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
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# **The GDR and the Third World: Suppliant and Surrogate**

by

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### THE GDR AND THE THIRD WORLD: SUPPLICANT AND SURROGATE

Michael Sodaro

The German Democratic Republic first appeared on the Third World scene as a suppliant. Initially, its primary objective was to secure international acceptance of its claim to constitute a sovereign, independent German state worthy of full-fledged diplomatic recognition. Having finally achieved this long-coveted goal by 1973, following the normalization of its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western states, the GDR next moved into a new, more active phase of involvement in the developing world, this time as a foreign policy surrogate of the Soviet Union. In this category, the GDR is in many respects the most active of all the Soviet Union's allies in Third World activities with the exception of Cuba (and, quite possibly, Romania, which pursues its own goals in the area). By supplying significant amounts of technology, expertise, and manpower to a select group of Third World nations and national liberation movements, the GDR has provided a vital source of support for Soviet ambitions in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America across the continent of Asia. The scope of East Germany's contribution to Soviet undertakings ranges from moral support for struggling pro-Communist elements to the supply of important, and occasionally indispensable, economic and military assistance to friendly forces.

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Interestingly, however, the GDR has recently combined this surrogate role with a renewed appearance in the role of supplicant. This time the object of its importunity is a commodity at least as precious as its cherished diplomatic status: oil. Moscow's decision in 1975 to raise the price and reduce the supply of petroleum exports to its Eastern European allies confronted nearly all of these states with the necessity of seeking new suppliers of primary energy. Thus far, neither the GDR nor any other member of the Warsaw Pact has succeeded in weening itself from almost total dependence on Soviet oil (again, with the exception of Romania), despite earnest attempts to find secure supplies at affordable prices on the world market. In the years to come, it seems certain that this supplicant's demand for diversified sources of oil will color the GDR's relationships with the developing countries at least as decisively as its more assertive posture as a Soviet surrogate, if not more so.

The analysis that follows will attempt to delineate the GDR's activity in the Third World as it relates to these central themes. After first glancing at some of the difficulties encountered by the GDR in its early initiatives toward the developing world, I shall look briefly at the fundamental theoretical postulates that guide the GDR's basic orientation to the panoramic diversity of the Third World's political systems and policies. I shall next survey East Germany's trade and aid policies toward the area as a whole and then mention some of the more political methods the GDR employs in its dealings with certain less developed countries. This will set the stage for a regional analysis of GDR activities, starting with Africa and the Middle East and moving on to Asia and Latin America. \* Finally, in the concluding section, I shall point out some of the international and domestic functions of East Germany's Third World engagement, with an eye to foreseeing how they might develop in the future.

#### THE GDR AS SUPPLICANT: THE QUEST FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

Although the post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union succeeded in achieving a significant breakthrough in its relations with the Third World as early as the mid-1950s with the windfall of Egypt's opening to the Soviet bloc, the GDR was not able to capitalize on Moscow's

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\*In this essay, the term "Third World" does not apply to the Communist-controlled countries of Cambodia, Laos, Cuba, North Korea, Mongolia, or Vietnam.

good fortune. Ironically, as the Soviets increasingly championed the nascent Nonalignment Movement, the GDR found itself constantly discriminated against by leaders of those very countries, many of whom justified their refusal to recognize the GDR by the principle of nonalignment itself. Both Nasser and Nehru declared that the establishment of de jure relations with East Germany would violate their concept of neutrality, and Nehru was particularly indisposed to accord the GDR diplomatic recognition following the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.<sup>1</sup> As the Nonalignment Movement expanded with the wave of newly independent African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the GDR suffered additional frustrations of this type. Even erstwhile Soviet client states such as Nkrumah's Ghana and Touré's Guinea held back from granting Moscow's wish for formal recognition of the East German state. The result was a clear victory for West Germany's Hallstein doctrine, which mandated the severing of diplomatic and economic ties with any state that recognized the GDR.<sup>2</sup>

Of course, in many cases it was not merely the principle of neutrality that motivated the nonaligned states to defer to Bonn's position in this matter. A number of the countries in question were recipients of substantial trade and aid benefits from the FRG. Bonn's ability to outspend and outproduce the GDR provided strong economic incentives to quite a few Third World states, significantly reinforcing the diplomatic pressures which Bonn vigorously applied on them to prevent a move in East Germany's direction. In what was perhaps the most blatant example of a widely shared interest in the Third World in retaining Bonn's friendship, in 1971 President Bokassa of the Central African Republic rudely broke off recently established diplomatic relations with the GDR on the grounds that East Germany had not come through with its promised economic favors.<sup>3</sup>

Not even Walter Ulbricht's loudly trumpeted state visit to Egypt in 1965 brought about the desired breakthrough in relations with the developing world. Although this was the first time the leader of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) had been formally received by a non-Communist government, the trip did not result in the establishment of diplomatic ties.<sup>4</sup> Nor did the revelation that the FRG was supplying arms and reparations to Israel, an action which induced several Arab states to break relations with Bonn in 1965, lead to the hoped-for normalization between these countries and the GDR. It was not until two years after the June War in the Middle East that the GDR scored its first triumphs in this region, gaining recognition by Iraq on May 10, 1969 (only two days after Cambodia became the first non-Communist state to take up diplomatic relations with East Germany). Soon thereafter, formal relations were established with Sudan (June 3, 1969), Syria (June 5), South Yemen (July 10), and Egypt (July 11). (Meanwhile, the Republic of South Vietnam recognized the

GDR on June 20, 1969.) In 1970, seven additional states entered into formal ties with the East German state, but only four more were added to the list by the summer of 1972. Only when negotiations were nearly completed on the Basic Treaty with the FRG (signed in December 1972) was the diplomatic logjam finally broken. India recognized the GDR in October of that year, to be followed a month later by Pakistan. December 1972 proved to be a veritable bonanza, as some 22 countries formally took up diplomatic relations with the GDR, most of them from the Third World. Forty-six additional states recognized East Germany in 1973, and by the end of the decade the GDR maintained relations with a total of nearly 130 states.

In sum, then, the GDR's ties to the Third World up to the end of 1972 were largely contingent upon the "German question," a matter which most Third World states (including some pro-Moscow ones) were generally reluctant to resolve for themselves in East Berlin's favor. With the signing of the Basic Treaty, however, and in the context of detente in Europe, an enormous obstacle was lifted from the GDR's capacity for maneuver in the Third World. Coincidentally, the GDR's new profile as a diplomatic partner of the developing nations emerged just as the break-up of Portugal's colonies provided opportunities for expanded Soviet involvement in Africa. As will be noted shortly, the GDR became quickly embroiled in these African adventures.

#### THE GDR AND THE THIRD WORLD: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In its theoretical approach to the phenomena of Third World political and economic development, the GDR tends to stick closely to positions laid out by Soviet scholars and ideologists. Like their Soviet counterparts, East German theoreticians are sensitive to the extraordinary variety of Third World regimes and are generally candid in observing the virtual absence of "real" Socialist systems in the developing world. However, both Soviet and East German writers hasten to note that a number of these states "orient themselves" toward socialism, largely by adopting a "noncapitalist" mode of development.<sup>5</sup> In these cases, according to one authority,

If one were to regard them in an isolated fashion, there exist neither the objective nor the subjective preconditions for a socialist revolution; however, within the world revolutionary process, in which they are objectively incorporated, they can shorten the way to socialism by avoiding a capitalist development or by overcoming it relatively early.<sup>6</sup>

Institutionally, this process is generally undertaken by what Soviet-bloc theorists call the "national-democratic state." This is a blanket designation applied to a host of structurally differentiated Third World regimes whose common destiny, in the Soviet view, is to manage the transition from colonial rule to "real socialism." Scholars in the GDR have shown a growing interest in the theory and practice of "national-democratic states" in recent years but seldom stray far beyond the propositions formulated on this subject by their Soviet counterparts.<sup>7</sup>

Coupled with this qualified approval of the path taken by certain of these "noncapitalist" countries, however, is a categorical rejection of any attempts by Third World states to construct their own "third way" to economic development, one which is neither "capitalist" nor "socialist," as these terms are understood in the Soviet bloc. This is a problem of considerable concern to the Soviets, as not a few Third World states have come to insist that their rejection of Western capitalism by no means implies their acceptance of the Soviet model of development. East German writers tend to echo Moscow's disapproval of this tendency.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, the GDR seems to be fully aware of the instabilities inherent in one-man rule by charismatic leaders. Several decades of postcolonial experience (especially in Africa) have demonstrated to Soviet-bloc observers the hazards of banking on non-Communist "strong men" with flimsy bases of institutional or popular support. Like the Soviets, the East Germans also recognize that such examples of personalized power, while frequently conditioned by powerful historical forces, are nonetheless "contradictory and problematic." According to GDR experts, one-person rule "is not . . . the decisive factor for the stabilization of the national-democratic state. Ultimately the decisive question is whether the national-democratic state and its leadership enjoy the trust and support of the popular masses and to what degree this support finds an organizational expression."<sup>9</sup> As we shall see, it is precisely in the domain of building such organizational props of power that the GDR is heavily engaged in a number of Third World countries at present.

With respect to recent appeals by Third World states for a "new world economic order," East German theorists generally approve of the slogan but insist that it should not be construed as implying the need for unwarranted economic demands on the developed Warsaw Pact states. They reject the notion of a confrontation between "North" and "South" on the grounds that the Socialist states do not deserve to be equated as fellow "Northerners" with the capitalist countries, which alone must bear responsibility for the economic exploitation of the Third World under imperialism and neocolonialism. Here, too, the East German writers lean heavily on the views of their Soviet colleagues.<sup>10</sup>

These theoretical considerations aside, however, it should be noted that, in practice, the nature of a state's political system has little to do with the GDR's (or the Soviet Union's) willingness to enter into trade or political relations. Neither Moscow nor East Berlin hesitates to engage in trade with regimes regarded as politically objectionable, while both have consistently courted states that suppress local Communist elements. In short, practical political or economic calculations, not ideological consistency, characterize the Soviet Union's approach to the Third World, and the same goes for the GDR.

Despite this close correlation between East German and Soviet views on the Third World, it should be stressed that the SED's interest in the subject, as reflected in GDR literature, is strong and growing stronger. The number of articles on the developing countries appearing in such journals as *Deutsche Aussenpolitik* and *Horizont* seems to be expanding, as is press coverage of the Third World in the SED's daily, *Neues Deutschland*. In addition, the GDR has a journal devoted entirely to Third World problems (*Afrika, Asien, Lateinamerika*), as well as quasi-academic establishments concerned with Third World studies (such as the African Institute associated with Leipzig University) or with the training of students and professionals from selected Third World states. It appears quite likely that the GDR's growing involvement in the Third World will continue to be matched by increasing theoretical interest in its problems.

#### TRADE AND AID

Although the GDR failed to attain diplomatic recognition from the less developed nations until 1969 and thereafter, its trade relations with selected Third World countries gained a firm foothold in the early 1950s. By the end of 1979, the GDR had commercial or other economic relations with 52 Third World countries.<sup>11</sup> Initially, the GDR's chief trading partners were Brazil, India, Egypt, and Iraq. These countries still assume a large share of the GDR's trade with the Third World, which tends to be concentrated in about half a dozen nations (see Table 4.1).

While trade with Brazil, India, and Iraq has risen relatively steadily over the past decade, economic relations with a number of other countries have exhibited fairly wide swings either up or down (or, as is the case with Libya, both up and down). Table 4.2 shows some of the widest fluctuations in the GDR's trade flows with the Third World in recent years. These variations tend to reflect either political vicissitudes (Egypt, Angola, Mozambique) or the GDR's interest in oil imports (Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Syria).

As a percentage of its total trade turnover, however, East Ger-

TABLE 4.1

Principal Third World Trade Partners of the GDR,  
1970 and 1978  
(millions of valutamarks)

Trade Partner	1970	Rank	1978	Rank
Egypt	389.7	1	442.2	4
India	276.7	2	472.1	2
Brazil	242.5	3	507.4	2
Turkey	67.3	4	120.3	12
Syria	67.0	5	405.7	5
Colombia	57.6	6	—	—
Peru	50.5	7	157.8	9
Iraq	48.7	8	724.7	1
Lebanon	32.7	9	—	—
Iran	27.4	10	159.5	8
Sudan	25.0	11	—	—
Sri Lanka	20.5	12	—	—
Ethiopia	—	—	316.5	6
Angola	—	—	233.7	7
Argentina	—	—	148.8	10
Mozambique	—	—	130.5	11

*Note:* The valutamark is the official GDR trade currency. In 1976, 1 VM was equal to 0.72 DM. Dashes indicate country was not a principal trade partner for that year.

*Source:* *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.*

many's trade with the developing world is consistently rather low. According to calculations based on official GDR statistics, Third World trade has remained in the range of 3 to 5 percent through most of the 1970s (see Table 4.3). Trade turnover with some 30 less developed countries rose from 1.6 million VM in 1970 to slightly over 5.0 million VM in 1978.<sup>12</sup>

Few precise figures are available on East German aid to the developing world, largely because much of it is hidden in credit agreements or other economic transfer arrangements for which details are rarely made public. It has been estimated, however, that, at least by the late 1960s, East German foreign aid amounted to about 0.02 percent of its national product. This figure has probably increased very

little in more recent years. It falls considerably short of the FRG's performance in both the late 1960s (when the Federal Republic spent more than 1.0 percent of its gross national product on development projects) and the 1970s (when the FRG devoted slightly less than 1.0 percent of its GNP to development aid.) The average figure for the Comecon bloc as a whole, meanwhile, has been about 0.04 percent.<sup>13</sup> As a giver of aid, the GDR has at times ranked below Poland and Czechoslovakia when its contributions are measured as a percentage of national income.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, economic relations with the Third World do not appear to take up a large portion of the GDR's annual budget. However, it should be noted that trade with the Third World brings in goods that are considered vital to East German consumers (coffee, tea, fruit, and so on) and industry (for example, petroleum), while providing an outlet for East German industrial products which cannot be sold easily to advanced countries. For its part, aid fulfills important political functions, especially in those areas where Moscow has a large stake. Over

TABLE 4.2

Countries with Wide Fluctuations in Trade Turnover with the GDR  
(millions of valutamarks)

Country	1973	1974	1975	1977	1978
Algeria			72.9		324.0
Angola			0		233.7
Argentina			26.4		148.8
Egypt			639.6		442.2
Iran			62.1		159.5
Iraq	186.1	648.0			724.7
Libya			12.1	84.8	13.3
Mozambique			0		130.5
Nigeria			3.3	19.3	14.4
Syria			211.2		405.7

Note: The valutamark is the official GDR trade currency. In 1976, 1 VM was equal to 0.72 DM.

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.*

TABLE 4.3

GDR Foreign Trade with the Third World as a Percentage of Total Foreign Trade Turnover

Year	Percentage of Total Foreign Trade Turnover
1970	4.0
1971	4.1
1972	3.2
1973	3.4
1974	4.9
1975	4.4
1976	4.5
1977	4.9
1978	5.2

Source: Computed from statistics in *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.*

the course of the next decade, it can be expected that both imports from and aid (including military aid) to the Third World will increase, and both will become increasingly expensive. Ultimately, these growing economic commitments can only have a negative impact on domestic consumption, a fact which the East German authorities endeavor to conceal when reporting their economic statistics. At a time when the GDR economy is experiencing rising prices, reduced growth rates, and mounting shortages of consumer goods, the domestic costs of a more active Third World policy may be felt all the more acutely at home, by economic planners as well as the general population.<sup>15</sup>

#### METHODS OF INFLUENCE

In addition to direct diplomatic ties and trade relations, the GDR reinforces its links with selected Third World states through a variety of other mechanisms. Party-to-party contacts, for instance, involving the SED or other parties in the GDR's "bloc-party system" perform similar quasidiplomatic functions. The GDR also provides training and advice for Third World functionaries engaged in economic planning, constructing state-controlled educational and media systems, or building mass organizations. Various flanking organizations of the SED are often involved in this process. Thus, the GDR's trade union, the FDGB,

assists client states in setting up centrally controlled workers' movements; the GDR's youth organization (the FDJ) sends "friendship brigades" to various Third World countries to work on development projects; East German teachers are engaged in training their counterparts in states that are particularly friendly with the GDR, and textbooks for use there are printed in East Germany; and the GDR's Journalists' Union runs a "Solidarity School" for preparing Third World journalists.

It is through activities such as these that the GDR helps establish the "preconditions for socialism" in countries ripe for this type of development. By educating thousands of "cadres" (especially younger ones) in the techniques of managing centrally directed economic and political institutions and by inculcating Soviet-style Socialist doctrine in the process, the GDR is seeking to build what may be called a Marxist-Leninist infrastructure in a number of closely allied Third World states (such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola). Whether these efforts result in the establishment of new elites that are thoroughly committed to Soviet methods of economic development and political control in these countries is a question that only future observers can answer. What is certain at present, however, is that the GDR is fully dedicated to preparing the next generation of prospective allies in these states, in the expectation that these individuals will be even better schooled in the fundamentals of "real socialism" than their predecessors in the current generation of national liberation movement leaders.

Among the mechanisms employed by the GDR to express its sympathy for promising Third World causes are a panoply of organizations, campaigns, and festivities, all closely patterned on Soviet models, designed to advertise East Germany's interest in Third World problems. Meetings of the World Peace Council, the organization of "solidarity weeks" and "friendship days" in East Berlin with guests from selected countries, the establishment of a League for People's Friendship for the purpose of encouraging people-to-people and cultural contacts with the Third World, and official gestures of support for Third World campaigns against racism, imperialism, and even human rights violations are all part of a growing program of propaganda activities serving to link the GDR with the developing nations. The "solidarity committees" of the GDR are largely responsible for coordinating many of these efforts. In addition to providing direct financial assistance to selected countries or liberation movements, the solidarity committees also help provide food and medical assistance to needy clients and arrange hospital care in the GDR for combatants wounded in Third World struggles. The committees also hold training courses for technicians, teachers, doctors, and the like (often with the cooperation of the FDGB and the FDJ) and engage in a variety of special activities, such as inviting children from Third World areas

for vacations in the GDR and organizing mass letter-writing campaigns against right-wing Third World regimes. In 1978 alone, the solidarity committees spent approximately 200 million Marks ("thanks to the generous contributions of the population" of the GDR, in the words of the organization's secretary general) and welcomed 180 injured Third World "freedom fighters" into East German hospitals.<sup>16</sup> All of these undertakings proceed from the SED's firm commitment to support states and peoples fighting against "imperialism," a commitment underscored in the GDR constitution and in the SED party program.

#### THE GDR AND BLACK AFRICA

During the 1970s, Africa stood out as the principal focal point of direct East German involvement in the Third World. By the end of the decade, the GDR maintained diplomatic relations with 46 African states and had economic treaties with 13. Moreover, the enhanced opportunities for intervention in African affairs by the Soviet Union and its allies, which were created by the dissolution of the Portuguese empire and by the revolution in Ethiopia and the acceleration of the black struggle for independence in Rhodesia and Southwest Africa, opened up new possibilities for the East German regime to add its weight to the cause of Moscow's clients (or would-be clients). Much of this assistance has been of a military nature, prompting some Western analysts to describe the GDR's engagement in terms of a new "Afrika Korps."<sup>17</sup> The designation is not entirely facetious, as the contribution to this volume by Jiri Valenta and Shannon Butler amply demonstrates.

The military assistance channeled to Soviet clients in Black Africa in recent years represents an extension of carefully cultivated political relations which, at least in some cases, antedates the final victory of the pro-Soviet forces by several years.<sup>18</sup> Like Moscow, the GDR began establishing ties with a number of "national liberation movements" well before their ultimate success was in view. Angolan leader Agostinho Neto, for example, led an MPLA delegation to the GDR in 1971, but this was a full ten years after the GDR first acknowledged its support for the MPLA by publishing its statutes. (In fact, the SED was the first party in Eastern Europe to establish ties with the MPLA.) Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau headed a PAIGC delegation in East Berlin in 1972, while the vice president of FRELIMO, Uria T. Simango, brought a group of what was later to become the ruling party of Mozambique on a visit to the GDR as early as 1963. Samora Machel, FRELIMO's leader, addressed the SED's Eighth Party Congress in East Berlin in 1971.<sup>19</sup> In October 1972, the GDR hosted a "Solidarity Week for the Liberation Struggle of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and



Angola," one of many manifestations of "solidarity" with specific Third World movements. Joshua Nkomo met with Erich Honecker in East Germany in March 1977, a meeting which paved the way for the opening of a ZAPU office in East Berlin in January 1978, the first of its kind in the Soviet bloc. The SED has also maintained good ties with SWAPO and the African National Congress of South America, both of which opened offices in the GDR in the fall of the same year.<sup>20</sup>

Since 1976, the East German regime has visibly stepped up both the quantity and the quality of its contacts with favorably oriented African states. Table 4.4 indicates the number of high- and secondary-level visits by East German delegations to Africa and by African representatives to the GDR.\*

The GDR's diplomatic blitz in Black Africa and the Horn intensified in 1977, when the SED Politburo's ill-fated African expert, Werner Lamberz, made three separate trips to the area. In addition to stopping in Ethiopia on each journey, Lamberz visited Somalia and Mozambique in February, the People's Republic of the Congo and Zambia in June, and South Yemen in June and December. (The trips to South Yemen were directly related to the GDR's African policy, as East Germany helped train South Yemeni troops for deployment in Ethiopia's war against Somalia.) SED Politburo member Konrad Naumann led a delegation to the Cape Verde Islands in November, and Horst Sinderman, a particularly high-ranking SED leader, visited Angola and São Tomé e Príncipe in the following month. It was during a trip to the Middle East and North Africa in March 1978 that Lamberz died in a helicopter crash in Libya, thereby depriving the SED of its foremost African troubleshooter.<sup>21</sup>

Lamberz's three visits to Ethiopia in 1977 were clearly related to that country's border conflict with Somalia. Since the resolution of the conflict in Ethiopia's favor in 1978, a result achieved with considerable East German military assistance, the GDR has solidified its links with the Derg. In November 1978, Ethiopian leader Mengistu was grandly received in East Berlin, and Honecker returned the visit a year later. Mengistu's stopover in the GDR, which followed on the heels of a visit to Moscow, resulted in the signing of a Declaration of Principles on Friendship and Cooperation between Ethiopia and the

\*As defined here, "high-level" contacts include meetings between SED Politburo members and leading African party or state officials that appear to have a special political significance, whereas "secondary-level" meetings, while often important, involve GDR party or government officials in talks with personages other than the head of the state or party.

TABLE 4.4

## Total Number of High- and Secondary-Level Meetings between GDR Officials and African Leaders

Country	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Angola	1 <sup>a</sup>	1	0	0	1 <sup>a</sup>	0	6	4	2	2
Benin	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	1
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	2
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	3	3
Guinea	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	0
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	1 <sup>b</sup>	1	1	1	4	2	0	0
Mozambique	0	1	0	0	1 <sup>c</sup>	1	2	3	2	6
São Tomé e Príncipe	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0
People's Republic of the Congo	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	6	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Zambia	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3

<sup>a</sup>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).

<sup>b</sup>Partido Africano para Independência de Guiné e Caso Verde (PAIGC).

<sup>c</sup>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO).

GDR.<sup>22</sup> The document was patterned on the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that Mengistu had just concluded with the Soviet Union. The GDR got the chance to sign a treaty of its own with Ethiopia during Honecker's visit at the end of 1979.<sup>23</sup>

A comparison of these texts and statements made by Honecker at the time of their conclusion with declarations made by Mengistu reveals some interesting differences in the expressed viewpoints of the two leaders on several outstanding issues. Whereas Mengistu referred explicitly to Addis Ababa's struggle against the Eritrean secessionists ("separatist bandits") and to the victory over Somalia ("the expansionist and reactionary regime of Mogadishu"), Honecker passed over these points in silence. Both he and the documents signed in 1978 and 1979 papered over these issues with ritualistic references to the necessity of upholding the principle of territorial inviolability. Honecker also failed to echo Mengistu's claim that Ethiopia espoused the principles of Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian internationalism."<sup>24</sup> The GDR's reluctance to voice approbation of Mengistu's opinions on these issues reflected Moscow's apparent unwillingness to express public approval of the Derg's operations against the Eritreans as well as its evident desire to avoid aggravating the split with Somalia. The Soviets are also less than enthusiastic about embracing the Mengistu regime as a bona fide example of Marxist-Leninist socialism. Another possible contentious question between Ethiopia and the Soviets centers on Mengistu's tardiness in establishing a Soviet-style Communist party, which still had not been developed by the middle of 1980. It is highly possible that Honecker's negotiating agenda with Ethiopia included a frank discussion of Soviet preferences in these matters.<sup>25</sup>

Despite these nuances, there can be no doubt that Ethiopia constitutes the GDR's most important bridgehead in Black Africa. By 1978, Ethiopia had become the GDR's leading economic partner there, with a total trade of 316.5 valutamarks. This figure for the most part reflected East German exports of agricultural equipment, construction machinery, trucks, textiles, medicines, and food. Ideologically, Mengistu's idiosyncratic interpretations of Marxism-Leninism did not prevent Honecker from joining with the Ethiopian leader in laying the cornerstone for the first "Karl Marx Memorial" on the continent. Even Honecker's failure to mention the Eritrean conflict may simply have been a means of avoiding direct reference to East German military support for the Derg's struggle against the separatist movements there. According to one Eritrean leader, the GDR has provided Mengistu with additional troops and advisers for pursuing the conflict.<sup>26</sup>

Next to Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique have won the lion's share of East Germany's attentions in Africa. Honecker visited both countries on his first African swing in February 1979. In each case, long-term treaties of "friendship and cooperation" were concluded.<sup>27</sup> A comparison of these two treaties with each other and with the GDR-

Ethiopian treaty reveals some significant variations which may reflect the particular problems and varying degrees of dependence on the Soviet bloc exhibited by these three African states. As Valenta and Butler point out in Chapter 5, the treaty with Mozambique makes the most explicit reference to collaboration in the military sphere. The only reference to military assistance in the GDR-Ethiopian treaty is a veiled allusion to cooperation "in other areas" besides the political, economic, and cultural spheres. This resort to an implicit form of referring to the GDR's military aid to Ethiopia may be an additional example of the Soviet Union's desire to refrain from openly taking the Derg's side with respect to the civil war (an issue of some embarrassment to the Kremlin, which had once supported the Eritreans during Haile Selassie's rule) and to avoid further arousing Somalia's suspicions.

Curiously, however, the treaty between the GDR and Angola contains no references to military cooperation of any kind, either direct or implied. The treaty also omits mention of certain other areas of collaboration with the GDR, such as education, literature, film, the media, and the "training of cadres" (although agreements in some of these areas were concluded subsequently). Cooperation in these fields was explicitly mentioned in the treaties with Ethiopia and Mozambique. Furthermore, the GDR-Angola treaty fails to note that the two countries are working toward the "harmonization" (*Abstimmung*) of their foreign policies or that there exists a "natural anti-imperialist alliance between the socialist states and the national liberation movements." Statements to this effect were an integral part of the GDR's treaties with Mozambique and Ethiopia. Conceivably, the absence of clauses relating to these forms of cooperation with East Germany may be indicative of Neto's apparent wish to seek a greater measure of autonomy from the Soviet bloc in the period before his death. Meanwhile, in light of Mengistu's efforts to quash the Eritrean independence movements, the GDR-Ethiopian treaty does not include any support for "the people's right of self-determination," a principle staunchly defended in the GDR's treaties with Angola and Mozambique.

These differences present subtle but transparent evidence that the GDR (and the Soviet Union) must be sensitive to the particular interests of their African clients—interests which may not always coincide with those of the Soviet bloc—and to the reluctance exhibited by at least some of these states to being embraced too tightly by their benefactors in the Soviet alliance. In short, there are limits to the Soviet-East German engagement in Africa, a fact discussed at greater length by Valenta and Butler.

This is especially the case with respect to countries that are courted by the Soviets and their allies but are not exactly clients. Tanzania and Zambia represent two examples of African states with which

the GDR has at various times sought improved relations but with only modest results. Prior to Tanzania's formation out of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the government of Zanzibar in January 1964 became the first country in Africa to accord the GDR diplomatic recognition. Several months later, however, the new government of Tanzania under Julius Nyerere broke off relations with East Germany after the FRG threatened to invoke the Hallstein doctrine. Formal relations were not established until December 1972.

Zambia has become a more recent target of East German overtures. Erich Honecker visited the country on his African tour in February 1979. (The fact that the announcement that the SED chief would visit Zambia, Angola, and Libya came on the day of Honecker's departure and several days after his trip to Mozambique was revealed suggests that some difficulties may have been encountered in arranging his stops in these countries.<sup>28</sup>) His talks with Kenneth Kaunda were apparently aimed above all at putting relations between the two countries on a smoother track following the strain they had suffered in 1971, when the Zambian foreign ministry expelled the GDR's trade representative for interference in internal affairs. Zambia eventually recognized the GDR in early 1973, and received Werner Lamberz and his entourage in June 1977. Honecker's mission in 1979 resulted in a joint declaration rather than a formal treaty. Whether the GDR succeeds in drawing Zambia into closer ties remains doubtful, particularly as the Kaunda government relies heavily on trade and aid from the West. More pointedly, Zambia has good economic and political relations with the Federal Republic, as emphasized by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's visit there in 1978.<sup>29</sup>

Indeed, the economic aspects of the East-West rivalry in Africa offer the most ponderous question about the long-term prospects for the GDR's African engagement. Up to now, most of the GDR's African clients have been engaged in some form of military struggle, whether internally (for example, the MPLA, ZAPU, and SWAPO) or internationally (for example, Ethiopia and Somalia). The GDR has managed to carve out an important role for itself as a supplier of military hardware and know-how to these forces. But what will happen when these struggles are over or lose their urgency and the regimes in question must grapple with the more protracted problems of economic development? Will the GDR turn out to be as reliable a partner for economic resources as it has been for military ones?

As already noted, the GDR's record as a supplier of aid is not exceptional. Between 1969 and 1978, East Germany provided African states with \$440 million in development aid, as against \$4.2 billion sent by the FRG.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the prospects for solidifying ties by expanding trade are not very promising, considering that countries like Ethiopia have little to offer the GDR beyond coffee and fruit. This

will scarcely prove sufficient to cover the costs of importing East German technology and industrial machinery. Thus, the GDR's "trade" with many African countries in effect amounts to aid, and East Germany will therefore have to continue to operate at an economic loss there if it is to remain economically useful to them. On the positive side of the ledger, it has been reported that the GDR is importing coal from Mozambique and petroleum and copper from Angola.<sup>31</sup> Figures on these imports, however, have not been published by official East German sources.

In the long run, the GDR may have to rely increasingly on reaping the fruits of its current efforts at building a "Marxist-Leninist infrastructure" in friendly countries in order to ensure its continuing influence there. This, however, can prove to be a task of long duration, with few guarantees for success. Nevertheless, Africa will most assuredly remain a center of East German attentions in the future. It was with this interest in mind that the GDR's deputy foreign minister described Erich Honecker's first visit to the continent in 1979 as "a peak in the history of the foreign policy of the GDR."<sup>32</sup>

TABLE 4.5

GDR Trade Turnover with Selected African Countries  
(millions of valutamarks)

Country	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Angola				236.0	233.7
Ethiopia	0.6	0.2	0.2	278.2	316.5
Ghana	2.2	17.7	9.1	17.7	15.5
People's Republic of the Congo	0.3	0.1	8.0	3.8	1.0
Mozambique				24.9	130.5
Nigeria	12.9	3.3	19.4	19.3	14.4
Tanzania	6.6	6.3	2.2	2.0	12.0

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*. (This source has not published separate figures for imports and exports for most countries since 1973, and it contains no trade data for other Black African countries.)

## THE GDR AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

To be sure, economic factors are assuming a growing importance for the GDR's stake in the Third World, especially with respect to the GDR's need for more diversified energy sources. Nowhere is this more the case than in the GDR's relations with the Middle East. It is on this account that the SED regime is playing a supplicant's role once again, this time as a supplicant for oil. The GDR also plays an active role as a helpmate of Soviet policy in political dealings with favored states and groups such as South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Accordingly, the ensuing analysis of the GDR's Middle East policy will look first at East Germany's relations with oil-exporting countries and next at its more politically oriented ties with Aden and the Palestinians.

East German statistics attest to the country's growing thirst for oil. Even though the GDR presently supplies approximately two-thirds of its energy needs out of domestically produced coal, petroleum imports nearly doubled from 1970 to 1978 (from 10.3 to 19.9 million metric tons).<sup>33</sup> The overwhelming bulk of these oil supplies was imported from the Soviet Union. Indeed, at a time when the Soviets themselves are faced with the prospect of dwindling domestic reserves and are urging their Eastern European allies to look elsewhere for oil, the GDR's petroleum dependence on the Soviet Union has actually increased in recent years. In 1975, East Germany imported 88.8 percent of its petroleum from the Soviet Union; in 1978, the figure was 89.4 percent.<sup>34</sup>

The GDR's inability to secure major oil supplies from OPEC producers is partly a function of price. Although the Soviets have substantially raised the price of the oil it exports to Warsaw Pact allies since 1975, these prices are still below current world market levels. Thus the GDR has little financial incentive to turn to the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) spot market. However, political considerations have also acted to obstruct the GDR's quest for new energy supplies. As Table 4.6 indicates, Egypt was East Germany's leading petroleum supplier after the Soviet Union in 1970. The consequences of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and of President Sadat's subsequent foreign policy turnabout, however, resulted in a drastic setback in Egyptian oil deliveries to the GDR by the mid-1970s. Though trade as a whole continues to be lively between the two countries, official contacts have cooled in the wake of Sadat's Western orientation and the Camp David accords, which the GDR has vociferously condemned.<sup>35</sup> In December 1977, the Egyptian government ordered the closing of East Germany's consulate in Alexandria and two GDR cultural centers.

Iraq next emerged as the GDR's principal oil supplier after the

TABLE 4.6

Sources of GDR Petroleum Imports  
(thousands of metric tons)

Country	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Soviet Union	9,233	15,097	16,012	17,007.0	17,760.0
Egypt	932	187	180	135.0	179.0
Iraq		1,454	1,576	1,072.0	1,157.0
Syria	18	240	258	301.0	350.0
Algeria				12.7	310.6
Total	10,183	16,978	18,026	18,527.7	19,656.6
Published total*	10,334	16,997	18,036	19,042.0	19,925.0
Unaccounted for in official GDR statistics	251	19	10	514.3	268.4

\*The total figure for petroleum imports published. These official totals do not account for the sum of oil imports obtained when the columns indicating oil imports by country are added up.

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.

Soviet Union. The East Germans first began importing oil from Iraq in 1972 (369,000 metric tons), and by 1976, following the conclusion of a long-term oil agreement in the previous year, this amount had nearly tripled. In the second half of the decade, however, the Baghdad government decided, apparently for economic reasons, to expand its trade relations with the West, including the FRG.<sup>36</sup> Trade with the Soviet bloc accordingly declined over the next several years, and by 1977 this tendency was perceptible in the case of the GDR. In that year, East German oil imports from Iraq fell by nearly a third of the previous year's total and continued to fall in 1978. As if to demonstrate its declining interest in doing business with the GDR, Iraq did not attend the meeting of the joint GDR-Iraq Standing Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation scheduled for the first quarter of 1979. The meeting was held only after an SED Politburo delegation under Günther Kleiber visited Baghdad in late April. Kleiber visited the country again in September 1979 for the next meeting of the standing committee. Meanwhile, the Iraqi regime renewed its drive

against local Communists, an action which the GDR criticized while continuing to address Hussein and his fellow ministers as "comrades."<sup>37</sup>

It must be emphasized, however, that Iraq is one of the GDR's closest friends in the Middle East. The GDR's political and economic dealings with the Iraqis go back several years before the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1969. Since then, some 25 high- and secondary-level exchanges have taken place, including visits to Iraq in 1971 and 1977 by General Heinz Hoffmann, the GDR's defense minister. (Since 1973, Hoffmann has also been a member of the SED Politburo, in recognition of the political importance of his position.) Finally, as noted earlier, Iraq is by far the GDR's leading trade partner in the Third World. What the GDR's somewhat disappointing experience in its oil dealings with Baghdad seems to indicate is that, as a general rule, political friendship is no guarantee of secure petroleum supplies.

Syria has lately become another promising source of petroleum for the motors of East Germany. Oil imports from Syria have risen steadily over the last several years, reaching a total of 350,000 metric tons in 1978. However, the GDR's relations with President Assad's regime, while friendly, are subject to the same tensions that occasionally disturb Moscow's ties with Damascus. Assad has been reluctant to reduce economic links with the West and has generally sought sufficient room for independent maneuver in Middle East politics to avoid complete subservience to Soviet wishes. Like a number of Arab states joined together in the "Steadfast Front" against Israel, Syria calls for the dissolution of the state of Israel, a cause which the Soviet Union does not share. The limits of Assad's willingness to adopt Moscow's views on a number of issues were apparent during the Syrian president's visit to East Berlin in October 1978. Assad confined his remarks primarily to Middle East questions, whereas Honecker addressed issues of European security and condemned the NATO powers for intervention in Africa and in the Middle and Far East. If diplomatic salutations are any guide to the degree of intimacy existing between two states, then perhaps there is some significance in the fact that Honecker referred to Assad as "Esteemed Comrad," whereas Assad addressed the SED chief merely as "Esteemed Mr. Chairman Erich Honecker."<sup>38</sup> The Syrian leader's visit concluded with the signing of a rather bland Joint Declaration on Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries.<sup>39</sup>

Despite these elements of stiffness in the GDR-Syrian relationship, Syria and the GDR continue to enjoy close relations. Exchanges of various official delegations began long before Syria formally recognized the GDR in 1969, and they have continued unabated ever since. The visit of an East German military delegation under General Hoff-

mann in 1971 and meetings involving the GDR's interior minister with his Syrian counterpart in 1969, 1975, and 1976 are clear signs of the GDR's interest in Syrian military and police organizations. In addition, the pace of high-level SED Politburo meetings with Syrian officials has quickened in recent years. Between 1969 and 1973, there were ten secondary-level meetings between officials of the two states and only one high-level encounter. Since 1974, however, there have been eight high-level meetings (including trips to Baghdad by Sieder-mann in 1974, and Kleiber in 1975 and 1977 and twice in 1979) and seven secondary-level meetings. Moreover, trade with Syria continues to rise (see Table 4.7).

TABLE 4.7

GDR Trade Turnover with Selected Middle Eastern Countries  
(millions of valutamarks)

Country	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Algeria	27.2	72.9	120.3	101.3	324.0
Egypt	389.7	639.6	559.2	546.3	442.2
Iraq	48.7	764.2	779.0	595.0	724.7
Iran	27.4	62.1	96.9	120.8	159.5
Kuwait	8.9	31.0	39.7	42.6	38.0
Lebanon	32.7	58.2	67.9	35.7	55.2
Libya	6.4	12.1	63.3	84.8	13.3
Morocco	20.3	48.6	33.9	47.1	71.2
Sudan	25.0	33.3	47.7	51.3	46.1
Syria	67.0	211.2	348.6	344.4	405.7
Tunisia	10.3	13.4	15.4	29.2	25.3

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. (This source provides no data on trade with South Yemen.)

Algeria has lately blossomed into another source of petroleum supplies. Oil imports rose from a mere 12,700 metric tons in 1977 to over 310,000 in 1978. However, the GDR has not engaged in direct high-level or secondary-level official contacts with Algeria to the same extent as it has with Iraq or Syria. Since establishing diplomatic relations with Algeria in 1970, the GDR has sent Defense Minister Hoffmann to Algiers in 1973, and the SED Politburo's economics ex-

pert, Günter Mittag, in 1977 and 1980. It has also signaled its support for Algeria's demand for independence for the former Spanish Sahara region currently contested between Morocco and the POLISARIO liberation movement.

Perhaps the most controversial ties between the GDR and the Middle East center on Libya and Iran. While both states are known to have supplied petroleum to the GDR in recent years, the East German regime has not published statistics on these transactions. (This may account for the fact that the sum of the oil imports from the countries listed in Table 4.6 is less than the official figure for total annual petroleum imports.) Both states represent regimes that are by nature reprehensible to Soviet-style socialism. Qaddafi's militant Islamic ideas, while fundamentally anti-Western, include a vehement denunciation of communism, and the Shah's regime was hardly ideal from Marxist-Leninist point of view. Nevertheless, the GDR began moving closer to both states in the late 1970s, and in large measure because of economic considerations.

Libya entered into diplomatic relations with the GDR in June 1973. Following the exchange of three secondary-level delegations (in 1975, 1976, and 1977) the GDR moved to upgrade the level of its contacts with Qaddafi's government in the fall of 1977. Politburo member Hermann Axen, responsible for international contacts, visited the country in October 1977, and was soon followed by Special Ambassador Lamberz, who arrived in Tripoli in December of the same year. It was on his second trip to Libya that Lamberz was killed in March 1978.

The high points of the GDR-Libyan relationship were reached when Qaddafi visited East Berlin in June 1978 during a tour of Soviet-bloc countries and when Honecker went to Tripoli on his African trip in February 1979. Although friendly words were exchanged, the visits did not result in any formal friendship and cooperation treaty. The communiqués signed on both occasions contained some clear differences of opinion when compared with Honecker's earlier remarks. In particular, they did not refer to the SED chief's anti-NATO opinions.<sup>40</sup>

This omission was more than just an oversight. Libya's trade with the West, and particularly with the FRG, has grown in recent years,\* thus providing Qaddafi with additional incentives to avoid

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\*West German imports from Libya amounted to 3.4 billion DM in 1975, 5.2 billion in 1976, 5.0 billion in 1977, and 3.4 billion in 1978. FRG exports went from 1.3 billion in 1975 to 1.6 billion in 1978. In addition, the level of FRG investments is high. Qaddafi has sought

moving too closely toward the Soviet bloc. The latent inter-German rivalry observable in these relationships appears to have worked to the GDR's disadvantage.

The GDR's connections with the Shah were especially intriguing. Sindermann visited Teheran in 1973, and the president of the National Iranian Oil Company, Egbal, met with Premier Willi Stoph in East Berlin in June 1977. Economic cooperation between the two nations intensified as the result of additional meetings between responsible officials. In September 1977, a delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Rauchfuss met with the Shah and Prime Minister Amuzegar, and two months later Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer came to Iran for another meeting with the Shah. Most importantly, the GDR was on the verge of welcoming the Shah in East Berlin in late 1978, on the eve of his overthrow.

Prior to this event, relations between the GDR and Iran suffered a minor jolt in February 1978, when the GDR arrested a group of Iranian students who had been demonstrating against the Shah in front of the Iranian embassy in East Berlin. After sentencing a dozen of them to jail terms of up to a year, the East German authorities quickly expelled them. (Most had been students in West Berlin.) Iran complained that the students should have been imprisoned and recalled its ambassador on March 2. To calm the situation, a special emissary was dispatched to Teheran in May, bearing a letter from Honecker to the Shah. Matters were sufficiently smoothed over by late summer to enable the GDR to announce on September 9 that the Shah would begin a three-day visit to East Germany on September 14. The announcement was preceded by an interview with the Iranian monarch published in Neues Deutschland on September 6, in which the interviewers praised the Shah's "resolve" in seeking "a new democratic international economic order."<sup>41</sup> However, the revolutionary tumult that erupted in Iran shortly thereafter compelled the Shah to cancel the visit.

In the aftermath of the Shah's fall, the GDR moved cautiously to establish links with the new provisional government in Teheran. One week after his appointment as prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan received a telegram from Erich Honecker on February 13, 1979, which called for continuing cooperation between the two countries. The GDR's ambassador in Iran met with Foreign Minister Zandshahi ten days later to pursue this aim. In late May, the GDR-Iran Standing Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation met for the fourth time since its inception under the Shah. Meanwhile, GDR press com-

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to improve political relations with Bonn in recent years, concluding an agreement to cooperate in combating terrorism, among other things.

mentary on Iranian events, while showing no great enthusiasm for Ayatollah Khomeini, offered guarded approval for the revolution and printed periodic reports of "U. S. threats" against the new regime. (These reports continued following the takeover of the U. S. embassy in November 1979.)

In spite of these efforts to maintain a working relationship with the revolutionary government, the GDR suffered a decline in oil imports from Iran in the aftermath of the fall of the Shah. Although reliable statistics on the extent of this shortfall are not available, it may be reasonably concluded that, in the wake of Khomeini's cancellation of the second pipeline to the Soviet Union and the general disruption of Iranian oil production that accompanied the revolution, the collapse of the Shah's regime brought at least a temporary economic loss for the GDR. It should be emphasized, however, that this loss probably involved little more than 1 percent of the GDR's total oil imports.

It is largely strategic and political rather than economic considerations that underlie the GDR's relations with South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organization. With its critical location at the foot of the Arabian peninsula, the People's Republic of Yemen has been the object of Soviet-bloc overtures ever since the South Yemeni regime took an anti-Western turn in 1969. In June of that year, diplomatic relations were established with the GDR, and trade and related agreements followed in the fall. As was later to be the case in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique, the GDR began providing South Yemen with credits, agricultural and communications technology, and scores of economic advisers, propagandists, and teachers. Functionaries of South Yemen's Socialist party are known to have been trained in SED party schools. The GDR has been especially active in providing instructors and equipment for South Yemen's army and security police and may even have trained members of the Aden-based People's Liberation Front of Oman (PLFO). GDR advisers also assisted the Yemeni regime in writing its constitution.<sup>42</sup> More than any other state in the Middle East, South Yemen has come the closest to allowing the GDR to attempt to build a Marxist-Leninist infrastructure, although it is still too early to determine how far this effort has proceeded.

In the second half of the 1970s, high-level contacts between the two countries increased substantially, culminating in Erich Honecker's visit to Aden in November 1979. Earlier, State Council Chairman Willi Stoph and Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer traveled to Aden in 1976, and Werner Lamberz and General Hoffmann followed suit the following year. These latter two visits were almost certainly intended to coordinate the GDR's training of Yemeni troops for operations against Somalia in Ogaden. Honecker's trip resulted in the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which confirmed the "harmonization

of foreign policy activities" of the contracting parties for the next 20 years.<sup>43</sup> Although South Yemen is officially regarded in East Berlin as a "national-democratic state," Honecker addressed his host, Abdul Fattah Ismail, as "Comrade" and had words of praise for Islam.<sup>44</sup> He was less enthusiastic than Ismail about the desirability of reuniting North and South Yemen, however, although the final communique expressed the GDR's "satisfaction" with the Kuwait and Sanaa declarations regarding reunification.<sup>45</sup> In sum, South Yemen constitutes the most successful achievement to date of the GDR's activities as a Soviet surrogate in the Middle East.

The GDR's ties with the PLO have also developed significantly in recent years. On the basis of agreements signed in 1973 and 1978, the GDR has provided "noncivilian equipment" and financial assistance to the PLO, which complements considerable propaganda support.<sup>46</sup> Honecker met personally with Arafat on two occasions in 1978, and the PLO leader maintains contacts with East German representatives, in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. In general, the GDR has strictly followed the Soviet line on the Middle East, tempering its support for a Palestinian state and opposition to the Camp David process with reluctance to support the PLO's demand for the destruction of Israel. Here again, the GDR plays a valuable supporting role on behalf of Soviet interests.

#### THE GDR AND SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Of all the Third World nations of Asia, stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Philippine Islands, India remains the chief object of the GDR's attentions. Honecker himself underscored East Germany's special interest in India when he led a 167-member delegation there in January 1979. The visit climaxed a series of high-level exchanges between the two countries which received a particular impetus in 1976, when Indira Gandhi became the first non-Communist head of government to make a state visit to the GDR. Earlier in the same year, the ubiquitous General Hoffmann headed a military delegation to India, possibly to coordinate East German training programs for pilots of India's MIG-21s,<sup>47</sup> and Sindermann led a group to New Delhi in 1978.

The GDR's ties with India date from 1954, when the first trade agreement was concluded between the two countries. Over the course of the next decades, the GDR adopted the same positions as the Soviet Union in its stance toward India, voicing support for New Delhi's position in its conflicts with Portugal, Pakistan, and China and expressing "sympathy" for Indira Gandhi's emergency laws.<sup>48</sup> Following her removal from power, political relations cooled somewhat, and this

coolness was reflected in the atmosphere surrounding Honecker's visit. The communique that concluded the trip was somewhat perfunctory, and neither Prime Minister Desai nor President Reddy expressed any enthusiasm for Honecker's expressions of solidarity with Vietnam's struggle in Cambodia or with Brezhnev's proposals for European disarmament of October 1978. It may therefore be assumed that the East Germans were just as pleased as the Soviets when Ghandi returned to power.

Afghanistan has assumed a special importance for all Soviet-bloc states as a consequence of the Soviet invasion of December 1979, which followed a series of changes in the Afghan leadership. To date the GDR's role in the wake of the invasion has largely been devoted to echoing approval of Soviet actions.<sup>49</sup> The first "solidarity aid" to Afghanistan was dispatched in September 1978 by the GDR's solidarity committees, and East German hospitals have been caring for injured Soviet soldiers in the period since the invasion began. Despite this obligatory backing of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the GDR may have good reason to feel uncomfortable about some of its consequences. For one thing, the GDR joined with the Soviets in losing face before the majority of Third World states at the United Nations, where the invasion was roundly condemned. East Germany's pro-invasion stance was particularly visible inasmuch as the GDR was taking its turn as a member of the Security Council when the issue came up for consideration in late January and used its vote to sustain the Soviet veto of a resolution denouncing the invasion. For another, East Berlin has a great deal of economic and other benefits to lose in the event of a rupture of detente and a reversion to a tenuous East-West relationship. As a result, the East Germans have sought to prevent the Afghan events from damaging their ties with West Germany and other Western European states.

Most of the GDR's East Asian engagement has been concentrated in the Communist states of the region. Trade and political relations with the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia tend to be considerably less intense than the GDR's involvement in Africa or the Middle East. The pinnacle of direct high-level contacts in this area was reached in December 1977, when Honecker led a delegation to the Philippines. The apparent purposes of the visit, beyond simply demonstrating the GDR's interest in Southeast Asia, were to improve trade relations and promote Soviet schemes for an Asian collective security agreement. Although the trip resulted in the signing of a trade agreement, the communique made no mention of the Soviet proposal.<sup>50</sup> The GDR's relations with other countries in the region are generally limited to trade ties and the usual propaganda support for Communist or allied forces.

TABLE 4.8

GDR Trade Turnover with Non-Communist Asian States  
(millions of valutamarks)

Country <sup>c</sup>	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
India	276.9	351.4	348.1	339.3	472.1
Indonesia	6.9	22.2	28.5	41.7	39.9
Malaysia		22.8	28.1	48.4	52.9
Pakistan	0.5	17.4	30.3	14.2	11.9
Sri Lanka	20.5	28.7	27.8	14.1	14.8

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. (This source contains no data for trade with other non-Communist Asian states.)

#### THE GDR AND LATIN AMERICA

Ever since the inauguration of the Allende government in Chile in 1970, the GDR has manifested a widening interest in the problems of Latin America. Earlier, East Germany's presence in the area was confined largely to trade relations with a handful of governments, the most important of which (Brazil) it regarded as politically contemptible. Allende's election brought a decided upsurge in the GDR's economic and political engagement in the region. Between 1970 and 1973, the GDR demonstrated its support for the Allende regime by means of extensive activity on the part of its solidarity committees and vastly increased trade relations. (GDR exports to Chile grew from 3.3 million VM in 1969 to 32 million VM in 1973, while imports increased from 0.2 million VM to 69.2 million in the same years.)<sup>51</sup> Even now some 1,500 Chilean exiles who supported Allende reside in the GDR.<sup>52</sup>

A recent analysis of Latin America by an East German specialist concluded that, despite the success of the "counterrevolutionary violence" exercised by the United States in Chile and elsewhere on the continent, the prospects for "national-democratic and anti-imperialistic revolutions" are improving, thus "clearing the path for socialism." Recent revolutionary developments in Nicaragua and Grenada are singled out as prime examples of this process, and leftist forces in other countries are seen as becoming "strengthened" as a result of efforts to repress them. Meanwhile, Mexico and Venezuela are described as oil-rich states exhibiting "tendencies toward a stronger anti-imperialist consciousness."<sup>53</sup>



While some of this analysis borders on the hyperbolic, it is nevertheless true that events in several Latin American countries have lately opened up new opportunities for the GDR to expand its political and economic undertakings there. Nicaragua is a case in point. In addition to providing rhetorical support for the Sandinistas for several years, the GDR signaled its willingness to help the revolutionary regime by sending Foreign Minister Fischer to Nicaragua in September 1979, barely two months after recognizing the new post-Somoza government. In December an East German plane transported a group of wounded Sandinistas to the GDR for medical treatment,<sup>54</sup> and in early April 1980 a series of agreements on economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation were signed, all "in the spirit of anti-imperialist solidarity."<sup>55</sup> Elsewhere in Latin America, the GDR has sought to improve ties with Guyana (President Burnham met with Honecker in East Berlin in 1978) and Panama (which signed a trade agreement with the GDR in early 1980). In addition, the SED maintains good contacts with established Latin American Communist parties.

Meanwhile, the GDR has also sought to broaden its economic dealings in the area in accordance with its role as an oil supplicant. Mexico, with its newly discovered petroleum reserves, has come to occupy a special place in East Germany's calculations. Honecker sent a special message to President Lopez-Portillo in March 1978, and in November the first meeting of the GDR-Mexico Mixed Government Commission was convened in East Berlin. Most importantly, Günter Mittag visited Mexico in June 1980, and signed trade agreements which foresee a turnover of \$250 million by 1982. In addition, Mittag concluded special long-term agreements providing for cooperative undertakings by the state-run industrial sectors of the two countries. These agreements will enable the GDR to take advantage of low production costs in Mexico to manufacture products there for export to North America. For its part, Mexico did not come through with the desired promises of oil deliveries to the GDR, at least until 1983. Clearly, however, the GDR hopes to gain a firm economic foothold in Mexico, with a view to gaining eventual access to its prized petroleum resources.<sup>56</sup>

The GDR has also sought to expand its trade relations with Ecuador and Colombia, both of which welcomed Fischer for talks in 1979, as well as with other traditional trade partners, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Peru (see Table 4.9). Even Pinochet's Chile, despite constant vilification in the East German press, signed a trade agreement in June 1980, following two years of negotiations initiated at the GDR's behest.<sup>57</sup>

In short, Latin America is developing into a fertile area for East Germany's dual activities as Soviet surrogate and economic supplicant. While it by no means occupies the same level of importance for the

TABLE 4.9

GDR Trade Turnover with Selected Latin American Countries  
(millions of valutamarks)

Country	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Argentina	11.3	26.4	47.3	169.9	148.8
Brazil	242.5	263.5	498.7	462.9	507.4
Colombia	57.6	40.0	120.0	153.1	102.2
Mexico	13.8	35.8	33.9	44.2	49.6
Peru	50.5	122.7	126.3	232.7	157.8

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. (This source contains no trade data for other Latin American countries.)

GDR as does Africa or the Middle East, its potential for development as a target of future GDR engagement cannot be underestimated.

#### FUNCTIONS OF THE GDR'S THIRD WORLD ENGAGEMENT

The GDR's activities in the Third World may be viewed as fulfilling four functions: (1) assisting the Soviet Union's efforts to influence various Third World states or liberation movements; (2) providing the GDR with necessary import goods and export markets; (3) enhancing the international visibility and prestige of the GDR, a goal which assumes special significance in view of East Germany's continuing rivalry with the Federal Republic; and (4) bolstering the internal legitimacy of the GDR.

Little has been said thus far about the last two functions. Both, however, are important features of the GDR's Third World engagement. Even though the GDR has normalized its relations with Bonn and has won diplomatic recognition by nearly all the states of the world as a consequence, the rivalry with the FRG for prestige and influence in the Third World remains a live issue. On occasion, the GDR has gained support among developing nations for its political positions with respect to the "German question." Certain of the GDR's "friendship and cooperation" treaties, for example, refer to "Berlin" as "the capital of the German Democratic Republic," and some states (such as Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau) have actually rejected aid from the FRG owing in part to differences over the status of Berlin.<sup>58</sup>

The East German government has also developed its own version of the "sole representation" theory, presenting itself as the sole custodian of the "good" German traditions of social justice, cultural development, and peace, in contrast to the negative traits of imperialism allegedly characteristic of the Federal Republic.

To be sure, the GDR still perceives itself as engaged in a continuing rivalry with the FRG in the Third World. Articles appearing in East German foreign policy journals periodically denounce Bonn's "neocolonial" designs, which are ostensibly aimed at undermining relations between the Third World and the Soviet bloc and at keeping open the "German question" to the detriment of the GDR's ties with the less developed countries.<sup>59</sup> This view corresponds fully with the GDR's (and the Kremlin's) notion that detente is not indivisible; hence, the diminution of inter-German tensions in Europe does not of itself imply a need for the GDR to abate the "ideological confrontation" in other parts of the world.<sup>60</sup> As a result, the GDR not only keeps up a steady barrage of propaganda assaults at Bonn's Third World policies but has even used its influence in certain client states to obstruct their relations with Bonn. Thus, the GDR was probably responsible for Ethiopia's expulsion of the West German ambassador in 1978 and for the collapse of negotiations between the FRG and Mozambique and Cape Verde in the same year.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, a good deal of East Germany's propaganda and other activities at the United Nations are also directed squarely at the FRG.<sup>62</sup> For its part, the government of the Federal Republic, while holding to its position on Berlin, has been working to avoid direct conflicts with the GDR in the Third World in the interest of maintaining correct, and occasionally even cooperative, inter-German relations there.<sup>63</sup>

As a general rule, however, it is mainly in closely allied client states that the GDR has succeeded in curbing or blocking improved relations with the FRG. Since the leaders of these states, normally a group of self-proclaimed "Socialists," tend to be predisposed against the West anyway, it is perhaps surprising that the East Germans and the Soviets must occasionally use pressure to prevent them from seeking to establish closer economic or political contacts with Bonn. Elsewhere in the Third World, however, the GDR has been less successful in wooing erstwhile "anti-imperialistic" countries into more intimate ties at the expense of relations with the West. In part this failure has been due to political factors (such as commitments by the states in question to real nonalignment or to a rejection of communism), but economic considerations also play a role.

On occasion these economic factors join with political ones in thwarting the GDR's efforts to counter Bonn's influence in the Third World, largely as a result of the FRG's superior economic engagement in Third World countries. GDR writers themselves note that

Bonn allocated 3.4 billion DM to development aid in 1979 alone and that by 1977 the FRG had exported state and private capital to the developing world in excess of 120 billion DM.<sup>64</sup> The FRG's contributions to such funds as the United Nations Development Program have also substantially exceeded those of the GDR.<sup>65</sup> As we have already seen, certain states courted by the GDR have held back from intensifying their relations with the Soviet bloc at least in part because of their need for Western aid or trade (such as Libya and Zambia). Even the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, clearly a target of GDR overtures, recently manifested its interest in obtaining economic assistance from all possible sources when it sent separate delegations to the GDR and the FRG to discuss aid requests. Over the long term, the West's substantial economic involvement in the developing countries may prove to be a major factor in countering Soviet-bloc influences in the Third World.

The internal function that is served by the GDR's endeavors in the Third World is clearly regarded by the SED leadership as an important one. Visits to East Berlin by Third World dignitaries and the reception accorded East German leaders abroad have been portrayed with banner headlines and photographs on the front page of Neues Deutschland with growing frequency. The manifest pride the GDR authorities take in these displays of public diplomacy is obviously intended to "rub off" on the citizens of the GDR, with a view to extracting greater popular support for the SED as the legitimate ruling force in a duly recognized state. It should also be pointed out that the GDR's front-and-center involvement in the Third World demonstrably contributes to enhancing its prestige among its Warsaw Pact allies. It may very well be the case that the GDR hopes to make the GDR as indispensable to the Soviet Union in the Third World as it is in Europe.

However significant these last two functions may be, it is the first two that directly underlie the GDR's motivations in the Third World. The role of Soviet surrogate and the role of economic supplicant are unquestionably the most vital functions that East Germany's Third World policies perform. Although the prevalence of one role over the other may vary from country to country, on the whole the GDR is presently both a surrogate and a supplicant in the Third World. But what will the future bring?

As already mentioned, East Germany's interventions in several Third World countries in recent years have involved political, military, and economic support for "Socialist" regimes struggling for internal supremacy or against foreign adversaries. The checkered history of numerous developing nations in the last decades, however, offers ample warnings against the assumption that pro-Soviet clients maintain either their domestic power or their foreign friendships indefinitely. East German writers on the Third World appear to be

grimly aware of the unpredictable nature of these realities. Whether the Soviet Union and its allies can "hold on" to countries like Ethiopia (which recently signed a mutual assistance treaty with Kenya) or Angola (which has shown some signs of moving away from excessive reliance on Moscow) thus remains an open question. Furthermore, the economic costs to the GDR of helping to maintain its various clients may prove to be a severe strain on the East German economy, which is already beset with staggering costs and decelerating growth rates. Thus the GDR's successes in the developing world are not without insecurities or liabilities.

In addition, it appears certain that the GDR's future relations with the Third World will also center around its need for petroleum and other raw materials. In this domain, too, success is neither guaranteed nor inexpensive. What is certain is that the price of OPEC oil will impose yet another strain on the East German economic system (as well as on its foreign currency reserves), while the availability of supplies will hinge to no small extent on political decisions that neither Moscow nor East Berlin may be able to influence, no matter how great their political support for the countries in question.

In the end, the GDR's Third World ventures, like the imperialist ambitions of the Western powers in an earlier epoch, may prove to bring more burdens than benefits.

## NOTES

1. For Nehru's attitude, see Eberhard Schneider, "Südasiens," in Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, et al., (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), pp. 703-4. For Nasser's, see Bernard von Plate, "Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten sowie der Maghreb," *ibid.*, p. 681.

2. For an elaboration of the international dimensions of the inter-German conflict in this period, see Heinrich End, Zweimal deutsche Aussenpolitik (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1972).

3. In the period 1950-71, the FRG dispersed some \$5 billion in the Third World. Cited in Hans Siegfried Lamm and Siegfried Kupper, DDR und Dritte Welt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1976), p. 139.

4. Egypt's "invitation" to Ulbricht was actually the result of a letter from the SED leader to Nasser informing him that, for reasons of health, a visit to a warm country would be desirable. See Henning von Löwis, "Das politische und militärische Engagement der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in Schwarzafrika," Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung, no. 1 (1978): 23.

5. In 1977, an East German writer listed the following states in

this category: Algeria, Angola, Burma, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique, Somalia, Syria, and Tunisia. Ethiopia is conspicuously absent from this list. See Martin Robbe, "Die Dritte Welt: Deutung und Fehldeutung," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 3 (1977): 69-70.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

7. See G. Brehme, ed., Der national-demokratische Staat in Asien und Afrika (East Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1976).

8. Robbe, "Die Dritte Welt," pp. 75-78.

9. Brehme, Der national-demokratische Staat, pp. 147, 148.

10. See Helmut Faulwetter and Gerhard Scharschmidt, "Die Forderung der Entwicklungsländer nach einer 'Neuen internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung' im Lichte einiger jüngster Entwicklungstendenzen im kapitalistischen Weltwirtschaftssystem," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 3 (1978): 74-78.

11. Statement by the GDR representative to the U. N. Economic Commission, November 14, 1979. Cited in Deutschland Archiv, no. 12 (1979): 1347.

12. Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, 1979.

13. Cited in Lamm and Kupper, DDR und Dritte Welt, p. 136.

14. Tadeusz T. Kaczmarek, "Stosunki ekonomiczno-handlowe NRD z krajami rozwijającymi się," Handel Zagraniczny, no. 2 (1979): 16-18. I am indebted to Dr. Heinrich Machowski for providing me with this source.

15. For a discussion of the domestic repercussions of the GDR's current economic predicament and their possible evolution in the 1980s, see Michael J. Sodaro, "Foreign and Domestic Policy Linkages in the GDR" (Paper prepared for the Conference on Eastern Europe in the 1980s, George Washington University, April 4-5, 1980).

16. On the role of the GDR solidarity committees, see Kurt Krüger, "Solidarität der DDR mit den Völkern Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 10 (1979): 52-64.

17. See, for example, Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?," Washington Quarterly 3, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 21-37; and Joachim Nawrocki, "Hoffmanns Afrikakorps," Die Zeit, May 26, 1978.

18. For an account of the GDR's early political relations with Africa, see Löwis, "DDR in Schwarzafrika," pp. 5-38.

19. See Ilona Schleicher, "Internationalistische Entwicklung der FRELIMO und ihre Beziehungen zur SED," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 7 (1979): 62-76.

20. See Jürgen Zenker, "Zusammenarbeit der SED mit revolutionär-demokratischen Parteien in Afrika und Asien," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 10 (1977): 93-106. The GDR's consistent support for

Nkomo prior to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 served to sour its relations with Mugabe's government afterward. For an East German study that glosses over these facts, see Christa Schaffmann, Simbabwe ist frei (East Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1980).

21. See Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Das afrikanische Erbe von Werner Lamberz," Deutschland Archiv, no. 4 (1978): 348-51.

22. For the text, see Neues Deutschland, November 26, 1978 (hereafter cited as ND).

23. For the text, see ND, November 19, 1979.

24. See, for example, the toasts offered by Honecker and Mengistu in ND, November 27, 1978, and Honecker's speech in ND, November 15, 1979.

25. The GDR's support for Mengistu has not always been consistent. While the power struggle in the Derg was still on, the GDR hinted its support for Teferi Benti, who was subsequently shot by Mengistu himself. See Bernard von Plate, "Aspekte der SED-Parteibeziehungen in Afrika und der arabischen Region," Deutschland Archiv, no. 2 (1979): 144.

26. See the statement by Taha Mohammed of the Eritrean Liberation Front, cited in Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Die DDR als Schrittmacher im weltrevolutionären Prozess," Deutschland Archiv, no. 1 (1980): 44.

27. The text of the GDR-Angola treaty is in ND, February 20, 1979; the GDR-Mozambique treaty is in ND, February 26, 1979.

28. See Johannes Kuppe, pp. 347-52. "Investitionen, die sich lohnten," Deutschland Archiv, no. 4 (1979).

29. Between 1975 and 1978, the FRG imported 983.2 million DM worth of goods from Zambia and exported goods worth 632.3 million DM. See Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

30. Der Spiegel, no. 10 (1980): 43. Löwis has estimated that the GDR spends more than \$250 million per year in Africa, of which \$100 million is for military purposes. See "Africa, Expensive Luxury at \$250 million a Year," To the Point, September 22, 1978.

31. Der Spiegel, no. 10 (1980): 52.

32. Klaus Willerding, "Zur Afrikapolitik der DDR," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 8 (1979): 5.

33. Statistisches Jahrbuch 1979 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.

34. Calculated from figures in *ibid.*

35. On the GDR's reactions to the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, see Henning von Löwis of Menar, "Geschichte ist ein schneller Reiter," Deutschland Archiv, no. 5 (1979): 461-64.

36. Direct FRG exports to Iraq jumped from 931.4 million DM in 1974 to 2.5 billion in 1975. Over the next several years, FRG ex-

ports averaged 1.7 billion DM. Meanwhile, the value of West German oil imports from Iraq went from 285 million DM in 1975 to 386 million DM in 1978. See Statistisches Bundesamt, Aussenhandel mit den Entwicklungsländern (Spezialhandel), 1978.

37. See Kurt Seliger, "Solidarität und Staatsraison," Deutschland Archiv, no. 11 (1979): 1195-97.

38. ND, October 2, 1978.

39. For the text, see ND, October 5, 1978.

40. For the texts, see ND, June 29, 1978, and February 19, 1979. See also Kuppe, *Investitionen*, p. 348.

41. ND, September 6, 1978.

42. See Löwis of Menar, "Die DDR als Schrittmacher," pp. 46, 48.

43. For the text, see ND, November 19, 1979.

44. See Honecker's toast in ND, November 16, 1979.

45. ND, November 19, 1979.

46. See Peter Dittmar, "Uneingeschränkte Unterstützung," Deutschland Archiv, no. 8 (1978): 807.

47. See Johannes Kuppe, "Honecker in Indien," Deutschland Archiv, no. 2 (1979): 120-23.

48. *Ibid.* See also Lamm and Kupper, *DDR und Dritte Welt*, for a case study of Indian-GDR relations, and Schneider, "Südasiens," pp. 699 ff.

49. For the GDR's reactions to events in Afghanistan, see Karl Wilhelm Fricke, "Der Fall Afghanistan im Spiegel des Neuen Deutschlands," Deutschland Archiv, no. 2 (1980): 123-26.

50. For the communique, see ND, December 9, 1977. See also Joachim Glaubitz, "Ost und Südostasien sowie Ozeanien," in Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, et al. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), p. 735.

51. Cited in Heinrich Bischof, "Lateinamerika (Ausser Kuba)," in Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, et al. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), p. 649.

52. Krüger, "Solidarität der DDT," p. 64.

53. Manfred Uschner, "Neue revolutionäre Erschütterungen in Lateinamerika," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 12 (1979): 43, 45.

54. ND, December 28, 1979.

55. ND, April 2, 1980. No precise figures were cited in this source.

56. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 9, 1980.

57. Der Tagespiegel (West Berlin), June 15, 1980.

58. Der Spiegel, no. 10 (1980): 58-59. See also Löwis of Menar, "Die DDR als Schrittmacher," pp. 40-41.

59. See, for example, Gertraud Liebscher, "Die Politik der BRD gegenüber Entwicklungsländern," Deutsche Aussenpolitik, no. 3

(1980): 47-49. The GDR has also criticized the efforts of the SPD and the Socialist International in support of social democratic movements in the Third World. See Uschner, "Neue revolutionäre Erschütterungen in Lateinamerika," pp. 51-52.

60. On the GDR's efforts to maintain favorable ties with the FRG in the wake of the Iran and Afghanistan events, see "East Germany Worried About A Confrontation with West over Iran," New York Times, April 20, 1980.

61. von Plate, "Aspekte der SED," p. 141.

62. For an extended treatment of the GDR's role in the United Nations, see Wilhelm Bruns, Die UNO-Politik der DDR (Stuttgart: Verlag Bonn Aktuell, 1978).

63. Der Spiegel, no. 10 (1980): 60-61.

64. Liebscher, "Die Politik der BRD," pp. 52, 53.

65. Between 1976 and 1980 (inclusive), the FRG's contributions to the UNDP totaled \$272,054,135, while the GDR contributed \$5,651,817. Source: UNDP, New York.

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