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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/25/2016

File Folder USSR (8/3/84) (1)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

SKINNER

408

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172720	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO ADM. POINDEXTER RE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES	1	8/3/1984	B1
172726	ARTICLE	COPY OF DOC #172725 (REUTERS NEWS ARTICLE, W/ADDED COMMENT) R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-11-4-3	1	8/2/1984	B1
172721	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #172720 (J. MATLOCK TO ADM. POINDEXTER RE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES)	1	8/3/1984	B1
172725	ARTICLE	REUTERS NEWS ARTICLE (W/ADDED COMMENT) R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-11-4-3	1	8/2/1984	B1
172722	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPROMISE R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-11-2-5	2	8/3/1984	B1
172723	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #172722 (J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPROMISE) R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-11-2-5	2	8/3/1984	B1

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- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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408

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172724	TALKING POINTS	RE SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. ELECTION	1	ND	B1
		PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-25A-11-3-4			

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NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8405941

1/25/16 CSO

RECEIVED 04 AUG 84 12

TO POINDEXTER

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 03 AUG 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

GRAIN

SUBJECT: SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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PAGES

3

RELEASER

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061800Z Aug 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO #2051

TOR! 061810Z AUG 84

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

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National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 5941

1283

01 AUG 83 P 3: 24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>JK</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	<u>2A</u>		<u>DACOM</u>

Information
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 N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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FOIA

F03-002/5

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Box Number

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408

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172720	MEMO J. MATLOCK TO ADM. POINDEXTER RE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES	1	8/3/1984	B1

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172726
Jack Inthick,
Could this mean they are getting ready to abrogate the agreement?

R928R A1111)LIYCBYLYR
BC-GRAIN
LARGE SOVIET PURCHASES OF U.S. GRAIN PUZZLE OFFICIALS
BY JANIE GABBETT

WASHINGTON, AUG 2; REUTER - A SOVIET GRAIN-BUYING SPREE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS PUZZLED GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS AND SPURRED THEORIES THE SOVIET CROP MAY BE FALLING BELOW U.S. GOVERNMENT FORECASTS.

IN THE PAST MONTH, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BOUGHT NEARLY 2.3 MILLION TONS OF U.S. WHEAT, MOSTLY FOR SHIPMENT BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, AND NEARLY 4.5 MILLION TONS OF CORN, LARGELY FOR SHIPMENT AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1984.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID IT WAS UNUSUALLY EARLY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO BUY SO MUCH U.S. CORN, AS IT NORMALLY WAITS UNTIL IT HAS A GOOD IDEA OF THE SIZE OF ITS OWN CROP AND THE U.S. CROP.

SOME ANALYSTS SAY THE EARLY BUYING CONFIRMS THEIR BELIEF THAT THE 1984 SOVIET GRAIN CROP IS BELOW THE 190 MILLION TONS CURRENTLY FORECAST BY THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE VARIED IN THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF SPORADIC HOT, DRY CONDITIONS IN SOME SOVIET GRAIN AREAS, COUPLED WITH DRENCHING RAINS IN OTHERS.

SOME PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE ADJUSTED THEIR FORECASTS AS LOW AS 170 TO 180 MILLION TONS, COMPARED TO THE SOVIET GOAL OF 240 MILLION TONS. THEY SAID THE RECENT BUYING BEARS THIS OUT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE ACTUAL CROP SIZE AND RELATE THE RECENT BUYING TO RECORD LIVESTOCK NUMBERS, A POOR FORAGE CROP AND QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THIS YEAR'S SOVIET WHEAT HARVEST.

BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS ALSO POINT TO POSSIBLE GRAIN STOCK REBUILDING IN THE USSR, FOLLOWING SEVERAL POOR HARVESTS IN RECENT YEARS.

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ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID THE EARLY SOVIET GRAIN BUYING COULD BE REPLACING ARGENTINE GRAIN PURCHASES THROUGH THE YEAR OF THIS

J.



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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
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ID 8405941

RECEIVED 04 AUG 84 12

TO POINDEXTER

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 03 AUG 84

KEYWORDS USSR

GRAIN

SUBJECT: SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS

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JM ✓

DISPATCH

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27.

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 5941

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>Δ</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓝ</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>2A</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>DACOM</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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(Date/Time)

8/6 R.C.M. noted
per Dona by phone

84 AUG 4 9:51

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USSR (8/3/84) (1)

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408

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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172721 MEMO

1

8/3/1984

B1

SAME MEMO AS DOC #172720 (J. MATLOCK TO
ADM. POINDEXTER RE SOVIET GRAIN
PURCHASES)

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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172125

Jack Matlock,

9

Could this mean they are getting ready to abrogate the agreement?

J



R928R A11111)LIYCBYLYR
BC-GRAIN
LARGE SOVIET PURCHASES OF U.S. GRAIN PUZZLE OFFICIALS
BY JANIE GABBETT

WASHINGTON, AUG 2, REUTER - A SOVIET GRAIN-BUYING SPREE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS PUZZLED GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS AND SPURRED THEORIES THE SOVIET CROP MAY BE FALLING BELOW U.S. GOVERNMENT FORECASTS.

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ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID THE EARLY SOVIET GRAIN BUYING COULD BE REPLACING ARGENTINE GRAIN PURCHASES TYPICAL OF THIS TIME IN RECENT YEARS, AS A SLIGHTLY SHORT CROP THERE MAY HAVE DECREASED SUPPLIES FOR EXPORT.

DECLASSIFIED (R/AD/SSP)
C-1-11-756-11-4-0
MAR 17 1988
BY CA DATE 1/19/12

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10

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3

CIRCLE ONE BELOW, AUG 6 P 2: 39

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PAGES

IMMEDIATE

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DTG 061800Z Aug 84

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO # 2051

2. 061810Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

~~Confidential~~
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TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

RECEIVED 04 AUG 84 11

DOC DATE 03 AUG 84 11

UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLAS
1/25/16 COB

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPROMISE

ACTION. FOR INFORMATION DUE. STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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KIMMITT
McFarlane

COMMENTS

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matlock	S 8/8	For further action	8/9	
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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) 27.

National Security Council
The White House

NSC/S

System # _____

Package # _____ *2*

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<i>Matlock</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>P/N</i>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

close-out if completed

*done 8/24/84
per JM
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National Security Council
The White House

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System # I

Package # 5942

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3 P3 24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>copy sent</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>BK</u>	<u>DACOM to Bud</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Jack,
This is very enlightening.
We should make certain that
Shultz sees it. Please prepare a
note for Bud to send.

84 AUG 4 9:52

TO: Mr. Kimmitt -

Bob -

14

State tells me that a copy of the article was sent to Secretary Shultz by Policy Planning (Azrael). Unless you want to send my comments, I believe we can assume he has already seen the before piece -

Jim

~~Confidential~~
CLASSIFICATION

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
1/25/16 COB

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IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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SECURE FAX # 244

NON-SECURE FAX # _____

TTY # _____

PAGES 11

RELEASER LUS

DTG 061910Z Aug 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO #2071

2. 062000Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. System #5942

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

Soviet Attitude toward Comproaise

~~Confidential~~
CLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

August 3, 1984

172722

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-25A-11-2-5

BY CCB NARA DATE 6/5/13

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

NOTED

SUBJECT:

Soviet Attitude toward Compromise

Vladimir Lefebvre, a Russian emigre now working in California, recently wrote an article comparing American and Soviet attitudes toward compromise which is highly relevant to our current dealings with the Soviets. It is short and I believe you should read it. Given the President's interest in Soviet psychology, you might want to send it to him as well.

Lefebvre argues, on the basis of polling he has done of Americans and ex-Soviets, that Americans and Russians place diametrically opposed moral values to compromise and confrontation. The first has a positive value for Americans, but is considered a moral flaw by Russians. This fact leads Lefebvre to say of the present Soviet leadership that "it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations."

Lefebvre's observations on the Soviet (I would say Russian) mind-set are entirely congruent with my own experience in dealing with Russians. I think the phenomenon discussed in the article explains in part the persistent Soviet effort to do two things, when they are serious about dealing with others:

(1) To get agreement on a broad principle in advance of talking about particulars. Often, of course, their proposals for non-aggression pacts, no-first-use and the like contain serious hooks. We tend to view them either as eyewash or of pernicious intent -- and sometimes they can be. But sometimes they are designed to provide a framework for public presentation of subsequent deals which avoids the appearance of compromise.

(2) The persistent effort to establish "private channels," when they are serious about striking deals. These permit them to structure their compromises so that they do not seem to be compromises. The other side of this coin is that when they do not deal in this fashion, and play out their positions in the public arena (as they did during INF following their rejection of Walk in the Woods, and are doing now regarding Vienna), there is no intent to compromise, since they put themselves in a position where compromise is simply impossible, even if empirically attractive.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

17

Attachment:

Tab I - Article by Vladimir Lefebvre, "The Soviet Union and the
Problem of Conflict Resolution"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Vladimir A. Lefebvre*

"Is the Soviet Union brave enough to extend a hand of friendship to President Reagan?" a friend of mine recently asked me. This is a critical question and, as a psychologist, I cannot answer it very briefly. The peculiarities of cognition in the common Soviet man and his American counterpart differ so deeply that even such seemingly general categories as "human dignity" and "sacrifice" have completely different meanings in Soviet and American culture. Schematically, the differences are as follows.

An American respects himself and is respected by others when he is willing to compromise with another person. A Soviet man respects himself and is respected by others when he is uncompromising toward another person. For example, a simple Soviet woman working as a librarian writes to a Soviet newspaper about a conflict she has with her supervisor, in which neither person has attempted to reach a compromise. This woman closes her letter by praising her co-workers for their support of her uncompromising behavior: "They are wonderful people! They weren't afraid to begin a fight!" Note that this conflict has nothing to do with class struggle, revolution, ideology, etc. This was a routine ^{Job} conflict ~~at a job~~, and the people involved were average people behaving in

*Research psychologist at the School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717; author of ALGEGRA OF CONSCIENCE: A Comparative Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems, D. Reidel, Holland, 1982.

"normal" ways. However, the "norms" in the Soviet Union are different from those in America, i.e., in the Soviet Union a good person is not supposed to compromise with his opponent.

The question which naturally arises is, how does one resolve such conflicts? The answer appears discouraging--in Soviet culture there is no procedure for conflict resolution. A conflict usually ends with the victory of one side over the other or is simply stopped by a higher authority.

Two more examples: in the early 1920's, my grandfather was in charge of ~~the~~ Moscow-Leningrad railroad traffic. At that time, every train was escorted by a military team headed by a "commander." It was not unusual for the commanders to threaten my grandfather with their pistols in order to receive scheduling priority. Sometimes the train commanders also confronted each other, brandished their weapons, and even shot in the air to establish their rights. Any attempts to compromise were considered disgraceful and unworthy of a person of the "proletarian state." The trains spent hours stuck on the tracks because their commanders refused to cooperate with each other.

During the Second World War, my father was a Soviet war correspondent. He told me that once on a narrow, snowy road ^{his} ~~the~~ car ~~he~~ was in encountered a jeep carrying Stalin's close associate, Marshall George M. Zhukov. Although the road was narrow, it was still wide enough for two cars to pass each other. However, this did not happen. Zhukov did not allow his driver to move his jeep slightly aside, and my father's driver was forced to move in reverse for more than a mile. Nobody was

surprised at this. Zhukov just could not allow himself to compromise in any way in front of his subordinates.

Unfortunately, not all conflicts in Soviet history have such a "happy ending." During the 1920s and '30s, millions of people were killed because no decent procedure for conflict resolution existed in Soviet society. The absence of such a procedure is now the main obstacle to needed social and economic transformations; in order to begin these transformations, different groups of Soviet leaders must arrive at a certain compromise, but they cannot, since it would lead to the disgrace of one of the groups.

Analogous situations appear in international relationships. Let us imagine that the Geneva arms negotiations resulted in an agreement about significant Soviet-American arms reductions. The American representative would return home triumphantly; this is a victory: a compromise has been reached! Contrarily, the Soviet representative would be perceived by his compatriots as a person who made a disgraceful deal. Therefore, in order for this compromise to be accepted without scorn by the Soviet people, it would have to be presented to them as a strategical maneuver in the battle between East and West.

The contrasting reactions of the Soviet and American media to the actual events in Geneva in early 1983 provide fertile ground for further comparisons of East-West perceptions. Every hint of a possible compromise or any step toward one was praised and exaggerated by the American media and diminished and denied by the Soviets. Here are two examples:

"The USSR declares that no progress has been made in the Geneva talks. Concerning the information about the fact that Washington may suggest some 'intermediate propositions' in the Geneva talks, Moscow asserts that in the discussions on this topic one cannot see any steps toward reality."

(Krasnaya Zvezda (the Red Star), February 26, 1983)

"The Soviet Union is warning the world, despite the rumors overseas: there is no improvement in the Geneva talks!"

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The absence of a compromise is "good news" for the Soviets.

We have been aware of similar incidents for quite a long time, but only now have we been able to speak of them as representing a special regular peculiarity of Soviet cognition. It became possible to explain this peculiarity after constructing a formal model of human ethical cognition which predicted the existence of the two different ethical systems. In the first ethical system, a person increases his ethical status when he compromises with another person, and in the second ethical system a person increases his ethical status when he confronts another person. We have numerous empirical data indicating that in American culture the first ethical system is dominant, while in Soviet culture the second system prevails. For example, in a comparative survey which Victorina Lefebvre and I conducted among people brought up in the Soviet Union vs. those in the United States one of the questions was:

Two terrorists are hijacking a small plane. There is a possibility of killing them without injury to the passengers. Another possibility is to start negotiations first and try to

persuade them to surrender. The head of the rescue group made the decision not to negotiate with the criminals.

Did he act correctly?

Fifty nine percent of those with a Soviet background approved the commander's decision, while only twenty four percent of Americans did so. As with the examples of real conflict, this survey indicates that a good person in Soviet culture must behave uncompromisingly toward his adversary.

The differences in ethical systems create mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings during Soviet-American negotiations. Very often Americans get the impression that their Soviet counterparts do not understand the advantages of a compromise. The Americans then direct their main efforts toward explaining to the Soviets all the advantages of compromise resolution. Moral problems are not taken into consideration. Americans believe that a compromise in relationships is universally evaluated as a meritorious act.

The Soviets know about the practical advantages of compromise very well, but the idea of a compromise in relationships has an immoral connotation. Therefore, a political leader making such a decision would be jeopardizing his moral reputation and his career. The following citation from Robert Kaiser about his meeting with Yuri Zhukov (no relation to Marshall George M. Zhukov), senior Pravda commentator, vividly illustrates this point:

"I paid a call on Zhukov soon after I arrived in Moscow The meeting was short, and I remember only one thing he said. When I commented that the recent settlement of the Berlin problem demonstrated that both his government and the Americans seemed ready to make compromises, he replied that the Soviet side had made no compromise."

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Yuri Zhukov could not admit that Brezhnev compromised; it would mean that Brezhnev committed an act embarrassing to himself and to his country. A Soviet leader ought to play according to the rules of his culture. Only the most confident of leaders, one securely ensconced in power, can dare to make conciliatory moves in Soviet-American negotiations.

Apparently one of the main reasons for the recent deterioration in Soviet-American relations is the relative lack of political power on the part of Soviet leaders after Brezhnev. Though the psychological features of their personalities differ, it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations.

The difference in ethical systems alters the problem of conflict resolution. Western theories on this problem did not foresee the possibility of ethical asymmetry; it stood to reason that the Soviets would willingly compromise if it were advantageous for them to do so. But the core of the problem is that, for both ethical and psychological

reasons, the side of the second ethical system cannot accept compromises offered by the side of the first ethical system.

This dramatic situation is also partly understood in the Soviet Union, as is evidenced by numerous articles written by Fedor Burlatsky, a close associate of Andropov during the 1950's. The solution offered by Burlatsky in an oblique form, may be called "controlled confrontation": the main task for the two superpowers is not to search for a compromise (which inevitably touches upon Soviet ideology and morality), but to try to stabilize international tension at a level which allows us to avoid armed confrontation. These ideas seem useful. Compromise is inimical to the Soviet mentality; confrontation to the American mentality. The solution is to "cheat" cultural stereotypes and to create a stable situation which can be interpreted as confrontation by the Soviets and as compromise by the Americans. It could be a "silent" coordination of military development and activity toward stabilization, while political and ideological confrontation proceeds.

Sadly, our world has a very dramatic ethical asymmetry; and our future depends on how well we will be able to realize the differences and cope with them.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8405942

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 04 AUG 84 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

6/25/16 KDB

DOC DATE 03 AUG 84 25

KEYWORDS: USSR

MEDIA

LEFEBVRE, VLADIMIR

SUBJECT: ARTICLE RE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPROMISE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 09 AUG 84 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CT JF)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA LAB 1/23/16

~~SECRET~~

ACTIONS TAKEN ON 8/8 (3)

DACOMS TO CALIFORNIA

<u>Dacom No</u>	<u>Page No</u>	<u>Sys No</u>	<u>Action Off</u>	<u>Subject</u>
244/207	1284	5942	Matlock	Soviet Attitude Toward Compromise - 8/8/ CM noted and asked that article only be put in 8/10 PDB.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/25/16 COB

~~Confidential~~
CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

- IMMEDIATE
- PRIORITY
- ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 244

NON-SECURE FAX # _____

TTY # _____

PAGES 11

RELEASER LUS

DTG 061910Z Aug 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO #2071

TOR: 062000Z AUG 84

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. System #5942

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

Soviet Attitude toward Comprosecution

~~Confidential~~
CLASSIFICATION

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 5942

1284

AUG 3 P 3: 24

Done
pa sent to RA 8/8
Decom (article holding to 10/22)
 28

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u> <i>am</i>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	<u>4</u>		<u>DACom to Bud</u>

Article only PDR
8/10

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

Mr McFarlane: 8/17

Lefebvre's piece is superb. I think as part of our effort to educate the media we ought to put it on their "recommended reading list." It is the best summary of the stark contrast between our two ethical systems I have read. Perhaps we should also put it into the POB sometime this week?

Jon

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172723

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 3, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Attitude toward Compromise

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-254-11-2-5

BY LC/ NARA DATE 6/5/13

Vladimir Lefebvre, a Russian emigre now working in California, recently wrote an article comparing American and Soviet attitudes toward compromise which is highly relevant to our current dealings with the Soviets. It is short and I believe you should read it. Given the President's interest in Soviet psychology, you might want to send it to him as well.

Lefebvre argues, on the basis of polling he has done of Americans and ex-Soviets, that Americans and Russians place diametrically opposed moral values to compromise and confrontation. The first has a positive value for Americans, but is considered a moral flaw by Russians. This fact leads Lefebvre to say of the present Soviet leadership that "it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations."

Lefebvre's observations on the Soviet (I would say Russian) mindset are entirely congruent with my own experience in dealing with Russians. I think the phenomenon discussed in the article explains in part the persistent Soviet effort to do two things, when they are serious about dealing with others:

(1) To get agreement on a broad principle in advance of talking about particulars. Often, of course, their proposals for non-aggression pacts, no-first-use and the like contain serious hookers. We tend to view them either as eyewash or of pernicious intent -- and sometimes they can be. But sometimes they are designed to provide a framework for public presentation of subsequent deals which avoids the appearance of compromise.

(2) The persistent effort to establish "private channels," when they are serious about striking deals. These permit them to structure their compromises so that they do not seem to be compromises. The other side of this coin is that when they do not deal in this fashion, and play out their positions in the public arena (as they did during INF following their rejection of Walk in the Woods, and are doing now regarding Vienna), there is no intent to compromise, since they put themselves in a position where compromise is simply impossible, even if empirically attractive.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachment:

Tab I - Article by Vladimir Lefebvre, "The Soviet Union and the Problem of Conflict Resolution"

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I



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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Vladimir A. Lefebvre*

"Is the Soviet Union brave enough to extend a hand of friendship to President Reagan?" a friend of mine recently asked me. This is a critical question and, as a psychologist, I cannot answer it very briefly. The peculiarities of cognition in the common Soviet man and his American counterpart differ so deeply that even such seemingly general categories as "human dignity" and "sacrifice" have completely different meanings in Soviet and American culture. Schematically, the differences are as follows.

An American respects himself and is respected by others when he is willing to compromise with another person. A Soviet man respects himself and is respected by others when he is uncompromising toward another person. For example, a simple Soviet woman working as a librarian writes to a Soviet newspaper about a conflict she has with her supervisor, in which neither person has attempted to reach a compromise. This woman closes her letter by praising her co-workers for their support of her uncompromising behavior: "They are wonderful people! They weren't afraid to begin a fight!" Note that this conflict has nothing to do with class struggle, revolution, ideology, etc. This was a routine ^{job} conflict [^] ~~at a job~~, and the people involved were average people behaving in

*Research psychologist at the School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717; author of ALGEGRA OF CONSCIENCE: A Comparative Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems, D. Reidel, Holland, 1982.

"normal" ways. However, the "norms" in the Soviet Union are different from those in America, i.e., in the Soviet Union a good person is not supposed to compromise with his opponent.

The question which naturally arises is, how does one resolve such conflicts? The answer appears discouraging--in Soviet culture there is no procedure for conflict resolution. A conflict usually ends with the victory of one side over the other or is simply stopped by a higher authority.

Two more examples: in the early 1920's, my grandfather was in charge of ~~the~~ Moscow-Leningrad railroad traffic. At that time, every train was escorted by a military team headed by a "commander." It was not unusual for the commanders to threaten my grandfather with their pistols in order to receive scheduling priority. Sometimes the train commanders also confronted each other, brandished their weapons, and even shot in the air to establish their rights. Any attempts to compromise were considered disgraceful and unworthy of a person of the "proletarian state." The trains spent hours stuck on the tracks because their commanders refused to cooperate with each other.

During the Second World War, my father was a Soviet war correspondent. He told me that once on a narrow, snowy road ~~the~~ ^{his} car ~~he~~ ~~was in~~ encountered a jeep carrying Stalin's close associate, Marshall George M. Zhukov. Although the road was narrow, it was still wide enough for two cars to pass each other. However, this did not happen. Zhukov did not allow his driver to move his jeep slightly aside, and my father's driver was forced to move in reverse for more than a mile. Nobody was

surprised at this. Zhukov just could not allow himself to compromise in any way in front of his subordinates.

Unfortunately, not all conflicts in Soviet history have such a "happy ending." During the 1920s and '30s, millions of people were killed because no decent procedure for conflict resolution existed in Soviet society. The absence of such a procedure is now the main obstacle to needed social and economic transformations; in order to begin these transformations, different groups of Soviet leaders must arrive at a certain compromise, but they cannot, since it would lead to the disgrace of one of the groups.

Analogous situations appear in international relationships. Let us imagine that the Geneva arms negotiations resulted in an agreement about significant Soviet-American arms reductions. The American representative would return home triumphantly; this is a victory: a compromise has been reached! Contrarily, the Soviet representative would be perceived by his compatriots as a person who made a disgraceful deal. Therefore, in order for this compromise to be accepted without scorn by the Soviet people, it would have to be presented to them as a strategical maneuver in the battle between East and West.

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The absence of a compromise is "good news" for the Soviets.

We have been aware of similar incidents for quite a long time, but only now have we been able to speak of them as representing a special regular peculiarity of Soviet cognition. It became possible to explain this peculiarity after constructing a formal model of human ethical cognition which predicted the existence of the two different ethical systems. In the first ethical system, a person increases his ethical status when he compromises with another person, and in the second ethical system a person increases his ethical status when he confronts another person. We have numerous empirical data indicating that in American culture the first ethical system is dominant, while in Soviet culture the second system prevails. For example, in a comparative survey which Victorina Lefebvre and I conducted among people brought up in the Soviet Union vs. those in the United States one of the questions was:

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The differences in ethical systems create mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings during Soviet-American negotiations. Very often Americans get the impression that their Soviet counterparts do not understand the advantages of a compromise. The Americans then direct their main efforts toward explaining to the Soviets all the advantages of compromise resolution. Moral problems are not taken into consideration. Americans believe that a compromise in relationships is universally evaluated as a meritorious act.

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National Security Council
The White House

39

System # _____

Package # _____

84 AUG 3 P 2: 29

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	_____
John Poindexter	1	✓	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	2	Di-	DACOM
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I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

1/25/16 EDB

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CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

34 AUG 3 P 3: 09

MODE

PAGES

2

IMMEDIATE

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SECURE FAX #

191

RELEASER

GP

3 JUL 84 18: 44

NON-SECURE FAX #

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TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO # 1691

TOR: 0318S1Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

CIA Talk. Pts. - Soviet View of US Elec.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CIA

TALKING POINTS
SOVIET VIEW OF US ELECTION

FROM JOHN McMAHON
MEETING.

41

J
172724

The Soviets have signalled, in an unusually blatant way, their intent to play upon the November presidential race.

Gromyko's comments to McGovern communicate very gloomy prospects for US-Soviet relations under Reagan, as well as the message that the Soviets do not expect to be at space-weapons talks in Vienna in September.

1st Secretary Rogov's remarks [redacted] are even more interesting: a) no talks of any kind with Reagan before November and probably for two years thereafter, b) Soviet view that Reagan cannot be dealt with at all, despite expectation that he will win, c) interest in the prospects, however unlikely, of dealing with a Democratic administration.

25X1

Soviet public propoganda has avoided too obvious a preference for the Democrats although it leaves the clear impression that Moscow would rather deal with a new administration, even though uncertain about its actual policies, than carry on with the present one.

None of this should be taken as absolutely ruling out any Soviet willingness to bargain with the Administration even before November.

Precisely because the Soviets want to exploit election pressures on the Administration if possible, there is still a chance of space weapons talks this fall, a small chance but not zero. It depends on the concessions the Administration may be willing to make, especially on an ASAT test moratorium and precommitment to a "comprehensive ban on space weapons" -- which would, in effect, grant the Soviets all their objectives a priori.

Moreover, all-round inflexibility before November won't stop the Soviets from shifting tactics afterwards if they choose to.

The Gromyko and Rogov performances are probably intended to put pressure on the Administration itself in the pre-election period.

The Soviets probably realize that public partisanship would be counterproductive -- although they may be less restrained as the campaign goes on.

But they also probably believe that somewhat less visible signals of their intense displeasure with President Reagan could push his political advisors to press for more concessions, particularly on the space weapons agenda.

They may figure, further, that if these pressures backfire and make the Administration less flexible, they can publicize this and hope for a beneficial effect in November.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

BY Orest

ON 1/13/12

SECRET