

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Cable Files
Folder: Habib Trip 06/12/1982-06/13/1982
Box: 45

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: CABLE FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/23/2009

File Folder HABIB TRIP 06/12/1982-06/13/1982

FOIA

F04-010/1

Box Number 45

SHAHAR

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65371	CABLE	JERUSALEM 01886 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	8	6/12/1982	B1
65372	CABLE	BEIRUT 04144 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	3	6/12/1982	B1
65373	CABLE	STATE 163009 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	7	6/12/1982	B1
65374	CABLE	STATE 163010 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	2	6/12/1982	B1
65375	CABLE	BEIRUT 4158 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	3	6/12/1982	B1
65376	CABLE	JERUSALEM 01897 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	1	6/13/1982	B1
65377	CABLE	JERUSALEM 01898 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	1	6/13/1982	B1
65378	CABLE	JERUSALEM 01902 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	1	6/13/1982	B1
65379	CABLE	JERUSALEM 01903 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	10	6/13/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 709

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE135
STU7867
UD RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1886/01 1632155
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
Q 122148Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2464
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8083
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1648
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 7892
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2463
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0628
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01886

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2,4 6/12/02 (HABIB, AMB.)

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, IS, LE, SY, US, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: JUNE 12 MEETING WITH FONMIN SHAMIR ON CEASEFIRE IN BEIRUT

1. (✓ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY LEWIS, DRAPER, BROWN, AND HOWELL CALLED AT 1900 LOCAL ON FONMIN SHAMIR IN HIS OFFICE. SHAMIR WAS JOINED BY KIMCHE AND BAR-ON FOR THE ONE-HOUR MEETING WHICH CENTERED ON ARRANGING AN EARLY CEASEFIRE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE MEETING, WE WERE INFORMED BY PHONE THAT LEBANESE PM WAZZAN HAD OBTAINED PLO COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE AT 2100 LOCAL AND THAT, WHILE WAZZAN WAS SEEKING TO HAVE THE PLO ANNOUNCE ITS INTENTION, HE WAS UNCERTAIN THAT HE WOULD SUCCEED.

3. HABIB OPENED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE BEIRUT AREA HAD BECOME SO SERIOUS AND SO INTOLERABLE THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM FACE-TO-FACE. THE FIGHTING HAD TO BE ENDED. THE USG, HE SAID, IS RECEIVING REPORTS, INCLUDING FROM AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, OF THE ALARMING CONDITIONS IN THE CITY AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI SHELLING AND BOMBING. THE ATTACKS HAVE NOW MOVED INTO RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF THE CITY NOT PREVIOUSLY AFFECTED, CAUSING CASUALTIES OF A SCOPE WHICH WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS HAVE DESCRIBED TO US AS A "SLAUGHTER."

4. HABIB RECALLED THAT WHEN HE HAD SPOKEN WITH KIMCHE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65371

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ABOUT THIS SITUATION IN THE AFTERNOON, HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE ISRAELI ATTACKS WOULD BE COMPLETED IN A MATTER OF A FEW HOURS. NOW, IT IS SOME HOURS LATER AND THE SITUATION CONTINUES, PROMPTING THE SECRETARY TO CALL IN AMB. ARENS TO INSIST ON A CEASEFIRE. SHAMIR HAD UNDOUBTEDLY HAD A REPORT FROM ARENS ON THE MEETING, DURING WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT THE MASSIVE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON BEIRUT HAVE "GOT TO STOP."

5. HABIB SAID WE HAD JUST RECEIVED A REPORT FROM BEIRUT THAT THE PLO WILL OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE FROM 2100 HOURS, ALTHOUGH SOME TIME MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR TOTAL OBSERVANCE DUE TO BAD COMMUNICATIONS. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD BY THE DEPARTMENT THAT ARENS HAD SAID THE IDF WOULD OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE ON THE BEIRUT FRONT BEGINNING AT MIDNIGHT.

6. SHAMIR INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD DECIDED ON A CEASEFIRE FOR 1930 HOURS. HABIB REPLIED THAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS HANDLING CONTACT WITH THE PLO, THAT IT COULD TAKE TWO HOURS FOR THE PLO COMMAND TO GET THE WORD TO ALL UNITS. WE DO NOT WANT AN ISRAELI CEASEFIRE WHICH IS NOT RECIPROCATED BY THE PLO BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE TIME TO GET THE WORD TO ALL ELEMENTS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS ANNOUNCE AT 1930 HOURS THEIR INTENTION TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE AS OF 2100 HOURS. THE IMPORTANT THING, HE SAID, IS THAT ISRAEL MAKE AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT THE PLO TO ANNOUNCE IT FIRST. WE WERE AWARE OF ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES, HE SAID, AS REGARDS TREATING THE PLO AS A CO-EQUAL PARTNER IN CEASEFIRES. SHAMIR WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE IDF UNITS COULD RECEIVE REVISED ORDERS IN TIME, BUT HE SUGGESTED AN ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT AT 2000 HOURS AND SENT KIMCHE FROM THE ROOM TO CALL SHARON.

7. HABIB SAID THAT ONCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE DECIDED, WE WILL GET TO THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO HAVE THEM PASS THE WORD TO THE PLO. SHAMIR CONTINUED TO WORRY ABOUT THE ORDERS IDF TROOPS ALREADY HAD RECEIVED

- AND LEWIS EXPLAINED THAT SOME DELAY BEYOND 1930 HOURS WAS DESIRABLE LEST THE CEASEFIRE BE STILLBORN AS A RESULT OF POSSIBILITY THE PLO WAS NOT PREPARED TO RESPOND. HABIB NOTED THAT A CONTINUING CONFLAGRATION IN BEIRUT WILL EVENTUALLY ENDANGER THE BROADER CEASEFIRE WITH THE SYRIANS, WHO HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ATTACKS ON BEIRUT TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS.

8. LEWIS URGED THAT THE ISRAELIS GIVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE CIRCULATION TO THEIR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND BAR-UN SUGGESTED THAT THE IDF MIGHT CEASE FIRING AT 1930 BUT

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 711

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GIVE THE PLD UNTIL 2100 HOURS TO RESPOND. SHAMIR ASKED
WHETHER PLD WAS PREPARED TO STOP FIRING AT 2100 HOURS AND
BT
#1886
NNNN

SENSITIVE

4
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 706

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE137
STU7872
UD RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1886/02 1632203
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 122148Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2465
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8084
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1649
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 7893
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2464
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0629

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01886

EXDIS

HABIB REPEATED THAT WAZZAN HAD TOLD US THIS. HE URGED THAT THE ISRAELIS NOT OVERREACT TO MINOR VIOLATIONS AFTER THAT TIME BUT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INEFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE PLO. WE URGED 2100 CF REPEATEDLY. 9. LEWIS SAID THAT INFERIOR PLO COMMUNICATIONS WERE THE REASON THAT THE ISRAELIS NEED TO GIVE FULL PUBLICITY TO THEIR INTENTION. SHAMIR ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE PLO DECIDED TO INITIATE FIRING AGAIN AND HABIB URGED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOW PATIENCE. HE RECALLED THAT SHARON HAD BEEN PREPARED YESTERDAY TO PUT UP WITH SOME NUISANCE FIRING SO LONG AS HIS TROOPS WERE NOT IN DANGER. SHAMIR RECALLED THAT BEGIN HAD OVERRULED HIM, HOWEVER. HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE A BIT DIFFERENT IN BEIRUT AND LEWIS SAID WE HAVE MANY RELIABLE REPORTS THAT DESTRUCTION AND CASUALTIES IN BEIRUT WERE VERY BAD.

10. HABIB TOOK THE OCCASION TO POINT OUT THAT ONE POINT IN SHAMIR'S RECENT PRESS INTERVIEW--HIS STATEMENT THAT THERE IS "NO CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT"--HAD UPSET THE SYRIANS, WE HAD READ THE TEXT AND UNDERSTOOD WHAT SHAMIR HAD MEANT BUT THE SYRIANS HAD WRONGLY THOUGHT HE MEANT THAT NO CEASEFIRE IS IN EFFECT FROM THE ISRAELI VIEWPOINT.

11. HABIB SAID IT WAS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CEASEFIRE "AGREEMENT" IN A FORMAL SENSE THAT HE HAD USED THE WORD, "ARRANGEMENT," WITH ASSAD. NOW, HABIB STATED, WE MUST MOVE TO THE STAGE OF GETTING AN AGREEMENT. ASSAD WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE ISRAELIS BUT HE WILL TALK TO US. IT WAS IMPORTANT, AS WE MOVE FORWARD, THAT THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO EMPHASIZE IN THEIR PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. SHAMIR AGREED.

12. WHILE KIMCHE WAS ON THE PHONE WITH SHARON, JUST BEFORE 1930 HOURS, LEWIS ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS INTENDED TO HAVE THE FIRST MEETING OF THEIR MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON LEBANON SUNDAY MORNING. SHAMIR SAID THE CABINET WILL MEET TO APPOINT SUB-COMMITTEES, ETC. BAR-ON CONFIRMED THAT HABIB WAS STILL SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH BEGIN AT 1700 HOURS SUNDAY. HABIB SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE ON ALL FRONTS IN LEBANON BECAUSE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF FIGHTING WERE NOT CONTINUING WHEN BEGIN ARRIVES IN NEW YORK NEXT WEEK. THIS LED BAR-ON TO COMMENT THAT THE UN SYG WAS BEING TROUBLESOME. HABIB SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE SYG HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN DELAYING SECURITY COUNCIL SESSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE. BAR-ON AGREED BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN MAKING STATEMENTS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS.

13. KIMCHE RETURNED AT THIS POINT TO STATE THAT THE SECRETARY HAD SUGGESTED IN HIS MEETING WITH ARENS THAT THE CEASEFIRE TAKE EFFECT AT MIDNIGHT. IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE AN ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT AT 2300 HOURS, HABIB OBJECTED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE WAY HE UNDERSTOOD THE MIDNIGHT TIMEFRAME HAD COME ABOUT, BUT IN ANY CASE WE UNDERSTOOD THAT ARENS WAS NOW BACK IN THE DEPARTMENT MEETING AGAIN WITH THE SECRETARY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WHAT THE SECRETARY HAS NOW HEARD FROM WAZZAN ABOUT PLO READINESS TO CEASE FIRING AT 2100 HOURS. KIMCHE SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED ALL THIS TO SHARON BUT IT WOULD STILL BE MIDNIGHT.

14. SHAMIR SAID THAT NONETHELESS THE ISRAELIS COULD ANNOUNCE THE MIDNIGHT CEASEFIRE AT 2000 HOURS RATHER THAN 2300 HOURS. KIMCHE SAID THAT SHARON WANTED THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO SAY THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS BROKEN BY THE PALESTINIANS YESTERDAY AND THAT, WHILE ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO TRY TO INSTITUTE ANOTHER CEASEFIRE IN THE BEIRUT REGION, THEY WILL RESPOND WITH ALL THE POWER AT THEIR DISPOSAL IF IT IS AGAIN BROKEN. LEWIS ENCOURAGED THE ISRAELIS TO ANNOUNCE THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THE PLO MAY MAKE ITS OWN ANNOUNCEMENT AS EARLY AS 2000 HOURS. AVNER WAS INSTRUCTED AT THIS POINT TO BEGIN DRAFTING AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MIDNIGHT CEASEFORE FOR BROADCAST AT 2000 HOURS. SHAMIR THEN TOOK A TELEPHONE CALL FROM ARENS IN WASHINGTON.

15. HABIB SOUGHT CLARIFICATION ABOUT WHAT THE IDF REACTION WOULD BE IF THE PLO UNILATERALLY CEASED FIRING AT 2100. RECALLING THE EARLIER ISKAELI POSITION THAT ITS TROUPS

6
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 708

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ON THE FRONT WOULD NOT FIRE UNLESS FIRED UPON, HE URGED
THAT IDF UNITS RECIPROCAIE ANY PLO SLACKENING EVEN BEFORE
BT
#1886
NNNN

SENSITIVE

7
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 704

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE138
STU7876
UD RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1886/03 163221Z
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
U 122148Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2466
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8085
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1650
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 7894
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2465
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0630
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01886
EXDIS

MIDNIGHT. SHAMIR RETURNED FROM THE TELEPHONE TO REPORT THAT ARENS SAID HE AND THE SECRETARY HAD AGREED ON MIDNIGHT AND HE (SHAMIR) HAD TOLD ARENS THAT HE WOULD NEVERTHELESS MAKE THE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT NOW.
CONFIDENTIAL

16. KIMCHE RETURNED FROM A FURTHER TALK WITH SHARON TO SAY THAT SHARON WANTED IT CLEAR THAT THE CURRENT ATTACKS ON BEIRUT RESULTED FROM THE EFFORT OF A PLO UNIT THE NIGHT BEFORE TO ATTACK AN IDF POST WHERE WORK WAS BEING CONDUCTED ON TANKS, WITH RESULTING HEAVY LOSSES AMONG IDF PERSONNEL. HABIB SAID HE DID NOT DISPUTE THAT THE PLO HAD PROVOKED THE ISRAELIS NOR THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, BUT THE FACT REMAINED THAT THE REACTION AGAINST THE CITY OF BEIRUT HAD BEEN EXCESSIVE. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT AS WE GET THE CEASEFIRE NAILED DOWN THE ISRAELI FORCES WILL HOLD THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS AND NOT ADVANCE.

17. KIMCHE WHO HAD ONCE AGAIN WITHDRAWN TO TALK WITH SHARON RETURNED SHORTLY BEFORE 2000 HOURS TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE ISRAELI CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN ADVANCED FROM MIDNIGHT TO 2100 HOURS. DRAPER WENT TO INFORM THE DEPARTMENT BY PHONE AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT PREVIOUSLY PREPARED WAS AMENDED TO SUBSTITUTE 2100 HOURS FOR MIDNIGHT. AT 2000 HOURS, WE LISTENED WITH SHAMIR AS THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS BROADCAST OVER ISRAELI RADIO.

18. WHILE WAITING, KIMCHE SAID THAT SHARON HAD ALSO WANTED TO AMPLIFY THE "INCOMPLETE" ANSWER

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 705

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE HAD PROVIDED JUNE 12 TO HABIB'S QUESTION ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT HIGHWAY. SHARON WANTED US TO KNOW NOW THAT THE ROAD IS "BLOCKED" BUT THE ISRAELIS WILL ALLOW CIVILIAN TRAFFIC TO USE IT. HABIB SAID HE WAS GLAD ABOUT CIVILIAN TRAFFIC AND HOPED IT ALSO INCLUDED FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES ON WHICH THE POPULATION OF BEIRUT WAS HEAVILY DEPENDENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE MORE RELAXED ABOUT MILITARY TRAFFIC, PROVIDED THERE WAS NO EFFORT TO REINFORCE BEIRUT, SINCE THIS COULD OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOME SYRIAN TROOPS TO LEAVE BEIRUT.

19. SHAMIR WAS INFORMED THAT WE HAVE REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE HAS MADE SOME USE OF CLUSTER BOMBS IN RECENT ATTACKS ON BEIRUT, THIS WEAPON IS JUST NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR USE IN URBAN AREAS.

20. IN CLOSING HABIB SOUGHT AND OBTAINED FROM SHAMIR AN ASSURANCE THAT SHOULD A CEASEFIRE INVOLVING PLO FORCES ON THE BEIRUT FRONT BECOME EFFECTIVE, THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT REGARD ATTACKS BY PLO ELEMENTS IN THE REAR AREAS AS A VIOLATION OF THE BEIRUT CEASEFIRE.

--
21. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS OMITTED BECAUSE OF MINIMIZE,
GROVE
BT
#1886
NNNN

SENSITIVE

65372

9

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 701

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE148
STU7915
LD RUEHC
DE RUQMBE #4144 1632259
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
U 122250Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6930
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 7574
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 1592
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4144

NODIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY, ASST SECRETARY VELIOTES
JERUSALEM FOR HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 4 6/12/02 (DILLON, ROBERT S) UR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, LE, US
SUBJ: CEASEFIRE: NEXT STEPS
1. (ENTIRE TEXT)
2. IT IS NOW 1030 PM IN LEBANON. WE MAY HAVE A
CEASEFIRE. GETTING THE GOL TO ACT LIKE IT WANTED TO
SAVE THIS COUNTRY THIS AFTERNOON WAS, BLUNTLY, LIKE
PULLING TEETH.
3. LATE THIS AFTERNOON WHEN I MET WITH THE PRESIDENT,
FONMIN AND COLONEL JOHNNY ABDU, I COULD NOT GET THE
PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO MAKE THE SIMPLE
DECISION TO INSIST THAT PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN GET
BACK TO THE PLO AND DEMAND A CEASGLME (##)BEIRUT AND ITS
INHABITANTS.(##) ABDU WAS HELPFUL.
FORTUNATELY, DCM BOB BARRETT GOT TO WAZZAN IN WEST
BEIRUT AND SO PERSUADED HIM. WHILE I WAS ARGUING
WITH SARKIS AND BUTRUS, WAZZAN TELEPHONED ME TO SAY
THE PLO WOULD AGREE TO A 900 PM CEASEFIRE IF THE
OTHER SIDE AGREED. I TOLD WAZZAN THAT THE OTHER SIDE
MOST LIKELY WOULD NOT AGREE BUT THAT IF HE COULD
GET THE PLO TO DECLARE A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE FOR
HUMANITARIAN REASONS, SOMEHOW THE US WOULD GET THE
ISRAELIS TO FOLLOW SUIT. WAZZAN AGREED TO TRY AND
AS YOU KNOW, TELEPHONED LATER TO SAY THAT HE HAD
ACCOMPLISHED WHAT I ASKED.
4. I RECOUNT THIS STORY NOT SIMPLY TO LET YOU KNOW
WHAT A GOOD JOB WE ALL DID TODAY BUT TO ILLUSTRATE
THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING THE GOL TO ACT. NOW IS THE
TIME, IF EVER, WHEN THE GOL CAN ASSERT ITSELF AND CAN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65372
BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 702

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RALLY THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT. STARTING TOMORROW MORNING I INTEND TO PRESS SARKIS VERY HARD TO DO JUST THAT. HE HAS BEEN PLAYING WITH THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT FOR SOME TIME. THIS IS THE TIME TO DO IT. WHAT MAY LOOK LIKE A PERFECTLY RATIONAL MOVE IN WASHINGTON, HOWEVER, IS LIKELY TO DISAPPEAR IN WRANGLING HERE. THE INDIFFERENCE OF MANY CHRISTIANS TO THE FATE OF THEIR MUSLIM FELLOW CITIZENS IS PAINFULLY EVIDENT. I INTEND TO SAY TO SARKIS TOMORROW THAT WITH THE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE US WILL DO ITS UTMOST TO FORWARD A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT LEADS BOTH TOWARD NATIONAL UNITY AND THE RECOVERY OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. I WILL ALSO TELL HIM THAT I KNOW THAT IN THIS EFFORT WE HAVE THE PERSONAL SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG, AND THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ENVOY AMBASSADOR HABIB IS READY TO CUME AND HELP IN THE PROCESS. I WILL URGE HIM ALSO TO GET THE LEBANESE ARMY ON THE MOVE AND POINT OUT AS WELL THAT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS GIVE THE GOL A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO LEAD. I ALSO INTEND TO GO DIRECTLY TO WAZZAN AND TRY TO ENERGIZE HIM TO EXERT LEADERSHIP WITH THE MUSLIMS. IF THE CEASEFIRE IS HOLDING THE PROCESS MUST START WHILE THE HORRORS OF THE PAST WEEK ARE FRESH IN EVERYONE'S MINDS.

5. I JUST HAD ONE HOUR'S CONVERSATION WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL. BASHIR IS READY TO GIVE THIS PROCESS HIS SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT IF A LEBANESE BODY POLITIC TRIES TO RETURN TO BUSINESS AS USUAL, BASHIR WILL ENGAGE IN DRASTIC ACTION. I WAS EXPLICIT WITH BASHIR THAT WE WERE DISCUSSING A PROCESS THAT HAD FULL US SUPPORT AND WOULD HAVE ACTIVE US PARTICIPATION. I WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT DESPITE MY ADMIRATION AND RESPECT FOR BASHIR, I DID NOT INTEND TO MANEUVER TO MAKE HIM PRESIDENT OF THIS COUNTRY. I ADDED THAT WE WERE NOT OPPOSED TO HIM AND IF IT HAPPENED, IT HAPPENED. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, AND ASSURED ME THAT HE INTENDED TO WORK WITH US IN THE PROCESS. FOR NOW AT LEAST, HE SAID HE WOULD PUT PERSONAL AMBITIONS ASIDE. HE PLEADED THAT I TRY NOT ONLY TO ENERGIZE SARKIS BUT THAT I GO TO WAZZAN AND GET THE OTHER MUSLIM LEADERS INTO THE GAME. AS I HAVE INDICATED ABOVE, I INTEND TO DO JUST THAT.

6. WHAT I NEED FROM WASHINGTON IS CONFIRMATION THAT MY BRAVE WORDS ABOVE ARE INDEED TRUE AND THAT I HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE US

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 703

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GOVERNMENT.

7. OPERATIONAL COMMENT: THIS MESSAGE WAS DICTATED
BY AMBASSADOR DILLON ON THE SECURE LINE. THERE WAS
A GREAT DEAL OF STATIC SO WORDING MAY NOT BE EXACTLY
AS HE INTENDED.

DILLON

BT

#4144

NNNN

SENSITIVE

65373

12

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 696

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA054
DD RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #3009/01 164032L
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
Q Q 130323Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 9465
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT/IMMEDIATE 3252
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0430
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1154
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7119
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7425
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6305
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7718
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 163009
EXDIS, FOR HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY
E.O. 12065; RDS 3,4 6/12/02 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A)
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, OVIP, PGOV, PINS, LE
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION; APPROACHES IN JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. AS WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING IN THE LAST 48 HOURS IT IS CLEAR THAT WE FACE A WHOLLY NEW SITUATION IN LEBANON, IT IS OUR STRONG VIEW HERE THAT THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST WEEK AND THE NEW REALITIES THEY REPRESENT, WHILE PRESENTING ANY NUMBER OF DANGERS TO OUR INTERESTS, ALSO AFFORD US AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH WE SHOULD SEIZE. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING EXTENSIVE THOUGHT ON HOW THIS CAN BE DONE AND TO HOW A NEW APPROACH CAN BE DEVELOPED. THERE IS NOW CONSENSUS ON CERTAIN KEY ELEMENTS OF A NEW APPROACH AND ON THE BELIEF THAT YOUR UNIQUE DIPLOMATIC SKILLS OFFER THE BEST INSTRUMENT FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES WE HAVE IN-MIND.
3. IN ESSENCE, THE APPROACH WE BELIEVE OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING OUR BASIC GOALS FOR THE AREA ARE CENTERED ON (1) THE STRENGTHENING OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, (2) A DRAMATIC REDUCTION OF THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; (3) AN END TO THE PLU AS AN EXTRATERRITORIAL ELEMENT IN LEBANON AND ABSORPTION OF PALESTINIANS THERE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65373

BY JKML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

INTO A FRAMEWORK RESPONSIVE TO GOL AUTHORITY. (THIS WAS THE CASE PRIOR TO THE ENORMOUS GROWTH OF PLO AND SYRIAN MILITARY POWER IN LEBANON.); (4) AN END TO THE HADDAD ENCLAVE AND TO HADDAD'S INDEPENDENT STATUS AND RETIREMENT OF HADDAD HIMSELF WITH AMNESTY OR INTEGRATION OF HIS PERSONNEL INTO GOL/LEBANESE SOCIETY (AND AGREEMENT BY THE OTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL FACTIONS TO WORK TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN COOPERATION WITH AND THROUGH THE LEGITIMATE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT); (5) STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS; (6) DEALING WITH THE CRITICAL REGIONAL DIMENSION TO REDUCE THE RISKS AND SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES WITH OTHER ARABS.

4. WE REALIZE THAT THIS IS A TALL ORDER BUT WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO STRIVE FOR A FULL REORDERING OF THE PREVIOUS SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE MISSED. IT IS CLEAR THAT TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD THIS GOAL PRESIDENT SARKIS IS GOING TO BE A CENTRAL FIGURE AND WE WILL NEED FROM HIM BOTH COOPERATION AND PROBABLY, MORE IMPORTANTLY, REAL LEADERSHIP. ESSENTIALLY, WHAT WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO DO IS TO GET TO BEIRUT AS QUICKLY AS SAFETY WILL ALLOW TO INITIATE A FAR REACHING DIALOGUE WITH SARKIS. WE WOULD LIKE YOU IN THIS DISCUSSION TO GO OVER OUR VIEW OF THE FUTURE AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER SARKIS CAN BE INDUCED TO TAKE THE LEAD POSSIBLY IN CALLING FOR ACTIONS WHICH WOULD INITIATE A PROCESS LEADING TO THE KIND OF FUTURE WE HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE.

5. IF SARKIS SEEMS PREPARED TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK STRENUOUSLY TO GET INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO FALL IN BEHIND THE LEAD OF THE GOL AND SARKIS. IN PARTICULAR, WE WOULD ENVISION SEEKING CLOSE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT FROM THE FRENCH AND FROM THE SAUDIS. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE A "CONTACT GROUP," WHOSE CORE WOULD BE COMPOSED OF LEBANON, U.S., FRANCE AND SAUDI ARABIA, WITH OTHER NATIONS LENDING SUPPORT IN SPECIALIZED AREAS (PEACEKEEPING, AID, STRENGTHENING LAF), COMBATANTS (SYRIA, ISRAEL AND PLO) EXCLUDED. RE SAUDIS, SECRETARY IS PLANNING TO TELEPHONE SAUD IN ALGIERS (AT SAUDIS REQUEST) TO REVIEW SITUATION WITH FOCUS ON OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN BEIRUT CEASE-FIRE AND OUR CONTINUING DESIRE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH SAUDIS AS WE MOVE AHEAD. PRESIDENT WILL REPLY ALONG SAME LINES TO ORAL MESSAGE FROM KING KHALID THROUGH MURPHY THAT SAUD PASSED IN BONN. WE WOULD ALSO USE WHATEVER RESOURCES

14
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 698

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WECOULD BE TRYING TO BE ABLE TO GAIN THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE
ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE

GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM.

6. IN YOUR TALKS WITH SARKIS YOU WILL KNOW BEST HOW TO
DISCUSS THE FOREGOING AND WE RELY FULLY ON YOUR JUDGMENT
AND SKILLS IN SEEKING TO ENERGIZE SARKIS AND THE
LEBANEFSE TO TAKE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP. WE HAVE ALSO
GIVEN SOME THOUGHTS TO THE KINDS OF SUBJECTS YOU MIGHT
USE TO COVER, WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN THE CHECK LIST
WHICH FOLLOWS.

(A) ENHANCEMENT OF GOL AUTHORITY:

BT

#3009

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 693

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA055
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #3009/02 164032Z
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O O 130323Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 9466
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT/IMMEDIATE 3253
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0431
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1155
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7120
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7426
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6306
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7719
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 163009
EXDIS, FOR HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY

-- SECURITY IN WEST BEIRUT: WHAT PLANS DO THE LAF/ISF HAVE FOR TAKING OVER ABANDONED ADF CHECKPOINTS? WE WANT TO STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THIS MOVE AS FIRST STEP TOWARD ENHANCEMENT OF GOL AUTHORITY.

-- WE BELIEVE BEST WAY TO AFFIRM GOL INTENTION TO ASSERT ITS INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY IS TO PROCEED WITH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AS SCHEDULED. ENCOURAGE SARKIS, ET AL TO ANNOUNCE THIS INTENTION, INFORM LEBANESE THAT WE WILL TAKE VERY LOW-PROFILE BUT DETERMINED INITIATIVE WITH OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO ENCOURAGE THEIR HIGH-PROFILE SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL, FREE ELECTION PROCESS, FREE FROM OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT.

-- ENCOURAGE SARKIS TO CONTINUE TO RESIST UNHELPFUL UN SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVES, UNDER THE RUBRIC THAT LEBANON IS NOW DETERMINED TO TAKE ITS FUTURE INTO ITS OWN HANDS AND WILL USE THE UN ONLY TO ADVANCE ITS OWN INTERESTS.

-- ENCOURAGE GOL TO TAKE INITIATIVES WITH UN HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS (WCC, ICRC) TO COORDINATE AND DIRECT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PROGRAMS. EXPLORE POSSIBLE SUCH "NON-POLITICAL" GOL ROLE IN SOUTH DESPITE ISRAELI OCCUPATION.

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- EXPLORE IDEAS FOR RETURNING COLLECTION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES AND TAXES TO GOL HANDS. YOU MAY EXPLORE POSSIBLE USG TECHNICAL HELP IN DESIGNING A NEW SYSTEM,

(B) WITHDRAWAL OF OUTSIDE FORCES:

-- ASK GOL TO TAKE FORTHRIGHT POSITION IN REQUESTING WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS FROM LEBANON,

-- SUGGEST STRONG GOL PUBLIC STATEMENT OPPOSING POLITICAL/MILITARY SUPPORT OF ANY LEBANESE GROUP BY

A FOREIGN POWER.

(C) NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:

-- STRONGLY ENCOURAGE SARKIS'S APPARENT INCLINATION TO FORM A "UNITY CABINET."

-- PUSH THE NOTION, IN DISCUSSIONS WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL LEADERS, THAT THE TRAGEDY THAT HAS BEFALLEN LEBANON CAN BE OVERCOME ONLY BY THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES NOW BANDING TOGETHER TO PURSUE THEIR COLLECTIVE NATIONAL INTERESTS.

-- SUGGEST THE PRIMARY FOCUS MUST BE ON RAPID ENHANCEMENT OF THE LAF/ISF AND AGREEMENT AMONG THE LEBANESE TO DEPLOY THE LAF/ISF IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE. THIS WOULD BACK UP AND MESH WITH GOL STATEMENTS REQUESTING ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

-- PROBE GOL FOR THOUGHTS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH LARGE PALESTINIAN POPULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ALTERED PLO. ENCOURAGE GOL TO ENGAGE IN DETERMINED DISCUSSIONS TO REACH POLITICAL/TERRITORIAL MODUS VIVENDI WITH PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON. WHAT IS SARKIS'S IMPRESSION OF THEIR PRESENT STATE? FUTURE PROSPECTS AND POLICIES?

(D) PEACEKEEPING:

-- SEEK GOL VIEWS ON POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

-- EXPLORE NOTION OF GRADUAL INCLUSION OF LAF IN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. GET SARKIS'S VIEWS ON HOW LAF ITSELF CAN BEST BE STRENGTHENED.

17
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 695

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/62/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- SOUND OUT SARKIS'S VIEWS ON IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON. DOES IT PRESENT ANY POSITIVE FEATURES FOR THE NEAR TERM? WHAT WOULD HIS VIEW BE TOWARD LINKAGE OF IDF-SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL? WOULD IDF IN ITS PRESENT FORWARD POSITIONS MAKE SENSE IN THIS REGARD. (YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO SARKIS OUR VIEW THAT WE MUST NOT LET IDEA OF QUICK IDF PULL-BACK TO 40 KM LINE DRIVE OUR APPROACH IN THIS SITUATION; ANY CONSIDERATION OF IDF WITHDRAWAL SHOULD MAKE SENSE WITHIN OUR BROADER STRATEGY.)

(E) EXPLORE WAYS TO DEAL WITH HADDAD AND HIS MILITIA.

7. THE ABOVE IS OFFERED WITH AIM OF BEING HELPFUL TO

BT
#3009
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 692

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA056
DD RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #3009/03 164032Z
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O O 130323Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 9467
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT/IMMEDIATE 3254
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0432
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1156
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7121
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7427
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6307
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7720 .

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 STATE 163009
EXDIS, FOR HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY
YOUR TALKS. UNDERSTAND THAT IN SITUATION LIKE THIS
YOU MUST MAINTAIN MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY TO DEAL WITH
CIRCUMSTANCES AND ATTITUDES AS THEY ARISE AND SHIFT.

8. FOR YOUR SUNDAY MEETING WITH BEGIN YOU SHOULD GIVE
HIM GENERAL VIEW OF OUR THINKING ALONG LINES OF
SECRETARY'S TALK WITH ARENS AS CONVEYED TO YOU VIA SECURE
TELCON. WE LEAVE IT TO YOU HOW FAR TO GO. OUR OBJECTIVE
IS NOT TO GIVE ANY PARTICULAR POINT AWAY TO ISRAELIS
BUT AT SAME TIME TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE OPERATING
ON SAME GENERAL WAVELENGTH. AS WE MOVE AHEAD WE WILL
BE DOING MUCH TO ADVANCE ISRAEL'S INTERESTS -- BUT TO
DO SO EFFECTIVELY, THEY WILL HAVE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO
OUR CONCERNS TOO.

HAIG
BT
#3009
NNNN

SENSITIVE

05374 19

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 699

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA058
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #3010 1640340
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O D 130344Z JUN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 5102
INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7721
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 163010
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 6/12/02 (BREMER, LP)
TAGS:PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV IN RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV'S JUNE 10 MCLINK MESSAGE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 10.

3. AS YOU KNOW, AT MY URGING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED JUNE 11 THAT ISRAELI FORCES IN LEBANON WOULD OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE FROM 12:00 P.M. THAT DAY. UNFORTUNATELY, FIGHTING BETWEEN PLO AND ISRAELI FORCES CONTINUED. MY GOVERNMENT WENT, AGAIN, TO THE ISRAELIS URGING RESTRAINT. THIS APPROACH RESULTED IN A NEW ISRAELI CEASEFIRE -- AGREED TO BY THE PLO -- TO GO INTO EFFECT AT 9:00 P.M. (LEBANESE TIME) JUNE 12.

4. THIS DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP THAT COULD RESULT IN A HALT TO THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON WHICH HAS RAISED SUCH GRAVE DANGERS TO PEACE THROUGHOUT THE REGION. OBVIOUSLY, THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE DEPENDS UPON RESTRAINT BY ALL PARTIES TO THE

CONFLICT. I SHALL CONTINUE TO USE MY INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO THAT END; I EXPECT THAT YOU WILL URGE SIMILAR RESTRAINT ON SYRIA AND THE PLO.

5. THE CEASEFIRE IS ONLY A FIRST STEP TOWARD A LASTING SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE AT THE ROOT OF THE RECENT TRAGIC EVENTS IN LEBANON. MY GOVERNMENT WILL CON-

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65374

BY KMI NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 700

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TINUE TO WORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, AND THE CREATION OF POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON UNDER AN EFFECTIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE WILL ALSO REQUIRE THAT ISRAEL BE ASSURED THAT ATTACKS ON ITS NORTHERN TERRITORIES ORIGINATING IN LEBANON NOT BE RESUMED,

6. MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE AREA, AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB, WILL CONTINUE HIS CONTACTS WITH ALL CONCERNED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND LEBANON WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, I MUST REJECT EMPHATICALLY THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR LETTER THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA HAVE OBSTRUCTED THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. INDEED, AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CARRIED OUT HIS DIFFICULT MISSION WITH DISTINCTION, AND HIS EFFURTS TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE WILL CONTINUE.

7. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT POLEMICS SHOULD HAVE NO PLACE IN OUR EXCHANGES AT ANY TIME -- BUT PARTICULARLY DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. HOWEVER, YOUR LETTER CONTAINS THE ALLEGATION WHICH HAS ALSO APPEARED IN THE SOVIET MEDIA THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK IN ADVANCE. THIS CHARGE IS TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION; THUS, IN KEEPING WITH YOUR OWN VIEW OF POLEMICS, IT HAS NO APPROPRIATE PLACE IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US.

8. IN CLOSING, I WISH TO REITERATE THAT MY GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE ITS ENERGETIC EFFURTS TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SINCERELY,
RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT, HAIG

BT
#3010
NNNN

SENSITIVE

65375 21

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 689

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE257
STU8350
TTTT ZZ RUEHC
DE RUQMBE #4158/01 1641515
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z O 131355Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6943
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 7584
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH 1151
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 2274
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 1604
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4158

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/13/02 (DILLON, ROBERT S) DR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, US, SA, XF
SUBJ: LEBANON; REASSERTION OF GOL AUTHORITY

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. I TOLD SARKIS AT LATE MORNING MEETING: A) PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY HAIG HAVE AUTHORIZED ME TO SAY US WILL DO ITS BEST TO HELP POLITICAL PROCESS IN LEBANON THAT LEADS TO NATIONAL UNITY AND TO REASSERTION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY OVER ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY, B) AMBASSADOR HABIB IS READY TO COME AND HELP IN THE PROCESS. C) THE US IS READY (AS ARE OTHER COUNTRIES) TO ENGAGE IN RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN LEBANON AND PARTICULARLY IN BEIRUT. D) WE INTEND TO ENGAGE IN THOSE OPERATIONS THROUGH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENHANCE ITS AUTHORITY. E) IN ORDER TO FACILITATE OPERATIONS IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT LAF MOVE IMMEDIATELY INTO WEST BEIRUT TO ENSURE SECURITY.
3. CONTINUING FROM LAST POINT, I SAID I UNDERSTOOD WELL THE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING (POLITICAL) AGREEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES TO LAF MOVE, BUT I DID NOT THINK THAT WAS THE QUESTION. QUESTION WAS WHETHER PLO, ADF OR OTHER ARMED GROUPS WOULD PHYSICALLY OPPOSE. I DID NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD. IF THE ADF OPPOSED, CEASEFIRE WOULD BE GONE AND ISRAELIS WOULD PULVERIZE SYRIANS IN BEIRUT AREA. PLO WAS IN A WEAK POSITION AND I FELT SURE IT COULD BE PERSUADED NOT TO OPPOSE LAF ENTRY. FINALLY, IN RORDER TO GIVE ABBREVIATED POLITICAL COVER AND BACKING FOR SUCH A MOVE, I WORNDERED IF HE MIGHT NOT WISH TO REVIVE PLANS TO RESTRUCTURE HIS GOVERNMENT.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65375

BY ICPL NARA DATE 7/2/17

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

4. I HAD GONE OVER THESE SAME POINTS IN A CONVERSATION EARLIER THIS MORNING WITH JOHNNY ABDO WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THIS MEETING AND SARKIS WAS OBVIOUSLY PREPARED FOR WHAT I HAD TO SAY. HE IMPLIED THAT IN MEETING WITH PM WAZZAN JUST CONCLUDED, HE HAD ASKED WAZZAN TO OBTAIN MUSLIM AND PLO ACQUIESCENCE TO ARMY MOVE. HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH WAZZAN POSSIBILITY OF NEW GOVERNMENT. WAZZAN PERSONALLY WANTED LAF IN WEST BEIRUT, BUT NEEDED HELP IN PERSUADING OTHERS. WAZZAN WAS LESS CONVINCED ABOUT NEW GOVERNMENT BUT SAID HE WAS READY TO ACCEPT TWO NEW MINISTERS (PRESUMABLY BASHIR GEMAYEL AND WALID JUMBLATT). SARKIS HAD TOLD HIM MORE MINISTERS WOULD MAKE AN UNWIELDY CABINET. A NEW GOVERNMENT OF 10 OR 12 MINISTERS WAS WHAT WAS NEEDED.

5. SARKIS URGED THAT WE GET SAUDIS TO INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY WITH SA'B SALAM WHOM HE BELIEVED WAS MAN HOLDING WAZZAN BACK. SAUDIS SHOULD URGE SALAM TO ACCEPT AND SUPPORT A NEW GOVERNMENT AND LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO WEST BEIRUT. THEY SHOULD ALSO CONVINCE PLO TO ACCEPT LAF WHICH COULD OFFER IT PROTECTION ALTHOUGH NO FREEDOM OF MILITARY ACTION. FURTHERMORE, SAUDIS SHOULD URGE PLO TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH NATIONAL MOVEMENT NOT TO OPPOSE LAF ENTRY.

6. I TOLD SARKIS WE WOULD TRY TO GET TO SAUDIS IMMEDIATELY AND ASK FOR THEIR COOPERATION. I ASKED IF I COULD ASSUME THAT NATIONAL MOVEMENT LEADER WALID JUMBLATT AND HIS PSP MILITIA WOULD COOPERATE. SARKIS SAID YES.

7. SARKIS ASKED MY OPINION OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS AS WELL AS INTENTIONS OF BASHIR GEMAYEL. I SAID BASED ON LAST NIGHT'S CONVERSATION, I BELIEVE THAT BASHIR WOULD COOPERATE WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY. I DID NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT BASHIR'S PATIENCE WAS LIMITLESS. AS FOR ISRAELIS, I BELIEVE THEIR INTENTION WAS TO TRY TO IMPOSE A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR LIKING ON LEBANON. THEY HAD ALREADY SAID THAT THEY WERE IN EFFECT MAKING SAAD HADDAD RULER OF SOUTH LEBANON - A DEVELOPMENT WE ALL FIND DANGEROUS. THE PROBLEM, I CONTINUED, WAS TO BARGAIN ISRAELI GAINS FOR GOL SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY. I HOPED ISRAELIS WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS WAS MOST ATTAINABLE POLITICAL SITUATION THEY COULD HOPE FOR AND THUS IN THEIR INTERESTS. U.S. FOR ITS PART WOULD CONTINUE PUBLICLY TO TRY TO STRENGTHEN CEASEFIRE AND TO TALK ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. UN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 091

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#4158
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 687

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE259
STU8358
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1895 1641448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
Z 131444Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUQMBA/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 6844
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH 5040
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 8094
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2475
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JERUSALEM 01895

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/13/88 (GROVE, JR., BRANDON) DR-M
TAGS: MOPS, PINT, LE, SY, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: PROCEEDING WITH TRAVEL PLANS
REF: (A) BEIRUT 4153, (B) DAMASCUS 4159

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. WE APPRECIATE REFTELS. ACCORDINGLY, HABIB PARTY--
CONSISTING OF HABIB, DRAPER, AND KUZAK--WILL
DEPART BEN GURION AIRPORT ON MONDAY, JUNE 14, AT 0700
LOCAL TIME AND PLAN TO ARRIVE DAMASCUS AT ABOUT 0845
LOCAL TIME (SUBJECT TO SEPTTEL REFINEMENTS FROM AIR CREW
THROUGH DATT CHANNELS). IDEALLY, HABIB WOULD LIKE TO
MEET WITH QADDOUR AT AIRPORT AND TALK TO HIM IN CAR
ENROUTE TO BORDER, OR AS FAR AS QADDOUR WANTS TO GO.
3. BY OUR CALCULATIONS, HABIB PARTY SHOULD BE AT
LEBANESE BORDER AT AROUND 1000 LOCAL AND WOULD GO BY
ROAD STRAIGHT TO AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN YARZE,
ARRIVING THERE AT AROUND NOON.
4. FOR AMB. PAGANELLI: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SYRIAN
ESCORT FOR THE HABIB PARTY CONSTITUTE THE MINIMUM
NECESSARY SO AS NOT TO CREATE A PROBLEM WITH THE
ISRAELIS.
5. WE WILL OF COURSE INFORM THE ISRAELIS FULLY OF OUR
PLANS AND EXTRACT THE EXPECTED ASSURANCES THAT THERE
WILL BE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE PARTY TRAVELLING
BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND YARZE.
6. PLEASE FLASH ASSURANCES AND GO-AHEADS FROM
LEBANESE AND SYRIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE
CAN FIX FINAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAELIS TONIGHT.
7. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. GROVE

BT

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By LS NARA, Date 2/23/09

25

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 688

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

#1895
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 683

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE295
VSK554 420 UTS6952
DD RUEHC
DE RUQMBE #4165 1641705
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
Z O 131455Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH 2276
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 7589
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 1609
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6950
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 4165
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/13/88 (BARRETT, RUBERT S) DR-M
TAGS: OTRA, OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP)
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: PROCEEDING WITH TRAVEL PLANS
REF: JERUSALEM 1895
1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. AMBASSADOR WILL BE CHECKING SHORTLY WITH JOHNNY
ABDU TO FIND OUT IF IT IS APPROPRIATE AND/OR SAFE
FOR YOU TO COME IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY ISRAELI SHELLING
AND BOMBING WHICH HAS OCCURRED TUDAY AND IS CONTINUING IN THE
BEIRUT AREA.
3. FOR AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI: IF HABIB COMES WE WILL
ARRANGE JOINT ISF AND ADF ESCORT FROM SYRIAN BURDER TO BEIRUT.
4. SINCE OUR LAST MESSAGE ON RESUMED ISRAELI AIR RAIDS
WAS SENT, THERE HAS BEEN A NEW STRIKE AGAINST BURJ AL-
BARAJINAH. DILLON
BT
#4165
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By LOS NARA, Date 2/23/09

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 686

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE285
STU8426
UD RUEHC
DE RUEHDM #4166 1641630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK RUEHC RUEHTV
Z 131626Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3653
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 0498
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6737
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 6076

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 04166

EXDIS

E. O. 12065: GDS 6/13/88 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) UR-M

TAGS: MOPS, PINT, LE, SY, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL FROM DAMASCUS TO BEIRUT

REF: (A) JERUSALEM 1895, (B) DAMASCUS 4164

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET WITH QADDUR AT 1800 LOCAL JUNE 13 TO REQUEST SYRIAN ASSISTANCE TO FACILITATE HABIB AND COMPANY TRAVEL FROM DAMASCUS TO BEIRUT. QADDUR SAID SYRIANS READY TO DO WHATEVER WE SPECIFY. THEY CAN TAKE HABIB AND PARTY ALL THE WAY OR MEET APPROPRIATE LEBANESE OR EMBASSY BEIRUT ESCORT AT DESIGNATED SPOT FOR TRANSFER. QADDUR ASKED THAT WE NOTIFY HIM PRECISELY WHAT OUR FINAL PLANS WILL BE SO THAT HE CAN APPROPRIATELY INFORM SECURITY ESCORT WHICH HE SAID WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE SYRIAN ARMY. FURTHER RE ESCORT, QADDUR TOOK OUR POINT THAT IT SHOULD BE MINIMUM NECESSARY.

3. QADDUR WILL BE AT AIRPORT TO GREET HABIB AND HE IS AGREEABLE TO RIDE WITH HIM SO THAT HABIB CAN GIVE HIM UPDATE. WE HAVE ADVISED MFA THAT WE ARE INITIATING FLIGHT CLEARANCES THROUGH OUR USUAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CHANNELS. PAGANELLI

BT

#4166

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By hjt NARA, Date 2/23/09

SENSITIVE

65376

28

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 685

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE289
STU8446
TTTT ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1897 1641745
ZNY SSSSS
Z 131744Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2477
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 6845
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5041
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8096
BT

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 01897

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/13/92 (HABIB, AMB).

TAGS: MILI, MDPS, PEPR, LE, IS, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FURTHER ISRAELI AIR STRIKES

REF: BEIRUT 4164

1. (✓ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MY FINAL TALKS WITH BEGIN TONIGHT, JUNE 13, I WAS IN THE HALLWAY WHEN WORD CAME TO ME BY TELEPHONE FROM HOWELL AT THE CONSULATE GENERAL THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD LAUNCHED EVEN MORE INTENSIVE AIR STRIKES AGAINST BURJ AL-BARAJINAH AND KHALDAH. I WENT BACK INTO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND URGED UPON HIM THE NECESSITY OF HALTING ALL AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS OF THE CITY OF BEIRUT. I RECALLED FOR BEGIN THAT ONLY SOME THIRTY MINUTES EARLIER SHAMIR HAD TOLD US THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD EARLIER DECIDED NOT TO USE AIR STRIKES AND THAT SHAMIR HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO LEARN IN OUR SESSION THAT THE AIR FORCE WAS EVEN THEN CARRYING OUT AIR STRIKES. I NOTED THAT AIR BOMBARDMENTS TENDED TO BE INACCURATE AND URGED THAT ISRAEL RETURN TO THE POLICY OF NO BOMBARDMENT, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED UPON EARLIER.
3. BEGIN, WITH BURG AT HIS SIDE, AGREED TO ACCEPT MY PLEA. HE REACHED FOR THE TELEPHONE--I BELIEVE TO CALL SHARON--AS I LEFT THE OFFICE.
4. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. GROVE

BT

#1897

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLRR M370/2 *65376

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

65377 29

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 684

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE296
STU8451
!!!! ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1898 1641809
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
Z 131808Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2478
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH 5042
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 6846
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 8097

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JERUSALEM 01898

EXDIS
FROM HABIB
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/13/88 (HABIB, AMB.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MILI, LE, IS, SY, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: POSSIBLE CHANGE OF TRAVEL PLANS

1. (- ENTIRE TEXT).
2. KIMCHE AND BAR-ON HAVE JUST URGED ME IN THE STRONGEST TERMS NOT RPT NOT TO TRY WHAT THEY CALLED A "CRAZY IDEA" OF TRAVELLING BY ROAD FROM DAMASCUS TO BEIRUT. WHILE THEY HAVE NO PROBLEMS IN HOLDING THEIR FORCES IN CHECK, THEY POINTED OUT THAT ONE KEY BRIDGE HAD BEEN BOMBED AND MAY NOT HAVE BEEN REPAIRED, THAT THERE ARE BURNED OUT VEHICLES THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE ROAD IN LEBANON, THAT PARTS OF THE ROAD ARE HELD BY THE CHRISTIANS, AND THAT THERE ARE SNIPERS FROM ALL SIDES. A VEHICLE BREAKDOWN IN THE CONVOY COULD CAUSE ADDED DANGERS.
3. BOTH URGED THAT I GO BY A HELICOPTER PROVIDED EITHER BY THE U.S. NAVY OR BY THE MFO, AFTER I TOLD THEM THAT I COULD NOT TRAVEL TO LEBANON IN AN ISRAELI HELICOPTER.
4. I AM NOW CONSIDERING THESE AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES. AMB. DILLON: ASK ABDU IF HE HAS OTHER IDEAS.
5. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. GROVE

BT
#1898
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65377

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 657

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE521
STU8527
11111 ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1902 1642033
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 132033Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2482
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5043
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 6848

BT

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 01902

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/13/92 (HABIB, AMB.)

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, MDPS, MILI, LE, IS,

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CANCELLATION OF TRAVEL PLANS

1. - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE THAT DILLON HAS REPORTED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED WORD FROM THE LEBANESE MINISTER OF DEFENSE THAT ISRAELIS ARE IN BAABDA. IT IS UNCERTAIN IF THE ISRAELIS ARE IN THE PALACE.

3. ACCORDING TO TELECON WITH VELIOTES, THIS IS CONFIRMED FROM DILLON.

4. I AM INQUIRING OF THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO THIS REPORT. IN ANY EVENT, I AM CANCELLING PLANS TO LEAVE FOR BEIRUT TOMORROW MORNING. I WILL STAY IN JERUSALEM AND AWAIT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.

5. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. GROVE

BT

#1902

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65378

BY KNL NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 680

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE339
STU8561
OO RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHJM #1903/01 1642138
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (TAD UPGRADED EXDIS AD311501 STU8556 - 032)
O 132127Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2483
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8099
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 01903

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/13/02 (HABIB, AMB) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, IS, US, UNSC, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH BEGIN JUNE 13

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN, AND KUZAK, MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH BEGIN, BURG, SHAMIR, MINISTER UZZAN, KIMCHE, BAR-ON, YEHUDA AVNER, AND MILITARY SECRETARY COL. NEVU AT 1730 JUNE 13.
3. BEGIN LOOKED BONE-WEARY AND HE BETRAYED A COLD ANGER -- APPARENTLY OVER A REPORT OF TALKS BETWEEN ARENS AND THE SECRETARY. HIS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO OUTLINE TO ME THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, BUT THE MEETING COVERED OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE AIR STRIKES IN BEIRUT, SYRIAN JEWRY, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND MY TRIP TO BEIRUT.
4. BEGIN OPENED BY SAYING THE CABINET TODAY HAD AGREED ON A GENERAL PROPOSAL OR PREFERRED "ARRANGEMENTS" FOR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO CONTROL THE 40-KM BUFFER ZONE SO AS TO ALLOW ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES TO ME AND LEWIS. THE CABINET HAD MADE A DECISION TO SUGGEST ONE OPTION: THE BASIC ELEMENTS WOULD BE (A) A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, (B) THE PARTICIPATION OF A U.S. CONTINGENT, (C) AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, AND (D) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY OR, ALTERNATIVELY, A SINGLE AGREEMENT WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD SIGN. BEGIN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65379

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

STATED THAT A COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS (TWO FOREIGN MINISTRY, TWO DEFENSE AND ONE MUSSAD) WOULD BE DEVELOPING THE SPECIFICS, AND GIVE US DETAILS LATER IN THE WEEK. HE ANTICIPATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD WANT EXPLICIT COMMITMENTS IN THESE AGREEMENTS THAT INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL UNITS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD NOT ALLOW PENETRATION BY THE PLO, EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS, OR THE PRESENCE OF ARMED TERRORISTS IN THE 40-KILOMETER ZONE.

5. BEGIN SAID HE WANTED OUR VIEWS AS TO WHETHER THIS APPROACH WAS FEASIBLE AND, IF SO, WHEN THE U.S. COULD GET IN TOUCH WITH POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTOR GOVERNMENTS. (HE SAID HE EXPECTED POSITIVE RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENTS, JUST AS WAS THE CASE WHEN THE U.S. WAS ORGANIZING THE MFO.) BEGIN SAID HE HAD USED THE TERM "MULTINATIONAL" RATHER THAN "INTERNATIONAL" SINCE THE LATTER COULD SUGGEST A CONNECTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH ISRAEL WANTS TO AVOID. HE DESCRIBED THE HOSTILITY ISRAEL FACES AT THE UN.

6. UNIFIL WAS UNACCEPTABLE, HE SAID, BUT LATE IN THE MEETING SAID THAT UNIFIL COULD BE RENEWED FOR THREE MONTHS NEXT WEEK; THIS SHOULD BE DONE "WITHOUT DEBATE," KIMCHE ADDED. HE REITERATED THAT, ONCE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS IN PLACE AND ASSUMED ITS DUTIES, "WE WILL BE OUT OF LEBANON COMPLETELY." HE NOTED THAT BECAUSE THE PLO HAD THE OLD 180MM GUN WITH A LONG RANGE, SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES HAD DISCUSSED EXPANDING THE ZONE TO 43-48 KILOMETERS, BUT IN THE END THEY HAD DECIDED TO STICK WITH 40 KILOMETERS.

7. ANSWERING MY FURTHER QUESTIONS, BEGIN SAID THAT THEY DESIRED A "STRONG FORCE" ON THE ORDER OF 10,000 MEN.

8. I MADE IT CLEAR I COULD NOT GIVE AN OFFICIAL OPINION ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. I WOULD REPORT IT, HOWEVER, AND TRY TO GET AN ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

9. I NOTED THAT BEGIN WAS LEAVING FOR THE U.S. ON TUESDAY AND I WAS NOT SURE I COULD GET AN ANSWER PRIOR TO THAT TIME. IT WAS INCUMBENT ON ME, HOWEVER, TO POINT OUT CERTAIN THINGS THAT WOULD AFFECT U.S. THINKING. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR A U.S. CONTRIBUTION. THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS THAN THOSE FACED IN OBTAINING APPROVAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. BEGIN INTERJECTED THAT, IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER CONCERNING THE SINAI FORCE, THE U.S. UNDERTAKINGS WERE MADE SUBJECT TO U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES. I POINTED OUT THAT IN THE CASE OF THE SINAI MFO, WE HAD TRIED FIRST TO OBTAIN A UN FORCE. IT WAS ONLY WHEN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 682

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THIS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE MFD CONCEPT WAS CON-
NOTE BY LC/T: MESSAGE UPGRADED FXDIS PER S/S-O, MR. MUSTAIN
BT
#1903
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 677

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE342
STU8562
OO RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHJM #1903/02 1642146
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (TAD UPGRADED EXDIS AD311512 STU8559 - 632)
O 132127Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2484
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8100
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 JERUSALEM 01903

EXDIS
FROM HABIB
SIDERED.

10. I RECALLED THAT BEGIN HAD PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE 40-KILOMETER ZONE. I ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT WHILE THE OPTION APPROVED BY THE CABINET IS ISRAEL'S PROPOSAL, THE OTHER TWO WERE NOT OUTSIDE ISRAEL'S RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN EXPANDED UNIFIL AS A SOLUTION, SINCE THERE HAD BEEN PENETRATION OF UNIFIL AREAS BY THE PLO AND REPEATED QUARRELS WITH UNIFIL. I NOTED THAT AS BEGIN HAD PROPOSED ONE OPTION AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS CABINET, I MIGHT COME BACK WITH OTHER PROPOSALS AFTER CONSULTATION. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SUCH PROPOSALS.

11. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS A FIRM CONDITION. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT IT WAS "NOT A SINE QUA NON." IT WAS "DESIRABLE" FROM ISRAEL'S STANDPOINT BUT, IF THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO SEND FORCES, THERE COULD BE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WITHOUT IT.

12. TURNING TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, I SAID THAT THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ISRAELI SECURITY WHICH BEGIN HAD PROPOSED DEPENDS IN PART ON THE ACTIVITIES AND ROLE OF THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY. WE MUST BRING ALONG THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS VITAL. I RECALLED THAT HE AND I HAD DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF A LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY WHOSE WRIT WOULD RUN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF THE PLO AS AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ELEMENT WHICH HAS TO BE DEALT WITH WITHIN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A LEBANESE CONTEXT; THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS PART AND PARCEL OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO CONTROL ITS OWN TERRITORY. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RULE THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GO TO LEBANON TOMORROW AND TALK WITH VARIOUS LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. CHANGES FOR THE FUTURE AS WELL AS THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE WERE CONNECTED CLOSELY WITH PROSPECTS FOR ISRAEL'S PROPOSALS.

13. BEGIN SAID THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT AT THIS TIME A RESHUFFLE OF THE LEBANESE CABINET MAY BE UNDERWAY. I SAID WE HAD THE SAME UNDERSTANDING AND BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN SARKIS. MY VISIT TO LEBANON WOULD ALSO BE DIRECTED TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE WILL OF THE LEBANESE PARTIES TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.

14. BEGIN SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL EXCEPT TO OBSERVE THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ASSAD SAYS SYRIA MUST STAY IN LEBANON. ISRAEL WILL LEAVE AND SYRIA SHOULD LEAVE ALSO. I PRESSED FOR MORE SPECIFICS AS TO ISRAEL'S BASIC OBJECTIVES. I ASKED WHETHER BEGIN'S POSITION WAS THAT IF THE U.S. AGREES TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, THEN OTHER THINGS WERE POSSIBLE. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT HIS PROPOSAL RELATED TO THE BASICS, NOT TO ALL THE DETAILS. THERE WERE MORE PROBLEMS TO BE DEALT WITH WHICH WOULD TAKE TIME. AGREEMENT WITH THE SYRIANS, DISARMING OF THE PLU AND OTHER ISSUES WILL COME LATER.

15. I NOTED THAT A SECURITY ZONE WAS ONLY A PIECE OF THE FRAMEWORK. WE HAD TO CONSOLIDATE THE CEASEFIRE. THIS WAS CRITICAL. BEGIN STATED THAT A CEASEFIRE WAS "NOT A SOLUTION." I SAID I THOUGHT WE HAD A CEASEFIRE, BUT NOW WE DON'T, REFERRING TO ISRAEL'S CONTINUING MILITARY ACTION AND CREEPING FORWARD FROM THE CEASE-FIRE LINES.

16. THIS LED TO A LENGTHY GIVE-AND-TAKE ON THE ISRAELI VS. THE U.S. DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE. OUR EXCHANGES BECAME VERY HEATED. IN ESSENCE, BEGIN ARGUED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS A UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING BY ISRAEL. THERE WAS NO SIGNED CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA OR ANY OTHER ELEMENT. ISRAEL UNDERTOOK ONLY NOT TO FIRE AND HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD FIRE ONLY IF FIRED UPON. WHEN I QUESTIONED WHY ISRAEL WAS CREEPING FORWARD FROM THE CEASEFIRE LINES, BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF A "CEASEFIRE IN PLACE." HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S APPEAL HAD NOT INCLUDED ANY MENTION OF THE

50

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 679

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WORDS "IN PLACE."

17. IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, I EXPRESSED SHOCK,
ASTONISHMENT AND INCRECULITY OVER THE VIEW THAT THE
NOTE BY UC/T: MESSAGE UPGRADED EXDIS PER S/S-U, MR. MUSTAIN.

BT

#1903

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 674

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE343
STU8573
DD RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHJM #1903/03 1642155
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (T.A.O. UPGRADED EXDIS AD311535 STU8564 - WIJ)
MCN NAR
U 132127Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2485
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8101
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 JERUSALEM 01903

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

CEASEFIRE WAS NOT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. THIS CONCEPT WAS IMPLICIT IN EVERY CEASEFIRE. WHILE THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY RULE OUT TACTICAL MOVEMENTS NECESSARY TO PROTECT FORCES IN THE EVENT THEY WERE BEING FIRED UPON, A CEASEFIRE COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS PERMITTING ONE PARTY TO ADVANCE ON AND ON AS LONG AS IT DID NOT INITIATE FIRE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELI EFFORT TO CUT THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT ROAD WILL CREATE REAL PROBLEMS. THE SYRIAN FORCES MUST BE ALLOWED TO HAVE A WAY OUT. SYRIA STILL HAS ONE BRIGADE IN BEIRUT. THEY SHOULD IN FACT BE ENCOURAGED TO LEAVE BEIRUT THROUGH AN OPEN ROAD.

18. BEGIN PERSISTENTLY COUNTER-ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT A PROBLEM. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ISRAEL HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE SYRIANS. THE SYRIANS OBSERVED THE CEASEFIRE. OUR PROBLEM IS ONLY WITH THE PLO. THE PLO IS NOT A PARTY TO A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, WHEN THE PLO FIRES UPON THE IDF, WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT, HE SAID, TO MAKE STRATEGIC MOVES TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE.

19. AT ABOUT THIS POINT, BEGIN EMOTIONALLY SAID THAT THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO BLAME ISRAEL FOR EVERYTHING. HE DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI CASUALTIES. AND NOW, HE ADDED WITH VISIBLE ANGER, THERE HAS BEEN AN OUTCRY THAT "I HAD MISLED PEOPLE." IT WAS UNFAIR TO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF DECEIVING PEOPLE. HE LEFT THE ROOM BRIEFLY AT THIS JUNCTURE.

20. WHILE HE WAS ABSENT, BURG DESCRIBED THE DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY ISRAEL REGARDED THE PLO AND SYRIA. THE FIRST WAS AN ORGANIZATION WHICH PRETENDED NO RESPONSIBILITY

SECRET

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR ITS SPLINTER GROUPS, WHILE SYRIA--AS A STATE--COULD BE RELIED UPON. I REPEATED MY INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND OR APPRECIATE THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THERE WAS NOT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE.

21. WHEN BEGIN RETURNED, I REPEATED THAT I FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD DEAL THIS WAY WITH THE APPEAL OF THE PRESIDENT. CLEARLY, THE PRESIDENT HAD PROPOSED A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, BEGIN REPEATED THAT THAT WOULD BE TRUE IF IT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED INTO AN AGREEMENT. AS IT IS, IT IS A UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING, BURG REPEATED THAT THERE WERE DYNAMICS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THERE COULD BE NO ISRAELI UNDERTAKING TO FREEZE ITS POSITION. SAM LEWIS INTERVENED THAT IT WAS ONLY FAIR TO SAY THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL HAD BEEN ON THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. I SAID THAT I MADE CLEAR THIS IS WHAT I MEANT WHEN I TALKED TO ASSAD.

22. SAM SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN GOOD FAITH BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL. WHAT WE HAVE SAID AND WHAT ISRAEL HAD SAID EARLIER HAS TO HAVE A CERTAIN CREDIBILITY.

23. IN THE END, THE ISRAELIS MORE OR LESS CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION AS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD FREEZE THEIR POSITIONS ONLY WHEN THERE WAS NO FIRING. WITH FIRING THEY FELT THEY HAD A RIGHT TO MOVE TO PROTECT THEIR MEN. IN SHORT, WHEN FIRING CAME FROM A HILL, THEY COULD TAKE THAT HILL. ON THIS INCONCLUSIVE JUNCTURE, WE WENT TO OTHER MATTERS.

24. WE RETURNED BRIEFLY TO THE FORTY KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE. BEGIN EMOTIONALLY SAID THAT HE WANTED THE ISRAELI MEN TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FAMILIES. IF NECESSARY, HOWEVER, HE WAS PREPARED TO KEEP THE IDF IN LEBANON FOR FIVE YEARS OR MORE IN ORDER TO PROTECT EVEN ONE CHILD IN A NORTHERN ISRAELI TOWN FROM BEING THREATENED BY PLU GUNS. ISRAEL WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF A FORCE COULD BE ESTABLISHED, ALLOWING THE IDF TO GET HOME IN WEEKS.

25. I RAISED OUR INTEREST IN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS FOR LEBANON, AND DESCRIBED SOME OF WHAT THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE DOING. BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE "A MOST POSITIVE APPROACH." I SAID THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT AND THANKED HIM.

26. AS THE MEETING BROKE UP, I SAID TO BEGIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO END THE FIGHTING IN THE BEIRUT AREA. I SAID THE AIR STRIKES HAD BECOME HEAVY AND THIS NEEDED TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END. I

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 676

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATALOGY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WENT OUT TO THE HALLWAY AND RECEIVED FURTHER NEWS
ARLUT ADDED AIR STRIKES AND RETURNED TO BEGIN'S
BT
#1903
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 073

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE340
STL8569
DD RLFHC
DE RLEHJM #1903/04 164220Z
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
U 132127Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RLFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 2480
INFO RLFHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 810Z
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 01903
FROM HABIB
OFFICE TO MAKE A FINAL APPEAL (SEPTEL).
27. DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE OF
MINIMIZE.
GORKDN
BT
#1903
NNNN

SENSITIVE