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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: CABLE FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/21/2016

File Folder USSR (6/28/84-6/29/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

SKINNER

400

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172541	MEMO	R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE AFGHANISTAN R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-1-5	1	7/5/1984	B1
172543	NON-PAPER	RE AFGHANISTAN	3	ND	B1
172544	MEMO	G. KEMP TO R. MCFARLANE RE NON-PAPER ON AFGHANISTAN	1	7/3/1984	B1
172542	MEMO	C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED NON-PAPER ON AFGHANISTAN R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-1-5	1	6/28/1984	B1
172545	CABLE	TEL AVIV 9520 R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-3-3	2	6/29/1984	B1
172561	PROFILE SHEET	SYSTEM II	1	7/3/1984	B1
172551	PROFS NOTE	FROM KIMMITT, FORWARDING MCFARLANE NOTE RE GORE (COPY OF DOC #172550)	1	7/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172562	PROFILE SHEET	SYSTEM II	1	7/3/1984	B1
172563	RECEIPT	RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL	1	ND	B1
172548	LETTER	ALBERT GORE JR. TO MCFARLANE RE SLCMS (W/ADDED NOTES)	3	6/29/1984	B1
172546	MEMO	R. LEHMAN TO R. MCFARLANE RE GORE LETTER	3	7/26/1984	B1
172550	PROFS NOTE	FROM KIMMITT, FORWARDING MCFARLANE NOTE RE GORE	1	7/10/1984	B1
172549	LETTER	COPY OF DOC #172548, W/ADDITIONAL NOTATIONS (ALBERT GORE JR. TO MCFARLANE RE SLCMS)	3	6/29/1984	B1
172552	TALKING POINTS	SLCM TALKING POINTS TO USE WITH REP. GORE	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172554	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE 6/29/84 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-5-1	2	6/29/1984	B1
172556	MESSAGE	FROM DOBRYNIN (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-5-1	1	ND	B1
172557	MESSAGE	STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-5-1	3	ND	B1
172558	MESSAGE	STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (IN RUSSIAN) R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-5-1	3	ND	B1
172560	MESSAGE	SAME MESSAGE AS DOC #172558 (STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, IN RUSSIAN) R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-3-5-1	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE AT 1:30 P.M. EDT

June 27, 1984

FACT SHEET

U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS

In his speech today to participants in the Smithsonian's Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, the President refers to several proposals we have made to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- New Exchanges Agreement: We have been discussing a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation and will present a draft to the Soviets for formal negotiations in the very near future. The previous agreement, often referred to as the "Cultural Agreement," lapsed in 1979. It was one of a series of two-year agreements going back to 1958. Our new draft would provide for resumption of official support for inter alia exchanges of major exhibits, academic, cultural, and sports individuals and groups, and reactivation of film presentations. The American team in the formal negotiations will be headed by Ambassador Arthur Hartman in Moscow.

-- New Consulates General: In 1974 the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to establish new Consulates General in Kiev and New York City. We already have a Consulate General in Leningrad and the Soviets have one in San Francisco. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. Government suspended the agreement for new Consulates General. At the time of the suspension, we had an advance team in Kiev for nearly two years and were approximately six months away from officially opening the Consulate. The Soviets had a similar team in New York. Both advance teams were withdrawn. Since that time, we have discussed the consulates issue on numerous occasions, focusing over the past year on concrete steps that could be taken to pave the way for opening these consulates. We have recently proposed to move forward and suggested we send a team to Kiev to inspect available property.

-- Environmental Protection Agreement: The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection was signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972, by President Nixon and Chairman Podgorny. The agreement has been renewed three times for 5-year periods and is due to expire May 23, 1987. Activities under the Agreement have included seminars, joint publications, exchange visits, and joint projects in several topics including protecting endangered species, modeling of long-range air pollution, and earthquake prediction. EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus has assumed the U.S. co-chairmanship of the Joint Environmental Committee and will seek to use this forum as a means to reinvigorate the Agreement. Mr. Ruckelshaus is currently representing the United States at the Multilateral Conference on the Environment in Munich, where he has discussed the Agreement with Soviet officials.

-- Housing: The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction was signed by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin on June 28, 1974, in Moscow. We decided in December 1983 to renew the Agreement for a third five-year period effective June 28, 1984. Besides exchange visits and seminars, the Agreement has supported joint projects in construction techniques in extreme climates and unusual geological conditions, sewage treatment in a permafrost environment, and fire prevention in the design of construction materials. The President's decision to expand the activities under the Agreement will lead to the convening of the first Joint Housing Committee meeting since 1978 and to an increase in the already extensive private sector involvement in joint projects. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel Pierce, Jr. will lead our efforts under this agreement.

-- Health: The United States and the Soviet Union entered into cooperation in the health area through two agreements signed in the early 1970s: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Medical Sciences and Public Health (signed May 23, 1972, at Moscow by Secretary of State Rogers and Minister of Health Petrovsky) and the Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development (signed at Moscow June 28, 1974 by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko). The Health Agreement has been extended until May 23, 1987, while the Artificial Heart Agreement will run until June 28, 1987. The President has directed that steps be taken in the near future to strengthen cooperation under these agreements through a renewal of high-level visits, joint committee meetings, and the initiation of new projects and possibly new agreements. The timing for such steps has not yet been set. The agreements have provided for joint research inter alia on laser treatment of glaucoma, congenital heart disease, mechanically assisted circulation in artificial hearts, and cancer treatment and prevention.

-- Agriculture: Signed at Washington June 19, 1973, by Secretary of Agriculture Butz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, the Agriculture Agreement has been extended three times and will not expire until June 19, 1988. The Department of Agriculture will now reactivate the Agreement (which has been dormant the past several years) through a Joint Committee meeting, high-level visits, and initiation of new projects. Earlier, the Agreement had supported plant, animal, and soil science research (germ plasm studies) and exchange of grain-related economic information. Exchange visits, especially those involving the private sector, had been particularly active. All of these programs will be reinvigorated.

-- Fishing Agreement: In April, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months (as opposed to the two previous 12-month extensions). Final approval is currently pending before Congress. The Fisheries agreement was initially signed in November 1976. The Soviet Union does not, however, have a directed fishing allocation. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States terminated allocations to the USSR to fish within our 200-mile zone. (The Soviet Union had been receiving a directed allocation of between 400,000 and 500,000 MT a year.) Soviet processing at sea of fish caught by U.S. fishermen as part of an existing joint venture was allowed to continue since it benefited U.S. fishermen. The U.S. is currently reviewing the U.S.-USSR fishing relationship to determine whether mutually beneficial steps can be taken to increase cooperation.

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-- Long-Term Cooperation Agreement: The U.S. has proposed to extend for ten years the U.S.-USSR Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. The Agreement was signed by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev during the 1974 Moscow Summit. It is scheduled to expire June 28, 1984. The principal provisions of the Agreement call upon the parties to use their good offices to facilitate cooperation in economic, industrial, and technical areas. In practice, the Agreement has been exclusively economic and has facilitated certain business dealings between the two countries. If the Agreement is extended, our expectation is that there will be a meeting of the Working Group of Experts under Article III to examine prospects for trade. If that meeting is successful, then a Joint Commercial Commission meeting will be held when practical.

-- U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA): The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea established certain "rules of the road" to govern special situations involving naval surface vessels and aircraft of the two nations. It also set up agreed-upon navy-to-navy channels for the prompt resolution of any problems arising under this Agreement. Senior officers of the U. S. and Soviet Navies meet on an annual basis for a general review of the implementation of the agreement and discussion of ways in which it might be strengthened. The most recent review took place in Moscow in late May. At that time, the U.S. and Soviet sides agreed to a renewal of the INCSEA agreement for another three years.

-- World Oceans Agreement: The U.S.-USSR World Oceans Agreement was signed in 1973 and renewed for three years in 1981. It has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research and has involved seminars, exchange visits, and joint ocean research cruises. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has taken the U.S. lead on this agreement. The Agreement comes up for renewal in December.

-- Maritime Boundary: The United States and the Soviet Union have a difference relating to the precise cartographic depiction and location of the boundary line established by the 1867 Convention ceding Alaska. The difference relates to the fact that the U.S. depicts the 1867 Convention Line as the maritime boundary by arcs of great circles, while the Soviet Union depicts the Convention Line by rhumb lines. We have proposed a fair and equitable resolution to the issue. Three rounds of technical level discussions have been held and a fourth round is expected soon.

-- Space Rescue Mission: The U. S. proposal envisages cooperation between NASA and Soviet space officials on a joint simulated space rescue mission. A space shuttle would rendezvous with the Soviet space station to practice procedures that might be necessary to rescue each other's personnel. Details of the proposal would have to be worked out.

-- Consular Review Talks: The session of U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks (CRT) currently underway in Moscow is the latest round of a series of discussions which began in 1976, when representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met to attempt to resolve a number of consular issues outstanding between the two countries. Those issues primarily involved visa questions and administrative matters relating to the functioning of our diplomatic missions. CRT discussions have taken place in Moscow in 1976, and in Washington in 1979 and 1983.

-- Search and Rescue Talks: In October 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard was authorized to take the initiative to open direct lines of emergency communications with the Soviet maritime rescue authorities in the Pacific. As a result of subsequent exchanges in June 1983, agreement was reached to hold a working level meeting on a broad range of search and rescue topics. This meeting was scheduled for early December 1983, but was postponed at the request of the Soviet side. We have proposed rescheduling this meeting.

-- U.S.-Soviet Communications Improvements Talks: On the basis of the President's proposals of May 1983, a U.S. team has met with Soviet counterparts three times to discuss possible means by which U.S.-Soviet communications -- for use in both times of crisis and calm -- might be strengthened. The most recent meeting was in Moscow in late April. On the basis of those talks, significant progress has been made in working out agreement with the Soviets on the desirability of upgrading the existing Direct Communications Link (the Hotline) with secure facsimile transmission capabilities, which would increase the speed, reliability and versatility of that system. We expect another meeting shortly. Additionally, the U.S. has put forward proposals to upgrade the communications capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet embassies in each other's countries, to establish a Joint Military Communications Link to handle the exchange of time-sensitive technical data, and to facilitate consultations in the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or incident.

-- U.S.-Soviet Military Contact: With the exception of the special navy-to-navy talks under the 1972 INCSEA Agreement, there has been no channel for high-level military exchange between the U.S. and Soviet Union outside of specifically arms control-related talks since the one-time meeting of the Secretary of Defense and Chief of the Joint Staff with their Soviet counterparts during the 1979 Vienna Summit. Earlier this year, the President suggested to the Soviet leadership the desirability of exploring the possibility of regularizing some form of contact and discussion between those responsible for defense matters on both sides for the purpose of increasing mutual understanding and minimizing the potential for misinterpretation and miscalculation.

-- Human Rights Cases:

- ANDREI SAKHAROV: Dr. Andrei Sakharov, a physicist and Academy of Sciences member who played a major role in the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, has spoken out at length in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union. In 1975 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for those efforts. Since 1980 he has been required to live in internal exile in the closed city of Gorkiy. In early May he began a hunger strike to obtain permission for his wife, Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for necessary medical treatment; there has been no confirmed information of any sort on his health or his status since that time.

23

- YELENA BONNER: A doctor by training, Yelena Bonner is the wife of Dr. Sakharov, and was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group. She has served as his main channel of communications to the outside world during his exile in Gorky. She is also believed to have begun a hunger strike in early May to obtain permission to travel abroad for vital medical treatment; she suffers from both a heart condition and serious eye problems.

- Yuriy Orlov: A founder and leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Yuriy Orlov was long active on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union. He was a founding member of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International and a participant in unofficial scientific seminars organized for refusenik scientists. He was arrested in February 1977 and convicted in May 1978 of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Earlier this year he completed seven years in a strict-regime labor camp and began five years of internal exile.

- ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY: Anatoliy Shcharanskiy is a long-time activist on behalf of human rights and Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. A founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Shcharanskiy was also a leader of the Jewish emigration movement and a liaison between Western newsmen and Soviet dissidents. In March 1977 he was arrested and in July 1978 was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and "treason". He is currently in Chistopol' Prison; his wife, Avital, lives in Israel.

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NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8404409

ENCLOSURE UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED 28 JUN 84 10

1/24/86 COB

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 28 JUN 84

KEYWORDS. AFGHANISTAN

USSR

GANDHI, INDIRA

SUBJECT: PROPOSED NON-PAPER RE AFGHANISTAN FOR PM GANDHI

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 02 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES WH

PM

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

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SESTANOVICH

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COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
MCFARLANE	X 7/3	FOR Decision	7/5	
	JUL 05 1984	Ponderstein approved		
	JUL 05 1984	Ponderstein spl		6/25/84

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

172541

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-254-3-1-5

July 5, 1984


BY KOB N DATE 5/30/13

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Non-Paper on Afghanistan (C)

The NSC has reviewed and approved the proposed draft non-paper for Afghanistan to be delivered to Mrs. Gandhi. (C)



Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Non-Paper on Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-25A-3-15

BY COB NARA DATE 5/31/13 AFGHANISTAN

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The United States maintains its view that the single most destabilizing factor in South Asia is the continuing presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. We are well aware of the importance which India also attaches to Soviet withdrawal. Further we think we both agree that the longer the situation continues, the more difficult its resolution becomes. Thus, we believe that India and the United States share an interest in doing all we can at the earliest possible date to facilitate a negotiated political settlement which will end the occupation of Afghanistan and allow the millions of Afghan refugees to return home.

Unfortunately, we do not see that such a settlement is likely to be reached at an early date. In fact, although the United Nations announced on June 12 that another session of indirect talks on Afghanistan will be held in late August in Geneva, we have seen no indication of genuine willingness on the Soviets' part to negotiate a withdrawal of their forces. Against these uncertain prospects, the current escalation of Soviet military operations highlights more than ever the need to make every effort to convince Moscow that its own interests are not served by continued occupation. India's voice is one that the Soviet Union takes seriously. Hearing from you on the need for a comprehensive agreement before the beginning of the August session of UN indirect talks could have a positive impact on Soviet thinking -- if not immediately, then in the longer term as the Soviets review the policies which have led to the present tragic and difficult situation.

In the UN's effort to find a solution for Afghanistan, the process of indirect talks has focused on a four-point agenda, most importantly balancing pledges of non-interference and non-intervention from the Pakistani side against an agreement by the Afghans and Soviets to a definite timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The other points are the development of a mechanism for consulting the refugees on the conditions of their return and a possible role for other nations in guaranteeing a comprehensive agreement. In April and May of 1983 there were hopes that a settlement might be possible. Since then the distance between the parties' positions seems to have widened, with the Soviets unwilling to give a definite timetable for withdrawal.

The United States cannot overemphasize the importance we attach to a negotiated agreement and our concern about the lack of progress toward a solution through the United Nations process, or any other channel. Our goal remains a negotiated political settlement for Afghanistan. We have strongly supported the UN negotiating effort as one way to achieve that objective, and welcome the recent announcement of another round in this process. We believe that to accommodate the interests of all parties and be viable, a settlement must address the four elements of the UNGA resolutions. We are not a party to the negotiating process and have not sought to develop a blueprint for such a settlement. However, it seems clear that the withdrawal of Soviet troops remains the key, though we also recognize that a number of other elements must be taken into account in the give-and-take of negotiations.

In our informal discussions with Mr. Cordovez, the United States has emphasized that we cannot comment on one element of the negotiating agenda in isolation from the others. These elements are interdependent. Balance is essential. For us this means not emphasizing one major element such as pledges of non-intervention and non-interference more than an agreement to a withdrawal timetable. Simultaneous implementation of steps to achieve both non-intervention/non-interference and the withdrawal of Soviet troops is vital; the beginning of one process cannot depend on the implementation of another. Thus the idea of having the Soviets agree to a withdrawal timetable with the Kabul regime only after Pakistan takes efforts to prevent alleged intervention and interference simply will not work.

In sum, we believe that only an agreement recognizing the close interrelationship of all the required elements and the need for parallel implementation can lead to a real and lasting solution of the crisis. As we have told the Soviet Union directly, we are prepared to associate ourselves with other nations in strengthening such a settlement and in supporting its effective implementation. We are prepared to discuss with them and those other nations involved all aspects of the problem of Afghanistan.

We very much hope that you will see fit at this time to impress again upon Soviet leaders the urgent need for a political settlement in Afghanistan and our sincere, good-faith desire to achieve it. We have no interest in seeing that confrontation continue.

The upcoming Geneva session of indirect talks offers an opportunity for real progress. Soviet leaders should know that we do not seek a government in Afghanistan which is anti-Soviet. In the years prior to 1978 the Soviet Union was able to protect its own security interests vis-a-vis Afghanistan without the destabilizing steps it later took; it was able to work with an Afghan regime that had as its guiding foreign policy goal the pursuit of non-alignment. We believe that such a situation can and should be restored.

The United States and India have differed on their evaluations of the motivations for and significance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, we have discussed this issue as friends and we remain convinced that we should continue to do so. We believe that on the key element of Soviet withdrawal we see eye-to-eye. The United States urges India to do everything it can to help achieve a political settlement for Afghanistan; the importance India attaches to such a diplomatic breakthrough will not be taken lightly by the Soviets. If you do decide to take such action, using the opportunity to assure the Soviets of our sincere desire for a peaceful settlement, you may say that we have asked you to convey our views to the Soviet Union.



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United States Department of State

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECLASSIFIED

June 28, 1984

NLRR 748-25A 3-15

BY 0007 NARA DATE 5/30/13

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Non-Paper on Afghanistan for
Prime Minister Gandhi

Attached is a draft non-paper on Afghanistan for Prime Minister Gandhi, asking that she approach the Soviets about an Afghan settlement. It is to be reviewed by the NSC and the Vice President, before being sent by the State Department to Embassy New Delhi to pass to Mrs. Gandhi when it delivers another letter from the President on Sri Lanka.

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Proposed non-paper on Afghanistan

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, UR, US, IS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MRS.
- ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKY
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1. ~~(S)~~ MRS. SHCHARANSKY CONTACTED THE EMBASSY JUNE 28 TO ASK US TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.
2. (U) COMMENCE TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I CONGRATULATE YOU AND THE GREAT AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR INDEPENDENCE DAY.
JULY THE 4TH IS AN ANNIVERSARY FOR ME PERSONALLY, TOO. ON THIS DAY, 10 YEARS AGO, I WAS MARRIED TO ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKY. SINCE THEN, WE HAVE BEEN SEPARATED.
I HOPE THAT NEXT YEAR, ON THIS DAY, WE WILL BE

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 9520

DTG: 291539Z JUN 84 PSN: 070428

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ABLE TO SEND YOU A GREETING SIGNED BY BOTH OF US. AND THAT ANATOLIY WILL BE ABLE TO THANK YOU, FROM ISRAEL, FOR ALL THAT YOU HAVE DONE FOR HIS RELEASE.

SINCERELY YOURS, AVITAL SHCHARANSKY.

END TEXT.

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3. ~~(S)~~ MRS. SHCHARANSKY ALSO SAID THAT SHE HAD CALLED ANATOLIY'S BROTHER, LEONID, ON JUNE 27. SHE SAID LEONID INFORMED HER THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD RECENTLY INFORMED HIM THAT THE SEMI-ANNUAL PRISON VISITATION BETWEEN ANATOLIY AND HIS MOTHER AND BROTHER SCHEDULED FOR JULY 4 HAD BEEN CANCELLED.

SHE NOTED THAT JULY 4 IS THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY DATE OF HER MARRIAGE TO ANATOLIY AND SAID THAT LEONID AND SHE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CANCELLATION OF THE VISITATION. ANATOLIY'S FAMILY THINKS IT MAY BE A SIGNAL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE AGAIN ABOUT TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON ANATOLIY IN ANOTHER EFFORT TO OBTAIN A CONFESSION FROM HIM.

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4. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO MOSCOW. LEWIS

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: CABLE FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/21/2016

File Folder

USSR (6/28/84-6/29/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

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172561	PROFILE SHEET SYSTEM II	1	7/3/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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National Security Council
The White House

System # II^B
Package # 90759

84 JUL 18 P 4: 10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

doz ✓
KS 7/18 Route to Ron Lehman in sealed, eyes only envelope.
✓ Memo to RCM due 7/20.

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172551 PROFS NOTE

1 7/10/1984 B1

FROM KIMMITT, FORWARDING MCFARLANE
NOTE RE GORE (COPY OF DOC #172550)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172562 PROFILE SHEET

1 7/3/1984

B1

SYSTEM II

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO,	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Tom Shull	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>JUL 03 1984</u>	<u>N(log</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>in Sys II</u>
<u>Poindexter</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>for info only)</u>
			<u>I</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Shull

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____

Do you want to staff this letter? (Date/Time)

TOM -
Bob Imp + Rmk
think Bud meant he doesn't want
it Staffer nor does he want to
reply. Do you want a double check
about Bob's reply.

NO

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172563	RECEIPT RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL	1	ND	B1

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172548	LETTER ALBERT GORE JR. TO MCFARLANE RE SLCMS (W/ADDED NOTES)	3	6/29/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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National Security Council
The White House

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System #

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26 P4:24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	✓	
John Poindexter	2	✓	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4		
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

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172546	MEMO R. LEHMAN TO R. MCFARLANE RE GORE LETTER	3	7/26/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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172550	PROFS NOTE	1	7/10/1984	B1
	FROM KIMMITT, FORWARDING MCFARLANE NOTE RE GORE			

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172549 LETTER

3 6/29/1984 B1

COPY OF DOC #172548, W/ADDITIONAL
NOTATIONS (ALBERT GORE JR. TO MCFARLANE
RE SLCMS)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172552 TALKING POINTS

1

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B1

SLCM TALKING POINTS TO USE WITH REP. GORE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
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MCFARLANE VIEWS ON EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION HIT

PM09157 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Aug 84 First Edition p 4

[Political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov article: "Mr McFarlane's Revelations"]

[Text] McFarlane, the U.S. President's assistant for national security affairs, recently made a long-winded speech in San Francisco. It is significant in its frank exposition of the present U.S. President's actual foreign policy aims. And in this sense McFarlane is involuntarily undermining the efforts of official American propaganda, which is trying its best under the conditions of the election campaign to create an image of some "new" Reagan.

With a claim to conceptuality McFarlane's speech essentially proclaims Reagan's philosophy of ensuring world supremacy for the United States and reorganizing the world along American lines. Here they frankly state that they reckon on achieving the set aim by strong-arm methods, using political, economic, and even military means. They try to cover up their great-power claims with the same old hackneyed fabrications about the "Soviet threat" and the intrigues of "international communism."

The first of the theses of the U.S. presidential assistant is essentially an indulgence for aggression in those parts of the world which Washington takes it into its head to proclaim a sphere of its "vital interests."

For both economic and military reasons, McFarlane expatiates, events in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are becoming increasingly significant for the United States. The American economy is becoming increasingly dependent on deliveries of raw materials from those regions. Thus, U.S. security depends on the strength of the regimes there allied with Washington. However, the White House representative complain, these regimes are "extremely vulnerable to subversive activity." And this, according to him, has intensified sharply over the past 10 years.

The U.S. presidential assistant tries to stun the ordinary American with a list of "examples" from Angola to Nicaragua. However, the references cited by him do not confirm but refute his thesis. It is absurd to portray any manifestation of the struggle for national liberation and social progress -- whether the collapse of the Portugese colonial empire or the overthrow of Somoza's rotten dictatorship in Nicaragua -- as the "intrigues of Moscow" and as a constituent part of the East-West confrontation.

Falsification of history is used in this instance to justify the policy of social revenge on a global scale. In order to turn back the wave of the people's movement, McFarlane pontificates, the United States must help its "friends" to acquire the ability to independently oppose "organized violence."

What this means, simply, is giving assistance to antipopular regimes that provide American monopolies with opportunities for unimpeded exploitation of the peoples of developing countries. McFarlane declares with mercenary-minded cynicism that only such assistance is "profitable" from the U.S. viewpoint. McFarlane withholds the fact that the Rapid Deployment Force has been set up for those who do not consent to put on the American yoke of their own free will and that "warning strikes" have been prepared in accordance with Presidential Directive 138 on the pretext of the struggle against so-called "terrorism."

The following three theses in McFarlane's speech are also devoted to substantiating Washington's imperial ambitions and to its desire to rule the destinies of other peoples. Their essence is expressed thus: "The Soviet Union differs from the United States"; "The Soviet Union is an expansionist power"; "The United States has the means to cope with Soviet expansion."

"I categorically reject the idea that our system and the Soviet system have anything in common in any moral or political sense," the U.S. presidential assistant pontificates. Well, it is probably possible to agree with that statement. Two worlds, indeed -- two ways of life, two policies. Man's exploitation of man is alien to Soviet society. Its well-being is not founded on the misfortunes of the indigent strata or on the extermination of national minorities. It does not resort to usurious plundering of other peoples and does not cover the whole world with military bases. It has no social groups for which the arms race and the policy of aggression serve as a source of profit.

McFarlane's allegations that only the military industry has undergone development in Russia over the years of Soviet power, while the people's living standards supposedly have not risen at all, are thoroughly false and malicious. Even the CIA, to whose materials the presidential assistant, it must be supposed, has access, admits that the real incomes of the population in the USSR have increased 200-300 percent over the past three decades.

In what, then does the speaker perceive the contrast between the two social systems? "The Soviet Union's aim is to fashion the whole world on the basis of its experience," he proclaims. "Soviet Communists have been seeking overtly and covertly since Lenin's time to make the governments and societies of other countries adopt their system." Only a total ignoramus could resort to such judgments. Washington politicians should be reminded of V.I. Lenin's statements that communists are opposed both to the export of revolution and to the export of counterrevolution.

The attempt to accuse others in order to conceal one's own designs is an old ploy. And it is being used now, too, not for any new purpose at all. "Over the past 4 years," McFarlane maintains, "a growing feeling has arisen in our country that, in the final analysis, the inability to meet the challenge from Soviet might will prove far more costly than a counterreaction to it. Readiness once again to allocate the necessary funds for military needs was one of the signs of this feeling." If we discard the wordy shell, we are left with the traditional scheme: First they frighten people with the "Soviet threat," and then they urge them to cough up.

It is probably worth commenting in greater detail on the following thesis in the U.S. presidential assistant's speech: "The Russians' approach to arms control is different from ours." The approach to arms control, the speaker states, may serve as the most eloquent expression of the principles of state policy in the 20th century. It is enough to recall the "Baruch plan."

Well, once again we are prepared to agree with McFarlane here. The approaches of the USSR and the United States to curbing the arms race -- the nuclear arms race, above all -- really have been fundamentally different. As long ago as 19 June 1946 the Soviet Union proposed a draft international convention, whose participants would adopt three pledges: first, not to use atomic weapons under any circumstances; second, to ban their production and storage; third, to destroy stocks of them within a 3-month period. That initiative opened up the possibility of nipping the nuclear race in the bud.

Rejecting the Soviet proposal, Washington then countered it with a demagogic demarche with the so-called "Baruch plan." The aim of the American project was not to ban atomic weapons but to consolidate the U.S. monopoly on their possession. The Pentagon made the "Baruch plan" directly conditional on the following: "The atom bomb must remain the core of the American arsenal, and the control system must be elaborated so as to prevent the Russians from creating atomic weapons."

As can be seen, McFarlane needed the excursion into history for a very definite purpose: to prove that no Soviet-American agreements are needed in the sphere of limiting the arms race and that they are even harmful. Juggling with figures and distorting the facts, McFarlane tries to uphold the old and long since hackneyed fairytale that the United States supposedly disarmed unilaterally in the sixties and seventies.

You may ask: What kind of unilateral disarmament is McFarlane expatiating about? What, then, has happened to the more than 1,000 ICBM launchers, the more than 650 submarine-based ballistic missile launchers, and the nearly 700 heavy bombers? Who should know better than the President's national security assistant that while in 1960 U.S. strategic weapons could deliver about 2,000 nuclear charges to targets, by the late seventies, as a result of the deployment of MIRVed missiles, this number was in excess of 10,000. At the same time programs were implemented for the nuclear forces' qualitative improvement: The missiles' accuracy was increased and retargeting systems were introduced. In those same years the United States carried out the accelerated development of air-, sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles, whose mass deployment began in the eighties.

All this utterly refutes McFarlane's allegations that the United States has reduced its nuclear arsenal. The same thing is borne out by the fact that at the Geneva talks the U.S. side has done everything to avoid the Soviet proposal to establish equal by substantially reduced ceilings for nuclear charges on strategic delivery vehicles.

The above examples are sufficient to persuade you of the falsty of McFarlane's arguments. His assurances of the present U.S. Administration's adherence to arms control are worth no more. In the 4 years of its rule this administration has not only failed to conclude a single agreement on arms limitation or reduction with the Soviet Union but is also seeking to trample on everything positive done by its predecessors. It has to its credit the breakdown of the Geneva nuclear disarmament talks, the sabotage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and of the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, and its blatant reluctance to resolve constructively the question of banning chemical weapons. The present U.S. Administration is acting vigorously to undermine existing accords on strategic offensive arms limitation and is encroaching on the unlimited treaty on the limitation of ABM systems. Washington clearly disliked the Soviet proposal to conduct talks on immediate measures to prevent the militarization of space. The U.S. Administration has done everything to thwart the possibility of holding them. And after all that McFarlane still dares to accuse the USSR of some kind of "violations" of the Soviet-U.S. agreements!

The last of the six theses put forward in San Francisco proclaims: "The preservation of peace requires strength, readiness for negotiations, and patience." Here all but one of the words are a demagogic camouflage and only one -- "strength" -- serves as the real linchpin of the U.S. Administration's political philosophy and foreign policy activity.

Preaching crude force and bellicose anti-Sovietism -- that is the only way to describe the speech delivered by the U.S. President's aide. Casting aside all disguise, he openly expressed Washington's desire to reverse the wheel of history with the aid of double-dyed reaction.

What lies behind such speeches? The intention to play on the chauvinist feelings of that category of ordinary Americans who applauded the United States' bandit attack on Grenada?

Or rage at the fact that the White House has not succeeded in imposing its will on the Soviet Union, especially on questions of arms control? Is it not with these premises in the field of "national security" that the President's team is going to the Republican Party convention? And will they not determine the administration's foreign policy and military course if the incumbent President is reelected for a second term? However that may be, McFarlane's speech again showed the whole world the predatory teeth-baring of U.S. imperialism, which is sometimes not averse to disguising itself beneath the mask of peacemaker.

AIR FORCE AWARDS MX GUIDANCE SYSTEM CONTRACT

LD092139 Moscow TASS in English 2113 GMT 9 Aug 84

[Text] Washington August 9 TASS -- The United States is speeding up the production of the qualitatively new system of nuclear armaments -- the intercontinental MX first-strike ballistic missile. The Department of the Air Force announced that it concluded with Rockwell International Corporation a contract for delivery of equipment for guidance and control systems to MX missiles. The cost of the contract is estimated at 233 million dollars.

The Pentagon plans to deploy a total of 100 MX missiles, each to be equipped with 10 nuclear warheads. Allocations for the production of the first batch of missiles were allocated by the Congress in the budget for the current fiscal year. The question of money for the production of several dozens more of such missiles is now being discussed in the Capitol Hill.

REAGAN TIES WITH MILITARY INDUSTRY EXAMINED

LD081553 Moscow TASS in English 1454 GMT 8 Aug 84

[Text] Moscow August 8 TASS -- TASS news analyst Ivan Ablamov writes:

The Reagan administration, a protege of the military-industrial complex, jeopardises U.S. national interests by zealously serving it. This view is expressed ever more often in the United States by people representing most different walks of political and economic life. Intense concern in American business and political quarters, including both the Democratic and the Republican Parties, has been aroused by the federal budget deficit which has, as Americans themselves admit, been caused by Washington's reckless militarist policy. The journal FORTUNE wrote, for instance, that one needed no special acuity of vision to see that the military items of spending in the federal budget played a big role in forming the deficit.

According to a just-published estimate of the Congressional Budget Office, the deficit will grow from 179 billion dollars in fiscal 1985 to 263 billion dollars in fiscal 1989. The business council uniting presidents, board chairmen and other managers of one hundred major U.S. corporations said in a statement that the country's economy was heading for another powerful upheaval because of those enormous deficits.

A large group of people prominent in U.S. business, political and scientific [word indistinct] including five former finance secretaries, both Democrats and Republicans, warned in an address to President Reagan that the unprecedentedly high bank rates pushed up by the deficit entailed depleted savings, slow economic growth rates, dramatic cuts in capital investments in industry and a slump in the farming sector. It was fraught with a national economic catastrophe. The deficit was not an abstract notion. It was already affecting the material position of the American man-in-the-street, the address said.

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8490748

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OF ENCLOSEURE(S)
1/21/16 CD

RECEIVED 29 JUN 84 15

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 29 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SHULTZ MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN ON 29 JUN RE US & USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

172554

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on
Friday, June 29, 1984

DECLASSIFIED
REF ID: A64826A3-51
BY: 60708 NARA DATE: 6/5/03

Ambassador Dobrynin called on me this morning at his request. We talked for about three-quarters of an hour covering three subjects.

1. Dobrynin delivered an additional proposal from the Soviet Union on negotiations about the "militarization of space" in which they add some specificity to the modalities of their proposal, particularly a date and place for negotiations. I said that we are not yet prepared to respond to their proposal but that there are no doubt a number of issues involved that need some discussion. For example, does "militarization" in space apply only to defensive systems or do they want to talk about offensive systems that go through space as well? Dobrynin did not respond to that suggestion, but I don't think it went by him either. The text of the Soviet proposal and the oral statement accompanying it are attached.

2. Dobrynin asked for anything I might tell him of a philosophical nature on our approach to the management of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, raising as an example his problem in interpreting your recent speech in which there was a part that was "good" from their standpoint and another part that was "bad." I said that the message from that speech and from the fact that you sent our negotiators back to Geneva at the height of the tension over the Korean airliner suggested an effort on a philosophical plane along the following lines:

We know that our systems are very different and the likelihood is that they will remain so. We know that our interests are often at variance and the likelihood is that they will remain so. It is, nevertheless, the case that our two countries have the preponderance of military power in the world and are at the moment the two largest economies, so the existence of a working relationship between us is of great importance to each of us and to the world more generally. Therefore, we have to seek a way of managing the relationship that will have important elements of continuity

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through the ups and downs of events that will trouble us greatly and that we will feel call for statements and actions on our part. That philosophy, I said, is what motivated the President to send our negotiators back to Geneva some months ago and, more recently, to identify a large number of significant -- if not quite "the big" -- problem areas where positive work can and is taking place. If such a philosophy can be implemented in practical terms, then we would consider that a positive achievement.

3. Dobrynin also raised questions about the personal and technical management of our relationship and used the Scowcroft mission as an example of how a good thing misfired because it wasn't handled right. The elements of incorrect handling from his point of view were: (a) it came about too suddenly, (b) there was no back-and-forth discussion of something so important as sending a Presidential Emissary to their head of state, and (c) it seemed to be an effort to go to Chernenko through some part of their government other than the Foreign Ministry. Dobrynin said that if the Scowcroft mission and Presidential letter had been worked out through him and then on to Moscow with careful preparation, he could have "guaranteed 100 percent" that Scowcroft would have seen Chernenko.

I told him that we were prepared to work out with him the technical aspects of our relationship in a way that did everything possible to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. We recognize the importance of giving interpretations of statements and activities we undertake and wish that they would also take note of this point in terms of their own behavior and work with Art Hartman. We also agree that private and small and perhaps one-on-one discussions could make an important contribution to the development of the relationship.

He stated that he felt the START and INF talks might have gone in a more constructive way if, in the discussions I had with him about them some time ago, it had been possible to discuss them in broad terms in a one-on-one meeting as distinct from meetings "where Rowny or Nitze or someone else was always present."

Dobrynin said that he is looking forward to the opportunity for conversation with you at the Diplomatic Reception on Sunday.

Attachments

I am instructed to deliver to you a text of the statement of the Soviet Government on the question of preventing the militarization of outer space. 172556

We would like to draw your attention to the fact, that the Soviet Union suggests a radical solution - to ban and to eliminate the whole class of attack space weapons and to close once and for ever all channels of possible militarization of outer space. It is exactly the attack space means that would be banned. While the means used for the purposes of control, navigation, communication, etc. would not be covered.

We deem it necessary to emphasize the importance and the urgency of the solution of the question of preventing the militarization of outer space, the special responsibility which rests upon the USSR and the USA as the leading space powers, and the necessity in this regard to show an example to all other states engaged in research and exploration of outer space.

The beginning of the negotiations on outer space between the USSR and the USA would be a practical proof of the readiness of the sides to wage a businesslike and concrete dialogue on one of the major questions of ensuring security and peace.

The Soviet side is ready to begin such negotiations ^{in Vienna} on September 18, 1984, for example, if there is a consent of the Austrian Government, and to send a special delegation for this purposes.

We would like to express hope that the American side will consider the Soviet proposal with all due attention and give a positive reply to it.

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EXPIRE DATE 6/6/83

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Statement of the Soviet Government

1-72557

BY GD NARA DATE 6/5/13

The Soviet Government most insistently draws attention to the necessity of urgent measures aimed at the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

The spreading of the arms race to outer space would sharply increase the risk of the military disaster, undermine the prospects of the limitation and the reduction of armaments in general. Everywhere the understanding of this is widening, the demands are growing to stop such development of events until it is too late. And it is necessary to do everything in order not to waste this opportunity, to close reliably all the channels without exception of the militarization of outer space.

In practical terms this means that weapons of any type-conventional, nuclear, laser, beam or any other should not be launched in space and deployed there, whether on piloted or pilotless systems. Space weapons of any basing mode should not be developed, tested or deployed either for antiballistic missile defense, or as antisatellite means, or for the use against targets on the ground or in the air. Means of such nature already created must be destroyed.

The use of force in space or from space against the earth, as well as from the earth against the objects in outer space should be banned forever.

Such approach, which would ban and eliminate the whole class of armaments - the attack space means including antisatellite and antiballistic missile space-based systems, as well as any other ground, air or sea-based means designed to

destroy objects in space, allows to ensure a reliable control over the compliance by the sides with their obligations.

The Government of the Soviet Union proposes to the Government of the United States of America to begin Soviet-American negotiations on the prevention of the militarization of outer space at the level of specially appointed delegations. Within the framework of these negotiations the question of mutual comprehensive repudiation of antisatellite systems should be resolved too.

Such negotiations could be started this September in Vienna (Austria), if the Government of Austria agrees to this. The specific date of the beginning of the negotiations would be agreed upon through the diplomatic channels.

For the purposes of creating the favorable conditions for achieving an agreement and of undertaking practical measures on the prevention of the arms race in outer space already now the Soviet Union proposes also to establish on mutual basis beginning from the date of opening the negotiations a moratorium on testing and deploying such weapons. It goes without saying that the joining of other states to such moratorium will be welcomed.

As the leading powers in the area of exploration of outer space, the USSR and the USA are called upon to do everything in their power to provide peace in space for the mankind and to show an example to other states in resolving this task common to all the humanity, creating the basis for multilateral agreement on this matter.

In view of the urgency and importance of this question the Soviet Government expects a prompt and positive reply of the US Government to this appeal.

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BY ICBB NARA DATE 6/5/13

ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА

172558

Советское правительство самым настоятельным образом обращает внимание на необходимость срочных мер по недопущению милитаризации космического пространства.

Выход гонки вооружений в космос резко усилил бы риск военной катастрофы, подорвал перспективы ограничения и сокращения вооружений вообще. Повсюду ширится понимание этого, нарастают требования остановить такое развитие событий пока не поздно. И надо сделать все, чтобы эта возможность не была упущена, надежно перекрыть все без исключения каналы милитаризации космического пространства.

В практическом плане это означает, что в космос не должно выводиться и размещаться там, будь то на пилотируемых или непилотируемых системах, оружие любого рода - обычное, ядерное, лазерное, пучковое или какое-либо другое. Космическое оружие любых видов базирования не должно создаваться, испытываться или разворачиваться ни для противоракетной обороны, ни в качестве противоспутниковых средств, ни для использования против целей на земле или в воздухе. Уже созданные такие средства должны быть уничтожены.

Использование силы в космосе и из космоса в отношении земли, а также с земли в отношении объектов в космосе должно быть навсегда поставлено под запрет.

Такой подход, при котором запрещался и ликвидировался бы целый класс вооружений - ударные космические средства, включая противоспутниковые и противоракетные системы космического

базирования, а также любые средства наземного, воздушного или морского базирования, предназначенные для поражения объектов в космосе, позволяет обеспечить надежный контроль за соблюдением обязательств сторон.

Правительство Советского Союза предлагает правительству Соединенных Штатов Америки начать на уровне специально назначенных делегаций советско-американские переговоры по предотвращению милитаризации космического пространства. В рамках этих переговоров должен быть решен и вопрос о взаимном полном отказе от противоспутниковых систем.

Приступить к таким переговорам можно было бы в сентябре этого года в Вене (Австрия) в случае согласия на это австрийского правительства. Конкретная дата открытия переговоров была бы согласована по дипломатическим каналам.

В целях создания благоприятных условий для достижения договоренности и принятия уже сейчас практических мер по предотвращению гонки космических вооружений Советский Союз предлагает также установить на взаимной основе начиная с даты открытия переговоров мораторий на испытания и развертывание таких вооружений. Разумеется, будет приветствоваться присоединение других государств к этому мораторию.

Как ведущие державы в области освоения космического пространства СССР и США призваны сделать все от них зависящее, чтобы обеспечить человечеству мирный космос, подать пример другим государствам в решении этой общечеловеческой задачи, заложив основу для многосторонней договоренности на этот счет.

Учитывая срочность и важность вопроса, Советское правительство ожидает скорого и положительного ответа правительства США на данное обращение.

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BY CDB NARA DATE 6/5/63 ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СОВЕТСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА 177560

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