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# The Melting of 'Nuclear Winter'

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By RUSSELL SEITZ  
"Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously, higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other matters where the stakes are not as great."

—Carl Sagan, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983-84.

The end of the world isn't what it used to be. "Nuclear Winter," the theory launched three years ago this week that predicted a nuclear exchange as small as 100 megatons ("a pure tactical war, in Europe, say" in Carl Sagan's phrase), in addition to its lethal primary effects, would fill the sky with smoke and dust, ushering in life-extinguishing sub-zero darkness, has been laid to rest in the semantic potter's field alongside the "Energy Crisis" and the "Population Bomb." Cause of death: notorious lack of scientific integrity.

The Nuclear Winter conjecture has unraveled under scrutiny. Yet not so long ago, policy analysts took it so seriously that there is reason to examine how the powerful synergy of environmental concern and the politics of disarmament drove some scientists to forge an unholy alliance with Madison Avenue. Mere software has been advertised as hard scientific fact. How did this polarization arise?

In 1982 a question arose within the inner circle of disarmament activists: Could the moral force of Jonathan Schell's eloquent call to lay down arms, "The Fate of the Earth," be transformed into a scientific imperative? Peace-movement strategists wanted something new to dramatize nuclear war's horrors. As Ralph K. White put it in his book "The Fearful Warriors": "Horror is needed. The peace movement cannot do without it." What they got was surreal—a secular apocalypse.

A 1982 special issue of the Swedish environmental science journal *Ambio* considered the environmental consequences of a nuclear war. This special issue did little to evoke a mass response of the sort needed to change the course of strategic doctrine. But one article contained the seed of what would become Nuclear Winter.

Mr. Sagan seized upon an article by Messrs. Paul Crutzen and Steven Birks that raised the question of a "Twilight at Noon" if the fires ignited by nuclear holocaust were to convert much of the fuel in both woodlands and cities into enough soot to enshroud the globe. In the hands of others their concerns would be transformed into an exhortation.

The chilling climatic impact of this soot can be modeled with existing software. The paper that resulted came to be known as TTAPS, after the initials of its authors beginning with Richard Turco and ending with Carl Sagan.

## A Bone-Dry Billiard Ball

Audubon Society president Russell Peterson, whose wife was editor of *Ambio*, sent the issue to Robert Scrivner of the Rockefeller Family Fund. Mr. Scrivner convened an ad hoc consortium of foundations and scientific groups with a bent for disarmament. Cornell astrophysicist and media personality Carl Sagan assembled a scientific advisory board that drew heavily from such organizations as the Union of Concerned Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council. Two-dozen foundations, and more than 100 scientists were recruited.

Nuclear Winter never existed outside of a computer, except as a painting commissioned by a PR firm. Instead of an earth with continents and oceans, the TTAPS model postulated a featureless, bone-dry billiard ball. Instead of nights and days, it postulated 24-hour sunlight at one-third strength. Instead of realistic smoke emissions, a 10-mile-thick soot cloud magically materialized, creating an alien sky as black as the ink you are reading. The model dealt with such complications as geography, winds, sunrise, sunset and patchy clouds in a stunningly elegant manner—they were ignored. When later computer models incorporated these elements, the flat black sky of TTAPS fell apart into a

pale and broken shadow that traveled less far and dissipated more quickly.

The TTAPS model entailed a long series of conjectures: if this much smoke goes up, if it is this dense, if it moves like this, and so on. The improbability of a string of 40 such coin tosses all coming up heads approaches that of a pat royal flush. Yet it was represented as a "sophisticated one-dimensional model"—a usage that is oxymoronic, unless applied to Twigg.

To the limitations of the software were added those of the data. It was an unknown and very complex topic, hard data was scant, so guesstimates prevailed. Not only were these educated guesses rampant throughout the process, but it was deemed prudent, given the gravity of the subject, to lean toward the worst-case end of the spectrum for dozens of the numbers involved. Political considerations subtly skewed the model away from natural history, while seeming to make the expression "nuclear freeze" a part of it.

"The question of peer review is essential. That is why we have delayed so long in the publication of these dire results," said Carl Sagan in late 1983. But instead of going through the ordinary peer-review process, the TTAPS study had been con-

*Even a Soviet scientist at the crucial meeting said, "You guys are fools. You can't use mathematical models like these. . . . You're playing with toys."*

veyed by Mr. Sagan and his colleagues to a chosen few at a closed meeting in April 1983. Despite Mr. Sagan's claim of responsible delay, before this peculiar review process had even begun, an \$80,000 retainer was paid to Porter-Novelli Associates, a Washington, D.C., public-relations firm. More money was spent in the 1984 fiscal year on video and advertising than on doing the science.

The meeting did not go smoothly; most participants I interviewed did not describe the reception accorded the Nuclear Winter theory as cordial or consensual. The proceedings were tape recorded, but Mr. Sagan has repeatedly refused to release the meeting's transcript. (The organizers have said it was closed to the press to avoid sensationalism and premature disclosure.) According to Dr. Kosta Tsiolis of MIT, even a Soviet scientist at the meeting said, "You guys are fools. You can't use mathematical models like these to model perturbed states of the atmosphere. You're playing with toys."

Having premiered on Oct. 30, 1983, as an article by Mr. Sagan in the Sunday supplement *Parade*, the TTAPS results finally appeared in *Science* magazine (Dec. 23, 1983). This is the very apex of scholarly publication, customarily reserved for a review article expounding a mature addition to an existing scientific discipline—one that has withstood the testing of its data and hypotheses by reproducible experiments recorded in the peer-reviewed literature. Yet what became of the many complex and uncertain variables necessary to operate the Nuclear Winter model? They were not explicitly set forth in the text—136 pages of data were instead reduced to a reference that said, simply, "In preparation." The critical details were missing. They have languished in unpublished obscurity ever since.

The readers of *Science* were still bewildered when, just one week later, another article by Mr. Sagan—"Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe"—appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. Mr. Sagan argued that, because of the TTAPS results, "What is urgently required is a coherent, mutually agreed upon, long-term policy for dramatic reductions in nuclear armaments. . . ."

In hastening to maximize the impact, Mr. Sagan made mistakes. While he cited the following passage as coming from a companion piece in *Science* that he had co-

authored, it did not actually appear in the published version of that article: "In almost any realistic case involving nuclear exchanges between the superpowers, global environmental changes sufficient to cause an extinction event equal to or more severe than that at the close of the Cretaceous when the dinosaurs and many other species died out are likely (emphasis added)." The ominous rhetoric italicized in this passage puts even the 100 megaton scenario of TTAPS on a par with the 100 million megaton blast of an asteroid striking the Earth. This astronomical megahype failed to pass peer review and never appeared in *Science*. Yet, having appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, it has been repeatedly cited in the literature of strategic doctrine as evidence.

Rather than "higher standards of evidence," Mr. Sagan merely provided testimonials. He had sent return-mail questionnaires to the nearly 100 participants at the April meeting, and edited the replies down to his favorite two-dozen quotations. What became of the hard copy of the less enthusiastic reports remains a mystery, but it is evident from subsequent comments by their authors that TTAPS received less than the unanimous endorsement of "a large number of scientists." Prof. Victor Weisskopf of MIT, sized up the matter in early 1984: "Ah! Nuclear Winter! The science is terrible, but, perhaps the psychology is good."

Many scientists were reluctant to speak out, perhaps for fear of being denounced as reactionaries or closet Strangeloves. For example, physicist Freeman Dyson of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton was privately critical in early 1984. As he put it, "It's (TTAPS) an absolutely atrocious piece of science, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight. . . . Who wants to be accused of being in favor of nuclear war?"

Most of the intellectual tools necessary to demolish TTAPS's bleak vision were already around then, but not the will to use them. From respected scientists one heard this: "You know, I really don't think these guys know what they're talking about" (Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman); "They stacked the deck" (Prof. Michael McElroy, Harvard); and, after a journalist's caution against four-letter words, "Humbig is six [letters]" (Prof. Jonathan Katz, Washington University).

In 1985, a series of unheralded and completely unpublicized studies started to appear in learned journals—studies that, piece by piece, started to fill in the blanks in the climate-modeling process that had previously been patched over with "educated" guesses.

The result was straightforward: As the science progressed and more authentic sophistication was achieved in newer and more elegant models, the postulated effects headed downhill. By 1986, these worst-case effects had melted down from a year of arctic darkness to warmer temperatures than the cool months in Palm Beach! A new paradigm of broken clouds and cool spots had emerged. The once global hard frost had retreated back to the northern tundra. Mr. Sagan's elaborate conjecture had fallen prey to Murphy's lesser known Second Law: If everything *must* go wrong, don't bet on it.

By June 1986 it was over: In the Summer 1986 *Foreign Affairs*, National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) scientists Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider declared, ". . . on scientific grounds the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability."

Yet the activist wing of the international scientific establishment had already announced the results of the first generations of interdisciplinary ecological and climatological studies based on Nuclear Winter. Journalists paid more attention to the press releases than the substance of these already obsolescent efforts at ecological modeling, and proceeded to inform the public that things were looking worse than ever. Bold headlines carried casualty esti-

mates that ran into the proverbial "billions and billions."

This process culminated in the reception given the 1985 report of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Stressing the uncertainties that plagued the calculations then and now, it scrupulously excluded the expression "Nuclear Winter" from its 193 pages of sober text, but the report's press release was prefaced "Nuclear Winter: Clear Possibility." Mr. Sagan construed the reports to constitute an endorsement of the theory.

But in February 1986, NCAR's Dr. Schneider quietly informed a gathering at the NASA-Ames Laboratory that Nuclear Winter had succumbed to scientific progress and that, "in a severe" 6,500-megaton strategic exchange, "The Day After" might witness July temperatures upward of 50-plus degrees Fahrenheit in mid-America. The depths of Nuclear Winter could no longer easily be distinguished from the coolest days of summer.

As the truth slowly emerged, private skepticism turned often to public outrage, and not just among the "hawks." Prof. George Rathjens of MIT, chairman of the Council for a Livable World, offered this judgment: "Nuclear Winter is the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory."

## The Politics of the Matter

But it is by no means solely within the halls of science that responsibility lies or where redress and the prevention of a recurrence must be sought. Policy analysts have shown themselves to be the lawful prey of software salesmen. They seem to be chronically incapable of distinguishing where science leaves off and the polemical abuse of global-systems modeling begins. The results of this confusion can be serious indeed. Doesn't anybody remember the last example of the "Garbage In, Gospel Out" phenomenon—the "Energy Crisis"? That crisis also began as a curve plotted by a computer. But it ended as "The Oil Glut." Factoids, scientific or economic, have a strange life of their own; woe to the polity that ignores the interaction of science, myth and the popular imagination in the age of the electronic media.

To historians of science, the Nuclear Winter episode may seem a bizarre com-

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edy of manners; having known sin at Hiroshima, physics was bound to run into advertising sooner or later. But what about the politics of this issue? Does all this matter? Mr. Sagan evidently thinks it does. His homiletic overkill has been relentless. An animated version of his obsolete apocalypse has been added to his updated documentary "Cosmos—A Special Edition." This fall, prime-time audiences will watch in horror as the airbrushed edge of nuclear darkness overspreads planet Earth. Marshall McLuhan was right on the mark—with television's advent, advertising has become more important than products.

What is being advertised is not science but a pernicious fantasy that strikes at the very foundation of crisis management, one that attempts to transform the Alliance doctrine of flexible response into a dangerous vision. For despite its scientific demise, the specter of Nuclear Winter is haunting Europe. Having failed in their campaign to block deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, Soviet propagandists have seized upon Nuclear Winter in their efforts to debilitate the political will of the Alliance. What more destabilizing fantasy than the equation of theater deterrence with a global *Gottterdammerung* could they dream of? What could be more dangerous than to invite the Soviets to conclude that the Alliance is self-deterred—and thus at the mercy of those who possess so ominous an advantage in conventional forces?

The Roman historian Livy observed that "where there is less fear, there is generally less danger." Until those who have put activism before objectivity come to apprehend this, nuclear illusions, some spontaneous and some carefully fostered, will continue to haunt the myth-loving animal that is man.

Mr. Seitz is a Visiting Scholar in Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. This is based on an article in the fall issue of *The National Interest*.

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## Oddly, Gramm-Rudman Brightens Trade Picture

By ALBERT M. WOJNILOWER

Our trade situation calls, if anything, for a larger rather than smaller budget deficit. Let me explain.

The U.S. export drive has failed. Why? First (in order of ascending importance), economists as usual had far too much faith in the short-run efficacy of price changes—in this case, of exchange-rate movements. Second, growth among the industrial powers, taken collectively, failed to speed up materially. Third, the "dollar bloc"—

East, the danger of such a switch, in my judgment, is and will remain minimal.

Imports can be reduced three ways. One is further dollar depreciation. This remains the path of least resistance and therefore the most likely to be taken even though it may lead nowhere.

A second method for import reduction is a recession. A stiff dose of budget cuts just might accomplish this. But why should we use a recession to curtail imports when we have on hand the unemployed labor and in-

is estimated at an unrealistic \$164 billion rather than the \$200 billion that reasonable people predict. As a result, Congress and the administration will be content with minor and largely spurious cuts of \$10 billion or so, which, together with a supposed revenue windfall from the tax reform, will satisfy Gramm-Rudman. Had there been no such law, our leaders would, as in previous years, be drafting another \$50 billion deficit-reduction package. I happen to believe that maintaining or even enlarging

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Jewish  
Politics

# Rosenberg Criticizes Jewish-Fundamentalist Ties

BY JON GREENE  
AND  
JENNIFER BAKER

"These are really scary times for the Jewish community," warned Michael J. Rosenberg, the recently appointed Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), during a Jewish Studies faculty luncheon at the University of Maryland's Hillel Jewish Student Center last week.

Rosenberg outlined the ties that far-right-wing Christian ideologues and religious political individuals, such as Pat Robertson, have with major Jewish organizations and criticized the actions of some Jewish organizations for their close ties with these groups.

Rosenberg said that "personally," he had "real problems" with the Israeli embassy's associations with far-right Christian evangelicals, which he called "extremely disturbing." He cited the Israeli ambassador's attendance at previous Christian prayer breakfasts, which has received much public criticism.

The 34-year-old Rosenberg took over as AJC's Washington representative in early August, replacing retiring social activist Hyman Bookbinder. Previously, from 1982 to 1986, he had been editor-in-chief of the *Near East Report*, which has close ties with AIPAC. He now edits the *The Washington Report* for the AJC.

Rosenberg says the current mission of the American Jewish Committee, second to Israel, centers around delineating the irreconcilable conflicts that prevent legitimate ties between the Jewish

community and the far-right-wing fundamentalists who both support Israel and support the Christianization of America.

Founded in 1906 by a group outraged by the slaughter of thousands of Russian Jews in czarist pogroms, the AJC is not a lobby per se: "If you educated people on Capitol Hill, you're still tax-exempt; this isn't so, if you influence or lobby them. . . and what we're teaching about is that Israel is not the only interest of the American Jewish Committee or the wider Jewish community." He contrasts this view with that of single-issue pro-Israel groups which sometimes support pro-Christianizing right-wing fundamentalist groups because of their stance for Israel.

"Here's an example of where the pro-Israel lobby and our kind of organization differ. . . . Mark Siljander was defeated in the Michigan Republican primary because he went so far as to say that his opponent was an agent of Satan. The idea of calling a Republican satanic was just too much for the good Republicans of that district," said Rosenberg. He contrasted this position with that of some of the single-issue activists, who backed Siljander because of his support for Israel, and overlooked his statements.

Although Rosenberg cites the visibility of AIPAC for Capitol Hill's misperception that Jews are preoccupied solely with Israel, he defends the need for a single-issue lobby: "It was created by the Jewish community to lobby on behalf of Israel. It is actually not permitted to take stands on anything other than Israel."

But, Rosenberg added, "In the Jewish community there's a consensus over very few things, and the single-issue activists would like to say that the only thing there is a

consensus on is Israel. Well, they're wrong. There are two issues there's a consensus on, Israel and Christianization. On everything else, it's true there is no consensus. I couldn't say, for example, what the Jewish consensus is on Star Wars issues or Contra aid, but on these two things that are clearly Jewish issues, there is a consensus.

"The new fundamentalist Christian right is a threat to us," Rosenberg reiterated, "All their protestations of love for Israel mean absolutely nothing. Who really cares if they love Israel, if at the same time they threaten our position as Jews in America?"

**“The new fundamentalist Christian right is a threat to us.”**

Recently, the AJC was successfully involved in an effort to kill a radio spot by the Republican Senate Committee running in the South that began: "Ever think of what's important to you? It's probably simple—a steady job, a healthy family, and a personal relationship with Christ. Who can guarantee all three? Elect a Republican Senate."

Rosenberg predicts a swelling tide of anti-Semitism if far-right-wing fundamentalist Christians run for political office, such as television evangelist Pat Robertson of the Christian Broadcasting Network, who is expected to announce his run for presidency in '88. "These are not the type of people we've traditionally come up against

who said they hated us flat out. These people say they love us. . . to death. We know they love Israel but we just suspect very strongly that for some of them, it's the Jews they don't like."

G. Benton Miller, a representative of the Christian Broadcasting Network in Virginia Beach, takes issue with Rosenberg's accusations, saying that Robertson is not out to Christianize America but to promote Judeo-Christian values such as strong family ties, moral righteousness, and demonstrating love for others.

"Christians and Jews have a great deal in common when it comes to the values that our respective societies have always held dear," Miller explained in a phone conversation. "CBN doesn't exist to get into conflicting situations with people of any faith. The Bible specifically speaks against this."

**'Ture Serves Jewish Purposes'**  
Rosenberg also commented on Kwame Ture, the radical anti-Zionist who has appeared on the University of Maryland campus: "Kwame Ture serves Jewish purposes. I think it is good to have kids get riled up and let them see that people like this exist. Any Jew exposed to the reality of anti-Semitism from the left or right is changed forever. I'm speaking almost as if I were still a student because that was the way of the sixties when everything was an opportunity to march, demonstrate, and to hold a counter-rally and do provocative things." ▲

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# Scientists disagree on the usefulness of atomic weapons tests

By Fred Kaplan  
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON — The question of whether the United States should agree to stop testing nuclear weapons has emerged as one of the Reagan administration's most bitter disputes, both with the Soviet Union and with the US House of Representatives.

For 13 months, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has abided by his unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Last month, the House passed a resolution forbidding US nuclear testing. But President Reagan has opposed stopping or slowing the underground tests.

On Tuesday, Reagan told supporters at the White House that US testing would remain "essential" until the day when all nuclear weapons are eliminated and that if the final defense bill from Congress contains "anything like" a ban on testing, "I'll veto it."

Yesterday, Pentagon officials in a 90-minute press conference said nuclear testing is needed to assure that US weapons still explode and do so with as much force as specified.

At the press conference, Franklin Gaffney, a deputy assistant

secretary of defense, cited a 1983 report by Research and Development Associates, a California-based think tank, noting that grave technical problems were found in six US nuclear warheads over the past 20 years and that nuclear tests helped find the problem or aided in the repair.

But Gaffney did not discuss another study, written this year, that rebuts the earlier report. According to the author of the study, Ray Kidder, a senior scientist at the Livermore weapons laboratory, four of those six faulty warheads were developed during the US-Soviet test moratorium of 1958-61, and were thus never fully tested before being placed into the arsenal. By contrast, all the warheads in the US arsenal today have been fully tested. The problems with the other two warheads, Kidder wrote, were "resolved without requiring a nuclear test."

Similarly, in 1978, three leading nuclear scientists — Norris Bradbury, former director of the Los Alamos weapons lab, J. Carson Mark, head of the lab's theoretical division, and Richard Garwin, a consultant for many institutes — wrote in a letter to President Jimmy Carter: "Can the con-

tinued operability of our stockpile of nuclear weapons be assured without future nuclear testing? ... Our answer is yes." They said assurance could be had through inspection and disassembly of components, firing fuses and other means.

Yesterday, Gaffney disagreed: "There are always surprises in underground [nuclear] tests." Theoretical calculations can predict results, but not always correctly.

He displayed a photograph of a reentry vehicle — the top stage of a nuclear missile, containing the warhead and various electronics — with a huge crack. He said the crack was caused by radiation released by an underground nuclear explosion, set off to see how it would affect the reentry vehicle. Scientists had earlier calculated that the vehicle could resist such radiation. "The calculations were proved in error," Gaffney said.

But Hans Bethe, a Nobel-Prize winning physicist now at Cornell University, said in an interview yesterday that effects of a nuclear

explosion on a particular object can be simulated without actually setting off a nuclear bomb. Several research facilities have cyclotrons and other high-powered machines that can generate a powerful flux of neutrons, gamma rays or X-rays.

"Now I'm not going to guarantee that you will be able to know everything about a nuclear weapon [from these devices], but this type of simulation has programmed quite well," Bethe said.

Gaffney also said nuclear testing was necessary to guarantee the workings of safety devices designed to keep a bomb from exploding accidentally. However, Bethe and others have said this can be done by testing various mechanisms on a bomb without actually blowing it up.

Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), an advocate of a test ban, has said, "The only real obstacle to a test ban is the administration's desire to keep developing and testing new nuclear weapons."

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## Abshire lecture

Navy Secretary John Lehman was selected by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies to deliver the fourth annual David M. Abshire lecture. He spoke to a crowd of about 200 last night on

maritime strategy in the defense of NATO. The Abshire series is named for the co-founder of CSIS and current ambassador to NATO. Previous speakers have included Sen. Sam Nunn, Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans, and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell.

## DELUSIONS...from Pg. 17

without the capacity to threaten such retaliation, not in the abstract but in the actual circumstances of war, the United States cannot rely on deterrence to protect its people.

There is enough dynamite in the world to blow us all up numerous times, and enough water in the oceans to drown us all countless times. But the real issue is under what circumstances can we expect lethal devices and materials to be used and what the precise goals are of the weapons we build. The same may be said of the overkill slogan.

There is only one way in which arms control agreements of a kind beneficial to stability might be secured, and that is if the Soviet Union anticipates suffering important military, and hence political disadvantage, if competition is not legally constrained. The road to an arms control agreement of which a U.S. administration could be justly proud, lies—alas—only through competitive armament of a kind and on a scale that scores high marks for the creation of healthy anxiety in Moscow. It is not a question of choosing to compete or to cooperate; the terms for success cited here simply reflect the way of the world.

### Lessons of History

It follows from the discussion in the main body of this article, and from the caveats cited above, that arms control is very unlikely to be important as an instrument for the

alleviation, let alone solution, of U.S. security problems. But it follows also that arms control continues to remain a magnet for the attraction of a pervasive mythology that reduces significantly the ability of Western publics to think in suitable terms about the choices they face in national security policy. In his Third Philippic of 341 B.C., Demosthenes wrote:

But in heaven's name, is there any intelligent man who could let words rather than deeds decide the question of who is at war with him? ... For he [Philip] says that he is not at war, but for my part, so far from admitting that in acting thus he is observing the peace with you, I assert that when he lays hands on Megara, sets up tyrannies in Thrace, hatches plots in the Peloponnese, and carries out all these operations with his armed force, he is breaking the peace and making war upon you—unless you are prepared to say that the men who bring up the siege-engines are keeping the peace until they actually bring them to bear on the walls.

COLIN S. GRAY is president of the National Institute for Public Policy. He is author of numerous books on military strategy, including most recently, *Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Style*.

## DELUSIONS... from Pg. 16

tary logic of this position is that the inevitable effect of SDI upon the arms competition will preclude the possibility of its being a strategic success.

The technological and tactical feasibility and cost-effectiveness of strategic missile defenses remain to be demonstrated. It should not be forgotten that strategic defenses, functionally speaking, would be a form of arms control. Frequently in public debate, opponents of SDI will concede the probability that defenses could be 50, 60, or 70 percent effective, for the purpose of highlighting the size of the likely "leakage" of warheads. (Speaking off the record, Soviet officials have conceded the likelihood of an even higher range of effectiveness than this.) Strategic defenses that were, say, 50 percent effective, in practical terms would reduce the size of the Soviet missile force by a like amount. What is more, such a level of effective defense would achieve a practical scale of reduction in Soviet offensive arms that goes far beyond any arms control proposal that is likely to be negotiated.

When facing a United States utterly bereft of strategic defenses (with air defense capability reduced to the status of a peacetime Coast Guard), the Soviet Union has chosen to effect a more than fivefold increase in its strategic force loadings. Plainly, it cannot have been the plausible anticipation of U.S. missile defenses that stimulated the buildup in the Soviet strategic arsenal. We have over a decade of experience with a zero level of U.S. BMD (ballistic missile defense) deployment. This should have been ample time for the concept of strategic stability focused upon assuredly vulnerable homelands to show its mettle as a generator of arms control agreements.

To note the fact that the ABM Treaty of 1972 has failed miserably to choke off the Soviet will to bid for a combat advantage with strategic offensive and defensive programs is not, of course, to demonstrate that strategic defense will automatically function as a catalyst for arms control worthy of the name. But the beginning of wisdom for an arms competition management strategy has to be frank recognition that a U.S. strategic defense program has been shown by the historical record not to be the critical stimulus to Soviet competitive effort. It can hardly be a coincidence that the first Soviet proposals for a radical scale of reduction in strategic offensive arms were presented late in 1985, in the context of their campaign to discourage the United States from proceeding with SDI. It would appear to be the case that SDI has brought the Soviets back to Geneva with some of the trappings, at least, of an attractive position.

U.S. strategic missile defenses of the kind under investigation by the SDI office should threaten the military integrity of Soviet strategic war plans, though not—for several decades at least—the Soviet ability to retaliate massively. There is no need to invent a fictitiously cooperative Soviet Union in order to anticipate the strong probability that Soviet leaders are very likely indeed to grow very interested in quite radical arms control measures. Soviet leaders would need to believe that it makes no strategic sense to amass more and more offensive arms that can have little if any military utility. Furthermore, if they believe that the United States might implement a strategic defensive addition which would place the Soviet Union in a condition of growing military disadvantage, then the quality of Soviet cooperation in the arms control process would be truly amazing to behold.

The world already is very familiar with a future from which strategic defenses are effectively precluded: it is a world at risk to a competition in offensive nuclear armaments that is "regulated" by the fraying bandage of very permissive and violated SALT agreements. Determined pursuit of defensive capabilities by the United States—we

can rely on the Soviets to behave responsibly in their pursuit of homeland defense—may, indeed is likely, to lead to a competition dominantly of a defense-defense character. This will not be real peace, but it should be a far safer and more stable environment than that provided by its offensive alternative.

Only in a situation where strategic defenses were deployed very heavily could the superpowers reduce their offensive nuclear arsenals down to a very small scale. Because of the practical impossibility of the United States knowing *exactly* how many nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles the Soviet Union has produced, absolute confidence in verification is a pipe dream. Adequate security against Soviet cheating can be provided only by active defense. Fortunately for the prospects of cooperation in disarmament, suspicious Soviet officials may be relied upon to agree with the logic of defense as a practical guarantee of self-help against foreign perfidy.

**Myth 6: The United States and the Soviet Union can destroy the world several times over, so the arms race is futile and arms control is the only rational approach.**

The "overkill" thesis holds that the superpowers already have sufficient nuclear weapons in their arsenals to make the rubble bounce at least several times. Holding to an apocalyptic view of nuclear strategy, critics of perceived "overkill" allege that the superpowers simply are adding redundancy upon redundancy as they augment their nuclear arsenals.

The "overkill" assertion against further rounds of competitive armament may look fine on a bumper sticker, but it bears no relation to the facts of strategic policy, here or in the Soviet Union, or to the probable consequences of very large-scale nuclear use. "Destroying the world" is of no policy interest as threat, let alone as action, to anybody. Nuclear weapons are weapons, in the traditional sense of the word—they can be used to disarm an enemy, politically through coercion or physically through the damage and disruption they could cause. Against the kind of offensive and defensive strategic weapons arsenal that the Soviet Union is acquiring, the kind of minimum city-busting deterrent that propagators of this myth recommend, would, in all likelihood, be no deterrent at all.

The popularity in debate of the morally repugnant, as well as strategic, idea of "overkill" points to the unfortunate fact that the U.S. government has performed very poorly over 40 years in explaining its strategic policy to the American people. The size of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal—approximately 10,000 weapons—naturally appears extravagant, even obscene, to those who believe both that a weapon in the arsenal is the same as a weapon on a target, and that the targets are cities. After all, how many cities are there in the Soviet Union?

The public should be able to understand that 10,000 nuclear weapons in the peacetime arsenal might be reduced to, say, 3,000 by a Soviet surprise attack. Those hypothetical 3,000 surviving weapons would be targeted against the assets of the Soviet state, not Soviet society. As a target structure, the Soviet state comprises literally thousands of more and less important military, political-control, and defense-economic assets. Furthermore, our 3,000 weapons would be opposed by Soviet air and missile defenses. The purpose of our arms buildup is to be able to develop a force that, even depleted by a Soviet first strike, and even impaired by Soviet anti-aircraft missiles and missile defense, will still be able to wreak massive damage upon the Soviet state—this knowledge, we hope, will deter the Soviet Union from attacking in the first place. But



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According to recently declassified British intelligence documents from the late 1930s, the British admiralty used the argument that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 was worth abiding by because otherwise the situation would be even worse. Actually, it's difficult to see how. The Germans may have built more ships, but the British could have as well. As it was, the Germans violated the agreement flagrantly, building, for example, 45 percent larger cruisers than permitted.

Americans have the false impression that we are successfully preventing the growth of Soviet missiles and warheads. In fact, we are not. SALT II places limits on weapon launchers or silos. The reason for this is that silos are holes in the ground and consequently are easy to count; missiles and warheads are much more difficult to tabulate. Arms control places no direct constraints on numbers of missiles and warheads, or on quantity of missile "throw weight." It is these that are significant in conflict, not the holes they come from. In this respect, the fundamental premise of arms control is misguided.

### **Myth 2: The ABM Treaty saves money and contributes to stability.**

The Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 has been described as the "jewel in the crown" of arms control. A founding father of modern arms control theory, Thomas Schelling, claimed recently in *Foreign Affairs*, "I consider [the ABM Treaty] the culmination of 15 years of progress, not merely the high point but the end point of successful arms control."

Arms controllers believed that the ABM Treaty, by preventing the United States and the Soviet Union from deploying missile defenses, would put a brake on the offensive-defensive spiral of the arms race. Specifically, it was felt that both countries would react to the other side's missile defenses by trying to bolster their offensive arsenals in order to be able to penetrate and overwhelm the defense. Outlawing defenses would eliminate the incentive for this offensive proliferation, arms control advocates insisted. Further, they believed that mutual offensive reductions could be more easily negotiated in an atmosphere that was not complicated by missile defense. Essentially, ABM advocates felt that the treaty expressed a notion of strategic stability held by both the United States and the Soviet Union, that it would curtail offensive nuclear competition, and that it would save money on defensive and offensive weapons that would not need to be built.

The United States signed the ABM Treaty on the clear understanding that its utility depended on its ability to restrain the Soviet offensive arsenal. Today experts with roughly equal access to the technical data can disagree on whether it would have been possible for the United States to build a technologically viable missile defense in 1972. There is no disagreement, however, on the fact that Soviet defensive and (more importantly) offensive nuclear efforts have proceeded in massive disregard for both the spirit of arms control and nuclear restraint, and of the letter of arms control law.

During the 1970s, the United States did very little about missile defenses. Indeed it even dismantled the one missile defense site permitted by the ABM Treaty—the site at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. Nor did the United States build nuclear missiles designed to be maximally lethal against Soviet missiles in hard silos. This country imposed on itself a unilateral "nuclear freeze." All this was aimed at generating reciprocal restraint from the Soviet Union. And it did save the country money on weapons that were not built.

But at what cost? During the mid- and late 1970s, the

Soviet Union spent an astonishing sum on strategic offensive and defensive measures. In his *Annual Report* for fiscal 1987, Caspar Weinberger shows the Soviet Union outspending the United States by \$80 billion on strategic defense procurement from 1970 to 1985. In the same period, the United States was outspent by \$390 billion in the field of nuclear offense procurement.

Why did the Soviet Union build all these weapons? There can only be one reason. It does not share the theory of strategic stability so lucidly outlined by arms control advocates in this country. However bewildered arms controllers were by the escalating Soviet arsenal, we must assume that it did not bewilder Soviet leaders, since they consciously directed the increase and backed it up with huge amounts of scarce resources. Soviet military journals, moreover, expressed open contempt and derision for the assumptions that underpinned the ABM Treaty. Anyone reading the Soviet literature and taking it seriously would not be surprised when our theory that the Soviet Union was merely trying to "catch up" and would stop building weapons after that, was rudely refuted by the historical evidence.

So what the ABM Treaty essentially permitted was the development of a plausible Soviet theory of military victory. The Soviet Union might be able to maneuver itself into a position where it could threaten the destruction of the majority of U.S. nuclear forces, and absorb much of our retaliatory strike through strategic defensive measures of all kinds. This would be a very dangerous situation indeed. Knowledge of this possibility has led President Reagan to direct initiation of our own strategic defense efforts, plus nuclear modernization to make our missiles less vulnerable to Soviet attack. Unfortunately, after a decade of relative neglect, such a belated effort to restore equilibrium has proved and is proving very expensive. So the ABM Treaty turns out not to have saved money in the long run; what we didn't spend in the 1970s we now have to spend on missile modernization, Midgetman, strategic defense research, and other measures designed to frustrate Soviet plans for military victory.

### **Myth 3: Verification and compliance are virtually synonymous.**

The organized arms control lobby (the Arms Control Association, Federation of American Scientists, Union of Concerned Scientists, Center for Defense Information, and so on) argues that the Soviet Union basically is complying with its legal obligations under arms control agreements and treaties. It is argued, further, that such violations as there may be, are minor in scale and importance and that there are established diplomatic procedures for coping with compliance problems. In particular, the ABM Treaty established a Standing Consultative Commission that is said to have worked well in the past.

Until quite recently, at least, the U.S. defense community behaved and spoke as though verification and compliance were fully interchangeable concepts. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was orthodox wisdom among conservatives as well as liberals, that the Soviet Union would be deterred from non-compliance by the fear of being discovered. Generally it was believed that an arms control agreement would be self-enforcing. It was argued that since states only sign an arms control agreement that serves their interests, they would not imperil the benefits by violating its provisions and risking discovery and retribution in pursuit of marginal illicit gain. Arms control non-compliance was considered highly improbable, given modern tools of verification and the pressures to conform.

Again, history proved the theory wrong. Soviet viola-



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tions have been important and persistent; indeed it is difficult to think of an arms control treaty, with the possible exception of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, that the Soviet Union has not violated. It would take too long to catalogue Soviet violations in literally dozens of categories. Here are a few:

- Flight testing and deploying a second new type of ICBM (the SS-25): a violation of SALT II.
- Encrypting missile testing telemetry, thereby impeding verification: a violation of SALT II.
- Deploying more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than are permitted: a violation of SALT II.
- Backfire bombers have been deployed to the far north, thereby violating the Soviet commitment not to give Backfire an intercontinental capability: a violation of SALT II.
- Deploying a large phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk that is neither on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. nor oriented outwards: in violation of the ABM Treaty.
- Concurrent testing of ABM and SAM system components: in violation of the ABM Treaty.
- Using former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of ICBMs: in violation of SALT I Interim Agreement.
- Conducting underground nuclear tests that vent radioactive debris beyond the Soviet borders: in violation of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
- Conducting nuclear tests of greater than 150 kiloton yield: in violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.
- Maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and capability: in violation of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention of 1972.

In sum, Soviet non-compliance and circumvention has meant that the treaties and agreements at issue have failed to accomplish the habits of obedience and control of the Soviet arsenal that they were designed, on our side, to achieve. Nonetheless, the U.S. military disadvantages that have flowed from "the expanding pattern of Soviet violations," as Weinberger calls them, are really smaller in significance than the lack of nuclear modernization that the United States, affected by arms control treaties and what may be termed the arms control temperament, failed to pursue during the late 1970s.

#### **Myth 4: Arms control violations do not affect our national security.**

Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI) reflects the view of the arms control community when he says:

The violations [of SALT by the Soviet Union] are politically harmful because they undermine American support for arms control and because they cry out for an American response, but in military terms they don't amount to a hill of beans.

Arms control advocates like Aspin seem to think that the main problem with arms control violations is that silly Americans get all worked up about them, operating on the principle that mutual agreements should be rigorously kept and other such bourgeois assumptions. In fact, the Aspin point of view only reflects the arms control narcotic at work. Many advocates have such a quasi-mystical view of arms control that they see it as an end in itself—they refuse to consider the significance of treaty violations or to hold the arms control process accountable or hostage to such violations.

This is also the historical reality. Western democracies have tended to place so much value on arms control that they do not want to hazard its termination by insisting on strict compliance. The idea seems to be that if the door is kept locked too tightly, the burglar may be tempted to

shoot his way in.

Japanese, German, and Italian treaty violations before World War II were just about as militarily significant as Soviet violations in recent decades. For example, in a recent study of arms control, Robin Ranger writes that in its battleship and cruiser building program, Japan violated the terms of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty by 70 to 100 percent on all 10 of its ships with reference to the 3,000-ton modernization allowance, while four ships also exceeded the 35,000-ton displacement limit. Germany demonstrated its regard for arms control and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 by constructing its two *Bismarck* class battleships with 42,000-ton displacements, considerably above the 35,000 tons permitted.

These violations were politically harmful not merely because they reduced public support in England for the arms control process, as Les Aspin would have it. They were politically harmful because they convinced Germany and Japan that the Allies were weak, that they could not enforce their treaties, that they were not even bold enough to insist on compliance, that there was constant hand-wringing and rationalization for hostile behavior. Thus arms control demonstrated weakness that could only have increased the confidence of Germany and Japan that increasing the military pressure would bring political capitulation from the Western democracies.

On the military front, military power is most effective when it does not have to be used. Stable deterrence is not a function of a large arsenal of weapons alone; such an arsenal deters only if a possible enemy believes he should respect the contingent threats. U.S. decisions not to undercut a SALT regime that the President claims the Soviet Union is violating, and indeed to pursue new agreements, invite and merit a Soviet disrespect that is dangerous for peace. Les Aspin is right that the political implications of Soviet treaty violations are most important, but it is for this reason, not the one he gives.

Aspin is wrong that violations are unimportant in military terms: pause to consider why they are taking place. Obviously Germany in 1935, and the Soviet Union in recent years, both felt that they were benefiting from going beyond the bounds of the agreements; otherwise they would not have violated them. In the case of the Soviet Union, one simply has to look at the treaty violations listed earlier to see that they are by no means trivial in military terms. It should be obvious that bolstering the engine of Soviet strategic power, its long-range ICBMs, brings military advantages; defending its military targets and top leadership through illicit defense fulfills the goal of protecting the lives that the Soviets value most.

#### **Myth 5: Strategic defense poses a threat to arms control.**

In a *Foreign Affairs* article published in the winter of 1984-85, McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith asserted that the United States has reached a fork in the policy road—"The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control?" It is their view, indeed it is the leading item in the Athanasian Creed of the arms control lobby, that defensive deployments, actual or in prospect, *must* stimulate countervailing offensive deployments. Therefore, the President cannot have both the strategic defense initiative (SDI) and arms control. The arms control lobby claims that what they like to call "Star Wars" would stand an outside chance of fulfilling some of its strategic promise only in the context of supportive arms control agreements to reduce the quantity, and perhaps quality, of offensive firepower and, even more important, to help protect vulnerable space-based assets. The elemen-



## Are U.S. Reserves Ready to Fight?

By WILLIAM V. KENNEDY

An internal memorandum by Maj. Gen. Robert E. Wagner drew some press last Sunday. The commander of the Reserve Officer Training Corps charged that the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are unable to meet needed readiness standards. Nearly half of the U.S. Army's strength in wartime would be made up of such reserves.

But this state of affairs could be remedied by adopting procedures used by the Air Force. Until this is done, however, no one can really know the true state of readiness of either the Army or the Navy.

A small mountain of evidence supports Gen. Wagner's criticisms, dating back to a yearlong study by the Army War College in 1972—a study that was largely suppressed by the Guard and Reserve. The problem, however, goes much deeper.

When the decision was made in the 1970s to reduce the U.S. Army from its Vietnam peak of 1.55 million men to its present strength of 777,000, the then Chief of Staff, Gen. Creighton Abrams, chose to maintain the same number of active Army divisions—16. The Army is now organizing two additional active divisions.

The maintenance of roughly seven division equivalents in more or less continuous combat in Vietnam taxed the Army worldwide, and reduced the Seventh Army in Europe and units in the U.S. to little more than shells. How is it then that the Army can today claim to effectively operate 18 divisions at half the strength it had when it was strained to the limit operating seven divisions in Vietnam? And that was against an enemy far more poorly equipped than the Soviets.

One of the means used to stretch active Army strength is to substitute National Guard and Reserve units for active Army units in most of the U.S.-based divisions. In most cases the substitution is an entire brigade, out of the normal three-brigade allocation. The 1972 Army War College study warned that no Guard or Reserve brigade could then meet the readiness goals required. And this was when the Army had a highly qualified pool of recruits in the reserves—individuals who joined as an alternative to the Vietnam War draft.

In short, no U.S. Army division anywhere in the world can be committed to combat without immediate support in some degree from National Guard and Reserve units presumed to be capable of operating at a level of efficiency equivalent to a well-trained, fully equipped active Army unit.

More serious questions about the quality of training in both the active and civilian components have been glossed over for years by an Army readiness reporting system that depends entirely on the judgment of the unit commander. For a commander to report his unit is poorly trained would, in effect, attack all of the optimistic assumptions on which Army force structure and budgets now are based. So the pressures to report a "can do" status are enormous. Yet Army battalions required to undergo the severe training regimen at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., are found to have serious

weaknesses in everything from map reading to tactics.

In marked contrast to the Army's subjective readiness reporting system is the Air Force system by which unit readiness is tested by an Operation Readiness Inspection. The ORI is a no-notice performance test administered by a team from outside the command. Simply put, if a fighter-bomber squadron cannot put the bombs and rockets in the circle within the time allotted and with an acceptable number of aircraft available it is reported to be not ready. The commander generally is replaced.

The Navy system is about halfway between that of the Army and the Air Force, but it lacks the severe no-notice, service-wide standardization features of the Air Force ORI. As a result the Navy judges readiness by "cross-decking" people, equipment and supplies—that is, transferring resources from a ship that has just been inspected to a ship about to be inspected—to hide shortages that would lead to ships and aircraft squadrons being declared non-ready.

What are some of the implications of such flawed readiness standards? Well, for example, if the level of true readiness is indeed far below that now being reported by the Army and Navy, then the degree of reliance the U.S. would have to place on nuclear weapons in any major confrontation with the Soviet Union would be far greater than is generally now realized.

In an attempt to get at the truth, and to drive the Army and Navy toward the Air Force ORI system, the House Armed Services Committee last year ordered the Defense Department to develop a uniform readiness reporting system modeled on the Air Force's ORI. In particular, the committee called for an accurate evaluation of

those Guard and Reserve units assigned to "round out" active units. (Maj. Gen. Wagner wrote that "These [round-out] forces will not be prepared to go to war in synchronization with their affiliated active duty formations. The Army is deceiving itself to state otherwise.")

The response by the Pentagon and Joint Chiefs of Staff was a model of everything that Sens. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.) and Sam Nunn (D., Ga.) have been saying is wrong with the JCS system. To avoid getting into embarrassing comparisons between the services the JCS simply avoided talking at all about the service readiness reporting systems, and limited its reply solely to the means by which reports from the services are synthesized once they reach the JCS. Nothing at all, the JCS concluded, needed to be changed.

In its report on the current (fiscal 1986) Authorization Act, the Armed Services Committee states that it is "disappointed by the lack of analysis, responsiveness and creativity displayed. . . . The reports neither addressed the stated concerns of the committee, nor . . . provided reasonable alternatives. . . . Instead, they defended the status quo. . . ." exactly what Sens. Goldwater and Nunn say the JCS does all the time. In exasperation, the Armed Services Committee earlier this year directed the General Accounting Office to conduct the analysis that the services dodged. To date, no progress has been made and the analysis appears to be in a permanent state of limbo.

One hopes that Maj. Gen. Wagner's warning will at last force the Defense Department to confront the issue.

*Mr. Kennedy, a retired colonel in the Army Reserve, was a member of the Army War College faculty for 17 years.*

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## The Heavy Traffic in Northern Seas

By John C. Ausland

**O**SLO — The U.S. Navy finds it difficult to intimidate its Soviet counterpart without also alarming America's allies. A good example is the assertive posture it has assumed on the defense of the Norwegian Sea.

Nordic awareness of this change has developed gradually. NATO commanders for the Atlantic have spoken of a forward defense in the Norwegian Sea since the late 1970s, but until recently, they attracted little attention. Statements by the U.S. navy secretary, John Lehman, early in the 1980s about "horizontal escalation" created more of a stir, but eventually faded into the background.

In 1984, Vice Admiral Henry Mustin came to Oslo with a new idea. (He was then commander of NATO's Striking Fleet, which, in wartime, would consist of a U.S. carrier task force and allied units.) His proposal was to see whether an aircraft carrier could be operated in a Norwegian fjord. With some misgivings, Norwegian authorities agreed to the deploy-

ment of the carrier *America* in a northern fjord last fall, in connection with NATO exercises. Though the experiment created no great controversy, the admiral did not endear himself to Oslo authorities by speaking publicly of an "offensive" strategy in the Norwegian Sea.

The U.S. chief of naval operations, Admiral James Watson, spurred new debate with his article "The Maritime Strategy." This appeared in a supplement to the January issue of the U.S. Naval Institute's journal, *Proceedings*. Two things about the article particularly alarmed many Norwegians. One was the suggestion that the U.S. Navy planned to attack Soviet nuclear-missile submarines during the conventional phase of any conflict. The other was Admiral Watson's assurance that the Soviets would have no sanctuaries in any conflict. For people in the Nordic countries, this meant the Kola penin-

sula would be subject to attack.

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs gave the public a vivid account of Soviet military installations on Kola in August, when it published a report based partly on satellite photography (*IHT, Aug. 23*).

Norwegian authorities know that NATO has plans for attacking these installations in an East-West conflict. But they do not like to talk about the possibility that such attacks might involve use of Norwegian bases.

The two most senior NATO commanders underlined the importance they attach to this part of the world by making personal appearances. General Bernard Rogers came from Brussels to hold a news conference near Oslo to launch his 1986 Autumn Forge exercises, which extend from northern Norway to Turkey. Admiral Lee Baggett, who recently became NATO commander for the Atlantic, was here in connection with a visit by

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A Arms Control

# NUCLEAR DELUSIONS

## Six Arms Control Fallacies

COLIN S. GRAY

The enormous criticism heaped on President Reagan for his decision that the United States will no longer feel obliged to abide by the constraints of SALT II shows the extent to which arms control mythology pervades American culture and American elites. It is not that Americans are naive about the nature of the Soviet Union. Surveys show a quite sensible appreciation by the American public of the threat this country faces from the Soviet Union. Yet Americans have been seduced by the arms control narcotic. They have been led to believe that the very fact of arms control, or the "arms control process" as it is often loftily termed, is an automatic protection against the risk of war.

The U.S. commitment to the arms control process today may be likened to what Dr. Samuel Johnson had to say about second marriages—it is a triumph of hope over experience. A proper respect for experience should be a principal source of guidance for debate over U.S. arms control policy. It so happens that we have a very great deal of historical experience, both of the negotiation of arms control agreements with totalitarian powers and of the ways in which those powers behave and misbehave when nominally constrained by treaty.

What is described here is a record of actual arms control performance. People are at liberty to dream of ways in which the United States might seek the control and reduction of arms far more effectively in the future than has

been the case to date.

But if those dreams are to be offered as responsible advice for possible adoption as policy, they must meet some tests of reality. Much too often, there is a missing first sentence to some bold new vision from the heartland of the arms control community, which should read: "First, let us imagine a quite different Soviet Union."

Assuming the Soviet Union as it exists, and assuming arms control as we have had it and as we continue to perceive it, the record shows that arms control has ill served our national security. In particular, it has generated myths that continue to thrive, uninhibited by experience and evidence. These myths have the effect of averting our gaze from the real threats we must face if we want to preserve our freedom and security.

### Myth 1: Arms control reduces the size of superpower nuclear arsenals and creates stability.

Despite what its name implies, arms control has clearly not stopped the growth of superpower arsenals. One of the most damning indictments of the SALT era is that it has licensed, or at least been compatible with, a truly massive growth in both the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals. According to studies by John Collins for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, and by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the Soviet Union between 1970 and 1985 increased by 533 percent, from 1,876 to 9,987. The increase registered by the United States was 275 percent, from 4,000 to 10,174. This brings to mind Richard Pipes's ironic comment, "If this is arms control, it might be interesting to experiment for a while with an honest arms race."

Arms control advocates argue that while the arms control period has seen these rapid buildups, nevertheless arms control has controlled the rate of growth of strategic arsenals, which would otherwise be even higher. The reason for this, they say, is that each side builds weapons in response to, and in anticipation of, what the other side builds; therefore, a certain knowledge of the outer bounds of what the adversary will do should serve to dampen the engine of competition. By channeling arms growth into "stable" channels, where neither side can hope to launch a successful first strike against the other, arms control diminishes appetites for aggression and reduces the risk of war.

This is the theory. It is not entirely without merit. Arms control probably has curtailed the rate of growth of superpower arsenals, which might have been higher without it. But the real issue is the relative strength of those arsenals. If arms control has restrained the U.S. arsenal in such a way that the restrained Soviet arsenal is still in a position to destroy it, that would defeat the very purpose of arms control, which is to achieve stability and diminish the threat of war. The Soviet Union, using only a fraction of its total ICBM force, is in a position to destroy the vast majority of land-based U.S. silos in a first strike. Moreover, American bombers would have a difficult time penetrating Soviet air defenses, the best in the world. Even our nuclear submarines may be vulnerable as detection techniques become more sophisticated; in any case, military analysts have long been opposed to allowing national security to hinge on a single "leg" of our deterrent triad. What could be more "unstable" than this?

All the evidence suggests that the Soviet Union builds its missiles in response to its perceived military necessities, not in congruence with agreements signed with the West. Indeed the Soviet Union only signs treaties that do not inhibit its weapons-building plans; when those plans are threatened by treaty, the Soviet Union has not been shy to violate treaties to which it has affixed its name.

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the NATO Military Committee.

Speaking to the press at the U.S. Embassy, Admiral Baggett sought to calm Norwegian concerns. He described the experiment with placing a carrier in a fjord as the development of one option. He emphasized that any attack on the Kola peninsula would require a political decision. On the other hand, he expressed the hope that U.S. naval forces would be able to step up their exercise activity in the North Atlantic, particularly during bad weather.

This month and next, 10 exercises are taking place in NATO's northern region, from Hamburg to northern Norway. Here are some highlights:

- A U.S. aircraft carrier, the *Nimitz*, has appeared in a Norwegian fjord. The emphasis was on defending the carrier against submarines.

- Allied forces are conducting the largest exercise in southern Norway since 1952. The focus up to now on northern Norway led to criticism here that the military was neglecting the south, where most of the population and industry are.

- NATO naval and air forces are exercising new procedures for coordinating operations. The command arrangements in the waters around Norway are particularly complex. If

NATO naval forces are to operate effectively and to get support from land-based air units, closer coordination is necessary.

- The Canadian brigade, dedicated for years to the reinforcement of northern Norway, is exercising there for the first time.

- The staff of the U.S. 9th Division will participate in an exercise in Denmark. This division is a part of General Rogers's Rapid Reinforcement Plan. Its home station is on the U.S. West Coast, and there are no plans to preposition matériel in Denmark. One must assume that the designation of the division as reinforcement for Denmark serves more of a political than military purpose.

- A new amphibious assault ship will practice unloading U.S. Marine equipment in Denmark.

These NATO exercises are the counterpart of last year's Soviet exercise Summerex 85, in the Atlantic.

With all this activity, Nordic political leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain that this is an area of low tension. Still, they cling to this concept. To do otherwise would expose them to even greater crossfire between those who are anti-military and those who favor a strong defense.

*International Herald Tribune.*



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*Note*

# Arms Talks: 20 Years Of Duds?

## Study for ACDA Finds Few Benefits

By R. Jeffrey Smith  
Washington Post Staff Writer

For more than 20 years, arms control has occupied center stage in U.S.-Soviet relations and played a major role in domestic U.S. politics. Despite the lavish attention, however, it has had virtually no success in controlling nuclear arsenals or changing the behavior of the superpowers.

This is the controversial thesis of a new 500-page study conducted for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) by Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Presented here last week at a seminar for U.S. arms control officials, the study won praise from ACDA's director even though it dismisses many commonplace notions about the benefits of arms control agreements.

"Those who hoped arms control would bring about major reductions in existing or planned [weapons] inventories or slow the introduction of new and more capable technologies have little grounds for satisfaction," the study concluded after surveying five sets of U.S.-Soviet superpower negotiations: SALT I, SALT II, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the inconclusive 1979 effort to ban antisatellite weapons and the 1971 Accident Measures Agreement.

The study, titled "Learning from Experience with Arms Control," summarized that "what emerges above all is the modesty of what arms control has wrought. Expectations, for better, or worse, for the most part have not been realized."

The principal evidence for this glum conclusion was the fact that none of the arms control agreements examined greatly disturbed the military plans of either side, the report said. "All agreements ...

were consistent with existing military force structures," it concluded. "None required substantial changes in the nature or size of those forces."

Although liberals will presumably see this observation as an admonition to try harder in the future, some conservatives have interpreted it as proof that arms control may not be worth the effort, at least as practiced by the past five presidents.

ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman, who commissioned the \$170,000 study last year, said for example that "it shows there hasn't been much restraint on either side, when all is said and done. This suggests to me that arms control should take its rightful place [alongside] human rights, regional issues, and other topics. As important as arms control is, it isn't everything."

This theme meshes well with the Reagan administration's avowed policy of deemphasizing arms control in favor of building up the U.S. nuclear arsenal—a policy that is based in part on the belief that arms control has been futile and unproductive, and in part on a preference for technical, rather than diplomatic, solutions to the arms race, according to administration officials.

But other elements of the report seemed likely to give the administration and some of its conservative followers heartburn. It concluded, for example, that however modest their ambitions, arms control negotiators will inevitably deadlock if the relevant arsenals of the superpowers are not roughly equivalent. This tends to undercut the belief of some administration officials that the United States can negotiate successfully from "a position of strength."

The report also concluded that arms control is unlikely to lull the country into military complacency, a favorite theme of assistant defense secretary Richard N. Perle, Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr., former National Security Council staff member Richard Pipes and former ACDA director Eugene Rostow, according to the report. As Adelman said, "the lulling effect" is the war cry of conservatives against arms control.

Some military expenditures—such as the appropriation for nuclear testing—were substantially increased in the wake of arms control agreements, the study said, while others declined for reasons unre-

lated to the agreement. In no case was the public attitude about the Soviets appreciably changed.

In addition, the study said, attempts to link progress in arms control with other foreign policy goals—to coerce Soviet behavior by threatening an arms control stalemate—are bound to fail. Its authors, including Harvard professor Albert Carnesale and lecturer Richard Haass, observed that "for the most part, the Soviets have resisted compromising their regional objectives for the sake of arms control." Haass was a deputy assistant secretary of state during Reagan's first term.

Moreover, they said, "active linkage diplomacy is often beyond the capacity of the United States to choreograph" because too little consensus exists within the government to send consistently strong diplomatic threats.

Typically, the report said, "linkage" works only in reverse, and arms control becomes the prisoner, not the warden, of overall U.S.-Soviet relations. "Arms control does not tend to lead to improved ties overall, nor does it necessarily require them," the report concluded, "although it benefits from them."

This contradicts the common assumption of several past Republican and Democratic presidents, including Richard M. Nixon and Jimmy Carter, that arms control progress is so eagerly sought by the Soviets that they will bend to American will. Soviet adventurism in Southeast Asia and North Africa was not lessened as a result of arms control agreements or stalemates, the report observed.

Considerable evidence is offered to support the conclusion that the past 20 years of arms control rarely controlled arms. The 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement "required no changes in U.S. and Soviet force structures or modernization plans," they said. It failed, for example, to constrain the deployment of MIRVs, or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

Similarly, the 1979 SALT II treaty "essentially [codified] existing forces and plans to modernize them," the study said. No limits were placed on the development of new submarines and bombers, and only temporary limits were placed on mobile and cruise missiles. Numerical totals were set so high that

each side could develop and deploy new weapons systems.

Even the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, one of the most sweeping arms control agreements, failed to ban tests of the "fixed land-based systems then judged most promising, [or] require abandonment of the Moscow ABM deployment," the study said.

Simply put, neither side gave up the weapons it liked most. Instead, they happily agreed to broad constraints on nuclear arms at sites that held little interest, such as the Antarctic (1959), outer space (1967), and the ocean floor (1971), the study said.

When agreement was reached, it was in part because neither side had "an appreciable advantage." Large antiballistic missile systems were banned because "both sides concluded that competition in this area would prove costly, possibly destabilizing, and in the near term technologically futile," the study said. In contrast, neither side was willing to agree to limitations on antisatellite weapons at a moment when the Soviets seemed to be ahead in that technology.

Carnesale, a nuclear engineer and longtime government adviser on arms control, said that this factor alone suggests failure for President Reagan's recent proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles. Both sides would then be dependent on bombers and cruise missiles, in which the United States holds a numerical and technological advantage; as a result, he says, the Soviets will not agree.

It also suggests failure, Carnesale said, for the administration's yearlong effort to persuade the Soviets that the ABM treaty does not constrain the most exotic missile defense technologies, in which the United States also holds a clear advantage. "Only if technology emerges sufficiently gradually and at comparable rates on both sides" will arms control have an opportunity to curb it, the study says.

The report suggests that the most the public can expect is an agreement that puts a cap of sorts on the growth of nuclear forces beyond existing plans, by keeping in check so-called "worst case" assumptions about the other side.

"If the history reveals anything," the report concluded, "it is that arms control has proved neither as promising as some had hoped nor as dangerous as others had feared."



# Non-nuclear warfare 'advances' are cited

**BEVERLY  
ORNDORFF**



Most of the discussions about war over the past several decades have focused on nuclear weapons and their consequences, from the poisoning of the Earth and its atmosphere with radioactive products to the prospects of a catastrophic "nuclear winter."

Nuclear weapons are, many people believe, contributions from the dark side of science and technology.

But we often tend to overlook what science and technology have created in the realm of non-nuclear warfare. If somehow, all nuclear weapons could be eliminated immediately, it would not mean that future wars would be benign.

In fact, science and technology have continued contributing mightily to the weapons of non-nuclear warfare. Any large-scale future non-nuclear war would not simply be like World War II with modernized planes, tanks and ships; it more likely would resemble scenes from recent space movies, in which intelligent, automated devices would play key roles.

A glimpse of some of the current instruments of modern, non-nuclear warfare is being provided by Frank Barnaby, former director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and now chairman of Just Defence, an organization based at Oxford University in England that is promoting a strong non-nuclear defense for the North American Treaty Organization.

Barnaby talks about such new weapons in a book soon to be published, "The Automated Battlefield," published by The Free Press. An excerpt was printed in the October issue of Technology Review, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology publication.

Modern, non-nuclear warfare weapons, Barnaby notes, rely heavily on "smart" missiles that can home in on targets miles away and, like tenacious bloodhounds, keep on the target's path. Computers, radar and sensors of various sorts literally give many modern weapons minds of their own.

As a result, scenarios of advanced warfare, according to Barnaby, might include:

- Over an approaching column of invading tanks comes a silent flock of missiles, fired from up to 25 miles away. Each hovers momentarily above the tanks, selects a target and fires a high-speed projectile at the turret and engine cover, the most vulnerable parts. None selects a tank that has been picked for attack by another missile.

There are various kinds of such missiles. Some are

aimed, fired and tracked by operators in jeeps, armored cars or helicopters; newer versions are guided by laser beams, and ones under development contain clusters of smaller missiles, each capable of destroying a tank. Those, Barnaby said, could be operated from aircraft or unmanned planes controlled by radio.

Tanks, meanwhile, are being developed that have "active armor," which contains sensors capable of detecting oncoming missiles and setting off explosives that would destroy the warheads before they could cause significant damage.

- Invading aircraft, up to 40 miles away and up to 15 miles high, touch off an early warning system that involves computer analysis of the aircrafts' courses, fires missiles toward them and guides the missiles to their targets. More advanced models of air-to-air missiles can seek out enemy aircraft, identify them and attack, all without further assistance from pilots once they have fired them.

- Invasion warships also need to be concerned about such "fire-and-forget" missiles that, once fired, will seek out, identify and strike the threatening ships from up to nearly 45 miles away.

All of the conventional vehicles of war, tanks, aircraft and ships, are extremely vulnerable to the new, smart weapons, according to Barnaby, and ships are the most vulnerable. Further, the newer weapons are only a fraction of the cost of the traditional vehicles.

He cited, for example, the sinking of the \$50 million British frigate HMS Sheffield during the 1982 Falklands war by a \$250,000 French-made missile fired by Argentina. Aircraft carriers and destroyers costing \$1 billion to \$3 billion now can be destroyed by "fire-and-forget" missiles costing about \$800,000.

A modern strategic bomber can cost more than \$200 million, and can be destroyed by smart missiles costing slightly more than \$1 million.

Modern tanks cost about \$3 million each now, but missiles costing from \$20,000 to \$40,000 can destroy them.

Such facts, of course, are provoking new discussions about the nature of warfare and about the old ways of doing things. Barnaby, for example, questions whether it's worth the tremendous costs anymore for nations to build huge warships, tanks and manned warplanes, considering their growing vulnerability. On tanks, for example, he said, "The plain fact is that it is virtually impossible to hide some 60 tons of hot metal on the modern battlefield from the sensors of intelligent missiles."

Similarly, it appears that it is becoming virtually impossible to hide tons and tons of metal in the shapes of ships and bombers on the open sea and in the air from the products of modern science and technology, which since the era of spears and bows and arrows has eternally changed the nature of warfare.

## Wellington for no-nuke zone treaty

WELLINGTON (Reuters) — New Zealand will ratify the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, Prime Minister David Lange said yesterday, calling it a small but important

step in the arms control process.

The treaty, adopted at the South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga in August last year, declares the region a nuclear-free zone and prohibits the ownership, use, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste in the region.

"We think it is important, at this time when the South Pacific is asking Washington, London, Moscow, Peking and Paris to formally commit themselves to the protocols, that we take the step of formally committing

ourselves to the treaty," Mr. Lange said in a statement.

He added: "It is the first international arms control agreement concluded since the ill-fated SALT II accords in 1979. It is proof that progress in arms control is possible if countries have the determination and political will to make it happen."

The treaty allows nations to set their own policies on calls by nuclear ships and aircraft.

New Zealand bans port calls by ships carrying nuclear weapons. For that reason Washington no longer re-

gards New Zealand as an ANZUS treaty partner and no longer offers military cooperation.

Fiji, the Cook Islands, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa have ratified the treaty, and 10 of the 13 Forum countries, including Australia and New Zealand, have signed it.

Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kapitsa said during a visit to New Zealand in August that his country would sign the protocols after regional countries ratified the pact.



# AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

February 6, 1987

John M. Fisher  
President

*Arms  
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The Honorable Linas Kojelis  
Office of Public Liaison  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Linas:

Two weeks ago the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations completed a series of three hearings on two unratified nuclear testing treaties. A Committee markup of a resolution of ratification of the two treaties will be held soon, and Majority Leader Robert Byrd has said he will expeditiously schedule a vote on the Senate's advice and consent.

The two treaties are the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed in 1974 by President Nixon and the late Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), signed in 1976 by President Ford and Brezhnev. The TTBT is a successor pact to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The TTBT limits underground explosions to a yield of 150 kilotons -- roughly 10 times the size of the explosion which destroyed Hiroshima in August, 1945. The PNET is designed to prevent the use of so-called "peaceful" explosions from being used to circumvent the controls applied by the TTBT to weapons tests.

The two treaties were submitted to the Senate by President Ford in 1976, and the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings in 1977 and ordered the treaties favorably reported. However, for several reasons, they were not actually reported and have been on the Committee calander since. The American Security Council opposed these treaties a decade ago because of their almost total lack of verification procedures, and at the very minimum, we feel that on-site verification is essential for their ratification.

Because of your interest in national security, I want to bring to your attention information about the compliance record of the Soviet Union with the TTBT. As you know, this session of Congress will be concerned with a number of major arms control proposals, and both of the treaties reflect the pattern of gross violations that we have come to expect from Moscow.

The attached Defense Department chart clearly indicates that the Soviet Union is flagrantly violating the TTBT limit of 150 kilotons put into effect in March of 1976.



The Honorable Linas Kojelis  
February 6, 1987  
Page Two

In fact, there have been at least 24 Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests since 1978 which are estimated to be above the 150-kiloton limit. There is also 95 percent confidence that several tests have been at the level of 250 kilotons or above.

In addition, Secretary of State George Shultz has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that during the week of June 16th the Soviet Union tested another nuclear weapon which was about "double" the 150-kiloton limit -- approximately 300 kilotons.

The Defense Department chart indicates that since 1978, the Soviet Union has conducted at least five tests at the 300-kiloton level or higher -- a factor of twice that allowed by TTBT.


The U.S. has given the Soviet Union the benefit of every doubt in TTBT compliance, even going so far as to change our methodology more than two times in the Soviets' favor. Nevertheless, the Soviets continue to violate TTBT.

The vertical axis of the chart is labeled "The Sliding Rulers," showing how the U.S. has changed its methodology twice. The horizontal bars represent the 150-kiloton thresholds, expressed in terms of the Richter Scale.

The lowest bar represents the 150-kiloton threshold for U.S. underground nuclear tests at the Nevada test site. The upper two bars represent Soviet 150-kiloton thresholds, as revised upwards by the U.S. to the benefit of the Soviets.

Each dot on the chart represents a Soviet test of a nuclear weapon at the Shagan River Test Area. For instance, the chart indicates the results of four nuclear tests at the site in 1976. During the up-coming congressional debates on nuclear testing I hope you will remember the Soviet compliance record, and the fact that the prestigious General Advisory Commission of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has submitted a report to President Reagan listing 50 substantive Soviet violations of arms control accords.

Cordially,




John M. Fisher

JMF/lg  
enclosure

P.S. I am also enclosing an article I wrote last year on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. House Joint Resolution Three was passed in the last Congress and it called for the immediate negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban. Even though the attached article is a year old, the information is still current and I hope you find it of use.

# SOVIET NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (SHAGAN RIVER TEST AREA) GLOBAL MAGNITUDES (N.E.I.S.) VS TIME



TTBT Hearings,  
Senate Foreign  
Relations Committee

Note: If the Soviets were testing up to the 150 KT limit of the TTBT in the first three years of the Treaty (as would be expected - the US certainly did), the Soviets are now testing up to 300 KT. Alternatively, if they are testing below 150 KT now, they must have restricted testing to below 75 KT during the first 2-1/2 years. This is an unrealistic assumption.



# SOVIET THREAT

**CombatArms**  
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MILITARY ANALYSTS

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Pg. 43.

# SOVIET MILITARY POWER

*Calms  
Tale*

## THE RED THREAT TO PEACE ESCALATES

**By Joe Poyer**

*Editor's note: Over the past three years, the editors of ICA have printed an annual assessment of the military power of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Each point of view is based on documentation published by both governments. Two incidents have prompted a change in this format. First, the Soviet Union has chosen not to provide such documentation this year, and second, the Reagan Administration announced in May 1986 that the United States will no longer be bound by certain provisions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II) because of Soviet infringements. This year, then, we will examine Soviet military power and its growth in recent years. We will also look at some reasons for the Reagan Administration's decision to forego certain SALT provisions.*

**S**oviet military power has increased at a remarkable rate since the early 1970s. In some respects, part of this growth was allowed by the SALT treaties; SALT I & II, after all, were supposed to create greater parity between the superpowers, eliminating the fear that one side might feel strong enough to attempt a nuclear first strike. Since the United States had an advantage at the time, the intent was to allow the Soviet Union to catch up (a fact conveniently forgotten by some critics of U.S. arms control policy) until further negotiations could reduce the levels of strategic nuclear weapons and perhaps eliminate them altogether. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the United States Senate refused to ratify the already negotiated SALT II treaty, and strategic arms talks came to a standstill.

Both governments announced that they would observe the provisions of SALT II, even in the absence of ratification. But the Reagan Administration is now questioning whether the Soviet Union has intentionally exceeded the limits imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the two SALT treaties.

### STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POWER—FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY?

The growth of Soviet military power, and in particular the growth of Soviet nuclear forces over the past four years, sug-

POWER . . . CONTINUED

gests very strongly that the Soviet Union is attempting to achieve a first-strike or pre-emptive capability. If so, they have violated both the spirit and letter of the SALT treaties. Within the past two years they have developed the following:

- The SS-25 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which recently reached operational status; 70 or more have now been deployed.

- The SS-18 Modification 4 ICBM, the largest and most powerful ever built, with 10 or more multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV); it is nearing complete deployment in new super-hardened silos.

- Testing of the new SS-X-24 rail-mobile ICBM is continuing. This launcher can carry up to 10 MIRVed warheads.

- Typhoon-class and Delta IV-class nuclear-powered strategic submarines (SSBN) were launched: both boats are capable of carrying submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) fitted with MIRVed warheads.

Clearly, three of these five new weapons systems, the SS-18-4 and the Typhoon and Delta IV subs, would seem to be first-strike weapons. The SS-25 and SS-X-24 can be considered defensive weapons, in that they are designed to survive a nuclear attack and still provide a retaliatory force. But their mobile configuration and the ability of the SS-X-24 to carry up to 10 MIRVed warheads also make the latter a suitable first-strike weapon.

Similarly, the SS-18-4, the largest and most powerful of all ICBMs, and the two new SSBNs could be considered defensive. The MIRV capability of all three, however, suggests the ability to conduct an overwhelming first strike against hardened targets, while the newly modernized, reloadable, hardened SS-18-4 silos suggest the ability to support a follow-up second strike. When fully deployed, these three systems alone will have the ability to deliver between 4,406 and 4,886 warheads (of perhaps one megaton each) in a first strike, depending on the MIRV configuration of the Typhoon SSBN-launched SS-N-20 SLBMs.

Compounding evidence that the Soviets are developing a first-strike capability are the recent activities surrounding their antiballistic missile system, the only such operational system in the world. The 1972 ABM treaty limited ABM defenses to 100 reloadable missile launchers, plus associated command and control radar located within 150 kilometers of the national capital. Also included were those radar units on the nation's periphery designed to provide early warning only. The Soviet ABM system that currently surrounds Moscow is clearly in violation of the 1972 treaty.

Both nations recognized that long-range ballistic missile warning radar can play a significant role in ABM defenses, and so the ABM treaty stipulates that any such radar be located on the nation's periphery.

Abbreviations and Acronyms			
AA	Air-to-Air	SAA	Strategic Air Armies (U.S.S.R.)
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery		
ABM	Antiballistic Missile	SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare	SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
ATGM	Antitank Guided Missile	SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
BW	Biological Warfare	SLOC	Sea Lanes of Communication
CW	Chemical Warfare		
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile	SPETSNAZ	Special Operations Forces (U.S.S.R.)
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile	SSBN	Strategic Submarine Ballistic, Nuclear
LRINF	Longer Range Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile	TVD	Theatre of Military Operations (U.S.S.R.)
MIRV	Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles	V/STOL	Vertical/Short Takeoff & Landing
OMG	Operational Maneuver Groups (U.S.S.R.)	VTA	Soviet Military Transport Aviation (U.S.S.R.)

But the Soviets are currently constructing a new network of six large, phased-array radar units that can track ballistic missiles with greater accuracy than their existing Henhouse net. Five sites have been completed, and a sixth is under construction at Krasnoyarsk, 750 kilometers from the nearest border to the south and 3,700 kilometers east of the ABM site at Moscow. The Reagan Administration maintains that this site violates the 1972 ABM Treaty, which, under Article IV(b), requires the Parties "not to deploy in the future radar for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward."

The Soviets claim that the Krasnoyarsk site will be used for space tracking rather than ballistic missile early warning and therefore does not violate the ABM treaty. But not only is this radar system not suitable for space tracking, it would add little to their already extensive space tracking network. The design of the radar system at Krasnoyarsk appears identical to systems in other facilities used for ballistic missile detection and tracking, including early warning.

When completed, probably in 1988, the new system will provide the Soviet Union with the components of a ballistic missile early warning system. The system could be assembled in a matter of months rather than years, and it could be used to provide a nationwide antiballistic missile command and control center—specifically prohibited by Article I(2) of the ABM Treaty.

In addition, tests currently underway with the SA-10 and SA-X-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and associated radar in ABM mode testing indicate that compo-

nents of a mobile ABM system are being assembled. This violates the ABM treaty on two counts: Article V prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "... ABM systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based . . ."; Article VI states . . . "each party undertakes not to give missiles, launchers or radar, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radar, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in the ABM mode . . ."

The SALT agreements limit the number of SSBNs to 62 per nation, with no more than 950 SLBMs total. Neither SALT I nor II limit the number of warheads that a missile can carry, however. While there has been no increase in the numbers of Soviet SSBNs overall, the number of nuclear missiles and warheads deployed within the last year has risen significantly. In fact, the Soviet Union may have been in violation of SALT I provisions regarding the number of SLBMs deployed since at least 1984. A fourth Typhoon-class SSBN has been launched to replace an older Yankee I-class SSBN. A Yankee I carries 16 SS-N-6 SLBMs with one warhead each, while a Typhoon-class carries 20 SS-N-20 SLBMs with six to nine MIRVed warheads. The net gain on this single exchange is between 104 and 164 warheads.

A second Yankee I was removed recently and will be replaced by a Delta IV SSBN, which is capable of carrying 16 missile tubes; these will probably be loaded with the SS-NX-23 (10 MIRVed warheads). The net gain will be 144 warheads over the Yankee I. It is also likely that the SS-NX-23 will replace SS-N-18s now de-



ployed in Delta III-class boats. SS-N-18 Modification 1s carry a triple warhead, Mod. 2s a single and Mod. 3s seven warheads. The total gain in warheads will therefore range from a low of 112 to a high of 144 warheads per SSBN.

The AS-15 long-range cruise missile, first operational in 1984, has by 1986 been deployed on 40 Bear-H bombers. The AS-15 is a small, air-launched, subsonic cruise missile for low altitude use, which is similar to the American Tomahawk. The AS-15 has a range of 3,000 km (1,670 nm), which, when added to the Bear-H's range of 8,300 km (4,480 nm), brings nearly every major target in North America within range of forward air bases in European Russia and Siberia. Additionally, older Bears are being reconfigured to carry the new supersonic AS-4 Kitchen air-to-surface missile.

The Backfire B, the Soviets' most modern operational bomber, remains in production at the rate of 30 per year, while the new and larger Blackjack (now being flight tested) is expected to become operational before the end of the decade and possibly as early as 1988. The Blackjack is larger than the U.S. B-1B and faster (Mach 2 versus 1.25) and has a combat range of 7,300 km (3,842 nm) versus the B-1B's 7,500 km (4,050 nm). Like the B-1B, the Blackjack will carry conventional nuclear bombs as well as cruise missiles (probably the AS-

15). With the Bear-H/AS-15 combination, this will significantly increase the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear striking power in terms of total numbers of warheads.

**THEATRE FORCES—TO SUPPORT A FIRST STRIKE?**

In 1985 the Soviet Union instituted High Commands within each theatre of military operations (TVD), a command assignment heretofore made only in wartime. The intent is obviously to increase the readiness of Soviet forces by reducing the time required to move from peacetime to wartime command structures.

The most important TVD in Soviet planning is the Western theatre, which encompasses Central Europe north of Italy and Austria and south of mid-Scandinavia. Here, the vast preponderance of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military power is gathered, including more than 37 percent of all Soviet tactical air assets. Operational plans are reminiscent of those employed by Germany in both World Wars: a rapid advance across West Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium to the coast and the French border, then a thrust south across France.

Soviet planning for hostilities with NATO is based on a conventional scenario, with objectives seized before NATO can decide to use nuclear weapons. As they did following WWII, the Soviets will plan to rebuild any war damage to their nation with material and resources stripped from

conquered territories—hence the planning for a non-nuclear war.

Military operations in the two flanking TVDs—the Northwestern (including northern Norway, Sweden and Finland) and the Southwestern (Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and southern France)—are considered vital to supporting

operations in the Western TVD, if only secondary in priority. In the Northwestern TVD, operations will be directed at securing vital air and sea bases in northern Norway to permit free access for Soviet submarine forces into the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, as well as to protect the strategic naval and air bases in the Mur-

CONTINUED BELOW

mansk area. This will require offensive land operations through Finland and probably Sweden.

Operations in the Southwestern TVD will support the Western TVD in central Europe with a ground offensive through neutral Austria into Italy and the Iberian peninsula, and southward into Turkey to capture the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; this would allow the Black Sea fleet and the Mediterranean squadron to unite. They would then clear the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Sea of NATO forces, denying vital oil and allied support to the West from friendly Arab governments and from Israel.

The second most important TVD to Soviet military planners is the Far Eastern TVD. In a war with NATO, Soviet military strategy is to deter a war with the People's Republic of China by maintaining overwhelming superiority. If this fails, the Soviets will conduct limited but rapid offensive operations to force a quick armistice and thus avoid a two-front war and a prolonged conventional conflict in the depths of China.

The Far Eastern TVD is also the home of the Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet, the largest of the four Soviet naval fleets. Its task is to protect the Soviet Union from sea-based attacks. SOVPACFLT would establish naval superiority in the Eastern Pacific coastal and adjacent waters by conducting offensive operations against enemy sea-based

**Soviet and U.S. Major Weapons System Procurement 1975-1986**

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of the climate of cooperation induced by detente and vigorous disinformation campaigns to add major new weapons systems at rates far in excess of the West. The Soviets are now spending between 15 and 17 percent of their gross national product annually on military efforts. The United States devotes less than half that to military spending, and NATO nations (with the exception of Greece, which spends nearly five percent) spend three percent or less.

Weapon System	United States	Soviet Union
ICBM/SLBMs	700	3,350
IRBMs/MRBMs	430	1,000
SAMs	1,600	112,000
Long and Intermediate-Range Bombers	2	345
Fighters	3,500	7,850
Helicopters	1,500	5,350
Submarines	40	96
Major Surface Combat Ships	90	83
Tanks	7,400	24,900
Artillery	2,400	32,225

Totals do not include NATO or Warsaw Pact weapons systems procurements.

Source: *Soviet Military Power*, March 1983, April 1984, April 1985, March 1986, United States Department of Defense.

strategic submarines and by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication (SLOC), which would require extensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiship efforts. To engage U.S. forces in the Northwest Pacific area, extensive deployments of attack and cruise-missile submarines will be made as the fleet establishes an echeloned defense. Outer defenses would extend to the U.S. Pacific Coast, with ASW and mine-laying submarines operating off the ballistic missile submarine base at Bangor, Washington, and other major West Coast ports and bases.

### SOVIET GROUND FORCES

The Soviets have reorganized their armed forces during the past decade to ensure the rapid penetration of enemy defenses in the event of war. In the past few years, the number of ground force divisions has been expanded to 213 maneuver divisions, comprising some 1.9 million troops, including 12 mobilization divisions of equipment that can be activated quickly in wartime.

The Soviets currently field three divisions—tank, motorized rifle and airborne. The Soviet Union now maintains the world's largest airborne force, consisting of seven divisions plus three additional regiments now active in Afghanistan. Tank divisions contain a total of 11,000 men in three tank regiments and one motorized infantry regiment. The motorized infantry division contains three infantry regiments plus a tank regiment, totaling 13,000 men. Airborne divisions contain three parachute regiments with airborne amphibious combat vehicles.

The two new corps-type units, Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG), serve an old purpose with a new twist. Old, because the tactics they use were employed in World War II; new, because the OMGs have been expanded to corps size from the regimental or divisional-level units first employed by Nazi forces in World War II. Each new unit contains over 450 tanks, 600 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and 300 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers. Their task is to break through enemy defenses and operate independently deep in the rear areas.

The OMG is the key element in Soviet strategy and tactics in Europe. The Soviets believe that a conventional war can be fought and won, providing the initial attack is swift, deep and disorientating enough for them to achieve their key objectives before NATO can decide to use nuclear weapons. To accomplish this, the OMGs will spearhead Warsaw Pact forces as they push through West Germany into Denmark and the low countries to the French border.

The tank-heavy OMGs will conduct mobile warfare deep in the rear areas and will concentrate on isolating front-line units and disrupting logistic and reserve centers. They are to be supported by their own organic air defense, air assault and artillery units. Artillery, self-propelled, will be car-

ried in infantry fighting vehicles, both wheeled and tracked. Operating ahead of the OMGs will be Spetsnaz (Special Operations Forces) troops. Up to 100 small units, each containing eight to 12 men fully trained in commando tactics, will be air dropped deep into rear areas and charged with disrupting command, control and communication centers and destroying road nets, airfields and other vital installations. Naval Spetsnaz teams will deploy from submarines, aircraft or surface vessels to attack coastal targets. Both types of Spetsnaz forces will concentrate on nuclear weapons facilities.

Concomitant with Soviet strategy in Europe is the use of chemical warfare. The Soviet Union has maintained the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons since the end of World War II, when they captured major stocks of Nazi Germany's unused tactical chemical weapons—Sarin and Tabun—and the technology to produce Soman. Two entire German chemical weapons manufacturing plants were dismantled and removed to the Soviet Union. A network of storage depots across the Soviet Union has been identified, most with rail nets to allow the rapid movement of chemical weapons to operational forces. The buildup in chemical weapons stores since the late 1960s has been significant and is continuing.

In violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the Soviets continue what appears to be the development of bacterial weapons, including strains of anthrax, tularemia and various toxins. Mycotoxins have been used in Southeast Asia and in Afghanistan. In 1979 an accidental release of anthrax occurred at the Sverdlovsk research center, killing a number of workers.

The military commands of the chemical weapon storage depots report to Headquarters, Chemical Troops, which is part of the Ministry of Defense. This lends credence to American claims that the Soviets have not only modernized and increased their stocks of chemical and biological weapons but have tested them in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

### SOVIET AIR FORCES

The Soviet air forces are divided into three main units: strategic air armies; air forces of the military districts and groups of forces; and Soviet military transport aviation (VTA). All aircraft are organized into five strategic air armies (SAA). One SAA is dedicated to intercontinental and maritime strike operations and contains approximately 180 Bear and Bison heavy bombers. These are equipped with free-fall and air-launched cruise missile nuclear weapons, plus 750 fighter and fighter interceptor aircraft. The four theatre air armies are equipped with medium bombers, fighter bombers and fighters to carry out their role as deep strike theatre forces.

Within the five air armies are 17 air forces divided among the groups of forces and military districts. They are subordi-

nate for operations to the commander of the military district group or, as in the case of Afghanistan, to the army commander. Each air force is equipped with a mix of combat fighters, reconnaissance, fighter-bomber aircraft and helicopters. Helicopters are organized into army aviation and provide direct support to tank and combined-arms armies. Over 700 bombers and 6,300 or more fighters and fighter-bombers are deployed among the five air armies. Groups of force and military air districts control 5,440 fighters and fighter-bombers. Nearly 140 reconnaissance and electronic countermeasure (ECM) aircraft are also deployed, and nearly 110 aircraft support operations in Afghanistan. Some 2,350 Warsaw Pact fixed-wing aircraft are available for operations in the Western and Southwestern TVDs.

VTA is responsible for providing airlift capacity, with 600 transports for Soviet airborne and air assault forces. It also provides logistics support for deployed Soviet and allied military units and for Soviet third world economic interests.

The Soviets have stressed the modernization of their aircraft in the past two decades in order to significantly increase range, payload and mission capability. The MiG-31 Foxhound, the MiG-29 Fulcrum and the Su-27 Flanker are all Mach-2-plus aircraft equipped with look-down, shoot-down capability for engaging low-flying aircraft or cruise missiles. The MiG-29 Fulcrum air superiority fighter was first deployed in 1985 and the Su-27 Flanker in early 1986. Both carry the AA-10 missile, which can be fired beyond visual range, and the new AA-11 air-to-air missile. These three aircraft will constitute the principle air intercept defense of the Soviet homeland into the next century.

In line with their developing first-strike capability, the Soviets have spent a great deal of time and money hardening tactical air bases throughout the western Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact area, and they are building secondary operating strips for reinforcing aircraft.

Air defense forces are organized to counter air threats to the homeland, as well as to deployed forces elsewhere. Weaponry includes both strategic and tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, which are capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles and some ballistic missiles. Strategic SAMs are deployed primarily for barrier, area and point defense of key installations inside the Soviet Union, but they are also used to cover frontal forces in garrison and staging areas. After the front deploys, these same SAMs would provide defense for rear echelon areas and supply lines. Mobile systems such as the SA-2 or the SA-10 could move forward to establish cover over newly occupied territory.

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## POWER . . . CONTINUED

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Tactical air defense consists largely of mobile SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery and radar to meet low-altitude threats. Certain tactical air-defense systems could be used to enhance strategic air defense, but these systems are primarily intended to move with the front in combined arms formations. They include over 4,600 tactical SAM launchers, 12,000 AAA pieces and up to 25,000 shoulder-launched SAMs at battalion and company level.

One other objective of the air defense arm is to disrupt or prevent enemy offensive deep interdiction against ground in-

stallations or troop concentrations by using both air and ground forces to attack enemy air force bases.

### SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

The greatest military strides of late have been made in Soviet naval forces. At the start of the 1970s, the Soviet navy was still largely a coastal defense force with limited deep water capability. In the past 16 years, however, it has grown to be the second largest surface naval presence and the largest underwater naval fleet in the world.

Geography necessarily plays a critical role in the organization of the Soviet navy. Four sea frontiers must be guarded, and so four fleets are required: the Northern (Arctic/North Atlantic Oceans); Baltic; Black Sea and Pacific Fleets; and the Caspian Sea Flotilla. Naval squadrons are also maintained in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean and off the West Coast of Africa; combat task forces are routinely deployed to the Caribbean with support facilities in Cuba. To allow proper command and control of the diverse fleets and squadrons, the

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oceans have been organized into theatres of military operations.

As recently as 10 years ago, Soviet naval surface forces were equipped to wage a short, intense war; as a consequence, they were limited in endurance, capability and weapons loads, as were some submarines and most air assets. In the past decade, though, new classes of vessels and aircraft have been sent into the fleets with sophisticated weaponry and electronics, and endurance and range have been strikingly improved. The Soviets do not presently have sufficient carrier aircraft to support carrier combat operations beyond the range of land-based aircraft, but the new 65,000-ton class of aircraft carriers now under construction portends this capability before the end of the century.

Again, aggressive intentions can be surmised. Recent naval exercises (like land-based exercises) have been held under realistic conditions that approximate wartime environments. In the Northern and Pacific Ocean fleets, the emphasis has been on command and control of multiple task groups and formations, the deployment of large numbers of warships and aircraft and the establishment of echeloned combat zones. The exercises have been conducted with larger and more powerful forces than in the past, and at increasingly greater distances from the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets can now deploy 675 surface combat vessels, including 280 principle

surface combatants, three Kiev-class aircraft carriers, 185 patrol combat vessels, 77 amphibious ships and 130 or more mine warfare ships. But even with Warsaw Pact navies included, NATO maintains an edge with more than 850 such vessels.


Several new classes of general purpose submarines, including Akula, Mike and Sierra, have been developed in a bid to modernize the underwater fleet in the 1990s. The new designs are characterized by significantly quieter engines, new weapons and sensors; they will pose a formidable challenge. One new nuclear-powered Victor III attack sub was launched in 1985, signaling the approaching SALT-constrained conclusion to this phase of submarine construction.

Three new classes of surface warships are presently in production, including a major evolutionary step in Soviet aircraft carriers. The first new carrier was launched in December 1985. It is 300 meters long and displaces 65,000 tons (27,900 tons larger than Kiev-class carriers, the last of which is now fitting out). The new carrier appears to be configured for either vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft (V/STOL) or conventionally launched high-performance aircraft. Aircraft for this class are still under development at Saki Naval Airfield, near the Black Sea. The new carrier is expected to begin sea trials in 1989.

The Pacific Fleet base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, continues to grow and now includes a submarine force with surface support combat ships, a composite air group of Badger strike and support aircraft

and an air defense force of MiG-23 Floggers. Taken together, recent developments in Soviet military power strongly indicate that the U.S.S.R. is moving to deploy a nationwide ABM system in the 1990s. This, coupled with a first-strike capability in road and rail-mobile, heavily MIRVed reloadable ICBMs secured in super-hardened silos, will violate the antiballistic missile, SALT I and SALT II agreements. The Soviets may also have been in violation of the SALT I provisions regulating the number of SLBM since 1983 or 1984, when their numbers exceeded the allowed 950 missiles. The Soviets continue to develop and test biological warfare weapons in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

Additionally, quantitative and qualitative improvements in both strategic and tactical weaponry and equipment and the development of Operational Maneuver Groups opposite NATO forces in Europe suggest the Soviets intend to expand their hegemony to all of Europe.

None of these military developments are necessary if the Soviet Union is truly interested in seeking parity with the U.S., and, ultimately, reducing and eliminating strategic nuclear weapons. The new naval construction, which is beyond the need to defend Soviet coastal areas, the stockpiling of chemical warfare weapons and defense spending at more than twice the rate of the United States, all point to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is not terribly interested in seeking a peaceful solution to their military and political differences with the West. 



# REGIONAL FOCUS

BOSTON GLOBE 28 SEPTEMBER 1986 Pg. 1

## Challenge to US in Pacific

### Islanders' ill-feeling toward Washington is Soviets' gain

First of three articles.

By Tom Ashbrook  
Globe Staff

SUVA, Fiji — The palm trees still sway. Dug-out canoes still ride the ocean swell. On back paths in the evening, a visitor can still find girls in grass skirts strolling off to dance. But the Pacific these days is anything but a timeless paradise. Geopolitics have hit the great "American lake."



For four decades, since US troops fought their way through the Pacific in the war against Japan, the United States has been the unchallenged superpower in this vast stretch of the globe. Now, that monopoly is being challenged — in part by careful probes by the Soviet Union, in part by islanders grown disillusioned with their war-forged ties to Washington.

"After World War II, the American public went to sleep on what was happening in the Pacific," said one US diplomat in the region. "Nobody cared about a few dry spots of land between Honolulu and Sydney."

Nobody, that is, except the islanders who live there. With mounting frustration, they have watched as their waters have been used as nuclear testing grounds, their fisheries have been raided by American tuna boats and their nationalist aspirations have been routinely ignored.

There is little that is politically revolutionary in the Pacific islands, which are generally conservative and devoutly Christian since American missionaries followed New England whaling ships to the region in the mid-19th century. But they are restless and primed to respond with special interest to the smiling diplomacy of Mikhail Gorbachev's Moscow.

In the islands of Micronesia, four decades of postwar American trusteeship over the area nears an end. In the South Pacific, poor, disgruntled island nations have opened unprecedented lines of communication with the Soviet Union.

"America has taken for granted that the Pacific will stick with them no matter what happens,"

said Henry F. Naisali, director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation in Fiji. "Now we see that is not the case. Your image is really black."

The islanders' two most bitter complaints are with American fishing policy that has sanctioned intrusion in their 200-mile economic zones by the US tuna fleet and with continued French nuclear weapons testing in French Polynesia.

After nine rounds of talks with Washington over the last two years, fisheries officials said the United States is still unwilling to pay a fair price for what is the sole resource of several of the island nations. The perception that Washington tolerates French nuclear testing has further tarnished America's image.

Evidence of the region's drift from the US embrace has been steadily accumulating. Last August, tiny Kiribati (kiri-bas), the former British colony of the Gilbert Islands, signed a \$1.5 million fishing deal with the Soviet Union, making it the first of the Pacific's microstates to open its waters to Russian trawlers. Vanuatu, the old New Hebrides, has plunged into the nonaligned movement, was the first nation to relay its sympathies to Moammar Khadafy, the Libyan leader, after the American bombing of Tripoli this spring, and in June became the first of the Pacific's island nations to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

On the region's southern flank, New Zealand's banning nuclear armed and powered vessels from its waters has further stirred long-held antinuclear sentiment in the Pacific.

The region's disenchantment has been clearly read by the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev stood in the north Pacific Soviet port of

Vladivostok on July 28 and reminded the world that "the Soviet Union is also an Asian-Pacific country" it was hardly news in the Pacific islands. With a gusto unknown in the memory of the region's islanders, Soviet envoys in the South Pacific have been pursuing new ties in a region long-considered closed to Moscow.

"America is perceived as the bully that's big into arms. Russia's got a better image," said an American banker working in the region. "We are falling behind in the P.R. game."

Before the end of this year, according to officials in Vanuatu, an agreement is expected to be signed with the Soviets that will, for a still undetermined price, open that country's 200-mile economic zone to Soviet fishermen and may also provide the Soviets with shore facilities and Aeroflot landing rights — their first in the Pacific islands. Tonga and Tuvalu also are reported to be considering Soviet fishing offers. Papua New Guinea announced last month that it was ready to begin negotiating a fishing deal with Moscow. Even staunchly pro-West Fiji received a Soviet trade mission this month.

Those probes have set off alarms in Washington, particularly among US military leaders already concerned with the sharp Soviet military build-up in recent years in the north Pacific and at the former US port facility at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. US officials have warned island leaders, with limited success, that the Soviets will be trawling "for more than fish" as their boats move deeper into Pacific waters. But the emphasis of US policy in the Pacific islands has long been on "strategic denial" of access to the Soviet

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ANALYSIS

# Will Chirac Turn France Away From Israel?

BY DAVID A. HARRIS

Jacques Chirac, the newly named French prime minister, returns to the key position he first held from 1974-76 under President Giscard d'Estaing. Leader of the Rally for the Republic (R.P.R.), the neo-Gaullist party he has led for a decade, and two-term mayor of Paris, Chirac's accession to power portends a possible shift in France's pro-Israel posture under President Francois Mitterrand. Although Mitterrand's term continues until 1988, the French political structure provides for a distribution of power between the top two posts, thus permitting Chirac to have a major, perhaps decisive, impact on the direction of French domestic and foreign policy.

As mayor of France's largest city, Chirac has enjoyed good relations with the 300,000-member Jewish community. Jewish leaders praise his openness, accessibility and energy.

In August 1982, a kosher restaurant in Paris was attacked, leaving six dead and 22 wounded. Chirac returned from vacation to attend a memorial ceremony and condemned the "horrible" and "racist character" of the tragedy. At the time of the bomb blast at the Rue Copernic synagogue, which left four persons dead, Chirac immediately dispatched an aide to the scene and himself came to the site the next day. Yet when a mass demonstration to protest this anti-Semitic attack was organized, the R.P.R. hesitated to participate because of the heavy involvement of the Socialist and Communist parties in the manifestation. Finally, however, it was decided to join to "express its solidarity with the national elan against racism," according to Chirac.

Chirac was interviewed at length in 1982 in the French Jewish monthly *L'Arche*. Of the French Jewish community and its ties with Israel, he said, "History shows that Jews have resided in what is today France for more than 2,000 years, and that, despite the persecutions and expulsions, they always lived in at least one part of the country, from Marseille to Alsace...I do not forget that during the Middle Ages the French rabbis were celebrated and one of the first to use the French language was the famous Rashi...It is normal that in the hearts of the Jews there is a place for Israel, the object of 20 centuries of hope and prayers, the biblical Promised Land, the place where Holocaust survivors live."

French Jews, nevertheless, are concerned about the possible impact of Chirac and his R.P.R. party on French foreign policy in the Middle East. France is a significant military and economic power with substantial global interests, including the Middle East and North Africa. One of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and a founding member of the 12-nation European Economic Community, France is in a unique position to address Middle East issues.

The election of Mitterrand in 1981 ushered in the most unabashedly pro-Israel French leader in years and strengthened Franco-Israeli bilateral ties, a move that Chirac has criticized as excessive, according to a 1982 study by the London-based Institute of Jewish Affairs. Does the Socialist reversal in the recent election and ascendancy of the R.P.R., under Chirac's leadership, augur a change in this pro-Israel policy? Chirac's previous foreign policy record, notwithstanding his favorable ties with French Jews domestically, gives grounds for concern.

As prime minister, Chirac negotiated the French nuclear cooperation agreement with Iraq. He claimed that the construction of a reactor near the Iraqi capital posed no risk to Israel and was adequately safeguarded by French restrictions on its operation. Israel, of course, did not share Chirac's sanguine view, and found it necessary to conduct a successful preemptive strike against the facility in June 1981.

According to a *New York Times* account, Chirac flew to Libya in 1976 for an official two-day visit, the first by the head of a Western government since Qaddafi came to power in 1969. At the time, Chirac spoke of the "close and longstanding" ties between France and Libya, and added, "I think we shall be discussing political problems as well as French-Libyan cooperation, which should be extended and well-balanced." At the end of the visit, Chirac and Libyan officials signed an agreement for France to build a nuclear power plant in Libya (but not research facilities or the facilities to produce heavy water), and several technical and cultural accords. Three months later, France agreed to build ten naval ships for Libya armed with sea-to-sea missiles and anti-aircraft guns.

Also during Chirac's tenure as prime minister, France permitted the PLO, which had hitherto been part of the Arab League representation, to open its own Information and Liaison office in Paris. He claims, again in the *L'Arche* interview, that, "Everyone knows—for reasons about which I will not now comment—that I learned about this decision from the radio." Other observers, however, argue that Chirac had certainly never opposed the move in government decision-making circles....

# Hungarian Jewish community shows remarkable courage, commitment

BY MARC H. TANENBAUM

Earlier this month, I made my first visit to Budapest, Hungary. With its majestic imperial palace and modern hotels overlooking the placid Danube River, it is one of the most interesting cities of the European continent.

It interested me as an American because of the cunning compromise that Hungarian communism has achieved with the Soviet Union. Janos Kadar's government has given Hungary the internal freedom to practice capitalism and free enterprise, side by side with state communism. That mix has given it the most productive economy in Eastern Europe.

Hungary is also especially interesting in terms of its Jewish community. During my visit here, I met with two leaders of the organized Jewish community, Imre Haber and Mrs. Geza Seifert, and Dr. Alexander Scheiber, president of the Rabbinical Seminary.

With its population of

some 800,000 Jews, Hungary has the second largest Jewish population in Eastern Europe next to the Soviet Union. Thanks to its well-organized Jewish community and the limited freedoms provided by the government, Hungarian Jewry has become the pivotal resource for helping smaller Jewish communities in the Eastern bloc meet their religious, educational and cultural needs.

According to Dr. Scheiber, there are 20 rabbinical students now training in Budapest, 10 of them coming from Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

Hungary does not allow its citizens to emigrate, and very few Jews are allowed to leave for Israel. Nor are rabbis allowed to refer to Israel in their sermons.

Ambiguous as this Communist freedom is, I cannot but help admire the courage and commitment of Hungarian Jews. Despite the terrible destruction they have suffered under the Nazis, they have succeeded in creating a viable spiritual Jewish life for themselves as well as for others.

THE DETROIT JEWISH NEWS

JEWISH STANDARD (NEW JERSEY)

## *Turnaround: Greece's Relations With Israel*

BY DR. MARC H. TANENBAUM

Ancient Greece was a land of paradox. It produced the first democratic constitution in world history and became the cradle of Western culture. It also produced tyrants who imposed Solon's democratic reforms that were intended to prevent tyranny.

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### Commentary

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I experienced something of that paradox as I visited Greece recently and walked through the awesome shrines of Western democracy.

The Hellenic contribution to the Western ideals of freedom, culture, and commerce were magnets that in the centuries prior to World War II attracted some 80,000 Jews to that beautiful country. They played a vital role in all aspects of the life of modern Greece. Then the Nazis conquered Greece, and destroyed 86 percent of the Greek Jewish population, leaving some 6,000 Greek Jews alive today.

Despite their small numbers, Greek Jews told me they feel secure in Greece and optimistic about their future. But they are deeply-troubled about the zig-zags in Greece's relations with Israel.

The Greek government apparently views itself as a bridge between the West and the Arab world, and in recent years has intensively cultivated diplomatic and trade relations with Arab countries, most recently with anti-democratic Libya. Greece is virtually dependent on Arab oil and sell about 25 percent of its exports to the Arab and Muslim countries.

But Greece is also disenchanted with the Arabs for not having made the large investments in Greece's economy as they had promised. Also, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, among other Moslem countries, have taken Turkey's side in the dispute over Cyprus.

In recent months, the Papandreou government has launched a discreet campaign to improve its relations with Israel and American Jews. This turn-around is an effort to win the backing of the United States and American Jews in Greece's perennial struggle with Turkey.

In 1982, the pro-Arab stance of the Greek government, including the embrace of the PLO, triggered off a spate of anti-Semitism that frightened Greek Jews. And so, while welcoming any improvement of ties between Greece and Israel, world Jewry clearly will be chary of that roller-coaster diplomacy.



# ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

THE  
WASHINGTON  
QUARTERLY

WINTER 1987 Pg. 5

## National Strategy and Arms Control

*Zbigniew Brzezinski*

IN DISCUSSING THE relationship between our national strategy and arms control, I would like to make two basic points. The first proposition is that geopolitical and ideological conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union are the main cause of the hostility and tension in U.S.-Soviet relations. Competition in arms, both strategic and conventional, is the consequence of that condition, not its cause. Hence, it is a mistake to make a fetish out of arms control or to make it the central facet of U.S.-Soviet relations. The second proposition is that mutual strategic security can be sought through arms control but also outside of arms control. In either case, the United States needs to make some salient, strategic decisions. Moreover, these decisions must be made now if we are to be effective in achieving mutual strategic security.

I consider these two propositions the most significant and germane to the issue before us. The conflictual aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations are historical in character and they are enduring. They are not some transient phenomena nor some unnatural aberration. In spite of 40 years of U.S.-Soviet tensions, there remains a ten-

dency in the American psyche to view the conflictual aspects of the relationship as an aberration to be resolved either through an act of reconciliation or through an apocalyptic confrontation. Neither of these two extremes are very likely. The U.S.-Soviet relationship has been managed quite stably, despite its inherent competitiveness, and the competitive aspects are likely to endure for a long time. Though that competition is global in scope, it is focused heavily on Eurasia, the central geopolitical prize of the competition. The U.S. objective since the 1940s has been to prevent Soviet control from extending over all of Eurasia; the Soviet objective has been to drive U.S. influence out of Eurasia. The Soviets have been explicit about their goals, most notably in the remarkably revealing Soviet-Nazi negotiations of 1940 about the division of the spoils after the anticipated Nazi victory on the Western front in World War II. At that time, the Kremlin made it very clear that the Soviet Union viewed the United States as having no role to play in Europe, Asia, or Africa. Thus, the Soviet desire to gain political preponderance over Eurasia is longstanding. We must face the fact that we are dealing with a great nation that, for a long time, has manifested a rather remarkable capacity for sustained expansionism. It is useful to keep in mind one central and revealing fact: the Russian empire has ex-

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Zbigniew Brzezinski is now counselor to CSIS and the Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University. His most recent book is *Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S. Soviet Contest* (Boston, Mass.: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).

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## ARMS CONTROL . . . CONTINUED

ment has to involve on-site verification if it will contribute to genuine mutual stability. I realize this is a tall order. But, precisely because of that, I do not anticipate that there will soon be a comprehensive new agreement. More likely, if there is progress, it will come in the form of limited, interim, ad hoc, and highly segmented agreements focusing on this or that aspect of the arms control conundrum. I have no objection to these types of agreements for they could represent real progress. But such progress certainly should not leave us with the illusion that arms control represents the breakthrough to a new strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Beyond our need to understand the proper place of arms control in our national security policy and to face up to the fact that we may be unable to achieve comprehensive arms control, we need to make some basic strategic decisions. What concerns me is that the present administration has not made these decisions. After all, we do face the possibility that there may be no arms control agreement, and we do face the need to have leverage in the arms control negotiations. Both of these conditions call for decisions that will assure our security in the absence of arms control and increase our negotiating strength in the arms control talks.

Here we have two fundamental options. First, we can proliferate the number of our own offensive systems. If we anticipate that there will be no arms control and that therefore the Soviets will increase their offensive forces, this situation will bolster their capacity for launching a first-strike attack at some point in the future. Even if such an attack does not take place, this imbalance in first-strike weaponry will create political pressures that will

constrict U.S. freedom of action. Our current strategic doctrine calls for us to proliferate the numbers of our own offensive systems. This means facing up to the need either for a comprehensive deployment of the MX—and the MX issue has been very badly handled by this administration—or a basic decision on the deployment of the Midgetman. We are not ready to make such a decision. Congress is not ready to support either course, and the administration has not exercised the necessary leadership to move us in the direction of either a more significant MX deployment or an accelerated decision on the Midgetman.

Furthermore, if the Soviet response or ongoing Soviet programs proliferate Soviet strategic systems, our own additional deployments will have to be quite substantial. We have yet to face up to the strategic problems dictated by numbers. If projected Soviet deployments remain stable—much less accelerate—into the mid-1990s, the Soviets may have between 16,000 to 24,000 nuclear warheads, half of them capable of being employed in a preemptive first strike. That will dictate a U.S. response. If our response is the proliferation of our own offensive systems on this very significant scale, we will need something in the range of 1,500 Midgetmen—no mean undertaking from the budgetary standpoint. It is a major undertaking operationally, in terms of manpower, and it is a massively complicated undertaking in terms of deployment modes, as anyone knows who is familiar with the debates over the MX and the anticipated intensity and the difficulty of the debate about the Midgetman. If that alternative becomes impossible, or if it is too difficult to undertake, we must seek mutual strategic security in some other fashion.

The second alternative—which also

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## ARMS CONTROL...CONTINUED

requires us to bite the bullet—involves SDI. I believe that this president can take this course and should do so. SDI, I think, contains the potential to help stabilize U.S.-Soviet strategic relations, provided it is fitted into actual strategic circumstances instead of being essentially a long-term program related to a rather idealistic objective of total population defense. Limited strategic defense that is designed to defend our own strategic systems (and therefore make them invulnerable), to protect our national command authority, and to maintain the security of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) would contribute to strategic stability.

At the same time, it would not be destabilizing internationally if SDI were linked to self-imposed restraint on the U.S. side on the number and character of further U.S. strategic offensive deployments. In my view, a limited strategic defense should be matched with a limited first-strike capability, not an unlimited U.S. first-strike capability that would be capable of placing all Soviet offensive systems in jeopardy. That means imposing restraint on the deployment of U.S. first-strike warheads such as the Trident II D-5, the MX, and the Midgetman. These weapons should be deployed at levels lower than the number of first-strike targets in the Soviet Union. Such a combination would convey an unmistakable message to the Soviets. We ourselves are not seeking a first-strike strategic capability, but we are determined to deny the Soviet Union the political and military benefits of such a capability. A limited strategic defense together with a limit on our own first-strike offensive deployments would convey that message. It might even obviate the need for a new land-based intercontinental ballistic missile

(ICBM), and thereby relieve us of a rather debilitating and divisive domestic debate that is enormously costly.

There is a further benefit to this approach. It puts maximum pressure on the Soviet Union to come back to the first policy alternative of a genuine, comprehensive arms control agreement. We will never get a decent, stabilizing, confidence-building arms control agreement with the Soviet Union if we are not prepared to bite the bullet regarding how we will assure our security in the absence of such an agreement. That is the only course that will enhance our ability to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets. The second alternative—a combination of defense and offense—rather than the first alternative—the proliferation of new offensive systems—puts the Soviet Union under the greatest pressure to reach an arms control agreement. For if the Soviet Union chooses to compete by deploying more offensive systems, we can obviate that move with a cost-effective tradeoff that would enhance our limited strategic defense and increase the mix of offensive forces.

We know that the Soviets moved toward the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty only after President Richard Nixon convinced the Soviets that he was prepared to deploy U.S. ABMs. It was then that the Soviets negotiated the ABM Treaty. Today the time has come for us to replicate that approach in a somewhat different mode. We should proceed with the deployment of limited strategic defense and indicate to the Soviets that it is our desire to renegotiate the ABM Treaty. That would send a credible message to the Soviets. If this is accomplished by a self-imposed restraint on the deployment of new first-strike offensive systems, it would not communicate the message that it is our

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## ARMS CONTROL...CONTINUED

intention to seek a first-strike capability against the Soviets. I anticipate that the Soviet response to any attempt to renegotiate the ABM Treaty would be negative. But the very process of discussing it would open up the issue and would create the grounds for eventually abrogating, if necessary, the treaty—which is our right if our supreme national interest is invoked.

What worries me is that this administration will not make the needed decisions at a time when the president is strong and popular. Whoever the next president may be, it is unlikely that he will have the popularity and the standing that President Reagan has. It would be a great tragedy if President Reagan left office without having made fundamentally binding and irrevocable commitments on some truly important strategic issues. His historical legacy could be a reasonable application of SDI to the strategic dilemma, but in a way that contributes to greater stability and perhaps creates a precondition for a comprehensive arms control agreement, but which even in the absence of such an agreement helps to stabilize the strategic equation. After all, we must consider the possibility that there will be no arms control agreement, and remain mindful that the strategic balance will not be more stable if both sides proliferate simply offensive systems. Thus the president has a unique chance. He can only take advantage of it, however, if he commits the country to a clear policy and uses his political strength now to make a commitment that any future president will have to follow.

In the meantime, we should engage the Soviets in a reconsideration of the nature of the strategic equilibrium. Short of that, the Soviets have no incentive either to reach a truly binding arms control agreement or to desist from their own ongoing strategic offensive deployments. Rhetoric alone is not going to change the course of this momentum. It has to be altered

by deliberate strategy, which, in my judgment, is the critical juncture between arms control and our national strategy.

As far as the political aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship are concerned, what strikes me about Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy up until now is its largely theatrical flavor. It is not a policy based on a sustained strategy, deliberately pursued and generating progressive attainments. Instead, it has been a policy of rather abrupt dramatic proposals, made not as serious negotiating gambits in the context of ongoing negotiations but through the mass media for the greatest possible dramatic effect. These rather theatrical proposals are not followed up in negotiations. Indeed, when the Soviets are asked to elaborate on the proposals made in public, the Soviet negotiators themselves are unable to respond because there is no follow-up. One may therefore doubt that the Soviet proposals are really meant to be the basis for serious negotiations.

Public opinion has become somewhat accustomed to this mode of operation, and the impact of Soviet propaganda gambits on Western public opinion has steadily diminished. I was struck by the fact that Gorbachev's most recent proposals, designed to evoke a sympathetic response in Europe, by and large did not provoke such a response. I think there is a growing recognition that these public proposals are made for effect, that they are theatrical and not substantive.

My hope is that over time, as the Soviet government shakes down and as new decision-making processes emerge, the Soviets will be prepared to negotiate more seriously on the issues that need to be negotiated: arms control, Afghanistan, in a sense Central Europe, and indirectly at least Central America. To make these negotiations more promising, we have to make the kind of decisions that will influence events in the right direction.

# Congressional Test Ban Lobby Nears Victory

By JOHN M. FISHER

After a self-imposed eight-month moratorium, the Soviet Union recently announced its intention to resume testing nuclear weapons. The Soviet action came immediately after the United States detonated its second test of 1986, and two weeks after Mikhail Gorbachev made a nationwide address on Soviet radio and television calling for a complete testing moratorium.

In his address, the Soviet leader offered to meet President Reagan in Europe to conduct negotiations on a test ban, and on Capitol Hill anti-defense lawmakers have been accusing the President of "fueling the arms race." Despite the Soviet announcement, liberal lawmakers are continuing their call for a complete moratorium, and they have already established a considerable momentum.

Immediately after the Nevada blast, 63 lawmakers wrote to President Reagan and urged a suspension of all future tests, and Senators Alan Cranston (D.-Calif.) and Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.) introduced a binding measure to cut off funds for all U.S. nuclear warhead tests. Sen. Hatfield said the new test means President Reagan feels "that building new weapons takes clear precedence over talking peace," and support for the Cranston-Hatfield bill is growing rapidly.

## Grave Consequences of Congressional Resolution

On February 26, by a vote of a 268 to 148, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for the immediate negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty. A similar resolution passed the U.S. Senate on June 20, 1984, and if enacted by the Congress such legislation would have grave consequences for our national security.

The Kremlin originally announced its moratorium immediately after their

*Mr. Fisher is the president of the American Security Council and the administrative chairman of the bipartisan Coalition for Peace Through Strength.*

completion of an extensive series of underground tests, and just before the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima. They received an international public relations bonanza, and clearly their main objective is to derail the Strategic Defense Initiative.

A test ban would also serve Soviet interests because their nuclear stockpile is far more reliable than ours. They are in a position to suspend future tests because they have been engaged in a massive, 15-year nuclear buildup, their warheads are significantly larger than U.S. models, and their designs are not as complex.

## New Arms Reduction Proposals on the Table

In light of their commitment to arms control negotiations, supporters of the Cranston-Hatfield bill are displaying a curious sense of timing. The CTB advocates seem to forget that we are already sitting down at the negotiating table in Geneva, and in the past four months both superpowers have tabled new arms reduction proposals.

President Reagan and our START negotiators believe that significant arms reductions must be negotiated *before* we pursue a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The Cranston-Hatfield advocates wish to reverse this order and rush headlong into test ban negotiations, thus ignoring the need for mutual and verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons.

It should also be remembered that CTB is not a new proposal: such an agreement was negotiated between the U.S. and the USSR in 1958, and was abruptly broken by the Soviets in 1961 when they conducted some 40 atmospheric tests in a two-month period. In a cogent way, President John F. Kennedy summarized the lesson learned when he said in 1962: "We now know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium."

The situation we face today is similar to Kennedy's experience in that the United States still has no valid way of knowing if the Soviets are preparing to test. The 1961 ban significantly delayed the modernization of our strategic forces, but Soviet programs were never reduced.

The proponents of this measure assure us that our laboratories can maintain the credibility of our deterrent without resorting to nuclear testing. They claim that it will be sufficient for us to use computer calculations and non-nuclear experiments.

The test ban advocates put great stock in a 1979 letter to President Carter from former weapons scientists, including Dr. Norris Bradbury, the former director of Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory. This letter insists that we can retain confidence in our nuclear stockpile by such measures as "remanufacture with minor modifications after thorough review by experienced and knowledgeable individuals." In other words, they propose that our confidence in the nuclear stockpile can be maintained without nuclear testing.


However, this is a procedure we have had some experience with, and it was tried by our physicists at Los Alamos. Unfortunately, they failed.

The warhead was the W-52. During the moratorium in 1959, a very slight redesign was done to our warheads using what was thought to be a safer explosive. No doubt "after thorough review by experienced and knowledgeable individuals," the director of Los Alamos had such high confidence in this redesign that he certified such a warhead would work. Our testing resumed following the Soviet breakout from the 1961 moratorium, but our experts at Los Alamos felt no need to test the W-52 immediately. When Los Alamos finally tested the device in early 1963, the W-52 failed miserably.

## W-52: Good Example of a Grave Failure

This episode with the W-52 was a grave failure and a good example of how far astray we can go without nuclear testing and by relying only on "review by experienced and knowledgeable individuals." It should also not be forgotten that the director of Los Alamos, who assured President Carter that review by knowledgeable individuals was sufficient to certify any modest design changes, was the same director who certified the W-52 that failed.

Ambassador Walter Stoessel, who negotiated the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and Don Kerr, the current director of Los Alamos, have both said that a CTB cannot be adequately verified. In fact, there has never been one witness testifying before any committee of Congress that has said with 100 per cent assurance that the Soviet Union is not testing low-yield nuclear



*It was discovered through testing in the '60s that deterioration had caused at least 50 per cent of Polaris warheads to become inoperative.*

weapons. Furthermore, the Soviets could continue their pattern of violations by testing in outer space and in remote ocean areas, and they could also use earthquakes and earth cavities to mask their test results.

A study conducted by the Department of Energy last year and ignored by the media concluded that testing in underground caverns could disguise explosions of up to 10 kilotons (Hiroshima was 12 kilotons). We also have very little knowledge about Soviet geology, and the DOE study stated that secret tests were both technically feasible and were a significant problem for seismic verification.

In the past two years the President has released four reports on "Soviet Non-Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," which list 50 treaty violations by the Kremlin. Among the violations are the 1958-61 Nuclear Test Moratorium, and numerous breaches of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The violations of the Limited Test Ban now include over 30 conclusively confirmed extra-territorial venting of radioactive debris from underground nuclear weapons tests, and hundreds of other probable and likely violations. There have also been 16 Soviet high-yield tests violating the 150-kiloton level set by the Threshold Test Ban.

The Resolution that was passed by the House of Representatives calls for the immediate ratification of both the Threshold and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. It totally ignores the fact that President Nixon negotiated the Threshold Treaty in one month in 1974 when he was in serious political trouble at home. That agreement contains the weakest verification provisions since the Geneva protocol of 1925. It does provide for an exchange of data, but this is unverified and unverifiable Soviet data.

## Treaties Don't Allow On-Site Inspections

Neither treaty allows the vitally important on-site inspections that are crucial to verification. However, there



*Senators Cranston (left) and Hatfield have introduced a measure to cut off funding for all U.S. nuclear warhead tests, and support for the bill seems to be growing rapidly.*

is a provision in PNET that allows on-site inspection only in the unlikely event that the Soviets admitted they were going to detonate a group of nuclear explosions in excess of 150 kilotons all at once. The Soviet position is that they will discuss verification, but only after we have ratified both Threshold and PNET, and only as part of a new total ban on testing.

Despite the massive evidence of Soviet cheating, President Reagan has invited Russian scientists to observe and measure our underground nuclear tests in Nevada. Reagan has said that if agreement can be reached on an effective on-site method for verifying the explosive power of future tests, he would be prepared to move forward toward ratifying both Threshold and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

The CTB ignores the simple fact that our security is dependent upon the safety and reliability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces. Without continued testing this reliability cannot be maintained, and this is highlighted by the fact that both our Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs have failed to meet performance levels in recent tests.


### **Only One Side Racing In Nuclear Arms Race**

Another major argument being used by the advocates of a CTB is that it will slow or reverse the nuclear arms race. These critics fail to recognize that for the past two decades only one side has been racing.

**In two decades the Soviet Union has gone from a continental to a global military superpower, while the United States has reduced the size of its nuclear stockpile by one-third since 1969. In the same time frame we have reduced our destructive power — or megatonnage — by 75 per cent!**

Instead of reducing the "arms race," the CTB would cause doubts about the reliability of long-untested systems, and it would then generate pressure for larger arsenals with higher total yields.

A test ban 20 years ago would have



Mr. Fisher notes that "As long as we are obliged to rely on retaliatory nuclear capabilities to secure deterrence, nuclear testing and a strong deterrent posture will remain inseparable." Above, the strategic missile submarine USS Sam Rayburn in the Charleston (S.C.) Naval Shipyard.

prevented the development of lower-yield warheads and of permissive action links, the safety devices that prevent unauthorized use of nuclear warheads. The critics also forget that negotiations to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were cancelled not by Ronald Reagan, but by Jimmy Carter in 1980, who publicly complained about Soviet non-compliance and our inability to verify such an agreement.

As long as we are obliged to rely on retaliatory nuclear capabilities, to secure deterrence, nuclear testing and a strong deterrent posture will remain inseparable. Consequently, even if verification were not a concern—and it is — under present circumstances, a total test ban would not serve our national security interest.

A CTB treaty would also mean that we would be abandoning major sections of our Strategic Modernization Program and we would be giving up new systems such as the Trident II submarine-launched missile, the Trident III submarine-launched missile and the nuclear warhead for our Midgetman small ICBM. Most important of all, it would mean curtailment of research on the nuclear-powered X-ray laser, which is essential to our Strategic Defense Initiative.

Many people believe that nuclear testing is solely concerned with

developing new systems. They do not realize that there have been at least six publicly stated cases (and many more which are top secret) where stockpile problems have been caught and corrected by testing.

Since the 1960s our nuclear stockpile has been plagued by serious mechanical problems, including a substantial number of duds. The major reason for this is because warheads are complex mechanisms that involve radioactive materials, chemical explosives, electronics, and various metals which deteriorate over time.

For instance, it was discovered through testing in the mid-1960s that deterioration had caused at least 50 per cent of our Polaris warheads to become duds. These warheads would not detonate, and without testing we never would have realized this problem.

Another example involves the several thousand Poseidon missile warheads which had to be retrofitted in the 1960s. In this case we learned through testing that the conventional explosives used to detonate the nuclear warhead device had deteriorated to the point that it could have exploded prematurely. This could have caused plutonium to be strewn over a wide area, and the potential loss of life could have been staggering. Other examples are the Minuteman I, the Sergeant Short-Range Tactical

Ballistic Missile and the Army's atomic demolition munitions.

Those who are advocating a test ban have consistently used the words "mutual and verifiable," but they have never explained how these goals are to be achieved, and they have never addressed the deplorable record of the Soviet Union.

In essence, a test ban would be another example of unilateral disarmament by the United States, and it would be another strategic and propaganda coup for Moscow.

Gorbachev has violated his own moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range SS 20s, and the Soviets realize the value of these propaganda ploys by the fact that the U.S. Congress has just initiated a complete ban on the testing of anti-satellite weapons. The United States will adhere to such a test ban despite the fact that we have not deployed an ASAT weapon, while the Soviets have four different ASAT systems.

### **CTB Would Preclude Nuclear Weapon Test**

Few thinking persons would suggest that we build a strategic bomber which we would not fly until the Klaxon sounded. Yet, a CTB would preclude the testing of the nuclear weapon that such a bomber and its crew might be called on to deliver.

The Soviet Union already leads the U.S. in practically every major military category. In the all-important area of land-based ICBM's, the Soviets have a 6-to-1 advantage over the U.S., and a test ban would firmly cement their superiority. A test ban that does not involve any reduction in Soviet stockpiles is only boosting Moscow's goals, and this in fact has been the Soviet negotiating position in Geneva.

Even if our arsenals were even, anyone who advocates an unverifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in light of the Soviet's past record of cheating and unwillingness to engage in meaningful negotiations, cannot possibly be serious about arms control or the future of the peace process. ■



# No More Talk of Never-Never Land

It is remarkable how little domestic change affects the basic patterns of foreign policy of either superpower. In the United States a conservative administration that six years ago had passionately proclaimed a new approach to East-West relations is today pursuing the traditional agenda of the past two decades with only minor variations. In the Soviet Union a formidable new leader seeks to reform the domestic economy, but in foreign affairs he is following basic directions inherited from his predecessor, albeit with much greater public relations skill.

Underlying attitudes have been even more persistent. The United States through all changes of administrations has been guided by the national conviction that peace is normal and that tensions are caused by misunderstandings or ill will. Every new Soviet leader has been greeted with the expectation that a new and better era is about to begin; we have seen it three times in recent years. The American nostalgia that a Soviet conversion to Western values might end tensions has led to the incongruity of a passionate commitment to peace rarely translated into complete programs.

As Leninists, the Soviet leaders are not committed to peace in the abstract. To them peace—as every other aspect of foreign policy—results not from a personal preference but from the correct assessment of the balance of power. Soviet negotiators are not concerned with compromise or personal good will—as are their American counterparts—but with nudging negotiations step by step toward what will increase Soviet power. Wherever the Soviets are numerically inferior or they demand equal numbers; in whatever categories they are ahead they ask for equal reductions that improve their proportionate advantage.

Every summit between Western and Soviet leaders has revealed this difference in approach. The most recent illustration of this "personalization" of foreign policy was the two meetings between President Reagan and Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan, the old nemesis of the communists, emerged from the first encounter at Geneva apparently convinced that he had achieved a special personal relationship, which he could use at future meetings to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs. Thus his willingness to go to an essentially unprepared summit at Reykjavik and to negotiate on the spot from a Soviet paper he had never seen.

Gorbachev's perception of Geneva was quite different. He had viewed it as a platform to establish himself in Western public opinion as conciliatory; he must have calculated that by agreeing to two further summits—in Washington and Moscow—he could bring the pressure of deadlines to bear on a president so tenuous in the mastery of detail. But the price he paid—Reagan's domination of the publicity from Geneva—apparently proved too much for his less imaginative colleagues. That must have spurred his decision to bring home results from Reykjavik more comprehensible in Moscow; in practical terms, some document translatable into an improvement of the "balance of forces" from the Soviet perspective.

The deadlock at Reykjavik reflected a fundamental difference of approach within the two societies—a difference brought home to me once again during a recent visit to Moscow. Domestic reform has not yet cracked the monolithic front presented by Soviet interlocutors. Hints of flexibility are carefully orchestrated. When a Soviet scientist advances an apparently technical argument at slight variance with the official position, it generally turns out to be a reconnaissance of the next diplomatic battlefield.

Americans, on the other hand, approach negotiations less as a means to reach an objective than as a problem-solving device. In every American delegation—including official ones—there are earnest individuals who sincerely believe that they and the Soviets are dealing with a common problem, not as adversaries but as colleagues. They try out possible compromises as if attending a university seminar, at a minimum giving the Soviets an insight into possible changes in the U.S. position. When I was in government there were several occasions when our own officials reported as a possible Soviet view what they had in fact themselves floated to the Soviet representative.

A number of cherished American principles add momentum to this process. Most Americans are convinced that when two parties disagree, a compromise should be sought somewhere in between. But in a diplomatic negotiation such a maxim promotes intransigence. American negotiators almost invariably bargain from their fallback position. And the Soviets get two cracks at modifying it: when the United States puts forward its fallback position and when it seeks to break the new deadlock with yet another compromise.

The current Strategic Defense Initiative negotiations are a good illustration of these self-imposed handicaps. For better or worse, Reagan's proposed defensive scheme is space-based. The Soviet proposal—that any SDI testing could take place only inside laboratories—was patently designed to kill SDI. Since the breakdown at Reykjavik, the Soviets have hinted that "laboratory" could be widely defined and have encouraged the United States to put forward some qualitative restrictions on testing. Once those restrictions are put on the table, it is predictable that the Soviets will use them to elaborate practical restraints that will make the development of SDI next to impossible.

Yet such a purely formal compromise is precisely what is being widely urged both in the United States and among our allies.

All this obscures the reality that no compromise is possible between the Soviet intention to kill SDI and the administration commitment to maintain it. Western negotiators are in fact obliged to negotiate on two fronts: with their Soviet opposite numbers and with their own public opinion. That second debate involves two unstated assumptions. Advocates of SDI believe that a strategy relying on the mass extermination of civilian populations will in the end drive the democracies toward pacifism. Opponents of SDI see in it an obstacle to their cherished arms control; they do not want to mitigate the threat of apocalypse for fear of tempting nuclear war.

For at least two decades every new strategic weapon has had to run the same gantlet of passionate opponents advancing two contradictory arguments: that existing weapons suffice for mass extermination and that some super weapon was just beyond the horizon. Thus yesterday's opponents of the MX missile are today's opponents of the SDI.

The Soviets are tempted to wait out these controversies to determine whether they can achieve their goals without any need for reciprocity.

America's allies usually compound the problem. Many of their leaders foster the impression that they are acting as mediators between an intransigent America and a mellowing Soviet Union. Yet dependent as they are on American protection and eager to participate in American technology, they are reluctant to take the responsibility for thwarting American strategic programs.

They therefore tend to hide behind feasibility studies, which can be protracted indefinitely, and distinctions between research and deployment, which obfuscate the issue.

The result has been a never-never land. The Reagan administration is committed to SDI; its domestic opponents are seeking to slow it down by reducing funds and limiting tests; its allies support research but block its application in pursuit of a compromise. The United States has agreed to a 10-year moratorium on SDI deployment followed by a two-year period for negotiation.

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The fashionable compromise currently being canvassed is to break the deadlock in arms control negotiations by allowing SDI testing in space but restricting its quality. From what I heard in Moscow, sensors—reconnaissance satellites—are perhaps acceptable to the Soviet Union. But the testing of devices to destroy missiles is to be prohibited, as is any system that links the killers with the sensors. This would enable the Soviets to improve the reconnaissance capability of their ground-based missile defense system. Combined with a deployment moratorium, it would in effect also end SDI. The result if the Soviets—and some American officials—have their way would be to freeze nuclear strategy in its most cataclysmic state.

The biggest challenge to East-West negotiations is thus within the democracies themselves. Arms control negotiations as now conducted are on the verge of giving the Soviet Union a veto over any new Western program. A recent statement by the West German government makes that position explicit: "For the federal government it is an essential criterion whether decisions on the SDI program and the ABM treaty are beneficial or detrimental to the Geneva negotiations." No new Soviet weapons program has ever been challenged or stopped by Western efforts. But from the neutron weapon to medium-range missiles in Europe to SDI, the Soviet Union has sought to stop—and has succeeded in slowing down—new Western technology by the simple device of declaring it an "obstacle" to the "arms control process." The crucial question must therefore be asked: To exactly what useful arms control measure is SDI an obstacle? I fear the answer is to the psychological relief of the mere fact of an agreement.

This is also likely to be the sole benefit of the removal of Soviet and American medium-range missiles from Europe, as just put forward in a separate package by Gorbachev. The so-called zero-option reduces in no significant way the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. It eliminates completely the American means of retaliating from Europe. It has little utility for arms control; it does represent an important step in decoupling Europe from the United States politically. Whether to proceed with SDI will be the next challenge to the Western democracies.

This decision cannot be fudged by feasibility studies; for many SDI opponents, feasibility studies are a subterfuge for attacking the principle. It cannot be achieved by a legal exegesis of agreements negotiated 15 years ago, when space defense belonged to science fiction. I personally believe the broad interpretations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty to be more nearly correct than the narrow interpretation. But a major program cannot be vindicated by what to many look like clever legalisms. Far better to put forward a clear statement of what the United States seeks and to incorporate it in a new agreement to be negotiated with the Soviets. And if they balk, the United States can, if necessary, threaten to abrogate the ABM treaty. At least this procedure would make clear to all what American objectives are.

This approach is relevant as well to the broader range of negotiations with the Soviets. For too long, American arms control positions have been the product of a negotiation between conflicting duchies within the administration, the outcome being a contradictory package providing a sop for every constituency.

The president must demand of his advisers a negotiating position that is internally consistent and reflects a long-range national strategy. He has a right to expect that America's allies will deal with it as a matter of common strategy and not domestic politics.

The U.S. position resulting from this process should encompass the following elements:

- a) A statement of overall strategy.
- b) A commitment to proceed with SDI testing and deployment.
- c) An offer to the Soviets to discuss quantitative restraints on SDI deployment and testing geared to the level of offensive forces (but no qualitative restrictions).
- d) An offer to reduce strategic forces in a manner that limits the capacity for surprise attacks by either side.
- e) An initial interim agreement to reduce strategic forces including medium-range missiles by a fixed percentage over three years (say 30 percent), together with an extension of the abrogation clause of the ABM treaty to two years.

A program containing such elements would test whether an agreement compatible with Western security interests is achievable. The democracies cannot guarantee that Gorbachev will accept a serious program. But they owe it to themselves to be serious.

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## Soldier Who Knew He Carried AIDS Virus Faces Assault Charges

PHOENIX, April 3 (AP) — An Army private has been accused of aggravated assault for reportedly having sexual relations with two other soldiers when he knew he carried the AIDS virus.

"In a sense, their theory is the AIDS virus is the weapon used in the assault," said Edward G. Rheinheimer, an attorney for Pfc. Adrian G. Morris Jr., who was charged this week by his company commander at Fort Huachuca in southeastern Arizona.

The Army said Private Morris was infected with the virus but had not shown symptoms of acquired immune deficiency syndrome, which destroys its victim's abilities to combat infections.

Mr. Rheinheimer said Thursday that the case was a first for the armed forces and would probably result in a court-martial. He said he had advised Private Morris not to discuss the case with reporters.

One of the soldiers with whom Private Morris was accused of having sexual relations was a man and the other was a woman. The Army has not said when the reported encounters occurred.

### Power to Discipline Soldiers

Lieut. Col. Pete Wyro, a Defense Department spokesman in Washington, said that he was not familiar with the case but that the military had the power to discipline soldiers who failed to protect the health of other soldiers.

Paul Marcus, dean of the University of Arizona law school, a criminal law specialist, said today that Private Morris's case was unique because it involved the AIDS virus and that, as a result, proving criminal intent and actual harm would be difficult.

Mr. Marcus said military precedents were not binding on other courts, but he predicted that the Morris case could

lead to an important legal decision.

Among civilian criminal cases involving AIDS, in Flint, Mich., a man infected with the AIDS virus was charged last year with attempted murder for spitting at the police. A judge dropped the charge after experts questioned whether AIDS could be spread in saliva.

### Homeless Man Pleads Guilty

In Mineola, L.I., last month, a homeless man who pleaded guilty to manslaughter said he had killed a male lover who said he had AIDS after they had a sexual encounter.

In the armed forces, Colonel Wyro said, doctor's orders are commands that must be followed.

"People are our most important resource, and we don't take it lightly if they could subject others to the disease," Colonel Wyro said. Everyone in the military is tested for the AIDS virus, he said.

In addition to two aggravated assault charges, Private Morris was accused of one count of sodomy, one count of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, and one count of conduct of a nature that would bring discredit to the armed forces.

Maj. David Georgi of the Fort Huachuca Public Affairs Office said that if Private Morris was convicted, he could be demoted to the lowest possible rank in the Army, stripped of his pay and benefits and imprisoned for 11 years before being dishonorably discharged.

The Sierra Vista (Ariz.) Daily Herald-Dispatch has reported that neither of the soldiers who reportedly had relations with Private Morris had tested positive for the AIDS virus but that the female soldier was impregnated. The newspaper said its sources said Private Morris was charged with assault because he had failed to use a condom in sexual encounters.

### SOVIETS...CONTINUED

Jacques Chirac, and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, is that the Soviets would be left with a 9-to-1 short-range superiority over NATO. But Britain and France also appear concerned over a larger threat to their own independent nuclear weapons, thus far left out of any proposed negotiation.

The question arises, according to British officials, as to what NATO would have to put on the table against the Soviet short-range missiles in subsequent negotiations.

One possibility, along with U.S. nuclear-equipped aircraft stationed in Europe, is the British and French missiles, a prospect that pleases neither London nor Paris.

"I made it clear we were not prepared to accept the denuclearization of Europe," Thatcher said of her talks with Gorbachev. Any INF agreement must include a western "right to match" on short-range systems. Britain's own nuclear forces "are, and will remain, crucial."

The Soviets acknowledge that things have changed since 1983, when British public opinion seemed more on their side than on Thatch-

er's. "I think maybe the influence of the CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament] mentality is not as clearcut as it used to be," said Belgov, referring to Britain's principal disarmament group. "I agree that the majority has gone over to Thatcher's side" on current arms control issues, he said.

On the question of how the Americans feel, Rodomir Bogdanov, deputy director of Moscow's U.S.A. Institute, said, "If you asked me six months ago, I could have answered you." With the confusion and new appointments in the wake of the Iran arms scandal, he said, "until Shultz comes to Moscow, we don't know a damn thing."

Now that Western Europe, for the moment at least, appears impervious to Soviet blandishments, Moscow does not seem interested in what Europe thinks. Disagreements in NATO, Bogdanov said, "are none of our business. It's family business" for the United States to sort out.

"We deal with you, and the final responsibility is yours," he said.



# Forget the 'Zero Option'

*Removing Missiles From Europe Will Help Moscow and Hurt Our Friends*

By Henry Kissinger

**W**HEN SECRETARY of State George P. Shultz leaves for Moscow next week he will carry with him the hopes of the democracies for a turn toward peace. But his mission to negotiate the removal of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe—the so-called zero option—will do little to advance these hopes in the long run.

The decision to deploy American missiles in Europe dealt at least temporarily with the fear of Europeans that growing nuclear arsenals would create a threshold below which the use of nuclear weapons from America was no longer credible. The installation of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe made it difficult for the Soviet Union to threaten American allies with a nuclear or a conventional attack confined to Europe, because the Kremlin would have to calculate that either move might trigger the American missiles. Thus, the INF closed a gap in deterrence; it "coupled" the defense of Europe to that of the United States and the defense of Germany to the defense of Europe. No wonder that the deployment of the INF in 1983 evoked massive radical demonstrations and intense Soviet diplo-

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matic pressure, including a suspension of all arms-control negotiations.

Why then is that deployment to be abandoned?

As so often happens in Washington, quite disparate elements combined to produce the zero option. The bureaucratic champion of the zero option in 1981 was Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, who had been ingenious in his opposition to every previous agreement. Obviously neither Perle nor Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger was heartbroken (or surprised) when their proposal was rejected by the Soviets.

Other supporters of the zero option included neo-isolationists and military technicians who preferred U.S. missiles at sea or within the United States to reduce the automaticity of any nuclear response.

As for European leaders, they at first asked for the INF to balance the Soviet deployment of hundreds of the new SS-20 medium-range missiles. Their deeper concern was political: to link both the U.S. and the Federal Republic to a common defense of Europe. But rattled by the combination of Soviet-orchestrated diplomatic pressures and growing public assaults, the European allies took refuge in the evasion that the INF could some day be traded for SS-20s, thereby neatly dodging the coupling problem.

All this was woven together into a formal proposal by the then-dominant group

in the White House. They knew little about strategy and less about arms control. But their finely honed sense of public relations persuaded them that nobody could top an offer to eliminate an entire class of missiles.

The traditional arms controllers started out on the sidelines of this particular exercise. But committed as they were to the proposition that there is no such thing as a good new weapon, they have since joined the fray with a passion.

**T**he West was saved for a time from the consequences of its frivolity by stagnation in Moscow as the Brezhnev era drew to a close. Also the Soviets hoped to use riots and diplomatic pressure to stop INF deployment without paying any price whatever. But the advent of General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev and the rise of former Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin brought a more sophisticated team into office. Dobrynin had learned, in over two decades in America, that what you see is what you get. Therefore, a NATO proposal seemingly disadvantageous to the West could safely be accepted because it was in fact disadvantageous to the West.

It would be miraculous if this witch's brew of motivations could generate a scheme beneficial to long-range Western interests. And it did not. The agreement now being negotiated has the following drawbacks:

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- It contributes to decoupling the defense of Europe and the United States and eliminates one organic link of the Federal Republic of Germany to the nuclear defense of NATO. It will thus in the long run strengthen the forces of neutralism in Europe.

- It reduces the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe only very slightly. The 700-800 Soviet warheads being withdrawn are a minuscule part of the total Soviet nuclear arsenal that can be brought to bear on Europe from short range weapons, ICBMs and aircraft. The American capacity to retaliate from Europe will be gone.

- It continues a process whereby successive American administrations have for three decades abandoned European leaders who staked their political positions on American proposals for the nuclear defense of Europe. Thor and Jupiter missiles were

withdrawn from Italy and Turkey within three years of their deployment by the Kennedy administration following the Cuban missile crisis. The neutron bomb was abandoned by the Carter administration within two years of being accepted by NATO. Now INF may join this company. Those European leaders who overcame prolonged, sometimes violent, public demonstrations must be asking themselves whether their anguish was worth a deployment of only three years.

- The Soviets are on the way to a veto over new nuclear deployments in NATO. The history of INF deployments makes it unlikely that any European leader will again run the gamut of Soviet pressure, public demonstrations and American inconstancy in order to pursue a nuclear option.

- The zero option will greatly complicate

the possible replacement of American missiles by European ones, such as French medium-range missiles. Indeed it may well be a big step towards the eventual denuclearization of Germany. It will not be long before peace groups and the left of several European political parties begin agitating for formal denuclearized zones (which the Soviets are also pressing in the Pacific).

The main counter-argument is that the Soviets are giving up more warheads than the United States. But the Soviets are not in the habit of making unequal trades and have not done so this time. What they give up in warheads they gain in political, psychological and diplomatic dissociation between the United States and Europe.

The principal argument for proceeding

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

# Disco's bombing remains unsolved

By Frieder Feimold  
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

BERLIN — The former GI hang-out is now a carpet store, and still unsolved, one year later, is the terrorist bombing of the La Belle discotheque which prompted U.S. air raids on Libya.

Investigators say they have new clues, but are not ready yet to seek indictments in the attack that killed two American soldiers and a Turkish woman and wounded 230 persons. One wounded West German woman remains hospitalized.

The United States blamed the April 5, 1986, attack on Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi. But West Berlin police have been unable to establish such a connection.

A local court ruled that Syria was involved in other terrorist attacks in the city around the same time.

Ten days after the La Belle bombing, the Reagan administration sent U.S. warplanes to bomb Tripoli, the Libyan capital, and Benghazi. Washington said the targets were military, but at least one residential neighborhood of Tripoli was heavily damaged.

The Libyans said 37 people, mostly civilians, died in the raids and hundreds more were wounded.

In explaining the raids, Washington also cited purported Libyan participation in Dec. 27, 1985, terrorist attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna.

"There are new facts, but we're not ready to indict anyone," West Berlin Justice Ministry spokesman Volker Kaehne told The Associated Press in an interview last week.

Mr. Kaehne declined to discuss a possible Libyan or Syrian role in the La Belle blast, and would not even say if Middle Eastern terrorists are suspected.

"The investigation is going better now than it was last year. We have in the meantime uncovered others who may have been involved," he said.

Without saying it was necessarily linked to the La Belle attack, he referred to the March 29, 1986, bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Society in West Berlin. That blast injured nine people.

Mr. Kaehne said there are indications that other people, whom he did not identify, were connected with Ahmed Nawaf Mansur Hasi, a Palestinian convicted in November for his part in the Friendship Society attack.

Hasi denied any role in the blast at the nightclub frequented by many of the U.S. soldiers stationed in West

Berlin. Police say, however, that a sketch of what could be the La Belle discotheque was found in Hasi's apartment in the city.

The trial of Hasi and co-defendant Farouk Salameh revealed a Syrian connection to the March bombing. Hasi was sentenced to 14 years in prison and Salameh to 13 years.

The two named a high-ranking Syrian air force intelligence officer as the coordinator of the Friendship Society attack, and the court ruled there was no cause to doubt their statements. West Germany subsequently issued an arrest warrant for the Syrian.

Mr. Kaehne said information in the discotheque investigation has been provided to West German federal prosecutor Kurt Rebmann in Karlsruhe. Mr. Rebmann is to decide whether his office will take over the probe. In the meantime, the investigation is being continued by West Berlin authorities.

"We have expanded our investigation to Italy and Britain," Mr. Kaehne said, but declined to go into details.

Hasi's brother, Nezar Hindawi, was convicted in London last fall of trying to smuggle a bomb onto an Israeli jetliner in the luggage of his girlfriend.

Hasi's cousin, Awni Hindawi, was jailed in Genoa, Italy, on suspicion of terrorist activity. Awni Hindawi has since been released, but has been ordered to remain in Genoa pending further investigation.

No trace of the bombing remains at the carpet store now occupying the former La Belle premises. A ballet school is on the floor above.

## 'ZERO OPTION'...CONTINUED

with the zero option is that too many governments would face too much domestic upheaval if they reversed their own initiative. But the alliance could still link the zero option to other vital issues by making the last increment of the projected withdrawal—say 25 percent to 30 percent—dependent on an agreement on short-range missiles and progress towards a balance of conventional forces. Since the zero level is not to be reached for five years, this would permit at least three years for follow-on negotiations. Failing that, cruise-missile ships (preferably

surface) should be assigned to NATO and stationed in European waters to provide some visible coupling of European and American nuclear defenses.

The West must get its intellectual house in order. For the imminent negotiations on strategic offensive and defensive weapons, it needs a strategy, not an amalgam of responses to domestic pressures and public-relations considerations. That process of rededication can perhaps start with one simple lesson: Be thoughtful about what you propose. The other side may accept it.

PLEASE CREDIT EXCERPTS TO "CNN'S EVANS & NOVAK."

EVANS & NOVAK

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Secretary of the Navy

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CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

WASHINGTON POST 6 APRIL 1987 Pg.10

# Cuba Lets 20 Prisoners Come to U.S.

*Ex-Inmates Arrive by Twos as Release Policy Seems to Shun Spotlight*

By George Gedda  
Associated Press

Cuba has allowed 20 former long-term political prisoners to emigrate to the United States in the past 10 weeks, sending them at the rate of two per week in an apparent attempt to avoid publicity, according to U.S. officials.

The officials said the piecemeal approach appeared aimed at eliminating the tumultuous receptions that have accompanied large-scale prisoner releases in the past and have received extensive media attention.

The Cuban government also may have been intent on keeping the prisoner issue out of the spotlight at a time when the United States was

trying to use the U.N. Human Rights Commission to call attention to rights abuses in Cuba, according to the officials.

All 20 Cubans were released from prison last May following a personal appeal to President Fidel Castro by French undersea explorer Jacques Cousteau, who visited Cuba in late 1985.

The last two released prisoners arrived Wednesday aboard a weekly charter flight that operates between Miami and Havana. The other 18 had arrived on earlier charter flights.

The officials, who asked not to be identified, said an additional 59 former prisoners have been authorized by the United States to emigrate

and are awaiting permission from their government to leave with close relatives. Cuban authorities have indicated that the group will be permitted to emigrate.

In the past, mass arrivals in Miami of former Cuban prisoners have generated widespread attention. When a group of 75 arrived last September, thousands gathered at the airport for the occasion, including high-ranking city officials and Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams.

The State Department had expected the 20 Cubans and members of their families to emigrate last December, but Cuban authorities postponed their departure until the new year without explanation.



PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON  
SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

MARCH 1987

annual  
control

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Q. What are the specific Congressional requirements for this report?
  - A. Public Law 99-145 requires the Administration to provide on an annual basis by December 1 of each year a classified and unclassified report to the Congress containing the findings of the President and any additional information necessary to keep the Congress informed on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.
  
2. Q. Why is the report late?
  - A. The delay in submitting this report was due to the need for full and frank discussion among concerned government agencies of the evidence of Soviet compliance.
  
3. Q. What is new and different with this report compared with previous reports?
  - A. No new issues are addressed in this year's report, although new developments regarding previously addressed issues have been taken into consideration. This report does not address SALT issues.
  
4. Q. What is the relationship of this report to the Administration's December 1985 report?
  - A. The current report updates all of the issues studied in the December 1985 report -- including violations of arms control agreements -- except those issues related to the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty. Now that those two agreements are behind us, Soviet activities with respect to the agreements, which have been studied and reported on in detail in the past, are not treated in the body of this report. This is not to suggest that the significance of the Soviet violations

related to those two agreements has in any way diminished. We remain concerned about these issues, which will continue to have an impact on our defense and arms control policy.

The current report reaffirms the findings of the December 1985 report concerning ABM issues. The findings address the Krasnoyarsk radar, mobility of ABM system components, concurrent operations of ABM and air defense components, ABM capability of modern SAM systems, the rapid reload of ABM launchers, and the possible preparation of an ABM defense of Soviet national territory.

Further, the current report reaffirms the December 1985 findings that the Soviet Union has violated the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the report repeats the December 1985 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities constitute a likely violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The finding will be updated when a US government review of methodologies for estimating Soviet nuclear test yield is completed.

5. Q. How do you reconcile release of the report on Soviet noncompliance with the objectives of improving relations with the USSR and making progress in the ongoing arms control negotiations?
- A. Submission of this report to the Congress is dictated by the Congressional requirement. As the President has stated: "In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive US-Soviet relationship."

We have raised these serious issues with the Soviets before in a variety of diplomatic channels. The President expressed his concern about Soviet noncompliance directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during his meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and last October in Reykjavik. We will continue to seek resolution of the outstanding issues contained in the body of the current report.

6. Q. Why are you going public with this information?

- A. The Congressional requirement was for unclassified and classified reports. Moreover, the Soviet record with respect to compliance has an important bearing on national security and the arms control process as a whole. The Congress and the public, therefore, should be informed, consistent with the protection of classified information.
7. Q. Are the Soviets complying with any arms control agreements?
- A. The USSR appears to be complying with such major arms control agreements as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty. While the USSR is violating or probably violating important provisions of other major agreements, it appears to be complying with other provisions of those same agreements. However, selective adherence is not enough. Parties to agreements are required to honor all obligations and commitments. As the President has stated many times: "Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to the arms control process in the future."
8. Q. What about US compliance with its own arms control obligations?
- A. We have recently submitted our annual report to Congress on US adherence to arms control agreements as required by the 1985 Pell Amendment. The report provides detailed responses and clarifications to Soviet allegations concerning certain US activities. The report finds that in each case the US is in full compliance with its arms control obligations. We have kept our part of the bargain.
9. Q. What role do these compliance reports play in our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union?
- A. It is clear there can be no real arms control without compliance with existing agreements. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance and we cannot impose a double standard upon ourselves. We will continue to press for resolution of our outstanding compliance concerns even as we vigorously seek effective new agreements. Soviet behavior has caused us to revise our view on various issues in negotiations.



We hope that the Soviet Union will reassess its attitudes, provide necessary clarifications, and take necessary corrective actions with respect to noncompliance issues involving arms control agreements. A change whereby the Soviets demonstrated a genuine willingness to work with us to resolve satisfactorily our compliance concerns would have a very positive influence on US-Soviet relations and on the future of arms control. Failure to do so makes it more difficult to negotiate new meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements.

10. Q. Why is the US still interested in negotiating new arms control agreements with the USSR if the USSR is not observing existing agreements?

A. The question frequently arises as to why we try to negotiate new agreements with the Soviet Union if it is violating existing ones. We do this for several reasons:

-- First, we are continuing to press the Soviet Union for clarifications, explanations, and corrective actions on issues contained in the body of the current report, and have made clear that we are serious about proportionate and appropriate action in response to Soviet noncompliance.

-- Second, the US believes that equitable arms reduction agreements with provisions that are effectively verifiable will, if complied with, enhance stability and security. New arms control agreements, if soundly formulated and fully adhered to, can serve US interests. We should not abandon efforts to achieve agreements that can increase US and Allied security and reduce the risk of war, provided that such agreements enhance stability and are effectively verifiable.

-- Third, negotiating with the Soviets does not in any way condone or ignore past Soviet behavior. Continuing to negotiate can give us leverage and is another way to try to get the Soviets to abide by existing agreements.

11. Q. How can we avoid these compliance-problems in the future?

A. The patient and careful negotiation of unambiguous agreements with provisions which permit effective

verification, combined with insistence on strict compliance with agreements and the willingness to take actions in response to Soviet violations to protect our security, can help deter violations in the future. However, confidence in compliance ultimately depends on the Soviet Union taking a constructive attitude toward honoring the letter and intent of all the agreements it has entered into.

12. Q. What has the US done since December 1985 about Soviet violations?

A. The US has continued to take a comprehensive approach to arms control compliance issues involving the following elements:

-- In response to Congressional requests, the President has now provided to the Congress four Administration reports and one by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. These reports have comprehensively reviewed Soviet violations, probable violations and ambiguous activity.

-- We are systematically analyzing new and existing data.

-- We have raised and continue to raise noncompliance issues with the USSR in confidential diplomatic exchanges, where we have insisted on explanations, clarifications, and, where necessary, corrective actions.

-- We are taking account of the security implications of Soviet violations in our defense modernization plans.

-- Largely in reaction to Soviet noncompliance, the President decided on May 27, 1986, that the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty.

-- In the context of the President's May 27 decision, we have taken and will continue to take appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance.

-- We will continue to require that future arms control agreements are effectively verifiable.

13. Q. Has the USSR ceased any of its non-complying practices since the December 1985 report?

A. As in the past, we pursued our compliance concerns with the Soviets in a variety of diplomatic channels during 1986. Despite these intensive efforts, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues. We are aware of reports that during 1986 the Soviets took certain actions that may have been intended to address several US compliance concerns. We have examined those issues and reports and have found no basis for changing the findings that appeared in the December 1985 report.

14. Q. Will the US continue to press the Soviet Union to resolve compliance questions concerning the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty.

A. No. The SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty no longer provide guidelines for US strategic policy. The President stated on May 27, 1985:

"In the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance and especially in a flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union."

Responding to a Soviet request, the US agreed to hold a special session of the Standing Consultative Commission in July 1986 to discuss the President's decision. During that session, the US made it clear that we would continue to demonstrate the utmost restraint. We also repeated the President's May 27th invitation to the Soviet Union to join the US in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending conclusion of a verifiable agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. The Soviet response was negative.

In his May 27th announcement, the President said that the US would remain in technical observance of SALT II until later in 1986 when we would deploy our 131st heavy bomber equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles. The deployment of that bomber on November 28, 1986, marked the full implementation of that policy.

15. Q. What do you expect the Soviet reaction to the current report to be?



- A. I will not speculate on what the Soviet reaction might be. Our compliance concerns are serious and we have reviewed them earlier with the Soviets in various channels. We hope that the Soviet Union will deal with them in a serious way since their resolution is important to the arms control process.
16. Q. Have you discussed this report with the Soviets? Our Allies?
- A. We have informed the Soviets and our Allies. We will be discussing further the findings contained in the body of the current report with the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission and through other diplomatic channels. We will continue to press them to provide explanations and clarifications and, where appropriate, to take corrective action. We will also provide the Allies with more complete information at a later date.
17. Q. Concerning Soviet noncompliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), the Director of Central Intelligence changed the bias/correction factor since the December 1985 report. Why doesn't the finding of the current report on the TTBT reflect that change?
- A. In arriving at the finding on the issue of Soviet compliance with the TTBT, the DCI's change was taken into account. The US government has been reviewing methodologies for estimating Soviet nuclear test yields, and this work is continuing.
18. Q. There have been reports that the Soviet Union is building three new large phased-array radars in the Western USSR. Are these radars consistent with the ABM Treaty?
- A. The three newly detected radars brings the number in this network of large phased-array radars -- which included the Krasnoyarsk radar which violated the ABM Treaty -- to nine and more are expected. These radars are located and oriented consistent with the ABM Treaty's provisions on ballistic missile early warning radars, but there has always been concern that their primary mission is ballistic missile acquisition and tracking. These radars and other Soviet ABM-related activities are of continued concern and suggest that the USSR may be preparing a prohibited nationwide ABM defense.

19. Q. There are reports that the Soviets have dismantled several radars which had been of concern to us as possible violations of the ABM Treaty. Do you have any comment?

A. It appears that the Soviets have recently removed or disassembled a few radars at their ABM test range. The significance of this action is not yet clear. In regard to the radar at Krasnoyarsk, no Soviet statements or actions -- including actions at their ABM test range -- over the past year have in any way changed the USG's assessment that that large phased-array radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. In regard to territorial defense, we stand by our finding that the USG judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

WANG 7973C 2/27/87

## The Reykjavik Meeting

December 1986

Background: President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11 and 12, 1986, in the belief that candid, informal discussions would help the two sides move toward resolution of outstanding issues, thus facilitating a summit between the two leaders in the US. The agenda included the four key elements of the US-Soviet relationship--arms reductions, human rights, resolution of regional conflicts, and expansion of bilateral contacts and communications.

Overview: The meeting succeeded in narrowing differences between US and Soviet positions and in laying the groundwork for more productive negotiations. However, the Soviets attempted to hold progress in all areas of arms control hostage to our acceptance of their demand that we severely restrict the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research and testing. This represents a step backward from the agreement at the November 1985 Geneva summit of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to seek progress in areas of common ground.

Arms reductions: The two leaders made significant progress on some key arms reduction issues.

- Strategic offensive arms reductions--They agreed in principle to a 50% reduction over 5 years to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with 6,000 warheads on them; made important advances in rules for counting bomber loads; and reached agreement in principle on the requirement for "significant cuts" in Soviet heavy ICBMs, the most destabilizing missiles of all.
- Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)--They agreed in principle to a global limit of 100 warheads on longer range INF missiles (with none in Europe), along with constraints on shorter range INF missiles and follow-on negotiations at Geneva for their reduction.

In the area of strategic defense, the President--in an effort to stimulate progress--offered a 10-year commitment not to deploy any future strategic defense system while both sides continue to conduct research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty. Such a commitment would be coupled with a plan to reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50% during the first 5 years of this 10-year period, and to eliminate all US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second 5 years. We further made it clear that at the end of the 10-year period either side could deploy defenses if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise. The Soviets, however, sought to make the ABM Treaty more restrictive by banning testing outside of laboratories. This, in effect, would have killed the US SDI program--something the President could not accept.

Human rights: The US made clear that the issue of human rights will remain high on the US agenda and that an improvement in the human



rights situation in the Soviet Union is essential if US-Soviet relations are to improve over the long term. President Reagan pressed for Soviet compliance with its international obligations under the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and expressed his deep personal concern over the current low levels of emigration and obstacles to family reunification, including separated spouses.

Resolution of regional conflicts: The US underscored the importance of resolving potentially explosive regional conflicts. At Reykjavik, the US raised the question of continuing Soviet occupation and war against the people of Afghanistan; military support (either directly or through proxies such as Cuba) for the regimes in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia; and Soviet support for Libya's policies of terrorism and subversion. We urged the Soviets to move beyond token gestures and to take genuinely constructive steps to end these dangerous conflicts.

Expansion of bilateral contacts and communications: The discussions at Reykjavik covered all aspects of our bilateral relations with the Soviets. The US reaffirmed its commitment to broadening cultural and scientific exchanges and people-to-people contacts. The two sides also reviewed progress in other bilateral areas, including civil aviation, maritime boundaries, and the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York.

Conclusion: The Reykjavik meeting was an important milestone in the dialogue between the two countries. Following the meeting, our arms control negotiators at Geneva promptly offered proposals reflecting the areas of agreement reached at Reykjavik, as well as our other proposals. Later, the Soviets offered proposals that partially reflect the headway made in Iceland. We are ready to build on this progress and hope the Soviets share our commitment to achieve real arms reductions.