \$500 million under the fiscal 1987 defense budget to the elimination of its current chemical munitions stocks. The Soviet Union, apparently, has no similar chemical weapons elimination or demilitarization program. The world expects better than this.

The United States has maintained a unilateral moratorium on the development of chemical weapons for seventeen years. The Soviet Union has never ceased producing chemical weapons and continues today to expand its facilities and capabilities. The world expects better than this.

It is because of this state of affairs, because of this glaring lack of openness in the realm of chemical weapons, that we are more than ever convinced that confidence in compliance is essential to any chemical weapons ban. We are convinced that nothing less than an inspection regime insitutionalizing the right of short notice access upon demand to any location or facility suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons will effectively deter non-compliance-- the challenge-inspection provisions of Article X of the United States

But every article of the convention must be designed to contribute to this overall objective of confidence in compliance. And to be effective, each provision must be clearly and unambiguously defined, written, and understood. It will do little good to have broad agreement on the basic provisions if inspection procedures are inadequate or imprecise.

At present, it is a point of consensus among all our governments that each State Party will provide international access to its destruction sites, to its production facilities to be eliminated, and to its facilities for producing permitted chemicals. But working out precise procedures for all these tasks was only just begun by Ambassador Lowitz and his delegation. And the vital question of how to ensure confidence in compliance with regard to undeclared sites still remains at issue.

But, again and again, wherever we turn in this negotiation it is precisely the absence of openness, the absence of Glasnost, that is standing in the way of further progress. In the draft convention, I count no less than thirteen different types of declarations that each state party will be expected to make about its stockpiles and their destruction, about its chemical weapons production facilities and their elimination, and about its chemical industry.

Article IV is a key element in this series of declarations -- calling for the declaration of all stockpiles. Everyone agrees that each state party should declare the amount and composition of its stockpile. Everyone agrees with the basic objective that the complete stockpile should be destroyed. And yet the Soviet Union continues to reject two particular "openness" provisions which are necessary if we are to have confidence that this objective is fulfilled. One is the early and complete declaration of the stockpile locations and on-site verification to ensure that the declaration reflects reality. The second is on-site monitoring of the stocks until destruction to ensure that some weapons are not clandestinely diverted to undeclared sites before destruction. And it is obvious that we face the serious risk that a state will not declare all its stockpile locations or the entire amount of its stockpile.

The consequences of lack of openness in this realm are unfortunate, and are not lost on world public opinion. I think the 1983 yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute identified the problem -- and the solution -- as well as anyone:

Faced with a high degree of uncertainty about Soviet CW intentions, Western defense authorities have no prudent option but to assume that they pose a threat. If it decided to do so, the Soviet government could probably find a way for reducing the ambiguities attaching to its CW stance in Western (and non-aligned country) eyes without at the same time jeopardizing Soviet security to the point of net detriment. Yet even though the need for such mistrust-reducing measures is so evidently growing, it seems that Moscow has not chosen to act in such a manner, a

failure which is becoming more and more conspicuous and damaging.

Clearly, there is a gap between the way certain states conduct business today and the way they promise they will behave under a convention banning chemical weapons. And it is simply not possible, Mr. President, for a nation to yield national control over its own defense to an international agreement -- as we will be asked to do when we have a convention ready for signature -- on the basis of a mere promise of a new and better pattern of behavior by other states.

The Soviet Union says it is interested in real openness. But will its deeds in this forum match its words? We hope so. We hope to see signs of real Glasnost, here in this forum, in the coming weeks and months.

I believe that a turn to real Glasnost could transform our discussion and sweep away a host of difficulties. I believe it could remove the barriers that some have attempted to erect to the inspection procedures absolutely essential to make a chemical weapons ban worth the paper it is printed on. Genuine openness, real Glasnost, were it to emerge in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Union's dealings with the rest of the world -- nothing could be more welcome to Americans. Nothing would do more to make possible progress in the relationship between our two governments. Nothing would so improve the prospects, not only for real advances in arms control, but for the entire cause of world peace. Nothing would be a better tribute to your dedicated and important work. Nothing would be a better monument to Donald Lowitz's work and life.

Thank you, Mr. President.

A World Without Nuclear Weapons



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

and
Control

Following is an address by Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), before the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, November 13, 1986.

Since the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, a lot of people have begun to take a fresh and serious look at an old question: would we be better off in a world without nuclear weapons? Over the past few weeks there have been numerous articles on the subject in such publications as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and the *New York Times*. I detect something of a sea change out there. Commentators who usually devote their column inches to telling us how desperately we need a new arms control agreement have suddenly taken to telling us how desperately we need nuclear weapons. Since Reykjavik, everybody seems to be learning to love nuclear deterrence.

What about this question? Is it really possible to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, and would we be better off in a world without them? These are serious issues for arms control. They are serious issues for our national security. The elimination of nuclear weapons has been, at least, a distant goal of our arms control and disarmament policy since the beginning of the nuclear era. But I think we have always understood that it was not a simple or immediate goal.

Problems of Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

Today, I think it would be useful to remind ourselves of some of the problems it would entail. So let's imagine, for a moment, a world in which nuclear weapons were about to be completely eliminated. What kind of world would this be? What kinds of problems would we face?

Soviet Superiority in Conventional Arms. The first problem we would face is Soviet superiority in conventional arms. In Europe right now there is a serious imbalance in conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

"The most basic reason that eliminating nuclear weapons will not solve our problem is that nuclear weapons are not the cause of our problem. They are merely the symptom."

At present, the Warsaw Pact has a formidable margin of superiority—almost twice as many divisions, nearly two-and-a-half times as many tanks, and nearly five times the number of artillery pieces in place in Europe. On the purely conventional plane, NATO forces are outnumbered and outgunned. Reinforcements can obviously be brought from the

United States, but that is a complicated task, and even then the Warsaw Pact enjoys a considerable edge. That is why deterrence in Europe continues to depend on nuclear weapons and cannot be anchored on conventional forces alone.

This is nothing new. Ever since 1945, when the United States rapidly demobilized its armed forces, we have depended, and Western Europe has depended, on U.S. nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression. Time and again over the years we have reaffirmed the need to strengthen conventional forces. And we have made some progress, insufficient progress but some nonetheless. But the imbalance remains.

Under these circumstances, to eliminate the nuclear threat would be to weaken our deterrence of Soviet aggression. The first task we would face were we to proceed in a steady way to eliminate nuclear weapons, therefore, would be to right the balance in conventional arms. This may be difficult, for despite the greater wealth of the West, we are still free peoples. And free peoples do not easily choose to commit large increases in current defense spending, even if only to match expenditures by totalitarian states.

Verification. The second problem we would face is that of verifying a total ban on nuclear weapons. The verification problems posed by such an agreement would be truly monumental. For the past 15 years in arms control, we have relied

on national technical means to verify compliance. We have been dealing with many provisions—for example, gross totals of fixed missile silos—that are comparatively easy to verify. These methods of verification have serious limitations. As we look a short distance down the arms control trail, we can see new verification problems emerging. Mobile missiles already pose a problem for verification. Warhead limits pose a problem for verification. As the technological trend moves in the direction of smaller and more mobile systems, these verification problems will only increase.

But these hurdles—by no means insignificant ones—pale in comparison with the huge difficulty of ensuring against clandestine production of nuclear weapons themselves. The verification problems posed by this idea take us back to the kinds of issues we first confronted 40 years ago, when the United States proposed the Baruch Plan to the United Nations. The Baruch Plan was our first nuclear arms control initiative, a comprehensive proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons and place all atomic energy activities under control of an international authority.

Had it been accepted by the Soviet Union in 1946, the Baruch Plan would have been a major undertaking even then. But at that time, circumstances were so much simpler. In 1946, when we proposed the Baruch Plan to the United Nations, we had a monopoly on atomic weapons.

Elimination of nuclear weapons would require the most extensive and intrusive system of onsite inspections anyone could imagine. It is hard to think of a major military or even industrial installation that could be legally exempted from inspection on demand. That would mean, in turn, unprecedented openness to foreign intrusion on the part of all nations. Thus far the Soviet Union has raised objections to even the most limited inspection arrangements.

The Soviets have always resisted inspection in practice. As Khrushchev said to Arthur Robens, a British official, in 1956: "Why should I let you into my back garden so that you can peep through my kitchen window?" We still do not have government-to-government inspection of Soviet territory. We are a vast distance away from the kind of inspection we would need for such a comprehensive agreement. One need only think of the fate of Major Nicholson—who was shot to death in 1985 by Soviet soldiers while carrying out his inspection duties in East Germany as permitted under interna-

tional agreement—to see the kinds of barriers we are up against. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will come to accept more effective verification measures. In the meantime, without a comprehensive and thoroughly intrusive inspection system, a treaty eliminating nuclear weapons would simply be impractical.

Third Countries and Nuclear Weapons. The third problem we must address is the issue of third countries. Needless to say, nuclear technology is far more widely disseminated today than it was in 1946. We already have a Non-Proliferation Treaty, of course. And we have been very successful at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. But in a nuclear-weapons-free world, the incentive to cheat might well increase, since a single madman, a single terrorist leader armed with atomic weapons, could wield, if only for a while, disproportionate power.

Fundamental Problems. But behind all these problems I have mentioned are two very fundamental ones. The first is that we can't put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. While it may some day be possible to return to a non-nuclear world, it is utterly impossible to return to a prenuclear world. It is utterly impossible to return to a world where the secrets of nuclear fission and nuclear fusion are not yet known. The knowledge for creating atomic bombs exists and will remain. The knowledge is widely disseminated. It cannot be unlearned. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. Like Adam and Eve, we have eaten of the apple, and we can't go back to Eden.

The other fundamental problem is the nature of the Soviet Union. The most basic reason that eliminating nuclear weapons will not solve our problem is that nuclear weapons are not the cause of our problem. They are merely the symptom. The cause of tension, the cause of fear, and the cause of danger are not weapons but aggressive intentions and aggressive policies. Nobody in the United States loses any sleep over the British nuclear arsenal. The source of tension is not the possession of nuclear weapons but the presence of aggressive intentions. The most basic barrier to radical measures of arms control thus far has been the secretive and aggressive nature of the Soviet regime. Until that changes, arms control is up against some serious hurdles.

Eliminating Ballistic Missiles

But what about the possibility—proposed by President Reagan at Reykjavik—of eliminating ballistic missiles? That is a different proposition from eliminating all nuclear weapons. Eliminating ballistic missiles would be a big job. It is a job we would have to go about very carefully, with a clear understanding of the complexities and problems involved. But a world without ballistic missiles would offer great advantages over our present situation, provided we had some form of insurance like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) coming on stream to cope with potential cheating.

Why single out ballistic missiles as a problem?

First, ballistic missiles are weapons *par excellence* of surprise attack and nuclear blackmail. They travel to their targets very quickly, 25–30 minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 10–15 minutes for some submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Once fired, they cannot be called back. They cover in minutes the distances that bombers cross only in hours. They also appear most threatening psychologically and politically. They are vulnerable, at least partly so, when based on land, and highly accurate in any basing mode. In a nutshell, they are the weapon system most likely to prompt a "use it or lose it" type of response in a crisis.

The Soviets were the first to test and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles in 1957, the year in which they launched the Sputnik satellite. Khrushchev made exaggerated claims about the number of missiles that the Soviet Union possessed, and many people in the West became frightened. Khrushchev's threats helped to prompt an antinuclear movement—the "ban the bomb" movement of the late 1950s. Since that time, the land-based ballistic missile has always been the weapon of choice for Soviet nuclear intimidation.

A world without the threat of ballistic missiles would thus be a world in which a major instrument of surprise nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail had been eliminated.

Second, there is also reason to believe that without ballistic missiles, nuclear deterrence would be more stable. The Soviets have always seen the ballistic missile as a preemptive weapon, even as we have placed emphasis on retaliation. The heart of the present Soviet arsenal is a force of 308 SS-18 missiles with 10-plus warheads each.

These warheads are powerful and accurate. The SS-18 missiles are designed as a first-strike weapon. They are designed to destroy our land-based missiles in their silos, to destroy a large part of our land-based retaliatory force before it can get off the ground.

If both sides' weapons are vulnerable, temptation on both sides to use them in a crisis increases. So ballistic missiles, in addition to being very threatening weapons, can be destabilizing. If we move away from these hair-trigger weapons, we may improve stability.

But what about the problems of a world without ballistic missiles? There is no use pretending that such a world would be problem free. What would be some of the difficulties we would face in moving to a world without ballistic missiles? First, nuclear deterrence would still operate. But now we would be talking about slower flying, air-breathing delivery vehicles.

Soviet Air Defense Superiority.

The first problem we would face in this world is Soviet air defense superiority. The Soviets have invested massively in air defenses. The Soviets have more than 9,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, over 4,600 tactical SAM launchers, and some 10,000 air defense radars. We have nothing comparable to this. If deterrence is no longer going to rely on ballistic missiles, then we need to think seriously about improving our own air defenses. We would also have to think seriously about improving our ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. And we would probably have to think seriously also about strengthening conventional forces.

Verification and Compliance. But the truly major problem we would face is verification and compliance. It would be a formidable problem. In a world without ballistic missiles and without strategic defense, there would always be a tremendous temptation for a potential aggressor to produce a clandestine force of ballistic missiles. Such a force would give its possessor enormous power. The danger would be far greater than it was in the 1950s. Because ballistic missiles have already been built, extremely powerful and accurate missiles could be fielded much more rapidly than they were then. Indeed, rocket technology would continue to advance, since space programs would continue.

In addition, clandestine production, storage, and deployment of missiles would be very hard to detect. Mobile missiles are of particular concern in this regard. Indeed, we should not forget

that the Soviets have already deployed a mobile ICBM, the SS-25, which was itself a violation of the SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks] agreement. Research and production have always been extremely difficult to verify by national technical means.

In a world without ballistic missiles, we would have to worry about not just Soviet noncompliance. We would also have to worry about third countries. These are all very serious problems.

The Need for Strategic Defenses

But this is where defenses come in. If we were to couple elimination of ballistic missiles with deployment of strategic defenses against ballistic missiles, we would have a critical hedge against cheating. We would also create a powerful disincentive against cheating, since in the presence of effective defenses, ballistic missiles would tend to lose the overwhelming military value they now have. If defenses exist to stop ballistic missiles, then there would be less military reason, in a world where ballistic missiles had been eliminated, to bring them back. Strategic defenses would thus be an insurance policy for arms control.

I am not saying that elimination of ballistic missiles would be an easy job. But defenses at least make the idea of a world without ballistic missiles seem a lot more reasonable than it might have seemed in the past.

That is what President Reagan proposed to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik—a plan for elimination of ballistic missiles coupled with deployment of strategic defenses. It is, in my view, a powerful and creative vision. It is a vision of a world in which the most menacing weapons, ballistic missiles, had been eliminated by arms control and simultaneously rendered obsolete by defenses. It is a vision in which paper agreements are backed up by strong physical guarantees. That's partly what's been missing in arms control in the past, a clear insurance policy against noncompliance.

President Reagan's offer suggests how strategic defense can assist and strengthen arms control. In fact, strategic defense technologies represent possibly the most promising development for arms control and national security since space launches made possible the reconnaissance satellite. The Strategic Defense Initiative could prove an even more radical advance than the emergence of "national technical means" of verification.

The President proposed the idea to show the Soviets how defenses and arms control can work together. The President proposed the idea to show how defenses can make arms control possible on a scale, I think, few people dreamed of in the recent past. Finally, the President proposed the idea to allay Soviet fears that we are seeking a first-strike capability through SDI. We are not, and by now the Soviets should realize this. If ballistic missiles are phased out, a first strike will become impossible. There will be no swift sword—only a defensive shield.

For me, the real significance of all this is the way in which the idea of defenses is allowing us to think in a new way about the problems of arms control and national security generally. And I would call upon everyone in this room to stop and give a moment's thought to what important possibilities lie before us. For I believe Reykjavik was an important moment, and I believe we are at a critical crossroads. We are at a critical crossroads, and we are being asked to choose between two paths.

Fourteen years ago, when we signed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, we deliberately chose as a nation the path of nuclear vulnerability. We chose the path of vulnerability because we believed that it would be a path to a safer world. We chose the path of vulnerability because we believed that it would be a way to real arms control. We chose the path of vulnerability because we believed it would be a road to genuine reductions in nuclear arms.

The 1972 ABM Treaty committed us to keep our society vulnerable to nuclear attack. But the preamble of the treaty also affirmed the "premise" that "the limitation of antiballistic missile systems" would "contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms." The preamble of the treaty spelled out the explicit connection between our agreement to remain vulnerable and our intention to get reductions in nuclear arms. The preamble of the treaty stated the expectation that both nations would "take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms" at "the earliest possible date." The chief American negotiator, my predecessor at ACDA, Gerard Smith, made a unilateral American statement on May 9, 1972, that:

... if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Well, 5 years came and went, and there was no move on the Soviet side toward reductions. Five years after 1972 was 1977. And in 1977 President Carter sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow with a proposal for deep reductions in nuclear arms. The Soviets turned President Carter down flat. Two years later, we signed SALT II, a treaty which permitted vast increases in strategic offensive arms. Since 1972, the number of nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal has quadrupled, and the Soviets have accumulated weapons designed to be used preemptively—those SS-18 missiles, which are weapons designed to deprive us of the retaliatory capacity that our vulnerability was supposed to guarantee. Our own arsenal has grown, too, though more slowly.

In short, the path of vulnerability has proved to be a blind alley. We sought reductions in offensive weapons and consented to vulnerability. All we got in return was vastly increased offensive weapons and increased vulnerability. It is time that we turn to the path of defenses. What can strategic defenses offer to national security and to arms control?

Strategic defenses, once deployed by both sides, can make three contributions to mutual security.

First, they can enhance stability by complicating any surprise attack and thus making a preemptive attack extremely difficult to plan with confidence.

Second, they can counteract nuclear blackmail by blunting the missile threat.

Third, by making ballistic missiles less effective, defenses can make them less of a factor in the military balance and in world politics generally. They can make ballistic missiles less valuable and thus create incentives for reducing them. In fact, it was SDI that brought the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva after their 1983 walkout from the arms talks.

In short, defensive research is pointing the way toward a world in which

ballistic missiles play less of a role, in which fast, first-strike systems will become less effective, and in which slower, second-strike systems come to dominate the military equation. It is pointing away from the current hair-trigger balance based on the primacy of ballistic missiles. These are precisely the goals we have sought to achieve over the years with arms control. Defenses can achieve many of the goals of arms control and can also be combined with arms control.

Soviet Intentions and U.S. National Security

The basic question is this: what do the Soviets want? Do they want safety for themselves? Will that be enough for them? For if that is the case, then they should be willing to move with us toward a world in which ballistic missiles are built down and defenses are built up. They should be willing to move with us toward a world in which offensive arms reductions are combined with defenses to reduce the total ballistic missile threat to each side.

Or do they, rather, wish to threaten others? If that is the case—if they need to threaten others in order to feel secure in themselves—then prospects for genuinely improving stability for both sides with negotiated agreements are very dim.

But I am hopeful. I believe our arms control policy and our national security ought to have a single goal. That goal is almost too obvious to state: it is to defend ourselves, to decrease the dangers that we face by whatever means are at our disposal. I believe we ought to be willing to move toward that goal by whatever path presents itself—whether by technology or by negotiated agreements or, hopefully, by some mutually reinforcing mixture of the two. I believe it is time to reject the idea that technology always has to work against us and can never be made to work for us. I believe it is time to reject the idea that the way to a safer world is by

restraining American technology while letting Soviet weapons multiply and become more lethal.

I believe we are in a better position today than we have been in years to achieve real, stabilizing arms control agreements. I believe the Soviets ought to have every incentive to join us, and I hope that they will. But I also believe we are in a better position today than ever before to guarantee our future by our own ingenuity, whether they do or not.

In short, I believe the day has arrived once again when it is not the totalitarian dictatorships of the world but rather the free societies, with their creativity and energy and ingenuity, that are calling the tune and setting the pace and pointing the way to the future. At the end of the Revolutionary War in 1782, a citizen of Philadelphia remarked to Dr. Benjamin Rush, "It looks as if the battle for independence is finally over." Rush replied, "Sir, you are mistaken. The Revolutionary War may be over, but the battle of independence has just begun."

We have preserved freedom, and we have preserved peace for 40 years. But in a real sense the battle for peace and for freedom is just beginning. But I am confident, in this nation's courage, its technological ingenuity, its dedication, and its good sense. "No problem of human dignity is beyond human beings," President Kennedy once said. "Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable—and we believe they can do it again." I believe that we can do it. I believe that with all the tools at our disposal—by deterrence, by defense, and by negotiation—we can build a more permanent and a more stable peace. That is why I believe that our children and our children's children will enjoy the same safety and prosperity that we enjoy and breathe the same air of liberty that we breathe in democratic countries that are secure and strong and free. ■

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In the course of these crowded two days, we also spanned the other crucial issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. For our part, we stressed the critical importance of human rights, making clear that real improvement in relations between our two governments must be accompanied by improvements in this area, making clear our conviction of the irreducible link between peace and freedom. We had vigorous discussions of regional issues, including Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Cambodia. We laid down important markers concerning Soviet behavior. We spoke of bilateral exchanges between our two peoples, and the two sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate negotiations on bilateral exchanges relating to consulates, space cooperation, and nuclear safety.

But the real importance of Reykjavik is that for the first time in history, we were able to get the Soviet Union to engage with us in serious negotiations not just on regulating the growth of offensive nuclear arsenals but on genuinely reducing these arsenals.

At what I believe history will see as the climax of the Reykjavik meeting, President Reagan put before General Secretary Gorbachev an offer of historic dimensions--an offer for an agreement to eliminate entirely offensive ballistic missiles from the face of the earth within a period of ten years. It was an offer expressly designed to meet the objections and concerns raised by the Soviet Union concerning defensive systems. It was an offer designed to demonstrate once and for all that defensive systems can be a sure and secure path from mutual threats to true, reciprocal security. It was an offer designed to take both sides toward a vastly safer world.

Under this offer, both sides would begin over a five-year period a reduction of all strategic nuclear arms--bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the weapons they carry. These weapons would be reduced 50 percent in this five-year period. During the next five years, we would continue to eliminate all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of whatever range. In the meantime, we would continue with the research, testing, and development of advanced strategic defenses, consistent with the ABM treaty. At the end of this ten-year period, both sides would be free to deploy strategic defenses.

With this offer, we had on the table for the first time in human memory a genuine, serious, and fully practicable proposal for the total elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons, indeed, the most powerful and dangerous weapons ever devised. What made it practicable was the prospect of deploying advanced strategic defenses at the end of the

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President's 1985 Goal of Resolving Five Regional Conflicts Is Elusive

Only Afghanistan May Be Taken Up During Iceland Meeting

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

REYKJAVIK, Iceland, Oct. 9—A year after President Reagan announced his initiative to end Soviet involvement in five regional conflicts, little progress has been made in resolving any of these East-West flashpoints, according to administration officials and area experts.

Both Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev have said they expect to discuss particularly the war in Afghanistan during their meeting here. Moscow announced yesterday the withdrawal of six regiments from that war-torn country starting Oct. 15. Western analysts in Moscow estimated that 6,000 to 8,000 men would be involved in the pullout.

Today a Soviet spokesman here, Nikolai Shishlin, said that if Reagan raises the Afghan issue Gorbachev is prepared to criticize U.S. involvement in Central American conflicts. Referring to U.S. "behavior in Central America and the Middle East," he said, "Gorbachev has a lot to say on that issue."

Evgeniy Primakov, a Gorbachev foreign policy adviser, also said here today, however, that "we are against those who want to replace discussion of the main issue of disarmament with one on [regional] conflicts."

In his United Nations speech a year ago, Reagan cited Afghanistan as the only war where negotiations of any kind are under way to reduce

the Soviet presence.

In the other four conflicts—Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia and Ethiopia—civil wars continue unabated or are getting worse, notably in Nicaragua and Angola. There is no sign that either the Soviet-backed governments or U.S.-supported guerrillas are even close to starting talks.

"There has been no real [Soviet] response to the proposal the president put forth at the United Nations," a senior administration official said in Washington this week.

"There is no evidence the Soviets are pressing their allies to stimulate local dialogues with the opposition," he added.

In his U.N. speech, Reagan called for the opening of negotiations in the five conflicts to achieve the withdrawal of foreign troops and national reconciliation. He also said that the United States and the Soviet Union should guarantee any agreements.

At that time, Reagan warned that without a settlement of the regional wars, a more stable superpower relationship was unlikely. Since then, however, the two sides have pursued negotiations on a broad range of other issues without any perceptible progress toward settling the regional conflicts.

Administration officials say that despite the lack of any direct Soviet response to Reagan's proposal, Gorbachev has repeatedly signaled a strong interest in settling the Afghanistan war.

In a July 28 speech in Vladivostok, where he first announced his intention to withdraw the regiments from Afghanistan, the Soviet leader said he was "striving to hasten a political settlement" and spoke of the need for "national reconciliation," the same language Reagan used in his U.N. speech.

For two years, U.S. and Soviet regional specialists have held periodic meetings to exchange views on the various conflicts where the two superpowers are involved.

Last year's meetings were described by one U.S. official as "sterile." But, he said, those held this past year in preparation for a Reagan-Gorbachev summit in the United States were more professional and "nonpolemical." They also revealed that the differences between Washington and Moscow were "still profound," he added.

The only issue where U.S. officials have found "some convergence" of objectives has been in the Persian Gulf, where both sides want to see the balance of power preserved between Iran and Iraq, who have been at war for six years. But discussion of joint action has not gone beyond supporting resolutions in the U.N. Security Council which urge the two sides to open negotiations to end the war, according to this U.S. official.

If the Iran-Iraq war finds its way onto the agenda here, Reagan will press Gorbachev to do more to end the flow of Soviet arms to Iran from its East European allies, the senior administration official said.

He said there had been "a significant increase" in arms shipments to Tehran from Moscow's allies, which are now providing a U.S.-estimated 10 to 15 percent of Iran's weapons imports.

Administration specialists dealing with Afghanistan are divided over Soviet intentions there. Some now believe Gorbachev really does want to extricate Soviet troops and may be willing to accept a compromise.

For this reason, the administration has supported the continuation of the U.N.-sponsored "proximity talks" in Geneva between Pakistan and the Kabul government. Pakistan, to avoid extending diplomatic recognition to the Soviet-imposed Kabul government, has refused to hold face-to-face talks, requiring U.N. Undersecretary General Diego Cordovez to shuttle back and forth between the delegations.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said at a White House press conference Tuesday that he thought there was "the possibility of some movement" on Afghanistan.

But the prevailing view within the administration is that Gorbachev is basically maneuvering to find a way to consolidate the power of the Kabul government and that his notion of "national reconciliation" still does not include bringing the U.S.-backed guerrilla forces, known as *mujaheddin*, into a coalition government.

This skepticism about Soviet intentions was reflected in comments made yesterday in Peking by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, who labeled the Soviet gesture of withdrawing six regiments from Afghanistan "a ruse" and said Moscow was actually sending in more new troops than it was planning to pull out. The result, he said, would be a "net combat gain."

Washington Post Moscow correspondent Gary Lee contributed to this report.

SUMMIT...

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cuts, such as 50 percent. "We're willing to discuss anything at this point in terms of an interim agreement," he said.

• Limits on shorter-range missiles, such as SS-21s, -22s and -23s.

"What the Soviets can do is cut back on SS-20s... and simply deploy more of the short-range systems," Mr. Holmes said, adding that that knowledge may be a principal reason why the Soviets entered the talks at all.

"My sources tell me we [U.S. negotiators] have already given up on this," he said.

"It's a subject that has to be addressed," the administration official said. "Right now, it's a back-burner issue."

• Knowing that the Soviets could

redeploy their missiles much more quickly than NATO—the alliance is still deploying GLCMs 7½ years after its initial decision—U.S. negotiators are seeking an agreement of indefinite duration.

Perhaps the most ticklish issue of all, however, is verification. The United States wants "on-site" inspections to verify that Soviet missiles have indeed been destroyed—and that new ones are not being manufactured surreptitiously.

"This is sort of your final barrier. It's a big one," said James P. Rubin, an analyst at the Arms Control Association. "I suspect the verification issue is one that will be used by those who don't want an agreement."

Said Mr. Holmes: "An agreement is only as good as your ability to verify that both parties are complying with it. Otherwise, all it is is a symbolic gesture."

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Chile Offers to Meet Opposition Leaders

SANTIAGO, Chile—President Augusto Pinochet's military government announced yesterday it will meet with opposition leaders for the first time since 1983 to discuss the legalization of Chile's political parties.

Opposition leaders seeking a return to democracy said the

move was merely "cosmetic" and that negotiations could only take place if the state of siege imposed Sept. 7 was lifted and freedom of expression restored, United Press International reported.

But the opposition figures applauded recent statements by three members of the four-man ruling junta—the Navy, Air Force and police chiefs—who said they favor wider-ranging talks with democratic opposition parties.

At the summit, Pershings and Asian missiles are the targets

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

An "agreement to agree" to interim limits on medium-range nuclear arms is the most likely product of this weekend's Iceland summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, observers from both sides agree.

While progress toward a treaty has been made in recent months, large gaps remain between the two superpowers' negotiating stances, along with U.S. concerns over Soviet intentions.

"I would frankly be surprised if it was anything more than a framework agreement," said one administration official.

Secretary of State George Shultz, while hinting all week at the possibility of an interim agreement in Reykjavik, has stated that the ultimate U.S. goal remains the "zero" option — elimination of all medium-range missiles.

In the face of serious disagreements on other arms issues — such as Mr. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative program — the United States will be pushing the Soviets in Reykjavik to cut its medium-range nuclear force in Asia. The Soviets, on the other hand, want the United States to dismantle its Pershing II missiles in West Germany.

While most Americans are unfamiliar with the esoterica of what are formally known as intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), many remember television broadcasts in 1983 and 1984 of protests against U.S. missile deployments of such missiles in Europe. The confrontation came to be known as the Euromissile crisis.

Medium-range missiles are one of three broad types of nuclear missiles; the others are tactical, or battlefield, weapons and strategic, or long-range, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

The Soviet Union began deploying its SS-20 medium-range missiles in 1977, and has 270 in Europe and 171 in the Soviet Far East. With three independently targetable nuclear warheads, the SS-20 has a range of 3,000 miles.

Some 112 older Soviet SS-4s, the SS-20's predecessor, remain operational.

In 1983, after the Soviets refused to eliminate the SS-20s, NATO deployed U.S. Pershing II missiles and ground-

The United States has proposed a global limit for each side of 200 warheads — 100 for each side in Europe, 100 for the Soviets in Asia and U.S. rights to stockpile 100.

The Soviets have agreed to a level of 100 warheads in the "European Zone" and a small reduction in their Asian force.

While the moves have left open the possibility of an agreement, some have grave worries.

"This agreement that they're talking about, if it comes about, would reduce us to 100 warheads, which means 25 GLCMs," said Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a Brookings Institution scholar and former aide to then-

national security adviser Henry Kissinger. "And the danger in my opinion is that the numbers become so small that people are going to say this is ridiculous... take it all out."

"It's not really wise to give up all our [INF] systems," said Kim R. Holmes, a policy analyst with the conservative Heritage Foundation. "You have a rung missing from the ladder of [nuclear] escalation" in the face of a Soviet attack.

Several crucial issues remain for U.S. negotiators:

- Soviet insistence on removal of the Pershing IIs — installed at great political cost — leaving the U.S. with only GLCMs.

"It's important because the Soviet

ON-GOING SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks:

- **Place:** Geneva.
 - **Background:** First met March 12, 1985. Round 6 of the talks began Sept. 18 and lasts until Nov. 4.
 - **Principal U.S. negotiator:** Max Kampelman.
- The NST talks are divided into negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear arms stationed in Europe and Asia; space defenses; and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has insisted that any reduction in long-range nuclear weapons must be linked to a ban on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense program.

Conference on Disarmament:

- **Place:** Geneva.
 - **Background:** First met in 1979. Last meeting ended Aug. 29, with another scheduled before the end of the year.
 - **Principal U.S. negotiator:** Donald Lowitz.
- Goal of talks is a complete ban on chemical weapons.

Conference on Disarmament in Europe:

- **Place:** Stockholm.
 - **Background:** First met in 1984.
 - **Principal U.S. negotiator:** Robert Barry.
- Negotiations ended Sept. 22, with a new agreement for notification of NATO and Warsaw Pact troop exercises, including on-site inspections on demand. CDE will report to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on Nov. 4.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction:

- **Place:** Vienna.
 - **Background:** First met in 1973. Round 40 of the talks began Sept. 25 and lasts until Dec. 4.
 - **Principal U.S. negotiator:** Robert Blackwell.
- Goal is to cut number of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops stationed in Europe.

Standing Consultative Commission:

- **Place:** Geneva.
 - **Background:** First met in 1973. Latest round began Oct. 1.
 - **Principal U.S. negotiator:** Gen. Richard Ellis.
- Ongoing discussions of compliance and other issues associated with signed arms control treaties. Soviets requested emergency meeting this summer to discuss U.S. announcement it would no longer observe limits of unratified SALT II Treaty.

The Washington Times

launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] in Western Europe.

The move was opposed by leftists in Europe and the Soviets who, after failing to block it, stormed out of the superpower negotiations in Geneva in November 1983.

There are 108 single-warhead Pershing IIs stationed in West Germany, and 40 four-warhead GLCM launchers reportedly have been deployed out of a planned 116. The Pershing II has a range of 1,080 miles; the GLCM has a 1500-mile range.

The two nations began meeting again in March 1985, with the Soviets eventually dropping their demand that British and French independent nuclear forces be included in any agreement.

SS-20s are fast-flying ballistic missiles," Mr. Holmes said. "The cruise missiles are a slow-flying retaliatory force."

According to several sources, the Penfagon has argued stringently for a mix of the two weapons systems, while State Department officials have said NATO can do without the Pershings.

"If they did, that was in one of the lower-level policy discussions," the administration official said. "The administration policy right now would not afford total reduction of the Pershings."

- A global agreement that includes the Soviet Asian force.

The SS-20s are "mobile — bloody well mobile," the official said, noting that without a global agreement, the Soviets could merely move their missiles from Asia to Europe in wartime.

However, the U.S. demand that the Soviets cut from 513 warheads in Asia to 100 "means we're sitting at the table and we're turning to Mr. Soviet and saying, 'We want you to reduce by 80 percent,'" the official said.

The Soviets reportedly have resisted the offer. The official said U.S. negotiators may consider lesser

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FORWARD DEFENSE OR MAGINOT LINE?

The Maritime Strategy and Its Alternatives

SETH CROPSEY

In 1977, perhaps the low point for America's military after the fall of Vietnam, Admiral Thomas Hayward was faced with a dilemma. As Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, he had the responsibility for keeping open our sea lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; for protecting the approaches to Japan, Korea, and the four other nations in Asia with which we had mutual defense agreements; and for preserving our access to vital raw materials. He faced a growing Soviet Pacific fleet with almost as many ships as the entire U.S. Navy. Access to the U.S.-built port facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam would free the Soviet fleet of its greatest limitation, geography, by giving it direct entree to the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, Admiral Hayward's own fleet was steadily shrinking: from 503 ships in 1968 to 216 in 1977. In the event of a war with the Soviet Union, U.S. strategy called for "swinging" some of our naval assets from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

Given the growing size and capability of the Soviet Navy, and the limited forces at his command, Admiral Hayward had reason to question whether the United States could fulfill its treaty commitments and maintain wartime communications with Asia. Given the political climate, he had reason to doubt that more capabilities would be forthcoming any time soon.

During these lean years, U.S. military leaders were often tempted to direct their planning toward a future when new technologies and generous budgets would restore the credibility of America's defenses. But the long run is not much use to a theater commander. So Admiral Hayward assembled a group of bright young officers and set them the task of considering ways to use *existing* U.S. naval forces more effectively.

Their conclusion: the United States, while a defensive power, had to be ready to seize the initiative in the event that the Soviet Union started a war. If Soviet leaders saw that our Navy would not just wait in the vast reaches of the Pacific for attacks on our communications or allies, but would directly threaten Soviet military assets, including Pacific ports such as Petropavlovsk, they might well reevaluate the risks of aggression.

Lines of communication between the western and eastern Soviet Union are long and fragile. By crippling Soviet Pacific naval power at its vulnerable source, the U.S. Navy would be able to resupply its Asian allies and guarantee the flow of raw materials without so formidable a threat from a powerful Soviet fleet. At the same time, such a "forward" strategy would also occupy Soviet forces that might otherwise be redeployed to Europe, and demonstrate resolve to our Asian allies and the People's Republic of China. In short, by deploying forward and striking decisively, the United States could magnify the effect of its naval forces, whatever their size.

Admiral Hayward came to Washington as Chief of Naval Operations in 1978. His ideas on strategy have since been expanded, and for good reason. Besides the Black and Baltic seas, the Soviet Union has major fleets at its eastern and northwestern extremes. Both areas—vastly separated from one another, and from the heart of Europe—offer valuable chances to divert Soviet attention from their strength at NATO's central front. The forward strategy concept applies not only to the Pacific but includes as well the threat to hold at risk the Soviet northern fleet in its home ports on the Kola Peninsula in the Barents Sea. The sum of these strategic ideas forms the nucleus of what the Navy today calls the Global Maritime Elements of U.S. Military Strategy (hereafter, the maritime strategy).

Geopolitics for an Island

When Soviet Vice Admiral K. Stalbo recently accused the United States of basing its maritime strategy on "the reactionary theory of geopolitics," he was, name-calling aside, mostly correct. The central tenets of our maritime strategy were ordained millions of years ago, when the Western Hemisphere split off from Eurasia to form a separate island. Free passage of the seas has always been, for our island nation, a basic requirement of national defense: twice, in 1812 and 1917, we went to war to secure it.

The two world wars of this century impressed upon the United States yet another geopolitical fact of life: the domination of Europe or Asia's rimland by a hostile power

SETH CROPSEY is deputy undersecretary of the Navy.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

FORWARD DEFENSE . . . CONTINUED

poses an unacceptable danger to our own security. Rather than wait for that danger to menace our own shores, today we defend forward at freedom's outer boundaries, and we defend in coalition with other free nations.

It is curious, when oceans separate the United States from most of its allies and forward-deployed forces, that the distinction is nevertheless sometimes made between a "maritime" and a "coalition" strategy. The *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* is aptly named: it is a maritime coalition, just as the Warsaw Pact, named for an inland city, is a coalition of land powers. A conflict between these two alliances would inevitably be decided on land. Just as inevitably, if the U.S. and allied navies were defeated, it would be decided against us. More than 90 percent of all the materiel needed to fight a land war in Europe would have to go by sea; a single mechanized division requires more than 1,000 tons delivered each day to sustain operations. Unless the United States and its allies can secure the seas, we cannot survive on land. To secure the seas, we must acquire and maintain maritime superiority.

The requirement of maritime superiority is no innovation of the Reagan Administration. It has been a basic element of U.S. military strategy since World War II. For the first quarter of a century after World War II, though, maritime superiority was seldom debated; it was simply assumed. At the end of the war, the United States had 5,718 ships in its fleet, including 98 aircraft carriers, 23 battleships, 72 cruisers, and over 700 destroyers and destroyer escorts. The second and third largest navies in the world belonged to our allies, Great Britain and Canada, while the Soviet Navy was little more than a coastal defense force. With such a preponderance of force, we hardly needed a maritime strategy; indeed, strategic thinking within the Navy tended to atrophy during these years.

But gradually this naval capital was used up. By 1977, the U.S. fleet had declined to around 460 ships; the fleets of our Western allies had shrunk drastically as well; and the largest navy in the world belonged to the Soviet Union. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was able to use its maritime superiority to achieve its political aims without bloodshed. Just over a decade later, when it appeared that the Soviets might intervene directly in the 1977 Arab-Israeli war, the U.S. Navy found itself "at a distinct disadvantage" with respect to a formidable Soviet Mediterranean fleet. And in 1981, the Chief of Naval Operations publicly acknowledged that the United States had lost its margin of maritime superiority over the Soviet Union: fulfilling, at least in part, Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov's 1968 prediction that "sooner or later, the United States will have to understand it no longer has mastery of the seas."

The metamorphosis of the Soviet Navy into a modern, ocean-going fleet stands out even in a time that has witnessed dramatic growth in Soviet military might. Today, although (due to its carrier fleet) the United States continues to enjoy a narrow margin of superiority in naval tonnage, the Soviet Navy has almost three times as many ships as the U.S. Navy, and maintains both a numerical and tonnage lead in several important categories. A significant portion of the Soviet Navy is likewise relatively new: during the last decade, the Soviets have introduced into their

fleet 13 new classes of submarines; the world's largest and most powerful battle cruiser (the "Kirov" class); a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft carrier (the "Kiev" class); and a modern strike bomber (the "Backfire"). The Soviet's first conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) carrier should appear on the seas before the end of this decade. This new carrier fleet will further ease the once formidable limits imposed by geography on Soviet naval power: limits already partly overcome by expanded Soviet naval facilities in Vietnam, Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, and Cuba.

By deploying forward and striking decisively, the United States could magnify the effect of its naval forces, whatever their size.

Confronted with the 1970s shrinkage of our own and allied fleets and the growth of Soviet naval power, and constrained by the post-Vietnam distaste for defense spending, U.S. strategists first tried to assume away the problem. Planning scenarios were revised: U.S. forces were now, theoretically, to be prepared to fight a one-and-a-half theater war rather than a two-and-a-half theater war (as if our experience in Korea and Vietnam had not exposed the fallacy of the "half war"). Naval forces already inadequate to protect the Pacific sea lanes were programmed to "swing" to the Atlantic in the event of a general war.

By the end of this past decade, these comfortable assumptions lay in shambles. The swing strategy had relegated the Indian and Pacific Oceans to relative insignificance, or at least had presumed their relative security. But the oil crisis, the fall of the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the growing economic significance of Asia to the United States—in 1984 our trade with the Pacific nations exceeded our trade with Western Europe by \$26 billion—demonstrated the growing importance of this region. Meanwhile, the rapid transformation of the Soviet Navy called into question our ability to defend these interests. And the Soviet naval buildup on the Kola Peninsula (including approximately two-thirds of the Soviet Navy's modern attack submarines and combat ships) ensured that a reverse swing strategy—from Atlantic to Pacific—would be just as unworkable.

The combination of growing threats and shrinking resources did, however, serve to strengthen U.S. defenses in one important respect. It resurrected serious debate over how (and not just whether) U.S. military power could be successfully applied, and thus created a favorable climate for strategic reform.

While the reformers' recommendations varied widely and conflicted frequently, they were based on a common assumption: the United States and its allies could no longer rely on raw preponderance of power to defeat aggression.



Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

America fought the War of 1812 to protect freedom of the seas.

This advantage now belonged to our adversaries. In order to preserve deterrence, we had to devise a strategy for outmaneuvering and outthinking opponents we could no longer outweigh. Within the Navy—and the naval reform movement stands out for originating within a military service—this imperative led to a two-year strategic review culminating, in February 1983, with the first public presentation of the maritime strategy.

Principles of the Maritime Strategy

The maritime strategy is based, roughly, on three principles, none of them new to American defense policy and all of them of operational and simultaneous application.

First, it is a strategy for thwarting, and therefore deterring, Soviet strategy. We have a reasonably clear notion, from Soviet troop configurations, exercises, and doctrine, of how the Soviet leaders would like to fight a war in the event they decided to start one. They would favor a direct blitzkrieg through Central Europe—without distractions at sea, on their European flanks, or in other theaters—ending in a quick and decisive victory against NATO's massively outnumbered land forces, before NATO's long-run advantage in mobile resources would weigh in the balance. The assumption underlying this strategy is, of course, that the United States would be left with the alternative of nuclear war or acquiescence in Soviet domination of Europe and would choose acquiescence.

We have a reasonably clear notion, too, that while the Soviet leaders are willing to take risks, they are not willing to take great risks. To deter war, we must raise the risk that their blitzkrieg scenario will not unfold as planned. The

maritime strategy is for this reason a strategy for a global, conventional war: a strategy that refuses to hold the Soviet homeland, flanks, or interests worldwide harmless, and prepares to sustain operations, even in the event of initial setbacks on land, without resort to nuclear escalation.

Second, the maritime strategy is a strategy for a forward, coalition defense. Any American military strategy for meeting an overseas threat must begin with this fundamental choice: either defend forward, with other nations, where the threat originates; or defend back, perhaps alone, where the threat more directly challenges the homeland, citizens, or possessions of the United States. In maritime strategy, a forward defense is chosen as close as possible to the point of origin. We do not wish to wait for attacks on Western shipping that could rupture the sea lifelines on which the alliance depends for commerce and critical military reinforcement. A coalition defense translates into activity that supports nations, for example Norway, on NATO's flanks that are implicitly written off in scenarios that call for reserving U.S. naval power behind some pre-established traffic barrier such as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G.I.U.K.) gap.

As a matter of overall national strategy, the United States has chosen forward coalition defense; the same reasons that animate that choice argue for a forward, coalition-based maritime strategy as well. We wish to minimize damage to our own assets. Therefore the strategy seeks to engage an adversary as far away as possible from our own shipping. It also, to borrow a medical metaphor, seeks to neutralize the tumor before it can spread; or, more precisely, to catch a Backfire bomber on the ground or in the

FORWARD DEFENSE . . . CONTINUED

air before it releases missiles that can sink several ships. Likewise, we wish to bring maritime strength to the direct assistance of allies because their strength can then be added to our own—and not our adversary's—and because the first breach in an alliance is unlikely to be the last. The strategy refuses to cede any areas by default.

Third, the maritime strategy is a strategy for using the comparative advantages of the United States. We have long since, wisely, made the decision not to race the Soviets to the top of the numbers charts. But we must compensate for being outnumbered by taking advantage of our particular strengths.

The most obvious strength is our technological edge. In the maritime realm, our technological advantages include sophisticated sonar that can detect Soviet submarines in the open ocean; large nuclear carriers that can project power far from our shores; new computer-based defense systems, such as Aegis, that can identify and destroy hundreds of attacking ships, planes, and missiles simultaneously; a new, highly mobile capability that will allow the Marine Corps to launch amphibious high-speed assaults from beyond the view of the beach. These capabilities make it possible to strike directly at Soviet naval power: first by crippling their submarine, surface, and naval air forces; and then, if necessary, exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities ashore.

The Maritime Strategy in Operation

A more passive strategy of waiting behind some geographical point for Soviet attacks on shipping, or withholding naval forces from land attack, dulls the edge we gain from these highly capable systems. It also increases the likelihood of effective Soviet diplomatic and military pressure on countries like Japan, which produce manufactured parts critical to any sustained U.S. war effort.

Indeed, maritime capability should itself be a comparative advantage for the United States because of our advanced maritime technology and long, successful maritime tradition. Making use of that comparative advantage means making use of the Navy and Marine Corps' special strengths. These forces are highly flexible and mobile, logistically self-supporting for long periods, and—since they operate on international waters and require no potentially embarrassing permission to move across host nations' borders—more rapidly employable. In a crisis, they can enhance deterrence by moving forward, signaling preparedness and resolve; they can also be quickly and easily withdrawn. In the event of actual conflict, maritime forces can heighten our adversaries' uncertainty about where the next strike will come, and force them to diffuse resources among many possible points of attack.

The desire to negate this comparative advantage—probably more, at least for now, than to acquire it for themselves—explains the Soviet leaders' willingness to allocate vast resources to what has heretofore been a secondary element of Soviet military power. The Soviets have dedicated their greatest maritime efforts to building highly capable submarine and land-based maritime bomber forces. They have also concentrated Soviet naval strength in “bastions” surrounding the Soviet Union. This pattern of resource allocation and deployment suggests that the Soviets'

greatest fear is that, in the event of war, the United States and its allies will directly threaten Soviet assets or attack Soviet flanks. If the United States were to adopt a maritime strategy that relegated the Navy to a largely defensive role behind a self-imposed “cordon sanitaire,” the Soviet maritime strategy would already have succeeded.

“It is hardly possible to imagine anything worse.”

**Soviet naval analyst
Valentin Falin on
the maritime strategy in
an interview with *Izvestia*.**

The maritime strategy is not a battle plan. Wars are fought by theater commanders, who must be able to seize opportunities and avoid dangers as they arise, without specific timetables, tactics, or targets preordained somewhere inside the Washington Beltway. Nothing is more unpredictable than war, especially for a nation whose defense policy begins with the premise that somebody else will start the shooting.

At the same time, commanders cannot intelligently take initiative in a strategic vacuum. They must understand what they are trying to accomplish, and in roughly what order. The maritime strategy offers this guidance by dividing operations into three parts: Phase I, “deterrence or transition to war”; Phase II, “seizing the initiative”; and Phase III, “carrying the fight to the enemy.”

The disjunctive in Phase I's title, “deterrence or transition to war,” is quite deliberate. Strategic theoreticians have strained to distinguish between a “deterrence” and a “war fighting” policy. But deterrence, especially in the time of heightened crisis presumed by Phase I, may well depend on convincing Soviet leaders who are actively debating the immediate use of force that the United States is not just prepared, but actually preparing, to counter aggression. Soviet military doctrine relies heavily on what Admiral Gorshkov has called “the battle for the first salvo”; the quick, decisive blow struck before the adversary can fully collect his forces or even his thoughts. In Phase I, U.S. maritime forces would demonstrate that they will not be caught off guard.

During Phase I, maritime forces would move forward globally. Reserve call-ups would begin. Attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft would deploy forward, driving Soviet submarines back into their “bastions” along the Soviet coast—and away from the sea lines along which American troops and materiel might soon be moving. Carrier battle groups hitherto operating independently would marry up into groups of three or four, moving forward as well. Marine amphibious forces would embark; a Marine amphibious brigade might also be airlifted to join its repositioned equipment in Norway.

FORWARD DEFENSE . . . CONTINUED

Along with the possibility of a forward movement in the Pacific, the maritime strategy attaches great importance to the long neglected task of securing NATO's northern flank. Were the Soviets to seize control of Norway and its surrounding seas, their aircraft and submarines would gain a position 1,000 miles closer to our sea lanes. From there, they could quite possibly cut off communications with Denmark and the Low Countries and force their surrender as well.

By preparing to meet an assault on the northern flank, however, we would seek not only to preclude this strategic disaster, but also to signal our solidarity with NATO ally Norway (and implicitly with other exposed allies on NATO's flanks), and to divert Soviet ground and air forces mobilizing for battle on the Central Front. It should be noted that one 17,000-man Marine Amphibious Brigade, using the cover provided by bad weather and difficult terrain to harass an invading force, could potentially tie up many times that number of Soviet troops.

Wars are fought by theater commanders who must be able to seize opportunities and avoid dangers as they arise, without specific timetables, tactics, or targets preordained somewhere inside the Washington Beltway.

The greatest challenge of Phase I, however, is not military but political. Moving maritime forces forward, calling up the reserves, and dispatching Marines would require quick decisions from political leaders understandably reluctant to face accusations of "warmongering." The Soviet leaders, whose strategy emphasizes deception and surprise, would do everything possible to reinforce these accusations and stall decisive mobilization.

But with the onset of war and Phase II, the question becomes rather how to seize back the initiative that an aggressor has already acquired. Our strategy provides for maritime forces to move forward on the offensive, destroying Soviet naval forces on the open seas, neutralizing Soviet clients, if necessary (for example, as 85 percent of our fuel and other logistics would have to come out of the Gulf of Mexico and pass through the 60-mile Straits of Florida, an actively hostile Cuba could pose a major threat), and moving closer to Soviet strongholds. An active defense of strategic chokepoints, such as the G.I.U.K. gap, would be coupled with an aggressive anti-submarine and anti-air forward offensive to keep Soviet naval forces preoccupied with self-defense, and to clear the way, if appropriate, for further forward movements of amphibious forces or carrier battle groups.

Two controversial issues should be clarified here: the strategy's disposition toward Soviet ballistic missile submarines; and the use, and usefulness, of large aircraft carriers in a conflict with the Soviet Union.


Throwing Away Our Advantage

Maritime strategy grabbed the headlines in January 1986, when then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins stated that it could provide for attacks on Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Immediately, the cry went up that the United States was upsetting the balance of mutual assured destruction by threatening Soviet strategic reserve forces. There have been some fears that this could escalate a conventional war into a nuclear one. The trouble with this argument is that the Soviets have long since indicated their intention, in the event of war, to attack U.S. ballistic missile submarines as well as forward-deployed land-based missile sites and airfields housing nuclear capable aircraft. Their strategy appears aimed not at preserving the nuclear "correlation of forces," but rather at altering it. Our strategy is aimed at convincing the Soviets that their strategy will not work, thereby reducing their incentive to escalate into nuclear war.

The debate over strategic anti-submarine warfare is relatively recent; not so the debate over the future of the aircraft carrier. Since the mid-1920s, their opponents have argued that carriers are expensive and vulnerable, and that their capabilities can be reproduced more cheaply on land. But actual combat experience has always rescued the carrier from its anticipated demise. In World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, carriers proved a highly flexible and effective means of projecting power against a distant adversary.

Today, with the deployment of such superbly capable weapon systems as the F-14 fighter, the new F/A-18 strike-fighter, the SSN-688 attack submarines, and the Aegis cruiser, carriers are more lethal and less vulnerable than ever before. (In recent exercises in the Norwegian Sea, hundreds of "orange" aircraft with capabilities similar to the best Soviet forces were unable to achieve a single hit on two carrier battle groups.) Some have argued that too many of the carrier's assets are dedicated to self-defense, but this demonstrates a confusion of terms. When a carrier battle group destroys a Backfire bomber in "self-defense," it eliminates a major threat to shipping, airbases, and troops fighting on land. Indeed, attracting and destroying Soviet naval assets is part of the carrier's job; in the words of Winston Churchill, "warships are meant to go under fire."

This does not mean, however, that theater commanders would blithely send \$2 billion carriers steaming into the waters surrounding the Kola or Kamchatka peninsulas before Soviet forces defending these bastions had been substantially reduced. Carriers would probably play their most vital offensive role in Phase III, after this attrition was largely complete and we were "carrying the fight to the enemy." In this phase, we would press home the initiative: completing the destruction of Soviet naval forces; supporting the land and air campaigns with carrier-based aircraft, naval artillery, and conventional cruise missiles; sending amphibious forces to take or retake territory; and, of course, continuing to keep the sea lines of communication



Courtesy of the Library of Congress

German submarine warfare and the sinking of the *Lusitania* were primary reasons for American entry into World War I.

(SLOCs) open. Our aim would be to end the war on favorable terms. Victory at sea, by guaranteeing continued replenishment of U.S. forward-deployed troops and allies, would confront Soviet leaders with the prospect of trying to match a fully mobilized U.S. economy.

Territory seized on Soviet flanks would serve as a bargaining chip for Soviet withdrawal from allied territory. In the not unlikely event of a stalemate on land, maritime forces might well prove the necessary “makeweight” for achieving a satisfactory negotiating peace.

Floating Picket Fence

The principal alternative to the “maritime strategy” is what may be called the “Magenot Sealine” strategy, which rejects an aggressive forward posture, and instead proposes reserving U.S. maritime strength behind more easily defended barriers, such as the G.I.U.K. gap. Its proponents argue that a more defensive strategy would reduce the cost of our maritime forces—most notably by reducing the requirement for large aircraft carriers—while still providing the necessary support for U.S. sealift to our forward-deployed troops and allies.

There are a number of problems with this approach, many of them alluded to already. A Magenot Sealine strategy that relieved Soviet naval forces of the necessity to defend their bastions would free those forces to attack our allies’ SLOCs.

A Magenot Sealine strategy would also throw away much of our comparative military advantage. It would allow the Soviets to escape from the geographic confines of the remote and vulnerable Kola and Kamchatka peninsulas. It would negate our edge in anti-submarine warfare by, in essence, using our shipping to attract Soviet subma-

rines, rather than tracking *them* down thousands of miles from the SLOCs. It would threaten alliance cohesion by ceding Norway to the Soviets—for without carrier-based air support, a Marine amphibious landing would be too hazardous—and probably Japan and Korea as well. And ironically, given the claims of its proponents, a Magenot Sealine strategy would actually require a large, albeit different kind of, Navy: more on the order of the Navy we built to fight World War II. For if threats to shipping are not to be defeated forward, then the shipping itself must be heavily protected by submarines, aircraft, and surface escorts . . . lots and lots of them. This alternative would not be cheap.

A Navy equipped to accomplish only this defensive mission would, moreover, be a Navy ill-equipped for intervention in the Third World: a less challenging but more likely role, as recent events in Libya have shown. To project power far from our own shores we need large, self-sustaining aircraft carriers and highly capable amphibious forces. A Magenot Sealine strategy, then, would require us either to write off some American interests and commitments—in conformity with the criticism that our defenses are overextended—or to acquire, in effect, two navies, which together would be far larger and more expensive than the multitask 600-ship Navy required to implement the maritime strategy.

Since navies have existed, the successful ones have all been employed aggressively or as we say today, “forward deployed.” The Athenians raided the ships of Spartan allies who lived at the eastern shore of the Aegean; Francis Drake implored Queen Elizabeth to allow him to attack Phillip’s Armada off the Spanish, not the English, coast; Nelson roamed the entire span of the North Atlantic to

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find and destroy the French fleet. There is no point in building an instrument of national policy as expensive and mobile as a fleet only to use it as a floating picket fence several miles off one's coast.

Its critics have freely dubbed the maritime strategy an elaborate rationale for President Reagan's naval buildup. But as the brief history at the beginning of this article indicated, the strategy's basic framework not only antedated the Reagan Administration, but developed (along with the Navy's goal of 600 ships, established in 1981) in an environment of shrinking resources. Navy planners realized that the maritime threat from the Soviet Union could only grow. They also realized that the halcyon postwar days of a huge Navy are over. In developing an aggressive forward strategy, in planning to seize the initiative and make every extra capability count, in acquiring a flexible and technologically sophisticated fleet, Navy reformers sought a way to achieve maximum gains with a minimum force.

The Navy reformers likewise sought to discipline and direct Navy procurement decisions. At a time when new technologies were dramatically increasing the capability and cost of weapons systems, the Navy needed a "so what?" standard for choosing among new ideas. "How does it fit into our maritime strategy?" became that standard. The heightened emphasis on aircraft strike warfare, standoff weapons, and amphibious lift capability in the Navy, for example, grew out of the strategy's requirements.

Maritime exercises, too, gained new realism and precision from the development of an explicit maritime strategy. Today carrier battle groups exercise, as they would

fight, in groups of two or more. Recent exercises have also tested the feasibility of operating carrier battle groups in and near the actual areas they would be employed in combat. These exercises in turn help refine the Navy's procurement priorities; for example, greater emphasis on the low-frequency end of towed array sonar.

By highlighting strategic requirements, the maritime strategy has also provided an impetus toward greater inter-service cooperation. Since 1982, the Navy has signed three memoranda of agreement, with the Air Force, Coast Guard, and Army respectively, outlining reforms to improve the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of joint operations. For example, in major joint exercises, Air Force AWACS are now used to direct Navy F-14 aircraft—enabling the Navy to extend further its combat air patrol.

Finally, the maritime strategy has infused the Navy with a shared sense of purpose, fostering cohesion among the sometimes squabbling air, submarine, and surface Navy "unions." Today every officer and indeed every sailor can understand how naval forces will be used and to what purpose. So can Congress, which is a much better explanation for the Navy's success in gaining legislative support for its program than its much vaunted lobbying power.

And so can the leadership of the Soviet Union. In January 1986, *Izvestia* published an interview with Soviet naval analyst Valentin Falin. His subject was the maritime strategy. His conclusion: "It is hardly possible to imagine anything worse." Immediately, proudly, this quote was tacked up on Navy bulletin boards around the globe. The maritime strategy had grabbed the attention of our formidable adversary. It was intended to. ■

MEDIA PERSPECTIVES

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4 OCTOBER 1986

Pg. 4

Donaldson says the White House choreographs the news

Speakes speaks out

Presidential press spokesman says presidential news conferences have outlived their usefulness; says most 'front-line' reporters don't attend

By James E. Roper

White House press spokesman Larry Speakes says the presidential news conference has outlived its usefulness.

"The televised news conference simply does not satisfy the president, the press or the public," Speakes says. "It has outgrown itself."

The declaration came during a panel discussion at the Times Mirror's Washington Forum, which examined news coverage from the nation's capital.

In complaining about the presidential news conferences as now conducted, Speakes said: "Except for the front-row reporters from the networks, most of the reporters there are not the front-line reporters. They are back at their offices watching on tv."

"We have searched for the best way for an exchange between the president and the press. We've tried one-on-one interviews, six-on-one interviews, even off-the-record cocktail sessions late in the afternoon."

Another panelist, ABC White House correspondent Sam Donaldson, argued back: "I think they've tried to find the safest way to package the president. The televised, half-hour news conference is about the only time the public gets to see Ronald Reagan use his mind. If you take that away, all you'll see of Ronald Reagan or his successor will be reading a speech."

"He reads a speech — he was trained for 45 years — like a gangbuster, but that's not what we're looking for."

Others on the panel were Jody Powell, press secretary to President Jimmy Carter; Theodore C. Soren-

son, special counsel to President John F. Kennedy; Jack Nelson, Washington bureau chief for the *Los Angeles Times*; and Tom DeFrank, White House correspondent for *Newsweek* magazine.

The discussion developed a theme that the White House under Carter and Reagan tried to manage the flow of news to benefit the president. This tactic was blamed for much of the conflict between the press and the White House public information staff.

Donaldson thought the real reason the White House staff keeps the president from the press is that he "would help destroy the line of the day."

"They decide every morning what story they want, particularly on tv, from the White House; then they admit us to this meeting and not to that meeting, to this ceremony but not that ceremony."

By the end of the day, Donaldson said, reporters have information about the story the White House wants covered on the evening tv news, but don't have information about a story the network news directors might prefer.

Neither Speakes nor Powell challenged this analysis.

Powell said presidents have an impulsive way of answering questions so unless the press is kept away from the president "he is going to answer the question, and it does muck up what you are trying to get across that day."

"Almost every politician and press secretary learns that unless you plan carefully, unless you carefully control the flow of information, you end up getting your brains beat out," Powell continued. "The way journalism

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CURRENT NEWS EARLY BIRD EDITION



FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1986

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WASHINGTON POST

17 OCTOBER 1986

Pg. 25

U.S. Radar Planes May Patrol Afghan Border, Says Weinberger

Aircraft Would Fill In Until Pakistan Is Provided Similar System

By Molly Moore
Washington Post Staff Writer

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Oct. 16—Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said today that the United States may send radar-bearing planes on short-term surveillance patrols of the troubled Pakistan-Afghanistan border until Pakistan can obtain its own air warning system.

Weinberger, after two days of meetings, said the discussion included "a number of possibilities" for helping Pakistan in its border defense and "has not ruled out any-

thing," including air patrols with U.S. crews.

U.S. officials here said such patrols, if initiated, would be used only on an interim basis until the Pakistani government can obtain its own permanent air surveillance system. The Air Force's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) provides long-distance surveillance, so that the planes would not need to be close to the border zone.

Although the two nations have not yet agreed on what type of advanced air warning system the United States will provide, Weinberger said it should "get this ca-

pability in the hands of Pakistan as quickly as possible."

In a separate news conference, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo said purchase of an AWACS, the most sophisticated American system, will be his nation's top priority in negotiating a proposed six-year, \$1.8 billion U.S. military aid package. He said Soviet-backed air attacks and incursions in the border area tripled from last year to more than 600 incidents in the first nine months of 1986.

Junejo, on another issue, criticized the Stinger ground-to-air missiles provided by the United States

in its first military aid package to Pakistan.

"We would like to have better missiles—we haven't been able to have good results," said Junejo, noting that Pakistani troops have been unable to down intruding aircraft with them. Afghan resistance forces have said, however, that Pakistan used Stingers to down two Afghan jets early this year but that the planes crashed in Afghanistan.

Weinberger, addressing a press conference today, made a gaffe on

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NEW YORK TIMES

17 OCTOBER 1986

Pg. 1

'87 SPENDING BILL PASSES INITIAL TEST IN VOTE IN SENATE

By JONATHAN FUE' BRINGER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 — The Senate today gave initial approval to a \$576 billion comprehensive appropriation bill for 1987, as Congress pushed to finish its work for the year.

But the compromise package, approved by a voice vote, is still subject to amendment and the Senate immediately bogged down in angry disagreement when an amendment was offered to delete a \$151 million appropriation for the T-46A jet trainer, which is built on Long Island by the Fairchild Republic Company.

The two Senators from New York, Alfonse M. D'Amato, a Republican, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat, served notice they would filibuster the

move to delete the money for the aircraft. Mr. D'Amato, in a display of his intent to keep talking, said he was even prepared to miss the opening game of the World Series between the New York Mets and the Boston Red Sox Saturday and offered to give his tickets to the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee.

Other Congressional Action

The comprehensive appropriation bill is one of the few major pieces of legislation standing between Congress and adjournment. Many lawmakers are eager to leave because their reelection campaigns have already been dramatically shortened.

As Congress moved to wind up its work for the year, there were these other developments:

¶ Presidential advisers' resistance to a \$9 billion toxic cleanup program softened. [Page A24.]

The Senate approved and sent to the President a clean water bill, which strengthens protections and authorizes

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Japan lauds Weinberger China visit

By Edward Neilan
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

the paper said.

TOKYO — Asian analysts are hailing U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's visit to China last week as bolstering Sino-American ties at a most opportune moment.

Several Japanese-language newspapers, after struggling to make sense of the Iceland summit aftermath, have published editorials praising the Weinberger mission for improving ties in all areas, not just defense.

The English-language Japan Times lauded the decision, formally announced at Mr. Weinberger's meeting with top Chinese leaders, to send a three-ship squadron from the Pacific fleet to Qingdao early next month.

"This first visit by U.S. warships to a Chinese port since the 1949 communist takeover of the mainland, is indeed very symbolic of the expanding of overall relations between Peking and Washington," an editorial in

Japan is very sensitive about its own ties with China and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone will be visiting Peking Nov. 8-9 to enhance the relationship.

One Western military analyst here said, "It is comforting to the Japanese that U.S. warships will now be visiting China as well as Japan, while Soviet warships are so far not welcome in Chinese ports."

The Japan Times editorial said, "even today, nothing would more impressively demonstrate a close relationship between two nations than the exchange of port calls by warships flying ensigns, a protocol practice which dates back to the days of tall ships."

China is known to disapprove of a recent increase in visits by Soviet warships to North Korean ports. North Korea recently invited China to send its warships on a visit, but

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Cutting A-Arms: Safer or More Dangerous World?

By BERNARD E. TRAINOR

Most discussions on arms control take for granted that a reduction in nuclear weapons is a desirable goal and that the greater the reduction the greater the benefits to mankind.

But some arms experts question the value of any agreement, such as the United States and the Soviet Union discussed at their Iceland meeting, that would dramatically change the level of nuclear weapons. If the elimination of nuclear weapons is not accompanied by a rebalancing of conventional forces, they say, the world could become more dangerous, not safer.

These experts point out that however dangerous the current strategy of mutual assured destruction appears, it has effectively kept the peace. It has also provided a background of stability against which overall American-Soviet relations have been conducted.

The numbers of nuclear weapons are not that important, these experts argue, because numbers do not determine the probability that such weapons would be used. Their use depends on either a deliberate decision or a technical accident. In a world filled with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the quality of technical safeguards is more important than the numbers.

Threat of Destabilization

As the nuclear weapons diminish in number, however, those remaining become more precious for each side. According to this argument, the deeper the cuts, the greater the threat of destabilization. Deep cuts may be politically popular and even psychologically necessary, but they may not be strategically sound for either side.

The same logic applies to the testing of nuclear weapons, the experts say. If underground nuclear tests are stopped, some procedure for testing weapons may still be desirable to guarantee their effectiveness. A lack of testing could lead both sides to worry about the reliability of their arsenals. The resulting nervousness, critics of a test ban argue, could foster new instability.

The effect on conventional defenses, particularly from the viewpoint of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is of critical importance in any reduction or elimination of nuclear ballistic weapons.

The nuclear posture of the United States, both in long-range weapons and medium-range missiles such as the Pershing 2's in Western Europe, results from a decision in the early days of NATO to substitute nuclear weapons for conventional forces in the defense of Western Europe.

The NATO allies felt unwilling or unable to deploy adequate ground and air forces to credibly deter the Soviet bloc. Nuclear weapons and the threat of their use provided an economical alternative to more costly conventional forces. That remains true today, as American nuclear forces account for only about one-fifth of the military budget.

For the security of the world to be enhanced by the elimination of strategic ballistic and cruise missiles within 10 years, as discussed in Iceland, there should also be some agreement between East and West on their conventional forces. Experts say the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies now have a conventional superiority of forces. Without the threat of nuclear retaliation, NATO would be hard put to stop a Warsaw Pact attack.

Talks on Conventional Arms

Since 1973 representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been meeting in Vienna in what are called the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, aimed at cutting back the deployment of troops, tanks, artillery and other conventional weapons. The talks have yet to come up with a formula that would provide adequate security for both sides in Europe.

In the absence of an agreement balancing these opposing forces, NATO would need to increase its conventional forces substantially to match the Warsaw Pact. In effect NATO would face the same problem it faced at its inception, when it chose nuclear weapons over large conventional forces.

Most military experts feel that removing the United States nuclear umbrella might undermine Western Europe's security.

Conventional Forces in Europe: The NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance

Figures show 1985-1986 estimates of forces in place in Europe

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Aircraft (includes fighters, interceptors, and ground attack craft)	3,218	5,736
Main battle tanks	20,333	52,600
Artillery	9,414	30,500
Antitank guns and missile launchers	2,590	7,902
Antiaircraft guns	5,654	4,506
Surface-to-surface missile launchers	365	1,570
Surface-to-air missiles	880	5,808
Division equivalents *	33	78½
Troops deployed in Europe (excluding naval)	2,088,000	2,685,000

* Warsaw Pact divisions normally have fewer people than many NATO divisions but have more tanks and artillery, thus representing similar combat power

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies

The West Europeans have worried that the United States might be afraid to risk its own destruction by using its strategic nuclear weapons on their half if war broke out. This concern prompted Britain and France to create an independent nuclear ability. Uncoupling strategic nuclear weapons from NATO's defenses could adversely affect its flexible strategy.

If strategic nuclear weapons were eliminated without a compensating reduction in the preponderance of Soviet bloc forces, experts fear that it would lead to the end of the NATO alliance as it now exists. The presence of tactical and short-range nuclear weapons, including nuclear artillery, might not be enough to deter a Soviet-led invasion.

Theoretically, NATO could enlarge its conventional forces. But many military and political analysts say the allies would be no more likely to spend more or increase their troop strength than they were in the early 1950's.

A buildup of conventional NATO forces could also be viewed as a threat by the Warsaw Pact, prompting the

Soviet Union to consider a pre-emptive attack without fear of American nuclear retaliation against its homeland. This possibility could lead the West European nations into accommodation with the Soviet bloc. The United States could conceivably be invited to remove its troops from Europe.

If NATO did break up, Britain and France would probably seek to maintain their separate nuclear forces, and these forces would be more valuable than ever to their security. The Soviet Union is unlikely to disarm while accepting the continued existence of independent French and British nuclear forces, to say nothing of the nuclear missiles of China.

Despite the assumption that the world would be safer without nuclear weapons, their removal does not remove international antagonisms that threaten peace. Without the restraining influence of the threat of nuclear holocaust, implicit in nuclear weapons, the likelihood of conventional war might rise dramatically.

PLANES...from Pg. 1

the sensitive subject of reports that U.S. Stingers and other weapons have been funneled through Pakistan to the Afghan guerrillas battling Soviet troops.

Neither the United States nor Pakistan has publicly confirmed those reports. But Weinberger, when asked if the Pakistani government has delayed delivery of American weapons to the rebels, responded, "There isn't the slightest suggestion I've had [that] there's any holdup in delivery of American aid or weapons systems."

He added, "The Pakistan government has every reason in the world to want to assist the mujaheddin

[resistance fighters] as much as possible."

At that statement, Weinberger's public affairs assistant, Robert Sims, jumped from his chair and slipped the defense secretary a note. At the end of the press conference, after consulting with Sims, Weinberger said he had intended to respond that there was no holdup of U.S. aid "in helping with the refugee problem" or in delivery of U.S. aid to the Pakistani military, not the guerrillas.

Sims later said Weinberger misunderstood the question.

Weinberger denied reports that the United States has supplied Stinger missiles to the Afghan reb-

els through Pakistan. He also disputed Junejo's charge that the Stinger has been ineffective. "There were a few problems with the Stinger due to lack of sufficient training at the beginning. We believe it is now working very well," the defense secretary said.

But Junejo said the training of Pakistani troops still is inadequate and noted, "even after firing, we couldn't get them [the intruding aircraft] down."

The Stingers, along with a fleet of F16 fighters and other U.S. weapons systems, have been used by Pakistan in an effort to prevent intrusions by Afghan forces fighting the rebels in the border area.

Pakistan officials said that without an early warning system, those weapons are frequently ineffective against incoming aircraft, which have bombed and strafed Afghan refugee camps near the border. They said the rugged mountain terrain along with border renders traditional radar devices almost useless.

Weinberger said an advanced air warning system is "vitaly needed" by Pakistan but that the two nations had not decided which one. Pakistani officials have said the AWACS is its first choice but that they may be forced to settle for a smaller, less costly system. U.S. officials have said they are not prepared to sell Pakistan the most advanced version.

Kenneth L. Adelman

Current
Policy
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Arms Control and Openness



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva, Switzerland, February 5, 1987.

Two years ago, when I first addressed the Conference on Disarmament, Donald Lowitz [U.S. Representative to the CD] sat by my side here; he was serving as your president that month. Since then, you have had the good fortune to know Don as I've known him for my adult life: a warm and wonderful person, who served his country whenever called upon—and who believed in this conference and its goals and who believed in all of you. You saw this side of Don. I had seen him as a marvelous husband to Shana—herself such a perfect embodiment of what's fresh and caring about America—as a fabulous father to Amy, Teddy, and Josh and a loving grandfather to David. How they will all miss him. How we will all miss him.

I understand that you have already heard President Reagan's tribute to Don. Let us, as the President said, pursue the goals Don pursued and, by so doing, give living monument to his work here. I would like now to convey to you the President's greetings at the opening of this session.

As the Conference on Disarmament resumes its work in 1987, I would like to extend my wishes for a productive session. Although the opening of the conference has been shadowed by the sad and untimely loss of our Ambassador, Donald Lowitz, I am

certain we can join together in making progress in this forum as a fitting testimonial to his memory.

Your work constitutes an important and integral part of efforts undertaken by the international community to make our world more peaceful. The issues with which you deal are complementary to those being addressed bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. The promise of Reykjavik, which has given us the vision of a world with significantly reduced levels of nuclear weapons, has become an indicator of what is possible. It inevitably draws attention to the issues on your agenda and should encourage you in your efforts to increase international stability and cooperation.

One of the most important tasks facing you is the working out of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. This task is made even more difficult by the fact that capabilities for chemical warfare are increasing and that, contrary to international agreement, chemical weapons are being used in various parts of the world. You have a heavy responsibility. For as you consider the provisions of a treaty, you must make sure that a global ban will, in fact, eliminate the capability for chemical weapons to be used against future generations. An effective convention will require an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all states.

I reaffirm the commitment made by the United States in 1984 when we tabled our draft treaty banning chemical weapons worldwide. The United States delegation will make every effort to work for the total elimination of these terrible weapons and for the verification provisions necessary to ensure that they never again enter the arsenals of the world's armies.

Your efforts in this and in other fields are to be commended. We are committed to working with you in the vital task of bringing stability to a still insecure world and in achieving responsible solutions to the problem of reducing the world's arms.

Shift in the Arms Control Agenda

In the 2 years since I last spoke to this forum, the world has witnessed some dramatic developments in arms control. I would single out especially the remarkable meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik last October. From the U.S. perspective, Reykjavik marked a historic turning point in our arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union. Why? Because for the first time, we engaged the Soviet Union in serious negotiations—not just public initiatives but serious, hands-on negotiations—on the subject of deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

This is a goal that President Reagan has been striving for since he first proposed the "zero-zero" option for intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and deep strategic arms reductions in 1981 and 1982. At that time, you may remember, there were many people in our own country and elsewhere who argued that such ambitious arms reduction proposals had no real place in the arms control dialogue. Many claimed that these deep-cuts proposals were too far-reaching and could never be the basis for productive negotiations with the

Soviet Union. And when the Soviet Union walked out of the arms talks at the end of 1983—totally unjustifiably, I might add—many of these same critics reiterated their arguments, believing that events had vindicated their views.

But President Reagan persisted. And his persistence has paid off in a real shift in the arms control agenda. Now, at last, the two sides are talking in nuclear arms control about agreements that, if signed—and if complied with fully—would effect real and deep reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals, particularly in the most destabilizing systems. No more are we looking at arrangements like the SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] accords of the 1970s, which permitted vast growth in the arsenals of both sides—a fourfold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, (i.e. strategic ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons)—since SALT I was signed in 1972. Thanks to President Reagan's persistence, the agenda in nuclear arms control is now, irreversibly, deep offensive weapons cuts.

The Need for Openness

There is another development to which I would call your attention—a development that has occurred outside the field of arms control proper but which, if it were to come to pass, could have potentially broad ramifications for arms control and even for the deliberations of this forum. That is the increasing discussion of “openness,” of *glasnost*, in the Soviet Union. Indeed, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov addressed it here 2 days ago. It is not clear yet where this focus on openness might lead. It is not clear yet what *glasnost* is to mean or if openness in the Soviet context will be genuine openness by the standards of truly open societies. Experience warns us to temper hope with skepticism.

But we can speak conditionally. We can express hope. We can say that if this *glasnost*, this development, were ever to come to real fruition, we could very well find ourselves standing on the threshold of a new era for the cause of arms control and disarmament. For openness and arms control go together, on two levels.

First, there is a clear connection between openness and international trust, between peace and the open society. Andrey Sakharov, that great world hero and a Soviet hero, has spoken of “the indissoluble bond between international security and trust on the one hand and respect for human rights and an open society on the other.” Societies that respect the rights of their citizens, that respect freedom of speech, freedom

of religion, freedom of the press, freedom to travel and to emigrate, freedom of assembly—that defend the rights of individuals to criticize their leaders and to vote them in and out of office—such societies also keep their international treaty commitments. Such societies can be expected to behave in a fashion that promotes world peace. Such societies do not crave new territory. Such societies do not menace their neighbors. Conversely, as President Reagan said not long ago, “. . . a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.”

Second, there is a direct, practical link between openness and progress in arms control. That link lies in the problem of verification. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of what we can achieve in arms control. We can control effectively only what we can effectively verify. But verification is often directly limited, in turn, by the degree of openness permitted by the states that subscribe to an arms control agreement.

In open societies like the United States, relevant information on defense programs is readily available. That is why, when dealing with open, democratic societies, one would not have to rely exclusively on so-called national technical means of verification or elaborate verification mechanisms to verify arms agreements. I have often said that the Soviet Union could tell if we ever were engaged in violating arms agreements simply by subscribing to half-a-dozen publications—the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *Aviation Week*, and a handful of others.

That is one reason why the United States has called for greater openness in all nations. Since 1982, the United States has consistently pressed for resolutions on disarmament and openness in the UN General Assembly. In 1982, our resolution on disarmament and openness was adopted by the General Assembly. It explicitly stated the connection between advancing disarmament on the one hand, and openness, free discussion, and free dissemination of information in all nations, on the other. It encouraged all nations to advance the cause of openness as a way of advancing the cause of disarmament and arms control.

And that is my message to you today: the path to more ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gate of greater openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, the issue here “is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust and security.”

The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which is one reason why arms control remains a very difficult, very painstaking business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defense spending. In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the Soviet Union each devoted the equivalent of approximately \$250 billion to defenses. Figures on U.S. defense spending are, of course, widely available in open sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed and scrutinized in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere.

Figures for Soviet defense spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis. Why? Because published Soviet figures bear no relation to the reality of the Soviet defense effort.

The Soviet Union claims to have spent 20.3 billion rubles on defense in 1985. Assuming the official exchange rate of approximately \$1.50 per ruble, that comes to about \$35 billion. Now, that is a ridiculously small sum for the declared defense budget of a state regarded as a military superpower. It bears no relation to the \$250-billion figure I mentioned a moment ago, which suggests what it would cost the United States to mount an effort equivalent to the present Soviet defense effort. There is no way in the world that the Soviet Union could be mounting its current defense effort on its declared budget of 20.3 billion rubles. It is spending many times that.

Or again, take the public statements of the two sides on the issue of strategic defenses. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is an openly declared program. Its budget is published and voted on by the U.S. Congress. Its activities are reported to the Congress, where it is widely discussed and debated. The President of the United States often discusses this program in his speeches.

Yet to this day, even as we negotiate on defense and space issues with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union continues to deny that it has the equivalent of an SDI program. We know this denial to be false. We know that it began investigating several advanced strategic defense technologies before we did. We know it is extensively engaged in exploration and development of these technologies. We know, for example, that the Soviet Union has an extensive laser research program involving about 10,000 scientists and expenditure of resources worth approximately \$1 billion a year. And it is researching a host of other technologies as well.

Can it surprise anyone that our progress in arms control is often slow and halting when there is a lack of openness and honesty between governments about even such elementary facts as this?

Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons

There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not open the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to meaningful agreement. Thus, unless the Soviet Union moves to the openness it now talks about, accomplishments are limited, if not thwarted altogether. That movement is necessary for progress on an issue before this conference now.

Of the tasks before you, my government considers the negotiations on achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons to have the highest priority. International negotiators have been striving to remove the chemical weapons threat since the late 19th century. Here it is 1987. Nearly a century has passed since the Hague conference prohibited use of chemical projectiles in 1899. Yet the problem of chemical weapons remains. Indeed, as the world edges toward the 21st century, the chemical weapons danger continues to grow. Shockingly, we have witnessed use of chemical weapons by some nations in this decade and even during the past year.

It is high time that chemical weapons use be rendered a thing of the past. It is high time that these barbaric weapons were banished from the face of the earth. But it is obvious that if these weapons are to be banned, a thorough and effective mechanism of verification is necessary. My country will not accept, and no free nation should accept, a ban without sound machinery of verification.

A chemical weapons ban without confidence of compliance will be no more effective than the Hague conference's 1899 prohibition on use of artillery containing poison gas, which did nothing to prevent extensive use of chemical weapons in the First World War. It will be no better than so many of the misguided disarmament measures of the 1920s and 1930s, which, in Walter Lippman's famous formulation, were "tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament" while permitting aggressor nations to maintain and expand their arsenals. Until an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban is in place, the American people will insist, rightly, that the

United States maintain adequate chemical forces to deter use of these heinous weapons by an aggressor.

While the establishment of procedures for the effective verification of arms control agreements is often extremely demanding, both technologically and politically, in the case of chemical weapons the challenges are especially great.

The toxic chemicals which are or could be used as agents of warfare are, in general, not very different from a variety of substances having legitimate civilian use. Similarly, the chemical process equipment used in their production can be found in the legitimate manufacture of pesticides or corrosives. Chemical agents can be stored in bulk, facilitating transportation as well as concealment. Chemical munitions have no particular characteristics which distinguish them from other types of munitions. They, too, are small and easily transported and concealed.

Thus, as I mentioned before, the issue of openness goes to the heart of achieving a chemical weapons ban. Article III of the rolling text of the draft convention on chemical weapons requires each state party to declare whether it possesses chemical weapons. And yet, today, the United States is the only country in this room, or in the world, that publicly admits to having chemical weapons and has made public its stockpile locations. That, to me, is astonishing—especially when so many countries are pressing the urgency of a chemical weapons ban. Some are even criticizing the United States for developing chemical weapons.

The production of chemical weapons is not illegal. The use of chemical weapons is illegal. Since it signed the 1925 Geneva protocol, the United States has never used chemical weapons; others have—others who don't even publicly admit to possessing chemical weapons; others with representatives in this very room. The world expects better than this.

The United States openly declares its possession and development of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union, along with other nations, does not. The world expects better than this.

The United States has presented publicly an extraordinary amount of information concerning its binary weapons program. The details are known to everyone. The Soviet Union has told us nothing about its chemical weapons program. The world expects better than this.

The United States invited all members of this body to Tooele, Utah, to examine procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has yet to accept the invitation. The world expects better than this.

The United States will devote some \$500 million under the fiscal year 1987 defense budget to the elimination of its current chemical munitions stocks. The Soviet Union, apparently, has no similar chemical weapons elimination or demilitarization program. The world expects better than this.

The United States maintained a unilateral moratorium on the development of chemical weapons for 17 years. The Soviet Union has never ceased producing chemical weapons and continues today to expand its facilities and capabilities. The world expects better than this.

Compliance Concerns

It is because of this state of affairs, because of this glaring lack of openness in the realm of chemical weapons, that we are more than ever convinced that confidence in compliance is essential to any chemical weapons ban. We are convinced that nothing less than an inspection regime institutionalizing the right of short-notice access, upon demand, to any location or facility suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons will effectively deter noncompliance—the challenge-inspection provisions of article X of the U.S. draft conventions.

But every article of the convention must be designed to contribute to this overall objective of confidence in compliance. And to be effective, each provision must be clearly and unambiguously defined, written, and understood. It will do little good to have broad agreement on the basic provisions if inspection procedures are inadequate or imprecise.

At present, it is a point of consensus among all our governments that each state party will provide international access to its destruction sites, to its production facilities to be eliminated, and to its facilities for producing permitted chemicals. But working out precise procedures for all these tasks was only just begun by Ambassador Lowitz and his delegation. And the vital question of how to ensure confidence in compliance with regard to undeclared sites still remains at issue.

But, again and again, wherever we turn in this negotiation, it is precisely the absence of openness, the absence of *glasnost*, that is standing in the way of further progress. In the draft convention, I count no less than 13 different

types of declarations that each state party will be expected to make about its stockpiles and their destruction, about its chemical weapons production facilities and their elimination, and about its chemical industry.

Article IV is a key element in this series of declarations—calling for the declaration of all stockpiles. Everyone agrees that each state party should declare the amount and composition of its stockpile. Everyone agrees with the basic objective that the complete stockpile should be destroyed. And yet, the Soviet Union continues to reject two particular “openness” provisions which are necessary if we are to have confidence that this objective is fulfilled. One is the early and complete declaration of the stockpile locations and onsite verification to ensure that the declaration reflects reality. The second is onsite monitoring of the stocks until destruction to ensure that some weapons are not clandestinely diverted to undeclared sites before destruction. And it is obvious that we face the serious risk that a state will not declare all its stockpile locations or the entire amount of its stockpile.

The consequences of lack of openness in this realm are unfortunate and are not lost on world public opinion. I think the 1983 yearbook of the

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute identified the problem—and the solution—as well as anyone.

Faced with a high degree of uncertainty about Soviet CW intentions, Western defence authorities have no prudent option but to assume that they present a threat. If it decided to do so, the Soviet government could probably find a way for reducing the ambiguities attaching to its CW stance in Western (and non-aligned country) eyes without at the same time jeopardizing Soviet security to the point of net detriment. Yet even though the need for such mistrust-reducing measures is so evidently growing, it seems that Moscow has not chosen to act in such a manner, a failure which is becoming more and more conspicuous and damaging.

Clearly, there is a gap between the way certain states conduct business today and the way they promise they will behave under a convention banning chemical weapons. And it is simply not possible for a nation to yield national control over its own defense to an international agreement—as we will be asked to do when we have a convention ready for signature—on the basis of a mere promise of a new and better pattern of behavior by other states.

The Soviet Union says it is interested in real openness. But will its deeds in this forum match its words? We

hope so. We hope to see signs of real *glasnost*, here in this forum, in the coming weeks and months.

I believe that a turn to real *glasnost* could transform our discussion and sweep away a host of difficulties. I believe it could remove the barriers that some have attempted to erect to the inspection procedures absolutely essential to make a chemical weapons ban worth the paper it is printed on. Genuine openness, real *glasnost*, were it to emerge in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Union's dealings with the rest of the world—nothing could be more welcome to Americans. Nothing would do more to make possible progress in the relationship between our two governments. Nothing would so improve the prospects not only for real advances in arms control but for the entire cause of world peace. Nothing would be a better tribute to your dedicated and important work. Nothing would be a better monument to Donald Lowitz's work and life. ■

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Principles and Initiatives in U.S. Arms Control Policy



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs Meeting of Experts on "After Reykjavik: Planning for the Nineties," Dagomys, U.S.S.R., June 9, 1987.

I am delighted to have this opportunity to visit the Soviet Union and to participate in this UN meeting of disarmament experts. I hope that this conference will contribute to better international understanding that will lead to a lessening of tension and will encourage good arms reduction agreements.

Under President Reagan's leadership, the United States has launched a number of far-reaching arms control initiatives. These include proposals for unprecedented, deep reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms and intermediate-range nuclear forces, as well as a complete ban on chemical weapons. I will provide details of these initiatives in the course of my remarks.

First, though, I think it important to make clear that the United States does not regard arms control as an end in itself. Arms control should be viewed as a means that nations can use to enhance their security interests and to support their national interests. Indeed, to be truly effective and enduring, arms control agreements must be accompanied by respect for and compliance with all the principles and provisions of the UN Charter.

President Reagan's Broad Agenda for U.S.-Soviet Relations

As true peace is not the mere absence of war, President Reagan has observed, so, too, it is not founded merely on the absence or limitation of weapons. Arms control, for example, is but one of the four "pillars" on which the United States is seeking to build better relations with the Soviet Union. The other three fundamental objectives are:

- Resolving regional conflicts;
- Progress on bilateral issues such as "people-to-people" exchanges; and
- Advancing human rights.

The Soviet Union's involvement in regional conflicts is a critical indicator as to whether its global aims are conducive to international peace. In Angola and Nicaragua, the Soviets, through their Cuban proxies, are pouring heavy amounts of military assistance into efforts by the communist regimes to crush popular resistance and consolidate their power. In Cambodia, the Soviet Union likewise is heavily subsidizing Vietnam's military occupation. But the most disturbing example is Afghanistan, where the Soviet Army itself is waging a furious war against civilians and armed freedom fighters. Soviet involvement in these regional conflicts has a profoundly chilling effect on U.S. attitudes toward Soviet pronouncements of peaceful intentions.

The status of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the U.S.S.R. has a profound effect on East-West relations. Soviet abuse of fundamental rights is a

deep source of mistrust and suspicion. Accordingly, we are watching with great interest the recently begun phenomenon of *glasnost*, or openness. Following the recent release of some political prisoners and the relaxation of some censorship of cultural expression, we can only hope that a much greater easing of repression will take place. In our judgment, though, this will require much more than cosmetic changes. Deeds rather than just words are needed. And unless change is pursued in a deep and consistent way, those who consider the new *glasnost* as primarily a public relations campaign will have the weight of evidence with them.

If truly profound reforms and openings in the Soviet system were to come about, I can attest that our confidence in Soviet compliance with arms control agreements would become greater. The Soviets can verify U.S. compliance with agreements very simply because of the openness of our government, our economy, and virtually every other element of our society. The Soviet system offers no such inherent means for us to verify compliance or detect strategic deception. Therefore, we call for the U.S.S.R. to apply real *glasnost* to its military policies and budgets. Let the people of the Soviet Union and the world know as much about Soviet military affairs as they know about U.S. military matters.

Basic Principles of U.S. Arms Control Policy

U.S. arms control objectives are integrated with our defense and foreign policies, to enhance deterrence and stability; to reduce the risk of all war, especially nuclear war; and to support the security of our allies. Since the beginning of his Administration, President Reagan has followed these fundamental principles.

- We seek only those agreements which contribute to our security and international security.
- We seek agreements which reduce forces, not simply limit them.
- To this end, we seek agreements on broad, deep, and equitable reductions in offensive arms.
- Within the category of offensive nuclear arms, we give priority to reducing the most destabilizing weapons; that is, fast-flying, nonrecallable ballistic missiles.
- We also seek equitable arms control agreements in the areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional forces.
- We insist on agreements that can be effectively verified. Arms control agreements without effective verification provisions are worse than no agreements at all.

These principles form the basis for our efforts to bring renewed integrity to arms control. A number of past agreements, it must be recognized, were flawed in concept. These and other agreements have suffered from Soviet violations.

Problems With Past Agreements

Typical of the defects of past agreements was the SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks] Treaty of 1979. Rather than force real reductions, SALT II, in fact, sanctioned considerable increases in the number of nuclear weapons deployed on ballistic missiles and bombers. The most basic flaw of the SALT approach was that it focused on limits on "launchers" and placed only indirect and inadequate limits on ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight—the real measures of ballistic missile capability. Thus, the SALT II accord did nothing to reduce, and little even to limit, the nuclear threat. If ratified, it would have undermined the stability of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.

Imperfect as many earlier arms control agreements were, their faults were compounded by the Soviets' failure to abide by key provisions. In violation of SALT II, the Soviet Union encrypted telemetry associated with ballistic

missile testing in a manner which impeded verification. They deployed a prohibited second new type of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], the SS-25, and exceeded the numerical limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

The Soviets also violated the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement's prohibition on the use of former intercontinental ballistic missile facilities. Specifically, the Soviet Union used former SS-7 ICBM facilities to support deployment of the SS-25 mobile ICBM.

Moreover, the Soviets are violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with their facility at Krasnoyarsk. This large, phased-array radar violates the ABM Treaty because in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by the treaty.

Because of our concerns about both the poor Soviet compliance record and flaws in past agreements, the United States, since May 1986, has based decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces. President Reagan has also determined that the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union. Thus, while ensuring an adequate strategic deterrent, the United States continues to exercise the utmost restraint.

U.S. Arms Control Initiatives

Let me turn now to the current status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control. The United States has put forward far-reaching proposals that could substantially mitigate the threats now posed by strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), and chemical weapons.

We now are working to conclude an agreement for deep reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces. On April 23, negotiators resumed work in Geneva that could, if the Soviets are serious, result in a verifiable treaty on INF. We have indicated we would sign a treaty, as an interim step, which embodies the Reykjavik formula of reducing U.S. and Soviet longer range INF (LRINF) missile warheads to a global limit of 100 warheads, with none in Europe. Those remaining would be deployed in the United States and Soviet Asia.

Our ultimate goal, however, remains the complete elimination of all LRINF missile systems on a global basis. Since weapons of this type are easily moved, their complete elimination would reduce

the threat to our allies and aid in achieving effective verification.

We welcome the opportunity to discuss the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet shorter range INF (SRINF) systems, as suggested by General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow. We hope the Soviet delegation will table a proposal for discussion soon. As with LRINF, the U.S. principles for dealing with SRINF are globality and equality. These principles are essential elements of our policy, and the United States will not deviate from them.

While we welcome any stabilizing reductions of intermediate-range missiles that enhance security, it is necessary that we make progress in other areas as well, including strategic nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional forces. In 1985, at the Geneva summit, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to accelerate progress in areas of common ground, including 50% reductions of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Further progress toward this goal was made last October at Reykjavik.

In April in Prague, General Secretary Gorbachev said the reduction of strategic arms was of paramount importance and called it "the root problem" of arms control. Yet when he met a few days later with Secretary Shultz, he refused to drop his insistence that any reduction in offensive arms be linked to restrictions on testing and development of strategic defenses. These constraints are not acceptable because they would cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), our hope for a more stable deterrent based increasingly on defensive systems. One point I would like to make especially emphatic and clear to this audience of international experts is that the defensive systems President Reagan envisions through SDI threaten no one.

We challenge the Soviet leaders, therefore, to get at the "root problem"—the high levels of devastating weapons targeted against one another. For our part, the U.S. delegation in Geneva on May 8 tabled a draft START [strategic arms reduction talks] treaty to cut strategic systems by 50%, according to the Reykjavik formula. This draft treaty, in addition to the overall reductions, provides for specific restrictions on the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear systems. Moreover, our draft treaty responds to Soviet concerns over the speed of reductions by extending the period for those reductions from 5 to 7 years. Agreement on START is possible, even as soon as this year, if the Soviets are ready to move forward.

Besides action concerning INF systems and the "root problem" of strategic offensive nuclear weapons, positive movement also is needed toward redressing the conventional force imbalance and putting into effect a verifiable ban on chemical weapons. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in April 1984, the United States tabled a comprehensive treaty banning development, production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. This ban would be verified by various means, including prompt, mandatory, onsite challenge inspection. At the November 1985 Geneva summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban. Five rounds of bilateral talks on this subject have been held since then, with a sixth scheduled to begin this summer.

Regarding conventional forces, too, the United States and our allies are continuing to press for stabilizing arms control. In the talks on mutual and

balanced force reductions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has sought assiduously to meet Soviet concerns, while the Soviets have not yet responded constructively to Western initiatives. The 23 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are currently engaged in discussions to establish a new forum for addressing conventional force stability in Europe.

One encouraging development in the field of confidence building was the recent U.S.-Soviet agreement on a draft joint text to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in our respective capitals. This agreement, which is a direct result of a U.S. initiative, is a practical measure that will strengthen international security by reducing the risk of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. Yet another positive development was the adoption by the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, in September 1986, of a set of confidence-building measures, based largely on NATO proposals, designed to

increase openness and predictability of military activities in Europe.

Much more action needs to be taken concerning conventional forces. As we move to reduce nuclear weapons, we do not want to make the world "safe" for aggression or intimidation based on Soviet superiority in conventional forces.

If stability and peace truly are to be advanced, progress must be made on all four "pillars" of U.S.-Soviet relations. In the area of arms control, Soviet forthcomingness is necessary in every major category. Only when the Soviet Union begins to work in earnest on the broad agenda of international peace can it be said that it is taking the necessary steps toward creating a safer world. ■

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ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

NEW YORK TIMES (MAGAZINE) 5 APRIL 1987 Pg. 48

A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

It is likely the question was first asked as soon as it could be — that the hope of abolition followed shortly after the task of creation. J. Robert Oppenheimer, transfixed in the glare of the first atomic explosion in the New Mexico desert, recalled a verse of the Bhagavad Gita: "Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds." It is not a role to which man would grow accustomed.

If current signs and portents are fulfilled, and American and Soviet negotiators in Geneva eventually agree on a formula to remove the intermediate-range Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, along with their Soviet counterparts, the SS-20's, from European soil — the so-called zero option — Ronald Reagan will have made good on his vow to hold out for an agreement that would actually reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

Since the American armies were demobilized after World War II, nuclear weapons have served as a relatively inexpensive means of filling the gap between the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the vast armies of the Warsaw Pact. From the earliest "ban-the-bomb" movements, through the halcyon days of arms control during the 1970's, to Mr. Reagan's vision of a nuclear-free world sheltered beneath a leakproof "space shield," the nuclear guarantee — under which the United States would respond to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe by launching its missiles — has remained the crucial link between America and its allies.

The 1979 decision to install the American missiles in Europe reaffirmed that link. When Mr. Reagan unveiled his "zero option" proposal to remove them, in 1981, it was widely derided as a charade offering no serious chance of an arms-control agreement. In March 1983, partly in response to massive demonstrations protesting the installation of those very missiles, this least-dovish of Presidents declared his intention to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," and put forward an ambitious new research program to achieve it: his Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as Star Wars. Previous nuclear

abolitionists had looked to international law or brotherly love to reduce the world supply of nuclear weapons — of which the Americans and Russians together possess about 50,000. Mr. Reagan proposed a more typically American object of faith: high technology.

That Mr. Reagan's defense program has irrevocably transformed the arms-control game was dramatically demonstrated at Reykjavik, Iceland, last October, when the President and Mikhail Gorbachev discussed a comprehensive agreement that would sharply cut the number of offensive strategic missiles in exchange for limits on research on Mr. Reagan's "space shield." To the subsequent chagrin of America's European allies, who fear the weakening of the American nuclear guarantee, the two leaders agreed in principle to eliminate all ballistic missiles, and even speculated about abolishing nuclear weapons altogether.

The Reykjavik meeting collapsed when Mr. Reagan refused to countenance limits on S.D.I. research. Yet only his enthusiasm for defense had made such a revolutionary agreement conceivable in the first place. Even if a future summit meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev produces an accord to remove the missiles from Europe, however, six long years will have passed without any significant arms-control agreement — while previous accords (most notably the 1972 ABM treaty banning the deployment of antiballistic missiles) have been placed in jeopardy.

In the pages that follow, The New York Times Magazine presents six short essays offering a broad spectrum of opinion on a central, and rapidly evolving, question of the nuclear age. —MARK D. DANNER

Mark D. Danner is an editor of The Times Magazine.

Six experts offer different answers to a question that is being raised with new urgency.

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The Danger of Disarming

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

T

he very concept of "A World Without Nuclear Weapons" is an illusion. Assume for a moment that all nuclear weapons have been destroyed. Unless the means for building them are also destroyed, or placed under some airtight supervision, a number of nations would still be able to produce them quickly. In the event of a war that threatens its survival, would any state able to make nuclear weapons abstain from quickly producing them?

The knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons cannot be erased. Human consciousness cannot be manipulated like a tape recorder. A world in which nations destroyed their nuclear weapons but knew how to produce them would not be a more secure world. Moreover, some states or even terrorist organizations might choose to cheat. Given the closed nature of the Soviet system, its record of duplicity and deception, and its enormous geographical expanse, the risk that the Kremlin might surreptitiously store some nuclear weapons and their delivery systems cannot be disregarded.

To imagine a world free of nuclear weapons is to imagine a world in which nations truly cooperate in enforcing inviolable restraints on their own knowledge, permit controls over all their scientific facilities and accept verification inspections in all parts of their territory, including their military bases and industrial plants. Anyone is free to dream about such a world, but it may not be wise policy to encourage the public to think it will soon come about.

A world free of nuclear weapons might also become dangerously safe for conventional war. Never in history have two dominant powers competed so intensely — during 40 years so fraught with provocations and indirect conflicts — and yet avoided open warfare. Without nuclear weapons, it is likely that during the Berlin blockade in 1948, or during the Berlin crisis of the early 1960's, or during the Korean War, or during the spread of Communism to Cuba, some incident would have sparked a major American-Soviet collision. About 60 million people died in World War II. Making the world safe for the resumption of conventional warfare could hardly be considered a major advance for humanity.

And for a world free of nuclear weapons to be safe, not only would the American-Soviet rivalry have to disappear; all other conflicts involving the United States and the Soviet Union would need to be peacefully resolved. It is sheer escapism to believe the world will soon plunge into such unprecedented bliss.

For years, the Russians have espoused the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Why? It is not cold-war-mongering to suggest that, in preaching

about a world free of nuclear weapons, Moscow aims to encourage the progressive disarmament of the West while it remains free to pursue its own buildup. Although Soviet public opinion has no impact on the Kremlin's strategic decisions, public opinion does determine American strategic abilities — and hence the stability and effectiveness of deterrence.

The competitive sloganeering about nonnuclear utopias that escalated so mindlessly after Reykjavik is likely to divert Western publics from seeking genuine strategic security. That security can be strengthened by gradual and progressive mutual accommodation in arms-control negotiations, and also by unilateral actions. Step-by-step reductions, carefully calibrated to reduce the threat of a first strike, should be our principal negotiating objective. This means seeking not only reductions in overall numbers of weapons but also sublimits on such missiles as the Russians' highly accurate SS-18, which can be employed in a pre-emptive attack. We should also seek to block the introduction of even more advanced and threatening strategic weapons, and to develop on-site verification procedures for all limitations and reductions. The more progress is made in strategic-arms reductions, the more important intrusive verification becomes.

But strategic security need not come only from arms control. We can also adopt, unilaterally, a deployment strategy that is relevant to the likely political and technological conditions of the next decade and the century beyond. Given the increased sophistication of nuclear weapons (particularly the enhanced accuracy that allows for precise strikes designed to disarm the other side), deploying some components of strategic defense, both on land and in space, becomes imperative. Deploying limited strategic defenses, while setting careful limits on the numbers of American first-strike offensive weapons such as the MX and the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, would help stabilize the nuclear relationship by reducing the Soviet threat to the United States without enhancing the potential American threat to the Soviet Union. A limited strategic defense, designed to protect only American military command and control facilities and land-based missiles, bomber fields and strategic submarine bases, would cost less than Soviet efforts to increase their own first-strike potential in response. Much as the Russians may protest initially, economic and strategic considerations are likely to drive them to adopt a similar posture.

President Reagan has rendered the country, and future generations, an important service by opening up a public discussion of strategic defense. He should proceed to take the initial steps to integrate the limited strategic defenses now available into our overall strategic posture. An early decision to deploy these defenses would not only enhance our strategic security (without increasing our threat to the Soviet Union), but would exert greater pressure on the Russians to consider meaningful arms-control arrangements. In a world with nuclear weapons, mutual strategic security is much to be preferred to escapist pipe dreams and deceptive slogans.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 to 1981. His most recent book is "Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest."

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materials, propulsion, radar sensing, and submarine detection. Nevertheless, their nature and the rate at which these technologies advance will afford a wide, and perhaps surprising, range of offense-defense mixes. By the same token, some of these technologies have already matured, but have been waiting in institutional backwaters to be discovered. Cruise missiles are perhaps the classic example. The technology involved in these had been around more than 20 years before they were discovered by the right parts of the bureaucracy.

A relatively quiet aspect of these developments is high technology in outer space, both for military and non-military purposes. Satellites have become an integral part of our terrestrial military operations. An attack on certain classes of our satellites could make us vulnerable to a first strike. Moreover, our economic well-being has become increasingly tied to satellites. However, in most cases, we have so far failed to take steps to protect these assets. This will have to be addressed in any future offense-defense mix because both offense and defense rely on space-based assets. This could be done by hardening the satellites, by giving them the ability to evade attackers, or by stationing redundant ones in space. Alternatively, we could plan on quickly replacing our lost satellites or count on deterring attacks on our satellites with antisatellites of our own. Satellites might also be protected in part through arms control agreements. When all is said and done, no space asset can currently be protected from all possible threats. However, it is possible to defend space assets from enough difficult threats that it greatly complicates an attacker's plans. The Soviets have maintained for many years various operational capabilities

for attacking U.S. satellites. These include an operational co-orbital interceptor, nuclear-armed Galosh antiballistic missiles designed to detonate in space, experimental ground-based lasers, and electronic countermeasures. The development of means to ensure adequate satellite survivability is a prime example of strategy driving technology in the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Another technological change now taking place is in the field of conventional weapons improvement. Better target acquisition, smart bombs, precision terrain-guided munitions, shaped charges, self-forging projectiles, fuel-air explosives, stealth, and the like will improve the effectiveness of current conventional forces. Improvement in tactical weapons will bring about changes in the offense-defense mix which are as yet highly unpredictable. The new SDI technologies related to space-based defense, supplementing other technologies which apply to the sensible atmosphere (for purposes here defined as under 300,000 feet), can contribute to the development of tactical missile defense in Europe and Asia. NATO, for example, has no active defense against tactical ballistic missiles, and NATO nuclear and air defense forces are currently vulnerable to a Soviet tactical ballistic missile attack. I emphasize the word active because many in NATO would argue that the hardening program NATO undertook in the late 1970s affords at least some defense. However, this will have to be improved. As the Soviets deploy a new generation of shorter-range missiles, their ability to deliver conventional munitions deeper into Western Europe will be enhanced. The Soviets are now replacing Frog and Scud missiles with SS-21s and SS-23s and up-

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grading the Scaleboard. An upgraded Patriot missile system would not provide the layered antitactical ballistic missile capability necessary to defend against these.

The advent of these new technologies further promises that some strategic missions currently assigned to nuclear forces could be turned over to non-nuclear weapons. One school of thought holds that non-nuclear weapons may be less escalatory than nuclear weapons because they cause less large-scale collateral damage. For example, a precision-guided conventional shaped-charge explosive or hypervelocity projectile may "bust" a missile silo just as well or better than a nuclear one, but with less collateral damage. This remains, however, the subject of some controversy. Conversely, some strategic assets are already being assigned conventional-theater missions. B-52s have conducted operations to support conventional forces for many years. Two squadrons of B-52Gs are equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles for maritime support operations. Submarines are being equipped with conventionally-armed cruise missiles. As we move from "smart" to "brilliant" munitions, the potential to attack strategic targets with conventional weapons will increase. This in itself should help drive nuclear inventories down. Thus, offensive forces may, in the future, include non-nuclear strategic weapons. This becomes even more complex because the same technology which applies to non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons can be applied to defense suppression.

Defense suppression is an area where conventional non-SDI-related high technology has much to offer. However, it is also the area that is driving the development of non-nuclear offensive strategic weapons. The same high technology can contribute

to either offense or defense suppression, but not SDI. Indeed, it is possible to have conventional weapons which approximate "zero CEP" (circular error probable) and thus become counterforce-capable. As such, they could perform missions that were once only in the realm of nuclear weapons. This may well have been why Gorbachev expressed such anxiety in his January 15, 1986, statement about the development of conventional weapons of mass destruction. Let me reiterate that this includes smart bombs, cruise missiles, stealth, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and the like. Quite different technology is involved in defense against a ballistic missile attack. Indeed, SDI has been deliberately structured so that it will examine technologies with no offensive potential and no capability against the territory of another country. Many of these, like charged particle beams and lasers of selected frequencies, cannot effectively penetrate the atmosphere and therefore are incapable of being used to strike targets on or near the earth's surface. Other technologies, while capable of modification for capability against ground targets, would have a limited potential at best. Therefore, if they were deployed in a space-based defense, these technologies could not pose a militarily significant threat to any ground, sea, or air targets. This, by the way, stands in distinction to the Soviet ABM and air defense system, which appears aimed solely at defending against a ragged second strike.

One definition of defense suppression is any means by which offensive forces can overcome defenses. This may include saturation, stealth, electronic or infrared (IR) countermeasures against defense sensors, and hypervelocity. Offensive weapons integrating these means can be used in a precursor attack to destroy de-

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fenses (sometimes also referred to as the first phase of defense suppression), enabling follow-on attacks by less sophisticated offensive weaponry. Some studies suggest that hypervelocity is the most efficient and cost-effective of the means outlined above and also, technologically, the most difficult against which to develop effective countermeasures.

In any event, defense suppression becomes of central importance in the offense-defense relationship because its effectiveness figures in a protracted conflict. Defenses, as mentioned above, can be overcome by saturation, stealth, electronics, and IR, or by extremely high speed. These means involve different high technologies than those being researched under SDI; they are all known to be feasible and all operate under 300,000 feet. We draw the line at 300,000 feet because anything above this would be a space asset. In a world of both offenses and defenses, suppression of defenses below 300,000 feet would be necessary to assure the success of a retaliatory strike and, most particularly, follow-on attacks. Ominously, these are measures to which the Soviets have not devoted much attention. Indeed, there are those who argue that Soviet antiballistic missile and air defenses seem to be aimed solely at defending against a U.S. retaliatory force severely degraded by a Soviet first strike. Therefore, U.S. success in waging a prolonged campaign would depend heavily on defense suppression. Although some of these technologies have been on the shelf for quite a while, we are only just now beginning to look coherently at their overall role in defense suppression.

If research proves strategic defenses to be feasible, there will still be a need to manage jointly, through negotiations with the Soviets, the transition

from the current offensive strategy to one based on a more balanced offense-defense mix. If agreements lead to the drastic reduction of offensive nuclear weapons, greater demand will be put on the need to negotiate conventional arms control agreements, lest the world be made "safe for conventional warfare." One might term these non-nuclear, nonproliferation agreements. Without such agreements, this might be a world where the Soviets have the edge. At the same time, agreements in conventional forces will become more complex. In this connection, the lack of success in the talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions of conventional weapons, after more than a decade of negotiations, does little to inspire confidence that the arms control process can provide the solution to this problem. But beyond this, the technological revolution in conventional arms will also require arms control negotiations covering strategic non-nuclear offensive forces and defense suppression forces. Otherwise, we will have done nothing to prevent what some analysts term a "strategic free market," at least for offenses and defenses under 300,000 feet.

Further, should we reach agreements that do profoundly reduce offensive nuclear arsenals, this must be done in its interrelationship with conventional forces. For example, should we reach a point where the five nuclear powers each have arsenals of only several hundred nuclear weapons, these weapons inherently become a secure reserve force for vital counter-value targets. This is because they would once again become the only weapons which could credibly threaten whole societies. The smaller the arsenal becomes, the more secure it becomes because it is easier to defend and easier to conceal. Some analysts speculate that non-nuclear stra-

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regic weapons could then become the strategic counterforce capability. Indeed, if nuclear weapons deter only the use of other nuclear weapons, then, according to this argument, one only needs a force of a relatively modest size to threaten the destruction of an entire society. An implication of this argument is that simply making drastic reductions in nuclear arsenals—indeed, even doing away with them completely—will not lessen the prospect of a conventional counterforce arms race. Technology will simply move in other directions. A persuasive counterargument, however, is that smart weapons will, in fact, deter other smart weapons, and that brilliant weapons will deter other brilliant weapons at all steps of the tactical-strategic continuum.

Yet another dimension to offense-defense weapons mixes relates in part to how we choose offensive weapons and in part to SDI. In choosing offensive weapons, we should not focus on the marginal contribution of a weapon to offensive capabilities. Rather, we must think in terms of contributions to overall stability. A mix of strategic and tactical nuclear and non-nuclear weapons is optimal only if it optimizes stability. Therefore, the issue that must be addressed in any weapons choice is its marginal contribution to stability. The other part of the question of offense-defense mixes has to do with managing the transition. The goal of managing the transition does not imply that the current situation is acceptably stable. The reasons for which confidence in retaliation based on offensive nuclear forces began to break down in the United States have been explored in greater detail elsewhere. Suffice it to say that, in terms of managing any transition, there are good reasons why we should believe that ballistic missile defenses can im-

prove stability. Among these is that if highly effective defenses prove to be feasible, they will help put a check on counterforce arms races (i.e., promote arms control stability). However, this will be a complex task. Along with whatever defensive changes the new technology may bring about, there will be a transition in the strategy of defending Europe and Asia quite aside from any transition with the Soviets which might be brought about through SDI.

How and how quickly we are able to solve the problems inherent in the defense of both countervalue and counterforce targets will continue to affect the mix of technologies used. The ability to thwart precursor attacks against space-based defenses is part of the technological problem. The relation of countervalue targets to the defense of counterforce targets is another. For the strategic defense of a city to fail, the attacker needs to get only one warhead through. This means that for each unit of defense, the attacker needs to match it with only one unit of offense until the 1:1 ratio is exceeded by one. If, however, the target is hidden or mobile, and the defense is preferential in nature, it would take a much more expensive barrage attack requiring many weapons to assure that a single target is destroyed. Hypothetically, such a barrage could be mounted with strategic nuclear weapons, strategic non-nuclear weapons, or a combination of both. The point to be made here is that if a defense is able to stop missiles early in their flight, it by definition will be affording protection to both countervalue and counterforce targets. Moreover, the better defenses become in defending a mix of countervalue and counterforce targets, the more uncertainty is created in the minds of attack planners. Indeed, a strong ar-

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gument can be made that uncertainty in the minds of attack planners is itself a significant component of deterrence. Unfortunately, possession of defenses by the attacker introduces uncertainty about the effectiveness of a retaliatory strike as well. The extent to which uncertainty that favors a second-strike force can be maintained with a small offensive retaliatory force (a minimum deterrent) coupled with defenses is also an interesting question in itself.

Moreover, the costs of destroying undefended targets also have near-term implications for our force modernization. As an illustrative example, the key elements of the Scowcroft Commission's blueprint for ballistic missile modernization called for the development of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles coupled with the development of a new missile—the small ICBM. This particular combination was designed to maintain a near-term capability to deter a first strike while creating a strong incentive for the Soviets to negotiate reductions in heavy ICBMs, where they have a decided advantage. As suggested above, there are economic considerations involved in this. By placing multiple reentry vehicles on a single missile, one can achieve the same military capability with a greatly reduced number of missiles, assuming they are capable of surviving a counterforce attack against them. As long as the small ICBM remains mobile, it becomes an extremely costly target to attack. This is because the only way to destroy a single missile whose exact location is unknown is to saturate the deployment area with attacking reentry vehicles. For a fixed deployment area, the number of reentry vehicles needed to accomplish this mission is a constant, regardless of the number of small ICBMs. Thus, a mobile "small Small ICBM" force, or a small mobile nu-

clear force of any type, has much leverage in terms of cost-effectiveness. Yet, much of this leverage comes from mobility (or anything which makes the retaliatory force costly to overcome). The technological question, though, is whether sufficient missile mobility can be maintained with a small ICBM that has more than one warhead. Beyond this, a mixture of limited defenses and mobile retaliatory forces further complicates an attacker's plans. This is because such a mix continues to hold an opponent's high-value targets at risk while it makes counterforce attacks extremely expensive. Some argue that such an offense-defense force mix is the most stable way to maintain deterrence through the transition to completely effective defenses.

What are the implications of all these technological changes on arms control? The problem of reducing strategic nuclear offensive forces, although until now largely unsolved, is relatively manageable. Indeed, agreements reducing strategic nuclear forces can be reached if only the necessary political will is manifested. Effective strategic defenses in themselves should also provide a strong incentive to reduce ballistic missiles. While the protection of our space assets might be assisted by arms control, agreements may never be able to guarantee fully their protection. This field of arms control needs to be developed. The transition from an offensive nuclear to a strategic defensive environment is currently being formulated. Finally, the nature of the arms control problem of jointly managing and controlling newly emerging, non-SDI high-technology conventional forces will be very complex and difficult. Thinking on how to deal with this problem has yet to begin.

All of this will occur against the backdrop of a need to maintain effec-

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Of surveillance and espionage

Two new books approach from opposite angles the question of how the modern world's two greatest powers find out about the intentions of rivals. Mr Jeffrey Richelson's *American Espionage and the Soviet Target* (*William Morrow, \$18.95*) explains how the Americans, more or less openly, carry out surveillance on Russia; Mr Nigel West's *Molehunt* (*Weidenfeld & Nicolson, £10.95*) looks into how the Russians try secretly to penetrate the British espionage service.

Mr Richelson, a professor of government at the American University in Washington, DC, should not have let a first-year student get away with the howler that there were "Soviet leaders for hundreds of years before" 1945. Nor does an author in this field command full confidence when he makes it clear that he does not understand how radar works. Over a quarter of his book is taken up by scholarly apparatus, but he does not establish himself as a true scholar. He relies largely on secondary

sources; and even among these, does not discriminate properly (rating, for instance, the unreliable James Bamford or Antony Cave Brown on a level with the more authoritative Ronald Lewin or David Eisenhower).

Mr West covers ground more familiar to a British readership: the still current controversy about the senior mole in MI5. On past form, there might seem to be little to look forward to from this prolific author, whose previous books abound in error as well as sensation; this time he has defied form, and produced a book at once readable and (and so far as anybody outside secret circles can tell) reasonably accurate. He pins firmly on the late Graham Mitchell, the late Sir Roger Hollis's deputy, the tag of Russian mole in the security service. His tone is urbane, reasonable, convincing—and he scoops Mr Peter Wright. Anybody who has read "Molehunt" will read Mr Wright's book—if it ever appears—with profound scepticism.



l spy

"Nigel West" is the pseudonym of Mr Rupert Allason, now Conservative candidate for Torbay—a safe seat, if any seat can be considered safe in current British politics. To vote for him would be to vote for reducing the flow of books about the intelligence world; which, if Mr Allason can keep up the standards of this one, would be a pity.

ARMS CONTROL...CONTINUED

tive verification. As technology becomes more complex, blurring militarily significant distinctions between tactical and strategic, conventional and nuclear, effective verification will become more difficult to achieve. However, once again, technology may prove helpful. Great strides continue daily in such critical technology areas for arms control verification as computers, optics and electro-optics, radar and signal processing, acoustics, and the like. Although it has its pros and cons, perhaps the greatest verification measure of all, however, would be for the Soviets to follow our lead in areas such as on-site inspection. Historically, however, the Soviets have resisted such notions.

In the final analysis, does moving beyond our current offense-reliant regime really taunt Nemesis? It does only if we believe offense-reliant arms control can indefinitely continue to provide us the security we seek. The events that have unfolded since 1972 undermine our confidence in this. However, this by no means signals an end to arms control or arms control agreements. On the contrary, as technology is now allowed naturally to evolve, it will demand the efficient allocation of offense-defense resources. This in itself should be an incentive for the Soviets to institutionalize a dialogue with us.

Charles Krauthammer

Another Name for Nuclear Freeze

A man is accused of taking a kettle and returning it damaged. His defense: first of all, I never took it. Second, it was broke when I took it. And third, it was fine when I returned it.

Lawyers call that "arguing in the alternative." Listen to the arguments being made for the latest idea-in-vogue, the comprehensive nuclear test ban, now stampeding through Congress.

The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty stopped nuclear tests in the atmosphere. That was a good idea because it keeps strontium 90 out of our milk. Last month the House of Representatives passed a one-year ban (matching a Soviet moratorium) on U.S. underground tests. The idea? No one claims that current underground tests pollute. Banning them must have another reason: to prevent the development of new nuclear weapons. In essence, a test ban is a nuclear freeze by another name.

What's wrong with that? What's wrong is that not all new weapons are bad. Some are needed to stabilize deterrence. When you freeze nuclear systems, you halt only half of the arms race. Improvements continue on (non-verifiable) nonnuclear defensive systems. Ban nuclear tests and the other side can proceed to, say, harden targets and improve its ability to shoot down bombers and hunt down subs.

Since you cannot improve your offensive weapons ("modernize," in the jargon) to make sure that they can still get through, your deterrent erodes. And the melancholy fact is that your safety and mine (Gorbachev's too) rests on deterrence.

Consider one example. Deterrence is strengthened, and thus the world made safer, if nuclear subs can hide in more parts of the ocean. But for that to happen, submarine missiles must have longer range. For that to happen, their warheads must be smaller in weight and size. For that, you need to test.

Now, test-ban proponents know how important modernization is for maintaining nuclear stability. So they argue—in the alternative—that a nuclear test ban will not really prevent modernization. The MX, cruise missile, Pershing II, neutron bomb, Midgetman and Trident II systems can all proceed, the pro-moratorium Arms Control Association reassures us.

Columnist Tom Wicker, ardent for a test ban, is reassuring too. "Strong scientific evidence exists," he writes, "that American supercomputers can simulate nuclear tests to a degree that renders explosive testing obsolete and unnecessary." But if nuclear testing is redundant and replaceable, then stopping it will cure none of the nuclear ills that so upset Wicker.

You can't have it both ways. If a test ban prevents modernization, it endangers deterrence and thus U.S. security. And if a test ban does not prevent modernization—if it does not "halt the arms race"—then it has no point.

Unless, that is, it is meant not to prevent new nuclear weapons, but to destroy the effectiveness of existing ones. If you can't test a weapon, you can't be sure it works, so you won't use it. In 1985 Rep. Pat Schroeder introduced a mutual test-ban bill thus: "After several years of being in effect, [it] would cause both sides to question whether the weapons they still had left were working efficiently, and, therefore, they would be less and less apt to use them."

Now, this is an idea with some attraction. A test ban as a back door, not to a freeze, but to a kind of functional disarmament. Have your weapons and disarm too, because neither side can be sure they will work.

Why is this not a good idea? Because the West is disproportionately dependent on nuclear weapons for its defense. It might have been a ghastly mistake, but it is now a fact: the West has chosen for 40 years to rest its defense on a nuclear deterrent. It did so because nuclear weapons are cheaper and thus less of a strain on democratic, consumer societies than are standing armies. ("More bang for the buck," explained John Foster Dulles.) Today the American security guarantee to Western Europe, where the Soviets have a vast preponderance of conventional force, consists principally of a threat of American nuclear retaliation.

In the face of this melancholy fact, test-ban advocates argue—in the alternative—that nuclear tests are *not* required to ensure the reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Test-ban advocates are in a box. Every time they extol the blessings of a test ban—ending the arms race, decreasing our reliance on nuclear weapons—they are forced to argue that they don't really mean it, that a test ban will really change nothing of importance.

And they rarely address two truly important functions of nuclear tests: 1) to develop safer, less sensitive explosives that cannot be detonated by accident and by terrorists; 2) to make other, often nonnuclear systems (such as satellites) more survivable by testing their ability to withstand the effects of a bomb.

Why then a test ban? One suspects that the point is to have an agreement with the Russians for its own sake. But if the real point is atmospheric and confidence-building and good detentish feeling, then we might start with other agreements, simpler and less injurious to national security. An agreement, say, banning the framing and imprisonment of journalists.

arms control

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Rockville war hero to get delayed honor

By Denise Baker
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A Vietnam war hero from Rockville finally will receive the Silver Star medal for bravery during an almost forgotten combat drama 19 years ago — thanks to his son.

Thomas E. Butt Jr., a retired Marine sergeant, will be feted at the Marine Barracks in Washington at a gala event in his honor tonight.

Before his son Michael Butt, 18, questioned his father about the battle that took place on March 30, 1967, the violent attack was a secret memory for Mr. Butt.

During that 90-minute spring battle — the last before he was to return home — Mr. Butt and about 34 other Marines in his company were attacked in the Quang Tri Province by

about 250 North Vietnamese regulars, a Marine spokesman said.

After the platoon's commanders were killed, Mr. Butts continued to fight, providing a rear guard shield for his escaping comrades.

Under continuous small arms fire, and wounded four times, Mr. Butts repelled frenzied enemy attacks, constantly thwarting their attempts to overrun the position.

For almost an hour, weak with fatigue and loss of blood, he managed to fight off the North Vietnamese attackers.

"For thirteen months, my father was in the Naval Hospital in Bethesda with four gunshot wounds," Michael Butt said.

While he lay in the hospital bed heavily sedated because of the pain, he vaguely remembered a soldier

telling him he was going to receive a medal for his bravery, his son said.

After he recovered, Mr. Butt returned home and never questioned what happened to the award.

After lots of phone calls and many letters, the son learned that his father's recommendation award papers were either lost or destroyed and never reached the United States.

"I always took pride in my father having fought for his country," said Michael Butt. . . . He could have just escaped. It could have been all over for him. The award shows something about my father's character. Even when the reasons weren't clear to him he walked into the elusive battle because he was devoted to human beings."

"When I got back to the U.S. the American public was so against us that I decided to keep what happened quiet," said Mr. Butt.

"Despite what the public thought, he still came back loving his country," said Michael Butt, who plans to join the Marines after he graduates from college. "That's why he deserves the award."

REBELS...CONTINUED

the guerrillas detonated two homemade Claymore mines and opened fire at close range, the military said. It said the patrol was part of routine preparations for the scout ranger mountain battalion to replace another Army battalion in the area and that, in any case, a cease-fire was not officially in effect.

The guerrillas claimed that 30 rangers and four guerrillas were killed in the battle. They argued that the patrol was a combat operation intended to track down guerrillas in the cease-fire zone despite a "moratorium" on such activities until the Aquino government reached a decision on the cease-fire. The Communists also charged that the soldiers fired first and that the guerrillas fought back in self defense.

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Arms Control: Turning the Corner?



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the American Bar Association's annual meeting, New York City, August 12, 1986.

This summer has been an intensely busy period for arms control. It began with the President's decision on interim restraint and SALT [strategic arms limitation talks]. Then there was the new Soviet proposal, General Secretary Gorbachev's subsequent letter to the President, a series of meetings with the President and his response to Gorbachev—as well as a special session of the Standing Consultative Commission and new talks on nuclear testing issues. In roughly a month, the sixth round of the Geneva talks will resume.

As the President said at Glassboro, we may be at a turning point in arms control. There are signs of hope in Gorbachev's letter and in Soviet moves in Geneva. The President's response seeks to bridge the remaining differences in our positions.

To get this far has taken an enormous amount of perseverance on his part. Having worked with him for 5-plus years now, I am most struck by his deep commitment to building a safer world, to reversing the nuclear arms buildup, and to providing an alternative strategy that does not hinge so dreadfully on the threat of mutual annihilation.

That said, I suspect the question in your minds and many others is: "Will there be an arms agreement during this Administration?"

To answer that question, we must first address two others.

Question One: What have we learned in the arms control process?

Question Two: What exactly is the United States trying to accomplish in arms control today?

What We Have Learned

First, what have we learned? Several things:

For one, we've learned the lesson that arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union are not necessarily a progressive or cumulative enterprise. The assumption in 1972, remember, was that SALT I would be a "first step" to more ambitious agreements—agreements which actually reduced and restricted the arms competition. You would move step by step to more comprehensive and ambitious treaties. That was the theory. The reality turned out otherwise. By 1979 when SALT II failed to get Senate approval, it was clear that our hope had not materialized.

What happened, and who was to blame? In 1979 I think there was a widespread feeling in this country that we had kept our side of the bargain. Americans from the President on down plainly saw the SALT agreements and negotiations as an opportunity to limit and stabilize the arms competition. In the wake of SALT I, our defense effort genuinely slackened, at least in part

because of our faith in the arms control process. In the 1970s U.S. defense spending actually dropped in real terms—the most significant decline since the Korean war—with procurement of new strategic systems declining the most.

I am not saying that we stood still. We continued to modernize our forces. But we did so at a far slower rate than we had pursued during the previous decade. We converted our missiles to multiple warheads and thus increased our total warheads, as did the Soviet Union.

But we did not field a new set of strategic weapons systems—and many of the new systems that were scheduled to come on in the late 1970s were stretched out or postponed. There was no new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) after we began deploying Minuteman III in 1970 until the MX. We built no new ballistic missile submarines between 1966 and 1981.

Believing, as many people did in the 1970s, that both sides were now prepared to accept "mutual vulnerability" and "mutual assured destruction," Congress also slashed funds for strategic defense research in the mid-1970s and voted to dismantle our one permitted ABM [antiballistic missile] site.

Meanwhile, on the Soviet side, we saw basically the opposite pattern. Instead of slowing down, the Soviets accelerated their building effort, using the breathing spell provided by SALT as an opportunity to move ahead.

Working largely—but not entirely—within the treaty limits, the Soviets essentially quadrupled their arsenal of ballistic missile warheads. They amassed a large force of first-strike-capable weapons—the SS-18 missiles, weapons apparently designed to reduce our ability to retaliate and to undermine mutual deterrence. In a period of roughly 15 years—during which both sides were supposedly restrained by SALT—the Soviets deployed four new types of ICBMs, five new classes of ballistic missile submarines, and five new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, to name only the most conspicuous things.

They never accepted the theory of “mutual vulnerability.” They poured roughly an equal amount of money and energy into defensive systems as they did into offensive ones. They upgraded their Moscow ABM system and vigorously pursued their own strategic defense program. (And, let me tell you, the Soviets were vigorously engaged in “star wars” long before anybody had heard of Luke Skywalker.)

We see similar problems in the negotiating process itself. With the Soviets, discussions do not normally proceed step by step to bigger and better things. More often than not, we found ourselves in the position of Sisyphus having to push the rock up the hill only to have it roll right back down again.

To take one example: when the SALT I negotiations began, the Soviets insisted on a completely lopsided definition of strategic systems. They proposed to include systems with which we defend our European and Asian allies, while excluding the comparable Soviet systems that threaten our allies. Eventually, the Soviets dropped this requirement, so that we could conclude SALT I. When negotiations resumed on SALT II, it reemerged. Eventually, they dropped it again so that we could conclude SALT II. When negotiations resumed on the strategic arms reduction talks (START), it reemerged. The rock kept rolling down the hill.

Negotiating with the Soviets is really an extraordinary experience, quite unlike anything even the most experienced negotiator—as many of you are—is likely to come across in the West.

Throughout the past 15 years, we have witnessed a process in which the United States has frequently carried the ball for both sides. In the SALT negotiations, the United States supplied not only the figures on U.S. forces but, relying on our intelligence, the figures on Soviet forces as well. The Soviets did not

volunteer facts and figures on their forces, but merely said they did not dispute our estimates. They wouldn't tell us the number, the types, or even the names of the systems on which we were negotiating.

On one occasion, when we gave them our figures on their weapons, the Soviet military representative asked us to refrain. He was agitated that such highly secret information would be revealed to the civilian members on his delegation.

The United States and the Soviet Union viewed negotiations very differently. We crafted proposals designed to be balanced and fair to both sides. The Soviets crafted proposals to give themselves advantages. The game was being played, so to speak, on our half of the field. To put it another way: while we played to tie, they played to win.

In the second place, we've learned that the Soviets use arms control negotiations to advance their broader aims of splitting the United States from its allies and having the United States unilaterally stop major strategic programs.

This approach was clear even in 1917. When Trotsky went to negotiate the peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans, Lenin told him to remember that what happens outside the negotiating room may be more important than what happens within.

So, there has always been a large political purpose to Soviet negotiating strategy. Frequently, in arms control it is the driving factor. During the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in 1981-83, for example, it was extremely unlikely that the West could have achieved an agreement. It's clear now that the Soviets were not seriously interested in any arms control agreement. Their main effort was outside the negotiating room to divide the NATO alliance. Similarly, for the past 3 years, their main effort was outside the negotiating room—to stop the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The problems in arms control negotiations are, of course, not all on the Soviet side. There is, to put it gingerly, a great deal of “pluralism” on our side.

President Reagan wants to hear all points of view on an issue before deciding a course. Believe me, he is never disappointed in this regard when it comes to arms control. While this diversity can be constructive in the decisionmaking process, it can get carried away at times.

Imagine that you were representing a corporation negotiating with another corporation—as I am sure many of you do—and that the other corporation simply refused to reveal any financial information relevant to the deal and repeatedly reraised issues you thought were settled. And then imagine that your opposites maintained an absolutely solid front—while your senior management, your board of directors, and your employees all staked out separate positions publicly that weakened your negotiating hand.

But these are precisely the conditions under which the United States tends to go into an arms negotiation, when you consider activities in the media, Congress, and among our allies and others.

The Congress has been particularly prone over the years to conduct its own, independent arms control policy based largely on the discredited idea that unilateral concessions by us will inspire matching concessions on the Soviet side. There is not a single instance when this has occurred. On the contrary, the Soviets read these gestures not as a sign of good will but as a sign we lack will. Unilateral concessions on our part just mean unilateral advantages on theirs.

All too often a weapons system that gets the Soviets' attention, that actually prompts the Soviet Union to bargain seriously, becomes fair game for Congress to gut or kill in the name of arms control.

The \$5.3 billion proposed for SDI, which got the Soviets back to the table for talks, is trimmed to less than \$4 billion by a Senate committee. A \$300-million program for an antisatellite (ASAT) weapon is gutted. The fact that the Soviets already have an ASAT weapon and an extensive strategic defense program in progress somehow does not weigh heavily in the arcane calculus by which Congress arrives at such decisions.

Two hundred years ago Congress was debating the creation of the Federal army. One member introduced a resolution that would limit the army to 3,000 soldiers. General Washington responded by suggesting his own resolution—to provide that any enemy invading the country would be limited to 2,000 soldiers. The first resolution was drowned in laughter. I wish George Washington were around to make the same point today.

The third major lesson is that the Soviets violate agreements. This says something about the Soviets and about the need for effective verification.

Look, for example, at the 1972 convention banning biological and toxin weapons. According to Arkady Shevchenko, the former senior Soviet official at the United Nations who defected to the United States, the Politburo decided to continue activities which violated the convention in the same time period that the Soviet Union signed it.

The Soviet violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty is a similar story. They decided to build the Krasnoyarsk radar in the early to mid-1970s. They knew we would eventually detect it, since it was over three football fields large. They must have known it could not be explained except as a violation of the treaty.

Hours upon hours of the ABM Treaty negotiations were spent negotiating the provisions governing such large radars. Why? Because these radars are a key to complying with the treaty: they are the large, long-lead-time item in any effort to deploy a nationwide ABM system. This is an issue we have to come to terms with. Soviet violations are undermining the basis for future agreements.

Finally, we've also learned the lesson that arms control negotiations and agreements by themselves are no guarantee of overall peace or stability. This lesson, too, went against the conventional wisdom.

After SALT I, the expectation was for a steady improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the period between SALT I and SALT II was, in fact, a period of deteriorating global stability. Regional conflicts were multiplying around the globe. Between 1975 and 1980—the height of the SALT process—virtually a nation a year fell to communist forces: South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in 1975–76, Ethiopia in 1977, Cambodia in 1978, and Afghanistan in 1979.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred in the same year as the signing of the major arms control agreement—SALT II—and just 6 months after a summit meeting between the American President and the Soviet leader. Arms control agreements can play a useful role, but it takes much more than a treaty to keep the peace.

What We Are Trying To Accomplish

Now to my second question: what are we trying to accomplish in arms control today?

The answer is simple: we want an arms agreement that will accomplish something of substance; one that will measurably decrease the risk of war and enhance stability; one that will reverse the upward nuclear spiral. President Reagan wants real reductions.

Arms agreements need to accomplish something in the real world. They have to be worth more than the paper they're printed on. They must express our hope, but they must be more than mere expressions of hope. That has been, and continues to be, the principle that governs the arms control policy of this Administration.

So, how far have we succeeded? Much more than our critics concede.

First, we have succeeded in getting the Soviets back to the table. They played politics and walked out. Now we finally discern what the President has said may be a turning point toward real and detailed bargaining on the substantive issues that divide us. If this is true, it is good news. Staying the course on one's overall goals is the watchword of sincerity on arms control. Shifting from goal to goal is to treat arms control primarily as a public relations enterprise, an activity more appropriate for Madison Avenue than Pennsylvania Avenue.

Second, we have succeeded in getting the Soviets to talk about reductions in nuclear weapons. This was no small feat. In 1977, you may remember, President Carter sent Secretary of State Vance to Moscow with a plan for deep reductions in nuclear weapons. Brezhnev turned the proposal down flat.

When President Reagan first proposed deep cuts in nuclear arsenals in 1982, he was criticized for seeking too much. A major criticism of this Administration's arms control policy during the first term was that our proposals were too ambitious and thus, as the saying goes, insufficiently "negotiable" with the Soviets. Over the past 5 years, we have redefined what is negotiable by insisting on negotiating about what is most important.

Third, we have succeeded in getting the talks to focus on the more critical measures of strategic power. While the flawed and obsolete SALT structure

dealt almost entirely with strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, our proposals now talk about warheads and destructive capabilities directly. The Soviets have begun to move in this direction as well. If they accepted this approach with deep reductions, we would finally get an agreement that would mitigate Soviet first-strike capabilities, really reduce the risk of war, and thus realize the primary goal of strategic arms control.

Finally, we have succeeded in launching an effort to see whether we can devise a means to effectively counter such nuclear missiles. Such defenses, if they prove feasible, could improve our security by strengthening deterrence and reducing the likelihood of any nuclear attack. President Reagan has simply asked whether we can find a better way to maintain the peace than the threat of mutual annihilation and total vulnerability. It may not be possible to find one. But we must continue to try.

Even with these successes we have a long way to go. Major bargains are not struck easily, especially with an adversary like the Soviet Union.

Proposing good arms control is one thing; attaining good arms control is another. As Glendower boasts in *Henry IV*, "I can call spirits from the vasty deep," to which Hotspur replies, "Why, so can I, or so can any man. But will they come when you do call for them?"

That brings us back to the question we began with: will there be an arms control agreement in this Administration?

Yes, there will be an agreement if the Soviets decide they want an agreement. Yes, there will be an agreement if the Soviets move off some unacceptable positions and, yes, if the Soviets are as ready to bargain as seriously as we are.

I personally am hopeful about the prospects for an agreement. We are ready to move. But we don't know whether the Soviets are ready to move seriously with us.

But even if we do not achieve an agreement, that does not mean we will be less secure. In the past 5 years, we have had no new agreements. But the goals that arms control is meant to advance—security, peace, a world safe for free nations—have been advanced. The 1980s have not witnessed those kinds of crises that brought the world to the brink—the Korean war in the 1950s, the Berlin and Cuban missile crises in

the 1960s, and the Yom Kippur war in the 1970s (when we went on strategic alert to prevent Soviet forces from moving into the Middle East).

From 1975-80, when arms control negotiations were occupying center stage, freedom was on the run around the world—from our embassy in Tehran, to the valleys of Afghanistan, to the charnel houses of Cambodia. The communist insurgencies of the 1970s—those seedbeds of tyranny—have given way to a new generation of popular movements

against Marxist regimes—in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Cambodia.

In the 1980s we have restored stability by rebuilding our military strength and restoring our national pride. We have intensified our dialogue with the Soviet Union on human rights and regional issues—as well as arms control. We have drawn the line against tyranny and terrorism, and the faith and

free economies of the world are prospering. Democracy is burgeoning around the globe. Freedom is no longer on the run. Freedom is now on the march. ■

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