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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	³⁹⁸ Doc Date	Restrictions		
172505 NOTE	BUD TO REAGAN RE ATTACHED CABLE	1	6/3/1984	B1		
172486 CABLE	020114Z JUN 84	2	6/1/1984	B1		
	R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-74	1 8-25A -	1-1-7			
172487 REPORT	RESULTS OF INCSEA REVIEW IN MOSCOW	3	ND	B1		
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-74	8-25A-	1-2-6			
172488 MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV/BONNER LETTERS	1	6/12/1984	B1		
172506 PROFS NOTE	FROM MCFARLANE RE NOTE TO J. MATLOCK	1	6/12/1984	B1		
172489 MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MR. MCFARLANE AND ADM. POINDEXTER RE CHERNENKO LETTER (PHOTOCOPIED ON TOP OF PAGE 1 OF LETTER)	1	6/13/1984	B1		
	R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-74	48-25A-	1-4-4			
172490 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES	1	6/15/1984	B1		
	R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-74	48-25A-	- <i>1-5-3</i>			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained In donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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172491	MEMO		(MATL	MEMO AS DOC # LOCK TO MCFARI ARY PRIORITIES)	LANE RE SOVIET	1	6/15/1984	B1
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172494	MEMO		PRESII	OCK TO MCFARL DENTIAL STATEN ERENCE ON SOVI	MENT TO	1	6/25/1984	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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5. MEANWHILE, AF HAS BEEN INFORMED BY BRITISH THAT SOVIETS HAVE INVITED THEM FOR THREE DAYS OF TALKS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IN MOSCOW MID-JUNE AT LEVEL OF CHET CROCKER'S BRITISH EQUIVALENT. IN DISCUSSION AT WORKING LEVEL LAST WEEK, SOVIET EMBASSY AFRICA EXPERT SAID WHILE HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF A DECISION ON OUR PROPOSAL FOR EXPERTS' TALKS, IT WOULD BE HARD TO DISCUSS "SMALL TOPICS" WHILE BIG PICTURE IN RELATIONS WAS SO BAD. SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BRITISH MAY BE END-RUN AROUND US, BUT IF SOVIETS ARE PREPARING "RESPONSIVE" CHERNENKO LETTER AS BESSMERTNYKH CLAIMS THEY COULD WELL OF THINKING OF SOUTHERN AFRICA TALKS PARALLELLING THOSE WITH BRITISH. WE WILL WORK WITH BRITISH TO ENSURE UK-SOVIET TALKS LEAVE THEM SOME INCENTIVE TO TALK TO US AS WELL.

6. IN ADDITION, NEW YORK ACADEMIC AND MIDDLE EAST EXPERT JOHN MROZ INFORMED US THIS MORNING THAT DURING PRIVATE DINNER WITH INFLUENTIAL MIDDLE EAST EXPERT PRIMAKOV IN NEW YORK MAY 4, PRIMAKOV HAD TOLD MROZ HE WOULD INVITE HIM TO MOSCOW TO MEET HIS OWN "PATRON SAINT" ALIYEV, BUT THIS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE AFTER U.S. ELECTION BECAUSE "NO ONE IS IN CHARGE IN MOSCOW NOW" AND THERE ARE "UPHEAVALS" GDING ON IN POLITBURO.

PROBLEM IN U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS IS GROMYKO, WHO HAS 'REACHED "CONCLUSION" (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM "OBSERVATION," PRIMAKOV SAID) THAT STABLE U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE AMERICANS WILL NEVER ACCEPT USSR AS "EQUAL," BECAUSE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM IS SO VOLATILE THAT IT CAN PRODUCE A RONALD REAGAN AT ANY TIME, AND BECAUSE U.S. WILL RETAIN CAPACITY FOR TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS WHICH IT WILL USE TO GET ABOVE SOVIETS.

7. NONE OF THIS ADDS UP TO MOVEMENT IN RELATIONS (WE WILL HAVE TO SEE WHAT CHERNENKO LETTER ACTUALLY SAYS), BUT IT CERTAINLY SHOWS EXTRAORDINARY PRIVATE INDISCIPLINE AMONG SOVIETS IN VIEW OF THE PUBLIC HARD LINE NOW IN FORCE, AND SUGGESTS THAT MORE IS GOING ON UNDERNEATH THAN MEETS THE EYE. DAM BT

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
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Encl: (1) Results of 1984 INCSEA Review in Moscow

1. Enclosure (1) which contains a summary of the results of the INCSEA review in Moscow is provided for your information.

J. A. LYONS, JR. VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY UTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS POLICY AND OPERATIONS)



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RESULTS OF 1984 INCSEA REVIEW IN MOSCOW

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The annual review of the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement in Moscow 28 May - 2 Jun was conducted in a very positive, cordial, and professional atmosphere, in stark contrast to the harsh rhetoric and propaganda in state-sponsored news media associated with other bilateral discussions and negotiations, such as START and INF. Throughout all formal and informal contacts, the Soviet Navy representatives went out of their way to ensure that a harmonious and cooperative atmosphere pervaded. It was obvious that the Soviet Navy places a high value on the Agreement and on the contact with the U.S. Navy through the established communications channel.

During these discussions, the following main themes emerged:

- This is the only channel of communication between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that is working.

The Soviet Navy wants the Agreement to continue to be effective in preventing serious incidents.

- The Soviet Navy representatives went out of their way to express their commitment to abide by the letter and the spirit of the Agreement.
- The Soviet Navy acknowledged the Agreement was seriously eroded during search operations for the Korean airliner in the Sea of Japan. They also concurred in the U.S. position that the Agreement needs to be applied consistently throughout the year, particularly during unusual situations involving high tension.
- In working level discussions, the Soviets accepted U.S. concerns with flare firing at U.S. ships, with hazardous approach to U.S. helicopters, and with generally poor adherence to the Agreement by Soviet Naval Auxiliaries.
- The Soviet Navy committed themselves to reissue instructions to commanders of **nava**l auxiliaries, combatant ships, and aircraft to **stric**tly abide by the Agreement.
- The Soviets expressed interest in returning to an atmosphere of cooperation such as that existing during WWII when we had a common objective to defeat Germany.
- The Chairman of the U.S. Delegation countered that we still have a common objective---to maintain the peace. He added that the INCSEA framework is a good example to

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all negotiators of what can be accomplished when the two sides come to the table with common objectives, equality of approach and treatment, and without thoughts of attempting to take advantage of the other. 11

In side discussions, the head of the Soviet delegation, ADM Navoytsev, indicated the Soviet Navy would have no problem with reciprocal ship visits such as had occurred in 1975, for example to Vladivostok and San Francisco. ADM Navoytsev also acknowledged the U. S. position that the VICTOR submarine which had collided with USS KITTY HAWK was obligated under International Rules of the Road to remain clear of KITTY HAWK and that no additional protocol was required.

A Soviet-proposed protocol to the Agreement to include military aircraft approach to civil aircraft was interesting in light of the downing of KAL-007. The proposal called for caution and prudence when approaching civil aircraft, and would prohibit simulated attacks. Simple verbal commands to civil aircraft were also included. It was interesting that this proposal contained language similar to that used in the past by the U. S. to argue against the need for an additional protocol. The U. S. side agreed to study this proposal.

As provided for in the Agreement, both sides concurred in a three-year renewal period. The next meeting will be held in Washington, May-June 1985.

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The twelfth annual review of the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement took place in Moscow 28 May - 2 June 1984. The discussion took place in a very upbeat, cordial atmosphere, reflecting the importance the Soviet Navy places on maintaining the agreement and the attendant official contact with the U.S. Navy.

The U.S. delegation expressed concern that among recent incidents, those occurring in connection with the Korean airliner salvage operations seemed to be especially at variance with the agreement. The large number of serious incidents, in particular those involving auxiliary naval vessels, raised the possibility of deliberate acts of violation thereby bringing into question the Soviet Navy's commitment to the future effectiveness of the agreement.

The Soviet Navy response to the U.S. concerns was professional and positive. During formal and informal discussions, Soviet delegation members acknowledged the U.S. concerns while strongly reaffirming Soviet commitment to the agreement. The positive tone of these discussions was in sharp contrast to Soviet attempts last year to shift blame equally to the U.S. side.

The proposal by the head of the Soviet delegation for a future exchange of ship visits was another positive indication of their interest in maintaining a good working relationship with our Navy. The U.S. delegation head supported such visits, and will look for an opportunity to pursue the proposal.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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June 13, 1984 11:40 a.m.

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SYSTEM II 90695

America

DECLASSIFIED NLRR 748-25A-1-4-NARA DATE

would like to express exchange of views. edge of commitment to the atries made by you in the n turn, I can reiterate to you, notably, that ish to see a turn for SR and the USA. As a matter ils submitted by us, includin ers to you, have been aimed

a willingness embodied in practical policies. Here is the clear and practice position of the Soviet Duion: we are not speking an advantage, but as will not ellow to be put at a disadvantage. I do not see anything in what I said which could be unacceptable to the United States if one wishes stability and lessening of tensions. Acting from the position of equality it is possible



SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO:

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

MR. MCFARLANE ADMIRAL POINDEXT

Attached is an advance copy of Chernenko's reply to the President's last letter. Dobrynin gave it to Shultz in their meeting yesterday. I understand that the original BY Cor (with a cleaned-up translation) is on the way from State.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 90695

My initial reading is that the letter holds firm on substance, but reveals a desire to keep the dialogue open. It is in no sense a personal letter and was obviously written by Gromyko's staff.

I'll provide more considered thoughts and suggestions for a reply shortly.

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SUBJECT.	SOVIET MILITARY	PRIORITIES					
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#4733 Letter to Harlan Ullman RCM sgned letter

#4957 Letter to Bill Beecher RCM will dictate new letter and send upon ret urn.

#4826 INfo item on Ogasrkov speech : RCM noted memo with great interest

#3090 Kemp memo on new NSDD on Middle Eawst: Mcf noted that we needed this four months ago. He agrees that now it is untimely but is time now to start th inking about the content of the NSDD we should publidsh in November.

Probably 50-60 other messages and odds and ends read without comment and d estroyed on site. I'm near the bottom of the brief case and glad to see it. Do not, however, hesitate to send more.

cc:	NSJMP	CPUA	NSRMK	CPUA
	NSPBT	CPUA	NSFEG	CPUA
	NSKWZ	CPUA		

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4826

MEMORANDUM

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CONFIDENTIAL	DECLASSIFIED	June 15,	1984	172490
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INFORMATION	BY 000 NARA DATE 6/5/13	RGM HERE	Sector and an and a sector of the	
MEMORANDUM FOR		TAS SEEN	NOTE)
FROM:	JACK MATLOCK			
SUBJECT:	Soviet Military Priorities			

Jeremy Azrael has called my attention to a most interesting interview which appeared in <u>Red Star</u>, May 9, by Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He prepared a memorandum for Secretary Shultz, a copy of which is attached at Tab I, and I believe you will find his observations of interest.

First, Ogarkov's comments on nuclear war are entirely consistent with our conviction that the Soviet General Staff is <u>not</u> fearful of an imminent U.S. first strike. Although the interview is directed at a military audience, and therefore would be expected to convey an air of confidence, his categorical statements that nuclear war makes no sense comes very close to an explicit endorsement of MAD. It is particularly interesting in this regard that he does not dwell on the alleged threat of the Pershing II's and GLCM's in Europe.

A second striking feature is his treatment of ET. The emphasis he gives it implies that he sees developments along these lines as his greatest future worry.

It would be foolhardy to attach too much significance to a single statement. But this one is indeed food for thought. As Jeremy points out, one of the questions it raises is whether we may not have more leverage in vigorous pursuit of ET in the conventional area than in the strategic nuclear area. Going somewhat further afield with speculation, one can also read in Ogarkov's treatment a recognition that the Soviet economy cannot support competition across the board and may have to make some agonizing decisions on priorities. This <u>could</u> mean that the Soviet military may not be as rigid in opposing strategic arms reduction as many assume. Even if this should be the case, however, we should understand that the most likely reason will be a desire to have more resources available for ET.

I have asked the Agency to be alert for any further commentary in Soviet military literature which reiterates or supports Orgakov's themes.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum "A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?"

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

172492

June 11, 1984

INFORMATIC				
CONFIDENTIAL	S/S		DECLASSIFIED	
/	*		NLRR748-25A-1-6-2	
TO:	The Secretary	BY	COB NARA DATE 6/5/13	
FROM:	S/P - Peter W. Rodman Pm2	-		
SUBJECT:	A Reordering of Soviet Militar	ry P:	riorities?	~

On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, <u>Red</u> <u>Star</u>, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (relevant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview has focussed on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's <u>anti-American rhetoric.</u> A not unrelated, but much more distinctive and noteworthy feature of the interview is its questioning of long-established Soviet mikitary priorities.

Unlike virtually all other recent Soviet commentaries on defense matters, the Ogarkov interview does not dwell on the threat posed by the deployment of Pershings and GLCM's and the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On the contrary, Ogarkov describes our continuing nuclear buildup as "senseless," since the already existing "overkill" capacity on both sides has made it "impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike." No matter how destructive an initial attack, the victim will "inevitably" retain enough weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage."

It would be unwarranted to conclude on this basis that Ogarkov has been converted from a proponent of nuclear war-fighting (the long-established Soviet military doctrine) to a proponent of mutual assured destruction. But he has gone out of his way to discount the military significance of the alleged U.S. quest for nuclear superiority. Although he refrains from saying so directly, it clearly follows from his argument that there is no compelling need either to cap the U.S. nuclear buildup through early arms-control agreements or to respond to that buildup through nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S. programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for granted.

Ogarkov's insouciance about a U.S. first-strike threat is accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional




weaponry is on the threshhold of a technological revolution that will radically transform current methods of waging war. Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now" -- with such urgency and concentration that other established, priorities are bound to suffer.

Ogarkov concedes that certain risks inhere in such a reordering of priorities, but he insists that these risks are manageable and can and must be run. Without quite saying so explicitly, he clearly takes it as a given that the Soviet military does not and will not have the resources both for a crash program in conventional weaponry and for a significant buildup of its nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable, it is nonetheless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov describes as "an objective law discovered in his time by Frederick Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy." Fortunately, however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable. While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an assumption that the current period is a period of relative security.

Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But in this particularly authoritative statement to a professional audience, he suggests that it is possible to concentrate resourses on the development and testing of necessarily uncertain emergent technologies and weapons systems because it is a time of peace -- and is likely to remain so for some time to come. In consequence, there is no justification for not reordering priorities. War is not a clear and present danger, and attempts to argue the contrary within military circles are nothing more than poorly disguised expressions of illegitimate inter-service rivalry. More generally, they reflect precisely the sort of "conservatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely overcome" by leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery" that innovations in military affairs often have to be imposed "almost forcibly and against the will of the military command."

If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct (and it is one in which Jeremy has considerable confidence), there are



a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and exploring further:

The Soviet military is far from monolithic and may presently be divided by particularly intense inter-service rivalries.

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- Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems and mission priorities.
- -- The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is particularly high.
- -- The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we often suppose.
- -- The Soviet determination to match us nuclear missile for nuclear missile in a continuing cycle of deployments and counterdeployments may be shakier than we often assume.
- -- Within the Soviet high command support for nuclear arms control may be strongest among conventional force commanders who are eager to cap <u>Soviet</u> nuclear programs and increase spending on conventional modernization.
- -- Pressing ahead with our conventional arms modernization programs may be one of our most effective means for limiting the modernization of Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces.
- -- The Soviets may be on the verge of conventional force modernization programs that will tip the conventional balance even further in their favor unless we in fact justify their apprehension and exploit our technological advantages in the field of conventional weaponry.

Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted: S/P:JAzrael

CONFLOENTIAL

Ogarkov Interview

PMO81625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 84 First Edition pp 2-3

[Interview with MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister: "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 is being celebrated widely and solemnly in our country today. On the eve of this great and resplendent holiday, the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, to answer a number of questions connected with the defense of socialism's gains.

Question: It is nearly 40 years since the Great Patriotic War. What changes have taken place in military matters in that time, and how are they taken into account in our military building, in the training of troops and fleets?

Answer: In his time, F. Engels discovered an objective law: "Nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics, and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the means of communication," and "successes of technology, the moment they have become usable and have been applied in practice in military matters, have immediately -- almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command -- caused changes and even revolutions in the methods of waging war."

In present-day conditions, this law is manifested with particular force. In the postwar years, several generations of weapons systems and combat hardware have already succeeded one another.

What do the basic changes in military matters consist of today?

First, the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons, which has continued over several decades, has led to radical qualitative changes in the conditions and potential for the use of these weapons. The stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and various means of delivery that the sides created have reached such a size and quality that they are sufficient to destroy all the important targets on enemy territory many times over in a short space of time. III. 9 May 84

USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

For instance, in just one salvo (launch) of strategic' (not counting battlefield) nuclear forces, the United States could today use about 12,000 nuclear charges with a total yield hundreds of times greater than the yield of all the explosives and ammunition used by all states throughout the 6 years of World War II. With the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, this potential of U.S. strategic nuclear forces will further increase. You do not have to be a military man or a scientist to realize that a further buildup is becoming senseless. Nonetheless, this buildup is continuing, through the fault of the United States.

As a result, a paradox arises: On the one hand, it would seem, a process of steadily increasing potential for the nuclear powers to destroy the enemy is taking place, while on the other there is an equally steady and, I would say, even steeper reduction in the potential for an aggressor to inflict a so-called "disarming strike" on his main enemy. The point is, with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missiles aiready achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike. A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor, even by the limited quantity of nuclear charges remaining to the defender -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage -becomes inevitable in present conditions. The calculation of the strategists across the ocean, based on the possibility of waging a so-called "limited" nuclear war, now has no foundation whatever. It is utopian: Any so-called limited use of nuclear facilities will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the whole of the sides' nuclear arsenal. That is the terrible logic of war. Their arguments about the possibility of a so-called "limited nuclear strike without retaliation" against the enemy's main centers and control points are even more groundless. Such arguments are pure fantasy. Put together, all this substantially changes both the conditions for the outbreak of modern warfare and the potential for waging it. . <u>1</u>. .

Second, rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the emergence in the developed countries of automated reconnaissance-and-strike complexes, long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines, and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply increased range of conventional weapons makes it possible to immediately extend active combat operations not just to the border regions, but to the whole country's territory, which was not possible in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations, which will in turn predetermine the possibility of conducting military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparably more destructive forms than before.

There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations, and the role and significance of the initial period of the war and its initial operations become incomparably greater. A new war, should imperialism unleash it, will certainly be strikingly different in nature from the last war.

Third, the rapid development of science and technology in recent years creates real preconditions for the emergence in the very near future of even more destructive and previously unknown types of weapons based on new physical principles. III. 9 May 84

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USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

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Work on these new types of weapons is already in progress in a number of countries, for example, in the United States. Their development is a reality of the very near future, and it would be a serious mistake not to consider it <u>right now</u>. This, in turn, cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle and even of the military might of the state.

This is a short list of only the basic changes currently taking place in the means of armed struggle. They are inevitably exerting their influence on the nature of war and the role and place of the branches of the Armed Forces in resolving operational and strategic tasks and on the further development and improvement of forms and methods of conducting military operations and military affairs as a whole.

All this must unconditionally be the subject of constant and in-depth analysis and must be generalized and taken into account in the practical building of our Armed Forces.

In consideration of this, the technical equipping, organizational building, and management of our Armed Forces are effected in such a way that they are always ready under any conditions to deal an immediate counterstrike against any aggressor. This capability must be guaranteed in all instances. The main component of the combat might of the Army and Navy and the basic factor in curbing the aggressor are our strategic nuclear forces, which are in a state of constant high combat readiness. All branches of the Armed Forces and categories of troops are developing harmoniously with them and are being equipped with the most modern weapons and combat hardware.

There is also a simultaneous process of honing and improving the system of operational, combat, and political training of troops and fleets; the procedure for mobilizing and provisioning them; troop and weapon control systems, and forms and methods of political-educational and party political work.

The Soviet Armed Forces' might is determined by not only the quantity but also the quality of their weapons and combat hardware. Our main strength is the Soviet people, who have an expert mastery of the awe-inspiring weapons entrusted to them by the motherland. Today, over 93 percent of our servicemen have secondary and higher education. Almost 90 percent of the servicemen are Communists and Komsomol members, who are transforming our Army and Navy into an invincible force.

The resolution of the tasks of military building and training of our Armed Forces is effected on the basis of comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the military-political situation and the development of the means of armed struggle. Therefore, our military cadres do not merely copy past experience, they use it creatively and enrich it. They must constantly improve the training and organizational structure of troops and naval forces and conduct scientific quests to this end, taking into account the continuous changes in military affairs and, if necessary, taking justified risks. It is better to test new forms in peacetime than to seek them in the course of a war. Furthermore, there would now be no time for this. We military men must, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, points out, "resolutely overcome any conservatism and inertia"; for us in the military "the slogan of the day must be: From a correct idea, fully armed with experience, to bold actions!" III. 9 May 84

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USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

I would like to emphasize that the defense of the socialist motherland is the concern of every Soviet person a concern of the entire people. In this connection, work to educate the Soviet people in accordance with revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and train reliable and skillful defenders of the motherland, and the active participation in this work of our party, labor, war, and Army veterans, are of great importance.

The main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength and invincibility and an important condition of their further strengthening and development has always been and remains the leadership of the Communist Party and the unbreakable unity between the Army and the beople. The CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and our government are doing everything necessary to ensure that the Soviet state's defense potential and its Armed Forces' combat might are abreast of present-day demands and that no eventuality can take us by surprise.

The grim years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further and further into the depths of history. A great deal has changed in the world in the almost 40 years since then. However, time cannot wipe out from the memory of grateful mankind the unparalleled feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who, in an unprecedentedly fierce confrontation with a perfidious enemy, not only defended the socialist fatherland, but also saved the peoples of many countries from fascist enslavement. The memory of the millions of weople who gave their lives for the great victory makes it imperative today to rally he forces of the world's peoples in the struggle against the perfidious designs of the orces of imperialism and reaction, against the instigators of a new war. The imperialist retenders to world domination should not forget that history savagely punishes those ho ignore its lessons.

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SUBJECT. SOVIET MILITARY PRIORITIES

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CONFIDENTIAL	DECLASSIFIED	June 15, 1984	17240
INFORMATION	NLRR 748-224-1-5-3		
MEMORANDUM FOR	ROBERT C. MCHARLANE	RGM HAS S	IEEN
FROM:	JACK MATLOCK		
SUBJECT:	Soviet Military Priorities		

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jeremy Azrael has called my attention to a most interesting interview which appeared in <u>Red Star</u>, May 9, by Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He prepared a memorandum for Secretary Shultz, a copy of which is attached at Tab I, and I believe you will find his observations of interest.

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A second striking feature is his treatment of ET. The emphasis he gives it implies that he sees developments along these lines as his greatest future worry.

It would be foolhardy to attach too much significance to a single statement. But this one is indeed food for thought. As Jeremy points out, one of the questions it raises is whether we may not have more leverage in vigorous pursuit of ET in the conventional area than in the strategic nuclear area. Going somewhat further afield with speculation, one can also read in Ogarkov's treatment a recognition that the Soviet economy cannot support competition across the board and may have to make some agonizing decisions on priorities. This <u>could</u> mean that the Soviet military may not be as rigid in opposing strategic arms reduction as many assume. Even if this should be the case, however, we should understand that the most likely reason will be a desire to have more resources available for ET.

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Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum "A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?"

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

172493

June 11, 1984

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED ______ NLRR 748-254-1-6-2 BY 1978 NARA DATE 6/5/13

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/P - Peter W. Rodman (MP2)

SUBJECT: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?

S/S

On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, <u>Red</u> <u>Star</u>, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (relevant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview has focussed on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's anti-American rhetoric. A not unrelated, but much more distinctive and noteworthy feature of the interview is its questioning of long-established Soviet military priorities.

Unlike virtually all other recent Soviet commentaries on defense matters, the Ogarkov interview does not dwell on the threat posed by the deployment of Pershings and GLCM's and the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On the contrary, Ogarkov describes our continuing nuclear buildup as "senseless," since the already existing "overkill" capacity on both sides has made it "impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike." No matter how destructive an initial attack, the victim will "inevitably" retain enough weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage."

It would be unwarranted to conclude on this basis that Ogarkov has been converted from a proponent of nuclear war-fighting (the long-established Soviet military doctrine) to a proponent of mutual assured destruction. But he has gone out of his way to discount the military significance of the alleged U.S. quest for nuclear superiority. Although he refrains from saying so directly, it clearly follows from his argument that there is no compelling need either to cap the U.S. nuclear buildup through early arms-control agreements or to respond to that buildup through nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S. programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for granted.

Ogarkov's insouciance about a U.S. first-strike threat is accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional



weaponry is on the threshhold of a technological revolution that will radically transform current methods of waging war. Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now" -- with such urgency and concentration that other established, priorities are bound to suffer.

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Ogarkov concedes that certain risks inhere in such a reordering of priorities, but he insists that these risks are manageable and can and must be run. Without quite saying so explicitly, he clearly takes it as a given that the Soviet military does not and will not have the resources both for a crash program in conventional weaponry and for a significant buildup of its nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable, it is nonetheless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov describes as "an objective law discovered in his time by Frederick Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy." Fortunately, however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable. While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an assumption that the current period is a period of relative security.

Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But in this particularly authoritative statement to a professional audience, he suggests that it is possible to concentrate resourses on the development and testing of necessarily uncertain emergent technologies and weapons systems because it is a time of peace -- and is likely to remain so for some time to come. In consequence, there is no justification for not reordering priorities. War is not a clear and present danger, and attempts to argue the contrary within military circles are nothing more than poorly disguised expressions of illegitimate inter-service rivalry. More generally, they reflect precisely the sort of "conservatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely overcome" by leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery" that innovations in military affairs often have to be imposed "almost forcibly and against the will of the military command."

If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct (and it is one in which Jeremy has considerable confidence), there are

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a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and exploring further:

- -- The Soviet military is far from monolithic and may presently be divided by particularly intense inter-service rivalries.
- Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems and mission priorities.
- -- The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is particularly high.
- -- The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we often suppose.
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Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted: S/P:JAzrael

CONFIDENTIAL

Ogarkov Interview

PMO81625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 84 First Edition pp 2-3

[Interview with MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister: "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 is being celebrated widely and solemnly in our country today. On the eve of this great and resplendent holiday, the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, to answer a number of questions connected with the defense of socialism's gains.

Question: It is nearly 40 years since the Great Patriotic War. What changes have taken place in military matters in that time, and how are they taken into account in our military building, in the training of troops and fleets?

Answer: In his time, F. Engels discovered an objective law: "Nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics, and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the means of communication," and "successes of technology, the moment they have become usable and have been applied in practice in military matters, have immediately -- almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command -- caused changes and even revolutions in the methods of waging war."

In present-day conditions, this law is manifested with particular force. In the postwar years, several generations of weapons systems and combat hardware have already succeeded one another.

What do the basic changes in military matters consist of today?

First, the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons, which has continued over several decades, has led to radical qualitative changes in the conditions and potential for the use of these weapons. The stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and various means of delivery that the sides created have reached such a size and quality that they are sufficient to destroy all the important targets on enemy territory many times over in a short space of time. III. 9 May 84


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USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

I would like to emphasize that the defense of the socialist motherland is the concern of every Soviet person a concern of the entire people. In this connection, work to educate the Soviet people in accordance with revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and train reliable and skillful defenders of the motherland, and the active participation in this work of our party, labor, war, and Army veterans, are of great importance.

The main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength and invincibility and an important condition of their further strengthening and development has always been and remains the leadership of the Communist Party and the unbreakable unity between the Army and the people. The CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and our government are doing everything necessary to ensure that the Soviet state's defense potential and its Armed Forces' combat might are abreast of present-day demands and that no eventuality can take us by surprise.

The grim years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further and further into the depths of history. A great deal has changed in the world in the almost 40 years since then. However, time cannot wipe out from the memory of grateful mankind the unparalleled feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who, in an unprecedentedly fierce confrontation with a perfidious enemy, not only defended the social ist fatherland, but also saved the peoples of many countries from fascist enslavement. The memory of the millions of people who gave their lives for the great victory makes it imperative today to rally the forces of the world's peoples in the struggle against the perfidious designs of the forces of imperialism and reaction, against the instigators of a new war. The imperialist pretenders to world domination should not forget that history savagely punishes those who ignore its lessons.



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Thank you for coming over to the White House today. When I heard that you would be meeting at the Smithsonian to discuss U.S.-Soviet exchanges, I was eager to have a chance to meet you and to share with you my thoughts on this most important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center and (adjourned (?) ? the Carnegie Corporation of New York for organizing your conference. These institutions are outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. And right now there is no topic more worthy of our attention than ways we can reach out and establish better communication with the people and government of the Soviet Union.

In my January address on U.S.-Soviet relations I suggested that the U.S. and Soviet governments make a major effort to see if we could make progress in three broad problem areas: reducing the threat and use of force in solving international disputes, reducing armaments in the world, and establishing a better working relationship with each other. We have been working hard to secure Soviet cooperation in all these areas.

I've had a lot to say recently about our efforts to establish a dialogue on regional issues and on arms reduction and control. Today I would like to describe to you what we are proposing to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union. If these proposals are accepted, they could open up new avenues for your own efforts. First, we have informed the Soviet Government that we are prepared to initiate negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and we have completed our preparations for these negotiations.

<u>Second</u>, we have proposed that we resume preparations to open consulates general in New York and Kiev.

<u>Third</u>, we have taken steps to reinvigorate our agreements for cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health and agriculture. Activities under these agreements have waned in recent years, since there have been no meetings of their joint committees to plan projects. We have proposed that preparations begin for such meetings in order to increase the number of active projects.

Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several agreements which otherwise would have expired this year.

-- We have proposed extending our fishing agreement for 18 months and are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under it.

-- We have proposed that our Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation be renewed for another ten years, and that preparations begin for a meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission.

-- A U.S. Navy delegation held talks this month with their Soviet counterparts in accord with our agreement on avoiding incidents at sea, and we have agreed to extend that useful agreement for another three years.

-- We are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement, which has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research, and will give careful thought to renewing it when it expires in December.

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<u>Finally</u>, we have made proposals in several other areas in order to solve problems, improve our dialogue and foster cooperation.

-- We have proposed a fair and equitable resolution of our differences on the exact depiction of the maritime boundary off Alaska.

-- We have proposed a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts and cosmonauts would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop techniques to rescue people from malfunctioning space vehicles.

-- We recently concluded another round of talks on consular matters, in which we are trying to improve visa procedures and facilitate travel between our countries.

-- We have suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures to assist citizens of all countries lost at sea.

-- We have made progress in our talks on upgrading the Hotline, and have proposed measures to deal with nuclear terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military Communications Line, and upgrading embassy communications in both countries.

-- We have put forward a specific set of steps to improve navigation aids along the North Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL tragedy never recurs.

-- We have suggested that we establish regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

As you can see, we have been working as hard to improve communication and our working relationship with the Soviets, as

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we have to persuade them to join us in finding ways to reduce arms and settle disputes without the use of force. We cannot yet judge the results: some of our proposals have been rejected -at least for the moment; a few are near agreement; and many others are still under discussion. But one thing is certain. <u>We</u> want to move ahead.

We don't expect that to be easy. Opening up contact and communication with a closed society governed by exceedingly suspicious officials can never be easy. I am as disturbed as you are by recent reports of new steps which have been taken by Soviet authorities to restrict their citizens' contacts with foreigners. And these come on top of intensified repression of many persons who have dared express views contrary to those of their political leaders. The people of the Soviet Union pay the greatest price for such practices, but we are all affected.

When attempts are made to seal off great, proud, accomplished peoples from outside influence, two things happen. First, their own intellectual and cultural life suffers. And second, the rest of the world is deprived of the cultural riches and intellectual stimulation they can offer.

Sometimes, if we get preoccupied with our political and ideological differences, we may not think enough about this. But we all know that Russian writers, composers and scientists are a part of our own heritage. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as one of his favorite composers? And what would our literature be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Chekhov? Or chemistry without Mendeleyev? I could give many more examples,

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but the point is clear: we all have a stake in keeping contacts and communication as broad and deep and unfettered as possible.

While our main problem, for decades, has been the Soviet propensity to seal their people off, or to filter and control the flow of contacts and information, we too have sometimes made decisions that led to a decrease in contacts, though that was never our purpose or goal. For example, some of the cooperative agreements which we would like to revive have been languishing in part because of our refusal, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to hold high-level meetings.

Here, frankly, we face a dilemma. When Soviet actions threaten the peace, or violate solemn agreements, or trample on standards essential to civilized mankind, we cannot be silent or continue to deal with the perpetrators as if nothing had happened. To do so would not only betray our deepest values and violate our conscience; it would also ultimately undermine world stability and our ability to keep the peace. We must have ways short of military threats to make it crystal clear that Soviet actions <u>do</u> matter and that some will inevitably affect the quality of the relationship.

But we have to bear something else in mind. That is, that our quarrel is not with the Russian people, or the Ukrainian people, or any of the other proud nationalities living in that enormous multinational state. (Pause) I can think of another word for it, but don't want to be accused of indulging in rhetoric. We wish the peoples of the Soviet Union well, and want only to live in peace and cooperation with them. And we're sure they want the same with us. So we must be careful, in reacting to

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actions by their government, not to take out our indignation on those not responsible.

That is why I feel that we should move to broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better. Our proposals are not a "signal" that we have forgotten Afghanistan. We have not, and we will continue to demonstrate our sympathy for the people of that ravished land, and will support their desire to rid themselves of foreign occupiers and reestablish an independence and neutrality which could threaten no one.

Our proposals also do not mean that we ignore violations of the Helsinki Final Act, or the plight in which the Soviet authorities have placed some of their noblest citizens. Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, Anatoly Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov and many others weigh heavily on our hearts, and it would be misleading to imply that their treatment and fate will not have an effect on our ability to increase cooperation with the Soviet Union. It will, and we all know it. Not because I want it that way, or you want it that way, but because our own consciences, and those of the American people, will have it no other way.

I know that these thoughts do not resolve the dilemma I mentioned. If they did, it wouldn't be a dilemma. But it is a dilemma for all of us, and I will value any advice that you, who have so much experience in dealing with the Soviet Union, may have for me.

You know, I don't think there is anything we are encouraging the Soviet leaders to do that is not as much in their interest as it is in ours -- and the whole world's. If they are as committed

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to peace as they say they are they should welcome our outstretched hand and join us in a dialogue aimed at solving problems. If they really want to reduce arms, there's no excuse for refusing to talk about ways to do just that. And if they want to deal with us as equals -- which is quite natural, and in fact the only way to treat each other -- then they wouldn't try to avoid a frank discussion of real problems.

Some say that the Soviet leaders are not really interested in peace but only in avoiding war while they use their military power to spread their dominance. A lot of things they are doing certainly seem to support this interpretation. But even if this is the case, it should be clear by now that it's not going to work. Once they realize that, maybe they'll see more clearly that they have as much to gain as everyone else from improving our dialogue, solving some problems and reducing tensions.

So I'm not going to stop trying to get our relations on a better track.

Your efforts will be very important. The best way governments can promote contacts among people is to avoid standing in the way. We in the American government will do all we can in conscience to stay out of the way, and to persuade the Soviet government to do the same. We all know this isn't going happen overnight. But if we are successful, or even partially successful, it's going to be up to you to do the real work of getting a lot more Americans into wider and more meaningful contact with a lot more Soviet citizens.

With all the problems in our relations, it may seem an impossible dream to think there could be a time when Americans

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and Soviet citizens of all walks of life could travel freely back and forth, visit each other's homes, look up friends and professional colleagues, work together on all sorts of problems and, if they feel like it, sit up all night talking about the meaning of life and the different ways they look at the world. All these things we take for granted with most countries of the world. We should never accept the idea that it should not be the normal way of interacting with people in the Soviet Union as well. When you think about it, doesn't it give you as clear a picture of true peace as you can imagine?

As distant as it may seem, I don't believe it's an impossible dream. And I hope you don't either. Let's dedicate ourselves to making it a reality.

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
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Washington, D.C. 20520

June 15, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE

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Subject: Proposed Presidential Statement for the June 26-27 Smithsonian Meeting on US-Soviet Exchanges

Attached is a draft Presidential message outlining our efforts to improve our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union for use at the June 26-27 meeting at the Smithsonian on US-Soviet exchanges.

Executive Secretary



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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Gathered here today is an impressive group of Americans dedicated to the improvement of the range and quality of our contacts with the people of the Soviet Union. The Smithsonian Institution and its Woodrow Wilson Center are themselves outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. As you know, I am generally less impressed by what governments can do in resolving outstanding problems than dedicated individuals giving free range to their energy and imagination. As I said on January 16, people don't make wars; on the contrary, their common interests cross all borders. For this reason, I believe your efforts to improve meaningful people-to-people communication is a matter of the greatest importance indeed.

The people of the Soviet Union have impressive energy, talent, and resources to contribute to the overall betterment of mankind. We all know that Russian writers, poets, and composers have made enormous contributions to the development of Western culture. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as among his favorite classical composers, and what would our common literary heritage be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, or *Chekhor?* Pasternak? Our recent commemoration of the Normandy landing reminds us once again of the incredible courage and sacrifice

of the Russian people, and the contribution we each made to the other's efforts when confronted with a common enemy. In the years since World War II, the Soviet and American governments have often been on the opposite sides of major issues, but our people still retain fond memories of the past and understand clearly the value of communication for the future.

I want to emphasize to you, and to the people and leaders of the Soviet Union that: Increased communication among the world's peoples is the trend of the future, an essential ingredient for social progress and world peace. Genuine dialogue between the American people and the people of the Soviet Union is necessary for all of us. In an era of increased global interdependence, the trend towards Soviet self-isolation and restriction of contacts can only undermine the future of Soviet science, its economy, and its cultural development. The Kremlin's current approach is not healthy for Soviet society or for mankind as a whole. We hope it will change, and quickly.

All of us here today share a common goal in seeking to reverse this negative trend. You can -- and I trust you will -- make new efforts on the people-to-people side. We, for our part, have been working hard to make progress on a set of issues designed to facilitate communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those of you at this conference are well aware of some elements of our agenda and our effort to improve the overall atmosphere of the US-Soviet relationship.

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-- We have encouraged the Soviets to return to the Geneva nuclear arms talks, put forth a new Chemical Weapons Treaty proposal, and advanced new ideas to break the impasse at the MBFR talks.

-- In Dublin, I noted our willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use-of-force in the CDE at Stockholm along with our proposals to make conflict in Europe less likely.

-- We have sought to engage the Soviets more deeply in discussions of regional trouble spots, most particularly in recent months, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and Southern Africa.

-- And, of course, we continue to make representations on human rights issues -- on the Sakharovs, on Shcharanskiy, on Orlov, on other persecuted individuals, on emigration issues, and on divided spouses. In these discussions, we regularly emphasize the importance of movement in the human rights area to an improvement in the overall relationship.

To give a fuller view of our efforts, I would like to take this opportunity today to provide for the first time a detailed accounting of the comprehensive program for cooperation and contacts between our peoples which we have proposed in recent months to the Soviet leadership.

First, we have completed all the necessary technical preparations for negotiations on a new exchanges agreement. This would open the way for official exchanges and encourage increased people-to-people contact. Our proposal contains

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such features as a resumption of the highly popular exhibitions in the USSR and a proposal for reciprocal appearances on national television which would allow the leaders of the two countries to communicate directly with the people of the other.

<u>Second</u>, we are working with the Soviets on moving to open consulates in Kiev and New York. The details may yet take some time, but when completed, a Consulate in Kiev would give us greatly increased contact with the people of the Ukraine, the largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR. <u>Third</u>, we have taken steps to reinvigorate agreements in force in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health, and agriculture.

-- Specifically, I have directed EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus to assume the position of U.S. Co-chairman of the US-USSR Committee on Environmental Protection. He is talking with his Soviet counterpart to begin arrangements for a Joint Committee meeting which would expand environmental cooperation.

-- Secretary Pierce at HUD has begun preparations for a meeting of the Joint Housing Committee, the first in over six years.

-- We are ready to move ahead with a full meeting of the Joint Agriculture Committee and rejuvenate cooperation in this vital area with, I hope, private sector participation.

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-- In the health area, we have informed the Soviets of our willingness to broaden cooperation under both the health and artificial heart agreements as soon as the issue of Mrs. Bonner's need for medical treatment abroad is resolved.

Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several US-Soviet agreements that expire this year.

-- We have proposed that our bilateral fishing agreement be extended for eighteen months, rather than one year, and are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under it.

-- Secretary Baldrige has formally proposed to Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev that we extend our Long-term Economic Cooperation Agreement for ten more years, hold a experts working group in the near future, and, if that meeting is successful, then convene a Cabinet-level Joint Commercial Commission to examine trade and economic issues.

-- A U.S. Naval delegation went to Moscow earlier this month to renew the Incidents at Sea agreement for another three years. This has been a highly successful agreement that demonstrates clearly the ability of our armed forces to ensure unnecessary frictions are not introduced into our military-to-military relationship.

-- And we are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement that

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has been quite useful in ocean-going joint research. The agreement is due for renewal in December and we anticipate no problems continuing our cooperation in this area.

Finally, I should note that we are negotiating on or have proposed steps in several other areas that will improve our government-to-government dialogue with considerable benefits for the people of our two countries.

-- We recently concluded another round of Consular Review Talks in Moscow aimed at improving visa procedures and facilitating travel between our two countries. -- We suggested a compromise formula to settle the exact depiction of the maritime boundary between us in the Bering Sea.

-- We proposed to the Soviets a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts of the two countries would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop ways to rescue astronauts from malfunctioning space vehicles.

-- We suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures that could be of major value to citizens of both countries lost at sea.

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-- We have made progress in the talks on upgrading the Hotline, and we have made proposals dealing with nuclear terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military Communications Link, and upgrading embassy communications in both countries.

-- We have also put forward a specific set of steps the Soviets and we could take along the Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL incident never recurs. -- Finally, I want to mention that I suggested to General Secretary Chernenko that in addition to our other channels of communication, we institute regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

I have enumerated the steps above because I wanted you to know the scope of the efforts that we are making to improve the quality of our dialogue with the government and people of the Soviet Union. We are sufficiently realistic not to expect immediate results in all our endeavors and, given the current mood in the Kremlin, even small steps can be difficult. We are, however, looking to the long-term in our approach. If we cannot settle all of these issues today, we want nevertheless to lay the groundwork to convince this and future Soviet leaders of the need and value of better and more fruitful communications in the future.

All of us know that broadening genuine communication with a country as closed and suspicious as the Soviet Union is no easy

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task. There is a natural conflict between the deeply ingrained American desire for free-wheeling discussions at all levels and the Soviet penchant for restricting contacts to a few hand-picked individuals on their side. At the present time, the atmosphere for contacts is at low ebb. Perhaps because of their own uncertainities, the Soviet leadership has recently boycotted the Olympics, reduced emigration abroad to a trickle, increased controls over mail allowed in, stepped up harassment of tourists, and even keep Soviets from our ambassador's cultural performances at his residence in Moscow.

One cloud over all our efforts to improve communications is the Soviet leadership's treatment of Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. As part of their generally defensive mood, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to cut them off from the outside world. The actions against the Sakharovs have earned the deserved condemnation of much of the world scientific community and forced the National Academy of Sciences to postpone its trip to the USSR. This is preeminently a people-to-people issue and it will inevitably affect what cooperation between our two peoples is possible. I call on the Soviet leadership to relax their pressures on the Sakharovs, allow them to communicate with the outside world, and provide them with their basic rights to seek medical care within or outside the country as necessary.

All of us here today understand only too well the difficulties before us. However, we cannot only dwell on the

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problems before us. We must must strive to reach the goal we are seeking and I am confident that those here at this meeting share my desire for improved communications with the peoples of the Soviet Union. I want to wish you well as you seek to formulate imaginative, but realistic, people-to-people programs that can increase the level of genuine and meaningful dialogue between our two peoples. Our task is hard, but I am sure that working together we can succeed.

Thank you.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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July 3, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

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SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (G)

The recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce in the memorandum from Mr. Hill to Mr. McFarlane of April 28, 1984, have been approved. These steps are:

- 1. Restoration of a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
- 2. Permission for further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems. (C)

Any steps taken should be coordinated in normal fashion with the appropriate internal security agencies. (\mathcal{L})

The proposed press release should be submitted to the NSC for approval. (\mathcal{L})

Robert M. K

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary



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MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR FISHING RELATIONSHIP (W/ADDED NOTES)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]


B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANEN ROOM THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Review of US-USSR Fishing Relationship

On May 23, the NSC requested the views of the Department of State on the question of the timing of the President's decision on partial restoration of the bilateral fisheries relationship with the USSR and, if such a step is to be taken now, on how we would explain a favorable decision in light of current strains on the bilateral relationship.

The Department of State recommends that the President decide now on whether to grant the Soviets a directed fishing allocation in the range of 50,000 tons and permit expanded joint ventures, if requested, provided there are no overriding security problems. We do not believe that the President's decision should be delayed by the factors mentioned in your memo of May 23 because:

1) The war in Afghanistan will continue for years and our sanctions have made their point. While our sanctions policy as such remains in place, therefore, we should be willing to make specific exceptions that are in our interest, such as these.

2) The Olympic boycott is largely an example of the Soviet tendency to retreat into self-isolation and our policy purpose is to encourage the Soviets to constructive engagement with us through steps that are mutually advantageous, like these.

3) We are attempting to persuade the Soviets to take action in the Sakharov case through quiet diplomacy and international pressure rather than through bilateral economic sanctions. Implementation of steps to activate four bilateral agreements will be affected by developments in the Sakharov case. But in our view this logic does not extend to the whole agenda of relations such as arms control and economic relations. In particular, it does not extend to economic steps of clear benefit to us, like these.



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In their original recommendation of April 28, State and Commerce noted that this would be a carefully modulated step, which excluded renegotiation of a bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. Our recommendation was based on the fact that the proposed steps would be of direct economic benefit to the currently depressed US fishing industry and were strongly supported by relevant Congressional delegations. This continues to be the case as we recently confirmed with contacts on the Hill. In addition, our recommendation was based on our belief that we should maintain the structure of economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, expanding it those areas in which it is appropriate from a security and economic standpoint to do so.

If the President decides to go forward, we recommend that we inform the Soviets here and in Moscow and do a low key public announcement. We believe that this course would enable us to present this action publicly as an example of the US policy of taking steps to increase exchanges of non-strategic goods as enunciated by the President in his June 4 speech. Our press guidance would underscore the benefits to the US fishing industry, noting US willingness to build upon existing structure in the US-USSR economic relationship where appropriate.

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Executive Secretary



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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

USSR FISHING RELATIONSHIP

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

DECLASSIFIED M.R. 748-25A-13

SUBJECT:

Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (C)

Since your memorandum of April 28, 1984, on this subject was sent, a number of additional strains have developed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These include the Soviet boycott of the Olympics, the intensification of the war in Afghanistan, and the steps taken against Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov.

In view of the above, the Department's views are requested on the question of timing the President's decision on the fisheries matter. Specifically, should such a step be taken now, and if so, how should we explain a favorable decision on this matter in light of present circumstances?

Upon receipt of the Department's views on the timing question, the matter will be forwarded to the President for decision.

> Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

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8412440 XR 8412439 DECLASSIFIED United States Department of State NLRR748-25A-1-14-3 Washington, D.C. 20520 NARA DATEG 72502 April 28, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLA THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Review of US - USSR Fishing Relationship

The NSC on March 21, 1983, requested an interagency review of measures proposed by Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the USSR. Breaux's proposals would remove an Afghanistan sanction and restore our bilateral fisheries relationship. They are strongly supported by the fishing industry and other Senators and Congressmen from the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. We and the Soviets just agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months, through December 31, 1985.

The interagency review, interrupted by the KAL incident, has been completed. The concerned agencies (State and Commerce; NSC unable to attend) considered the following three steps:

--granting the Soviets a directed fish allocation of approximately 50,000 metric tons to permit expansion of the existing joint venture based in Seattle. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets had a 500,000-ton allocation. A directed allocation would permit Soviet vessels to remain on station fishing when weather conditions require the smaller U.S. fishing boats to seek shelter. This would permit an expanded Soviet processing capability to remain in place for longer periods of time, which would benefit the joint venture. At present, Soviet vessels can only process U.S.-caught fish;

--allow further joint ventures in other areas of the U.S. fishing zone as they are proposed, assuming there are no overriding security problems;

--inform the Soviets we are prepared to renegotiate the US-Soviet fisheries agreement, with the possibility of negotiating an agreement to allow US fishermen access to Soviet fisheries. This would almost certainly require a large directed allocation to the Soviets in return.

The IG determined that there are strong economic reasons to restore the fisheries relationship and that the current sanctions are imposing economic hardships on the U.S. fishing industry:

-- The US firm currently involved in the existing joint

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venture has stated that it expects to increase the joint venture operations by the amount of the direct allocation given to the USSR. The joint venture currently processes about 160,000 MT of US-caught fish annually, valued at \$30 million, and involving 40 US vessels which otherwise would not be employed. An additional 50,000 MT caught by the joint venture would result in an estimated \$8 million increase in proceeds to participating US fishermen.

-- Establishment of new joint ventures with the Soviets in US waters would increase our leverage with other countries now fishing off the US coast (Japan and Korea) to expand cooperation with the US fishing industry.

-- The US fishing industry is depressed and the impact from the joint ventures is substantial; the multiplier effect on local fish-related industries from each dollar earned by the present joint venture is estimated at four to one.

-- There has been a significant reverse flow of technology and expertise to the US fishing industry from the Soviets as the result of the joint venture and our cooperative fisheries research programs. Restoration of Soviet fishing privileges would enhance our opportunities to take greater advantage of these benefits.

The IG also concluded that forward movement would be consistent with the President's January 16 speech calling for a constructive dialogue with the Soviets. The fishing sanction on Poland has been removed and the restoration of Soviet privileges would underscore our commitment to review sanctions to ensure that US business interests are not unfairly penalized. Finally this action parallels negotiation of the the new LTA.

The Departments of State and Commerce have concluded that we should now take the first two steps: restoring a directed allocation of 50,000 MT, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture commensurately; and, permitting further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems. We would not publicly encourage new joint ventures, however. The allocation would be granted in at least two stages to permit observation of Soviet performance.

It was deemed inappropriate to seek renegotiation of the bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. We will keep this step under review should political conditions permit our moving in that direction in the future.





We now request NSC concurrence with the recommendations of the interagency review and that the matter be forwarded to the President for his review of all the options and decision.

b^{or}Charles Hill Executive Secretary

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Bob, 74 per JMP's pote to you I had a new meno drafted

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

DECLASSIFIED NLRR748-25A-1-15-2 9V NARA DATE Utr

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (C)

The recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce in the memorandum from Mr. Hill to Mr. McFarlane of April 28, 1984, have been approved. These steps are:

- 1. Restoration of a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
- 2. Permission for further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems. (C)

Any steps taken should be coordinated in normal fashion with the appropriate internal security agencies. (2)

Recommendations for public handling of the issue contained in Mr. Hill's Memorandum of June 18, 1984, are also approved. (2)

> Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX

July 3, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

NLRR748-25A -1-15-2 NARA DATE 6/ BY GAB

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

The recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce in the memorandum from Mr. Hill to Mr. McFarlane of April 28, 1984, have been approved. These steps are:

- 1. Restoration of a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
- 2. Permission for further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems.

Any steps taken should be coordinated in normal fashion with the appropriate internal security agencies.

The proposed press release should be submitted to the NSC for approval.

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

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