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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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17272	20 MEMO J. MATLOCK TO ADM. POINDEXTER RE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES	1	8/3/1984	B1	

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LARGE SOVIET PURCHASES OF U.S. GRAIN PUZZLE OFFICIALS BY JANIE GABBETT

ready areg ready to HASHINGTON, AUG 2, REUTER - A SOVIET GRAIN-BUYING SPREE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS PUZZLED GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS AND SPURKED THEORIES THE SOULET CROP MAY BE FALLING BELOW U.S. **EDVERMMENT FORECASTS**.

IN THE PAST HONTH, THE SOUIET UNION HAS BOUGHT NEARLY 2.3 FILLION TONS OF U.S. WHEAT, ROSTLY FOR SHIPHENT BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, AND NEARLY 4.5 HILLION TONS OF CORN, LARGELY FOR SHIPHENT AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1984.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID IT WAS UNUSUALLY EARLY FOR THE SOULET UNION TO BUY SO MUCH U.S. CORN, AS IT NORMALLY MAITS UNTIL IT HAS A GOOD IDEA OF THE SIZE OF ITS OWN CROP AND THE U.S. CROP.

SOME ANALYSTS SAY THE EARLY BUYING CONFIRMS THEIR BELIEF THAT THE 1984 SOULET GRAIN CROP IS BELOW THE 190 MILLION TONS CURRENTLY FORECAST BY THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL BEPARTMENT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE VARIED IN THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF SPORADIC HOT, DRY CONDITIONS IN SOME SOULET GRAIN AREAS, COUPLED WITH DRENCHING RAINS IN OTHERS.

SOME PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE ADJUSTED THEIR FORECASTS AS LOW AS 174 TO 186 HILLION TONS, COMPARED TO THE SOVIET GOAL OF 240 HILLION TONS, THEY SAID THE RECENT BUYING BEARS THIS OUT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE ACTUAL CROP SIZE AND RELATE THE RECENT BUYING TO RECORD LIVESTOCK NUMBERS, A POOR FORAGE CROP AND QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THIS YEAR'S SOVIET WHEAT HARVEST.


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LARGE SOVIET PURCHASES OF U.S. GRAIN PUZZLE OFFICIALS BY JANIE GABBETT

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
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Soviel attitude toward Compromaine

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FROM:	JACK MATLOCKA	The			
SUBJECT:	Soviet Attitude toward	Compromise			

Vladimir Lefebvre, a Russian emigre now working in California, recently wrote an article comparing American and Soviet attitudes toward compromise which is highly relevant to our current dealings with the Soviets. It is short and I believe you should read it. Given the President's interest in Soviet psychology, you might want to send it to him as well.

Lefebvre argues, on the basis of polling he has done of Americans and ex-Soviets, that Americans and Russians place diametrically opposed moral values to compromise and confrontation. The first has a positive value for Americans, but is considered a moral flaw by Russians. This fact leads Lefebvre to say of the present Soviet leadership that "it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations."

Lefebvre's observations on the Soviet (I would say Russian) mindset are entirely congruent with my own experience in dealing with Russians. I think the phenomenon discussed in the article explains in part the persistent Soviet effort to do two things, when they are serious about dealing with others:

(1) To get agreement on a broad principle in advance of talking about particulars. Often, of course, their proposals for nonaggression pacts, no-first-use and the like contain serious hookers. We tend to view them either as eyewash or of pernicious intent -- and sometimes they can be. But sometimes they are designed to provide a framework for public presentation of subsequent deals which avoids the appearance of compromise.

(2) The persistent effort to establish "private channels," when they are serious about striking deals. These permit them to structure their compromises so that they do not seem to be compromises. The other side of this coin is that when they do not deal in this fashion, and play out their positions in the public arena (as they did during INF following their rejection of Walk in the Woods, and are doing now regarding Vienna), there is no intent to compromise, since they put themselves in a position where compromise is simply impossible, even if empirically attractive.

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Attachment:

Tab I - Article by Vladimir Lefebvre, "The Soviet Union and the Problem of Conflict Resolution"

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Vladimir A. Lefebvre*

"Is the Soviet Union brave enough to extend a hand of friendship to President Reagan?" a friend of mine recently asked me. This is a critical question and, as a psychologist, I cannot answer it very briefly. The peculiarities of cognition in the common Soviet man and his American counterpart differ so deeply that even such seemingly general categories as "human dignity" and "sacrifice" have completely different meanings in Soviet and American culture. Schematically, the differences are as follows.

An American respects himself and is respected by others when he is willing to compromise with another person. A Soviet man respects himself and is respected by others when he is uncompromising toward another person. For example, a simple Soviet woman working as a librarian writes to a Soviet newspaper about a conflict she has with her supervisor, in which neither person has attempted to reach a compromise. This woman closes her letter by praising her co-workers for their support of her uncompromising behavior: "They are wonderful people! They weren't afraid to begin a fight!" Note that this conflict has nothing to do with class struggle, revolution, ideology, etc. This was a routine conflict at a job, and the people involved were average people behaving in

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"normal" ways. However, the "norms" in the Soviet Union are different from those in America, i.e., in the Soviet Union a good person is not supposed to compromise with his opponent.

The question which naturally arises is, how does one resolve such conflicts? The answer appears discouraging--in Soviet culture there is no procedure for conflict resolution. A conflict usually ends with the victory of one side over the other or is simply stopped by a higher authority.

Two more examples: in the early 1920's, my grandfather was in charge of the Moscow-Leningrad railroad traffic. At that time, every train was escorted by a military team headed by a "commander." It was not unusual for the commanders to threaten my grandfather with their pistols in order to receive scheduling priority. Sometimes the train commanders also confronted each other, brandished their weapons, and even shot in the air to establish their rights. Any attempts to compromise were considered disgraceful and unworthy of a person of the "proletarian state." The trains spent hours stuck on the tracks because their commanders refused to cooperate with each other.

During the Second World War, my father was a Soviet war correspondent. He told me that once on a narrow, snowy road the car he was in encountered a jeep carrying Stalin's close associate, Marshall George M. Zhukov. Although the road was narrow, it was still wide enough for two cars to pass each other. However, this did not happen. Zhukov did not allow his driver to move his jeep slightly aside, and my father's driver was forced to move in reverse for more than a mile. Nobody was

surprised at this. Zhukov just could not allow himself to compromise in any way in front of his subordinates.

Unfortunately, not all conflicts in Soviet history have such a "happy ending." During the 1920s and '30s, millions of people were killed because no decent procedure for conflict resolution existed in Soviet society. The absence of such a procedure is now the main obstacle to needed social and economic transformations; in order to begin these transformations, different groups of Soviet leaders must arrive at a certain compromise, but they cannot, since it would lead to the disgrace of one of the groups.

Analogous situations appear in international relationships. Let us imagine that the Geneva arms negotiations resulted in an agreement about significant Soviet-American arms reductions. The American representative would return home triumphantly; this is a victory: a compromise has been reached! Contrarily, the Soviet representative would be perceived by his compatriots as a person who made a disgraceful deal. Therefore, in order for this compromise to be accepted without scorn by the Soviet people, it would have to be presented to them as a strategical maneuver in the battle between East and West.

The contrasting reactions of the Soviet and American media to the actual events in Geneva in early 1983 provide fertile ground for further comparisons of East-West perceptions. Every hint of a possible compromise or any step toward one was praised and exaggerated by the American media and diminished and denied by the Soviets. Here are two examples:

"The USSR declares that no progress has been made in the Geneva talks. Concerning the information about the fact that Washington may suggest some 'intermediate propositions' in the Geneva talks, Moscow asserts that in the discussions on this topic one cannot see any steps toward reality."

(Krasnaya Zvezda (the Red Star), February 26, 1983)

"The Soviet Union is warning the world, despite the rumors overseas: there is no improvement in the Geneva talks!" (Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 4, 1983)

The absence of a compromise is "good news" for the Soviets.

We have been aware of similar incidents for quite a long time, but only now have we been able to speak of them as representing a special regular peculiarity of Soviet cognition. It became possible to explain this peculiarity after constructing a formal model of human ethical cognition which predicted the existence of the two different ethical systems. In the first ethical system, a person increases his ethical status when he compromises with another person, and in the second ethical system a person increases his ethical status when he confronts another person. We have numerous empirical data indicating that in American culture the first ethical system is dominant, while in Soviet culture the second system prevails. For example, in a comparative survey which Victorina Lefebvre and I conducted among people brought up in the Soviet Union vs. those in the United States one of the questions was:

Two terrorists are hijacking a small plane. There is a possibility of killing them without injury to the passengers. Another possibility is to start negotiations first and try to

persuade them to surrender. The head of the rescue group made the decision not to negotiate with the criminals.

Did he act correctly?

Fifty nine percent of those with a Soviet background approved the commander's decision, while only twenty four percent of Americans did so. As with the examples of real conflict, this survey indicates that a good person in Soviet culture must behave uncompromisingly toward his adversary.

The differences in ethical systems create mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings during Soviet-American negotiations. Very often Americans get the impression that their Soviet counterparts do not understand the advantages of a compromise. The Americans then direct their main efforts toward explaining to the Soviets all the advantages of compromise resolution. Moral problems are not taken into consideration. Americans believe that a compromise in relationships is universally evaluated as a meritorious act.

The Soviets know about the practical advantages of compromise very well, but the idea of a compromise in relationships has an immoral connotation. Therefore, a political leader making such a decision would be jeopardizing his moral reputation and his career. The following citation from Robert Kaiser about his meeting with Yuri Zhukov (no relation to Marshall George M. Zhukov), senior Pravda commentator, vividly illustrates this point:

"I paid a call on Zhukov soon after I arrived in Moscow . . . The meeting was short, and I remember only one thing he said. When I commented that the recent settlement of the Berlin problem demonstrated that both his government and the Americans seemed ready to make compromises, he replied that the Soviet side had made no compromise."

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Yuri Zhukov could not admit that Brezhnev compromised; it would mean that Brezhnev committed an act embarrassing to himself and to his country. A Soviet leader ought to play according to the rules of his culture. Only the most confident of leaders, one securely ensconced in power, can dare to make conciliatory moves in Soviet-American negotiations.


Apparently one of the main reasons for the recent deterioration in Soviet-American relations is the relative lack of political power on the part of Soviet leaders after Brezhnev. Though the psychological features of their personalities differ, it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations.

The difference in ethical systems alters the problem of conflict resolution. Western theories on this problem did not foresee the possibility of ethical asymmetry; it stood to reason that the Soviets would willingly compromise if it were advantageous for them to do so. But the core of the problem is that, for both ethical and psychological reasons, the side of the second ethical system cannot accept compromises . offered by the side of the first ethical system.

This dramatic situation is also partly understood in the Soviet — Union, as is evidenced by numerous articles written by Fedor Burlatsky, a close associate of Andropov during the 1950's. The solution offered by Burlatsky in an oblique form, may be called "controlled confrontation": the main task for the two superpowers is not to search for a compromise (which inevitably touches upon Soviet ideology and morality), but to try to stabilize international tension at a level which allows us to avoid armed confrontation. These ideas seem useful. Compromise is inimical to the Soviet mentality; confrontation to the American mentality. The solution is to "cheat" cultural stereotypes and to create a stable situation which can be interpreted as confrontation by the Soviets and as compromise by the Americans. It could be a "silent" coordination of military development and activity toward stabilization, while political and ideological confrontation proceeds.

Sadly, our world has a very dramatic ethical asymmetry; and our future depends on how well we will be able to realize the differences and cope with them.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 3, 1984

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED NLRR 748-254-11-2-5 MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOTARLANE JACK MATLOCK FROM: Soviet Attitude toward Compromise SUBJECT:

Vladimir Lefebvre, a Russian emigre now working in California, recently wrote an article comparing American and Soviet attitudes toward compromise which is highly relevant to our current dealings with the Soviets. It is short and I believe you should read it. Given the President's interest in Soviet psychology, you might want to send it to him as well.

Lefebvre argues, on the basis of polling he has done of Americans and ex-Soviets, that Americans and Russians place diametrically opposed moral values to compromise and confrontation. The first has a positive value for Americans, but is considered a moral flaw by Russians. This fact leads Lefebvre to say of the present Soviet leadership that "it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations."

Lefebvre's observations on the Soviet (I would say Russian) mindset are entirely congruent with my own experience in dealing with Russians. I think the phenomenon discussed in the article explains in part the persistent Soviet effort to do two things, when they are serious about dealing with others:

(1) To get agreement on a broad principle in advance of talking about particulars. Often, of course, their proposals for nonaggression pacts, no-first-use and the like contain serious hookers. We tend to view them either as eyewash or of pernicious intent -- and sometimes they can be. But sometimes they are designed to provide a framework for public presentation of subsequent deals which avoids the appearance of compromise.

(2) The persistent effort to establish "private channels," when they are serious about striking deals. These permit them to structure their compromises so that they do not seem to be compromises. The other side of this coin is that when they do not deal in this fashion, and play out their positions in the public arena (as they did during INF following their rejection of Walk in the Woods, and are doing now regarding Vienna), there is no intent to compromise, since they put themselves in a position where compromise is simply impossible, even if empirically attractive.

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
Tab I - Article by Vladimir Lefebvre, "The Soviet Union and the Problem of Conflict Resolution"

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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Vladimir A. Lefebvre*

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/10/08 : NLR-748-25A-11-3-4

TALKING POINTS SOVIET VIEW OF US ELECTION

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FROM JOHN MCMAHON MEETING. 172724

The Soviets have signalled, in an unusually blatant way, their intent to play upon the November presidential race.

Gromyko's comments to McGovern communicate very gloomy prospects for US-Soviet relations under Reagan, as well as the message that the Soviets do not expect to be at space-weapons talks in Vienna in September.

1st Secretary Rogov's remarks are even more interesting: a) no talks of any kind with Reagan before November and probably for two years thereafter, b) Soviet view that Reagan cannot be dealt with at all, despite expectation that he will win, c) interest in the prospects, however unlikely, of dealing with a Democratic administration.

Soviet public propaganda has avoided too obvious a preference for the Democrats although it leaves the clear impression that Moscow would rather deal with a new administration, even though uncertain about its actual policies, than carry on with the present one.

None of this should be taken as absolutely ruling out any Soviet willingness to bargain with the Administration even before November.

Precisely because the Soviets want to exploit election pressures on the Administration if possible, there is still a chance of space weapons talks this fall, a small chance but not zero. It depends on the concessions the Administrtion may be willing to make, especially on an ASAT test moratorium and precommitment to a "comprehensive ban; on space weapons" -- which would, in effect, grant the Soviets all their objectives a priori.

Moreover, all-round inflexibility before November won't stop the Soviets from shifting tactics afterwards if they choose to.

The Gromyko and Rogov preformances are probably intended to put pressure on the Administration itself in the pre-election period.

The Soviets probably realize that public partisanship would be counterproductive -- although they may be less restrained as the campaign goes on.

But they also probably believe that somewhat less visible signals of their intense displeasure with President Reagan could push his political advisors to press for more concessions, particularly on the space weapons agenda.

They may figure, further, that if these pressures backfire and make the Administration less flexible, they can publicize this and hope for a beneficial effect in November.

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