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File Folder USSR (3/6/84-3/7/84)

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374

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172157	REPORT	RE SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR CONFLICT	19	3/6/1984	B1
		PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-25-23-1-4			
172158	SCHEDULING MEMO	FROM R. MCFARLANE RE 3/16/84 NSC BRIEFING	1	ND	B1
172159	MEMO	K. DEGRAFFENREID TO R. MCFARLANE RE OVAL OFFICE BRIEFING FOR PRESIDENT	1	3/14/1984	B1
172160	MEMO	K. DEGRAFFENREID TO R. MCFARLANE RE BRIEFING FOR PRESIDENT	1	3/7/1984	B1
172161	MEMO	R. LEVINE TO J. POINDEXTER RE U.S.- USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY	2	3/7/1984	B1
172162	MEMO	W. CLARK TO G. SHULTZ RE U.S. OFF- SHORE LEASE SALES AND U.S.-SOVIET BOUNDARY NEGOTIATIONS (DRAFT W/ATTACHMENT)	2	ND	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-23-6-9			

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	PAR	10/8/2010			CREST NLR-748-25-23-1-4
172158	SCHEDULING MEMO	FROM R. MCFARLANE RE 3/16/84 NSC BRIEFING	1	ND	B1
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National Intelligence Estimate

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1983-93

Key Judgments

for the President

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NIE 11-3/8-83
6 March 1984

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NIE 11-3/8-83

SOVIET CAPABILITIES
FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
CONFLICT, 1983-93

KEY JUDGMENTS

The full text of this Estimate is
being published separately with regular distribution.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Energy.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES FROM LAST YEAR'S ESTIMATE

We have incorporated new intelligence information and have refined or changed some of our important judgments for this year's NIE 11-3/8:

- Our judgments concerning characteristics and deployment of certain Soviet offensive programs are becoming more firm, largely as a result of new and continued flight-testing and construction of bases and launchers:
 - The Soviets now have flight-tested their SS-X-25 small-size solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from both a silo and a mobile launcher. We expect mobile deployment to begin in late 1985 or 1986 and maybe some silo deployment in 1985. The SS-X-24 medium-size ICBM is continuing flight-testing; we expect deployment to begin in silos in late 1985, and flight-testing of a rail-mobile version to begin in late 1984 or 1985. We have also reevaluated the future of the SS-18 and SS-19 force; while we expect continued deployment of heavy SS-18-type ICBMs throughout the 1990s, we are uncertain about the future of the SS-19-type missile.
 - The Soviets have also begun flight-testing of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-23, a liquid-propellant missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—a follow-on to the MIRVed SS-N-18. We expect it will begin deployment in 1986 on new, significantly modified D-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)—the first such SSBN was launched in February 1984.
 - The Soviets are preparing to deploy their new long-range cruise missiles: the air-launched AS-X-15 (ALCM) will be deployed in 1984 on new Bear H bombers; some sea-launched SS-NX-21s (SLCMs) will be deployed on submarines in 1984; and the ground-launched SSC-X-4 (GLCM) will probably be deployed in 1985. They are also flight-testing the SS-NX-24, a new, land-attack cruise missile, with deployment expected to begin in 1985 or 1986 on submarines dedicated to carry this SLCM.
- This year we have added in this Estimate a force projection that assumes continued negotiations and adherence to numerical

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force-level constraints of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the unratified SALT II Treaty through 1990. We continue to include quantitative measures of Soviet forces configured to conform to the US and Soviet arms control proposals, and we compare them with our projections of forces reflecting expansion in the absence of arms control constraints. The Soviets could expand their forces well beyond arms-control-limited forces, with increases in inter-continental attack forces from about 8,500 deployed warheads at present to between 16,000 and 19,000 deployed warheads by the early 1990s.

- We have reevaluated our estimates and there are now differing agency views of the yields and accuracies of the SS-18 Mod 4 and SS-19 Mod 3 ICBMs, which lead to differing agency views of Soviet capabilities for attacking US Minuteman silos. All agencies have agreed to carry out further needed work on this key issue.
- We have expanded our judgments on how the Soviets will operate their strategic forces in the 1990s. The Soviets will continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for use in initial strikes, while withholding most or all of the mobile ICBMs for subsequent strikes. ALCMs will give Soviet intercontinental bombers a standoff attack capability and SLCMs will add to the Navy's capabilities against theater targets, as well as those in the United States.
- We have reevaluated our judgments about Soviet efforts to develop nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) detection capabilities. We do not believe there is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that could reliably monitor US SSBNs operating in the open ocean. There is a low-to-moderate probability that the Soviets could deploy in the mid-1990s an ASW remote detection system that would operate with some effectiveness if enemy nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) approached ASW barriers near Soviet SSBN bastions.
- We have included new judgments on Soviet directed-energy capabilities. There is a good chance the Soviets will test a prototype high-energy space-based laser antisatellite (ASAT) weapon by the early 1990s. Limited deployment of an airborne laser is possible by the early 1990s.
- We continue to include antiballistic missile (ABM) judgments to reflect those in NIE 11-13-82, *Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense*. The Soviets are steadily improving their ability to exercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses in the 1980s.

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- We have acquired a better understanding of Soviet wartime management concepts and have identified more relocation facilities for the higher levels of Soviet wartime management, including deep underground facilities for the top leadership.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

The Soviets continue their vigorous efforts to enhance their capability for strategic nuclear war. Using their extensive military research, development, and production base, they continue to develop, improve, and deploy offensive and defensive weapons of virtually every type, and to improve their war planning and the command, control, and communications capabilities of their strategic forces. The Soviet strategic force of the early 1990s will have a significantly different character. Its major features will include:

- An improved first-strike capability against hardened targets through continued deployment of ballistic missile systems with increasingly better accuracy.
- Significantly greater survivability, including more warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The latter will improve the Soviets' capabilities to use reload missiles.¹ The largest element of their force capability, however, will continue to be ICBMs in potentially vulnerable silos.
- Major improvements in the aerodynamic element of the force through deployment of manned bombers with much better capabilities and long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.
- Significantly enhanced capability to maintain command, control, and communications connectivity to all forces.
- Enhanced operational flexibility and force sustainability.
- Enhanced air defense capability against low-altitude targets.

In addition the Soviets could:

- Expand their forces well beyond arms-control-limited forces, with increases in intercontinental attack forces from about 8,500 deployed warheads at present to between 16,000 and 19,000 deployed warheads.
- Deploy a widespread antiballistic missile (ABM) defense and test a directed-energy capability against satellites and possibly against ballistic missiles.

We estimate that the Soviets will replace most of the weapons in their strategic offensive forces with new or modernized weapons by the early-to-middle 1990s. ICBMs will continue to be the key element of

¹ For an alternate view see page 9. (v)

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their intercontinental strike forces. Their future force structure will include:

- An ICBM force composed mostly of: heavy silo-based liquid-propellant SS-18s, which will have been modernized to be more accurate and have more throw weight potential; medium-size solid-propellant SS-X-24s deployed in silos and probably on rail-mobile launchers; and smaller solid-propellant SS-X-25s deployed mostly on road-mobile launchers, but some may be deployed in silos. We have no current evidence for modernized SS-19-class missiles, and we are uncertain as to the future of this system. We believe that it will be replaced by improved SS-X-24s in the 1990s. There is an alternative view that it will be modernized and retained in the force.²
- An SLBM force composed mostly of: long-range solid-propellant SS-N-20s in Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); and long-range liquid-propellant SS-NX-23s in modified D-class SSBNs. These missiles will be equipped—to a greater extent than the missiles in the current force—with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
- A bomber force composed of: Blackjacks; Bear H's with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs); some older bombers; and some new aircraft types beginning deployment.
- A new long-range, land-attack cruise missile force composed of: SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) on submarines; AS-X-15 ALCMs on bombers; and SSC-X-4 and probably BL-10 GLCMs on ground launchers.
- An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) force composed of modernized SS-20s.

We believe that in the early 1990s the Soviets will be deploying or developing improved versions of most of these weapons.

If Soviet strategic force deployments were to expand beyond arms control constraints, we project that the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would increase by 90 to 120 percent from about 8,000 at the end of 1983, resulting in about 15,000 to 18,000 ballistic missile warheads by the early 1990s. Soviet ICBM and SLBM warheads, if constrained by the Soviet proposal at the strategic arms reduction talks (START), would increase by about one-third over current deployments. Soviet ICBM and SLBM warheads, if constrained by the US START proposal, would decrease by about one-third from

² The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (v)

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current deployments. Although the number of Soviet bombers in our projections increases only slightly, the number of bomber weapons increases substantially in the next 10 years—primarily because of the large payload of bombs and ALCMs on the Blackjack A bomber, and ALCMs on Bear H's. We expect the Soviets to deploy about 1,500 to 2,000 long-range land-attack cruise missiles of all types over the next 10 years. Many of these bomber weapons and cruise missiles—air-, sea-, and ground-launched—would, however, be allocated for theater, and not intercontinental, attack. Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces will continue to be the primary elements of the intercontinental attack forces.

We estimate that the Soviets will significantly improve the capabilities of their strategic defensive forces over the next 10 years. We expect a number of new types of weapons to be introduced and many of the older systems to be retired, but we do not predict the same massive replacement of defensive weapons that we project for the offensive weapons. Potential future developments in strategic defenses could be of great significance to the perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of the strategic balance. We are particularly concerned about the growing Soviet potential for widespread deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles well beyond the limits of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty using ABM systems currently in development. The Soviets' air defenses are undergoing significant changes, and they will have improving capabilities to threaten current types of bombers at low altitude and, to a lesser extent, cruise missiles. There is an alternative view that this Estimate substantially understates the capability of the Soviet air defense system to defend key target areas against low-altitude penetrators. This view is presented in more detail in the Summary and in volume II.³ According to another alternative view, the Soviet Union will not have the capability in this decade to deploy strategic defenses that would significantly affect the US-Soviet nuclear relationship.⁴

We see under way significant developments for the Soviet strategic defenses of the 1990s:

- When completed, in 1986 or 1987, the improved Moscow ABM system will probably consist of 32 silo-launched Galosh interceptors and 68 silo-launched SH-8 interceptors.
- The Soviets continue construction of large phased-array radars that, to varying degrees, could provide ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment, and battle management support. A sixth such radar was detected under construction in 1983 near Krasnoyarsk.

³ The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. (u)

⁴ The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. (u)

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- The Soviets continue to deploy the SA-10—a new all-altitude strategic air defense missile—but at a rate slower than we had previously forecast. They are also developing some new vehicles for use by SA-10 units that will increase their mobility.
- The Soviets are continuing the development of the SA-X-12 system, which can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles, and some tactical ballistic missiles. While it is premature to judge its actual capabilities, this system could also have a capability against some strategic ballistic missile reentry vehicles (RVs).
- We expect initial deployment in 1984 of the Fulcrum A and in 1984-85 of the Flanker, probably with enhanced lockdown/shutdown capabilities, and initial deployment in 1984 of the Soviets' Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.

The Soviets are in the process of upgrading and expanding the ballistic missile defenses at Moscow within the limits of the ABM Treaty, and are actively engaged in ABM research and development programs. We have made a projection for the new deployments around Moscow, under the assumption that the current launcher limits of the ABM Treaty continue to be observed for the next 10 years. The available evidence does not indicate with any certainty whether the Soviets are making preparations for deployments beyond the limits of the Treaty—100 ABM launchers at Moscow—but it does show they are steadily improving their ability to exercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses in the 1980s. If the Treaty were abrogated by either the United States or the USSR, we believe the Soviets would undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen their defenses at Moscow and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets east of the Urals. Widespread defenses could be in place by the late 1980s or early 1990s.

We judge that, in evaluating the technical performance of the ABM systems they could deploy in a more widespread defense, the Soviets probably would not have high confidence in how well these systems would perform against a large-scale, undegraded US missile attack, especially in the late 1980s by improved US forces. However, the Soviets would probably view their ballistic missile defenses as having considerable value in reducing the impact of a degraded US retaliatory attack if the USSR succeeded in carrying out a well-coordinated, effective initial strike. Also, widespread Soviet defenses, even if US evaluations indicated they could be overcome by an attacking force, would complicate US attack planning and create major uncertainties

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about the potential effectiveness of a US strike. Another view is that the Soviets, in a widespread deployment, would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systems to enhance their confidence in the survival of high-value targets, even in the event of a full-scale US attack.⁵

The Soviets will continue to pursue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies as potential solutions to the vexing problems of countering US SSBNs and defending their own SSBNs against US attack submarines. We are concerned about the energetic Soviet effort to develop a capability to remotely sense submarine-generated effects. In the last year we have improved our understanding of the nature of the overall Soviet effort, as well as of the physical phenomena the Soviets are examining. There remain important uncertainties about the full extent and direction of the Soviet program.

The Soviets have developed a strong active sonar technology and deployed a variety of modern systems that support point defense, area denial, and SSBN protection but do not provide open-ocean surveillance capability. They still lack effective means to locate US SSBNs at sea. They lack both a long-range submarine detection capability and a sufficient number of short-range systems to search potential US SSBN patrol areas effectively. They probably are unable, moreover, to track a US SSBN on patrol for more than a few hours even if they detect one.

The Soviets may have the technology in hand to deploy an airborne remote sensor system—and to test a prototype spaceborne system—with limited ASW capabilities before the mid-1990s. We believe that systems that could result from present efforts would have the most impact on protecting Soviet SSBN bastions against encroaching US nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) operating at shallow depths. Even if remote sensors work only in favorable waters, the Soviets may decide to continue sensor development, begin development of a detection system, and eventually deploy such a system in order to defend their SSBNs from Western attack submarines. Soviet nonacoustic ASW detection systems that could be deployed within the next 10 years are unlikely to pose any significant threat to US SSBNs on patrol:

- An operational space-based remote sensing system could not be available in less than 10 years from the start of engineering development. This constraint is imposed by Soviet design practices, as demonstrated by numerous development programs. The wide range of continuing experimentation, however, suggests that the Soviets have not yet selected a sensor for engineering development.

⁵ The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. (u)

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- In view of the operational considerations mentioned, the difficulties in exploiting the basic phenomena, and the major advances required in high-speed computing and in sensor and signal-processing technologies, we do not believe there is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that could reliably monitor US SSBNs operating in the open ocean.
- There is a low-to-moderate probability that the Soviets could deploy in the mid-1990s an ASW remote detection system that would operate with some effectiveness if enemy SSNs approached ASW barriers near Soviet SSBN bastions.

Directed-energy weapons potentially could be developed for anti-satellite (ASAT) applications, air defense, battlefield use, and, in the longer term, ballistic missile defense (BMD). Of the three types of directed-energy technologies with potential weapon applications—high-energy laser, particle beam, and radiofrequency—evidence is strongest that the Soviets are pursuing development of high-energy laser weapons:

- There are two facilities at a Soviet test center that are assessed to have high-energy lasers and that have the potential to function as ASAT weapons.
- We are concerned about the magnitude of the Soviet effort in ground-based lasers. There are many unknowns concerning the feasibility and practicality of ground-based laser weapons for ballistic missile defense. Nevertheless, during the 1980s we expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of ground-based BMD lasers, using one of their high-energy laser facilities. If a ground-based laser proves feasible and practical in such a role, a prototype could be tested in the 1990s. An initial operational capability, however, would not be achieved until after the year 2000. If the Soviets chose a risky course of action—developing this system without building such a prototype—a few such systems could be operational by the early-to-middle 1990s.
- The Soviets could deploy ground-based high-energy laser weapons for strategic air defense in the mid-to-late 1980s. They probably will deploy tactical battlefield lasers to complement mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries in the mid-1980s.
- The Soviets continue to develop an airborne laser, with airborne testing likely to begin in a year or two. Its application is unclear to us. Limited deployment is possible by the early 1990s.

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- We believe there is a high probability (60- to 90-percent chance) that a prototype high-energy space-based laser ASAT weapon will be tested in low orbit by the early 1990s. The psychological effect of the first test of a space-based laser in a weapon-related mode would be greater than the actual military significance of such a weapon in its initial application.
- Although space-based weapons for ballistic missile defense may prove to be feasible from a technical standpoint, such weapons would require significant technological advances. In view of the technological requirements, we do not expect the Soviets to have a prototype space-based laser BMD system until at least the mid-1990s or an operational system until after the year 2000.
- The Soviets are expending resources on technologies of critical importance to the development of particle beam weapons (PBWs). The technical requirements for such a system, including precise pointing and tracking, are severe, and it is unlikely that the Soviets could test a prototype space-based PBW to destroy hard targets like missile RVs before the end of the century, or any earlier than 1995 for an ASAT weapon.
- There is a moderate likelihood that, by 1990, the USSR will test a ground-based radiofrequency weapon potentially capable of physically damaging satellites.

Training of Soviet forces for a global nuclear conflict is increasingly broad in scope and complex in the operational factors taken into account. The Soviets recognize that numerous complications and degradations would affect planned operations, particularly in the unprecedentedly difficult nuclear environment. The inherent uncertainties of warfare cannot be eliminated by training for fighting under various conditions, but the Soviets believe that their ability to continue to operate effectively in adverse situations would be enhanced as a result of the experience gained from extensive and varied exercises.

The Soviets apparently believe that a major nuclear conflict, if it occurred, would be likely to arise out of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict preceded by a political crisis period that could last several weeks or longer. We believe they would anticipate a conventional phase as lasting from a few days to as long as several weeks. The Soviets see little likelihood that the United States would initiate a surprise nuclear attack from a normal peacetime posture; we believe it is unlikely that the Soviets would mount such an attack themselves. Key objectives of the Soviets in the conventional phase would be to weaken the enemy's theater-based and sea-based nuclear capability, while protecting their own nuclear force.

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The Soviets, in our judgment, are unlikely to initiate nuclear conflict on a limited scale, with small-scale use confined to the immediate combat zone, because they would probably see it as being to their advantage instead to keep the conflict at the conventional force level. Moreover, they would see the use of nuclear weapons on any scale as substantially increasing the risks of escalation to strategic nuclear war. We believe, however, that the likelihood of Soviet initiation of nuclear strikes would increase if Soviet conventional forces were faced with a major defeat or a NATO counteroffensive into Eastern Europe.

We believe they would see an initial localized use of nuclear weapons as probably being the last realistic opportunity to avoid large-scale nuclear war. Once large-scale use of nuclear weapons in the theater occurred, imminent escalation to intercontinental nuclear war would be likely.

As the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict increased, Soviet leaders would face the difficult decision of whether to seize the initiative and strike, as would be consistent with their general military doctrine, or to be more cautious in the hope of averting massive nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland. There are no easy prescriptions for what the Soviets would actually do under a particular set of circumstances, despite the apparent doctrinal imperative to mount massive preemptive nuclear attacks:

- They would be more likely to seize the initiative by launching intercontinental nuclear strikes if the war had already reached the level of small-scale battlefield nuclear use, than if it was still at the conventional level.
- We believe they would launch a coordinated theater and intercontinental strike if there had been a large-scale theater nuclear strike against the western USSR.
- If they acquired convincing evidence that a US intercontinental strike were imminent, they would try to preempt. While we are unable to judge what information would be sufficiently convincing to cause Soviet leaders to order a massive preemptive attack, we believe that they would be more likely to act on the basis of ambiguous indications and inconclusive evidence of US strike intentions if a battlefield nuclear conflict were under way than during a crisis or a conventional conflict.
- For reasons such as lack of convincing evidence from their strategic warning systems or fear of unnecessarily or mistakenly initiating intercontinental nuclear war, the Soviets might not mount a preemptive strike.
- We believe the Soviets place considerable emphasis on assessing their strategic offensive capabilities under conditions in which

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the United States launched the initial major strike. These would include scenarios in which they were able to launch varying portions of their forces on tactical warning, as well as the most stressful scenario—in which they failed to launch on tactical warning and had to absorb a well-coordinated US counterforce attack. For the Soviets, these scenarios would be the most critical in an evaluation of their capabilities.

Soviet offensive objectives in carrying out large-scale nuclear strikes—regardless of which side initiated the strikes—would be to neutralize US and Allied military operations and capabilities. In intercontinental strikes the Soviets would seek to destroy US-based nuclear forces and to disrupt and destroy the supporting infrastructure and control systems for these forces as well as the National Command Authority. They would attempt to isolate the United States from the theater campaign by attacking its power projection capabilities. They probably would also attempt to reduce US military power in the long term by attacking other nonnuclear forces, US military-industrial capacity, and governmental control facilities, although the extent of the attack on these targets in the initial strikes could vary, depending on the circumstances. Limiting the initial strikes to only command, control, and communications targets, or to only a portion of US strategic forces such as ICBM silos, would not be consistent with the available evidence.

The Soviets probably have plans to reconstitute some surviving general purpose and strategic forces and to occupy substantial areas of Western Europe, while neutralizing the ability of US and Allied nuclear forces to interfere with these objectives. They prepare for combat operations that could extend weeks beyond the initial nuclear phase. The Soviets would clearly prefer to accomplish their objectives quickly, but recognize that the later phases could be protracted, given the difficulty and complexity of conducting operations following massive nuclear strikes.

We believe the structure and operations of Soviet strategic forces will be markedly different by the 1990s:

- A mixed force of mobile and silo-based systems will enable the Soviet planner of the 1990s to continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for use in initial strikes, while withholding most or all of the mobile ICBMs for subsequent strikes. The deployment of mobile ICBMs will also lead to improved capabilities for ICBM reload, and we expect reload practices for the SS-X-25 to be similar to those for the SS-20. According to an alternative view, a Soviet requirement for additional warheads would be better met by deployment of additional missiles on launchers; it is by no means clear that reload and refire

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operations during nuclear war would be less problematic for mobile launchers than for silos and in any case, according to this view, there is no information about reload procedures for the SS-20.⁶

- The introduction of cruise missiles will enhance Soviet offensive capabilities. ALCMs will give Soviet intercontinental bombers a standoff attack capability. SLCMs will add to the Navy's capabilities against theater targets, as well as those in the United States.
- To improve their capability to defend against attacks by low-altitude bombers and cruise missiles, we believe the Soviets will alter air defense command operations procedures and introduce improved communications equipment and data systems in order to better integrate the operations of their new air defense fighters, Mainstay AWACS aircraft, and SAM systems.

We do not know how the Soviets would assess their prospects for prevailing in a global nuclear conflict. Sizable forces on both sides would survive massive nuclear strikes. The Soviets have enough hard-target-capable ICBM reentry vehicles today to attack all US missile silos and launch control centers in a well-executed first strike. In our projections of the growth and modernization of Soviet ICBM forces, the USSR will have substantially larger numbers of hard-target-capable RVs in the future. The projected improvements in Soviet ICBM accuracy, in conjunction with the expected warhead yields and improvements in weapon system reliabilities, will produce a substantial increase in the destructive potential of future Soviet ICBMs. We note, however, that our preliminary estimate of the yield of the SS-X-24 indicates it will have less hard-target capability than was predicted last year.

This year, alternative estimates of current SS-18 and SS-19 weapons accuracies and yields (described in the Summary and volume II) lead to differing views of Soviet capabilities for attacking US Minuteman silos:

- According to one view, the Soviets currently would plan to launch two (possibly three) SS-18 or SS-19 warheads at each US Minuteman silo. This view holds that the accuracies and yields are such that a two-on-one attack would result in a best estimate damage expectancy of about 80 to 85 percent with today's systems, although with a considerable uncertainty range.⁷
- According to a second view, continuing reanalysis of accuracies and yields of the SS-18 and SS-19 suggests that the Soviets'

⁶ The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. (v)

⁷ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. (v)

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capability to achieve their desired damage expectancy is somewhat lower than previously estimated.⁸

During the next year, we will be carrying out additional needed analysis on this key issue, including, in particular, further analysis of the accuracies and yields of these Soviet ICBMs.

By the early-to-middle 1990s the Soviet ICBM force is projected to have hard-target ICBM RVs in sufficient numbers and with enough capabilities to achieve its targeting goals (a damage expectancy of over 80 percent) by allocating a single RV to each target. We do not know the number of additional weapons the Soviets would allocate to compensate for detectable launch and in-flight failures or losses to enemy counteraction. We believe that they will still be concerned that the US ICBM force would launch at least a portion of its missiles while under attack.

Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably target and destroy patrolling US SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, or land-mobile missiles, particularly those beyond the range of tactical reconnaissance systems.

Soviet mobile missiles, SSBNs patrolling in waters near the USSR, and a large part of the silo-based ICBM force would survive a US nuclear attack. We believe the Soviets can launch ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warning and control systems are undegraded. However, with the increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos during the period of this Estimate, as the accuracy of US weapons improves, the Soviets will be faced with more difficult problems in assuring adequate retaliatory capabilities in their critical planning scenario in which they are struck first. We believe the Soviets' efforts to expand the capabilities of their command and control network and SLBM force, and to develop mobile ICBMs, reflect their concerns about maintaining the capability to fulfill the missions of their strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the Soviets are well aware of their inability to prevent massive damage to the USSR with their strategic defenses even with the improvements taking place in these forces. They also recognize that US strategic defenses cannot prevent massive damage.

During the past few years, we have acquired a better understanding of Soviet wartime management concepts and have identified more relocation facilities for the higher levels of Soviet wartime management—national, military district, and key regional organizations. We believe there are over 700 and possibly more than 1,500 relocation facilities that we have not identified; many of these are for leaders at lower levels, the republics and oblasts. A recent reassessment of deep

⁸ The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. (v)

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underground facilities for the National Command Authority at Shara-povo and Chekhov indicates that they are harder, deeper, and much less vulnerable than previously estimated. For more than a decade the Soviets have been expanding and improving these sites, but have concealed the extent of their activities. Consequently, we are uncertain as to the aim points and types and numbers of weapons required to destroy these facilities. It is possible that the deep underground elements are virtually invulnerable at present to any practical nuclear attack. The Soviets may believe that deep underground structures such as those near Moscow will assure the survivability of the top leadership—a priority objective of their wartime management plans.

We believe that the Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for global conflict probably will be critically dependent on command and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying the ability of the United States and its Allies to command and to operate their forces. Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed command, control, and communications facilities, many elements of the political leadership and military commands probably would survive, and redundancy in Soviet strategic communications would prevent loss of any one channel from disabling the overall system. We believe the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and Allied strategic command, control, and communications to prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing US and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute forces.

The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are attempting to prepare their military forces for the possibility of having to fight a nuclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations. They have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operations in a nuclear war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict, and raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR. There is an alternative view that wishes to emphasize that the Soviets have not resolved many of the critical problems bearing on the conduct of nuclear war, such as the nature of initiation of conflict, escalation within the theater, and protracted nuclear operations. According to this view, the Soviets recognize that nuclear war is so destructive, and its course so uncertain, that they could not expect an outcome that was "favorable" in any meaningful sense.⁹

The evidence that we have on how the Soviets would plan to conduct a successful military campaign provides insight into how they would seek to end a nuclear war on their terms—by neutralizing the ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to prevail in a conflict in Eurasia.

⁹ The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. (v)

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TO KIMMITT

FROM CHEW, D

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
4/2/15/88

DOCDATE 06 MAR 84

DE GRAFFENREID

07 MAR 84

DE GRAFFENREID

14 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

EXPORT CONTROLS

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

SUBJECT: PROPOSED RAMPARTS BRIEFING FOR PRES

ACTION: PREPARE SP

DUE: 08 MAR 84 STATUS X

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National Security Council
The White House

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Add-On

MAR 14 P 8:18

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Bill Martin	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	✓	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	3	✓	
Bud McFarlane	4	✓	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		D
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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374

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172158	SCHEDULING MEMO FROM R. MCFARLANE RE 3/16/84 NSC BRIEFING	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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172159	MEMO K. DEGRAFFENREID TO R. MCFARLANE RE OVAL OFFICE BRIEFING FOR PRESIDENT	1	3/14/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MAR 6 P 6:41

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Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
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Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

SYSTEM II
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March 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: David L. Chew *DL*
Executive Assistant to the Secretary

SUBJECT: RAMPART Briefing

At your earliest convenience, Treasury would like to brief the President on RAMPART, the Customs effort to help control the export of critical technology. Allowing for Q's and A's, the briefing should take no more than 20 minutes, and attached is a short synopsis of the RAMPART program.

If you need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Attachment

- The Soviets have demonstrated desire and capability for acquiring Western technology for military uses, such as computers for developing in-flight guidance systems, special materials for use in warheads, radars and lasers.
 - They acquire Western technology through a variety of legal methods (such as trade shows), illegal methods (such as espionage), and abuse of export channels (through mislabeling of goods and diversion). The focus of the Customs Service is to prevent the abuse of export channels.
- Current efforts to prevent Soviet access to critical technology involve DOD and Commerce specification of controlled items, Commerce and State licensing of exports, and Customs Service and Commerce enforcement operations.
 - The Customs enforcement program (called EXODUS) involves over 100 port inspectors who review documents and examine cargo at the border, and over 100 field agents involved in investigating suspects and coordinating with U.S. allies.
- However, EXODUS faces a difficult task because of the complex export environment (many ports, large volumes of exports), multiple criminal techniques, and the need to expedite legitimate exports.
- One solution that has been developed by the Customs Service is Operation RAMPART. Under RAMPART, a small passive electronic taggant is inserted into all items of potential interest to the Soviets.
 - Taggants inserted by manufacturer.
 - Taggants emit signal (which can penetrate cargo containers) when in the presence of special detectors.
- RAMPART detectors will be deployed at 39 priority ports. In addition, detectors will be provided for 62 mobile inspector teams and 35 special agent offices.
 - Initial operations will begin September 1984, with full coverage expected by December 1984.
 - Subsequently, we expect to extend RAMPART to our COCOM allies.
- Although RAMPART is a major improvement, it is not fool-proof. The Soviets could avoid detection through shipments through low-volume ports (which are not covered full-time), or removal of taggants (although this is difficult). In addition, taggants have a 1-2 year life.
- Although no publicity is planned, the public will soon be aware of RAMPART. Manufacturers (several thousand) will be aware of the taggants and the first seizure using RAMPART will undoubtedly be a news item.

- RAMPART faces a number of issues, including:

- Provisions in the House version of the Export Administration Act renewal which could prohibit Customs from engaging in the RAMPART program.
- Need for additional funding support.
- The need to stay "one step ahead" of the Soviets which Customs is attempting through an ongoing research program.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

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RECEIVED 06 MAR 84 18

TO KIMMITT FROM CHEW, D

DOCDATE 06 MAR 84

KEYWORDS USSR EXPORT CONTROLS
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

SUBJECT. PROPOSED RAMPARTS BRIEFING FOR PRES

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DE GRAFFENREID ROBINSON FORTIER

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1984

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *RJK*

REQUEST: Briefing by Secretary Regan or Deputy Secretary McNamar on a new Customs program to limit the illegal diversion of U.S. high technology.

PURPOSE: To inform the President of the RAMPART program.

BACKGROUND: Operation RAMPART is the Customs effort to help control the illegal export of critical technology. Under RAMPART, a small passive electronic taggant is inserted by the manufacturer into controlled items of potential interest to the Soviets. The taggants emit a signal when interrogated by special detectors. Initial operations are planned to begin in September 1984.

DATE AND TIME: OPEN DURATION: 20 Minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office or Situation Room

PATRICIPANTS: Secretary Regan and/or Deputy Secretary McNamar, Robert C. McFarlane and possibly other NSPG members.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Briefing by Treasury; questions and answers.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt
Kenneth E. deGraffenreid, NSC Staff

National Security Council
The White House

✓ *can 12*

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	<i>w/c</i>	
Bob Kimmitt	~	K	
John Poindexter	3	<i>J</i>	<i>A</i>
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	4	<i>BK</i>	
NSC Secretariat	5	<i>MAR 0 8 1984</i>	<i>D</i>
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

This issue would seem to be covered well by the paper at Tab II, and Deaver will not be enthusiastic. Nonetheless, Reagan rarely asks us for time, and I recommend we forward.

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172160	MEMO K. DEGRAFFENREID TO R. MCFARLANE RE BRIEFING FOR PRESIDENT	1	3/7/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

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March 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: David L. Chev *DL*
Executive Assistant to the Secretary

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 - Need for additional funding support.
 - The need to stay "one step ahead" of the Soviets which Customs is attempting through an ongoing research program.

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RECEIVED 07 MAR 84 19

TO POINDEXTER

FROM LEVINE

1/7/85 end

DOCDATE 07 MAR 84

KEYWORDS USSR

MARITIME

SUBJECT: US - USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY

ACTION: FORWARD TO MCFARLANE FOR SIG DUE: 12 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

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172161	MEMO R. LEVINE TO J. POINDEXTER RE U.S.-USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY	2	3/7/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

172162

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REF ID: A66748-25-23-6-9

BY CDR NARA DATE 4/8/0

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

~~THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. CLARK~~
The Secretary of the Interior

SUBJECT: U.S. Off-Shore Lease Sales and U.S.-Soviet
Boundary Negotiations (U)

I understand that the Department of Interior is to proceed with a final notice of sale for off-shore oil leases. If these sales include areas within the Soviet "Rhumb line" claim or the Soviet's claimed 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone area, such lease sales could impact on ongoing U.S.-Soviet boundary negotiations or U.S.-USSR relations generally. (S)

I suggest that your respective staffs, working together and in consultation with my staff, prepare a succinct briefing of the lease sales issue and its ramifications for other aspects of our Soviet relations. A clear map would be helpful. I would also ask that a range of four options be prepared concerning the suggested extent of the lease sales and any stipulations that should be made regarding offerings in a contested area. (S)

A meeting will be held in the Situation Room on March to hopefully reach a decision on this matter. If differences arise, this subject could then be briefed to the President for resolution. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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
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Green line was USA offer to split the difference between US and Soviet claims.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Little delta is within both US lease sale area and Soviet 200 miles zone.

(Soviets appeared ready in recent negotiations to accept the US proposal depicted by the green line north of the red triangle area).



Blue area is outside 200 mile zone of both USSR and USA. Soviets suggested in January that this area be divided between the two countries. US thus far has rejected this proposal. The next round of negotiations will probably take place this June.