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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 6/17/2005

File Folder PRESIDENT-GROMYKO-WORKING PAPERS (1)

FOIA

2001-061

Box Number 58

ZUBOK

5810

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
15829	MEMO	PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETING WITH ROMANIAN SPECIAL ENVOY [1 - 1]	1	ND	B1
15836	CHART	U.S. AND SOVIET LONGER RANGE INF MISSILES [2 - 2]	1	ND	B1
15830	REPORT	US-SOVIET SPACE WEAPONS TALKS: POSSIBLE ISSUES [3 - 16]	14	8/24/1984	B1
15831	COVER SHEET	WEINBERGER TO MCFARLANE RE POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN ASAT ARMS CONTROL [17 - 17]	1	8/27/1984	B1
15832	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO POINDEXTER RE POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN ASAT ARMS CONTROL [18 - 19]	2	8/27/1984	B1
15837	MEMO	SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS [20 - 27]	8	9/5/1984	B1
15833	MEMO	MATLOCK RE GROMYKO VISIT [28 - 28]	1	9/14/1984	B1
15838	REPORT	USSR [29 - 29]	1	9/12/1984	B1
15839	REPORT	USSR [30 - 30]	1	3/2/1984	B1
15840	REPORT	USSR [31 - 31]	1	8/2/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
15841	REPORT	USSR [32 - 32]	1	9/12/1984	B1
15842	REPORT	USSR (SAME TEXT AS DOC #15841) [33 - 33]	1	9/12/1984	B1
15843	REPORT	USSR [34 - 34]	1	9/12/1984	B1
15844	REPORT	USSR [35 - 35]	1	9/12/1984	B1
15845	REPORT	USSR [36 - 36]	1	8/6/1984	B1
15846	REPORT	USSR [37 - 37]	1	8/6/1984	B1
15834	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO POINDEXTER RE ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE PRESIDENT'S UN SPEECH AND IN HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO [41 - 43]	3	9/14/1984	B1
15835	CHART	US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS [44 - 45]	2	9/14/1984	B1
15847	REPORT	USSR [46 - 46]	1	9/14/1984	B1

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—
Matlock

RECEIVED 14 SEP 84 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 14 SEP 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CAS NARA, Date 10/24/02

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

SPEECHES

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

UN

USSR

AP

SUBJECT: ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL IN PRES UN SPEECH & HIS MTG W/ GROMYKO

ACTION: FOR FURTHER ACTION

DUE: 18 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

Matlock

COMMENTS

REF# 32241

LOG

NSCIFID

(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Lehman, R</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Prepare memo for McFarlane</i>	<i>9/18</i>	
<i>Matlock</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Comment to Lehman, R</i>	<i>9/18</i>	
		<i>attached to II 90984</i>	<i>18 Sept</i>	

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

40

System # II

Package # 90976

1347

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3	WJH	
Bud McFarlane	4	VM	A
Bob Kimmitt	5	K	
NSC Secretariat	6		Action Rehearsal Cont Matlock
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Should this be stuffed to Rehearsal
and Matlock?

yes pls

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 17, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: New Poll Showing Contradictions in American
Public Opinion Regarding Nuclear Arms Issues

Attached at Tab I is a recent poll conducted by Yankelovitch regarding nuclear arms issues. The poll reveals that, with one major exception and several contradictory responses, the Administration's policies are pretty much in line with the views of the majority of the American public. For example, 82 percent believe that the Soviets are constantly probing for weakness, of which they are quick to take advantage.

The one major exception is that 81 percent believe that the U.S. has a "no first-use" policy, while only 22 percent think it is current policy to use nuclear arms in event of a conventional Soviet invasion of Japan or Europe.

Yankelovitch's poll points out the contradictory stands that Americans may take. For example, while 74 percent think that on-site inspection is necessary for a good arms control agreement, 56 percent think that foolproof verification is not necessary to sign an agreement. Such contradictory answers arise, basically, from the way in which the pollster's questions are couched.

The bottom line is that it is necessary, when presenting Administration policies to the public, to stress that the same points which Americans staunchly support are used in the formulation of policy.

Attachment:

Tab I Poll on Nuclear Arms Issues

TEN AREAS OF PUBLIC CONVICTION

82% believe that the Soviets are constantly testing us, probing for weakness, and they're quick to take advantage whenever they find any (82% to 14%).

89% believe there can be no winner in an all out nuclear war, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be completely destroyed (89% to 9%).

92% believe that if the U.S. had a bigger nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would keep building until they caught up (92% to 5%).

90% believe that both we and the Soviets now have enough weapons to blow each other up several times over (90% to 4%).

83% believe that a limited nuclear war is nonsense; if either superpower were to use nuclear weapons, it would turn into all out nuclear war (83% to 13%).

84% believe that building new weapons just to have "bargaining chips" doesn't work. What usually happens is the Soviets build one to match us (84% to 11%).

85% believe nuclear weapons can never be abolished because the knowledge to make them will always exist (85% to 13%).

85% believe that in the past, countries could settle their differences by going to war. But in a nuclear age, the U.S. and the Soviet Union must never settle their differences by going to war (85% to 13%).

76% believe the U.S. has to accept some of the blame for the tension that has plagued U.S.-Soviet relations in recent years (76% to 16%).

83% believe our experience with communist China proves that our mortal enemies can quickly turn into countries we can get along with (83% to 12%).

FOUR AREAS OF PUBLIC CONFUSION AND CONFLICT

1. ABOUT U.S. POLICY

81% say it is current U.S. policy to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets "if and only if they attack the U.S. first with nuclear weapons;" only 22% say it is current policy to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets "if they invade Europe or Japan with soldiers and tanks, even if they don't use nuclear weapons."

2. ABOUT WHAT WEAPONS WE NEED

71% say the U.S. should continue to develop new and better nuclear weapons because technological breakthroughs might make those we have now obsolete (71% to 26%).

BUT

50% say the U.S. would be safer if we spent less time and effort building up our military strength and more on negotiating with the Soviets (50% to 22%).

3. ABOUT WHAT ARMS AGREEMENTS WE SHOULD MAKE

74% say that unless the Soviets agree to on-site inspection, we would refuse to sign any arms control treaty with them (74% to 22%).

BUT

56% say it would be an acceptable risk to sign an arms control agreement with the Soviets even if foolproof verification can't be guaranteed (56% to 40%).

4. ABOUT HOW TO COUNTER THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM

46% say we should weaken the Soviets at every opportunity because anything that weakens our enemies strengthens us (46% to 48%).

BUT

63% believe we should not weaken the Soviets at every opportunity because if we weaken them too much they may become more dangerous, like cornered rats (63% to 29%).

46% say the U.S. should use military force if necessary to prevent communist revolutions in other countries (46% to 44%).

BUT

53% believe the U.S. would be safer if we stopped trying to prevent the spread of communism and learned to live with them the way we live with China and Yugoslavia (53% to 22%).

55% say it would be an acceptable risk for the U.S. to expand trade with the Soviets, even if that made them stronger and more secure (55% to 40%).

BUT

56% disagree that it would be acceptable to take a friendly and more conciliatory approach, even if that gave them an opportunity to expand communist influence around the globe (56% to 38%).