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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: CABLE FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/20/2009

File Folder HABIB TRIP 06/09/1982

FOIA

F04-010/1

Box Number 45

SHAHAR

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65310	CABLE	STATE 157567 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	5	6/9/1982	B1
65311	CABLE	STATE 157569 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	4	6/9/1982	B1
65312	CABLE	JERUSALEM 01786 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	1	6/9/1982	B1
65313	CABLE	BEIRUT 04042 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	1	6/9/1982	B1
65314	CABLE	DAMASCUS 04013 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	2	6/9/1982	B1
65315	CABLE	TEL AVIV 08563 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	6	6/9/1982	B1
65316	CABLE	TEL AVIV 08565 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	1	6/9/1982	B1
65317	CABLE	DAMASCUS 04027 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	1	6/9/1982	B1
65318	CABLE	CAIRO 14307 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 M370/2	2	6/9/1982	B1

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE292
STU7222
TTTT ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #8487 1600210
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 090209Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH 6542
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5658
RUFHWIN/USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
INFO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3322
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8367
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4726
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 08487
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/9/82 (HARE, PAUL)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MDPS, US, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS
REF: DAMASCUS 03983 (NOTAL)
1. SECRET - (ENTIRE TEXT)
2. ASSUMING FLIGHT CLEARANCES RECEIVED, HABIB
AND HOWELL ETD BEN GURION 0630 HOURS LOCAL, JUNE 9.
FLIGHT TIME TO DAMASCUS IS ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS IF
CYPRUS TOUCH DOWN IS WAIVED.
3. WILL ADVISE DEPARTURE TIME BY FLASH PRECEDENCE.
4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BT
#8487
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By 101 NARA, Date 2/21/09

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE282

UTS1559

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHTV #8489 1600340

ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK

U 090340Z JUN 82 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUQMGG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 1347

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3323

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5659

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TEL AVIV 08489

E.O. 12065:GDS 6/9/82 (HARE, PAUL)

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP)

SUBJECT: HABIB TRAVEL

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE HAVE REQUESTED THROUGH DAD CHANNELS FLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUESTS FOR HABIB TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS, DEPARTING BEN GURION 0630 HOURS LOCAL, JUNE 9.

3. APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN GIVE TO EXPEDITE CLEARANCE.

4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BT

#8489

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By 105 NARA, Date 2/23/09

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE335
UD RUEHC
DE RUEHC #7567 1600400
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
U 090345Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHWIN/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 157567 TOSEC 080313

EXDIS
JERUSALEM ALSO FOR HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS 1/4 6/8/02 (VELIOTES, N. A.)
TAGS: PEPR, US, XF
SUBJECT: INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: ARAB REACTION TO
ISRAELI ACTION IN LEBANON (S/S NU. 8216021)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INFURMAIJON MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY NEA AND CLEARED BY INR.
3. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST, THIS MEMORANDUM DESCRIBES ARAB REACTION TO DATE TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON, DISCUSSES WHAT FURTHER ARAB REACTION IS LIKELY OVER THE COMING FEW DAYS AND SUGGESTS THE EFFECT THESE REACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND SAUDI ARABIA, IMMEDIATELY AND OVER THE MID-TERM.

REACTION IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY ACTIONS HAS BEEN SLOW TO COALESCE. WE NORMALLY EXPECT A GAP OF SEVERAL DAYS IN THE PENINSULA'S REACTION TO UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE EVENTS. IN THIS CASE, THE FACT THAT THE PENINSULA STATES HAD BEEN FOCUSING ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR MAY HAVE MUTED SOME OF THEIR INITIAL REACTIONS. AMONG THE FIRST REACTIONS RECEIVED WAS A MESSAGE FROM KING KHALID

OF SAUDI ARABIA TO PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSING HIS GREAT CONCERN AT ISRAEL'S "VAST AGGRESSION" AND THE MANY INNOCENT CASUALTIES IT IS CAUSING. KHALID APPEALED FOR QUICK AND FIRM U.S. INTERVENTION TO STOP THE BLOODSHED AND SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES.

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NLRR M370/2 #65310

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OTHER GULF STATES. ON JUNE 8 THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTRY STRONGLY PROTESTED TO AMBASSADOR DICKMAN THE USE OF U.S.-SUPPLIED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO INVADE A NEIGHBOR AND CAUSE A LARGE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. UAE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SHAIKH SUROUR COMPLAINED TO OUR CHARGE OF THE INCREASING DANGERS TO HIS COUNTRY FROM THIS ISRAELI ACTION WHICH, HE WARNED, WOULD FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE GULF. ON JUNE 7 THE QATAR FOREIGN MINISTRY CONVEYED AN URGENT GOQ REQUEST THAT THE USG BRING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON LEST SYRIA ENGAGE ISRAELI TROOPS AND OPEN FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE AREA.

NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES. ON JUNE 7 MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA STATED IN ENGLISH ON THE RADIO THAT MOROCCO STRONGLY CONDEMNS ISRAEL'S "UNSPEAKABLE INVASION" OF SOUTH LEBANON AND "INSISTENTLY REQUESTS THE COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL." TUNISIAN RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAD EXPRESSED HIS GREAT CONCERN OVER "ISRAEL'S DRIVE FOR HEGEMONY" AND DEPUTY FONMIN MESTERI ECHOED THIS "MOST PROFOUND CONCERN AND ANXIETY" TO AMBASSADOR CUTLER ON JUNE 7, APPEALING FOR MAXIMUM U.S. EFFORTS, BOTH IN THE UN AND BILATERALLY, TO INDUCE ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. LIBYA'S PEOPLES' BUREAU ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO DEFEND LEBANON AGAINST "ZIONIST AGGRESSION" AND SPOKE OF RECRUITING PLO VOLUNTEERS FOR LEBANON.

SYRIA, DEPUTY FONMIN QADDUR TOLD AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI JUNE 7 THAT SYRIA HAD NO DESIRE TO SEE CONFLICT IN LEBANON WIDEN BUT IF ISRAEL SHOULD ATTACK SYRIAN FORCES THERE THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO RESPOND. QADDUR CRITICIZED US PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOR ENCOURAGING THE ISRAELIS INDIRECTLY. HE CHARGED THAT U.S. CREDIBILITY WAS AT AN ALL-TIME LOW AND U.S. MOTIVES WERE SUSPECT IN SEEKING AN END TO THE FIGHTING. QADDUR WAS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF USG PRESS STATEMENT ON JUNE 4 WHICH HE SAID SUPPORTED THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND SUGGESTED THE U.S. BELIEVED THE INVASION WAS JUSTIFIED. HE SAID SOME SYRIANS BELIEVED HABIB HAD DELAYED HIS ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL TO GIVE THE IDF TIME TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS. PAGANELLI TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO THIS LINE. HE ALSO RECOMMENDED A FIRM U.S. POLICY STATEMENT CONDEMNING

ISRAELI ACTIONS IN LEBANON.

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SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IRAQ. ON JUNE 6 IRAQ'S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TOLD CHARGE EAGLETON THAT IRAQ WAS CONVINCED THIS WAS PART OF AN ISRAELI EFFORT ON BEHALF OF IRAN TO DISTRACT THE PARTIES FROM SETTLING THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT.

EGYPT. IN A JUNE 6 STATEMENT, EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK DENOUNCED ISRAEL'S "FLAGRANT AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY." HE DESCRIBED ISRAEL'S MOVE AS "A FLAGRANT DEPARTURE FROM THE SPIRIT OF PEACE, A GRAVE ESCALATION OF TENSION, AND A BLATANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW." IN A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ATHERTON ON JUNE 8, MUBARAK STRESSED THAT THE U.S. MUST BE SEEN TO BE MOVING ACTIVELY TO BRING ABOUT A QUICK ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. A PROLONGED ISRAELI STAY WOULD CREATE INTERNAL TENSIONS IN EVERY COUNTRY IN THE REGION AND HARM U.S. AND EGYPTIAN INTERESTS THROUGH THE REGION. BY A QUICK WITHDRAWAL, MUBARAK EMPHASIZED THAT HE MEANT IT SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN A WEEK TO 15 DAYS AT THE MOST, MUBARAK ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE EXTENT OF THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC'S ANGER TOWARD ISRAEL.

THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR, LATER JOINED BY OTHER ARAB AMBASSADORS, CALLED ON ACTING SECRETARY STOESEL JUNE 8 TO URGE U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH UNSC RES. 509 REGARDING IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL (FULL REPORT BY SEPTEL). BAHRAINI AMBASSADOR, ASKING WHY THE U.S. WAS SITTING SILENT, SAID USG POSITION IN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR BAHRAIN AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO CONTINUE TO BE CLOSE TO THE U.S. KUWAITI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON U.S. TO CONDEMN ISRAELI ACTION AND IMPOSE "REAL, NOT SYMBOLIC" SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR CHARGED THAT ISRAELI INVASION WAS NOT AN ACT OF SELF-DEFENSE BUT RATHER A "PREMEDITATED PLAN", USING THE LONDON INCIDENT AS AN EXCUSE. HE SAID U.S. MUST PUNISH ISRAELI BEHAVIOR IN A MEANINGFUL WAY BY CUTTING OFF THE FUNDS AND THE EQUIPMENT THAT THE U.S. SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL. KING KHALID HAS NOW WRITTEN A SECOND LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, THIS TIME SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE SIX ARAB MEMBERS OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL. FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD WISHES TO DELIVER THIS MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT IN EUROPE.

WE MUST ANTICIPATE AN INTENSIFICATION OF ARAB REACTION OVER COMING DAYS, PARTICULARLY IF AN ISRAELI

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PULLBACK DOES NOT FOLLOW QUICKLY AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CEASEFIRE. DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS ARAB GOVERN-

MENTS CONSTRUCTIVELY ON TREATING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE ISRAELI INVASION, THEIR REACTION, BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE, IS LIKELY TO FOCUS ON U.S. UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO SECURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR ARAB CALLS FOR U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND FOR ARAB PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES TO INVOKE THE SUSPENSION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES OR OTHER VISIBLE SANCTIONS AS A MEANS OF INDUCING ISRAELI COMPLIANCE. EVEN MODERATE ARAB STATES ARE LIKELY TO SEE U.S. RESPONSES AS INADEQUATE, PARTICULARLY IF WE ARE OBLIGED TO CAST ANOTHER UNSC VETO. THEY WILL BE TEMPTED TO PLACE US AT A GREATER DISTANCE POLITICALLY AND WILL CAST ABOUT FOR EFFECTIVE WAYS TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITHOUT HARMING THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

THE DILEMMA FACING SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES WILL BE ACUTE IN THIS REGARD. FACED WITH THE DUAL HUMILIATION OF ARAB DEFEATS IN LEBANON BY THE ISRAELIS AND IN IRAQ BY THE PERSIANS, THEY WILL SUCCUMB TO THE TEMPTATION TO CASTIGATE THE U.S. PUBLICLY AND TO ASCRIBE THE VICTORIES OF THEIR REGIONAL OPPONENTS TO AMERICAN SUPPORT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SAUDIS' LONG RELATIONSHIP WITH US AND GENUINE FEAR OF REVOLUTIONARY IRAN WILL PULL IN THE OTHER DIRECTION AND INCLINE THEM QUIETLY TO MAINTAIN A CLOSE SECURITY LINK WITH THE UNITED STATES.

WE MUST NEVERTHELESS BE PREPARED FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RAPID ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THERE WILL BE SOME SAUDI SHIFT AWAY FROM US. FOR SOME TIME SAUDI LEADERS HAVE BEEN FACING INTERNAL CRITICISM MAINTAINING THAT A CLOSE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS BECOME TOO DIFFICULT, TOO UNPOPULAR AND TOO UNCERTAIN A PROPOSITION. IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS, ABSENT STRONG U.S. ACTION TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL, THE SAUDIS COULD WELL MOVE TOWARD AN ALTERNATE POLICY FOR ENSURING THEIR SECURITY, SLIPPING AWAY FROM CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE U.S. AND PLACING THEMSELVES MORE DIRECTLY WITHIN THE PREVAILING ARAB MAINSTREAM ON ARAB/ISRAELI, ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED ISSUES. OVER TIME, THEY COULD REINFORCE THIS NEW DIRECTION BY TURNING INCREASINGLY TO EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING.

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DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BECAUSE OF THE SHARPNESS OF THEIR CURRENT DILEMMA,
NONE OF THIS IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN OVERNIGHT NOR ARE WE
LIKELY TO SEE WIDESPREAD DEMONSTRATIONS OR VIOLENCE
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INSTALLATIONS IN THE PENINSULA.
THUS, THE PACE AND EXTENT OF A POSSIBLE SAUDI (AND GULF

"TATE) SHIFT AWAY FROM US CAN BE AFFECTED BY U.S.
POLICIES AND ACTIONS. STUESSEL

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE338
LD RUEHC
DE RUEHC #7569 1600407
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090354Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHWIN/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 157569 TOSEC 080315
EXDIS USDEL FOR CLUVERIUS; JERUSALEM FOR HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3 6/8/92 (STOESSEL, WALTER)
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: STOESSEL MEETING WITH ARENS 6/8
ZFF FOR SECRETARY ONLY
1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ARENS MET WITH ACTING SECRETARY
STOESSEL 6/8 TO REITERATE THEMES OF HIS MEETING WITH
EAGLEBURGER ON 6/7. ARENS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ISRAELI
EMBASSY MINISTER NEHUSHTAN. NEA ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY SCHNEIDER ATTENDED.

3. AFTER A BRIEF RECAPITULATION OF THE MILITARY
SITUATION, ARENS SAID ISRAEL WAS CLOSE TO ACHIEVING ITS
MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND WAS ASKING THE U.S. TO "GIVE US A
CHANCE TO FINISH THE JOB AND THEN WORK WITH US TO KEEP
THE PLO OUT." THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS MIDDLE
EAST STABILITY, SAID ARENS, AND WOULD LEAD TO A STRONGER
AND MORE INDEPENDENT LEBANON. ARAB COUNTRIES--THE SAUDIS
AND JORDANIANS IN PARTICULAR--WERE "NOT UNHAPPY" TO SEE
THE PLO TAKE A BEATING, HE SAID.

4. ARENS SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT WE HAD SUPPORTED THE
6/6 UN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL; THIS
WOULD BE A "TOTALLY DESTRUCTIVE" COURSE AMOUNTING TO A

RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, WHICH WOULD ONLY SERVE

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NLRR M370/2 #65311

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOVIET AND PLO INTERESTS. STOESEL SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE SAUDIS WERE CIRCULATING A NEW DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL, CALLING FOR A WITHDRAWAL WITHIN SIX HOURS AND IMPLYING THE USE OF SANCTIONS LATER IF ISRAEL DID NOT COMPLY. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE U.S. SUPPORTING ANY SUCH RESOLUTION; WE WOULD WORK TO POSTPONE ACTION AND OTHERWISE HEAD OFF CONSIDERATION OF IT, BUT WE HAD WORKED HARD TO GET BALANCE INTO THE 6/6 RESOLUTION AND COULD NOT HAVE VETOED IT WITHOUT PUTTING OURSELVES INTO AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION..

5. ARENS SAID HE BELIEVES THERE ARE A NUMBER OF "FACTORS" IN LEBANON DEDICATED TO ITS INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY THAT WOULD BUILD UPON THE OPPORTUNITY THAT WAS NOW OPEN. THE COMMON DENOMINATOR AMONG THESE GROUPS--INCLUDING MANY SHIAS AND SUNNIS--WAS THE DESIRE TO RID LEBANON OF FOREIGN DOMINATION BY SYRIA AND PLO FORCES.

6. STOESEL AGREED THAT WE WANTED TO STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OVER ITS TERRITORY AND MOVE FOREIGN FORCES OUT. HABIB HAD BEEN ON HIS WAY TO DISCUSS THESE AIMS PRIOR TO THE ISRAELI ACTION BUT HIS ITINERARY HAD NOW BEEN SOMEWHAT CHANGED. ARENS REPLIED THAT WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS NO WAY SHORT OF FORCE TO MOVE THE PLO OUT OF THE SOUTH; WE WERE MISTAKEN IF WE BELIEVED THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS HAD SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE TO ACCOMPLISH THAT FEAT AS PART OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

7. IN HIS MEETING 6/7 WITH DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER, ARENS SAID, WEINBERGER HAD SAID THE U.S. POSITION WAS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW AND THE STATUS QUO ANTE SHOULD BE RESTORED. ARENS SAID HE HAD TOLD WEINBERGER THAT THIS WOULD MEAN A PLO RETURN--"NOTHING COULD BE MORE DESTRUCTIVE TO OUR COMMON INTERESTS"--AND IN THE END, WEINBERGER HAD AGREED.

8. TO STOESEL'S QUESTION WHETHER AN EXPANDED UNIFIL MIGHT PLAY A ROLE FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, ARENS SAID THAT HIS PURELY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT ISRAEL HAD HAD PROBLEMS WITH U.N. FORCES SUBJECT TO MANIPULATION BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR COHORTS, AND THAT UNIFIL'S PERFORMANCE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING. ASIDE FROM CONSCIENTIOUS SERVICE PERFORMED BY THE SHORT-LIVED FRENCH UNIFIL CONTINGENT, UNIFIL HAD ALLOWED THE PLO TO PASS

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FULLY-ARMED THROUGH THEIR LINES WITH ACQUIESCENCE. ARENS BELIEVED ISRAEL WOULD LOOK FOR BETTER ALTERNATIVES THAT WERE MORE IRONCLAD.

8. NEHUSHTAN INTERJECTED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT CONSIDER PLAYING A ROLE IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. STOESSEL MENTIONED THE SENSITIVITIES IN ANY INJECTION OF U.S. TROOPS INTO THE AREA AND PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE. A LEBANON PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE SINAI MFO, FOR INSTANCE.

9. ARENS REPEATED THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL SHOULD WORK THE PROBLEMS OUT TOGETHER. ISRAEL DID NOT CLAIM TO BE THE GREATEST EXPERTS, THOUGH THEY DID MAINTAIN PRETENSIONS OF UNDERSTANDING THE AREA WELL; WE WERE BOTH WORKING FOR THE SAFETY OF ISRAEL, THE PEACE OF LEBANON AND AN END TO TERROR AND SYRIAN INFLUENCE. LEBANESE ELECTIONS COULD NOW TAKE PLACE WITHOUT PLO AND SYRIAN PRESSURE ON VOTERS.

10. STOESSEL POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO DO SOMETHING QUICKLY, WHILE ARENS' IDEAS CLEARLY WOULD TAKE TIME TO WORK OUT. ARENS SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ADOPT AN "INTELLIGENT, EVEN SOPHISTICATED" POLICY, AVOIDING ACTIONS AT THE UN AND ELSEWHERE THAT WOULD BUILD PRESSURE FOR QUICK ACTION. STOESSEL EMPHASIZED THAT OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY BALANCED; WE WERE TAKING FLAK FROM THE ARABS BECAUSE OF OUR PUBLIC POSTURE. ARENS SAID ARAB COMPLAINTS WERE WINDOW DRESSING. "THERE IS NOT A SINGLE ARAB COUNTRY THAT IN ITS HEART OF HEARTS IS NOT HAPPY" THAT THE PLO IS TAKING A BEATING.

11. ARENS SAID HE HAD TAKEN EXCEPTION TO WEINBERGER'S STATEMENT TO HIM THAT THE U.S. HAD TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT AGGRESSIVE ACTION DID NOT PAY OFF, BOTH IN THE FALKLANDS SITUATION AND IN LEBANON. THERE WAS NO ANALOGY; ISRAEL'S ACTION WAS MORE SIMILAR TO THE U.S. PUNITIVE EXPEDITION AGAINST PANCHO VILLA THAN TO THE FALKLANDS SITUATION. THE LEBANON CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENT HAD BEEN "INIRISICALLY UNSTABLE", WITH NO CONSTRAINTS ON THE TERRORISTS. AFTER A LONG CHAIN OF VIOLATIONS, THE ATTEMPT ON AMBASSADOR ARGOV WAS THE LAST STRAW. ARAFAI HAD PERPETRATED AND AUTHORIZED SUCH TERRORISM BY REPEATEDLY REJECTING

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AMBASSADOR HABIB'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND SAYING THE PLO WAS FREE TO CARRY OUT ATTACKS ON ISRAELIS. "WE RESPONDED TO TERROR, HE SHELLED OUR TOWNS" ARENS SAID.

12. STOESEL CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY TELLING ARENS WE

WOULD BE ANNOUNCING OUR PLAN TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WITHIN A DAY OR SO. THE PROGRAM WOULD HELP THE INJURED AND PROVIDE SHELTER. ARENS ASKED WHAT FORM THE ASSISTANCE WOULD TAKE AND WAS TOLD IT WOULD CONSIST OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND RED CROSS AND EMERGENCY SUPPLIES SUCH AS TENTS. NEHUSHTAN SAID THAT WE SHOULD ASK ISRAEL TO HELP IF WE THOUGHT THEY COULD CONTRIBUTE, AND ARENS AGREED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSIST. STOESEL

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#7569
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65312 12

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE333
STU7445
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHJM #1786 1600436
ZNY .SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 090435Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 6788
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2377
RUFHWIN/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 4986

BT

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 01786

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR DILLON FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,2,3-06/09/02 (GROVE, BRANDON) UR-M

TAGS: PEPR, DVIP (HABIB, AMB.) LE, US, SY, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION-BEIRUT VISIT

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. INFORM BUTROS THAT I HAVE HIS REQUEST THAT I COME TO BEIRUT VERY MUCH IN MIND. I WILL TRY TO DO SO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND YOU AND HE SHOULD CONCERT ON BEST WAY FOR ME TO GET THERE. TELL HIM THAT MEANWHILE I AM GOING TO DAMASCUS TODAY. FOR HIS AND PRES. SARKIS' INFORMATION ONLY, YOU CAN SAY I AM URGENTLY WORKING TO AVOID A MAJOR CLASH BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES AND TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE IN LEBANON.

3. TELL BUTROS I MAY FIND IT NECESSARY TO COME BACK TO ISRAEL FROM DAMASCUS BEFORE GOING TO BEIRUT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DEPENDING ON HOW MY TALK WITH ASSAD GOES, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO MAKE A QUICK STOP IN BEIRUT BEFORE COMING ON TO ISRAEL. WE WILL HAVE TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE AND LEAVE ALL POSSIBILITIES OPEN. THE IMPORTANT THING AT THE MOMENT IS TO AVOID A WIDER WAR AND BRING AN END TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. OUR OBJECTIVES REMAIN AS STATED BY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY IN RECENT STATEMENTS.

4. FINALLY, INFORM HIM THAT I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING HIM AND PRESIDENT SARKIS FOR A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE SITUATION AND WHAT WE ARE DOING ABOUT IT. GROVE

BT

#1786

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DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLRR M370/2 #65312
BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

65313 13

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE433
STU8472
OO RUEHC
DE RUQMBE #4042 1601130
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 091127Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6849
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSYDAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 2224
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 7522
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 1535

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4042

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/9/02 (DILLON, ROBERT S.) UR-M

TAGS/ QTRA

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF HABIB TO BEIRUT

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING, JOHNNY ABDO SAID THAT IF HABIB IS COMING TO BEIRUT FROM DAMASCUS, SAFEST MEANS WILL BE BY ROAD, JOHNNY SAID HE WOULD ASSIST WITH ARRANGEMENTS FOR BORDER MEET AND EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT AS LONG A BOTH ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS WERE INFORMED, THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEMS.

3. GIVEN ISRAELI-SYRIAN AIR ACTIVITY IN THE BIQ'A, JOHNNY THINKS THAT RAYAQ AIR BASE HAS BECOME TOO DANGEROUS.

DILLON

BT

#4042

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 + 65313

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

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65314 14

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE473
VSK127STU8639
'''''' ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHDM #4013 1601209
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK (TAU)
Z 091207Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 6014
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3591
RUFHWIN/USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6636

BT

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04013

NODIS

TEL AVIV FOR AMB. LEWIS FROM HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/9/02 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, IS, SY, LE, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM BEGIN CONCERNING NEW MISSILE
BATTERIES

REF: TEL AVIV 8505

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS TOWARD REMOVAL OF SAM-6'S FROM LEBANON.
3. IN THIS CONNECTION, I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY LEAKS IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA REGARDING MY VISIT TO DAMASCUS. THE SYRIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BRACED ME IN THE CAR FROM THE AIRPORT RE REPORTS IN ISRAELI MEDIA ON MY PURPOSE IN VISITING SYRIA. I CANNOT SAY WHETHER ASSAD WOULD HAVE AGREED TO RECEIVE ME AT THIS MOMENT HAD THE FULL EXTENT OF ISRAELI MEDIA COVERAGE BEEN AVAILABLE WHEN HE DECIDED. I DO KNOW THAT THESE LEAKS ARE SERIOUSLY UNDERCUTTING MY EFFORTS.
4. AS REGARDS THE MISSILES JUST RAISED BY BEGIN, THEIR WITHDRAWAL WILL BECOME WELL NIGH IMPOSSIBLE IF THE ISRAELIS CHOOSE TO MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF THEM, DEMANDING THEIR REMOVAL ON LINKING THEM TO MY TALKS IN DAMASCUS. I REALIZE IN THAT CASE THE ISRAELIS WILL PROBABLY DECIDE TO TAKE THEM OUT BY FORCE, NOT WISHING TO REPLAY LAST YEAR'S STAND-OFF.
5. I WILL DO MY BEST BUT THEY ARE NOT MAKING IT ANY EASIER. I WILL LEAVE IT TO YOUR JUDGEMENT WHETHER ANYTHING USEFUL CAN BE DONE TO FORESTALL LEAKS ON THIS ONE. PAGANELLI

NOTE BY DC/T: NODIS ADDED PER S/S-O MR. FRETZ

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65314

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#4013
NNNN

SENSITIVE

65315 16

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE564
UTS2420
'''''' ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #8563/01 1601537
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
Z 091533Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5676
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6548
INFO RUOMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3328
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4733
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 08563

NODIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY FLASH
FOR THE SECRETARY AND HABIB FROM LEWIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/9/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) DR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, US, SY, PLO
SUBJECT: LEBANESE HOSTILITIES: BEGIN PROVIDES HABIB WITH
- ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS INTO ISRAELI STRATEGY

- REF: JERUSALEM 1785
1. (8 - ENTIRE TEXT)
 2. BEFORE FLYING TO DAMASCUS WEDNESDAY MORNING TO SEE PRESIDENT ASSAD, HABIB MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AT HIS RESIDENCE FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF HOUR TO PROBE INTO BEGIN'S THINKING FURTHER ABOUT THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. BEGIN WAS ALONE; I ACCOMPANIED HABIB.
 3. BEGIN BEGAN BY THANKING THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FOR THE U.S. NEGATIVE VOTE LAST NIGHT ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS IN LEBANON. BEGIN ASKED THAT HIS PROFOUND THANKS BE CONVEYED TO BOTH, SAYING THAT "ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT REQUEST YOUR VETO, WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL INDEED FOR IT."
 4. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S QUERIES ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS NEAR BEIRUT AND CLOSE TO THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY, BEGIN CONFIDED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION OF THE ISRAELI STRATEGY. REMINDING HABIB THAT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FACED BY THE ISRAELIS IS TO GET THE PLO NORTH OF HASBAYYAH TO PULL BACK AN ADDITIONAL TWENTY FIVE KILOMETERS TO THE 40-KILOMETER LINE, AS HAS NOW BEEN MILITARILY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE IDF IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN PARTS OF LEBANON. THE STRATEGY, CONCEIVED BY DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, IS TO "ENCIRCLE" THE SYRIAN AND PLO

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65315
BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FORCES IN EASTERN LEBANON, MOVING NORTH AND THEN EAST "BEHIND THEM" TO PUT THE ISRAELI FORCES IN POSITION TO GO AFTER THE PLO FROM THE NORTH IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, BEGIN SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE ISRAELI FORCES NOT TO ATTACK THE SYRIAN OR PLO UNITS IN THE EAST, PREFERRING TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS BY POLITICAL MEANS AND THROUGH HABIB THAT IT WOULD BE WISER FOR SYRIA TO ACCOMPLISH THE NECESSARY ACTIONS TO MOVE THE PLO NORTHWARD OUT OF RANGE. IN OTHER WORDS, BEGIN EXPLAINED THE OPERATIONS IN THE BEIRUT AREA AS PART OF THIS ENCIRCLEMENT STRATEGY INTENDED TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS WHICH WOULD THEN PERSUADE THEM TO DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY VIS-A-VIS THE PLO, THUS AVOIDING HOSTILITIES WITH SYRIA.

5. HABIB THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO PERSUADE ASSAD TO TAKE THE ACTIONS REQUESTED IN BEGIN'S MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS, BUT HE VISUALIZED HIS CHANCES AS VERY SLIM. HABIB SAID THAT THE FIRST INDICATIONS THROUGH ONE OF ASSAD'S TRUSTED ASSOCIATES (QADDUR) WERE NOT ENCOURAGING; NONETHELESS HE WOULD DO HIS BEST. HABIB SAID HE WOULD HAVE MUCH MORE CHANCE IF HE COULD TELL ASSAD THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES NORTH OF THE FORTY KILOMETER LINE WOULD WITHDRAW BEHIND THAT ROUGH LINE AS SOON AS THE PLO UNITS HAD MOVED NORTH AND THE FIGHTING HAD STOPPED. BEGIN DEMURRED. BEGIN INSISTED THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL REMAIN AFTER THE FIGHTING STOPS IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS THE SOUTH, UNTIL ACCEPTABLE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN PLACE TO ASSURE THAT THE AREA BEHIND THE FORTY KILOMETER LINE WILL REMAIN CLEAR OF PLO PRESENCE, EITHER THROUGH A MULTINATIONAL FORCE OR SOME OTHER MEANS. HABIB TRIED STRENUOUSLY TO EXTRACT THE COMMITMENT FROM BEGIN THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NORTHERN POINTS WOULD OCCUR AS SOON AS PLO MOVEMENT TOOK PLACE AND A CEASEFIRE TOOK EFFECT, BUT BEGIN WOULD NOT AGREE. FINALLY BEGIN AUTHORIZED HABIB TO SAY ONLY THAT ONCE THE PLO HAD MOVED NORTH AND A CEASEFIRE WAS IN EFFECT, ISRAEL WILL NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF WITHDRAWAL. HE THEN HEDGED EVEN THIS COMMITMENT BY SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE HABIB "A HARD PROMISE," AND THAT HABIB "CANNOT PROMISE ASSAD ANYTHING NOW." HE SUGGESTED THAT HABIB USE THE WORDS WITH ASSAD: "NEGOTIATIONS CAN THEN OPEN."

6. BEGIN CONFIDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO KEEP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS TO "PERSUADE THEM" TO MOVE THE PLO OUT. TO PROMISE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ADVANCE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THAT STRATEGY. AT ONE POINT BEGIN MADE AN ANALOGY WITH THE IDF'S ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY ON THE EAST BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT FIRED

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AT THAT ARMY, BUT THAT BY KEEPING IT ENCIRCLED IT HAD FACILITATED THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.
7. AFTER REALIZING THAT THIS WAS AS FAR AS BEGIN WOULD GO AT THIS TIME, AND THAT BEGIN WAS CLEARLY ASSUMING HABIB
BT
#R563
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE565
STU9089
'''''' ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #8563/02 1601546
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
Z 091533Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5677
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6549
INFO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3329
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4734
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 08563

NODIS
MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE MORE THAN ONE TRIP BACK AND FORTH TO DAMASCUS, WE TURNED TO ANOTHER RELATED SUBJECT. BEFORE DOING SO HOWEVER, BEGIN RECONFIRMED AGAIN THAT ISRAEL'S ONLY PURPOSE IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE FORTY KILOMETER LINE IS TO PROVIDE LEVERAGE TO FORCE THE SYRIANS TO ARRANGE FOR PLO WITHDRAWAL NORTHWARD.
8. AS WE WERE LEAVING, WE QUERIED BEGIN ABOUT HIS EXCHANGES WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL. BEGIN CONFIDED THAT BASHIR HAD MET WITH GENERAL EITAN, APPARENTLY MUNDAY NIGHT. AMONG OTHER THINGS AT THAT MEETING, EITAN APPARENTLY SUGGESTED TO BASHIR THAT HE APPOINT A "COMMISSIUNER" TO TAKE OVER IN TYRE. BASHIR REPORTEDLY SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT THE PHALANGE COUNCIL BEFORE RESPONDING.
9. IT WAS AT THAT MEETING THAT BASHIR RELAYED THE OFFER FROM PRESIDENT SARKIS TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL, DESCRIBED INITIALLY BY BEGIN IN THE TERMS WE REPORTED IN PARA FOUR OF REFTEL. HOWEVER, BEGIN ADMITTED THAT HIS MEMORY WAS A BIT FAULTY ON THIS AND HE WANTED TO CONSULT HIS WRITTEN NOTES ABOUT THE SARKIS MESSAGE.
10. BEGIN TELEPHONED ME AFTER HABIB'S DEPARTURE AND READ ME THE FOLLOWING VERBATIM MESSAGE AS EITAN HAD APPARENTLY TAKEN IT FROM BASHIR. (AS WILL BE READILY SEEN, THE SARKIS MESSAGE IS BOTH DIFFERENT AND MORE COMPLEX THAN BEGIN'S ORIGINAL DESCRIPTION TO HABIB.) "IN THE OPINION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISOR, ZAZI BUSTANI, PRESIDENT SARKIS WOULD BE READY NOW FOR A DIPLOMATIC ACTION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF THE ISRAELI FORCES. IT SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED THAT IN THE INITIAL STAGE PRESIDENT SARKIS WOULD PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE THIS.

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RATHER IT WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF AN UNDERSTANDING ARRIVED AT VIA THE CAPITALIZED LEBANESE FORCES. IT COULD BE THAT SUCH A POLICY LINE WILL REQUIRE PRESIDENT SARKIS TO BRING ABOUT THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONALLY POSSIBLE, AND IN WHICH THE CAPITALIZED LEBANESE FORCES WOULD ASSUME AN ACTIVE ROLE. ON THIS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS." (COMMENT: THIS IS CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT THAN BEGIN'S EARLIER STATEMENT THAT SARKIS HAD OFFERED TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. IT DOES, HOWEVER, POINT TOWARD AN AVENUE THROUGH WHICH BASHIR MAY BE PLANNING TO ASSUME SUBSTANTIAL POWER IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.)

11. WE PROBED FURTHER TO TRY TO PIN DOWN WHETHER THE NORTHERN MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE A PRELUDE TO A LINK-UP BETWEEN THE PHALANGIST AREA AND THE IDF FORCES, INTENDED TO ASSURE BASHIR'S ELECTION AT THE FURTHCOMING LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTING. BEGIN WAS SOMEWHAT COY ON THIS SUBJECT, SAYING THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT BASHIR HAD A VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF BEING ELECTED PRESIDENT WHILE CAMILLE CHAMOUN'S CHANCES WERE MUCH BETTER. HE DID NOT CATEGORICALLY DENY ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MILITARY MOVES AND THE PRE-ELECTORAL MANEUVERING, CONTENTING HIMSELF WITH STRESSING THE MILITARY PURPOSE VIS-A-VIS SYRIA AND THE PLO. BOTH HABIB AND I WERE LEFT HOWEVER WITH THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT THE GAME BEHIND THESE MILITARY MOVES IS TWOFOLD: TO PRODUCE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT AND TO FORCE THE PLO OUT OF THE HASBAYYAH AREA ON THE ONE HAND, AND PERHAPS TO LINK UP WITH BASHIR'S FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE NEARLY CERTAIN A RESTRUCTURING OF THE POLITICAL GAME IN BEIRUT IN THE WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. IF OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE CORRECT, THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD OCCUR ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AFTER A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE ARE SURE TO BE LENGTHY AND LABORIOUS.

12. LONG AFTER HABIB'S DEPARTURE, I RECEIVED SECTO 8045 AUTHORIZING HABIB TO TAKE "A FIRM LINE WITH BEGIN TODAY TO GET HIM TO PULL BACK HIS GROUND FORCES, ETC." IN LIGHT OF THE STRATEGY PICTURE BEGIN OUTLINED THIS MORNING, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE OBJECTIVE IN THIS MESSAGE WILL BE EXTREMELY HARD IF NOT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE.

13. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR ME TO MAKE THE POINTS IN SECTO 8045 PRIOR TO HABIB'S RETURN. TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON BEGIN, HABIB WILL NEED TO HAVE NOT ONLY THE AUTHORIZATION IN THIS MESSAGE BUT ALSO SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ASSAD CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVE BEGIN IS SEEKING WITH RESPECT TO THE PLO IN THE HASBAYYAH AREA.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

14. WE DO NOT KNOW YET WHEN HARIB WILL RETURN HERE. IF HE IS TOO LONG DELAYED, IT MAY BE BEST FOR ME TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT HIM, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO AWAIT HIS JUDGMENT ON THIS TACTICAL ISSUE.

15. RETROT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE651
STU9195
LD RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #8565 1601619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091540Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5679
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 08565
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/9/87 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) DR-M
TAGS: OVIP (BEGIN, MENACHEM)
SUBJECT: BEGIN'S TRAVEL PLANS

1. (e - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. WHEN PHIL HABIB AND I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TUESDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 8, AT THE KNESSET, HE TOOK THE OCCASION TO MENTION HIS TRAVEL PLANS. AS OUR MEETING WAS WINDING UP, BEGIN TURNED TO ME AND SAID MEANINGFULLY THAT HE STILL INTENDS TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES NEXT WEEK TO DELIVER HIS SPEECH AT THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT AND TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE MIGHT HAVE TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE FROM ISRAEL ONE DAY, THAT IS, FROM JUNE 15 TO JUNE 16. (HE CONFIRMED THAT THE DOCTORS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT PERMIT MRS. BEGIN TO ACCOMPANY HIM.)
3. I MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT BUT MERELY TOLD HIM OF MY OWN TRAVEL PLANS DESIGNED TO HAVE ME IN WASHINGTON DURING HIS VISIT. LEWIS

BT
#8565
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NLRR M370/2 * 65316

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE687
STU9675
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHDM #4027 1601842
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK RUEHTV RUEHJM RUEHC
U 091840Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 6017
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 3594
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6642
INFO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0442
BT

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04027

EXDIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/09/02 (EIGHMIE, JAMES W.) DR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, US, SY, PLO
SUBJECT: APPROACH TO BEGIN
REF: TEL AVIV 8563
MEETING WITH ASSAD STILL IN PROGRESS. RE PARA 13 REFTEL,
HABIB PARTY AGREES YOU SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS
MOMENT. WILL COMMUNICATE WITH YOU FURTHER AT CONCLUSION OF
MEETING. PAGANELLI

BT
#4027
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65317

BY KMI NARA DATE 7/2/13

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

MCE626
STU9735
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHEG #4307 1601916
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091915Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7901
RUFHWIN/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 14307

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/9/2002 (ATHERTON, A.L., JR.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, LE, IS

SUBJECT: GDE QUERY ABOUT SECRETARY HAIG'S TRAVEL PLANS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IN REVIEWING THE STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE CRISIS WITH MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI THIS MORNING, JUNE 9 (SEPTEL), I HAD OCCASION TO OBSERVE THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD DOUBTLESS WANT TO DISCUSS SUCH ISSUES IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL WITH DEPRIMIN AND FURMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. THIS PROMPTED BOUTROS TO INQUIRE IF THERE IS ANY TRUTH TO PRESS SPECULATION THAT THE SECRETARY MIGHT BE CONSIDERING A VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I TOLD HIM I HAD NO BASIS FOR CREDITING SUCH REPORTS, AND THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, THE SECRETARY HAD NO PLANS TO VISIT THE AREA ANY TIME SOON. I ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT I KNEW THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WOULD BE GIVING URGENT CONSIDERATION TO WHATEVER RECOMMENDATION PHIL HABIB MIGHT PUT FORWARD AS THE RESULT OF HIS CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN AREA CAPITALS. I REPEATED, HOWEVER, THAT AS OF NOW I HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT ANY PLANS FOR THE SECRETARY TO VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. BOUTROS ASKED IF, ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PRESENT IN WASHINGTON BY THE TIME ALI ARRIVES THERE, PROBABLY ON SATURDAY, JUNE 12. I SAID I THOUGHT PRESENT PLANS CALLED FOR THE SECRETARY TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT AT GHALI'S REQUEST I UNDERTOOK TO ASCERTAIN IF THOSE PLANS MIGHT BE LIKELY TO CHANGE. BOUTROS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, NOTING THAT SUCH INFORMATION WOULD ENABLE ALI TO PLAN -- AND, IF NECESSARY, ADJUST -- HIS OWN TRAVEL SCHEDULE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SECRETARY'S MOVEMENTS. EVEN IF THE SECRETARY WERE TO BE DELAYED IN EUROPE, HE SAID, ALI (WHO IS NOW IN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 +65318

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GENEVA) MIGHT WISH TO MEET WITH HIM THERE. I EXPRESSED
DOUBTS THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.
4. I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE FOR A RESPONSE TO BOUIROS'
QUERY. ATHERTON
BT
#4307
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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA576
TTTTT ZZ RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #8653 1602043
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 092031Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH 0313
RUFHQL/USDEL SECRETARY FLASH 9125
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 9319
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3157
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 1046
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE FLASH 7690
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 158653 TOSEC 080360
EXDIS; FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND PAGANELLI
E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4, 6/9/02 (DRAPER, MORRIS)
TAGS: XF, SY, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: ESTABLISHING A CEASEFIRE FOR
THURSDAY, JUNE 10

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OUR EARLIER MESSAGE CONCERNING OUR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A CEASEFIRE AT 0600-(LEBANESE TIME) ON THURSDAY, JUNE 10. -AM LEWIS WILL BE DELIVERING A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN THIS CONNECTION, AND YOU SHOULD SEEK THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT WITH ASSAD TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL POINTS:

-- I AM SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT, AND ON HIS BEHALF.

--WE ARE MOST SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE MAJOR ESCALATION IN FIGHTING BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES. -IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THESE HOSTILITIES BE BROUGHT TO AN END IN ORDER TO FORESTALL FURTHER TRAGEDY.

--THE U.S. IS THEREFORE URGING THAT ALL PARTIES IN THIS CONFLICT AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE TO TAKE EFFECT AT 6 A.M.

(LEBANESE TIME), THURSDAY, JUNE 10.

-- YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT WE ARE URGING THE CEASEFIRE ON

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BY KM NARA DATE 7/2/13

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DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ISRAEL IN THE STRONGEST TERMS, A FAILURE BY THE PARTIES TO AGREE TO THE CEASEFIRE COULD AGGRAVATE WHAT IS ALREADY A GRAVE THREAT TO PEACE IN THE REGION.

-- OUR APPEAL TO YOU IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POSITION TOWARDS THE HOSTILITIES. THIS IS THAT HOSTILITIES SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END FORIHWITH; THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO FORESTALL ANY ESCALATION IN THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES AS WELL AS ANY WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT; AND THAT ISRAELI FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON ,

-- IN OUR OPINION, NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO JUDGE THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE POSITION OF ANY OF THE PARTIES, OR TO REVIEW THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT LED TO THIS CRITICALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. SIOESSEL

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE726
VSK184 610 STU0020
'''''' ZZ RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHDM #4029/01 1602110
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (TAO NOT PROCESSED BY OFFLINE AD143170)610
MC NAR
Z 092047Z JUN 82 ZFF-4 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 0443
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3595
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 6018
RUFHQL/USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6643
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 04029

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2,3 6/9/02 (HABIB, AMB) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, LE, SY, IS, US, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: JUNE 9 MEEJING WITH PRES. ASSAD

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. I SPENT ALMOST THREE HOURS, BEGINNING 1600GMT, WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD AND DEP PRIMIN KHADDAM EVENING JUNE 9. ASSAD WAS IN GOOD HUMOR AND I BELIEVE WE MADE PROGRESS IN IMPRESSING UPON HIM A NEED TO MOVE TOWARD DE-ESCALATION IN LEBANON.
3. REFERRING TO THE MESSAGE WHICH BEGIN HAD ASKED US TO TRANSMIT JUNE 8 AS WELL AS U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATION IN LEBANON, I CAREFULLY SUMMARIZED U.S. OBJECTIVES AS (A) A DE-ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, INCLUDING THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON; (B) THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE IN ALL OF LEBANON; (C) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES, BEGINNING WITH A PULLBACK TO A LINE ROUGHLY 40 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE BORDER AND PROCEEDING TO A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY UNCE A STABLE ARRANGEMENT GOVERNING THE SITUATION BELOW THE 40 KILOMETER LINE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED TO THE AGREEMENT OF APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENTS.
4. WITH THESE OBJECTIVES CLEAR, I WENT OVER WITH EQUAL CARE WITH ASSAD MY PRELIMINARY IDEAS FOR A PROCESS THAT WOULD BEGIN IN THE NEXT TWO DAYS OR SO TO MOVE THE SITUATION IN THIS DIRECTION. ASSAD AGREED THAT CONTINUED ESCALATION IS UNDESIRABLE AND

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NLRR M370/2 *65320

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AS I OUTLINED PRACTICAL STEPS. A FULL REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL.

5. IN SUMMARY FORM, I PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE AND SOUGHT ASSAD'S SUPPORT AND COOPERATION:

- PULLBACK OF PLO ELEMENTS AND ARTILLERY INTERMINGLED WITH SYRIAN FORCES IN THE LOWER BEKAA TO A LINE 40 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM THE BORDER;
- SYRIAN FORCES IN THE LOWER BEKAA TO READJUST DEPLOYMENTS TO POSITIONS OCCUPIED JUNE 5 RPT 5 WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THEY CAN REMAIN IRRESPECTIVE OF THE 40 KILOMETER ZONE;
- CEASEFIRE THROUGHOUT LEBANON LEADING ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO INITIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO 40 KILOMETER LINE WITH NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR A MORE STABLE, PEACEFUL SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WITHIN THE 40 KILOMETER ZONE AND TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

6. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, ASSAD AGREED TO MAKE THE ADJUSTMENTS OF SYRIAN FORCES IN THE LOWER BEKAA I SUGGESTED BUT, PREDICTABLY, SAID HE COULD NOT DECIDE QUESTIONS FOR LEBANON OR THE PLO. WHILE HE DID NOT ADMIT THE REASONABLENESS OF A PLO PULLBACK IN THAT REGION, NEITHER DID HE REJECT IT. I CONCENTRATED ON ENCOURAGING HIM TO THINK IN TERMS OF THE TOTAL EQUATION AND TO USE HIS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH THE PLO AND OTHERS. HE CONCURRED THAT HE CAN LEGITIMATELY TALK WITH OTHER PARTIES WITHOUT FORESHADOWING WHAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO THEM. HE SPECIFIED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD DO NOTHING TO IMPEDE MY EFFORTS WITH OTHERS.

7. AS WE PROCEEDED, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT A FURTHER KEY TO THE RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SEQUENTIAL PROCESS WILL BE MY CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS TO SECURE HIS COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION AS WELL. IN RESPONSE TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT I NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO, I REMINDED HIM THAT I COULD NOT BUT WOULD LEAVE THAT ASPECT TO HIM AND SARKIS. HE SAID SARKIS COULD TALK TO ARAFAT AND DID NOT REJECT MY SUGGESTION THAT HE USE HIS "PERSUASIVE INFLUENCE" ON THE PLO. I TOLD ASSAD THAT I WOULD THEREFORE PROCEED TONIGHT TO LEBANON FOR TALKS WITH SARKIS WHILE I HOPE HE WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY USE HIS OWN CONTACTS. I RE-EMPHASIZED THAT WE COULD ACHIEVE OUR GOALS (CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES; ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND A NEW ARRANGEMENT FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON INVOLVING A 40 KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE THAT WOULD PREVENT THIS KIND OF CONFLICT FROM REOCCURRING) BY WORKING TOGETHER. IF WE DO AND ALL OTHER PARTIES ALSO COOPERATE,

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

HCE727
STU9973
'''''' ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHDM #4029/02 1602116
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 092047Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 0444
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3596
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 6019
RUFHQL/USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6644

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 04029

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I SAID I BELIEVED WE CAN BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END
IN ONE OR TWO DAYS AND MOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TOWARD
AN AGREED, ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR TOTAL ISRAELI WITH-
DRAWAL.

8. WHEN I RETURNED TO EMBASSY, I FOUND MESSAGE CON-
CERNING PROPOSED CEASEFIRE AT 0600 HOURS JUNE 10.
I THEREFORE INFORMED ASSAD'S OFFICE THAT I MAY NEED TO
SEE HIM ON AN URGENT AND IMPURTANT MATTER LATER TONIGHT
AND THEREFORE WOULD HOLD OFF TRAVEL TO BEIRUT FOR NOW.

PAGANELLI

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA594
11111 ZZ RUEADWW
DE RUEHDM #4034 1602250
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 092249Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6648
RUFHOL/USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC FLASH
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 0446
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3599
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 6022
BT

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04034

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2,3 6/9/02 (HABIB, PHILIP C.) UR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, US, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: ESTABLISHING A CEASEFIRE--

- SUMMARY REPORT OF SECOND MEETING WITH ASSAD

REF: STATE 158653

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I MET WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD FOR 45 MINUTES THIS EVENING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL. I SET FORTH THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE AT 0600 ON JUNE 10 AND TOLD PRESIDENT ASSAD THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS MAKING THE SAME REQUEST OF ALL THE PARTIES IN THE CONFLICT. I OUTLINED OUR REASONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS, MAKING CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT REAGAN.

3. ASSAD SAID THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR THAT NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED. THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO BEGIN TO WITHDRAW FROM THEIR ADVANCED POSITIONS WHEN THE CEASEFIRE GOES INTO EFFECT. HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THEY WITHDRAW TO THE 40 KILOMETER LIMIT OF WHICH THEY HAD SPOKEN, EVEN THOUGH SYRIA DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD A RIGHT TO SET SUCH LIMITS.

4. HE SAID THAT, WITHOUT WITHDRAWAL IN THE FIRST STAGE, THE CEASEFIRE WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL BECAUSE THE OPPOSING FORCES WERE IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER AND THERE WAS A DYNAMIC TO THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE A CEASEFIRE EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER, HE ADDED, IT HAD TO BE CLEAR THAT IN THE END ISRAEL HAD TO WITHDRAW

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NLRR M370/2 #65321

BY KM NARA DATE 7/2/13

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

COMPLETELY FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY AS I HAD STATED WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POSITION.

5. I MADE IT CLEAR TO ASSAD THAT THE CEASEFIRE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER STEPS AND THAT, FOLLOWING THE CEASEFIRE GOING INTO EFFECT, THE MOVEMENT WOULD BE IN A DIRECTION OF THE POLICY THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD BEEN ANNOUNCING AND WHICH WE HAD ADHERED TO IN OUR SUPPORT FOR TWO UN RESOLUTIONS.

6. I URGED ASSAD IN STRONG TERMS TO ORDER HIS TROOPS TO CEASE FIRING AT SIX O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING IF ALL THE OPPOSING PARTIES WOULD DO LIKEWISE. HE COMMENTED THAT, OF COURSE, IF PRESIDENT SARKIS DIDN'T AGREE, HE COULDN'T AGREE BUT WE BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WAS NOT LIKELY. I TOLD ASSAD THAT I WOULD TRY TO GET WORD TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF OTHER PARTIES TO THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, AND I WOULD TRY TO GET AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION HE HAD RAISED, BUT I URGED HIM AGAIN NOT TO LET ANYTHING INTERFERE WITH HIS ORDERING A CEASEFIRE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT OTHER THINGS WOULD FALL INTO PLACE. IN MY OPINION, ASSAD WILL ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE IF ALL THE OTHERS AGREE. NEVERTHELESS, IT WILL ALSO BE INCUMBENT UPON US TO SATISFY HIM WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

7. I WILL NOT BE PROCEEDING TO BEIRUT BUT WILL STAY HERE IN DAMASCUS TONIGHT. FURTHER TRAVEL PLANS WILL DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS. PAGANELLI

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