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Withdrawer

SMF 6/28/2011

File Folder ACTIVE MEASURES (8)

FOIA

M430

Box Number 1

LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions		
113821	MEMO	TO RAYMOND RE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE	1	7/23/1985	B1	B3	
113824	REPORT	SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE	7	7/10/1985	B1	B3	
113826	MEMO	TO LENCZOWSKI RE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE	1	7/23/1985	B1	B3	
113829	REPORT	DUPLICATE OF 113824	7	7/10/1985	B1	B3	
113830	MEMO	HEICHLER TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #13 OF 1985	6	7/24/1985	B1	B3	
113831	MEMO	HEICHLER TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 7/25/85	4	7/26/1985	B1	B2	
					B3	B6	B7(C)
113832	CABLE	021847Z AUG 85	4	8/2/1985	B1	B3	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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113833	MEMO	RAPOPORT TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #14 OF 1985	6	8/14/1985	B1 B3
113834	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 113831	4	7/26/1985	B1 B2 B3 B6 B7(C)
113835	REPORT	WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL POST-MORTEM R 4/15/2013 M430/1	2	ND	B1
113836	CABLE	STATE 269123 R 4/15/2013 M430/1	1	8/30/1985	B1

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JL FILE ON
SOVIET ACTIVE
MEASURES

which is impossible to appraise accurately. The accumulation of credits, deductions, and exclusions divert resources from their most productive uses—those with highest rates of return before taxes—into uses that are less productive but yield higher after-tax returns. The result is reduced national output, lower productivity, and more sluggish economic growth.

Even the preferences and incentives provided with the best of intentions have had unrecognized and unintended consequences. While we may get the intended result from certain tax provisions, the inclusion of such a preference often spawns unintended results which do not contribute to our economic goals. Frankly, I believe that we should not use the Tax Code as backdoor social and industrial policy. With very few exceptions, our tax laws should simply raise revenue to finance the legitimate responsibilities of the Federal Government.

The current tax system inhibits growth by allowing a deduction for interest paid on borrowing while taxing income from savings. I believe this is largely responsible for a national savings rate that lags far behind that of our major competitors. The United States has a national savings rate of about 6 percent as compared to approximately 12 percent in Germany and 22 percent in Japan. No wonder Germany and Japan have capital for investment.

By taking a pure approach to tax reform, by eliminating as many preferences, deductions, and exclusions as possible and, by making saving as attractive as consuming, I believe we can unleash the system for growth.

Second, the tax system is not fair. Many people feel that the tax system is too complex for them to understand and lack confidence in the system's fairness. In addition, I suspect that the widespread assumption that the Tax Code cheats hardworking taxpayers has led to more cheating.

All of the major tax system proposals must be weighed in terms of their fairness to the poor and to middle-class working Americans. While the President's tax reform proposal is a good starting point for the debate, his proposal preserves too many loopholes and gives a far bigger tax cut to the rich, people earning over \$200,000 a year, than he offers to middle-income Americans.

In particular, I am concerned that in his efforts to devise a plan which is profamily, the President has yet to recognize the changing characteristics of the family in our society. Under a recent analysis of the President's plan, it has been determined that working couples in the median income range in several States would face widespread tax increases, while couples in which one spouse stays home would have tax cuts.

Finally, I strongly oppose the President's proposal to eliminate the deduction for State and local taxes. The

President has argued that this deduction subsidizes high-tax States. In fact, this deduction simply means that the Federal Government will neither subsidize nor penalize States for their tax policies.

Since the Federal income tax was imposed in 1913, Congress has recognized that it should not interfere with State and local governments in their ability to raise revenue. For the past 72 years, the Tax Code has allowed a person to deduct State and local taxes from his or her Federal income tax. In effect, this gives local governments the first chance to raise revenue, and the Federal Government is able to tax only what income is left.

It seems to me that eliminating this deduction would be a mistake. It would amount to double taxation: you would have to pay Federal taxes on income that had already been taxed at the local level. It would also penalize some States, like New York, that have higher taxes because of geography or population. Eliminating the deduction for those taxes would mean that the Federal Government would no longer recognize local differences, but would force all States to have similar tax policies.

Still, I am glad that the President has endorsed the idea of tax reform. Now it is up to Congress to improve upon the President's proposal, making it fairer and simpler for working Americans. I am confident that we can pass legislation that will end special tax breaks and genuinely reform our tax laws. ●

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. ROTH addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GAYDOS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

[Mr. GAYDOS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. DANNEMEYER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. DANNEMEYER addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

□ 2220

THE ISSUE OF SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. LUNGREN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks, and to include therein extraneous material, on the subject of my mk special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker, it may be too soon to tell, but during Mikhail Gorbachev's brief tenure as leader of the Soviet Union there have been no significant signs of change in Soviet foreign policy. If anything, Mr. Gorbachev has brought more aggressiveness to that nation's foreign policy.

Like his predecessors, he has concentrated on three important themes: fomenting discord between the United States and its Western allies, strengthening the unity of the Socialist community, and posing as the champion of developing countries.

The Soviet Union has also stepped up its so-called peace offensive, which was reformulated at the end of last year on the eve of the resumption of the Geneva arms control talks. At the talks the Soviet Union has insisted that there can be no progress unless the United States abandons its strategic defense initiative.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet's proposals in the area of arms control have broken no new ground. Their moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe failed to impress either the United States or most of its European allies because the moratorium would give the Soviet's an obvious advantage in medium-range missiles.

Mr. Gorbachev's statements since he has taken office suggest that he might not be the pragmatist some originally thought him to be. His world view now appears to be depicted in stark black and white terms with the Socialist camp on one side and the capitalist-imperialist on the other.

Based on what we have seen so far, I think we can only conclude that Mikhail Gorbachev will continue to pursue a foreign policy that varies little from past Soviet leaders. His predecessor, Constantine Chernenko, in a speech at a regular plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee held from June 14-15, 1983 in Moscow, said:

The battle of ideas in the international arena is going on without respite . . . Our entire system of ideological work should operate as a well-arranged orchestra in which every instrument has a distinctive voice and leads its theme, while harmony is achieved by skillful conducting . . . Propaganda is called upon to embrace every aspect of social life and every social group and region and to reach every individual.

Both of these Soviet leaders have affirmed their belief in "coexistence," but have always emphasized the irrec-

oncilable difference between capitalism and socialism.

Mr. Speaker, this brief discussion of the lack of significant change in Soviet foreign policy brings me to the main topic I wanted to discuss this evening, the issue of Soviet "active measures."

ACTIVE MEASURES

Since its inception in 1917, the U.S.S.R. has sought the support of non-Communist individuals and groups to lend credibility and general appeal to its domestic and foreign policies. Lenin embarked on a new course when he introduced the notion that there is no distinction between war and peace and that until the aims of the proletariat state are achieved worldwide, the Soviet Union use whatever tactics were necessary—including the tactics of communication warfare—during times of peace. The Soviets call these tactics "active measures."

The term "active measures" itself is a literal translation from the Russian "aktivnye meropriyatiya." That is the name of the organization in the KGB's First Chief Directorate responsible for worldwide direction of these activities. As the Soviets use the concept, active measures encompass a wide range of practices, including disinformation, manipulating the media in foreign countries, the use of Communist parties and Communist front groups, and other operations to expand Soviet political influence. Unlike overt Soviet diplomatic and informational efforts, active measures involve an element of deception and frequently employ clandestine means to mask Moscow's involvement.

Before I proceed with my remarks, it may be helpful to my colleagues to be aware of terms related with active measures that will be discussed tonight. Richard Shultz and Roy Godson, authors of "Dezinformatsia" present several terms for review:

Active Measures: Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents.

Agent of Influence: is a person who uses his or her position, influence, power, and credibility to promote the objectives of a foreign power in ways unattributable to that power.

Covert Propaganda: is information (written or oral) which deliberately seeks to influence/manipulate the opinions of a given target audience.

Correlation of Forces: refers to the assessment of world power. In Soviet doctrine, policy priorities and offensive and defensive strategy at any given stage of history are to flow from a determination of the correlation of forces.

Disinformation: is a non-attributed, or falsely attributed communication, written or oral, containing false, incomplete, or misleading information.

Forgery: is one of the many disinformation techniques, is the use of authentic-looking but false documents and communiques. The main targets tend to be foreign governmental entities, or even mass audiences.

International Department, CPSU: (established in the mid 50s) is the department that is responsible for foreign policy planning concerning non-Communist governments and non-governmental organizations, and planning, coordinating, and conducting active measures.

International Front Organizations: while reporting to be independent non-governmental, in reality international front organizations are established and directed by the CPSU to promote its foreign policy objectives.

International Information Department, CPSU: established in 1978, some Western analysts believe it was created to improve the Soviet foreign propaganda effort through more centralized and efficient integration of the wide range of outlets.

Overt Propaganda: is written or oral information from an unconcealed government source which deliberately seeks to influence to manipulate the opinions and attitudes of other persons. Soviet overt propaganda increasingly has been characterized by intensity and concentration; flexibility and adaptability; and centralized control and coordination.

Political Warfare: broadly defined, political warfare is the threat to employ or actual use of overt and covert political, economic, and military techniques to influence politics and events in foreign countries.

Service "A" of the KGB's First Chief Directorate: has the responsibility for planning and conducting covert active measures. These include agent-of-influence operations, oral and written disinformation, forgeries, and other types of covert political action.

As a policy tool, active measures trace back to the 1920's when the Soviets sought to discredit emigre groups in Western Europe, particularly in France, by spreading disinformation.

Even before the 1917 revolution, the czarist secret police employed similar deception techniques. They used agents abroad not only to collect intelligence but also to sow dissent within emigre groups. They also gave covert subsidies to selected journals to stimulate a better press for imperial Russia.

After World War II, the Soviets institutionalized these activities. They established a disinformation unit—department D—within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, the Soviet overseas intelligence arm.

In the mid-1970's, KGB active measures department was upgraded to a service, a further indication of the importance the Soviet leadership attached to active measures operations. This change meant that the chief of the service would have to be a KGB general officer.

The timing of the shift in the mid-1970's suggests a connection with Soviet disappointment with "détente"—during which time forgeries dropped off sharply. There seemed to be a willingness to employ deception techniques on a larger scale in support of Soviet aims. Reflective of this, the Carter administration was targeted with an upsurge of active measures, frequently involving fake U.S. documents. These were particularly directed against the United States-Egyptian relationship and the Camp David process. I will discuss in greater detail

other examples of active measures during the course of my remarks.

According to the U.S. State Department:

The KGB Active Measures Service has the primary role of backstopping foreign active measures operations, which are directed in general terms at the Politburo level—the summit of the Soviet hierarchy.

The service is organized along functional and geographic lines with half a dozen departments. It is believed to employ directly about 300 people. According to the State Department:

It is believed to monitor ongoing active measures around the world; process proposals for new operations; maintain liaison on active measures with the KGB regional and country desks and with overseas operations; and provide technical support for operations through preparation of forgeries and fabrications, translation of documents, and printing and publication of materials.

In July of 1982, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report revealed in an excerpt from the interagency intelligence study on Soviet active measures that:

Ultimate approval for the use of active measures, like all major decisions affecting Soviet foreign policy, rests with the highest level of the Soviet hierarchy, the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Most decisions concerning implementation are carried out by the KGB in close coordination with two elements of the Soviet party bureaucracy, the International Department and the International Information Department. The extensive participation of these two powerful party components in active measures indicates both the importance attached to such activities by Soviet leaders and their appreciation of the policy implications of such activities.

The Interagency report revealed that:

Active measures are in essence an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy;

Active measures remain a major element of Soviet foreign policy even during "Détente;"

The primary target of active measures is the U.S., which the Soviets has long regarded as its main opponent;

The Soviet regime generously provides the necessary financial, technical, and personnel resources necessary to support active measures operations.

The Interagency report concluded that:

Soviet active measures is well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy actions but that the impact, while frequently effective, varies on place and circumstance.

The 1982 hearing also released testimony given earlier in the year by former KGB Maj. Stanislav Levchenko, who defected to the United States in 1979. At the time, Levchenko was in charge of Soviet active measures in Japan.

His testimony made it abundantly clear that the Soviets were making an extensive effort to influence Japanese political and public opinion through the full panoply of active measures:

Use of agents of influence, including senior journalist and politicians, to spread rumors and disinformation (i.e., alleged serious splits in the Chinese hierarchy over the

border fighting with Vietnam, rumors of a secret nuclear deal between China and Italy, a false political testament of the Chinese leader Zhou En-Lai, and a concerted effort to label President Carter "neutron" Carter; and

Use of agents of influence in Japan's internal politics. (Through such agents of influence, Levchenko asserted that the KGB played a behind-the-scenes role in some Japanese opposition groups).

Soviet active measures goals, prepared annually by the KGB residency, according to Levchenko, "mirrored Soviet policy toward Japan, and active measures were designed to support specific policy aims" to:

- Improve Soviet-Japanese relations;
- Increase tensions between Japan and China;
- Increase tensions between Japan and the United States;
- Convince the Japanese that it was hopeless to work for the return of the northern territories.

Levchenko was recently quoted:

There is a collection of techniques called active measures. These include disseminated or hidden propaganda, organization of mass demonstrations, control of international organizations, forgeries, falsification of documents, utilization of agents of influence, sabotage and terrorism. By weakening or destroying the consensus within a free country, active measures do more than classical espionage. In the West, few people understand this concept.

A recent Washington Times interview with Levchenko was very interesting. When asked who in the Soviet system decides on major disinformation themes, he responded by stating:

All these decisions are centralized and depend on the Politburo. The different services of the KGB and the International Department establish programs of action. But it is always the Politburo that decides major operations. The orders are then given to each functionary who is expected to take immediate action.

According to Levchenko, "\$3 to \$4 billion a year expended for propaganda is a reasonable estimate." This includes both internal and external propaganda, which are essential for the survival of the regime. The former is as important as the latter. It consists of a systematic brainwashing of generations upon generations of people since the time of the revolution. There is no comparable example in the world.

Levchenko remarked about the major themes of Soviet propaganda in the world, stating that there are essentially three of them:

- (1) To present the Soviet Union as a country that is fundamentally committed to a gigantic peace effort;
- (2) Try to get rid of the Pershings in Europe and to weaken NATO;
- (3) To back up so-called liberation movements. Beyond that the slogans remain directed against the "principal enemy" the United States.

Levchenko described at great length the Soviet victory against the neutron bomb as "strategically decisive." He stated that:

Exploiting the visceral fear of Western opinion, the Soviet Union managed to erase from the debate the effectiveness of the

neutron weapon system against 21,000 Soviet tanks in East Germany.

□ 2230

Mr. Speaker, this is extremely important, because if anyone would suggest that there are more humane bombs versus less human bombs, the neutron bomb would certainly come in the prior category, because what it attempted to do was to scale down the area of injury to the battlefield; that is, to allow the use of that sort of weapon and confine its effect to the area which would be populated by the individuals that were fighting on behalf of the Eastern bloc in the Soviet Union, and instead of that being the argument the Soviet Union was allowed or assisted in having the debate really revolve around the question of whether this bomb would kill people, but not devastate property, and therefore the suggestion that the Americans and their allies were suddenly confronting Europe with a hideous bomb.

I am not suggesting that the bomb would not destroy life, would not kill people. What I am suggesting is that it was a bomb that would be effective against the onslaught of 21,000 Soviet tanks that we currently find in East Germany. If one believes in the concept of deterrence, one has to believe that we need effective deterrence against the possible onslaught of those tanks in Western Europe.

Why? Because if we fail in that deterrent policy, most analysts suggest that the Soviets and their allies could overrun ourselves and our allies in terms of conventional force structure in Western Europe and then put ourselves in the very difficult situation of deciding whether we allow that to continue or whether we in the United States and our allies are forced to introduce nuclear weapons into the battlefield of the kind that are not in any way confined to the battlefield and once you introduce such weapons to the battlefield, how do you stop from escalating the intercontinental ballistic missiles? How do you stop from escalating to nuclear weapons carried on manned bombers? How do you stop from using nuclear weapons that are discharged from our submarines around the world?

One of the things that we have got to say is that there were some very sincere people in Western Europe who sincerely believed that the neutron bomb was not the proper thing to do, but in fact it is extremely difficult for us to gauge exactly how much of what occurred in Western Europe was the result of Soviet disinformation and other aspects of their active measures.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUNGREN. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The gentleman I think was quoting the Soviet official when he said with

regard to the neutron bomb that the Soviets had won a strategic victory.

Mr. LUNGREN. Strategically decisive were the words he used.

Mr. WALKER. A decisive victory, and I think maybe that very language is somewhat significant because we spend a lot of time on this floor discussing strategic weaponry. In most instances we are talking about spending multi-billions of dollars in order to increase our strategic arsenal.

If I understand what the gentleman is quoting the Soviet official as stating, the Soviets through the use of the disinformation campaign indeed achieved a strategic victory against the West by the use of disinformation.

I think that very language shows how important the message that the gentleman from California is delivering to us tonight, because what it is saying is that despite those things that we do to try to increase our military armament in this country, the fact is that the Soviets in their disinformation campaign are winning major military victories, such as the one that was won on the neutron bomb and I think it really underscores the importance of what the gentleman is telling us here.

□ 2240

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate those remarks because it hearkens back to other remarks made by Levchenko in which he said, and I would repeat, that by weakening or destroying the consensus within a free country, active measures do more than classical espionage. And right now we are in the midst of determining how much espionage we have involved in some aspects of our military, espionage directly connected to the Soviet Union.

His statement is that even worse than some of that classical espionage are the results of active measures. And then he goes on to say "In the West, few people understand this concept."

Perhaps that is one of the most important parts or most important messages that I would like to convey in this special order, which is that there is a knowledge gap, if we can use that term, on the part of many elected officials, and certainly on the part of many in the general public population concerning this whole area, and that as long as there is lack of knowledge, a lack of information about how important this is to the Soviet Union, how they consider it important for their strategic purposes, it weakens our ability to respond to it, because in the absence of information, or confined to the parameters of ignorance, we are very much restricted in our ability to pass legislation which effectively responds to this. And oftentimes we do not even realize that some of our debate is being influenced by this.

I am not suggesting any Member here is doing that intentionally, or any member of the press is doing it, or the electronic media. What I am suggest-

ing is most of us, if not all of us, are in the dark on this and do not fully appreciate what it means. And it just stikes me that the more we get this information out, and the more we understand the full seriousness of it, the greater the chances that we will not only do things, but support measures that are already ongoing, and strengthen those efforts so that we can, in fact, deal with this form of modern warfare that the Soviet Union is so much engaged in.

Mr. WALKER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUNGREN. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. Just to emphasize the gentleman's point, a lot of the American people have heard in recent days Navy officials talking about the tremendous damage that was done to our military by the espionage that was carried out on by a number of people that I regret to say have been labeled "the Walker ring." But it, I think, is important then to note that in the mind of this Soviet official, despite whatever damage may have been done by espionage, that the disinformation campaign is regarded by the Soviets as being even more important to their long-term interests than that kind of espionage activity.

So the way and the fact that major damage was done by espionage, and then ratchet that up a little bit higher to understand what disinformation does in terms of advancing the Soviet cause, and once again I think it emphasizes again the need for us to have a better understanding of just what is happening.

Mr. LUNGREN. One of the interesting things I have found in looking into this subject is the number of analysts believe that the Soviet Union has really become the first modern state to institutionalize these practices to the extent they have, and to make them a fundamental instrument of state policy. Members of the KGB and the 15,000 or so persons who work in Moscow at Soviet embassies and elsewhere, press agencies and numerous Soviet front organizations, all work in harmony to carry out this effort at the active measures, and to undermine, or in many cases at the same time embarrass the United States.

A State Department report recently revealed that "Soviet active measures have increased significantly in the last 2 years, particularly in the Third World, and in a few instances have resulted in the loss of life." In these campaigns, the United States has been falsely blamed for killing 7,000 persons in Brazil's Amazon Basin through chemical warfare, plotting the assassination of Pope Paul II, firing astronaut Neil Armstrong because he allegedly converted to Islam after hearing the Moslem call to prayer on the Moon, attacking the whole Mosque in Mecca, which touched off an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, placing cruise missiles in South Africa,

planning the Balkanization of India, and using food for political blackmail against that country.

And while these tactics may seem ridiculous, particularly when you talk about the Armstrong incident, they attempt to play on religious hatred, and also political and racial unrest. The phony plan to Balkanize India was circulated just before the nonaligned nations of the world met in India for an international conference. And what is so sad is that this stupid rumor gained so much credibility that it was written about in major papers, and denounced by members of the Indian Parliament before we in the United States had a chance to deny it.

For those who downplay the danger of these tactics, the false story that Americans had attacked the holy Mosque ignited an angry mob which attacked and burned our Embassy, and several Americans died in the riot.

My point is that unfortunately, for decades we certainly have ignored Soviet disinformation campaigns by somehow believing that whistleblowing on the Soviets would only give credibility to their efforts. The deaths in Islamabad and the recent rash of terror aimed at the Americans, all Americans around the world, I think ought to bring us to the realization that all active measures need to be countered to increase the odds of protecting American citizens around the world.

In 1981 an interagency task force suggested that "an information network be put in place to track Soviet active measures, and that a rapid-response system be established so that our Foreign Soviet officials could be given accurate and appropriate guidance to defuse disinformation ploys that might have potentially damaging consequences to our national security."

So I would suggest that the U.S. Information Agency should be commended for its efforts to expose Soviet-inspired campaigns against the United States.

Such examples include this: Quick action by the U.S. Embassy and Austrian officials averted political fallout from a forged letter supposedly written by an ambassador suggesting that Austria compromise its historical military neutrality and join NATO.

It exposed the Soviet-inspired campaign to blame the United States for implicating the Soviets in the Bulgarians' attempted assassination of Pope Paul II by pointing out major defects in a supposedly authentic cable. These mistakes actually were so glaring that the result was adverse Italian press again the Soviets.

So in places where we anticipated what the Soviets might do, immediately found them, and immediately responded, we were able to turn that around.

Some people may say well, what is it you are engaged in, some sort of a game, tit for tat? Unfortunately, there

is a big game being played out there by the Soviet Union which influences people, because they taken it seriously, and at times, we have not taken it seriously.

According to active measures experts Herb Romerstein and Jan Hemming of USIA:

The anatomy of a typical Soviet disinformation campaign often starts in so-called "legitimate" Western papers although sometimes it is "planted" in sympathetic Communist publications. USIA cites the example of the Nov. 1, 1984 Greek newspaper Ethnos which carried a lead story on the front page that the CIA was behind Indira Gandhi's assassination.

According to USIA:

That same day similar reports cropped up in numerous English-speaking dailies in India quoting government and Communist party officials who believed "foreign powers" or U.S. imperialists were behind the Ghandi assassination.

What is fascinating is the next day the same theme was repeated in selected papers throughout Argentina from the extreme left wing daily La Voz to the right wing paper La Prensa. Allegations of U.S. involvement were printed in papers in Nepal and Indonesian papers including the respected Sinar Harapin.

According to USIA, by November 5:

The story line had spread to the Gulf Daily News in Bahrain and appeared in the General-Anzeiger in Bonn and ABC in Spain. The German and Spanish papers—both pro-Western, quoted Pravda which attempted to implicate the CIA in Ghandi's death.

So you have it going from small stories appearing in admittedly Communist papers to somehow gaining currency so it appears in newspapers not only in Third World countries but in pro-Western countries. And it gains some credibility and some currency; and by the time we run it down and deny it, the damage has been done.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUNGREN. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I would like to thank Mr. LUNGREN for organizing this special order, and commend him for attempting to expose and clarify the many shapes and forms that Soviet "active measures" take.

Last month I circulated a "Dear Colleague" entitled "Disinformation Through Revisionist History" which dealt with the tendency of Communist regimes to pervert certain national heroes, historical causes, and important phrases and words in order to influence Western opinion, subvert confidence in Western institutions, and generally to advance Soviet interests. I would like to briefly outline several points in my Dear Colleague, because I believe this is an interesting case study of semantic corruption and disinformation through revisionist history.

Historically, Communist regimes have been adept at disguising the to-

totalitarian nature of their rule by associating national heroes with their cause. This historical disinformation has been exploited to the fullest by the Communist Directorate in Nicaragua which has skillfully associated itself with the Nicaraguan national hero, Augusto Cesar Sandino, in an attempt to lend a certain degree of credibility to their cause.

The Sandinista movement dates back to the early 1920's when Sandino began to build a political movement based upon three fundamental themes: First, sovereignty; second, nationalism; and third, democratic socialism. "Sandinismo," then, is a political movement which can in no way be identified with Marxist-Leninism which is inherently internationalist, totalitarian and atheistic. Sandinismo, on the other hand, is nationalistic, democratic, and religious.

In short, Marxist-Leninism is a view of man and state antithetical to Sandinismo and the two cannot be confused without doing a grave injustice to the goals and intentions of Sandino as well as democratic resistance movements around the world.

With this in mind, it is reasonable—in spite of the efforts of the present Government of Nicaragua to align itself with Sandino—that we no longer refer to the present Government of Nicaragua as the Sandinista National Directorate. To do so is to pervert the true spirit of Sandinismo and the national pride and spirit of Nicaragua. Marxist-Leninism is a political orientation which runs counter to the history and culture of Nicaragua, and our political vocabulary should not be insensitive to this fact.

As Eden Pastora stated on May 24, 1984:

It is not true that the Managua regime is Sandinista. The regime is communist and only communist. Sandinismo is totally opposed to communism because communism is internationalist and Sandinismo is nationalistic. Sandinismo is democratic and communism is totalitarian, Sandinismo is religious and communism does not believe in God. Let us not be confused.

This is, unfortunately, not an isolated case of inaccurate history, but part of a systematic campaign to legitimize the international Communist cause by associating it with folk heroes. The Soviet Union has done this time and time again using artists and poets to lend a certain "folk" credibility to their cause, when in fact these poets and artists would certainly oppose the repressive Soviet regime if they were alive today.

The importance of using the reputations of certain national figures to legitimize the Communist cause was revealed by a leading Stalinist official, Georgi Dimitrov, in 1935. And I quote, "A writer of reputation, or a retired general, are worth more than 500 poor devils who won't know any better than to get themselves beaten up by the police."

Another major weapon of Soviet disinformation by revisionist history is

more subtle, but no less dangerous, and can be called semantic corruption. Semantic corruption is the practice of redefining the meanings of words in order to align them with Marxist-Leninist political objectives.

Semantic corruption may seem to be a trivial exercise, but Soviet leaders have placed an extremely high priority on the power of redefining words. As Stalin himself said, "the most important weapon in my arsenal is the dictionary. Let me choose the words and concepts by which you think, and I will tell you what and how to think."

Examples of semantic corruption abound. Recently, the editors of the Oxford English Dictionary were surprised to find that the definition of socialism had changed from "a theory or policy of social organization * * *" in the British editions, to "a system which is replacing capitalism * * *" in the Soviet version. Likewise, the definition of capitalism in the Soviet version turned out to be, "an economic and social system based on * * * the exploitation of man by man."

In fact, the Soviets pervert the meaning of nearly every important political word or phrase. For example, they make a mockery of the word "democracy" by proclaiming in their constitution that they have the only true and "genuine democracy." Democracy, in the Western sense, connotes a free and pluralist society. Democracy, in the Soviet sense, has nothing to do with freedom or pluralism, but is based upon equality—or better, equality enforced—and requires a strong mechanism with which to enforce democratic equality. Despite the long history of the word "democracy," it has never, by no stretch of the imagination, been defined in such a manner. This is only one of the more obvious examples of semantic corruption which abound in the Soviet vocabulary.

Semantic corruption and disinformation through revisionist history are two of the most powerful Soviet active measures. The only way we can deal with the subtle workings of these two measures is to expose them in discussions such as these. So at this point, I would like to thank Mr. Lungren once again for organizing this session, and hope that they will continue in the future.

□ 2250

Again I want to commend the gentleman from California [Mr. LUNGREN] for his effort and the initiative he has shown in this special order.

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman very much for his comments. I appreciate his comments and I appreciate his being here at this late hour.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, with the mention of the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the assassination attempt on John

Paul, I cannot help but tell the story that I saw recently with regard to the Soviet Union, the story about Chernenko and Gromyko. Supposedly, at one point, Chernenko went to Gromyko and told him, "You got to do something about international time zones." Gromyko was somewhat confused. He said, "Well, why do we have to do something about the international time zones?" Chernenko said, "They are confusing me. They are causing me all kinds of problems and you have to do something about them." Gromyko said, "Well, what kind of problems?" And Chernenko said, "Well, for example, when Indira Gandhi was assassinated I called with my condolences 1 day too late. And when there was an assassination attempt on John Paul II, I called one day too early." I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. Speaker, we all know the story about Grenada, which I refuse to call the invasion, but I call the liberation of Grenada. But it raises an interesting issue for discussion in the context of this special order. Romerstein and Hemming of USIA make an interesting observation. They recently remarked that: "Most Soviet disinformation campaigns take place far from America's shores, but there is now indisputable evidence that disinformation was used in Grenada during the New Jewel movement's seizure and expansion of power. Documents captured by American forces after they secured the island reveal that Grenada was securely in the Communist sphere. Copies of a secret speech delivered by Maurice Bishop, leader of the New Jewel movement, outlined ways in which Washington and the rest of the free world would be deceived into thinking that Grenada had created a moderate government embracing conservative elements within the country."

Romerstein and Hemming stated: "The deception was so effective, that prior to Bishop's last trip to America before his assassination he was coached by the American wife of Cuban Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo, on how to manipulate the American press. Ambassador Rizo is a high-ranking intelligence officer with experience in active measures. Most of Mrs. Rizo's recommendations—including blaming the Reagan administration for bad relations, speaking directly to the American people as their friend through the American press, finding sympathetic forums to express grievances about American treatment of Grenada, and announcing the construction of a modern airport facility to attract American tourists rather than accommodate Russian jets—actually worked. Secret documents found later showed the intended military use of the airport."

In one document, Marshal Ogarkov, chief of staff of the Soviet Armed

Forces, boasted in 1983 to Major Louison, chief of staff of the Grenadian Army, that "over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador."

Mr. Speaker, the citizens of our great country need to know that we sincerely desire peace. The Soviet Union, however, through its intricate propaganda network does make a significant effort to convince the world that the United States supports the nuclear arms race and is thwarting attempts to negotiate a nuclear arms freeze.

What deeply concerns me is the fact that the same Soviet active measures that have been used in Western Europe and elsewhere in the world are also being used here in America.

The Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation released a report—which is unclassified—entitled "Soviet Active Measures Relating to the U.S. Peace Movement" which describes Soviet efforts in the United States. The FBI report states that:

It is extremely difficult to determine the extent to which various organizations and coalitions are being influenced or manipulated by the Soviet Union. An assessment of the effect of the Soviet active measures other U.S. peace movement is particularly difficult because the Soviets have endeavored to capitalize on or manipulate existing sentiments within peace organizations such as the desire for a nuclear freeze, that parallel or tend to promote Soviet propaganda objectives.

As the 1981 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet Active Measures noted: "Whenever a political movement supports policies that coincide with goals or objectives of Soviet foreign policy, the exact contribution of Soviet active measures is impossible to determine objectively."

Mr. Speaker, the point here, however, is we must come to some sort of realization that there does exist an effort to discredit us, to isolate us from our allies, and the rest of the world.

I share the observations of the FBI that the Soviets do not seek a dominant role in the U.S. peace or nuclear freeze movements, or that they seek directly to control or manipulate the movement.

The Soviets do not view control of a movement as a necessary condition for successful active measures. Much of the Soviets efforts are designed to focus public attention on new U.S. weapon systems and policies to create the impression that they are the more interested party to serious arms control negotiations and disarmament negotiations.

Mr. Speaker, the American public must understand that the Soviet Union does attempt to manipulate the sentiments of the Western desire for peace. They do so with the use of the Soviet worldwide propaganda apparatus, international fronts and local

Communist parties, and trusted contracts and agents.

□ 2300

Mr. Speaker, we have many, many examples of what the Soviets have done over the last number of years. Perhaps one of the most egregious efforts that they made to try and disinform the rest of the world was their response to the shoot down of the KAL 007 in 1983, and as we remember, there were a number of Americans aboard that flight, including one of our colleagues in the House, the Congressman from Georgia.

The first Soviet response to news of the shoot-down was simple disinformation. Tass reported September 2, 1983:

"... on the night of August 31 to September 1 this year, an unidentified plane rudely violated the Soviet state border and intruded deep into the Soviet Union's air space...."

In violation of international regulations, the plane flew without navigation lights, did not react to radio signals of the Soviet dispatcher services and itself made no attempts to establish such communication contact...."

Soon after this the intruder plane left the limits of Soviet air space and continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan. For about ten minutes it was within the observation zone of radio location means, after which it could be observed no more."

The U.S. response was to release the tape of the Soviet interceptor pilots radio transmissions which showed that the plane had navigational lights, even the strobe lights used by civilian aircraft (spy planes are painted black). In addition the Soviets had shot the plane down. The Soviet transmissions included:

1821:35 Su-15 (805): The target's (strobe) light is blinking,

* * * * *
1825:11 Su-15 (805): I am closing on the target, am in lock-on. Distance to target is 8 (kilometers).

* * * * *
1826:20 Su-15 (805): I have executed the launch.

1826:22 Su-15 (805): The target is destroyed.

1826:27 Su-15 (805): I am breaking off attack.

On September 9 Marshal Ogarkov, then Soviet Chief of Staff admitted that the Soviets had shot down the plane.

He told a press conference in Moscow:

The order to terminate the flight was issued at 06.24 local time over the Soviet Union's territory in the area of Pravda settlement on the southwest coast of the island of Sakhalin. The order was fulfilled over the Soviet territory.

After that the intruder plane continued a descending flight for some time, and then radar aids lost contact with it and could observe it no longer.

The Soviet air defense systems, acted strictly in accordance with the Law of the State Border of the USSR. The decision to terminate the flight was taken by the command of the air defense district.

From the start the Soviets have claimed that KAL was a spy plane.

For example, Moscow television broadcast on September 8, 1983, that—

It has been irrefutably proven that the flight of the South Korean liner was a reconnaissance one. The aircraft was crammed with the appropriate apparatus.

This, of course, was false. The Soviets had shot down a KAL plane in 1978. When the Soviets recovered the aircraft, it did not have any spy gear on board.

Soviet propagandists and KGB assets in non-Communist countries continued to repeat the false story that KAL was a spy flight.

An example is Akira Yamada, in Japan, who uses the pen name Akeo Yamakawa. Former KGB officer Levchenko has identified him as a KGB agent. Yamada has repeated the false story that KAL was a spy plane in articles for legitimate Japanese publications.

Just one example, and an outrageous example, of where the Soviets, of course, when caught with what they had done, first denied it and then tried a disinformation campaign in which they made statements which on their face appeared to be very silly, but then they had those who seemed to write their line on a continual basis actually writing articles for publication in legitimate publications in other countries outside the Soviet Union.

Mr. Speaker, I would just suggest that the American people need to know far more about what the Soviet Union is doing with respect to the full panoply of active measures. It is, in fact, an effective means that they are using; it is one that we are attempting to respond to, albeit slowly at times and without sufficient resources, and it is one that should be kept uppermost in the minds of many of our elected officials when they have to make the very difficult decision about ensuring the finances for our intelligence communities, and not just so that we can get this information and analyze it, but that we can do it in a timely fashion, not only for internal research and internal filing for intelligence purposes, but for an external response and a timely external response by ourselves.

Because often, it is the timeliness of the response which will really determine whether or not the Soviets are effective in the active measures that they have utilized.

I would just like to say, Mr. Speaker, that a number of different Members have sought time to take during my special order. Because of the lateness of the hour, they have entered their statements in the RECORD, and I would just hope that my other colleagues would take the time to look at the prepared and well-researched statements that will appear in the RECORD along with this special order, so that we can all become a little better informed as to what it is the Soviet Union is up to, how well organized they are, how extensive their apparatus is for utilizing

this information, and the necessity of our response, the necessity of the maintenance of our response and the necessity of us to do far more, so that we can have a more effective response in the future.

● Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, let me first say that I greatly appreciate the gentleman from California reserving time this evening to discuss Soviet active measures. Surely, there has been too little published in open sources on this topic to date. Yet, Soviet efforts in this regard are known to be massive and increasing. It is incumbent upon this body to pass on our knowledge of these activities to our constituents and, indeed, to the people throughout the free world. For the stakes in this deadly game are quite high. The future security and stability of the free nations depends upon our ability to recognize and combat this growing menace. Again, let me congratulate the gentleman on his initiative.

Mr. Speaker, Soviet active measures pose a serious threat to the security and well-being of the United States, our allies and other non-Communist nations and undermine our combined efforts to defend ourselves against Communist-inspired overt aggression and political warfare. Such activities fly in the face of repeated assertions from Soviet leaders and spokesmen that it is the Soviet Union which yearns for world peace and that theirs is the side most desirous of the return of détente. Of course, we have seen in Afghanistan, the Baltic States, Eastern Europe, and in other countries and other regions of the globe what peace on the Soviet's terms has wrought. It is, therefore, vital for free people everywhere to study and understand these active measures, and recognize that they are part of a systematic attempt by the Soviets and their proxies to subvert and undermine our ability and resolve to respond to Communist aggressive intentions and actions. The Soviets hope to achieve their objectives through the use of false or misleading information and propaganda; the distribution of inaccurate or fabricated stories—including the use of forgeries—in the Western and other media; the use of front organizations; political influence operations; and a host of additional tactics.

Let me turn for a moment, Mr. Speaker, to how some analysts have described the goals and importance of Soviet active measures. Charles Sorrels authored an excellent expose for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] on the "Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against NATO." He views the Soviet's long-term goals in pursuing active measures as follows:

One, to influence American as well as world opinion against U.S. national security policies and programs that are perceived as threatening to Soviet objectives—such as the domination of Western Europe.

Two, to portray the United States as an aggressive "Imperialist" power which, unlike the Soviet Union, is an obstacle to maintaining peace or making progress in arms control negotiations.

Three, to isolate the United States from its allies and friends and to discredit governments and political leaders that cooperate with it and support it.

Four, to create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

Five, to undermine the political resolve of the United States and other Western Nations to protect their interests against Soviet encroachments.

The common thread that runs through all active measures is a high degree of manipulation and misrepresentation, whether to disguise Soviet involvement in a particular activity or to conceal the real purpose behind an activity in which a Soviet element is overtly involved.

According to testimony from deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], John McMahon, during a House permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on this topic in July 1982:

Active measures are in essence an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy. They contribute effectively to the strategic Soviet purpose, central to Soviet foreign policy, of extending Moscow's influence and power throughout the world. The primary target of Soviet active measures is the United States, which the Soviet Union has long regarded as its main opponent and the principal obstacle to carrying out its policies. The Soviet regime generously provides the financial, technical and personnel resources necessary to support active measures operations . . . the basic aims of active measure operations are to weaken the opponents of the U.S.S.R. and to create a favorable environment for advancing Moscow's views and international objectives worldwide.

Finally, Richard Shultz and Roy Godson have written perhaps the most authoritative exposé on Soviet active measures, entitled, "Dezinformatsia." They argue that:

For the Soviet Union, active measures constitute a dynamic and integral array of overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries. These measures are employed to influence the policies of other governments, undermine confidence in the leaders and institutions of these states, disrupt the relations between various nations, and discredit and weaken major opponents. This frequently involves attempts to deceive the target, and to distort the targets of perceptions of reality.

Their thorough analysis of Soviet active measures is must reading for all interested students of Soviet political warfare and operations against the West and the United States in particular.

I would like to request unanimous consent at this point, Mr. Speaker, to include extraneous matter following my remarks as they appear in the RECORD of today's proceedings. Among this information are declassified CIA

studies on trends in Soviet active measures and additional reports and analyses of forgeries which have surfaced in Western Europe and elsewhere, all designed to disrupt U.S. relations with our friends and allies.

The Soviet active measures campaign is not new, Mr. Speaker. Propaganda, for example, played a key role in Lenin's earliest attempts to discredit the existing regime, by the publication of "Iskra" (The Spark)—a newspaper that according to Lenin would "blow every spark of class struggle and popular indignation into a general conflagration." As noted by Shultz and Godson, the Bolsheviks were able to seize power from the provisional government largely by a combination of propaganda and political influence techniques, in addition to the use of armed force. Current Soviet active measures techniques, they argue, are, therefore, "a logical outgrowth of the Bolshevik struggle for power, especially during the period between the two revolutions of 1917." The Bolsheviks also used active measures to discredit emigre groups in France and throughout Europe.

Given the Soviets' historical affinity for using this foreign policy tool, it is not surprising, say Shultz and Godson, that:

After the Bolshevik revolution first Lenin and then Stalin applied these measures not only against the remnants of non-Communist forces in the new Soviet state, but also against rival factions in the Communist Party, Soviet Union [CPSU]. The campaigns against Trotsky—who has dubbed first a "Menshevik," then an enemy of the Soviet state, and finally an outright Nazi German and Japanese agent—serve as good examples.

After World War II, the Soviets set up a disinformation unit, called Department D, within the first chief directorate of the KGB. Department D's title was subsequently changed to the Active Measures Department. Today's KGB active measures service is headed by a KGB officer of general rank, and is directed and overseen by the ruling Politburo itself.

Thus we can see, Mr. Speaker, that political warfare is an important and indeed integral part of Soviet foreign policy. They seek to exploit opportunities for creating tensions between us and our allies and create problems where in fact none exist. They willfully acknowledge, however, that the "war of ideas" between East and West is ongoing and that Marxist-Leninist ideology is the philosophical foundation upon which the struggle between capitalism and communism is based. There is an ideology with a world view, a purpose—that is to unite men of all nations and in all regions under the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

We have seen, however, Soviet-style communism in practice. We have seen the tremendous inequities between an analytical view of Marxist theory and the ideology in practice. We have seen the gulags, the prison camps, the

forced famines, the secret police, the refuseniks, the suffering and the hardships and many of the other, less attractive aspects of Soviet-style communism. We know that Marx's visions have led some leaders to turn whole countries into vast prison camps. Those Russian leaders who picked up on Marx's writings and created this century's second totalitarian, expansionist European power are the same leaders who turned to active measures in the early 1920's in an attempt to insure their own political survival and the extinction of other groups vying for power following the demise of the provisional government. Active measures are by no means a new addition to the mighty Soviet arsenal.

Now, I wish to turn to one aspect of Soviet active measures or "aktivnyye meropriyatiya" in Soviet parlance—that is, disinformation. Of course, disinformation is only one component of the overall Soviet active measures campaign, but it certainly deserves our attention here today. Let me briefly discuss the two types of disinformation and then summarize my remarks.

As stated, there are in fact two types of disinformation: One is tactical disinformation, the other is strategic disinformation. Tactical disinformation is designed primarily to confuse the enemy about Soviet political, economic, and military capabilities; for example, the number of Soviet tanks facing Western Europe, the number of independently targetable nuclear warheads on a particular sea-launched ballistic missile or even the level of shortfall in the annual wheat harvest. This type of disinformation seeks to persuade the enemy that Soviet capabilities or performance are different from those projected or actually in existence. Another example of Soviet tactical disinformation can be seen in the Soviets' recent negotiating behavior in the mutual and balanced force reduction [MBFR] talks on European security. There, the Soviets consistently misrepresented and underestimated Warsaw Pact troop strength levels by a huge number, around 150,000 to 180,000 men. The Soviets know the figure they have proffered is inaccurate, and they know that we know it is inaccurate. And, yet, they have stood by this figure in an attempt to mislead the United States about the danger we confront. Needless to say, the United States has seen through this relatively ineffective smokescreen.

The second type of disinformation is of greater concern to long-term U.S. national security. That is, namely, the masking of real Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the United States and the West through strategic disinformation.

Due to the closed nature of Soviet society, the West knows very little about how foreign policy is formulated in the councils of the Kremlin. Given this lack of solid information, we are often left without specific knowledge about true Soviet intentions or motives underlying certain policy deci-

sions or actions. This lack of knowledge could lead to a dangerous escalation of conflict during periods of increased tensions or outright hostility due to false analysis of Soviet intentions on the part of U.S. decision-makers. The possibility of such a scenario certainly cannot be ruled out. The likelihood of such an occurrence is increased by Soviet strategic deception and disinformation.

Let us look at a specific example of Soviet strategic disinformation and deception. Détente, for example, was viewed by many in this country as a mutual, viable policy whereby East and West would both lessen their hostile rhetoric and cease those activities deemed especially threatening by the other party. Certainly, the United States kept up its end of the bargain. We abandoned Vietnam, drastically curtailed arms expenditures, deployed no new strategic nuclear weapons systems and initiated a policy of trade and aid designed to wean the Soviets and their proxies away from committing acts which we would consider dangerous and provocative. Leaders in this country and Western Europe looked to détente as an opportunity to make genuine progress in arms control, trade, cultural exchanges, emigration, et cetera. We yearned for a relaxation of tensions and eagerly accepted CPSU chief Brezhnev's word that the Soviets, too, sought only peaceful relations with the West and expanded cooperation and trade.

Yet, the grandiose expectations regarding détente proved illusory. The Soviet continued to brutally repress their people and the people of Eastern Europe, they embarked on a massive nuclear and conventional arms buildup—as yet unmatched in the annals of history—almost 100,000 Soviet Red Army troops rolled across the border into Afghanistan, and Soviet proxies helped trench repressive regimes and advance Soviet interests in virtually every region of every continent, including our own Western Hemisphere. In a word, détente was a hoax perpetrated against an unwitting and susceptible America.

According to Leonard Shapiro, in an article entitled "Totalitarianism In Foreign Policy":

The use of overwhelming military presence and the maximum espionage and subversion presence are part of what has always been described in Soviet terminology as "ideological struggle," which is repeatedly asserted as the necessary concomitant of "peaceful coexistence." . . . In essence, this view is the logical implementation of Lenin's policy of combining trade and correct diplomatic relations, on the one hand, with subversion and political warfare, on the other.

The Soviets' ability to mislead the United States about its true motives and intentions vis-a-vis the United States and the West, through strategic disinformation and deception, is dangerous and needs to be understood and corrected.

Soviet active measures have the potential to greatly affect our relations with our friends and allies across the globe. I trust our discussions today have shed some light on the Soviets' behavior and perhaps, just perhaps, increased the likelihood of a favorable United States response to this very real and increasing component of the Soviets' ongoing political warfare campaign being waged against the West.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

(Following is an address by William E. Knepper, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, May 30, 1984.)

I'm delighted to be here and appreciate this opportunity to help shed some light on one of the aspects of Soviet clandestine activities which attempt to influence world public opinion. One of the activities that falls within the purview of my new responsibilities has been an interagency working group on Soviet active measures. To us "active measures" means unorthodox and covert Soviet and Soviet-bloc efforts to affect political attitudes and influence public opinion in the noncommunist world. State chairs the group which includes representatives from several agencies including the Defense Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Information Agency. Among its several responsibilities, the group is charged with identifying forged documents prepared by Soviet KGB [Committee for State Security] operatives or the closely coordinated East European or Cuban intelligence services.

Our Embassies abroad have as a priority requirement reporting likely forgeries that may appear in the press or be circulated privately among influential foreign leaders and opinionmakers. Our active measures working group meets every other week to review the "surfacing" of possible forgeries any place in the world. Confirmed forgeries are officially denied and publicly exposed in discussions such as this one.

Larry Eagleburger, who retired May 7 as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs—the highest ranking position then held by a career officer in the State Department—wrote in a recent article:

Soviet Active Measures need to be countered by public exposure. They are infections that thrive only in darkness, and sunlight is the best antiseptic. Governments should make available to their publics as much as possible of our growing knowledge of Soviet practices.

OVERVIEW

Before we see some examples of forgeries, let's look behind the cloak of secrecy with which the Soviets seek to shroud their intelligence operations.

The term "active measures" itself is a literal translation from the Russian *aktivnyye meropriyatiya*. That's the name of the organization in the KGB's First Chief Directorate responsible for worldwide direction of these activities. As the Soviets use the concept, active measures encompass a wide range of practices, including disinformation, manipulating the media in foreign countries, the use of communist parties and communist front groups, and other operations to expand Soviet political influence. Unlike overt Soviet diplomatic and informational efforts, active measures usually involve an element of deception and frequently employ clandestine means to mask Moscow's involvement.

Intelligence operations and propaganda can be grouped in three categories; white, black, and gray. White refers to openly acknowledged government positions, policies, and statements. Black operations are supposedly never officially acknowledged or attributed. Gray affairs fall somewhere in between.

Looking at the whole spectrum of Soviet foreign policy, diplomatic, trade, and informational programs may be considered white or overt activities. The use of procommunist fronts, local communist parties, or traditional media information outlets fall into a gray category. Spreading rumors, planting false stories, surfacing forgeries, and use of agents of influence—collaborators, voluntary or paid—are black or clandestine operations. Active measures thus involve either gray or black operations, depending on the specific circumstances. Characteristic of Soviet active measures is their wide scope, geographic spread, and persistence over time, as well as the frequent use of fabricated documents to underpin disinformation operations.

As a policy tool active measures trace back to the 1920s when the Soviets sought to discredit emigre groups in Western Europe, particularly in France, by spreading disinformation. They also lured emigre activists back to Russia through various subterfuges. Some of you may have watched last fall on PBS the 10-part series, "Reilly, Ace of Spies." A character in the series was lured back to his death in Russia by a supposed exile organization, "The Trust," which was in reality a KGB black operation. Even before the 1917 revolution, the tsarist secret police employed similar deception techniques. They used agents abroad not only to collect intelligence but also to sow dissent among emigre groups of that era. They also gave covert subsidies to selected journals to stimulate a better press for imperial Russia.

After World War II, the Soviets institutionalized these activities. They established a disinformation unit—Department D—within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, the Soviet overseas intelligence arm. In the 1960s, the term "active measures" first appeared when the Soviet changed the name of Department D to the Active Measures Department. The switch conveyed that the scope of the department's activities was far broader than mere dissemination of false stories in the press or floating forged documents.

Some of our best information on Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence operations is provided by defectors. In 1968 the one-time chief of the disinformation section of Czechoslovak intelligence, Ladislav Bittman, defected and has provided unusual insights into active measures operations. Bittman recounts that one of the main aims of Czech activities was to brand West German officials as Nazis. But he was also involved in anti-U.S. operations taking place as far afield as Indonesia and Central Africa.

Bittman's experience underscores the close cooperation between the Soviets and satellite intelligence services. Indeed, it is often difficult to know whether the Soviets or one of their surrogates are implementing an operation. Since their overall purpose is the same, the difficulty in differentiating a Russian from an East German or Cuban effort is an interesting challenge but not really significant.

In the mid-1970s, the KGB active measures department was upgraded to a "service," a further indication of the importance the Soviet leadership attached to active measures. This change meant that the chief of the service would have KGB general officer rank. The timing of the shift in the mid-1970s suggests a connection with Soviet dis-

appointment with the fruits of detente—during which time forgeries had fallen off sharply. It indicated renewed willingness to employ deception techniques on a larger scale in support of Soviet aims. Reflective of this, the Carter Administration was targeted with an upsurge of active measures, frequently involving fake U.S. documents. These were particularly directed against the U.S. Egyptian relationship and the Camp David process.

Organizationally, the KGB Active Measures Service has the primary role of backstopping foreign active measures operations, which are directed in general terms at the Politburo level—the summit of the Soviet hierarchy. The service is organized along functional and geographic lines with roughly half a dozen departments. It is believed to employ directly about 300 people. They monitor ongoing active measures around the world; process proposals for new operations; maintain liaison on active measures with KGB regional and country desks and with overseas operations; and provide technical support for operations through preparation of forgeries and fabrications, translation of documents, and printing and publication of materials.

Our best view under the Soviet cloak of secrecy has been provided by Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB major and active measures specialist who defected to the United States in 1979 while working as a "journalist" in Japan. At the time of this defection, Levchenko was acting chief of the active measures section of the KGB "residency" in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. He supervised five case officers or KGB operatives. They, in turn, ran a string of 25 agents of Japanese or third-country nationalities. Levchenko was sentenced to death by a Soviet military tribunal meeting in secret in August 1981. He has declared open opposition to what he views as "... the corrupt Soviet system. 'The Soviets are preventing his wife and teenage son from joining him in the United States.

According to Levchenko, KGB "residencies" or foreign stations operating under diplomatic cover in Soviet Embassies or missions consider active measures part of their core operational work, along with espionage. Residencies submit proposals for new active measures and assessments of old activities in the annual plan sent to Moscow every December. Residencies can take the initiative in proposing new operations to take advantage of perceived opportunities at any time during the year. Final approval, however, rests with KGB headquarters as approved by the Politburo. Moscow can, of course, instruct residencies to undertake active measures at any time.

Most official or quasi-official Soviet representatives abroad are likely to be involved from time to time in active measures. Even Soviet scholars, journalists, and representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, who are often accepted abroad as legitimate counterparts by their non-Soviet colleagues, also often engage in these types of active measures. Unlike their free-world counterparts, they often must play a dual role. Their legitimate academic or other pursuits sometimes play a subsidiary role to their political activities on behalf of the Kremlin. They are required to obey instructions from the bodies which plan and control Soviet active measures.

While the specifics of active measures vary widely, Levchenko stresses that all are specifically designed to reinforce Soviet policy objectives in a particular country or region. The United States and NATO are the Soviet Union's principal worldwide targets. However, as Major Levchenko's activi-

ties in Japan show, other countries are also on the receiving end of active measures.

When Levchenko defected, he was ostensibly working as a correspondent for the Soviet news magazine, *New Times*. He found cover as a journalist to be especially useful for active measures operations, since it provided broader access than more traditional diplomatic cover.

Ideally, the KGB seeks publication of disinformation in reputable noncommunist media. The Soviet press then replays the story, citing credible sources. It may also be replayed elsewhere, for example by wire services or others unaware that they are repeating disinformation. Sometimes the KGB runs disinformation in pro-Soviet news outlets. This is in the hope that the phony story will gain acceptance through frequent repetition, even though the initial surfacing vehicle lacks credibility.

Spreading rumors is perhaps the crudest form of active measures. This was done on a considerable scale by both the Axis and the Allied nations in World War II. In recent years, there are indications that the Soviets may have resumed the practice. In 1979 after the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by religious fanatics, U.S. Embassies picked up numerous reports that the Soviets were falsely spreading the word to Arab contacts that the United States was implicated. Levchenko told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that he personally participated in several operations to spread rumors in Japan directed against the People's Republic of China. One such effort was to suggest secret collusion on nuclear matters between the Chinese and the Italians.

FORGERIES

Many disinformation operations gain acceptance by showing tangible "proof." Fabricated documents and forgeries are provided as "evidence." In some cases a Soviet role in manufacturing these documents may be uncovered by content and forensic analyses of the document, the method of surfacing, the relative level of sophistication of the forgery, or its nearly instantaneous replay by the Soviet media. While it is not entirely clear why the Soviets have made forgeries such a specialty, the fake U.S. Government document has become a postwar hallmark of Soviet disinformation operations. In 1961 then CIA Assistant Director Richard Helms told the Senate Judiciary Committee that some 32 forgeries of U.S. Government documents had been uncovered during the preceding 4 years. These ranged from fake high-level plans on Middle East policy, involving Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and then New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, to false Pentagon documents alleging that most U.S. strategic bomber pilots were medical wrecks.

Nineteen years later in February 1980, John McMahon, a successor to Helms as chief of the CIA's clandestine service, told the House Intelligence Committee a similar tale of fabricated U.S. Government documents. He provided background on the renewed Soviet surfacing of forgeries following the establishment of the Active Measures Service in the mid-1970s. McMahon elaborated on some two dozen forgeries, such as a series intended to create frictions in U.S.-Egyptian relations.

Since 1980, the KGB forgery curve has continued to rise. According to CIA testimony before the House Intelligence Committee in 1982, and our own State Department reports on Soviet active measures, 4 forgeries surfaced in 1980, 7 in 1981, 9 in 1982, and 12 in 1983—or over 30 since 1980. In addition,

several earlier forgeries have been purposefully resurfaced a number of times.

The technical quality of recent forgeries has improved over earlier KGB products. The formatting is on the whole good, certainly sufficient to deceive those unfamiliar with U.S. Government documents. There are, however, almost always some discrepancies and mistakes. It is difficult for an outsider to duplicate U.S. Government documents with total accuracy, given the frequent changes in form and procedures. (It's even difficult for us insiders to do it "by the book"—skilled secretaries and word processors are highly prized.) While the American English in most forged documents is colloquial, there are occasional linguistic flaws, use of stilted language or of British rather than American phrases or spelling. In some instances, literal translations expose the likely Soviet authorship. In a fake U.S. document that was surfaced in Nigeria, the term "wet affair" was used to describe a proposed assassination. "Wet affair" is the euphemism in the Soviet intelligence lexicon for "assassination." In a letter from the New Orleans-based aviation personnel agency to the South African Air Force chief, the term "competent bodies" is used. "Competent bodies" is the way the Soviets describe their security services.

In contrast to the 1950s when the Soviets were often satisfied with surfacing forgeries in the communist press, in recent years the KGB has sought publication in noncommunist media. When successful, this enhances the credibility of the disinformation operation and provides more believable sourcing for replay by communist media. A number of respected noncommunist journals have been victimized by fabrications during the past 2 years.

The Soviets sometimes surface forgeries through blind mailings sent to newsmen with no return address or other indication of the sender's identity. This is a random affair since most serious media outlets will either reject an anonymously sent document or, at the least, check before printing. The Soviets also use journalists working as KGB agents of influence to surface disinformation. They also try to plant fakes with newsmen either gullible or unprofessional enough to accept the authenticity of a document without checking.

Some fabrications are circulated privately and do not seem intended for publication in the media. This method prevents the alleged author from finding out about the forgery and thus is unable to publicly deny the document's authenticity.

Many fabrications never attain uncritical publication or surface only in communist or procommunist journals; still, forgeries are one of the most popular tools of disinformation. One reason forgeries are so frequently used is the difficulty in rebutting them effectively. The United States or other offended parties can forcefully deny fabrications. However, once published, a story frequently assumes a life of its own. Either the denial does not catch up with the original false report or a few people are willing to believe the story simply because it is in print.

Now let's review several examples of forgeries that dovetail with Soviet propaganda themes.

Probably the most enduring set of forgeries are the so-called Holocaust papers, designed to create tension between the United States and European allies. This is a collection of altered and authentic U.S. war plans that date from the early 1960s. The papers allege that the United States would sacrifice Western Europe by nuclear bombing strikes during a prospective world war II to save the continental United States. The papers

surfaced initially in a Norwegian magazine in 1967. More recently, they were the subject of questions in the town council of Graz, Austria, in December 1982. At least 20 separate surfacings have been identified.

The Soviets received at least some of the authentic documents from an espionage agent, a U.S. Army sergeant. The sergeant was stationed in Paris as a military courier in the early 1960s. In 1965 he was tried and convicted of espionage and given 25 years in prison. He passed a wide variety of U.S. documents to the Soviets, some of which still occasionally appear in altered form.

In November 1981 an attempt was made in Madrid to surface a forged letter from President Reagan to the King of Spain. The forgery was technically well done with the correct White House stationery and transcript. In terms intended to offend Spanish sensitivities, the letter urged the King both to join NATO and to crack down on groups such as the "Opus Dei pacifists" and the "left wing opposition."

After an initial blind mailing to Spanish journalists failed to obtain publication, the forgery was circulated on November 11 to all delegations (except the U.S. and Spanish) to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) then meeting in Madrid. This time several Madrid newspapers ran stories that exposed the letter as a fabrication, probably of Soviet origin.

This forgery of an alleged June 1979 letter from then NATO Commander Alexander Haig to NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns surfaced in April 1982. The letter discusses a possible nuclear first strike and calls for "... action of a sensitive nature to jolt the faint hearted." The letter is intended to stimulate the nuclear disarmament campaign by suggesting a Haig-Luns collusion against opponents of the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe. Technically, the quality is good but does include mistakes, such as inappropriate stationery and also the "Dear Joseph" greeting instead of the "Dear Joe" habitually used by General Haig. The forgery was surfaced in a leftist Belgian weekly and reported to Belgian television and radio. Its appearance coincided with numerous antinuclear demonstrations in the spring of 1982.

In January 1982, a forged letter and an accompanying research analysis dated September 23, 1981, from Judge William Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns, was surfaced in Athens. This forgery indicated U.S. support for the conservatives in the October Greek elections. It alluded to a possible military coup if socialist leader Andreas Papandreou won at the polls (as he did). On the basis of Embassy assurances that the letter was a fake, it was not initially published. Several weeks later, after copies had been circulated at the CSCE in Madrid, a small Athens daily published it. However, the daily described the letter as of doubtful authenticity and probably attributable to a "third-country" intelligence service.

Two faked 1982 telegrams were allegedly from the U.S. Embassy in Rome. They depict the Italian investigation of a possible Bulgarian connection in the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II as a campaign orchestrated by the United States. The forgery appeared in a leftist Rome newsweekly in late July 1983. The cables are cleverly done and read much like State Department cables. An exception is the use of the term "spynest Sofia" and various technical formatting errors. The fabrication apparently was designed to provide "credible evidence" for Soviet media allegations that the United States had orchestrated the arrest of the Bulgarian intelligence officer,

Antonov, as part of an effort to blame the Soviets and Bulgarians for the papal assassination attempt.

Another active measure alleging military cooperation with South Africa is a forged letter from the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency, addressed to a Lt. Gen. Dutton, South African Defense Force. This purports to be a positive reply to a South African request for satellite-produced maps and charts of Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. Let me point out that Lt. Gen. Dutton has not held a command in the South African forces for years. There are many other features about this letter which indicate that the Defense Mapping Agency would never have written it, such as curious and ungrammatical punctuations—even for U.S. Government bureaucrat. The word "concretize" is used, which is similar to a Russian word in general usage.

Jeune Afrique, an influential French-language newsweekly published in Paris and widely read in Francophone Africa, reported on November 17, 1982, that despite the U.S. embargo on arms sales to South Africa, Northrop Aviation was offering to sell South Africa its new Tigershark fighter. To "prove" the point, Jeune Afrique published a picture of a letter ostensibly sent by Northrop's vice president for marketing to the commander of the South African Air Force. When Northrop called the letter a fake, Jeune Afrique ran a new story on January 19, 1983, suggesting that the denial was untrue and the original letter was authentic.

In this case, the perpetrator of the active measure apparently obtained a copy of a genuine letter that Northrop had routinely sent to many countries, but not to South Africa, and simply typed in the South African addressee. The purpose of this active measure was to suggest that the U.S. embargo on military sales to South Africa was a sham. The envelope also had a 20¢ stamp—not enough to reach South Africa.

In Lima, Peru, last year a report surfaced that the United States was planning to sell nuclear-tipped cruise missiles to Chile. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth. The obvious intent was to stir up trouble between Peru and Chile and make the Peruvians suspicious of and antagonistic toward the United States. The report was based on a fake airgram appearing there. The Peruvians quickly realized that an attempt was being made to dupe them, and nearly every newspaper in Lima denounced the report as a forgery, most likely of Soviet inspiration.

IMPACT OF ACTIVE MEASURES

The box score for disinformation and other media influence efforts is mixed. Despite extensive KGB active measures operations, it is hard to perceive any major impact on well-established, non-communist, Western media outlets. Most fabrications or disinformation efforts are able to achieve publication only in obscure journals or in those known for their predilection for the Soviet line. Probably more damaging are repeaters. Even though exposed, through repeated surfacing and occasional uncritical publication, the impression can be created that "where there is smoke, there is fire."

Unfortunately for the United States, the Soviets have had much more success with active measures in the Third World. In Africa and South Asia, in particular, they have probably significantly added to U.S. image problems. Over the years, the KGB and its allies have developed well-established outlets to float disinformation. They also have had considerable success in ar-

ranging for press plants of distorted news stories in Africa.

In gauging the overall impact of active measures, it is important to view it through Soviet, not just American, eyes. The Soviets, as Levchenko points out, take a long-term view. They are not seeking immediate, short-term gains or necessarily a big impact from any one operation. Rather, they regard active measures like pawns in a chess game, able to damage the opponent at the margin. If Dr. Goebbels espoused the technique of the "big lie," the Soviets in active measures operations have more modest aspirations. They take the long-term view and by all accounts appear satisfied that the cumulative impact makes their considerable investment worthwhile.

MOLES WHO BURROW FOR MICROCHIPS

Were it not for a few telltale antennas and a curious whitewashed rooftop coop, the handsome brick edifice in San Francisco's tony Pacific Heights could be easily mistaken for a small, posh hotel. In fact, the owner is the Soviet Union and the occupants are at least 41 Soviet officials. That is an unusually large number of diplomats for a consulate in a medium-size American city, but the Soviets did not come to the Bay Area to stamp tourist visas. About half the consular officials, the FBI estimates, are actually spies.

The Soviets bought the building for its sweeping vistas of the bay, as well as its unobstructed microwave reception. The electronic gadgetry on the roof scans the airwaves and can pluck out conversations when a computer recognizes certain words or phrases. On a clear day, the Soviets can watch Navy aircraft carriers cruising under the Golden Gate Bridge and jets taking off from the Alameda Naval Air Station to the east. But the activity that truly intrigues the Soviets is 40 miles to the south, in Silicon Valley.

There, amid the taco joints and shopping malls, are hundreds of burgeoning high-tech firms that help give the U.S. its essential—but fast shrinking—edge over the Soviets in high-technology equipment. From their high-rent spy nest in San Francisco, KGB agents fan out through the valley, looking for Americans who can be bought and secrets that can be stolen.

Moscow's hunger for high tech has transformed the ancient art of spying. No longer are the Soviets principally interested in the traditional fruits of espionage—the enemy's order of battle, troop movements and codes—even though, as the Walker case vividly demonstrates, they would dearly like to know the secrets of U.S. antisubmarine warfare. High tech has both raised the stakes and broadened the game. It has made the Silicon Valley microchips as valuable as NATO war plans, and it has made traitors out of civilian engineers as well as Navy code clerks.

Kremlin scientists cannot possibly compete with their U.S. counterparts in the race of microchips and laser beams that have increasingly become the sinews of modern warfare. The Soviets have long been able to build powerful rockets and sturdy tanks, but their home-designed computers are slow and crude. To close the gap, the Soviets have waged a massive and successful campaign to capture America's technological wizardry. Since the late '70s, estimate U.S. intelligence experts, the Soviets have made off with 30,000 pieces of high-tech equipment and 400,000 technical documents. As a result, declares Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, they have cut the U.S. technological lead from ten years to as little as three. For the U.S. and its NATO allies, who rely on brains to beat brawn, on "smart

weapons" to counter the larger Warsaw Pact forces, the high-tech drain is a factor of consequence in the precarious balance of power.

The Reagan Administration has tried to limit the sale of high-tech equipment that can be put to military use and to crack down on the international "technobandits" who purchase or steal for the Soviets what they cannot directly buy. But in an open society that must trade freely with the world, the Reaganites have about as much chance of preventing high-tech secrets from flowing out of the U.S. as they do of stopping cocaine and marijuana from flooding in.

Stealing high-tech secrets is nothing new; the Soviets have been doing it since at least the 1930s, when Communist agents made off with Western inventions like Eastman Kodak's formula for developing color pictures. In the late '40s the Russians even managed to steal atomic secrets. But in the 1960s, as the U.S. outmatched the Kremlin's big missiles with more accurate ones, Soviet spies were ordered by their masters to make high tech their No. 1 target. It is U.S. computer technology that the Soviets truly covet, for the ability to process masses of information in milliseconds is what makes modern weapons so deadly. Says FBI Counter-intelligence Chief Ed O'Malley: "Science and technology is the KGB's largest growth industry."

Détente, with its scientific exchanges and increased East-West trade, was an enormous windfall for the Soviets. Pentagon officials still shake their heads over the guile of Soviet engineers who, as they toured a U.S. aircraft factory during the 1970s, would wear sticky-soled shoes to pick up metal filings. When the U.S. sent young scholars to Moscow to study Slavic languages, the Soviets exchanged "graduate students" who were often middle-age technocrats with a more than academic interest in the microcircuitry. A huge truck factory built in the Soviet Kama region with U.S. financing and know-how, all acquired above-board, was put to work making the army transports that now convoy Soviet troops over the Afghanistan countryside. Far worse, grinding machines that can craft tiny ball-bearings, legally sold to the Soviets by a small Vermont company in 1972, have in the estimate of U.S. intelligence experts saved the Soviets about a decade of R. and D. on improving the accuracy of their ICBMs.

Today many Soviet weapons are reasonable facsimiles if not exact duplicates of American ones. The Soviets AWACS and space shuttles are carbon copies of earlier U.S. models. The Boeing short takeoff and landing (STOL) prototype, a breakthrough aerodynamic design, miraculously appeared just 16 months later as the Soviet AN-72. The SU-15 fighter that shot down the Korean Air Line's Flight 007 two years ago did so with a missile guidance system designed in the U.S. The Soviets do not even attempt to create their own computers anymore: the Kremlin's mainframe RIAD computer is IBM's 360 and 370 series of mainframes, right down to the color of its wires, while the Soviet AGAT personal computer is a copy of the Apple II.

The Soviets decide what to buy or steal by wading through the flood of technical journals and documents freely available in the U.S. Specialized translators at the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) assess some 1.5 million scientific papers a year. A favorite source: *Aviation Week and Space Technology* a trade journal so informative that it is known as "Aviation Leak." Several dozen copies of the magazine are put on a plane to Moscow every week. They are translated in mid-flight.

From such public documents the Kremlin technocrats draw up shopping lists for the KGB and GRU, the chief intelligence directorate of the Soviet military. Last year, for instance, German officials uncovered a secret guide of high-tech items requested by the Kremlin. It was the size of a telephone book. KGB agents, like salesmen with a quota, were required to produce at least four items a year from the list.

The Soviets in the past preferred to wait until the Americans worked the bugs out of a weapons system before stealing it, says retired Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, the former deputy director of the CIA. "They didn't have to worry about competitive bidding, or 'fly before buy' or 'test before buy,' and in three or four years they could have their own version of it in operating forces." But lately the Soviets have become less interested in stealing the finished product than in getting the know-how used to build it. Says a former FBI counterintelligence official: "It's not the cruise missile they want, it's the theory to build it.

"Laser technology," he warns, "is next." Unnerved by the threat of the U.S.'s erecting a space-based nuclear umbrella, the Soviets are beginning to zero in on Star Wars devices. This spring British agents caught two GRU officers trying to steal a laser gyroscope made by British Aerospace that can keep killer satellites precisely in orbit.

Many of the items that Moscow desires in order to modernize its arsenal were developed first in the U.S. for commercial use. "Virtually any high-tech advance can be turned by the Soviets into a military use tomorrow," says former CIA Director Richard Helms. The microcircuitry of some video games can be re-engineered to be guided missiles; industrial pipe and tubing can make stronger tank barrels; drilling equipment can be adapted to produce a better armor-piercing shell.

The Soviets would prefer simply to buy this hardware on the open market. Like any careful consumer, they would prefer reliable warranties and servicing and to be able to order spare parts. U.S. export laws, however, ban the sale of more than 200,000 items that might have military application to East bloc countries. So the Soviets have to steal most of what they want or buy it on the black market.

To satisfy the Kremlin's discriminating high-tech palate, the KGB has more than doubled its presence in the U.S. during the past decade. No longer the cloddish thugs of the late-night movies, many are university graduates with smooth manners and fluent English. They can be spotted anywhere military secrets or high-tech gadgets are to be found: trolling night spots outside U.S. military bases or browsing through the booths at trade fairs.

Their most prized hunting ground is Silicon Valley. There they seek out civilians with secrets and a willingness to sell them. The contact often begins with casual friendship, formed in a trendy bar or at a trade show. The agent, perhaps posing as an East European émigré, tries to get his target—for example, a high-tech engineer who has a security clearance and a large mortgage or heavy alimony payments—into the habit of handing over information. At first the documents are innocuous, such as an in-house phone directory. Gradually, however, the American is caught on a barbed hook. The cultivation of a turncoat can take months and even years, but, says the FBI's O'Malley, "the KGB is very patient." Christopher Boyce, 32, serving a 40-year sentence for spying, sums it up: "The KGB is forever."

High-tech spying can seem relatively innocuous, at least to those predisposed not to

ask too many questions. The Soviets regularly use European middlemen to buy high-tech gadgetry, which itself often seems harmless. "People rationalize," says Herbert Clough, a security consultant. "This little thing can't do any damage. It won't start World War III."

In 1982, Customs officials found the garage of Millie McKee, a divorcee living in the San Francisco suburb of Redwood City, stuffed with high-tech gear. Charged with illegally exporting laser components and sophisticated electronics to Switzerland, where authorities believe it was transhipped to the Soviet Union, McKee was given a six-month work release sentence for making a false statement. She described the crime as "all technical violations," like driving 60 m.p.h. in 55 m.p.h. zones.

"There's been little fear of heavy sentences. It's more often a slap on the wrist," says Robert McDiarmid, a Santa Clara County private investigator who handles high-tech security for industry.

The feds are trying to crack down, however. A bureaucratic struggle between free traders in the Commerce Department and Pentagon officials appalled by high-tech transfer has been resolved by the Reagan Administration in favor of tougher export controls. The military won the right to review export licenses, and has blocked sales like the shipment of machinery to test concrete strength to the Soviets, on the grounds that the equipment could be used to help harden missile silos. Since 1981 the Customs Service's Operation Exodus has stopped at the docks some 4,000 illegal shipments abroad, including crates destined for the Soviet Union full of C-130 transport aircraft parts and satellite scanners. "The Russians are sweating," declares Customs Service Commissioner William von Raab. "They used to be able to carry off all our technology by the truckload. Now we're making them pay more and take longer."

Also work harder. Earlier this month, for instance, the Soviets expanded the definition of "diplomatic pouch" to ship 35 tons of cargo marked embassy "household goods" out of Baltimore harbor without the presence of even a single Customs inspector. Pentagon officials blamed the State Department for naively waving the shipment through and failing to notify the proper Customs officials of the impending Soviet move.

The KGB has set up some 400 dummy corporations in Europe to buy high-tech exports. The Soviets can rely on dozens of unscrupulous Western technobandits eager to cash in on the Kremlin's 500% markups by acting as middlemen. So numerous and willing are the technobandits that the Soviets are able to get three or four bids for a single transaction. A valuable piece of high-tech gadgetry can sail a circuitous route before it "jumps the wall," in Customs agents' parlance, to the East bloc. Last month U.S. marshals arrested Marino Pradetto, 46, the Italian operator of a West German electronics firm who was in California for a trade fair, and charged him with illegal diversion of a powerful VAX II/780 mainframe computer to Czechoslovakia through San Jose, Haiti and Switzerland.

What the Kremlin cannot purchase in the U.S. it can often buy from other countries. In 1979 and 1981, the Soviets bought two huge dry docks from Sweden and Japan, promising to use them only for commercial shipping. They are now tenders for Kiev-class aircraft carriers.

The Reaganauts have leaned hard on U.S. allies to tighten their own export restrictions. The Pentagon is not above threatening to withhold export licenses from Western governments if they are not more care-

ful about the re-export of U.S. technology to the Soviets. Western nations have been resentful of pressure from Washington to restrict exports, suspecting that the real motive is economic protectionism rather than national security. Nonetheless, NATO allies and Japan have agreed to ban the export of particularly sensitive high-tech equipment in return for the U.S.'s easing up on the export of less sophisticated gadgetry the Soviets already possess.

The U.S. cannot afford to clamp down too hard on trade. "An important element of national security is a strong economy," says John McTague, deputy director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. "If you try to stop the release of everything, you may slow down our own industrial growth and do some rather serious harm." Cumbersome licensing procedures mean delay; the vagaries of bureaucracy mean inaction. Businessmen complain, for instance, that Texas Instruments' elementary Speak & Spell game, available at toy stores everywhere, was until recently under export controls because of an embedded microprocessor.

For the Administration, the Kremlin campaign to steal high-tech secrets poses a dilemma. It cannot give the Kremlin carte blanche to buy without endangering security. It cannot simply cut off high tech trade, or the U.S. will lose valuable markets—without really thwarting the Soviets, who always seem to find less scrupulous sellers. Worse, if the U.S. restricts access to scientific information, it will dampen the spirit of innovation that gave the country its high-tech edge in the first place. The only answer, albeit a less than perfect one, appears to be heightened vigilance. If, as the old Government posters warned, loose lips sank ships in the last World War, then loose microchips could launch missiles in the next one.—By Evan Thomas. Reported by Jay Branegan/Washington and Richard Woodbury/Los Angeles.

WHY THE SHIP OF STATE LEAKS

Americans cannot keep a secret. Or so it increasingly seems to frustrated Government officials who decry what retired Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, former deputy director of the CIA, terms the "hemorrhaging" of classified information. The experts have no trouble identifying the reasons: "Too much, too many and too little," says Senator William Roth of Delaware, too much classified information, too many people with security clearances to look at it and too little investigation of those getting the clearances. The Walker case has stirred demands in the national security establishment to patch up the storehouse of Government secrets, but an open society makes the cure elusive.

At least 4.2 million have security clearances, most of them civilians who work for the Pentagon or defense-related industry. About 920,000, including 121 Soviet emigres, have access to classified documents all the way up to top secret. The number of security clearances has increased by more than 40% in the past five years.

As the Walker scandal reverberated last week, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger vowed to cut the numbers back. But he may find the task difficult. During his tour as director of the CIA for the Carter Administration, retired Admiral Stansfield Turner tried to put a freeze on the number of clearances granted. "But the pressure became so intense that after three years I had to relax it," he ruefully admits. "In many cases people kept their clearances just as a matter of prestige."

A multitude of different agencies hand out security clearances, usually after the

most perfunctory record check for convictions and firings. "It's harder to get an American Express card," says Senator Roth. Of the 200,000 clearances requested last year, only about 160 were denied. Christopher Boyce, now serving a 40-year sentence for selling codes to the Soviets that he stole as a low-level clerk at TRW, a CIA contractor, noted that his sister was required to take a polygraph test to get a job at a 7-Eleven convenience store, but that investigators took no notice of his own counterculture life-style before letting him handle some of the nation's most sensitive secrets. Reclearance, mandated every five years for those approved for access to top-secret information, is even more haphazard. The feds currently have a ten-year backlog. During the 15 years Jerry Whitworth is accused of having spied for the Soviet Union, the Navy twice reinstated his clearance to handle top secrets.

Defense contractors and high-tech firms have been notorious for lax security. At TRW, according to Boyce, "security was a joke." He and his co-workers used the code-destruction blender in YRW's ultra-secret "black vault" for mixing banana daiquiris. The Boyce scandal forced TRW to tighten up, and other firms as well are becoming more careful, contend authorities in Silicon Valley.

The military is also lax. Says retired Admiral Clarence Hill: "When I was a sub commander in World War II, we never sent anything over four lines. Everything had to be coded and decoded by hand. Now they think nothing about sending three or four pages, and many of these are being sent just because you can send them." Admits Turner: "There is no question that our entire procedure for handling classified documents in this Government is sloppy." Horror stories abound. Turner recalls that, when CIA Clerk William Kampiles sold a classified manual on satellite surveillance to the Soviets (for \$3,000), the CIA checked and could not find 13 other authorized copies of the same document.

There may just be too many secrets to keep. It has been estimated that there are 19.6 million authorized copies of classified documents. That, of course, does not take into account the photocopier. "The Xerox machine is one of the biggest threats to national security ever devised," says retired Admiral Thomas Moorer. "Even if documents are numbered and accounted for, it is easy to slip one out over lunch and copy it quickly."

Other technological breakthroughs have made secrets harder to keep. Most phone messages now pass through the air-waves rather than over wires, which facilitates interception by the microwave gadgetry atop Soviet consulates and in offices. Sophisticated laser devices can eavesdrop on conversation in a room by picking up the vibrations from the windowpane. The most insecure place to store information is probably a computer. A study by the Department of Defense Computer Security Center in Fort Meade, Md., concluded that only 30 out of about 17,000 DOD computers are even minimally secure against intrusion by clever hackers. Though no one has ever been caught doing it, the mere thought of Soviet intelligence plugging into Defense Department computers, particularly the ones that command the American nuclear arsenal, is the stuff of Hollywood chillers.

The Pentagon this week will announce steps to eliminate leaks, including cutting back on both the number of security clearances and the number of classified documents. "If we don't do these things and do them soon," warns Senator Sam Nunn of

Georgia, "we're going to have a lot more Walker cases in the future." But no one is suggesting the kind of drastic steps that would protect state secrets as securely as they are held, in the Soviet Union. Says John Martin, chief of the Justice Department's Division of Internal Security: "You've got to maintain an open society, or you're no better than your adversaries."—By Evan Thomas. Reported by David Beckwith/Washington

WHERE SPIES ARE SUPERSTARS

Understandably enough, the Walker spy scandal is an occasion for American self-examination and self-criticism. The revelations are being pondered for what they say about how democracy sometimes allows human venality to thrive and vital state secrets to perish. But there is another lesson in the whole shocking, sordid affair. It is a reminder that spying comes naturally to the Soviet Union in a way that is difficult for Americans to understand.

For most in the West, notably including political leaders, spying is deemed necessary largely because everyone does it, but it is relegated to the shadowy sidelines of the more legitimate enterprises of diplomacy and soldiering. Opening each other's mail is a business gentleman pursue only with a certain self-conscious distaste.

Even in fiction, espionage is treated as the dirty little secret of modern international politics. James Bond is good escapist fun, but the world of John le Carré is recognized as the real thing. The bookish, perpetually cuckolded George Smiley is not a hero because he champions Western civilization; rather, he is the melancholy rationalist, penetrating the ingenuity of other people's deceit. He is more honest, and braver in his honesty, than his colleagues. Yes, he fights Karla, his Soviet counterpart, but Smiley also does battle against the corruption of his own organization and society.

No such dark brooding is in order in the Soviet Union. Spies are good guys, pure and simple, as long as they are on the Soviet side. Even in czarist times, secret agents were regarded as legitimate and indispensable protectors of a sprawling empire that was surrounded by hostile forces and infested with political malcontents and agitators. Backward in so many other respects, Russia was precocious in developing a police apparatus. That institution was ready-made for the Bolsheviks, with their militant ideology and their conspiratorial, secretive methods. According to Marxism-Leninism, politics is a continuation of war by other means. Spies are in the front line of that war.

The concept of the security of the Soviet state is sacrosanct in a way roughly comparable to the concept of personal freedom in the West. In Russian, security is *bezopasnost*—the B in KGB. The word literally means "the absence of danger." As a profession, security means vigorously identifying and, whenever possible, eliminating danger.

Hence, in the Soviet Union, the mentality of the spy is part and parcel of the mentality of the commissar and, beyond that, of the citizen. The relationship between an agent and his source, between a secret policeman and his informer, is not only an honorable estate but an essential one.

Secret agents, once their work is done, are lionized in the U.S.S.R. Richard Sorge, a German who spied for Joseph Stalin in Japan during World War II, is honored on a postage stamp. Rudolph Abel, one of the most notorious Soviet agents of the '50s, was awarded the Order of Lenin after he was traded for U-2 Pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962. KGB anniversaries are occasions for rallies and testimonials. "The com-

petent organs," a common euphemism for the intelligence services, make up a kind of superelite. For years it was a basic tenet of Kremlinological wisdom that the head of the KGB was too much distrusted by his comrades ever to become General Secretary of the party. Yuri Andropov disproved that rule of thumb in 1982. He personified the Soviet obsession with security and reverence for the guardians of security.

Anyone caught spying against the Soviet Union is worse than an enemy and deserving of a fate worse than mere execution. After Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in military intelligence, was discovered to be working for the CIA in 1962, he was put to death. The assumption at the time was that he had been shot. Subsequently, however, it was reported that in fact he was hurled alive into a crematorium furnace. Thus, there is a brutal converse of the Soviet Union's adulation of spies who serve its cause around the world.—By Strobe Talbott

● **Mr. COURTER.** Mr. Speaker, my colleague from California, Mr. LUNGREN, has organized a special order of the House for this evening on the subject of Soviet disinformation. The topic is a worthy one, because efforts to disinform are a critical aspect of what Marxist-Leninists call "the war of ideas."

In recent years, Intelligence has uncovered KGB manipulation of an eminent conservative Japanese newspaper, a French journalist who rendered services to Moscow for 20 years, and untold numbers of letters and documents created to discredit NATO and American military officials.

The KGB tried twice to recruit Arnaud de Borchgrave when he was with Newsweek. Other journalists have apparently been more willing. These include the Englishman Ralph Parker, who was a Prague correspondent for the New York Times just before World War II, and Wilfred Burchett, an Australian who feigned independence while writing for newspapers in his country and Europe but in fact worked for North Vietnam, Cuba, and other Communist countries.

There is thus good cause for thanking Mr. LUNGREN for his initiative, and I hope my other colleagues will be present this evening. ●

● **Mr. SOLOMON.** Mr. Speaker, let me first of all thank the gentleman from California for his initiative in calling this special order today. This is not an academic exercise, nor is it a way of passing the time of day with empty and idle speculation. The subject of this special order—the relentless offensive by the Soviet Union to defame, discredit, and, ultimately, defeat the United States and our democratic allies—is the greatest issue facing our country. It concerns the very survival of human dignity, free societies, and democratic institutions throughout the world for our time—and for all time.

Let us not be reluctant or embarrassed to speak the truth. The Soviet Union's ultimate objective is world domination. The pursuit of that objective necessarily entails the elimination of the United States of America as a free country, the only obstacle stand-

ing between Soviet communism and the realization of its perverted goals. As our colleague from Illinois, Mr. HYDE, frequently reminds us, Soviet communism is the greatest assault on the human spirit ever known in recorded history.

Soviet communism is so implacably opposed to the legitimate aspirations of human nature that it can only come into power by violence—and it can only remain in power by force. It's only moral code is a dogmatic promotion of world revolution. How ironic it is that the most reactionary theory of political and social development to ever keep the human spirit in bondage is also the blueprint for global conquest, all the while pretending to be concerned about peace, justice, and liberation. But such is the only way that Soviet communism can justify itself. It cannot and will not present its true face to the world.

But the goals of Soviet communism cannot be advanced by this kind of deception alone. Soviet communism must also lie about those individuals and countries who dare to challenge its claim on the future, those who deny that Soviet communism is the fulfillment of human destiny.

Mr. Speaker, the issue is clear: The war against totalitarianism did not end in 1945 with the defeat of fascism. What happened in 1945 is that the war entered into a different and more complicated phase. The struggle is no less deadly, nor would the consequences of our losing it be any less hideous. It is, however, a phase which is much more subtle—a conflict fought with ideas, diplomacy, and psychological warfare. And the Soviet Union has devoted an inordinate amount of effort and resources for purposes of propaganda—to maintain constant pressure and intimidation on the nations and people of the free world.

It is this particular aspect of our struggle against the Soviet Union that places our country at a peculiar disadvantage. A country whose preeminent characteristics include political pluralism and a free flow of information and ideas simply cannot resort to the deception, manipulation, and distortion that is part and parcel of propaganda warfare. Jean-Francois Revel, in his compelling new book "How Democracies Perish," makes this very point. He analyzes at some length the Soviet disinformation campaign directed against the United States and other Western Democracies. He concludes that we and our allies simply cannot respond in kind to this sort of attack. A propaganda disinformation campaign mounted by a democratic country is bound to fail because it is inherently inconsistent with other democratic values and practices that we profess.

Moreover, the policies of our own Government and those of our allies are subject to the pressures of public opinion, something the Communists know nothing about. It is this aspect

of democracy that caught the attention of Alexis de Tocqueville, the young French nobleman who toured the United States in the 1830's and wrote the prophetic study "Democracy in America." He noted, and I am quoting now, "It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments."

De Tocqueville went on to say, and again I am quoting, that "A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience."

I would add one further point, and that is that, our country is trying to pursue constructive purposes and policies in the world. When our enemy is only concerned with creating chaos and destabilization, our job becomes that much more difficult. The ground rules, so to speak, covering our actions are much more stringent and impose many more limits than does the code governing Soviet behavior.

What then are we to do? Must we concede defeat in the war of ideas and leave the field wide open for the Soviets to exploit? My answer—and the answer of every Member participating in this special order—is an emphatic no! The United States must use every means and opportunity at its disposal to expose Soviet deceit and duplicity. This means pursuing a more positive and forceful approach at the United Nations and other international meetings, instead of listening in benign indifference to the attacks that are made against us there. This means that our Government must be candid with the American people about Soviet treaty violations and about the massive and unwarranted buildup of Soviet military power—an expansion of military power that is consuming over half of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity. This means requiring our allies to contribute their fair share to the defense of the West.

It goes without saying, of course, that the maintenance of our own national security and an effective strategic deterrent are indispensable. In all of our congressional debates about entitlement programs, let us remember that the Constitution mandates national defense, first and foremost, as the protection to which all Americans are entitled. The price of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it.

An effective strategy to counter the Soviet assault on freedom and human dignity necessarily includes a renewal of our belief in the efficacy and goodness of our democratic values and institutions. This means that we have to get off the guilt trip—that we have to quit flagellating ourselves about our lack of perfection. We will never fully live up to the values that we aspire to, but at least we have set a lofty stand-

ard that will continue to serve as an inspiration to ourselves and succeeding generations. The Soviets have no trouble living up—or should I say down—to their standards, which are based on the most bestial instincts that have ever debased human nature.

Finally, our only sure defense is an enlightened and responsible sense of citizenship. The Founding Fathers of this free republic were very outspoken in their belief that the ultimate success or failure of the American experiment in self-government is in the hands of the American people. There is no substitute for civic virtue—the fact that every civil right carries with it a civil responsibility. We, as representatives of the American people, have a unique obligation to serve as examples of the higher duties of citizenship without which a free society cannot survive.

At the same time that Alexis de Tocqueville was touring the United States in the 1830's, a young man from Illinois, a struggling young lawyer, was making the first public speech in a career that would take him from the county court house in Illinois to the White House in Washington. "Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us at a blow?" asked Abraham Lincoln. He answered: "Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined * * * could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years."

Lincoln went on, and I am quoting again, "If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of free men, we must live through all times, or die by suicide."

The "transatlantic military giant" that Abraham Lincoln talked about is a reality in our time. And the doctrine of containment was formulated under President Truman as a means of dealing with this new challenge. I can only conclude my remarks today by quoting the final paragraph in George Kennan's article in the Foreign Affairs Journal that first outlined our policy of containment.

It reads:

The thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude for a providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

Let me just repeat that: Our entire security as a nation is dependent on our pulling ourselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intends us to bear. This is the greatest issue facing each and every American citizen in 1985. We can only live up to this challenge by renewing

our dedication as citizens of this blessed country. With a renewed spirit of patriotism, citizenship, and sacrifice we need not fear the slings and arrows of the Soviet Union. Free men and women will prevail.●

● Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, I wish to commend my distinguished colleague from California [Mr. LUNGREN], for taking the lead on this most important matter. The objective of this special order is to educate ourselves as well as the American people on a special kind of Soviet clandestine activity that is designed to influence public opinion and thereby further Soviet foreign policy objectives.

When it comes to disseminating false information, the Soviets are without peer. Much of the free world, however, did not realize this until not too long ago. In fact, it is probably safe to say that many Americans first learned of this Soviet ruse when they read Spikè, the best selling novel by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss that was published several years ago.

More recently, a book entitled "Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy," authored by Profs. Roy Godson and Richard H. Schultz has served as a definitive source on the subject. Particularly instructive are the two academics' observations regarding covert disinformation which they define as a—

* * * non-attributed or falsely attributed communication, written or oral, containing intentionally false, incomplete, or misleading information (frequently combined with true information), which seeks to deceive, misinform, and/or mislead the target. Either foreign governmental and non-governmental elites, or a foreign mass audience, may comprise the target.

The objective of disinformation is to lead the target to believe in the veracity of the message and consequently to act in the interests of the nation conducting the disinformation operation. This technique may be advanced through rumors, forgeries, manipulative political actions, agents of influence, front organizations, and other means. Until the 1950's, the term *dezinformatsia* was used in some Soviet circles to refer to what Soviet leaders now call "active measures". *Dezinformatsia* currently is used in Moscow to refer to a specific type of active measures technique, here called "disinformation."

Paul B. Henze, a former National Security Council official in the Carter administration and a longtime student of Soviet behavior, has this to say about disinformation:

It is impossible to draw a clear boundary between misinformation and disinformation. The two categories are part of a continuum which in Soviet practice extends from distortion to total falsification, misrepresentation and forgery. All parts of this spectrum are interconnected and consciously manipulated to achieve desired results. Thus false information planted abroad and seemingly originating from sources that have no connection with the USSR or Eastern Europe is fed back into the Soviet propaganda system, cited in the Soviet press as authoritative confirmation of views which the CPSU propagandists want to spread,

and then it is disgorged by TASS and Novosti in their international services. Thus spewed out again into international information channels, it becomes self-confirming. Sometimes the process goes through several cycles. Not only current news, but even scholarly research and intelligence are influenced.

To those familiar with Soviet techniques and objectives, such operations are relatively easy to identify, but often difficult to prove. To accomplish their purposes, Soviet propagandists and KGB operatives do not rely only on the credulity and predisposition to believe of Western and Third World journalists, writers and intellectuals.

They exploit the readiness of reporters to accept cash or other favours in return for doing their bidding. In Soviet usage, *dezinformatsia* means deliberately concocted, falsely attributed or distorted information brought to the surface through ostensibly non-Soviet channels or outlets. Of course, the more legitimate (and unwitting) these are, the better.

Duplicity in the pursuit of objectives is an acknowledged Soviet tactic and has been employed from the earliest days of the Soviet revolution. Lenin, for example, told Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of the CHEKA, the predecessor of the KGB, "Tell them what they want to hear."

Following World War II, the Soviets decided to institutionalize their disinformation activities in a move that underscored the importance they attached to such measures. Specifically, they set up a disinformation component within the KGB directorate responsible for Soviet intelligence activities abroad. By the mid-1970's, this active measures unit had been upgraded to a service and its chief was given the rank of a KGB general officer.

Some of the best insights we have regarding Soviet disinformation activities have been furnished by Soviet and Eastern bloc defectors who were erstwhile intelligence operatives. One of the most important is Ladislav Bittman. In 1968, this former head of a disinformation unit in the Czechoslovak Intelligence service defected to the West and provided much useful information regarding Czech activities to brand West German officials as Nazis. In addition, he told about anti-U.S. activities that he participated in vis-a-vis Indonesia and Central Africa.

Bittman also revealed just how closely the Soviets work with their Communist allies. It is so close, in fact, that it is often difficult to determine who is carrying out an operation.

Circulating rumors may be the oldest and most primitive form of disinformation but it is still used with some degree of effectiveness by the Soviets. Especially informative are the observations of Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB major who specialized in active measures before he defected to the United States in 1979 while pretending to be a Soviet journalist in Japan. Among other things, he indicated that he was involved in rumor spreading operations in Japan that were targeted against the People's Republic of China. Levchenko also pointed out that while the United States

and NATO are the Soviet Union's main targets, other nations have operations directed against them to support Soviet policy objectives.

Forgeries, of course, have played an important role in a number of Soviet disinformation operations. They are sometimes complete falsifications, but they also can be clever alterations of, for instance, genuine documents, photos, or tape recordings. A common ploy is to fake a U.S. Government document.

An interesting fake hit the streets in Western Europe in April 1982. It was a forgery of a reputed June 1979 letter from then NATO Commander Alexander Haig to then NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns. According to William E. Knepper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, this letter was—

Intended to stimulate the nuclear disarmament campaign by suggesting a Haig-Luns collusion against opponents of the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe. Technically, the quality is good but does include mistakes, such as inappropriate stationery and also, the "Dear Joseph" greeting instead of the "Dear Joe" habitually used by General Haig. The forgery was surfaced in a leftist Belgian weekly and reported to Belgian television and radio. Its appearance coincided with numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations in the spring of 1982.

Although it may be true that none of these forgery efforts have had a devastating impact on the United States, there is no doubt that collectively they have been injurious and put us on the defensive. They are clearly intended to raise suspicions about the United States and in that sense they have accomplished their purpose.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I would like to cite what Larry Eagleburger, the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has recommended with respect to coping with the U.S.S.R.'s active measures:

Soviet active measures need to be countered by public exposure. They are infections that thrive only in darkness, and sunlight is the best antiseptic. Governments should make available to their publics as much as possible of our growing knowledge of Soviet practices. ●

● Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the efforts of Soviet intelligence and policy agencies to divert and duplicate U.S. high-technology commodities. My district in coastal southern California stretches from Del Mar in the south to Mission Viejo in the north. That region is rapidly turning into California's southern Silicon Valley. Computer firms, high tech manufacturing companies, semiconductor producers, innovative energy companies, and defense contractors all maintain a highly visible presence in the region. It is these types of companies that are the primary industrial espionage targets for the Soviet Union.

Americans were shocked to learn that John Walker, his son and their family friends betrayed our Nation and sold Navy secrets to the Moscow

government. In fact, there have been many others. In the 1970's, two misguided young men from Palos Verdes, CA, decided that our Government was corrupt and that the Soviet Union offered a better way. Christopher Boyce and Daulton Lee stole secret encryption information from TRW, a major Government contractor, and sold that material to the Soviets through their Embassy in Mexico City.

Boyce's problem was that he believed the propaganda fed to the Western media by the Soviets and their collaborators. The kind of persistent disinformation tactics used by the KGB and other East-bloc intelligence services portrayed the Communist system as a benevolent, humanitarian regime. Conversely, our democratic system was characterized as a cruel deception and an evil imperial force. Those of us who have watched our country grow up, who have participated in the formation of public policy and who have fought in Congress and on the battlefield to prevent the spread of totalitarianism know better. Unfortunately, the unsuspecting minds of our youth absorb many lies that masquerade as the truth. Those lies become the basis for a distorted view of the world—a view the Soviets promote.

Others have also fallen prey to that disinformation and espionage effort. William Bell, a radar engineer in Los Angeles whose personal problems made him a perfect target for the typical Soviet gambit of propaganda and financial incentives, succumbed to the temptation. That engineer and his next-door neighbor, a Polish national, joined forces to sell defense secrets. It just happened that Bell's next-door neighbor was active in the Polish Intelligence Agency.

This story is repeated time and time again. Some of the characters are American and some are European. The end result is the same. American high technology information ends up in the hands of scientists and defense strategists behind the Iron Curtain. Jan Stankovsky, an East-West trade expert at the Vienna Institute for Economic Research was quoted by the Wall Street Journal describing our effort to prevent technology transfer as "a Sisyphus job." We all remember that Sisyphus was condemned to Hades, where his eternal task was to push a boulder up a hill, only to have the boulder roll back down again.

In some respects, our job of restricting the flow of secrets is becoming tougher. American high tech firms are spreading out. As our older industrial base retails with newer machinery and processes, those kinds of products and methods that the Soviets so desperately seek become more available.

Major telecommunications and computer firms have offices and plants not only in the Santa Clara Silicon Valley, but also in Texas' Silicon Gulch, in the Chicago area, in the Raleigh-Durham Research Triangle, in Phoe-

nix and Tucson, the Pacific Northwest, in suburban Boston and in my area. One common theme we see evolving in our high tech industry is the coalition of business and academic institutions.

As state universities and private institutions like Stanford, Harvard, MIT, Duke, and Northwestern participate in industrial innovation, it becomes easier for Soviet scholars to infiltrate our most modern facilities and take our newest technology with them. This is no exaggeration. The average Soviet exchange scholar is a scientist or engineer, has the equivalent of a U.S. Ph.D., is 35 years old and has 8 years of practical experience in their specialty. To quote Air Force magazine, they are "capable scientists usually involved in military related work in the U.S.S.R. Not too surprisingly, they seek out research activities involving technologies that have direct military applications in fields in which the Soviets are deficient."

These techno-thieves do their work in a gray area of American law. Nothing prevents the scientific community from sharing new ideas. When those ideas have military applications, though, the result can be quite damaging. We are also guilty of other unwitting transfers of information that have aided the Soviet war effort. After World War II, the U.S. Government transferred the engineering principle behind the shaped-charge warhead to oil tool and mining applications. Over the years, universities and other non-defense related commercial interests acquired the technology. Results on developments in this area were published in open literature. The Soviet military R&D shops exploited this information and applied their acquisition to developing higher-grade munitions.

U.S. publications continue this historic problem. Aviation week, well known for publishing sensitive information has earned the nickname aviation leak, not a positive distinction in our security sensitive age.

The list of high tech ripoffs perpetrated by Soviet agents is frighteningly impressive. Richard Mueller, a German citizen who operates front-companies designed to divert computer equipment to Moscow, was successful in shipping 8 of 15 parts of a Vax 11/782 computer. He was able to accomplish this feat by routing the parts through South Africa, Germany, and Sweden. Seismograph equipment used to detect underground atomic tests was seized by U.S. Customs officials in Germany after a similar tour through free-world nations. William Bell, the radar engineer, was responsible for giving the Soviets the F-15 look-down/shoot-down radar, the B-1's quiet radar system, all weather radar for tanks, an experimental Navy radar system, the Patriot surface-to-air missile, a shipboard surveillance radar, the improved Hawk missile, a NATO air defense system and a handful of other radar-related systems.

All you have to do to see the extent of Soviet penetration into our technological industries is compare our current conventional military forces. The new "Blackjack" Soviet bomber is composed of major portions of the B-1A. Our technology also contributed to designing the Soviet AN-72; a short-takeoff vehicle copied from the Boeing YC-14 STOL. Trucks used in the invasion of Afghanistan were built using technology acquired from the West. Lenin was right when he said that the capitalists would sell Russia the rope by which he would hang them.

The process by which the Soviets obtain our new technical information and dissect it is referred to as "reverse engineering." The principle is the same as the curious youngster who gets a new radio and proceeds to take it apart to see how it worked.

The entire Soviet Government, it seems, has committed itself to cultivating Western sources of information and to fulfilling quotas for that information. The KGB and the GRU—the Chief Intelligence Directorate for the Soviet General Staff—head the list. They account for 70 percent of all high tech espionage. Items of particular interest include those that have civilian and military uses, such as computers, microelectronics, fiber optics, metal powder compounds, composite synthetics and associated manufacturing equipment. The KGB relies on its own "directorates 'T'" to identify the most crucial items on the Soviets' agenda. The State Committee for Science and Technology and the Ministry of Foreign Trade also put together wish-lists of Western data they would like to have—virtually at any cost. Eastern bloc intelligence services and foreign trade missions also manage to assist their mentor in this effort.

If the Soviet activities I describe sound like a combination of James Bond and Buck Rogers, the U.S. countereffort borders on the Keystone Kops. We are unable to enlist more than casual support from the Austrians. They ferociously defend their neutrality, which makes it much more difficult to protect equipment and materials going to other European nations. The Department of Commerce and the U.S. Customs Service can barely keep up with the newest technology that should be withheld from the East bloc. Our Defense Department has been engaged in an ongoing jurisdictional dispute with the State Department and with the Commerce Department. I agree with DOD's assessment that we need strict controls over exports. We cannot, however, place indefinite delays on legitimate exports because of questions of national security. I have already handled several of these cases this year. A computer company in my district and a laser-process manufacturing firm had to request my personal assistance in working with the International Trade Administration to expedite export licenses that allowed millions of dollars

of goods to leave U.S. loading docks for foreign destinations. Only my direct intervention enabled these firms to export legitimately nonsensitive devices.

Now that we are directing our attention to the issue of technology transfer, espionage and other active measures, I hope that this body, and our colleagues on the other side of the Hill can work through the appropriate legislative committees and executive agencies to enact reforms that protect our security while insuring the proper degree of free trade for nonsensitive American products.

To learn more about the issue of tech-transfer, I recommend reviewing the December 1984 issue of Air Force magazine, the 1984 edition of Soviet Military Power, and the Defense Department's 1984 report, "The Technology Transfer Control Program."

● Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I am glad to have this opportunity to join with the gentleman from California [Mr. LUNGREN] in bringing to the attention of our colleagues Soviet active measures—a broad range of activities, ranging from hidden propaganda, to sabotage, and terrorism, to expand Soviet political influence.

We have become so used to saying that we are in a "war of ideas" that we have forgotten how literally true that statement is. The official philosophy of the Soviet Union is based on the idea that the Communist Party possesses, through its understanding of the concepts of Marxist-Leninism, not just a useful political tool, but a scientific understanding of all aspects of human history and an absolute guide to general trends in the future.

I mention this only to emphasize a point that is too often forgotten: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union looks to Marxist-Leninism as a source of legitimacy. Without this philosophy to support its assertion of total dominance of society, the Communist Party has no legitimacy because it rules without—indeed against—the approval of the majority of its people.

Thus, ideas are all important to the Soviet rulers. That's why they spend so much time and money trying to influence ideas in the West. The question is: Are we capable of winning this war of ideas? I think we are—but we must understand the nature of the war we are in. I'm not at all certain we do fully understand how important ideas are in international affairs.

We in the United States like to say we are "pragmatic." By this we usually mean we confront problems as they present themselves to us, with little or no preconceived, philosophical view or ideology to use as guidelines in solving them. We look upon every problem as one that can be solved by hard work, technological expertise, individual initiative, and, especially, human freedom. This kind of thinking is anathema to Communists. Their official ideology demands that all problems be re-

ferred to Marxist-Leninism as the sole source of wisdom. This explains, to a great degree, their total failure to give the people of the Soviet Union a decent standard of living. The people there are victims of the rigid, doctrinaire myths of Marxist-Leninism and there is nothing they can do about it. But this unyielding adherence to Marxist-Leninism does not mean the Communists are inflexible when it comes to tactical matters. They are very pragmatic at that level.

This means that the Soviet Union has an arsenal of propaganda and disinformation techniques, each used for a special purpose. Active measures can best be understood as weapons in this great arsenal, weapons aimed at the values, the confidence, and the very existence of Western freedom.

Let me give an example of how the Soviet Union engages in this war of ideas. I refer to the campaign against NATO Theater-Nuclear-Force [TNF]. According to the State Department's "Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations" (October 1981):

In this campaign, Soviet diplomats in European countries pressured their host governments in many ways. In one European country, the Soviet ambassador met privately with the Minister of Commerce to discuss the supply and price of oil sold by the Soviet Union to that country. During the discussion, the ambassador gave the minister a copy of the Leonid Brezhnev's Berlin speech dealing with TNF. He suggested that if the host government would oppose TNF modernization, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs might persuade the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade to grant more favorable oil prices.

Moscow has spurred many front groups to oppose the TNF decision through well-publicized conferences and public demonstrations. To broaden the base of the anti-TNF campaign, front groups have lobbied non-Communist participants, including antinuclear groups, pacifists, environmentalists, and others. In some cases, the activities of these broad front groups have been directed by local Communist parties. Soviets have predictably devoted the greatest resources to these activities in NATO countries where opposition to the TNF modernization decision is strongest.

Bribes, threats, front groups, infiltration of non-Communist groups—these methods are only part of the arsenal of persuasion at the disposal of Communist leaders. But the overall strategy is the same: the gradual weakening of Western will, the growing acceptance of Communist viewpoints among Western opinion leaders, and the steady, inexorable disintegration of Western security and defense. That is what the war of ideas is all about.

We have our own ways of waging this war of ideas. We do it through the public diplomacy of the Voice of America. We do it by telling the truth to the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. We do it through Worldnet, the U.S. Information Agency's [USIA] satellite-television program. We do it by telling the

truth about our society and about Communist society as well.

But we also have to expose Soviet disinformation programs. One of the most useful ways of identifying such programs is the USIA publication "Soviet Propaganda Alert." Produced by the Office of Research of USIA, the "Alert" identifies and gives examples of various Soviet propaganda campaigns, and their major themes. But how many newspaper editors or citizens in the United States ever see this useful publication? Not many, because USIA is forbidden to disseminate its products in this country. I support such a ban, but I do wish that there were some way that certain USIA products could be made available. If we are in a war of ideas, the people of the United States should have some opportunity to see what weapons we are using.

USIA carries out its important tasks with only a tiny fraction of the budget that the Soviet Union uses in its campaign of abuse, slander, disinformation, and forgery. The Soviet Union spends more in electronically jamming our international radio broadcasts than we do in making the broadcasts themselves. So although we are in a war of ideas, our side is badly underfunded.

Yet we do a good job of defending and communicating our values. And it doesn't mean we engage in heavy-handed propaganda. One of the best ways we have of communicating with people under Communist domination is "Music USA," a program of the Voice of America. Indeed it is said that Willis Conover, associated with this program since its inception, is probably the best-known American behind the Iron Curtain. Conover brings the best in American music to people all over the world. Jazz, the uniquely American art form, has become an international musical language and it is a language that those deprived of freedom understand and appreciate. Jazz is not propaganda about America; in its essence, it is part of America itself. Millions around the world, listening to American music through "Music USA," come to appreciate the society that gave the world this great music which combines freedom and order in a creative way—just as our country does.

So we have our own ways of waging the war of ideas. It might be a recording of a great American jazz artist broadcast to Russia; it might be a USIA public affairs officer talking to a group of journalists and setting the record straight somewhere in Africa; it might be a Worldnet television program in which American Government officials in Washington are questioned by journalists in Brazil or some other country—whatever the method is, the message is the same: the United States wants to tell its story frankly and fully and then let the world judge. I think that is the best way to combat Soviet disinformation.

At the same time, we have to become more aware of the deceitful and sometimes dangerous ways the Soviet Union's Communist Party has of trying to influence opinion here and among our allies. The more we know about their methods, the easier they will be to fight. That is why I am glad we took this opportunity to talk about the ideas that lie behind the geopolitics of our time.

I want to thank the gentleman from California [Mr. LUNGREN] for this chance to say a few words about the war of ideas.

● Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, in November 1980, a purported State Department "Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America" surfaced. Allegedly circulated through the Department's "dissent channel," the paper's authors warned that U.S. policy toward Central America would lead to the introduction of American forces into the region. The media, including Flora Lewis of the New York Times, quoted from this document in their reporting on our Central America policy.

In 1983, shortly after the joint United States-Organization of Eastern Caribbean States rescue of Grenada, a story appeared in the Indian press claiming that the United States was responsible for the death of Maurice Bishop. Another charge, this time carried by the Soviet media, claimed that 2,000 Grenadians had been killed by chemical weapons and that the United States had filmed this grisly episode.

In February 1984, two memos came to light in Peru which proved the United States was planning to provide Chile with large supplies of weapons, including Pershing missiles. The Soviet Union cited the story as evidence of United States-Chilean collusion to destabilize South America and as a violation of the Tlatelalco treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Mr. Speaker, all these stories were false. Each was designed to discredit American policy in Latin America and sow discord between us and our southern neighbors. And each is an example of Soviet active measures.

The term "active measures" is relatively new to the American intelligence lexicon. Active measures covers a wide range of activities, including disinformation, media manipulation, agents of influence, forgeries, and the use of front groups. They are implemented in coordination with overall Soviet foreign policy objectives. The primary target of active measures is the United States.

Briefly, I will review some examples of active measures in Latin America. All examples are from the public record.

Active measures in Latin America mirror Soviet—and Cuban—foreign policy goals. Active measures seek to discredit U.S. foreign policy, increase regional tensions, strengthen pro-

Moscow and pro-Havana movements and governments, and destabilize countries.

Destabilizing El Salvador and generating support for the leftist insurgency there have been primary active measures operations. In a 1982 declassified study, the CIA noted that Moscow decided "in late 1979 or early 1980 that the time was ripe for decisive action in El Salvador." To this end, all resources and assets, ranging from the covert supply of arms to overt diplomatic support, were mobilized.

After the establishment of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), which represents the Salvadorans abroad, the decision was made to develop solidarity committees. In the words of the CIA these committees served as "propaganda outlets, conduits for aid, and organizers of solidarity meetings and demonstrations." The success of these efforts can be seen in the 70 demonstrations held from mid-January to mid-March 1981.

The Soviet Union played up the demonstrations through its official media. Soviet media reported that the United States had a "genocide policy" and was preparing to intervene militarily in El Salvador. *Izvestiya* made reference to "Operation Centaur," a plan that allegedly "provides for the physical elimination of many thousands of Salvadorans." Operation Centaur existed only in the minds of the active measures specialists in Moscow.

On an international diplomatic level, a 30-man Cuban delegation to the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in New Delhi worked with the Soviets present to press for a condemnation of U.S. policy in El Salvador.

In the spring of 1982, the World Front of Solidarity with the Salvadoran People was established as the umbrella group for the various national solidarity committees. Also in 1982, prior to the March Salvadoran elections, 12 cities witnessed demonstrations in opposition to U.S. policy in El Salvador.

The U.S. affiliate of the World Front is the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, most commonly known by its acronym CISPES. It was CISPES which distributed the purported dissent paper forgery that I referred to the beginning of my remarks.

In fact, CISPES resulted from a 1980 trip to the United States by Farid Handel for the express purpose of organizing support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Farid Handel, by the way, is the brother of Shafik Handel, the head of El Salvador's Communist Party. We know of Farid's activities because of documents captured at a terrorist safe house in El Salvador. His trip report describes the help he received from the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, the Communist Party, U.S.A., and the U.S. Peace Council, the American affiliate of the World Peace Council.

Forgery has been used a number of times against U.S. policy toward Latin America.

On March 12, 1982, the Ethiopian Herald carried an article on CIA chemical and bacteriological warfare against Cuba. The article's proof of such warfare was "U.S. Document No. 502988/1-77" and a partial map from this. The document, which is on sale at the Government Printing Office, is an unclassified map of Cuba from seven vantage points, including population, land, and economic activity. The Ethiopian article took the economic activity map as evidence of CIA-sponsored chemical warfare.

Sometime in May or June 1982, a fake Defense Department press release on the Falklands crisis circulated among Latin American diplomats at the OAS. This release overstated U.S. support for Great Britain, alleged joint United States-British operational planning, and contained insulting references to Argentina. Denounced as a forgery by DOD, the release was obviously intended to exacerbate United States-Argentinian relations at a critical time.

Shortly before the 1983 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Indian press reported on a speech by Jeane Kirkpatrick, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. According to the bogus speech, the United States planned to create a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization," uniting South America with South Africa. Leftist media in Latin America gave this report extensive play, while Moscow used the speech as evidence that,

Washington was the chief guilty party responsible for the tragedy of Latin American peoples.

The Falklands resurfaced as the subject of another disinformation operation in May 1983 when *Que Pasa*, the weekly Argentine Communist Party publication, asserted the Falklands were being converted into a NATO military base. Moscow, which never misses an opportunity to blast the United States, replayed the story in Latin America through "Radio Peace and Progress" and the *Novosti* press agency.

A final aspect of Soviet and Cuban active measures in Latin America is the use of international front groups. Earlier I mentioned the World Front of Solidarity with the Salvadoran People. This is not the only front organization active in promoting Soviet foreign policy objectives in Latin America. The World Peace Council [WPC], the World Federation of Democratic Youth [WFDY], and the International Union of Students [IUS] have all sponsored solidarity meetings for the Salvadoran guerrillas and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

For example, the 1982 CIA report on active measures noted:

The WPC agreed to pay for the travel of representatives of communist and leftist organizations in a Latin American country

who wanted to seek support in Europe for the insurgency movement in their country.

In April 1983, the WPC held a conference in support of the Communist Sandinista regime and Maurice Bishop's rule on Grenada. The conference took place in Managua. In November 1983, after the liberation of Grenada, the WPC held an emergency meeting in Mexico City, and in April 1984, Guyana served as host to a WPC-sponsored "Caribbean and Latin America Peace Conference," which condemned U.S. policy.

Mr. Speaker, as I noted earlier, all these examples of active measures are from the public record. Many have come to light in published records of congressional hearings.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, it is important that we understand how the Soviet Union and its allies seek to take advantage of the sincere political debate in this country on the best policy for peace and democracy in Latin America. I commend my colleague from California, Mr. LUNGREN, for holding this special order on an important topic. ●

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. RITTER addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extension of Remarks.]

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. HALL of Texas (at the request of Mr. WRIGHT), on account of illness.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FAWELL), to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, for 60 minutes, July 24.

Mr. HANSEN, for 60 minutes, July 24.

Mr. MICHEL, for 60 minutes, July 18.

Mr. MADIGAN, for 60 minutes, July 18.

Mr. ARMEY, for 60 minutes, July 23.

Mr. ARMEY, for 60 minutes, July 24.

Mr. ARMEY, for 60 minutes, July 25.

Mr. ARMEY, for 60 minutes, July 30.

Mr. ARMEY, for 60 minutes, July 31.

Mr. ARMEY, for 60 minutes, August 1.

Mrs. BENTLEY, for 10 minutes, July 18.

Mr. RITTER, for 60 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HOWARD) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 5 minutes, today.

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113821	MEMO TO RAYMOND RE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE	1	7/23/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113824	REPORT	7	7/10/1985	B1
	SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE			B3

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113826	MEMO	1	7/23/1985	B1 B3
	TO LENCZOWSKI RE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JAMAICA INTERNATIONAL YOUTH CONFERENCE			

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113829	REPORT	7	7/10/1985	B1
	DUPLICATE OF 113824			B3

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113830	MEMO	6	7/24/1985	B1
	HEICHLER TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #13 OF 1985			B3

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113831	MEMO HEICHLER TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 7/25/85	4	7/26/1985	B1 B2 B3 B6 B7(C)

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113832	CABLE 021847Z AUG 85	4	8/2/1985	B1 B3

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113833	MEMO RAPOPORT TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #14 OF 1985	6	8/14/1985	B1 B3

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113834	MEMO DUPLICATE OF 113831	4	7/26/1985	B1 B2 B3 B6 B7(C)

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60
File
Aug 28 1985
Soviet Weekly

Youth Politics

113835

WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL POST-MORTEM

The World Youth Festival in Moscow (July 27 - August 3) proved to be the expected anti-imperialist extravaganza, but Soviet controls were so blatant--from packing of discussion groups to the monitoring of delegates' every activity--that the propaganda impact of the event was largely neutralized.

Unplanned Foul Ups. Soviet authorities spared no effort to ensure that the gathering would be trouble-free. Moscow was virtually sealed off to those without city residence permits; dissidents were warned to stay away from festival participants and even the weather was forced to cooperate--Soviet aircraft seeded stormclouds to make them shed their rain outside Moscow.

Nonetheless, unscheduled embarrassments repeatedly stole the headlines in the West during the week-long festival. The first occurred at the opening ceremony on July 27th when the West German delegation threatened to walk out when the festival management sought to treat a West Berlin communist delegation as a separate national group. (The organizers eventually apologized for the "mistake.") Two days later, during a meeting on Afghanistan, the organizing committee's attempt to focus attention on America's "war-mongering" role came a cropper when a Swedish delegate accused Moscow of "pouring bombs" on Afghanistan and violating human rights there "on an enormous scale." Much of the audience began protesting loudly when it was discovered the translators of the Swede's speech omitted all criticism of the USSR.

Many Western and third world delegates were also put off by the tight controls on comings and goings, rigid scheduling and overt politicization of the proceedings. Journalists' dispatches in many cases were checked by Soviet officials before they could be sent out. Some delegates had material confiscated at the airport upon arrival, discovered microphones in their hotel rooms and found their luggage had been opened and searched in absences from the hotels.

Balance Sheet. Despite the complaints, the Kremlin presumably does not regret having hosted the affair, but may have wished its original intention of staging it in Finland or France had panned out.

The festival was not a net public relations success for its sponsors, to judge from the almost uniformly negative world press coverage, both during and afterwards. On the whole, the Soviets proved to be their own worst enemy, disillusioning impressionable first-time visitors to the USSR while reinforcing the negative preconceptions many

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Western delegates already had about the Soviet system. Even many communist youth reportedly were embarrassed at Soviet heavyhandedness.

As a propaganda vehicle the festival also left much to be desired. Gorbachev's speech to the opening ceremonies, the political high point of the gathering, was an anodyne sermon on peace and goodwill. The final communique turned out to be equally pro forma, chiefly because Western delegates were able to block references to contentious issues such as "Zionism" and US security policy. Soviet commentators found themselves devoting almost as many, if not more, column inches to defending the festival against Western "slander" as they did to touting it as an event of importance for international amity.

Indeed, by most accounts the festival did not go far in fostering goodwill between communist and noncommunist youth. This had been an important Soviet objective, part of a long-term effort to effect a rapprochement between communist and independent elements of the peace movement in Europe and nudge the latter in an exclusively anti-US direction. Moscow's most important thesis--that the US was solely to blame for the nuclear arms race--also failed to carry; it was conspicuously absent from the festival's final communique.

On the other hand, the festival did serve to foster a sense of community among some of the politically naive, and for many non-communists the opportunity to see the USSR was appreciated. Then too, KGB had ample opportunity for spotting and assessing potential third world candidates for political and ideological grooming. In that sense, the elaborate efforts were not wasted.

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File NISR 62
Active Measures
113036

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(A) -THE WPC IS AN INTERNATIONAL FRONT FUNDED BY THE CPSU, WHICH DETERMINES WPC ACTIVITIES AND STRUCTURES WPC STATEMENT AND COMMUNIQES. THE WPC HAS NEVER CRITICIZED THE DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN POLICIES OF COMMUNIST REGIMES, INCLUDING THE USSR'S SUPPRESSION OF ITS OWN "UNOFFICIAL" PEACE ACTIVISTS. INDEED, THE WPC'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE SEPTEMBER 1983 SOVIET SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007 ILLUSTRATES ITS TYPICAL STAND ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES.

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0000

(B) -THE "STATUS OF MANKIND" UNDER THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WAR IS THE SUBJECT MOST LIKELY TO DOMINATE THE UPCOMING SESSION. DEPARTMENT ANALYSTS EXPECT THE WPC TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ARGENTINA'S OSTENSIBLY ANTI-NUCLEAR STANCE IN ORDER TO HAMMER AWAY AT ALLEGED US RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NUCLEAR ARMS BUILDUP AS WELL AS "AGGRESSIVE" WESTERN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES IN THE REGION. THE WPC ALSO WILL LOBBY FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE ATLANTIC AND PRAISE ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO "DECOLONIZE" THE MALVINAS. IF PAST PRACTICE HOLDS, THE SESSION'S FINAL

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PLEASE PASS TO POLITICAL SECTION AND PAO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UR, PROP, AR, XM, XR
SUBJECT: ADVANCE NOTICE OF WORLD PEACE COUNCIL MEETING

COMMUNIQUE WILL SCRUPULOUSLY AVOID ALL MENTION OF CONTROVERSIAL SOVIET POLICIES.

REF: STATE 70751

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. POST SHOULD BE ALERT TO A SCHEDULED ANTI-US WPC-SPONSORED GATHERING IN BUENOS AIRES EARLY NEXT WEEK. EMBASSY OFFICERS SHOULD BRIEF FRIENDLY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHER CONTACTS AS APPROPRIATE ON THE GATHERING'S LIKELY THEMES AND DISTRIBUTE THE RECENTLY-RELEASED DEPARTMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOTE (FAN) ON THE WPC IN ORDER TO GENERATE NEGATIVE PUBLICITY FOR THE EVENT. END SUMMARY.

(C) -WPC ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA HAS INTENSIFIED OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS AS THE MOSCOW-BACKED FRONT LOST CREDIBILITY AMONG EUROPEAN PEACE GROUPS BECAUSE OF ITS UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT FOR THE USSR. ITS MAJOR MEETINGS IN THE REGION HAVE INCLUDED: A PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN HAVANA (APRIL 1981) THAT CRITICIZED THE "SERIOUS DANGERS ARISING FROM THE ARMS ESCALATION" UNDERTAKEN BY THE US; AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IN BUEHOS AIRES, AUGUST 14-15 1982, WHICH CAME OUT IN SUPPORT OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MALVINAS; AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN MANAGUA, APRIL 21-24, 1983, DESIGNED TO GIVE MORAL SUPPORT TO THE SANDINISTA REGIME; AN EMERGENCY PEACE MEETING IN MEXICO CITY, NOVEMBER 2-4 1983, WHERE US INTERVENTION IN GRENADA AND OTHER "CRIMES" AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES CAME UNDER ATTACK; AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE IN QUITO, JULY 16-18 1984, WHICH CRITICIZED US POLICIES AND ISSUED STATEMENTS SUPPORTING THE LATEST SOVIET "PEACE PROPOSALS"; AND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AGAINST THE ARMS RACE IN HAVANA, JANUARY 7-11 1985, AT WHICH US FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES, ITS USE OF THE MASS MEDIA AND THE ARTS IN "WAR PROPAGANDA", AND OF "TERRORISM" IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST WERE CONDEMNED. THE "PEACE PROGRAM" OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WAS APPLAUDED. WHITEHEAD
BT

2. AN AUGUST 27 BUENOS AIRES RADIO BROADCAST MONITORED BY FBIS REPORTED THAT WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC) PRESIDENT ROMESH CHANDRA HAD ARRIVED IN ARGENTINA TO ATTEND A WPC MEETING SCHEDULED FOR THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 2. CHANDRA TOLD REPORTERS THAT "PRIORITY TOPICS" SUCH AS THE "STATUS OF MANKIND TODAY" WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING, WHICH HE CALLED "ONE OF THE MAIN CONFERENCES" TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE WPC THIS YEAR.

3. CHANDRA NOTED THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE STAGED IN A COUNTRY WHICH, ALONG WITH FIVE OTHERS, HAS SIGNED A DECLARATION AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR. (ON MAY 22 1984, THE HEADS OF STATE OF ARGENTINA, GREECE, MEXICO, INDIA, SWEDEN AND TANZANIA SIGNED A COMMUNIQUE IN NEW DELHI URGING THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR POWERS TO FREEZE TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.) CHANDRA MET WITH THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT SOON THEREAFTER AND EXPRESSED WPC "SOLIDARITY" WITH THE DELHI DECLARATION (BUENOS AIRES LA PRENSA, JUNE 22 1984).

4. THE DEPARTMENT ATTACHES HIGH PRIORITY TO COUNTERING SUCH SOVIET-SPONSORED EVENTS (REF. A). IN THE PAST IT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL - WITH PAO ASSISTANCE -- IN GENERATING

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BY RW NARA DATE 4/15/13

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