

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File
Folder Title: USSR
(05/09/1984-05/04/1984)
Box: RAC Box 25

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Last Updated: 02/06/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

KDB 1/15/2016

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

394

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172431	PROFS NOTE	R. KIMMITT TO MCFARLANE RE NOTE TO MATLOCK AND ROBINSON	1	5/11/1984	B1
172429	MEMO	J. MATLOCK AND R. ROBINSON TO R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY FORCED LABOR (W/NOTATIONS)	3	5/9/1984	B1
172430	POSITION PAPER	RE SOVIET IMPORTS	2	ND	B1
172432	PROFS NOTE	FROM R. KIMMITT, FORWARDING PROFS NOTE FROM MCFARLANE	1	5/9/1984	B1
172433	PROFS NOTE	FROM R. KIMMITT, FORWARDING PROFS NOTE FROM MCFARLANE	1	5/9/1984	B1
172434	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH TO MCFARLANE RE MILITARY FACTS FOR FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON	2	5/9/1984	B1
172435	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE PRESS GUIDANCE ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM OLYMPICS	1	5/10/1984	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-44-3-9			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

394

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172436	MEMO	D. FORTIER AND S. SESTANOVICH TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED COORDINATING GROUP (W/NOTATIONS)	5	5/10/1984	B1
172437	TALKING POINTS	RE PROPOSED TELEPHONE CALLS TO WEINBERGER ET AL.	3	ND	B1
172438	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE 5/10/84 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-44-6-6	4	5/11/1984	B1
172439	REPORT	POINTS HANDED OVER BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-44-6-6	2	5/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

1/15/16 COB

RECEIVED 09 MAY 84 11

TO KIMMITT

FROM MCFARLANE

DOC DATE 09 MAY 84 /

URGENT

KEYWORDS USSR

IMPORT CONTROLS

INTL LABOR

ECONOMICS

MEDIA

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: TREASURY ANNOUNCEMENT ON SLAVE LABOR / RESTRICTION ON IMPORT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 09 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

ROBINSON

FORTIER

LEHMAN, C

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
McFarlane X	5/10	For decision	5/12	
C	5/10	McFarlane Disapproval		JM, RO
-	5/21	Recd Treasury Announcement		B JM, RO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (14) (10)

National Security Council
The White House

2

System #

I

Package #

3742

84 MAY 18 A 9: 25

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	J	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	M	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		N
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Wigg Matlock Robinson

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Treasury announcement on forced labor.

Bud,
 This is less than helpful especially
 with the Treasury input to Farnsworth
 in attached article. ~~This whole thing~~
~~pointless~~

J

National Security Council
The White House

System # I 3
Package # 3742
add-on

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>Stuff</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain O = Oispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

info to Matlock / Robinson

National Security Council
The White House

4

System # 5
Package # 3742

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	X	
Tom Shull			<i>Shull</i>
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	<i>M</i>	<i>Advance</i>
Bob Kimmitt	5		
NSC Secretariat		<i>g...</i>	
Situation Room		<i>W...</i>	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*I agree. Can't we just tell
Don to forget it until after
election.*

National Security Council
The White House

1151

80F
5

ED

System #

Package #

3742

8 MAY 9 6:41

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	<i>[Signature]</i>	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: ASAP
(Date/Time)

Secret Slave Labor

Good paper

84 MAY 9

P 6: 52

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

I
3742

URGENT URGENT G

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		Staff
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Action Matlock
Cmt ~~Robinson~~
 Forster
 Chelman

ASAP

TREASURY NEWS



Department of the Treasury • Washington, D.C. • Telephone 566-2041

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 17, 1984

CONTACT: Sydney Wilson
566-2041

TREASURY POSTPONES FINDING ON FORCED LABOR GOODS

Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan announced today that he has postponed any determination on whether convict-made goods are being imported into the United States from the Soviet Union in violation of 19 U.S.C. 1307 until after completion of the International Trade Commission study of this question. Because of the closed nature of the Soviet economy, the only usable information of any value on the question of Soviet forced labor was furnished to the Commissioner of Customs by the Central Intelligence Agency. Secretary Regan's decision was made after consultation with CIA Director William Casey as to the nature of the evidence on Soviet imports made available to the Customs Service by the CIA. According to Director Casey, the evidence is "fragmentary" and not useful in determining whether any particular Soviet goods are being produced with forced labor, or that any significant quantity of such goods is being imported into the United States.

In connection with this decision, Secretary Regan said: "This is a significant and highly controversial issue. Many Americans, including many in Congress, believe that substantial quantities of goods are produced in the Soviet Union with forced labor. Although CIA Director Casey confirms that this is true, it is apparent from his comments that we cannot, with currently available information, determine which products are produced in this manner and which are not. I do not believe that the American people want their government to act precipitously and without serious consideration and evidence in a matter of such importance to our international relations."

To facilitate the International Trade Commission study, Secretary Regan has directed Customs Commissioner William Von Raab to provide the ITC with monthly reports on all importations of Soviet-made goods. The ITC study, which was requested by Senator Dole on behalf of the Senate Finance Committee, is scheduled for completion on November 12, 1984.

The Treasury Department will release evidentiary standards recently established by Treasury and Customs to assist in future determinations of whether any foreign-made goods violate 19 U.S.C. 1307. These standards will be applied to information available to the Secretary regarding Soviet-made goods upon completion of the ITC study.

444

111A049

D N CZCUIVQYV

7BC-IMPORTS

7BY CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH

7C.1984 N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERVICE

WASHINGTON - THE REGAN ADMINISTRATION, AFTER A HEATED INTERNAL CONFLICT, HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE UNTIL AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTION ANY DECISION TO BAN IMPORTS OF SOVIET PRODUCTS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN MADE WITH FORCED LABOR.

THE ACTION, ANNOUNCED WEDNESDAY BY TREASURY SECRETARY DONALD T. REGAN, WAS SEEN AS A VICTORY FOR THOSE IN THE CABINET WHO HAVE BEEN ARGUING THAT AMERICAN TRADE RESTRICTIONS WOULD CAUSE FURTHER DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND LEAD TO RETALIATION AGAINST AMERICAN FARM EXPORTS.

MOST OF THE CABINET, LED BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION, ACCORDING TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WHO HAVE MONITORED THE OFTEN ANGRY DISCUSSION.

THE CHIEF PROPONENT OF RESTRICTIVE ACTION HAD BEEN REGAN HIMSELF, THESE SOURCES SAID.

THE ISSUE HAS BEEN SMOLDERING SINCE LAST SEPTEMBER, WHEN CUSTOMS COMMISSIONER WILLIAM VON RAAB SAID IN A LETTER TO REGAN THAT HE HAD INFORMATION THAT "REASONABLY INDICATES" SOME THREE DOZEN PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM THE SOVIET UNION IN 1982 WERE MANUFACTURED WITH THE HELP OF PRISONERS OR OTHER FORCED LABOR.

REGAN, WHO OVERSEES THE CUSTOMS SERVICE, ALSO FELT PRESSURE TO ACT FROM A NONBINDING SENSE OF THE SENATE RESOLUTION THAT CALLED ON THE TREASURY TO BAN IMPORTS OF PRODUCTS MADE BY FORCED LABOR.

LED BY SEN. WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, R-COLO., 45 SENATORS HAD SENT A LETTER TO SECRETARY REGAN ALSO URGING THE USE OF A RARELY ENFORCED PROVISION OF THE 1930 SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT THAT DENIES ENTRY TO "ALL GOODS, WARES, ARTICLES AND MERCHANDISE MINED, PRODUCED OR MANUFACTURED WHOLLY OR IN PART IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY BY CONVICT OR FORCED LABOR."

REGAN WAS DESCRIBED BY ONE SOURCE AS "GENUINELY CAUGHT IN A QUANDARY."

"HE WANTED TO DO SOMETHING, AND YET EVERY TIME HE DID IT WAS KNOCKED DOWN BY SHULTZ AND BALDRIGE," THIS SOURCE ADDED.

AMONG THE OTHER CABINET OFFICERS OPPOSED TO TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE RUSSIANS WERE COMMERCE SECRETARY MALCOLM BALDRIGE, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, BILL BROCK, AND AGRICULTURE SECRETARY JOHN R. BLOCK.

THE DECISION TO POSTPONE ACTION WAS TAKEN JUST BEFORE A SOVIET TRADE AND ECONOMIC DELEGATION WAS DUE TO ARRIVE HERE TO DISCUSS THE EASING OF EXISTING ADMINISTRATION TRADE RESTRICTIONS.

9
SOVIET FORCED LABOR WAS FURNISHED TO THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS BY WILLIAM J. CASEY, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

A LETTER FROM CASEY DISTRIBUTED WITH THE TREASURY STATEMENT SAYS: "THERE ARE ABOUT 2 MILLION FORCED LABORERS IN CAMPS. AN ADDITIONAL 2 MILLION OR SO FORCED LABORERS ARE NOT CONFINED; AND ARE MOSTLY INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION."

BUT CASEY'S LETTER GOES ON TO SAY THAT DESPITE THE "CONVINCING" EVIDENCE OF EXTENSIVE USE OF FORCED LABOR: "IT IS FRAGMENTARY WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIC PRODUCTS."

THE TREASURY SAID NO DECISION IN THE MATTER WOULD BE TAKEN UNTIL AFTER COMPLETION OF A STUDY BY THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION TITLED "IMPORT OF GOODS MANUFACTURED BY CONVICT, FORCED OR INDENTURED LABOR." THE INVESTIGATION BY THE FEDERAL FACT-FINDING AGENCY WILL NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL NOV. 12; SIX DAYS AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE TRADE COMMISSION WILL HOLD A HEARING JULY 12.

THE STUDY WAS COMMISSIONED LAST DECEMBER BY THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AFTER THE SENATE HAD VOTED ITS NONBINDING RESOLUTION. AS ONE SENATE STAFF MEMBER PUT IT: "HERE WE WERE ASKING THE ADMINISTRATION TO ADMINISTER THE LAW ON SLAVE LABOR; AND YET NO ONE HAD ANY CLEAR DEFINITION ABOUT WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT."

THE ARGUMENTS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE ARISEN AT A TIME WHEN MOST CABINET OFFICERS WERE LOATH TO SEE FURTHER DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW FOLLOWING THE SOVIET DECISION LAST WEEK NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN LOS ANGELES.

NYT-05-17-84 1522EDT



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172431	PROFS NOTE R. KIMMITT TO MCFARLANE RE NOTE TO MATLOCK AND ROBINSON	1	5/11/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
WASHINGTON
20506

COPY //

84 MAY 10 All: 33

May 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM E. BROCK 

SUBJECT: Prohibition of Imports from the Soviet Union of Products Made
by Forced Labor

I understand that this subject, which I had thought to be no longer active, is once again under serious consideration and that action may be imminent. Prohibition of imports from the Soviet Union, even if the list of affected imports is limited, raises serious questions which should be carefully vetted by all interested members of the Cabinet.

I also understand Senator Dole has requested that no decision on this be taken until after the USITC has made its report, due on November 12, to the Senate Finance Committee on the results of its ongoing study of the worldwide incidence and effect of trade in goods produced by forced labor. Senator Dole has made a reasonable request. As the evidence that any particular Soviet good is produced by slave labor is scanty, we need all the documentation we can get before we act because among other reasons, U.S. importers, acting in good faith, could suffer considerable financial damage.

In the meantime, we should consider the possible effect of any such action on U.S. trade. The Soviets, of course, do not wish us well. We can reasonably expect them to jump at the chance to take a public posture -- especially after their boycotting the Olympics -- where they could be seen as reacting to U.S. "provocation".

The U.S.-USSR long-term grain agreement is a tempting target. The world is now awash in grain. The Soviets would not run any great risk if they denounced the agreement, especially as they could always come quietly back into the world market to buy U.S. grain once they had played the public posturing for all its worth.

I urge that before any final decision is taken, this issue be fully discussed in the NSC or the Cabinet.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172429	MEMO J. MATLOCK AND R. ROBINSON TO R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY FORCED LABOR (W/NOTATIONS)	3	5/9/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172430	POSITION PAPER RE SOVIET IMPORTS	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

BOB PARROTT, OREG.
WILLIAM W. ROTH, JR., DEL.
JOHN S. DANFORTH, MO.
JOHN CHAFFET, ILL.
JOHN HEINZ, PA.
MALCOLM WALLOP, WYO.
DAVID DURENBERGER, MINN.
WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, COLO.
STEVEN D. SYMMS, IDAHO
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA

RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEX.
SPARK M. MATSUMAGA, HAWAII
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y.
MAX BAUCUS, MONT.
DAVID L. BOREN, OKLA.
BILL BRADLEY, N.J.
GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAINE
DAVID PRYOR, ARK.

17
Φ ETRD - UR - US - A7
United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RODERICK A. CLARMENT, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
MICHAEL STERN, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

March 2, 1984

The Honorable Donald T. Regan
Secretary
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Don:

Thank you for your letter of November 21, 1983, advising me of the ongoing review by your Department of preliminary findings that the United States may be importing articles from the Soviet Union produced with the use of convict, forced or indentured labor. I look forward to the results of this investigation, including your evaluation of the collateral effects of enforcing section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 on overall U.S.-Soviet relations.

As you may be aware, the Committee on Finance has requested a similar investigation by the International Trade Commission, which initiated its review on February 1. The ITC investigation will encompass articles imported from all U.S. trading partners, and will include the application of domestic and international law, and particularly section 307 to international trade in goods produced in whole or in part by convict, forced or indentured labor. A copy of the ITC notice of investigation, and the transmittal letter from Chairman Eckes, are enclosed for your review and information.

The ITC will hold a public hearing in connection with its investigation on July 10, with a final report due between November 12 and the end of this year. I am sure that the Treasury Department's findings and views on the legal standards and adequacy of proof for enforcement of section 307 would be of great value to the ITC's current review.


In view of the broad scope of the ITC investigation now underway, I hope you will take into account the need for a consistent and comprehensive official position on this issue in

The Honorable Donald T. Regan
Page 2
March 2, 1984

developing the Treasury Department's recommendations. It may be preferable to defer a final decision until the ITC report is available to assure an unambiguous interpretation of the relevant statutes and practices.

I appreciate your consideration of my views, and look forward to working with you on this important matter.

Sincerely,



BOB DOLE
Chairman

BK:lsk

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172432	PROFS NOTE FROM R. KIMMITT, FORWARDING PROFS NOTE FROM MCFARLANE	1	5/9/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172433	PROFS NOTE FROM R. KIMMITT, FORWARDING PROFS NOTE FROM MCFARLANE	1	5/9/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

1/15/16 (013)

RECEIVED 09 MAY 84 12

DOCDATE 09 MAY 84 21

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

KEYWORDS MILITARY POSTURE
USSR

EL SALVADOR
NICARAGUA

NIXON, RICHARD M

SUBJECT MILITARY FACTS RE EL SALVADOR & NICARAGUA FOR FORMER PRES NIXON

ACTION. FOR DECISION DUE. 11 MAY 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION
MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
C	5/9 5/10	Requested Mcfarlane noted		ON ✓

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE 1A (c)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172434	MEMO OLIVER NORTH TO MCFARLANE RE MILITARY FACTS FOR FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON	2	5/9/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 15 MAY 84 11

TO PRESIDENT FROM BLOCK, J FULLER, C

DOCDATE 10 MAY 84 24 14 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: USSR CM

IMPORT CONTROLS WHS

~~SUSPENSE~~

SUBJECT: IMPORT RESTRICTIONS FM SOVIET UNION BASED ON FORCED LABOR ALLEGATION

ACTION: **PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 17 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

THOMPSON

MCMINN

FORTIER

KIMMITT

POINDEXTER

RAYMOND

COMMENTS **IF APPROPRIATE

REF# LOG 8403742 NSCIFID (CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 10/18	OWRZ		

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (PA) (C)

25

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Date: May 14, 1984 Number: 214693CA Due By: -----

Subject: Import Restrictions from Soviet Union Based on Forced Labor Allegation

	Action	FYI		Action	FYI
ALL CABINET MEMBERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CEA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Vice President	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CEQ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
State	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OSTP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Defense	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Attorney General	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
Agriculture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Baker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Commerce	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Deaver	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Labor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Darman (For WH Staffing)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HHS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Jenkins	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HUD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McFarlane (original)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Svahn	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Energy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Counsellor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
UN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USTR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCCT/Gunn	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
			CCEA/Porter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GSA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCFA/	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
EPA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCHR/Simmons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OPM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCLP/Uhmann	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
VA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCMA/Bledsoe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SBA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCNRE/	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: For appropriate action.

RETURN TO:

Craig L. Fuller
Assistant to the President
for Cabinet Affairs
456-2823

Katherine Anderson Don Clarey
 Tom Gibson Larry Herbolsheimer
Associate Director
Office of Cabinet Affairs
456-2800

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 11, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BLOCK

SUBJECT: SUGGESTS DELAY OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS FROM
SOVIET UNION BASED ON FORCE LABOR ALLEGATION
UNTIL ITC INVESTIGATION REPORT

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
CRAIG L. FULLER	ORG	84/05/11		___/___/___
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:      *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM      *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *          OF SIGNER  *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE     *C-COMPLETED        *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE      *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY      *                      *                      *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

37
C. Fuller
MAY 10 1984

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that consideration is being given to move forward with a ban on imports of certain products from the Soviet Union, which are allegedly made by forced labor. A decision on this matter may be made very soon.

In my judgment, we should not proceed with import restrictions based on the forced labor allegation. It is questionable whether sufficient evidence is available to justify restrictions on specific imports based on the allegations. Moreover, an ITC investigation of forced labor practices by all U.S. trading partners has been requested by Senator Dole and is now underway. The report is due between November 12 and the end of the year. Any decision should be deferred until after this report is available.

As you are aware, the Soviet Union is a major market for U.S. agricultural products, particularly grain. In our consultations with the Soviets, they have pointed out clearly that there would be a connection between their grain purchases from the United States and U.S. restrictions on imports from the USSR. The ban on certain imports would have little measurable economic effect on the Soviet Union, but could be expected to provoke retaliation by the USSR against purchases of U.S. grain.

With your leadership we have carefully repaired the damage caused by the 1980 embargo to our agricultural trade with the USSR. Restrictions on Soviet imports could have serious consequences for the future of this trade, which is of fundamental importance in U.S. farm income.

U.S. farmers are concerned about the economic situation confronting them. Reduced trade with the USSR would worsen the economic outlook. There could be broad dissatisfaction in rural America and among their Congressional representation with any Administration actions that provoked new agricultural trade frictions with the USSR.

Respectfully,


John R. Block
Secretary

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8403796

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/16/16 EDO

RECEIVED 11 MAY 84 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM LENCZOWSKI

DOCDATE 10 MAY 84

KEYWORDS . PRESS

USSR

OLYMPICS

SUBJECT. PRESS GUIDANCE ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM OLYMPICS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 5/23

MCFarlane noted

JL ✓

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172435

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

May 10, 1984

INFORMATION

NLR 748-25-443-9

BY LCDR NARA DATE 4/8/83

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Press Guidance on Soviet Withdrawal from Olympics

In the midst of an otherwise well-crafted cable (Tab I) of press guidance on the Soviet Olympics decision, there appears one answer to a logical question which I believe is ill-considered and ineffective. In response to the question "Why did they do this?" The guidance recommends that we say "It is inexplicable to us." This response appears three times in the guidance (see underlined passages).

The motive underlying this response is clear: it is designed to portray the U.S. as an innocent party, full of goodwill toward the Soviets, and ready to attribute the Soviet decision to some grievous misunderstanding which the U.S. stands willing to clear up. However noble the tactical intention of this bit of political theater, its contrived innocence is disingenuously transparent and too clever by half. Substantively, it serves to obscure the true nature of current Soviet strategy, when this episode could instead serve as an opportunity to enlighten public opinion about Soviet intentions and methods. And here is the point: the American public will be more rather than less inclined to support the President's policies in Central America and in restoring a credible deterrent if we use such opportunities to keep the public fully informed about the nature and goals of Soviet communism. This is the "realism" component of the President's policy of "realism, strength and willingness to negotiate" -- a component that gets short shrift when we bend over backwards to show the world what nice guys we are.

The public should know why exactly the Soviets made their decision and we should not be afraid to say so. At a time when public understanding about the nature of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet strategy is so manifestly at its all-time low after a decade of detente and its accompanying self-censorship and self-deception, the job of reeducating people about these realities is enormous and the opportunities for capturing public attention on this are rare and precious. We should not squander them, much less confuse the issue.

Attachment:

Tab I State Department cable 135436

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5436 DTG: 090237Z MAY 84 PSN: 025240
EOB576 AN007379 TOR: 130/0424Z CSN: HCE626

OLYMPICS?

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DEGR-01 DOBR-01 SMAL-01 LEVN-01 NOR-01
SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENG-01 MAT-01 /010 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIMS SMAL
EOB:

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #5436 130035Z
O 090237Z MAY 84 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 135436

E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: KOLY, -PREL, UR -
SUBJECT: SOVIET DECISION NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN
OLYMPIC GAMES

1. SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS ANNOUNCED MAY 8 THAT IT WAS QUOTE IMPOSSIBLE UNQUOTE FOR SOVIET ATHLETES TO PARTICIPATE IN 1984 SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES IN LOS ANGELES. POSTS MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO RESPOND TO INQUIRIES.

2. PRESS GUIDANCE:

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THEY WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE OLYMPICS IN LOS ANGELES?

A: WE HAVE SEEN THE TASS REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT, AND HAVE CONFIRMED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT INTEND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES IN LOS ANGELES. WE REGRET THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CHOSEN TO MAKE A DECISION FOR WHICH THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION. IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DISAPPOINT HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS COMMITTED THE U.S. TO LIVE

UP FULLY TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE OLYMPIC CHARTER AS HOST COUNTRY. THE VAGUE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S STATEMENT PROVIDE NO SUPPORT FOR CHARGES THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT FULLY MET THESE OLYMPIC OBLIGATIONS.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGES THAT WE WERE NOT LIVING UP TO OUR OBLIGATIONS AS HOSTS?

A: THEY ARE WHOLLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IN RECENT MONTHS, WE HAVE MADE EXHAUSTIVE EFFORTS TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN LOS ANGELES, AND WE HAVE MET THOSE CONCERNS. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN HINDERED BY THE U.S. OR HAMPERED FROM PARTICIPATING FREELY IN THE OLYMPICS.

Q: THEN HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE SOVIET DECISION?

A: WE DO NOT. IT IS INEXPLICABLE TO US.

Q: WHAT EFFECT WILL THIS HAVE ON OUR APPROACH TO THE

A. NONE. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING THE LOS ANGELES OLYMPIC ORGANIZING COMMITTEE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. OUR DOORS ARE OPEN AND WE ARE EAGER TO GREET ALL ATHLETES FROM EVERY OLYMPIC NATION WHO WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GAMES OF THE XXIII OLYMPIAD.

3. GUIDANCE FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY:

Q: WHAT CHARGES HAVE THE SOVIETS MADE AGAINST THE USG ON THE OLYMPICS?

A: SOVIET COMPLAINTS HAVE FOCUSED ON THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- DENYING A VISA TO THEIR OLYMPIC ATTACHE.
- INSTITUTING A VISA REQUIREMENT FOR PARTICIPANTS, CONTRARY TO THE CHARTER.
- PREVENTING THE TRAVEL OF SOVIET CITIZENS TO OLYMPIC SITES IN CLOSED AREAS.
- FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY.
- ENCOURAGEMENT AND INCITEMENT OF ANTI-SOVIET DEMONSTRATIONS AND CREATION OF AN ANTI-SOVIET ATMOSPHERE.
- RESERVING THE RIGHT TO SEARCH THE SOVIET CRUISE SHIP WHICH WAS TO SERVE AS THEIR HEADQUARTERS.
- ENCOURAGING DEFECTIONS.

Q: AND WHAT ABOUT THEIR COMPLAINTS AGAINST IAOOC?

A: THE SOVIETS HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT:

- EXORBITANT AND UNPRECEDENTED COSTS.
- MORE THAN ONE OLYMPIC VILLAGE.
- TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS DUE TO DISPERSED VENUES.
- SMOG AND CRIME.
- EXTREME COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE GAMES AND PROFITEERING.
- SELLING THE OLYMPIC TORCH RELAY.
- ACCREDITATION OF RFE AND RADIO LIBERTY.

Q: WHAT STEPS HAS THE USG TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET COMPLAINTS?

A: THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY AND PUBLICLY ASSURED THE IOC THAT THE US WOULD LIVE UP TO THE OLYMPIC CHARTER. THESE REASSURANCES HAVE BEEN REPEATED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO THE SOVIETS.

-- AUTHORIZED THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR AT LEAST 25 AEROFLOT CHARTER FLIGHTS.

-- ASSURED THE SOVIETS BY DIPLOMATIC NOTE AND PRIVATELY THAT, AS AGREED BY THE IOC, ALL OLYMPIC PARTICIPANTS COULD ENTER THE U.S. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR OLYMPIC IDENTITY CARDS WITHOUT VISAS.

-- AUTHORIZED A MONTH-LONG PORT CALL FOR THE SOVIET CRUISE SHIP TO SERVE AS THEIR OLYMPICS HEADQUARTERS. ASSURED SOVIETS PRIVATELY THAT AFTER INITIAL CUSTOMS AND SAFETY INSPECTION, SUBSEQUENT SEARCHES OF SHIP WOULD BE ONLY FOR CAUSE (E.G., BOMB THREATS) AND NOT FOR PURPOSE OF HARASSMENT.

-- AUTHORIZED ENTRY OF AEROFLOT AND SHIPPING PERSONNEL IN ADVANCE OF GAMES TO DO PREPARATORY WORK.

-- INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE AN OLYMPIC

UNCLASSIFIED

31

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5436 DTG: 090237Z MAY 84 PSN: 025240

ATTACHE WITH FULL DIPLOMATIC STATUS (BUT NOT THE INDIVIDUAL ORIGINALLY PROPOSED.)

-- INFORMED THEM WE WOULD BE READY TO RENT VEHICLES (NORMALLY PROHIBITED) TO SOVIET OFFICIALS DURING THE OLYMPICS.

-- TOLD THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT EMIGRE

GROUPS OPPOSING SOVIET PARTICIPATION, ORGANIZING DEMONSTRATIONS OR INCITING DEFECTIONS HAVE NO USG SANCTION WHATSOEVER.

-- OPENED ALL AREAS CONTAINING OLYMPIC SITES, HOTELS, AIRPORTS, ETC. TO SOVIET TRAVEL FROM JUNE 1-AUGUST 15.

-- UNDERTOOK FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF THE SOVIET SHIP, AT A PRELIMINARILY ESTIMATED COST IN EXCESS OF \$500,000.

-- SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE GAMES ARE EXTRAORDINARY. WE TOLD THE SOVIETS PRIVATELY THAT EVERY POSSIBLE SECURITY PRECAUTION WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN.

Q: WHY DO YOU REALLY THINK THE SOVIETS DID NOT COME?

A: IT IS INEXPLICABLE TO US.

THIS IS HARD TO TELL, AND I WON'T PRESUME TO GET INSIDE THEIR HEADS. THE REASONS THEY GAVE WERE PRETTY FLIMSY.

-- WE WORKED HARD TO MEET ALL THE SOVIETS' LEGITIMATE CONCERNS.

-- WE WENT THE EXTRA MILE ON THIS. THE SOVIETS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE EITHER US OR THE LAOOC IN ANY SORT OF DIALOGUE.

-- AFTER THE APRIL 24 IOC MEETING IN LAUSANNE, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO FURTHER CONCRETE DEMANDS.

-- THE TASS STATEMENT TODAY IS VERY THIN: LONG ON ADJECTIVES AND ADVERBS, SHORT ON CONCRETE CHARGES.

-- THUS, WE ARE AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN THE SOVIET DECISION.

Q: BUT WHAT COULD THE REAL REASONS BE?

A: WHILE WE, OF COURSE, CANNOT KNOW WHAT THE "REAL REASONS" ARE, THE EFFECT IS TO ISOLATE THE SOVIETS EVEN FURTHER FROM THE WORLD COMMUNITY. THEY ARE TRYING TO BLAME US FOR THIS, BUT IT IS THEIR OWN CHOICE. THE ANALOGY IS THE WALKOUT FROM THE START AND LINE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS CERTAINLY NOT OUR CHOICE, AND THEY WILL ALSO NOT SUCCEED IN CONVINCING WORLD PUBLIC OPINION THAT IT IS.

Q: HAVE THEY HAD PROBLEMS WITH DEFECTIONS IN PAST OLYMPICS?

A: WE ARE AWARE OF ONLY ONE NEAR DEFECTION BY A SOVIET ATHLETE IN OLYMPIC HISTORY. CERTAINLY THERE IS NOTHING IN PAST HISTORY OF THE GAMES OR CURRENT PREPARATIONS FOR LOS ANGELES TO RAISE SOVIET CONCERNS TO SUCH A LEVEL. OF COURSE, THEIR OWN SECURITY SERVICES MAY HAVE EXAGGERATED THE DANGERS AND CONVINCED THE POLITICAL LEVEL. BUT IT SUGGESTS AN INCREDIBLE SENSE OF

INSECURITY ABOUT THEIR OWN CITIZENS AND THEIR OWN SOCIETY TO WORRY ABOUT THE PROBLEM AT ALL, GIVEN THE HISTORY.

Q: WILL THE STATE DEPARTMENT TAKE ANY STEPS TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR MIND?

A: WE WOULD WELCOME SOVIET PARTICIPATION IF THEY DID CHANGE THEIR MINDS, BUT THIS IS A DECISION THEY HAVE TAKEN, AND THEY WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH IT.

Q: DOES IT MEAN THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS HAVE FAILED?

A: IT IS NOT NEW FOR THE SOVIETS TO HAVE DONE SOMETHING THAT DISAPPOINTS AND SHOCKS MILLIONS OF PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO PUT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR THE LONG-TERM. WE HOPE THEY WILL RESPOND. IF THEY DO NOT, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE BECAUSE THEY HAVE CHOSEN THE PATH OF SELF-ISOLATION AND RAISING TENSIONS, PRESUMABLY FOR SHORT TERM REASONS OF THEIR OWN.

Q: ARE OTHER EAST EUROPEANS BOYCOTTING THE GAMES?

A: WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS ON THIS BUT HAVE NO FIRM WORD ON OTHER PARTICIPANTS. SHULTZ
BT

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~ENCLOSURE(S)~~
1/15/16/07

RECEIVED 10 MAY 84 20

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 10 MAY 84 32

SESTANOVICH

10 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT COORDINATING GRP ON SOVIET CLIENTS

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE. STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (K / R)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	MAY 24 1984	Mcfarlane Approved		DF 513

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

1153 81F

33

System # II
Package # 90557

MAY 10 P 5: 16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>7</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>8</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
<u>JP</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>J</u>	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Should this be coordinated with regional officers, or at least Matlock?

Done, 33 | 5/24
Please make a copy of Talker at Tab A and give to Bud in a Call Folder for Shultz & Kerensky
R

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

34

May 10, 1984

NOTE FOR BUD MCFARLANE

This paper, combined with another longish piece on NATO which you should receive on Friday or Monday, sets forth a program of work which -- if approved -- would occupy a major portion of our time and energy over the next several months. For that reason, we have thought hard about how to create a process that pulls together a number of important strands, thereby allowing us to capture the essence of what we need to be doing in our approach to countering Soviet activities in the Third World. We did not, in short, just decide willy-nilly to set up a new committee. We have talked about this project before, and I think that our views have crystallized over time as to how to really make it work.



Don Fortier

84 Y10 P6: 54

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172436	MEMO D. FORTIER AND S. SESTANOVICH TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED COORDINATING GROUP (W/NOTATIONS)	5	5/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

40



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/15/2016

File Folder

USSR (5/9/84-5/11/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

394

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172437	TALKING POINTS RE PROPOSED TELEPHONE CALLS TO WEINBERGER ET AL.	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED/NO REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

1/15/16 (CSB)

RECEIVED 15 MAY 84 11

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 11 MAY 84 44

KEYWORDS USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SHULTZ MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN ON 10 MAY

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

[Handwritten signature]

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

NO COPIES

System #

II

Package #

90578

84 MAY 15 11:11

42

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	2	HAS SEEN	
Bob Kimmitt	3	IC	A
NSC Secretariat	4		File in
Situation Room			Sys II

for record purposes

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

You may show this copy to Hatlock only.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

46

May 11, 1984

RR

172438

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin,
May 10, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for a little over an hour this morning. He was accompanied by his No. 2 man, Sokolov, and Rick Burt was with me. He had asked to come in on instructions from Moscow to give some responses to proposals we had made.

The responses dealt with outer space arms control and opening new consulates in Kiev and New York, and he handed over papers (attached) on these two issues.

After reading the paper on outer space, I commented that the two sides seem to have different ideas. We had proposed discussions without preconditions; they seemed to be proposing discussions linked to negotiations. While we were not necessarily negative on negotiations, he knew of our concerns on verification. But we would look at their paper and get back to them.

After reading the paper on the consulates, I commented that the Soviets seem to be making agreement on Aeroflot operations a precondition for moving forward. Dobrynin replied that this was not so; rather, they were proposing parallel or even later discussion of Aeroflot. They think they can satisfy our concerns on Kiev, and are prepared to help. At the same time, he said, opening consulates is more in our interest than theirs, since it would give us an "entirely new point" in the capital of the Ukraine. As a practical matter -- and he stressed that it was a practical and not a political matter -- opening up in New York would not make much sense without Soviet travelers to take care of.

I then pointed out that there is a range of other issues where we are awaiting Soviet responses. I mentioned our proposals for bilateral discussions here in Washington on chemical weapons; for experts' talks on southern Africa; for an exchange on the Middle East; and for a concrete date to resume talks on consular housekeeping matters. I also noted we are awaiting a suggestion for a date to resume negotiations on the Pacific maritime boundary, and a lifting of their beach ban on our Moscow diplomats in response to the lifting of the ban on

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 798-25-44-6-6

BY COL NARA DATEY/9/0

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

theirs in Glen Cove, New York. Dobrynin said answers would be forthcoming in due course.

Continuing, I said that on various other issues they had raised with us, our responses were pretty much in hand. However, I said, we have to ask ourselves whether it makes sense to move forward on them. We have to ask ourselves if Soviet policy is not to shut down meaningful U.S.-Soviet discussions at this point. If it is, so be it. In any event we are puzzled.

I then went on to raise three issues -- the Sakharovs, the Soviet scholar in their Embassy, and the Olympics -- where the problem is not just substance but what the Soviets are saying. On these issues, I said, we are not telling the Soviets what they should do, but we do expect them to stick to the facts.

On the Sakharovs, I pointed out that both I and Eagleburger had raised the issue privately with Dobrynin, and that these démarches were designed to encourage the Soviets to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment. In response, TASS had then alleged that U.S. Embassy personnel and Mrs. Bonner had coordinated a plan for Sakharov to go on hunger strike and for her to seek refuge in our Embassy. The fact is, I said, that U.S. officials did not at any time discuss either a Sakharov hunger strike or a Bonner temporary refuge with Mrs. Bonner. There is thus no foundation for the TASS statement. The facts in it are wrong. We had tried to handle the issue privately, not publicly, and the Soviets had blown it up. We think they made a mistake. Sakharov is a Nobel Prize winner, and Mrs. Bonner fought and was wounded in the War. But the point is that the facts the Soviets are stating are not correct.

On the Soviet scholar Kozlov, I said we have no desire to keep him in this country, and when we talked to him he did not indicate he wanted to stay. It was on that basis that we gave him permission to board the plane April 30. But the Soviets have now alleged through TASS that he was subjected to blackmail at the airport, isolated for a long time from their Embassy staff and ultimately prevented from departing. This is absolutely not the case, I said. The facts are that we talked to Kozlov to ensure that we was not being hustled out of the U.S. involuntarily; that there was at least one Soviet official present with him at all times; and that he himself decided not to board the plane despite repeated urgings by the Soviet official present. Once again, therefore, the facts are not as the Soviets allege.

On the Olympics, I said that this was once again a decision for the Soviets to make. If they changed their minds, their athletes would be welcome at the Games. But they have alleged through TASS that at the April 24 Lausanne meeting, the IOC found

the complaints of their Olympic Committee to be just and substantiated; that U.S. authorities continued to interfere in affairs within the exclusive competence of the Los Angeles Committee; and that U.S. authorities were conniving with extremist organizations which aim to create "unbearable conditions" for their delegation and athletes.

The facts, I said, are that the IOC did not make the finding TASS describes; that the U.S. Government has not interfered in LAOOC affairs (nor has the LAOOC ever claimed it has), but has worked with the LAOOC on issues within the sole competence of the U.S. Government at the committee's request; and that there has been no connivance with nor encouragement of these groups, that we have bent over backwards to meet all Soviet concerns, and have met them. I said I could run through a long list of facts about the tremendous effort we had made to meet Soviet concerns. For instance, we would have 17,000 people involved in Olympic security, and we were prepared to spend up to \$50 million to assure it, including \$500,000 for the Soviet ship alone. We had taken every imaginable step to ensure that Soviet athletes were safe and able to compete in the Olympics.

Overall, I said, it was hard for us to see how the effort we had undertaken over a year ago to make progress in our bilateral relationship was going anywhere but downhill. The concrete efforts we had made had been pretty much rebuffed. There seemed to be a Soviet effort underway to close down the avenues of U.S.-Soviet discussion. I said that I assumed our diplomatic channel would stay open, but noted on the other hand that they were not even permitting scientists like Velikhov to talk with us.

For our part we believe that the right posture is to be reasonable, ready to talk, and ready to make progress whenever the Soviets are. But, I concluded, the picture from our point of view is bleak.

Dobrynin objected to this analysis. I had asserted that the Soviets are trying to cut off efforts to create better relations, he said. That was not the Soviet intention. They wanted "better, even normal" relations with us. This was, is and will remain the goal, regardless of the Administration in power here.

He said he could not see a single issue where the Soviets are saying no. The single exception was temporary: the agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and their Academy of Sciences, which Arbatov had received last-minute instructions not to sign as long as Kozlov was in the U.S. This agreement could be signed as soon as the Kozlov case was resolved. On all other issues, Dobrynin said, they think progress can be made.

On the comprehensive test ban, for example, all they were suggesting were negotiations, even if they did not reach conclusions, and the U.S. was refusing to talk. They are still awaiting our answer on the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement. They are prepared to deal with the Administration on everything, if we are willing to meet them halfway. This was true of nuclear testing, of consulates, of the hotline.

Overall, Dobrynin said, it seemed to the Soviets that this Administration was seeking to cut all ties with the Soviet Union except in agriculture. My conclusion that the Soviets are seeking to cut ties is wrong: they are prepared for better relations; but he had to ask where we are prepared to move.

Turning to the specific points I had raised, Dobrynin started with the Sakharovs. Their "people" got the information that Mrs. Bonner had been to the Embassy and given us a letter asking to stay there during Sakharov's hunger strike. Their government had to act on that information. It was a coincidence that it had acted while we were making our démarches. We had "three fellows" (i.e. U.S. Embassy officers) going around with this family. Mrs. Bonner was a Soviet citizen, not ours. And we are dealing with a woman with anti-Soviet intentions. The Soviets had treated Sakharov well. He was in a big city with all facilities. Mrs. Bonner had gone abroad three times for eye treatment, when everyone knows that Soviet eye doctors are the best in the world. And when she goes abroad she meets with people who are working against the Soviet Union.

On Kozlov, Dobrynin went on, Rick Burt had been there at the airport and asked him his intentions twice, and it was clear he did not want asylum here. The Soviets had now brought in two doctors, and appreciated our giving them visas. Kozlov had been in California on his own, and they had had no contact with him until he arrived in Dulles. Burt pointed out that he had in fact been with a Soviet official on his trip across the country. I cut this short by commenting that we were not trying to keep Kozlov, and that his case had been handled in the proper way. Nevertheless, Dobrynin went on, we are still insisting on an interview; he asked what our aim could be, and what we would do if Kozlov said he wanted to stay here. In the end, however, he suggested that Burt and Sokolov be in touch to work out the case, and we will continue to talk with the Soviet Embassy about this matter, ensuring that Kozlov's rights are protected.

We also had a discussion of ratification of the nuclear testing agreements. I will be reporting to you separately on this issue.

Attachment: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLR 748-25-44-66
BY 2012 NARA DATE 4/8/13

35

172439

POINTS HANDED OVER BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

May 10, 1984

The question of preventing the militarization of outer space, as was emphasized by the Soviet side in the course of recent contacts, is acute and urgent. Solutions to this effect must not be delayed. Hence, the need to hold appropriate negotiations with an aim of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

In this regard, we would like to be clear as to the real position of the U.S. side. It is all the more necessary, since initially the U.S. side declared its negative attitude to an exchange of views on the issue of preventing the militarization of space, although later it did express in general terms readiness to discuss this problem without any preconditions. It is also known that two months ago the U.S. government in its report to the Congress maintained that it did not deem it necessary to enter into official discussions on the space issue. Should it be understood that the said position is now becoming invalid? For it is obvious that those two things are incompatible.

So, if the previously declared negative position of the U.S. is discarded, we propose that the two sides, in parallel and simultaneously, make an official statement to the effect that they have agreed to begin discussions of the problem of preventing the militarization of space.

The discussion through diplomatic channels should accordingly be focused on coming to an agreement, with no time lost, on the practical questions concerning the time of the negotiations, their venue and the level of representatives or delegations. We believe that no difficulties should arise in this respect.

It would seem that in the course of this exchange of views the agenda of the negotiations could be agreed upon in more specific detail. As has already been said, we prefer that there should be a comprehensive and full scope discussion and solution to the problem of preventing the militarization of space. Our specific views in this regard have been outlined to the U.S. side. At the same time, we do not rule out the possibility of discussing, for example, the question of a mutual complete renunciation of anti-satellite systems separately, in parallel with the negotiations on the problem as a whole.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL. OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

It is clear that in order to ensure the necessary conditions it is important for the sides not to take actions contrary to the goal of the negotiations, that is, to refrain from launching anti-satellite weapons into space. For our part, we have been doing precisely that.

Regarding the consulates-general in New York and Kiev. On the question asked by the U.S. side with respect to the buildings earlier allocated for a U.S. consulate-general in Kiev, we can say that in principle this is a solvable problem. The main thing, however, as has already been indicated, is that the practical usefulness of the opening of the consulates-general will be considered in the light of the attitude of the U.S. side to the resumption of Aeroflot flights to the U.S. Again for purely practical reasons, this also applies to some other matters in the area of bilateral relations.

Accordingly, we shall be waiting for the results of the review of the question of Aeroflot flights, which was promised by the U.S. side.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~