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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder USSR (7/1/84-7/2/84)

FOIA

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Box Number 25A

SKINNER

401

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172565	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN	1	ND	B1
172566	TALKING POINTS	RE DOBRYNIN AT DIPLOMATIC CORPS BARBEQUE	1	ND	B1
172567	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE OGARKOV ARTICLE	1	8/24/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-4-2-3</i>			
172568	MEMO	W. CASEY TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES	2	7/27/1984	B1
	<i>PAR</i>	<i>1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-4-3-2</i>			
172569	REPORT	COMMENTS ON STATE MEMORANDUM RE SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES	8	ND	B1
	<i>PAR</i>	<i>1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-4-3-2</i>			
172570	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES	1	6/15/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-4-4-1</i>			
172571	MEMO	P. RODMAN TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES	3	6/11/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-4-5-0</i>			

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172572	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO C. WEINBERGER, W. CASEY, AND R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES	1	7/2/1984	B1
	R	5/30/2013	CREST NLR-748-25A-4-6-9		
172573	REPORT	RE SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES	3	ND	B1
	R	5/30/2013	CREST NLR-748-25A-4-6-9		

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON RECEIPT OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/24/16 COB
DOCDATE 02 JUL 84 3
27 JUL 84

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SHULTZ, G
CASEY, W

KEYWORDS: USSR

CM

OGARKOV, MARSHAL N

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF OGARKOV INTERVIEW RE REORDERING OF SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 01 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

KIMMITT

THOMPSON

COMMENTS

RLF# 8418467

LOG 8404826

NSCIFID

(CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

E 7/30 Rec'd CIA Memo / Reopen

Matlock *S* 7/30 Prepare Memo for McFarlane 8/1

McFarlane *X* 8/24 for info

C 9/9 *McFarlane notes*

Jan

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

W.
(C)

4

National Security Council
The White House

cc

System # I 4

Package # 5041

24 4 16 1312

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>Δ</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

<u>I = Information</u>	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

84 AUG 24

P 6: 47

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172567

~~SECRET~~

August 24, 1984

KCM HAS SEE
NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Military Priorities: Ogarkov Article

You will recall that in June I sent you an analysis Jeremy Azrael had made of an article by Marshal Ogarkov in May (TAB II). The Agency has now done its comment on Azrael's analysis (TAB I).

My own view of the issues discussed lies somewhere between Azrael's and the Agency's. Specifically, I believe that more differences of opinion exist in the Soviet General Staff regarding priorities for resource allocation than the Agency concludes. Of course, the Soviets would like to do everything if they could, but they can't, and there is always a problem of how you order your investment priorities. The Agency is right that the Soviets have already embarked on a program in the ET area, but given the technological bottlenecks they always face in bringing new programs on, I think it is most likely that a debate is in progress as to the relative priority of new nuclear and strategic systems, and ET in the conventional area. We do have a jump on them in the latter, and thus there is implicit leverage in our hands, as Azrael argues.

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum from DCI Casey to the Secretary of State
- Tab II - Memorandum of June 15, 1984, with Azrael analysis

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Declassify on: OADR

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Oest
NLR 117-748-75A-4-1-3
BY GJ NARA DATE 1/13/12

Central Intelligence Agency

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172568

Washington, D.C. 20505

27 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities

1. Thank you for sending me the thought provoking analysis on Ogarkov's views of current and emergent Soviet military priorities.

2. My staff has prepared the attached comments that I hope you will find useful. In brief,

- We believe that since about the mid-70s Ogarkov and the Soviet military in general have been paying greater attention to conventional capabilities. But we do not believe that Ogarkov is now arguing this should be done at the expense of nuclear capabilities.
- Consequently we do not believe there are major differences of opinion in the Soviet high command on the desirability of capping the U.S. strategic buildup on this issue.
- The Soviets are not "on the verge of launching conventional force modernization programs." Rather they launched these programs some time ago.
- As nice as it would be for us to deter these on-going Soviet nuclear and conventional modernization efforts, we do not believe we can do so in the short term, this despite the USSR's obvious economic difficulties.

State Dept. review completed

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
BY G.J. NARA DATE 1/13/10



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-- In the longer term, if we continue preventing the Soviets from turning their military investments into political payoffs, we may see a diminution of their obsession with international military dominance, expansion through intimidation or force, and military primacy in resource allocation.


William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment: as stated

cc: The Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs ✓

Comments on State Memorandum "A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?"

1. The author of the though-provoking memorandum entitled "A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?" has done us all a signal service by focusing our attention on Ogarkov's latest expression of his views. While we agree that Ogarkov, in this as well as other statements, is emphasizing non-nuclear war fighting capabilities, we do not agree with the author's inference that Ogarkov is denigrating the role of nuclear weapons. Nor do we believe that Ogarkov is making a statement one way or the other about the value of nuclear arms control agreements. In our view Ogarkov is saying the following:

a. The "cutting edge" of usable, particularly decisive, military power lies in new conventional weapons technology and exotic technologies exploiting new principles.

b. The roles of nuclear weapons remains vital, first, to deter the enemy's nuclear use, and second, to accomplish military missions along with other forces, if the need arises.

c. These trends are not "imposed" on the USSR by the US or NATO so much as they are built into the evolution of military affairs, of which the USSR must be in the forefront.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR

BY CJ

NARA DATE 1/13/12

d. Meeting these needs is urgent enough to warrant new sacrifice.

2. Unlike many other Soviet political and military leaders, Ogarkov is always worth reading and his May 9 Victory Day interview is no exception-- (even though he shares the amnesia of other Soviets about the period 1939-1941.) The format of his Victory Day statement is itself noteworthy: While other Soviet extollers of the Soviet Union's glorious and practically singlehanded defeat of Nazi Germany write articles on the subject, Ogarkov chose a pseudo-interview format, "pseudo" because the alleged interviewer got to ask four questions and the format gave Ogarkov the possibility of disposing with the necessary Victory Day boilerplate quickly and spending about two thirds of the "interview" on subjects of higher interest to him: the international situation today and contemporary Soviet military strategy. The format itself, then, seems intended to tell Soviet readers that what follows is more than the usual self-praise and should be read.

3. In commenting on the international situation, Ogarkov remains true to his earlier statements. While his comments have followed the general Soviet line about the dangerous international situation being created by the Reagan administration and about the negative long-term implications of the US military buildup, Ogarkov has not taken the shrill tone of others who have hyped the immediacy of the war threat. In his 23 September Red Star article, for instance, he did not join the Soviet campaign of predicting immediate doom-and-gloom in case of NATO INF deployment but simply asserted that the Soviet Union would respond to Western deployments in its own way

and not in tit-for-tat fashion. With this caveat, we agree with the memorandum's author that Ogarkov's interview is but another indication that "the Soviet high command does not believe that the risk of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is particularly high."

4. We believe the author is on much shakier ground when he suggests that Ogarkov may be decrying the Soviet nuclear modernization program as a waste of resources. This interpretation would mean that Ogarkov, who has been Chief of the General Staff since January 1977 and thus guided Soviet military strategy and programs for the last eight years, has been presiding over the expensive past and on-going Soviet nuclear modernization program (SS-20, SS-24, SS-25, Typhoon, ALCM-carrying Beer H bomber, SS-N-23, cruise missiles, follow-on missiles of all types) against his will and therefore been a figurehead commander. This interpretation not only flies against what we know about Ogarkov as an extremely strong personality but also against what Ogarkov has been writing during his tenure as Chief of the General Staff -- namely that, despite the untold horrors inherent in a nuclear war, the Soviet Union must develop its nuclear forces in such a way that it could prevail in any type of war "should the imperialists unleash it." On-going Soviet efforts to improve their capability to fight a protracted nuclear war indicate that this is still the prevailing Soviet view. It seems to us that Ogarkov is saying that the U.S (or, for that matter, the Soviet Union) cannot rationally hope to carry out a successful first strike, but, that as long as the US continues to build up its nuclear forces, the USSR will have to build up its own in order to prevent the US

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
from achieving superiority. Although Ogarkov does not say so, the alternative to this buildup would seem to be an arms control agreement (which Ogarkov would probably try to shape along the lines of the SALT I and SALT II agreements that the USSR has found so much to its liking.)

5. This interpretation of Ogarkov's words leads us to differ from the memorandum's author on two additional points: we believe the Soviets would like to cap the US buildup (even though it is possible they may be satisfied at capping it not through an arms control agreement but rather through self-imposed US political restraints such as the ones that have whittled the MX force from 200 to 100 or less); further, no matter whether there is an arms control agreement or not, they will continue to develop their nuclear forces and to refine their methods of employing them--not because they wish to use them but because they believe their continued viability will render more credible and usable the conventional capabilities that are more likely to be of use to the Soviets in intimidating and, if need be defeating, other nations.

6. Ogarkov's remarks also should be placed in the broader context of a major propaganda effort conducted by the Soviets in recent years to convince the West that they have altered their traditional "war-fighting" approach to nuclear war. This effort got underway in 1977 and at least until mid-1981 was actively promoted by Ogarkov himself. Analysis of this propaganda campaign challenges the authenticity of a variety of Soviet disclaimers about the major tenets in their doctrine on nuclear war.

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7. Ogarkov is, and has been for a number of years, striving to develop a Soviet capability to wage a victorious non-nuclear campaign. We say "non-nuclear", not simply "conventional", because, in both this article and in the aforementioned Red Star article, Ogarkov refers to new types of weapons based on heretofore unexploited physical principles. These new weapons are therefore not conventional in the ordinary sense of the word. He does not specify what he has in mind but we believe he is referring to two kinds of weapon system developments which he sees as of rising significance in the future for both sides: long-range precision non-nuclear weapons and defensive systems taking advantage of emerging technologies, including microelectronics. We suspect the Soviets are telling themselves it would be unacceptable if the US were to gain significant advantage in these areas; moreover, there is a certain inevitability to the pursuit of these efforts and they better be playing.

8. We disagree with the memorandum's author when he writes that "the Soviets may be on the verge of launching conventional force modernization programs that will tip the balance even further in their favor". Rather we believe the Soviets have already launched these efforts: Witness their theater-force equipment modernization programs, doctrinal innovations (operational maneuver group), reorganization of the Soviet forces in

Germany, and development efforts in such non-conventional areas as lasers. But there are also certain inherent limitations to a shift in Soviet priorities from "nuclear" to "conventional" combat that must be borne in mind. To the extent that NATO INF and other improvements in Western nuclear capabilities complicate or frustrate Moscow's ability to wage nuclear combat--whether in a general nuclear war or in a limited nuclear war in Europe--they also make it harder for Moscow to count on conventional combat as an alternative. Moscow cannot simply decide to abstract conventional combat from the larger strategic context in which it will inevitably have to take place. If the Soviets therefore perceive that their chances of dominating in nuclear combat are undercut by US force improvements, these same improvements also call into question Moscow's ability to successfully keep a conventional war from escalating and thus prevailing at that level of combat as well. In brief, the Soviets cannot afford to give short shrift to their nuclear capabilities without also undercutting the very preconditions for focusing on conventional combat. Overall, rather than argue as the author does, that Ogarkov is dissatisfied with the balance between conventional and nuclear efforts so far, we would take at face value his statement that:

"The main component of the combat might of the Army and Navy and the basic factor in curbing the aggressor are our strategic nuclear forces, which are in a state of constant high combat readiness. All services of the Armed Forces and troop branches are developing harmoniously with them." (Our emphasis)

9. We disagree with the author's view of our ability to discourage the Soviets from modernizing their armed forces and with the steps he advocates to that end. Much as we would like to be optimistic about being able to "limit...the modernization of Soviet strategic and nuclear forces", we think our prospects for doing so are poor at least in the short run. It is a truism (and one with which we think the memorandum's author would agree) that the Soviets are an expansionist power that seeks to dominate other countries and that the cutting edge of their efforts to do so are their armed forces. As long as this is so, our task is to negate Soviet efforts by ensuring that they do not acquire military dominance. Further, since we think the Soviets look on their nuclear and conventional forces not as separate entities but rather as parts of a larger whole, we do not think we can check them by concentrating our efforts in one field or the other, be it in strategic forces or in conventional forces. In our view, we must weigh Soviet developments, establish our own strategic objectives, and undertake commensurate efforts across the board.

10. In the short run this policy should serve to frustrate, and we hope deter, any Soviet attempts to take advantage of their military power. Only in the longer run may we eventually see some moderation of the Soviet arms drive. On this score we agree with the memorandum's author: "Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet high command faces --and is more or less resigned to facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems and mission priorities." These hard choices are not just among weapons systems and mission priorities but among military priorities and

other economic imperatives, primarily the reinvigoration of the Soviet economic system as a whole through greater investement in such things as energy, industrial modernization, and labor incentives. The primacy of military requirements is not likely to change. But if we continue to prevent the Soviets from turning their military investments into political payoffs, we may at least see a diminution of that primacy--which should render less onerous the military efforts we have to continue making, and may bring closer a time when economic calculations become more important for the Soviets than the expansionist drive and dysfunctional economic system dictated by their current obsession with international military dominance, expansion through intimidation or force, and military primacy in resource allocation.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 15, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATIONNLRR 748-25A-441

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*BY KOR NARA DATE 6/3/83

SUBJECT:

Soviet Military Priorities

Jeremy Azrael has called my attention to a most interesting interview which appeared in Red Star, May 9, by Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He prepared a memorandum for Secretary Shultz, a copy of which is attached at Tab I, and I believe you will find his observations of interest.

First, Ogarkov's comments on nuclear war are entirely consistent with our conviction that the Soviet General Staff is not fearful of an imminent U.S. first strike. Although the interview is directed at a military audience, and therefore would be expected to convey an air of confidence, his categorical statements that nuclear war makes no sense comes very close to an explicit endorsement of MAD. It is particularly interesting in this regard that he does not dwell on the alleged threat of the Pershing II's and GLCM's in Europe.

A second striking feature is his treatment of ET. The emphasis he gives it implies that he sees developments along these lines as his greatest future worry.

It would be foolhardy to attach too much significance to a single statement. But this one is indeed food for thought. As Jeremy points out, one of the questions it raises is whether we may not have more leverage in vigorous pursuit of ET in the conventional area than in the strategic nuclear area. Going somewhat further afield with speculation, one can also read in Ogarkov's treatment a recognition that the Soviet economy cannot support competition across the board and may have to make some agonizing decisions on priorities. This could mean that the Soviet military may not be as rigid in opposing strategic arms reduction as many assume. Even if this should be the case, however, we should understand that the most likely reason will be a desire to have more resources available for ET.

I have asked the Agency to be alert for any further commentary in Soviet military literature which reiterates or supports Orgakov's themes.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum "A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?"

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DECLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

17

NLRR 748-254-450

Washington, D. C. 20520

172571

BY COB NARA DATE 5/30/03

June 11, 1984

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/P - Peter W. Rodman *PMR*

SUBJECT: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?

On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, Red Star, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (relevant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview has focussed on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's anti-American rhetoric. A not unrelated, but much more distinctive and noteworthy feature of the interview is its questioning of long-established Soviet military priorities.

Unlike virtually all other recent Soviet commentaries on defense matters, the Ogarkov interview does not dwell on the threat posed by the deployment of Pershings and GLCM's and the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On the contrary, Ogarkov describes our continuing nuclear buildup as "senseless," since the already existing "overkill" capacity on both sides has made it "impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike." No matter how destructive an initial attack, the victim will "inevitably" retain enough weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage."

It would be unwarranted to conclude on this basis that Ogarkov has been converted from a proponent of nuclear war-fighting (the long-established Soviet military doctrine) to a proponent of mutual assured destruction. But he has gone out of his way to discount the military significance of the alleged U.S. quest for nuclear superiority. Although he refrains from saying so directly, it clearly follows from his argument that there is no compelling need either to cap the U.S. nuclear buildup through early arms-control agreements or to respond to that buildup through nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S. programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for granted.

Ogarkov's insouciance about a U.S. first-strike threat is accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional

CONFIDENTIAL

DECL: OADR

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weaponry is on the threshold of a technological revolution that will radically transform current methods of waging war. Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now" -- with such urgency and concentration that other established priorities are bound to suffer.

Ogarkov concedes that certain risks inhere in such a reordering of priorities, but he insists that these risks are manageable and can and must be run. Without quite saying so explicitly, he clearly takes it as a given that the Soviet military does not and will not have the resources both for a crash program in conventional weaponry and for a significant buildup of its nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable, it is nonetheless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov describes as "an objective law discovered in his time by Frederick Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy." Fortunately, however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable. While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an assumption that the current period is a period of relative security.

Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But in this particularly authoritative statement to a professional audience, he suggests that it is possible to concentrate resources on the development and testing of necessarily uncertain emergent technologies and weapons systems because it is a time of peace -- and is likely to remain so for some time to come. In consequence, there is no justification for not reordering priorities. War is not a clear and present danger, and attempts to argue the contrary within military circles are nothing more than poorly disguised expressions of illegitimate inter-service rivalry. More generally, they reflect precisely the sort of "conservatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely overcome" by leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery" that innovations in military affairs often have to be imposed "almost forcibly and against the will of the military command."

If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct (and it is one in which Jeremy has considerable confidence), there are

a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and exploring further:

- The Soviet military is far from monolithic and may presently be divided by particularly intense inter-service rivalries.
- Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems and mission priorities.
- The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is particularly high.
- The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we often suppose.
- The Soviet determination to match us nuclear missile for nuclear missile in a continuing cycle of deployments and counterdeployments may be shakier than we often assume.
- Within the Soviet high command support for nuclear arms control may be strongest among conventional force commanders who are eager to cap Soviet nuclear programs and increase spending on conventional modernization.
- Pressing ahead with our conventional arms modernization programs may be one of our most effective means for limiting the modernization of Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces.
- The Soviets may be on the verge of conventional force modernization programs that will tip the conventional balance even further in their favor unless we in fact justify their apprehension and exploit our technological advantages in the field of conventional weaponry.

Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted: S/P:JAzrael *YK*

Ogarkov Interview

PM081625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 84 First Edition pp 2-3

[Interview with MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister: "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day" — first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 is being celebrated widely and solemnly in our country today. On the eve of this great and resplendent holiday, the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, to answer a number of questions connected with the defense of socialism's gains.

Question: It is nearly 40 years since the Great Patriotic War. What changes have taken place in military matters in that time, and how are they taken into account in our military building, in the training of troops and fleets?

Answer: In his time, F. Engels discovered an objective law: "Nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics, and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the means of communication," and "successes of technology, the moment they have become usable and have been applied in practice in military matters, have immediately -- almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command -- caused changes and even revolutions in the methods of waging war."

In present-day conditions, this law is manifested with particular force. In the postwar years, several generations of weapons systems and combat hardware have already succeeded one another.

What do the basic changes in military matters consist of today?

First, the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons, which has continued over several decades, has led to radical qualitative changes in the conditions and potential for the use of these weapons. The stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and various means of delivery that the sides created have reached such a size and quality that they are sufficient to destroy all the important targets on enemy territory many times over in a short space of time.

For instance, in just one salvo (launch) of strategic (not counting battlefield) nuclear forces, the United States could today use about 12,000 nuclear charges with a total yield hundreds of times greater than the yield of all the explosives and ammunition used by all states throughout the 6 years of World War II. With the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, this potential of U.S. strategic nuclear forces will further increase. You do not have to be a military man or a scientist to realize that a further buildup is becoming senseless. Nonetheless, this buildup is continuing, through the fault of the United States.

As a result, a paradox arises: On the one hand, it would seem, a process of steadily increasing potential for the nuclear powers to destroy the enemy is taking place, while on the other there is an equally steady and, I would say, even steeper reduction in the potential for an aggressor to inflict a so-called "disarming strike" on his main enemy. The point is, with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missiles already achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike. A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor, even by the limited quantity of nuclear charges remaining to the defender -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage -- becomes inevitable in present conditions. The calculation of the strategists across the ocean, based on the possibility of waging a so-called "limited" nuclear war, now has no foundation whatever. It is utopian: Any so-called limited use of nuclear facilities will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the whole of the sides' nuclear arsenal. That is the terrible logic of war. Their arguments about the possibility of a so-called "limited nuclear strike without retaliation" against the enemy's main centers and control points are even more groundless. Such arguments are pure fantasy. Put together, all this substantially changes both the conditions for the outbreak of modern warfare and the potential for waging it.

Second, rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the emergence in the developed countries of automated reconnaissance-and-strike complexes, long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines, and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply increased range of conventional weapons makes it possible to immediately extend active combat operations not just to the border regions, but to the whole country's territory, which was not possible in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations, which will in turn predetermine the possibility of conducting military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparably more destructive forms than before.

There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations, and the role and significance of the initial period of the war and its initial operations become incomparably greater. A new war, should imperialism unleash it, will certainly be strikingly different in nature from the last war.

Third, the rapid development of science and technology in recent years creates real reconditions for the emergence in the very near future of even more destructive and previously unknown types of weapons based on new physical principles.

Work on these new types of weapons is already in progress in a number of countries, for example, in the United States. Their development is a reality of the very near future, and it would be a serious mistake not to consider it right now. This, in turn, cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle and even of the military might of the state.

This is a short list of only the basic changes currently taking place in the means of armed struggle. They are inevitably exerting their influence on the nature of war and the role and place of the branches of the Armed Forces in resolving operational and strategic tasks and on the further development and improvement of forms and methods of conducting military operations and military affairs as a whole.

All this must unconditionally be the subject of constant and in-depth analysis and must be generalized and taken into account in the practical building of our Armed Forces.

In consideration of this, the technical equipping, organizational building, and management of our Armed Forces are effected in such a way that they are always ready under any conditions to deal an immediate counterstrike against any aggressor. This capability must be guaranteed in all instances. The main component of the combat might of the Army and Navy and the basic factor in curbing the aggressor are our strategic nuclear forces, which are in a state of constant high combat readiness. All branches of the Armed Forces and categories of troops are developing harmoniously with them and are being equipped with the most modern weapons and combat hardware.

There is also a simultaneous process of honing and improving the system of operational, combat, and political training of troops and fleets; the procedure for mobilizing and provisioning them; troop and weapon control systems, and forms and methods of political-educational and party political work.

The Soviet Armed Forces' might is determined by not only the quantity but also the quality of their weapons and combat hardware. Our main strength is the Soviet people, who have an expert mastery of the awe-inspiring weapons entrusted to them by the motherland. Today, over 93 percent of our servicemen have secondary and higher education. Almost 90 percent of the servicemen are Communists and Komsomol members, who are transforming our Army and Navy into an invincible force.

The resolution of the tasks of military building and training of our Armed Forces is effected on the basis of comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the military-political situation and the development of the means of armed struggle. Therefore, our military cadres do not merely copy past experience, they use it creatively and enrich it. They must constantly improve the training and organizational structure of troops and naval forces and conduct scientific quests to this end, taking into account the continuous changes in military affairs and, if necessary, taking justified risks. It is better to test new forms in peacetime than to seek them in the course of a war. Furthermore, there would now be no time for this. We military men must, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, points out, "resolutely overcome any conservatism and inertia"; for us in the military "the slogan of the day must be: From a correct idea, fully armed with experience, to bold actions!"

II. 9 May 84

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USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

would like to emphasize that the defense of the socialist motherland is the concern of every Soviet person, a concern of the entire people. In this connection, work to educate the Soviet people in accordance with revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and train reliable and skillful defenders of the motherland, and the active participation in this work of our party, labor, war, and Army veterans, are of great importance.

The main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength and invincibility and an important condition of their further strengthening and development has always been and remains the leadership of the Communist Party and the unbreakable unity between the Army and the people. The CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and our government are doing everything necessary to ensure that the Soviet state's defense potential and its Armed Forces' combat might are abreast of present-day demands and that no eventuality can take us by surprise.

The grim years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further and further into the depths of history. A great deal has changed in the world in the almost 40 years since then. However, time cannot wipe out from the memory of grateful mankind the unparalleled feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who, in an unprecedentedly fierce confrontation with a perfidious enemy, not only defended the socialist fatherland, but also saved the peoples of many countries from fascist enslavement. The memory of the millions of people who gave their lives for the great victory makes it imperative today to rally the forces of the world's peoples in the struggle against the perfidious designs of the forces of imperialism and reaction, against the instigators of a new war. The imperialist pretenders to world domination should not forget that history savagely punishes those who ignore its lessons.

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8405041

RECEIVED 03 JUL 84 08

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 02 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

CM

OGARKOV, MARSHAL N

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF OGARKOV INTERVIEW RE REORDERING OF SOVIET MILITARY
PRIORITIES

Action not necessary

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 05 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

KIMMITT

THOMPSON

COMMENTS *Sent to McFarlane earlier - AFM 7/3/84*

REF# 8418467

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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July 2, 1984

84 JUL 2 P10:30

NLRR 7-18-25A-4-6-9

BY LCDB NARA DATE 5/30/13

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Caspar W. Weinberger ---- 8418465
Secretary
Department of Defense

Mr. William J. Casey ----- 8418466
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane ---- 8418467
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities

The attached analysis of Ogarkov's views of current and emergent Soviet military priorities caught my attention. I would be interested in your reactions.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?

172573

On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, Red Star, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (relevant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview has focused on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's anti-American rhetoric. A not unrelated, but much more distinctive and noteworthy feature of the interview is its implicit questioning of some long-established Soviet military priorities.

Unlike most other recent Soviet commentaries on defense matters (including those by other Soviet marshals), the Ogarkov interview does not dwell on the threat posed by the deployment of Pershings and GLCM's and the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On the contrary, Ogarkov describes our continuing nuclear buildup as "senseless," since the already existing "overkill" capacity on both sides has made it "impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike." No matter how destructive an initial attack, the victim will "inevitably" retain enough weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage."

In the absence of corroborating evidence, it would clearly be unwarranted to conclude that Ogarkov has been converted from a proponent of nuclear war-fighting (the long-established Soviet military doctrine) to a proponent of mutual assured destruction. But he has gone out of his way to discount the military significance of the alleged U.S. quest for nuclear superiority. One can infer from his argument that there is no urgent need either to cap the U.S. nuclear buildup through early arms-control agreements or to respond to that buildup through matching nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S. programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for granted so long as the Soviet Union maintains a survivable retaliatory ("second-strike") force and the U.S. lacks reliable strategic defenses. (Notably, Ogarkov says nothing whatever about the SDI.)

Ogarkov's disparagement of a U.S. first-strike threat is accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional weaponry is on the threshold of a technological revolution that will radically transform current methods of waging war. Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now" -- with such urgency and concentration that other established priorities are bound to suffer in the absence of a sizeable increase in military spending.

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NLRR 74 8-25A-4-6-9

BY 608 NARA DATE 5/30/01

Although Ogarkov may well be a proponent of such an increase, in this interview he seems to take it as a given that the Soviet military can not afford both a crash program in conventional weaponry and an accelerating buildup of its nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable, it is nonetheless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov describes as "an objective law discovered in his time by Frederick Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy." Fortunately, however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable. While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an assumption that the current period is a period of relative security.

Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But in this interview he argues that it is possible to concentrate resources on the development and testing of necessarily uncertain emergent technologies and weapons systems because there is no clear and present danger of war. Attempts to argue the contrary within military circles are nothing more than poorly disguised expressions of illegitimate inter-service rivalry. More generally, they reflect precisely the sort of "conservatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely overcome" by leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery" that innovations in military affairs often have to be imposed "almost forcibly and against the will of the military command."

If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct, there are a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and exploring further:

- The Soviet military is far from monolithic and traditional inter-service rivalries may have been considerably intensified as a result of work on the new Soviet Five Year Plan.
- Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems and mission priorities.
- The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is particularly high.

- The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we often suppose.
- Within the Soviet high command support for nuclear arms control may be strongest among conventional force commanders who feel it is more important to increase spending on conventional modernization than to match us nuclear missile for nuclear missile in a continuing cycle of deployments and counterdeployments.
- Pressing ahead with our conventional arms modernization programs may be one of our most effective means for limiting the modernization of Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces.
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Attachment:

Relevant Section of Ogarkov Interview

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Work on these new types of weapons is already in progress in a number of countries, for example, in the United States. Their development is a reality of the very near future, and it would be a serious mistake not to consider it right now. This, in turn, cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle and even of the military might of the state.

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III. 9 May 84

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USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

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