

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Clark, William: Files  
**Folder:** FALKLANDS WAR  
(UN/KIRKPATRICK/HAIG) 6/05/1982  
**Box:** 3

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 12/22/2004

**File Folder** FALKLANDS WAR (UN/KIRKPATRICK/HAIG) 6/05/1982

**FOIA**

2000-147

**Box Number** 3

CLARK

43

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1274	FAX COVER	COVER FOR 041633Z JUN 82 <b>R 6/23/2006</b>	1	6/5/1982	B1
1279	CABLE	050231Z JUN 82 <b>R 11/6/2007 F2000-147</b>	4	6/5/1982	B1
1281	CABLE	050245Z JUN 82 <b>R 11/6/2007 F2000-147</b>	3	6/5/1982	B1
1283	FAX COVER	COVER FOR 1285 <b>R 6/23/2006</b>	1	6/5/1982	B1
1285	REPORT	RE FALKLAND ISLANDS <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	7	6/5/1982	B1
1276	CABLE	041633Z JUN 82 <b>D 6/23/2006 UPHELD 6/13/2017 M1186 #1276</b>	3	6/4/1982	B1 B3
1282	CABLE	050917Z JUN 82 <b>D 6/23/2006 UPHELD 6/13/2017 M1186 #1282</b>	2	6/5/1982	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 12/22/2004

**File Folder** FALKLANDS WAR (UN/KIRKPATRICK/HAIG) 6/05/1982

**FOIA**

2000-147

**Box Number** 3

CLARK

43

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1285	REPORT	RE FALKLAND ISLANDS	7	6/5/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

URGENT

PER YOUR REQUEST.  
SENT YOU AS SOON  
AS WE COULD  
TAKE BY PHONE  
FROM WASHINGTON-

USICA  
PARIS

From the New York Times, June 5.

THE UNITED NATIONS ENVOY SURVIVES IN THE FEUD WITH HAIG

WASHINGTON, June 5 -- If an ordinary ambassador runs a foul of the Secretary of State, especially one with a temper like that of Alexander Haig, he runs a risk of a quick return to private life. But Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is no ordinary ambassador. In the seventeenth month as chief U.S. delegate to the U.N., she has disagreed openly with Mr. Haig over a number of issues -- most recently the administration's Falkland policy -- and not only survived but has also been granted a forty-minute private audience with President Reagan. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, by an American diplomatic <sup>quirk,</sup> ~~work~~ is not only envoy to the United Nations but also a member of the Reagan cabinet. The fact that she is also the highest <sup>ranking</sup> ~~rank~~ woman in the senior echelon of the government and the administration's main liaison agent with the neo-conservative Democrats known loosely as "the Commentary crowd" has also contributed to her "fireproof" status.

A senior administration official who admits to a bias in favor of Mr. Haig was musing the other day over the ambiguity of the tradition that gives cabinet status to an official who by the nature of her job has to take instruction from civil servant bureaucrats in the State Department.

A TRADITION SURVIVES

He noted that before the inauguration the Reagan transition team recommended abolishing that tradition. "I think a lot

of the problems between Jeane and Al could have been avoided if we had taken the transition team advise" he said.

Ambassadors often differ privately with their government's politics but not publicly, at least not for long. Last summer for example Robert G. Neumann then the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia criticized Mr. Haig's Middle East policy in a conversation with Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Haig heard about it and within two days Mr. Neumann was forced to resign.

But ever since the Falkland crisis erupted Mrs. Kirkpatrick, who is an Argentine specialist, has been critical of the administration's handling of it. She was especially perturbed when Mr. Haig persuaded the President to side with Britain after Mr. Haig's mediation effort failed.

As a cabinet member, Mrs. Kirkpatrick has the right to consult directly with President Reagan without going through Mr. Haig or the State Department. All ambassadors who are appointed by the President theoretically have the same rights. But in practice it is rare for an envoy ever to see the oval office after posing for his departure picture. And Mr. Haig is unlikely to suffer gladly any who try to go there over his head.

On the other hand, as the U.S. delegate to the UN, Mrs. Kirkpatrick has to follow instructions that are usually drafted by the State Department. The person whose responsibility

it is to tell Mrs. Kirkpatrick what to do is at the relatively lowly Assistant Secretary for International Organizations.

Administration officials say that Mrs. Kirkpatrick has not enjoyed taking orders from lower level officials and that for sensitive matters Deputy Secretary Walter Stoessel or even Mr. Haig has had to deal with her.

#### LODGE NAMED TO CABINET

After her latest dispute with Mr. Haig surfaced, Mrs. Kirkpatrick made it clear that as a cabinet officer she would deal with the President. She spent 40 minutes with him with only William P. Clark, the National Security Adviser, present to discuss her views on the Falklands. Even though the Administration has publicly sided with Britain, Mrs. Kirkpatrick publicly admitted to "tilting toward neutrality".

The first UN delegate to be appointed to the Cabinet was Henry Cabot Lodge, former Senator of Massachusetts in the Eisenhower administration. President Kennedy named Adlai Stevenson to the UN in 1961 and he had his public problems with Washington particularly when he let it be known that he had not been consulted before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

President Johnson, in trouble over Vietnam, persuaded Arthur J. Goldberg, then a Supreme Court judge, to be his UN envoy promising a major policy role in the effort to bring peace. Mr. Goldberg opened an office in the State Department and told journalists of his independent marching orders.

But his ~~h~~ovish views quickly cut his influence.

STRAINS SET IN

Andrew Young, first black U.S. chief delegate to the UN, was a close political ally of President Jimmy Carter and took his cabinet rank seriously enough that it constantly caused Secretary of State Cyrus Vance trouble. Mr. Vance and Mr. Young were much closer than Mr. Haig and Mrs. Kirkpatrick, but Mr. Young was finally forced to quit after it was learned that he had met with the Palestine Liberation Organization envoy without permission.

According to State Department officials, Mr. Haig and Mrs. Kirkpatrick started out working well together but after about six months strains began to set in, starting with Mrs. Kirkpatrick's handling of the Security Council debate over Israel's June 1981 bombing of the Iraqi <sup>gu</sup> reactor. From New Zealand, Mr. Haig's aids let it be known that Mr. Haig thought Mrs. Kirkpatrick had acted ~~ag~~ainst orders.

In that case, the White House rushed to her defense, and Mr. Haig was forced to say that his aides were misinformed. That retraction was never taken seriously by Mrs. Kirkpatrick's aides who believed that Mr. Haig was jealous of her success in getting a resolution that the US could support through the Council.



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 3

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 54

RELEASER WHC

PRIORITY

DEX #     

DTG 051329Z JUN 82

ROUTINE

TTY #     

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM/THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MR. CHARLES TYSON FOR JUDGE CLARK 051340Z JUN 82

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DIRNSA 3/00/28396-82

PALACE: PLEASE PLACE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE MARKED "EYES ONLY FOR JUDGE CLARK", AND PLACE IN HIS EVENING FOLDER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-147#1274

BY LDS, NARA, DATE 6/23/06

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

*Withdrawer*

LOJ 12/22/2004

*File Folder*

FALKLANDS WAR (UN/KIRKPATRICK/HAIG) 6/05/1982

*FOIA*

2000-147

CLARK

*Box Number*

3

43

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
1276	CABLE 041633Z JUN 82	3	6/4/1982	B1

---

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

**B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**

**B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**

**B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**

**B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**

**B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**

**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

we  
RR

PAGE 01 OF 04 UN/NEW YORK 0265  
SIT239

DTG: 050231Z JUN 82 PSN: 002097  
TOR: 156/0351Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF JP SIT /007  
WHSR COMMENT: SENT TO WPC  
-----

FLASH

DE YEKORR #0265 1560240  
Z 050231Z JUN 82 ZYH ZFF4  
FM UN/NEW YORK

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 050231Z JUN 81 PRIVACY CHANNEL

FROM AMBASSADOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK (FR/NEW YORK 265)  
TO: FLASH FOR WHITEHOUSE (NSC FOR CLARK-EYES ONLY)

1. EVENING WEDNESDAY JUNE 2, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SPAIN CIRCULATED A SIMPLE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION AND THE COUNCIL WAS CALLED TO MEET THE FOLLOWING MORNING, JUNE 3RD.
2. BRITISH ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION TO VETO AND USUN RECEIVED INSTRUCTION TO VETO ALONG WITH THE BRITISH (STATE 8005).
3. THURSDAY JUNE 3RD, AMENDMENTS WERE INTRODUCED TO SPAINISH TEXT CALLING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505 SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE, THAT IS, LINKING THE CEASE-FIRE TO A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS AS CALLED FOR IN RES. 502, AS UK DESIRED.
4. SINCE THE U.K. HAD ASSERTED THAT THEY WANTED IMPLEMENTATION OF RES. 502, THERE APPEARED TO BE A CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE.
5. THE U.K. SAID THEY WOULD ONLY CONSIDER IT SERIOUSLY IF ARGENTINES AGREED. BY CUTTING THROUGH VARIOUS LEVELS AND COMPLICATIONS OF ARGENTINE BUREAUCRACY TO THE TOP, WE WERE ABLE TO GET A CLEAR

~~SECRET~~

Fon-147#1270

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 UN/NEW YORK 0265

DTG: 050231Z JUN 82 PSN: 002097

CUT ARGENTINE AFFIRMATIVE, CONDITIONED ON U.K. ACCEPTANCE.

6. THERE WERE MORNING AND AFTERNOON COUNCIL SESSION ON JUNE 3. AT APPROXIMATELY 6.00 P.M. THAT DAY, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD RECONVENE AT 4.00 P.M., TODAY, JUNE 4, TO VOTE ON THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE FINAL AMENDED TEXT WAS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT IN USUN CABLE 1558.

7. MANY OF US, INCLUDING ME (AMB KIRKPARTICK) BELIEVED THAT THE U.K. MIGHT ACCEPT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION POSSIBLY WITH MINOR REVISIONS.

8. AT 11:30 A.M. TODAY (JUNE 4) I SPOKE WITH ACTING SECRETARY STOESSEL WHO SAID THAT THE U.K. FOREIGN OFFICE HAD SENT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION TO PM THATCHER ALONG WITH TWO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. HE SAID HE HAD SENT HAIG THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. STOESSEL AND I AGREE THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO VOTE "NO" IN CASE THE BRITISH REJECTED THE RESOLUTION.

9. AT 2:00 P.M. IN NEW YORK, I RECEIVED WORD FROM THE BRITISH THAT A) THEY WOULD VETO THE RESOLUTION; B) THAT THEY WOULD ENTER-TAIN NO AMENDMENTS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

10. AFTER CONFIRMING THE BRITISH POSITION, I CALLED ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS WHO WAS AS UNHAPPY AS I WITH U.K. DECISION. WE AGREED THAT A U.S. VETO WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE.

11. I SPOKE WITH WALT STOESSEL AND TOM ENDERS AT 3:00 P.M. TO INFORM THEM THAT JAPAN AND IRELAND WOULD VOTE "YES" AND THAT FRANCE WAS ABSTAINING. I SAID THAT I WANTED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS, AND THEN SPOKE WITH STOESSEL AGAIN TO INQUIRE IF THEY WERE VERY SURE THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO VOTE NO. I REITERATED WHAT A DISASTER I THOUGH A "NO" VOTE WOULD BE. HOW UNNECESSARY IT WAS, HOW THE U.K. FREQUENTLY DID NOT VOTE WITH US IN THE SC. AGAIN, I SAID THAT TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE CONFUSION, I WANTED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 UN/NEW YORK 0265

DTG: 050231Z JUN 82 PSN: 002097

12. I ASKED IF THEY HAD SPOKEN WITH SEC. HAIG ABOUT THE DRAFT. THEY SAID YES. AGAIN I REPEATED THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY CONTROVEERSIAL VOTE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THEY SHOULD DISCUSS THIS AGAIN WITH SEC. HAIG.

13. AT 4:00 I ONCE AGAIN CALLED STOESSEL AND ENDERS TO SAY THAT I HAD RECEIVED NO WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS. THEY SAID THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE CLEAR--I WAS TO FOLLOW THE BRITISH--BUT THEY COULD UNDERSTAND THAT I WANTED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS. EXECSEC BREMER SAID THAT THEY WERE SENDING WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS SINCE ACTING SEC STOESSEL HAD JUST SIGNED THEM. (NOW AT 9:00 P.M. USUN HAS STILL NOT RECEIVED SUCH WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS. STATE AT FIRST SAID THEY WERE SENT, AND NOW EXECSEC IS LOOKING).

14. AT 5:00 I CALLED TO REPORT EVERYTHING WE KNEW ABOUT THE LINE UP: JAPAN, IRELAND, SPAIN, USSR, POLAND, PANAMA, ZAIRE WOULD VOTE YES, AND THE U.K. WOULD VETO. I THEN SAID THAT THE SC MEETING WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN. THEY SAID THAT SEC. HAIG WAS STILL OUT AT TH DINNER AND THEY HAD NOT YET HEARD FROM HIM.

15. LATER AT 5:00 THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD SPOKEN TO SEC. HAIG, EXPLAINED THE SITUATION TO HIM. BUT THAT HE (HAIG) WANTED TO REFLECT. I EXPLAINED THAT THE VOTE WAS RAPIDLY APPROACHING. (LATER IT WAS EXPLAINED HAIG HAD WANTED TO CONSULT WITH PYM).

16. AT 6:30 I HEARD THAT THE SECRETARY WANTED TO REFLECT FURTHER. I REPLIED THAT TIME HAD RUN OUT. THE SC MEETING HAD BEEN CALLED FOR 4:00 AND WE HAD BEEN DELAYING FOR 2 AND A HALF HOURS BY THAT POINT.

17. AT 6:35 THE VOTE OCCURRED. AND WE VOTED NO.

18. AN OPEN PHONE LONE WAS MAINTAINED THE ENTIRE TIME OF THE SC DELIBERATIONS BETWEEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE. IT WAS INTERRUPTED ONLY AFTER THE VOTE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 UN/NEW YORK 0265

DTG: 050231Z JUN 82 PSN: 002097

19. AMB. KIRKPATRICK HAD SPECIFICALLY ASCERTAINED FROM AS ENDERS AND ACTING SEC STOESSEL WHETHER SHE SHOULD VOTE "NO" OR NOT AT ALL IF WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT COME IN TIME. SHE WAS TOLD SPECIFICALLY TO VOTE "NO". THEY SAID WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS WERE ON THE WAY.

20. THE MESSAGE TO ABSTAIN CAME MINUTES AFTER THE SC VOTE. SINCE SC VOTES CANNOT BE CHANGED, AMB. KIRKPATRICK WAS INSTRUCTED TO ANNOUNCE THAT WE WISHED TO RECORDED THE CHANGE IN ANY CASE.

21. AMB. KIRKPATRICK FOLLOWED THES INSTRUCTIONS AND ADDED CHANGE OF INTENTION TO THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE. SINCE THEN KIRKPATRICK HAS EXPLAINED THE CONFUSION WAS A RESULT OF SHORT TIME AND LONG DISTANCE.

22. AT 9:10 P.M. USUN RECEIVED WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO ABSTAIN. AT 9:35. ON REQUEST FROM ENDERS TO TAKE ALL REASONALBE STEPS TO MEND RELATIONS WITH ARGETNINES. AMB. KIRKPATRICK, ACCOMPANIED BY AMB. SORZANO. HAS DILENR WITH GENERALS MIRET AND GIL. END

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*we -*  
*RR*  
*u/File*

PAGE 01 OF 03 USMISSION USUN NEW 1570 DTG: 050245Z JUN 82 PSN: 002035  
SIT722 TOR: 156/0256Z

DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB /010

OP IMMED  
STU9013  
DE RUEHDT #1570 1560246  
O 050245Z JUN 82  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
  
TO SFGSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2397

*pc*

INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 1682  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6482  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1765  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 6590  
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USUN NEW YORK 01570

BRUSSELS FOR USEC  
DEPARTMENT PASS AMREP AND SOUTHCOM  
F.O. 12065: GDS 6/4/88 (KIRKPATRICK, JEANE), OR-M  
TAGS: UN, PLPR  
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS CRISIS: VETO OF SPANISH/PANAMANIAN  
- RESOLUTION, JUNE 4, 1982.  
REF: USUN 1558

1. (~~THE~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED 9-2 (UK, US) - 4  
(TOGO, FRANCE, JORDAN AND GUYANA) ON THE SPANISH/  
PANAMANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (REFTEL)  
CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTAION  
OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505. US INSTRUCTIONS TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED 1281  
NLS FOO-147# 1281  
BY NET NARA, DATE 11/6/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USMISSION USUN NEW 1570 DTG:050245Z JUN 82 PSN:002035

SWITCH TO VOTE OF ABSTAIN ARRIVED TOO LATE, ALTHOUGH AN OPEN LINE WAS MAINTAINED FROM SC TO THE DEPARTMENT. ON INSTRUCTION. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK EXPLAINED THIS IN THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. PRESIDENT. THE DECISION TAKEN BY THIS COUNCIL TODAY IS, I THINK WE ALL UNDERSTAND, A TERRIBLY IMPORTANT ONE. IT MARKS ONE MORE FAILURE IN A SERIES OF FAILED EFFORTS TO, MEDIATE A CONFLICT THAT IS MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED YEARS OLD. ONE MORE FAILED ATTEMPT TO SUBSTITUTE REASON FOR FORCE, NEGOTIATION FOR VIOLENCE. WORDS FOR BOMBS AND BULLETS. TODAY'S DECISION, THEN, MARKS ONE MORE STEP IN A PROCESS OF ESCALATION WHOSE END IS NOT YET IN SIGHT.

PHASE ONE OF THIS MOST RECENT CONFLICT ENDED WITH THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLANDS. PHASE TWO MAY WELL END WITH BRITISH REOCCUPATION OF THE FALKLANDS. WHERE,

MR. PRESIDENT, WILL PHASE THREE END>

AFFIRMED IN THE VOTE OF THE MAJORITY TODAY IS THE WILL TO NEGOTIATION AND PEACE. AFFIRMED IN THE VETO OF MY GOVERNMENT, TO WHICH I WILL RETURN MOMENTARILY, IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT FORCE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TRIUMPH IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

MR. PRESIDENT, ONE OF MY SONS HANDED ME THIS MORNING THE POEM OF ANOTHER MAN WHO DISAPPROVES ARGENTINA'S FORCIBLE ACT AGAINST THE FALKLANDS ISLANDS. IN SOME LINES IN A POEM, CALLED "AN ENGLISH POEM", THE GREAT ARGENTINE WRITER, BORGES, WROTE:

I OFFER YOU MY ANCESTORS, MY DEAD MEN,

THE GHOSTS THAT LIVING MEN HAVE HONORED IN MARBLE:

MY FATHER'S FATHER KILLED IN THE FRONTIER OF BUENOS AIRES,

TWO BULLETS THROUGH HIS LUNGS, BEARDED AND DEAD,

WRAPPED BY HIS SOLDIERS IN THE HIDE OF A COW;

MY MOTHER'S GRANDFATHER -- JUST TWENTY-FOUR --

HEADING A CHARGE OF THREE HUNDRED INTO PERU,

NOW GHOSTS ON VANISHED HORSES.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE FRIENDS OF ARGENTINA, OF THE AMERICAS,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USMISSION USUN NEW 1570 DTG: 050245Z JUN 82 PSN: 002035

AND OF WORLD PEACE. HOPE THAT ARGENTINA WILL HAVE FEW SUCH OFFERINGS FROM THIS WAR AND FROM THE POST-WAR PERIOD. WE HOPE, I BELIEVE ALL OF US HERE, THAT COOPERATION CAN BE RESTORED, FRIENDSHIPS MENDED, URGENT TASKS RECOMMENCED, THAT BUILDING A NEW WORLD IN THIS NEW WORLD CAN BE BEGUN AGAIN. MY GOVERNMENT WORKED HARD FOR MEDIATION OF THIS CONFLICT AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THIS DISPUTE. WE HAVE BEEN RENT BY THE CLASH OF VALUES... LOYALTIES AND FRIENDSHIPS. THAT AGONIZING PROCESS OF DECISION. MR. PRESIDENT, CONTINUED DOWN TO THE VOTE ON THIS ISSUE.

I AM TOLD IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE A VOTE ONCE IT IS CAST. BUT I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO RECORD THE FACT THAT, WERE IT POSSIBLE TO CHANGE OUR VOICE, WE SHOULD LIKE TO CHANGE IT FROM A "VETO", A "NO" THAT IS, TO AN ABSTENTION.

THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT.

END TEXT.

KIRKPATRICK

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 2

2

WHC

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 50

RELEASER \_\_\_\_\_

PRIORITY

DEX # \_\_\_\_\_

DTG 051200Z JUN 82

ROUTINE

TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM/THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. CHARLES TYSON FOR JUDGE CLARK/PALACE *FBI 051210Z JUN 82*

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

PALACE: DELIVER TO MR. TYSON IF POSSIBLE, IF NOT, DELIVER DIRECTLY TO THE JUDGE.

PLACE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE MARKED EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ CONTAINS CODEWORD

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*for 12/20/04*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*  
CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

*Withdrawer*  
LOJ 12/22/2004

*File Folder*  
FALKLANDS WAR (UN/KIRKPATRICK/HAIG) 6/05/1982

*FOIA*  
2000-147  
CLARK

*Box Number*  
3

43

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
1282	CABLE 050917Z JUN 82	2	6/5/1982	B1

---

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.





The New York Times/Marilyn K. Yee  
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 4 — If an ordinary ambassador runs afoul of the Secretary of State, especially one with a temper like that of Alexander M. Haig Jr., he runs the risk of a quick return to private life.

But Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is no ordinary ambassador. In her 17 months as the chief United States delegate to the United Nations, she has disagreed openly with Mr. Haig over a number of issues, most recently the Administration's Falklands policy, and has not only survived but has also been granted a 40-minute private audience with President Reagan.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick, by an American diplomatic quirk, is not only envoy to the United Nations but also a member of the Reagan Cabinet. The fact that she is also the highest-ranked woman in the senior echelons of the Government and the Administration's main liaison agent with the neo-conservative Democrats known loosely as "the Commentary crowd" has also contributed to her "fireproof" status.

A senior Administration official, who admits to a bias in favor of Mr. Haig, was musing the other day over the ambiguity of the tradition that gives Cabinet status to an official who, by the nature of her job, has to take instructions from civil service bureaucrats in the State Department.

#### A Tradition Survives

He noted that before the inauguration, the Reagan transition team recommended abolishing that tradition. "I think a lot of the problem between Jeane and Al could have been avoided if we had taken the transition team's advice," he said.

Ambassadors often differ privately with their government's policies, but not publicly, at least not for long. Last summer, for example, Robert G. Neumann, then the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, criticized Mr. Haig's Middle

## State Department U.N. Envoy Survives In a Feud With Haig

East policy in a conversation with Senator Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Haig heard about it, and within two days, Mr. Neumann was forced to

But ever since the Falklands crisis erupted, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, who is an Argentine specialist, has been critical of the Administration's handling of it. She was especially perturbed when Mr. Haig persuaded the President to side with Britain after Mr. Haig's mediation efforts failed.

As a Cabinet member, Mrs. Kirkpatrick has the right to consult directly with President Reagan without going through Mr. Haig or the State Department. All ambassadors are appointed by the President and theoretically have the same right. But in practice, it is the rare for an envoy ever to see the Oval Office after posing for his departure picture. And Mr. Haig is unlikely to suffer gladly any who try to go there over his head.

On the other hand, as the United States delegate to the United Nations, Mrs. Kirkpatrick has to follow instructions that are usually drafted by the State Department. The person whose responsibility it is to tell Mrs. Kirkpatrick what to do is the relatively lowly Assistant Secretary for International Organizations.

Administration officials say that Mrs. Kirkpatrick has not enjoyed taking orders from middle-level officials and that on sensitive matters, Deputy Secretary Walter J. Stoessel or even Mr. Haig has had to deal with her.

#### Lodge Named to Cabinet

After her latest dispute with Mr. Haig surfaced, Mrs. Kirkpatrick made it clear that as a Cabinet officer she would deal directly with the President. She spent 40 minutes with him, with only William P. Clark, the national security adviser, present, to discuss her views on the Falklands. Even though the Administration has publicly sided with Britain, Mrs. Kirkpatrick publicly admits to "tilting toward neutrality."

The first U.N. delegate to be appointed to the Cabinet was Henry Cabot Lodge, former Senator from Massachusetts, in the Eisenhower Administration. President Kennedy



Sygnia/Diego Goldberg

Alexander M. Haig Jr.

named Adlai E. Stevenson to the United Nations in 1961, and he had his public problems with Washington, particularly when he let it be known that he had not been consulted before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

President Johnson, in trouble over Vietnam, persuaded Arthur J. Goldberg, then a Supreme Court Justice, to be his U.N. envoy, promising him a major policy role in the effort to bring peace. Mr. Goldberg opened an office in the State Department and told journalists of his independent marching orders. But his dovish views quickly cut his influence.

#### Strains Set In

Andrew Young, the first black United States chief delegate to the United Nations, was a close political ally of President Jimmy Carter and took his Cabinet rank seriously enough to make statements that constantly caused Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance trouble. Mr. Young and Mr. Vance were much closer than Mr. Haig and Mrs. Kirkpatrick, but Mr. Young was finally forced to quit after it was learned that he had met with the Palestine Liberation Organization envoy without permission.

According to State Department officials, Mr. Haig and Mrs. Kirkpatrick started out working well together, but after about six months, strains began to set in, starting with Mrs. Kirkpatrick's handling of the Security Council debate over Israel's June 1981 bombing of the Iraqi reactor. From New Zealand, Mr. Haig's aides let it be known that Mr. Haig thought Mrs. Kirkpatrick had acted against orders.

In that case, the White House rushed to her defense, and Mr. Haig was forced to say that his aides were misinformed. That retraction was never taken seriously by Mrs. Kirkpatrick's aides, who believed that Mr. Haig was jealous of her success in getting a resolution that the United States could support through the Council.



## FALKLANDS STATEMENT

If there is any principle upon which the functioning of modern international society rests, it is that disputes should not be resolved by the resort to arms. Simply put, unprovoked aggression is no longer a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Eight weeks ago, on ~~some tiny~~ islands in the South Atlantic, that principle was violated. The result has been the tragic expenditure of lives and a continuing crisis that has disturbed traditional friendships in the Western hemisphere and beyond.

We have all watched this tragedy closely, aware that the conflict over the Falkland Islands has posed fundamental questions and difficult choices. Throughout the crisis we all have been struck by the United Kingdom's magnificent resolve. In differing ways, we have demonstrated our support for Britain's responsible behavior in the crisis.

The United States continues to believe that it is urgent to end the fighting in the South Atlantic and achieve a settlement that is acceptable to both parties. In our view, the best framework for doing this remains Security Council Resolution 502 which, as you know, calls for a ceasefire, Argentine withdrawal and the negotiation of a political settlement.

I hope that in our public remarks at the conclusion of this Summit we can endorse the approach contained in Resolution 502 as well as demonstrate united support for Britain's courageous defense of international principle. In the longer term, I know you will agree that it will be vital for all of us to work together closely on helping to heal the wounds

Q. How do you explain the U.S. vote at the United Nations yesterday and later statement?

A. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's ~~original~~ <sup>from State Dept</sup> instructions were to vote against the Spanish/Panamanian resolution. After consultation with Secretary Haig, it was decided that the U.S. should abstain, but the new instructions did not reach the U.S. delegation in New York until after the vote.

Our problem with the resolution was that it was unclear. The obligation with regard to a ceasefire was precise, but the resolution was not sufficiently precise with regard to obligations the parties would assume in connection with the withdrawal of forces as called for by Resolution 502. Specifically, it would have been virtually impossible to have determined compliance with the provision for withdrawal in the absence of a date certain for completion of the withdrawal.

## FALKLANDS STATEMENT

If there is any principle upon which the functioning of modern international society rests, it is that disputes should not be resolved by the resort to arms. Simply put, unprovoked aggression is no longer a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Eight weeks ago, on some tiny islands in the South Atlantic, that principle was violated. The result has been the tragic expenditure of lives and a continuing crisis that has disturbed traditional friendships in the Western hemisphere and beyond.

We have all watched this tragedy closely, aware that the conflict over the Falkland Islands has posed fundamental questions and difficult choices. Throughout the crisis we all have been struck by the United Kingdom's magnificent resolve. In differing ways, we have demonstrated our support for Britain's responsible behavior in the crisis.

The United States continues to believe that it is urgent to end the fighting in the South Atlantic and achieve a settlement that is acceptable to both parties. In our view, the best framework for doing this remains Security Council Resolution 502 which, as you know, calls for a ceasefire, Argentine withdrawal and the negotiation of a political settlement.

I hope that in our public remarks at the conclusion of this Summit we can endorse the approach contained in Resolution 502 as well as demonstrate united support for Britain's courageous defense of international principle. In the longer term, I know you will agree that it will be vital for all of us to work together closely on helping to heal the wounds

~~TOP SECRET~~ CONTAINS CODEWORD

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 7

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 76

RELEASER MAD

PRIORITY

DEX #     

DTG 052212Z

ROUTINE

TTY #     

JUN 82

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. CHARLES TYSON FOR JUDGE CLARK / PALACE / TOR: 05/2238Z JUN 82

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.       
2.     

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

FOR DELIVERY WITH MORNING PACKAGES,

( ATTACHED: FALKLAND SITREP 66 )

~~TOP SECRET~~ CONTAINS CODEWORD.

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-147#1283

WHCA FORM 8, 26 FEB 81

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 10/23/06

1532 AM/ 5 22 12



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

*Withdrawer*

LOJ 12/22/2004

*File Folder*

FALKLANDS WAR (UN/KIRKPATRICK/HAIG) 6/05/1982

*FOIA*

2000-147

CLARK

*Box Number*

3

43

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
1285	REPORT  RE FALKLAND ISLANDS	7	6/5/1982	B1

---

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

**B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**

**B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**

**B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**

**B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**

**B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**

**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

N006

RI

U.S.-FALKLANDS

VERSAILLES, FRANCE (AP) -- WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN LARRY SPEAKES SAID TODAY THE U.S. ATTEMPT TO SWITCH ITS POSITION ON A UNITED NATIONS CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION DID NOT REFLECT ANY CHANGE IN THE BASIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES' ON THE CONFLICT IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

BUT BRITISH DIPLOMATIC SOURCES INTERPRETED THE U.S. MOVE AS A SOFTENING OF SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN IN ITS CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA. THEY EXPRESSED DISHAY AND ONE SOURCE SAID FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCIS PYM WAS FURIOUS.

ON FRIDAY, U.S. AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK VOTED, WITH BRITAIN, TO VETO A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE FALKLANDS CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT BEING TIED TO AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EMBATTLED ISLANDS. MINUTES LATER, HOWEVER, THE EMBARRASSED ENVOY ANNOUNCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE ABSTAINED HAD SHE RECEIVED A CHANGE OF INSTRUCTIONS IN TIME.

SPEAKES, WHO IS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, SAID THE UNITED STATES IS NOT EMBARRASSED BY THE INCIDENT AND WAS NOT TRYING TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS BY PLEASING THE BRITISH WITH A NO VOTE AND THEN ACCOMODATING ARGENTINA WITH THE PUBLIC SWITCH.

SPEAKES SAID THE DECISION TO SWITCH FROM A NO VOTE TO AN ABSTENTION WAS MADE BY SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR., AT VERSAILLES AND RELAYED TO NEW YORK VIA WASHINGTON. BUT IT REACHED KIRKPATRICK TOO LATE TO BE RECORDED.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD RETIRED ABOUT 11:30 P.M. PARIS TIME, HAVING APPROVED THE DECISION TO VETO AND DID NOT LEARN OF THE FLIP-FLOP UNTIL HE MET WITH HAIG AND OTHER ADVISORS AT BREAKFAST THIS MORNING, HE ADDED.

BRITISH SOURCES, WHO WOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED, SAID HAIG WAS ON THE PHONE TWICE WITH PYM OVERNIGHT TO EXPLAIN THE CONFUSION.

THE SOURCES -- CLEARLY IN A POSITION TO KNOW WHAT TRANSPIRED -- SAID HAIG EXPLAINED THE NEW RESOLUTION IN EFFECT REAFFIRMED U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 OF APRIL 3 THAT CALLS FOR AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS. SINCE THIS WAS THE CASE, HAIG REPORTEDLY SAID, HE COULD NOT REST ON THE VETO.

AP-WX-06-05-82 0904EBT

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES THREE

IMMEDIATE

DACOM

RELEASER MAD

PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG 090622Z JUN 82

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM - THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. CHARLES TYSON FOR JUDGE CLARK - PALACE #45 050633Z JUN 82

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DELIVER WITH MORNING PACKAGE, OR IF  
PACKAGE DELIVERED THEN DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

ATTACHED: STATE 4096

UNCLASSIFIED.

CLASSIFICATION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*Unfiled*

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 4096  
SIT220

DTG: 050221Z JUN 82 PSN: 002026  
TOR: 156/0246Z

*wrc*  
-----  
DISTRIBUTION: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB /007  
-----

*FY/*

OP IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #4096 1560236  
O. 050221Z JUN 82 ZFF5  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5718

INFO EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 8697  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6630  
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN IMMEDIATE 3099  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
USCINCLANT IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 154096 TOSEC 080126

ZFF SECRETARY ONLY

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: FA, UK, AR, US

SUBJECT: U.S. VOTE ON UN FALKLAND RESOLUTION; PRESS  
GUIDANCE

1. VOTE ON DRAFT SPANISH/PANAMANIAN RESOLUTION IN  
SECURITY COUNCIL JUNE 4 WAS NINE IN FAVOR, TWO AGAINST; UK  
AND US, AND FOUR ABSTAINING FRANCE, JORDAN, TOGO,  
GUYANA. INITIAL DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTE NO WERE  
CHANGED TO ABSTENTION BUT NEW INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT REACH  
USDEL UNTIL AFTER VOTE. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK EXPLAINED  
FINAL US POSITION I.E. ABSTENTION IN HER STATEMENT TO  
COUNCIL FOLLOWING VOTE.

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 4096

DTG: 050221Z JUN 82 PSN: 002026

2. DEPARTMENT IS USING FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE US VOTE.

BEGIN GUIDANCE.

Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S VOTE AND LATER STATEMENT AT THE UN TODAY>

A. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT WERE TO VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH SECRETARY HAIG IN VERSAILLES, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ABSTAIN INSTEAD.

OUR PROBLEM WITH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS THAT IT WAS SERIOUSLY FLAWED. WHILE THE OBLIGATION WITH REGARD TO AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WAS CLEAR, THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE WITH REGARD TO OBLIGATIONS THE PARTIES WOULD ASSUME IN CONNECTION WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AS CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 502. SPECIFICALLY, A VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE WOULD BE UNMISTAKABLE, WHILE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IN THE ABSENCE OF A DATE CERTAIN FOR COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL.

AS IN MANY SUCH CASES, THE DECISION ON THE U.S. VOTE WAS A QUOTE CLOSE CALL UNQUOTE. IN THIS CASE, AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED, ON FURTHER REVIEW IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE DEFECTS IN THE RESOLUTION, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL, DID NOT JUSTIFY A QUOTE NO UNQUOTE VOTE. THUS THE DECISION TO ABSTAIN.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE TIMING OF THE VOTE WAS SUCH THAT THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT REACH AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK UNTIL AFTER SHE HAD VOTED. UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 4096

DTG: 050221Z JUN 82 PSN: 002026

PROCEDURES, A VOTE CANNOT BE CHANGED. SHE EXPLAINED THIS AFTER HER VOTE.

Q. WAS THERE A SPLIT BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK>

A. ABSOLUTELY NOT. AS IS OBVIOUS FROM BOTH THE VOTE AND AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S EXPLANATION, SHE WAS ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS WHEN SHE VOTED AND WAS MAKING THE FINAL U.S. POSITION CLEAR WHEN SHE MADE HER STATEMENT. END GUIDANCE.

3. BUENOS AIRES MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. STOESSEL  
BT



PRESS BRIEFING  
BY  
LARRY SPEAKES

June 5, 1982

L'Orangerie, Press Center

12:31 PM Local Time

MR. SPEAKES: Let me have your attention please. We are briefing today, as we will tomorrow, by popular demand -- Saul Friedman cast the single vote in favor -- there were none against. So mainly we are here each day to give you logistical instructions as to what may happen so that you will be up to date on the briefing plans and so forth. In addition we will also answer whatever questions you might have that don't pertain to the summit or what may be answered in a later briefing.

We are allowing some silent footage here at the beginning and we will try to kill the lights after two or three minutes if that is sufficient.

The briefing will be our customary briefing rules where it is on the record but not for cameras.

At 1:00 p.m. today Secretary Regan will be here to brief on this morning's first session. It will be open for sound and cameras

At 6:05 p.m. the President will deliver his radio broadcast from the U.S. Delegation area which is adjacent to the meeting area there at Versailles. The White House will have a photo release on that subject. We are not able to cover it as we had anticipated. Color prints for the networks and color and black and white for the wires will be available in this room at about 10:00 p.m. Paris time. Prints for the magazines and agencies will be available at the Meridien Press Center sometime later in the evening. Diane Powers of the White House Photo Office will be handling that release.

In addition we hope to have the Rome-London press schedule available later this evening or early tomorrow morning. Mark Weinberg will have the action on that.

Now the regular broadcast, as I say, is at 6:05. Immediately following in this room, Secretary Regan followed by Secretary Haig, each appearing separately, will brief for radio and television coverage. We will also brief at the same time here tomorrow at 12:30 and roughly the same times, although there may be some variations for Secretary Haig.

Q Larry, what about a transcript on the radio speech?

MR. SPEAKES: The transcript on the radio speech will be turned out as quickly as we can. It will be available here.

As far as downtown transcripts we will send them by courier so there will be some delay in transcripts getting down there.

Q Larry, will it be piped in here, please?

MORE



MR. SPEAKES: Yes, it will be piped in here.

Q When is the start of the Regan evening briefing?  
Before the start of the evening briefings?

MR. SPEAKES: It will be piped in here before the start of the evening briefings. The transcript probably will not be available that quickly.

Q Any topic, Larry?

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Okay, new topic?

Q Any topic on the radio address?

MR. SPEAKES: Oh, any topic? None that I am willing to state at this time.

Q How about telling us the U.S. -- about the foul-up on the Falklands.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay, Helen asked about the vote. I don't accept it.

Q The what?

MR. SPEAKES: The vote in the U.N. last night.

Q The foul-up.

MR. SPEAKES: You used the word "foul-up," which I don't accept.

Q It wasn't a foul-up?

MR. SPEAKES: I didn't consider them separate.

The instructions from the State Department to Ambassador Kirkpatrick were to vote against the Spanish-Panamanian resolution. After consultations with Secretary Haig it was decided that the United States should abstain, but the instructions did not reach the U.S. delegation in New York until shortly after the vote. Our problem with the resolution at the outset was that it was unclear. The obligation with regard --

Q Wait a minute. The problem what?

MR. SPEAKES: With the resolution was that it was unclear. The obligation with regard to a cease-fire was precise but the resolution was not sufficiently precise with regard to obligations the parties would assume in connection with the withdrawal of forces as called for by Resolution 502.

Q Would assume in the withdrawal?

MR. SPEAKES: Specifically it would have been virtually impossible to have determined compliance with the provision for withdrawal in the absence of a date certain for completion of the withdrawal.

MORE

#341-6/5



Q What for completion of withdrawal?

MR. SPEAKES: For completion of the withdrawal.

Q Who did he consult -- who did Haig consult with before they decided to change the vote?

Q Is that the end of the thing?

MR. SPEAKES: End of statement, yes.

The question, if you should ask it on why we changed from a no vote to abstention and why we indicated we would have changed had we received instructions earlier in New York was that after further review and consultation we determined that the defects were not substantial enough --

Q Who is we?

MR. SPEAKES: The United States government.

Q -- were not substantial enough to what?

MR. SPEAKES: -- enough to justify a no vote.

Q Repeat that, Larry, please. Were not substantial enough --

MR. SPEAKES: After further review and consultation it was determined that the [defects] were not substantial enough to justify a no vote. As in the case of many votes, it was a close call.

Q Larry -- I am sorry, are you still reading?

MR. SPEAKES: No, I have finished.

Q Were we aware when the instructions -- was the American delegation aware when that instruction was given to abstain that the British were going to cast a veto?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't know. Ambassador Kirkpatrick can better speak to that than I as to what she was aware of there in consultation with our colleagues on the Security Council.

Q The Secretary of State met Francis Pym.

MR. SPEAKES: I am answering and you may ask a question. Now go ahead.

Q When the Secretary of State met Francis Pym yesterday afternoon he gave him a categorical assurance that America would join Britian in a veto. What exactly was the timing of the change of mind and who initiated the consultation?

MR. SPEAKES: The consultations took place between the Ambassador to the UN and the State Department and Secretary Haig here at Versailles.

Q At what time and what was the first communication, at which end?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't think we are going into that much detail.



Q Well, if she was in on the consultation, how come she didn't get proper word?

MR. SPEAKES: It was further reviewed. Things were moving quickly at the UN. We took a look at it and studied the text of the UN and decided we preferred to abstain rather than veto.

Q At what point, Larry, did --

MR. SPEAKES: You have to understand that these are degrees of disagreement with the Resolution and not fundamental changes in position.

Q At what point did the President get involved in this decision.

MR. SPEAKES: He was involved this morning.

Q He wasn't involved when the decision was made to abstain?

MR. SPEAKES: You have to understand this was taking place at 3:00 am Paris time.

Q But surely -- in fact Haig rang Pym at 12:30 and told him of the decision for abstention, and rang back ten minutes later to say that it had been too late. Well, that is rather before 3:00 am.

MR. SPEAKES: That is true. The question about 3:00 am was asked in the context of the President's involvement.

Q Did the Americans --

Q I mean when the decision was reached, Larry -- before the decision was reached that there should have been -- that we should have abstained, that we wanted to abstain. Was the President consulted and if he wasn't, why wasn't he?

MR. SPEAKES: You will have to understand, as I said, the degrees of disagreement with the resolution. We disagree with the Resolution because it was not precise in the terms

MORE

#341-6/5



that we were looking for or the terms that the British government was looking for. But we decided that it was not sufficiently -- that the wording was not sufficiently imprecise to justify a no vote. So we would have preferred to abstain.

Q So if --

Q Excuse me. Was the answer to that question, no, that the President was not consulted before the decision was --

MR. SPEAKES: To my knowledge, he was not involved. But the decisions on the action certainly do involve the President and it's longstanding United States policy that we adhere to the provisions of Resolution 502, which are called for in the Resolution last night. But it was in the judgment of the State Department and the Secretary of State that this was not precise enough.

Q Larry, did the President go to bed last night having assured the British that the United States would veto the Resolution and not realizing that this was going to change?

MR. SPEAKES: I do not know of any assurances or any explicit discussions that the President had with the British government on this matter.

Q Given another opportunity to do so, if it should come up again in the Security Council, what do we do? What do we do? What's our position?

MR. SPEAKES: I think what we would have to do is once again look at the Resolution. I'm sure if it came up in this precise wording again, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick indicated, that it would be a vote to abstain.

Q Larry, did the further review of the American position involve any direct contacts with the Argentinian authorities?

MR. SPEAKES: Not to my knowledge, they certainly did not.

Q Larry?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q What was the President's reaction when he woke up this morning and was told that while he was asleep we switched positions?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't indicate this is as a switched position. I indicate it as a review and a change from two negative votes.

Q Not a switch?

MR. SPEAKES: No. If there was a change of vote, it would be a change.

Q What was his reaction to the fact that we had -- whatever we had done?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't have any reactions for you.

Q Was he dismayed?

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q Well, was Haig dismayed?



MR. SPEAKES: I don't know. Secretary Haig will be here this afternoon and you certainly may ask him.

Q Why didn't the message reach Ambassador Kirkpatrick in time? Where did the communications break down?

MR. SPEAKES: We were in consultation with the State Department and with the Secretary of State here in Versailles. It was a fast-moving event at the United Nations. We were conferring at the three points and I cannot assess any blame. It was a situation that was difficult to deal with.

Q Larry, the British say that Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Secretary Pym were on the phone twice in the middle of the night to discuss this after the event. Were the British caught off guard by Mrs. Kirkpatrick's explanation?

MR. SPEAKES: You would have to ask the British that. I cannot presume to speak for the government. They're right down the hall here, conveniently.

Q Larry, do you know anything about what Haig's explanation was to Pym?

MR. SPEAKES: No, I don't.

Q Larry, could I ask you this?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes, sir.

Q Is it your position that there's no substantial difference between an abstention and a negative vote which constitutes a veto?

MR. SPEAKES: I didn't indicate that, Dan, I hope I didn't, to you.

Q Well, you said it did not involve a switch in position.

MR. SPEAKES: It did not -- a switch in fundamental position.

Q Well, that's my question. You're saying it did not involve a switch in fundamental position?

MR. SPEAKES: No, I wouldn't indicate that it did. It's a degree of opposition to the -- to it. Degrees. If it was a switch from yes to no, as I said, that would have been a change in position.

Q But this was not?

MR. SPEAKES: Well, not a fundamental position. Of course not.

Q Larry, I didn't understand your answer to the question about the President. Is he happy -- When he got up, however you characterize this, he was told about this when he awoke this morning, presumably. What was his reaction? Is he happy that we changed, whether it's fundamental or minor? What was his feeling about it?

MR. SPEAKES: I didn't reflect any feeling of the President.

Q I mean, does he support our final -- does he support abstention on this particular resolution?

MR. SPEAKES: As we have indicated that is the position of the United States government,



and I think you can presume that's the President -- position of the President.

Q Larry --

Q Larry, the President --

MR. SPEAKES: We're getting two questions at once.

Q If the President was not involved in the attempt to change from a "no" vote to an abstention, was he involved in the original decision to vote against it?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't know whether personally and involved in those kinds of details, Ted, but certainly the original position of the U.N. Ambassador there certainly reflected the State Department's views, which reflect the President's views.

Q Larry, can you tell us -- Larry --

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q Can you tell us if Ambassador Kirkpatrick, in the latest instructions she got, was instructed to make the statement that she did?

MR. SPEAKES: I do not know. I think you'd have to ask her.

Q Well, presuming she would get instructions from here, if she got instructions, to announce that the U.S. would have preferred to abstain had it understood what the vote was all about.

Q Can you tell us what --

Q Go ahead and answer that first.

MR. SPEAKES: I didn't hear the question.

Q She was getting new instructions to abstain --

MR. SPEAKES: That's right.

Q -- got there too late. Was she then instructed from here to make the statement she did?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't know the answer to that.

Q Did the President --

Q One point of clarification -- that a British Foreign Ministry spokesman says that Mr. Pym was told yesterday by Mr. Haig during their meeting quite clearly that the United States would vote against the resolution. Would you agree with that?

MR. SPEAKES: I do not know the content of Secretary Haig's conversation with the Foreign Secretary.

Q Well, assuming that the British government spokesman is telling the truth, do you still say that the fact that Mr. Haig changed his mind is not a switch of position?

MR. SPEAKES: Not a switch in the fundamental position.



Q Well, what was it, if you say to the Foreign Secretary, "We are going to vote against," and then a few hours later you don't? That's not a switch in fundamental position?

MR. SPEAKES: Not fundamental position -- (laughter) -- not the position of the United States Government on this matter. Of course not.

Q Well, then you say --

Q What degree of a switch is it then?

Q What is it?

MR. SPEAKES: I indicated it was a degree of change and a degree of looking at the resolution.

Q What further degree could there be? You go from one position to the other.

MR. SPEAKES: I said if we'd have gone from yes to no, it would have been a fundamental position change. We did not go from no to yes.

Q Larry, did Ambassador Kirkpatrick recommend abstention instead of a negative vote?

MR. SPEAKES: I do not know. I just don't think we're going into those kinds of details, Dan.

Q Did the President --

MR. SPEAKES: I have stated what we want to say on the matter, and I'm willing to answer your questions. But I think we have gone about as far as we're going to go on it.

Q Could I just -- could I just ask you whether in view --

MR. SPEAKES: I think Miss Thomas has a question.

Q Did the President discuss it at -- in the aftermath of Mrs. Thatcher today?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't know. The President is still in sessions and there hasn't been a break.

Q -- fact that all of the maneuvers -- last minute maneuvers the President was not involved in and wasn't even aware of. Is that -- are we right on that?

MR. SPEAKES: That's what I'm trying to indicate here, Helen; that the position of the United States government was laid out, and it reflected the President's view. As these things began to change at the United Nations in the early hours of Paris time, Secretary of State was dealing with Washington; Washington was dealing with New York. And in that way we made the decision -- the United States government made the decision to make the fundamental change -- the change which I've maintained was not fundamental.

Q Larry, you're saying that -- original decision -- you're saying your original decision, Larry, was based on incomplete information? Is that what you're saying about the resolution?



MR. SPEAKES: The resolution wording, yes.

Q Larry, you said that the Secretary of State was dealing with Washington and Washington was dealing with New York.

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q Is that to say the Secretary of State does not deal with New York?

MR. SPEAKES: Certainly, he does.

Q Was he not in contact with Ambassador Kirkpatrick in this --

MR. SPEAKES: I'm not certain whether there was direct contact.

Q Larry, just for the record --

MR. SPEAKES: That's not always the way it works. Yes?

Q Larry, just for the record, can you answer whether we were trying to have it both ways?

MR. SPEAKES: Pardon?

Q For the record --

MR. SPEAKES: Oh.

Q -- can you answer whether we were trying to have it both ways?

MR. SPEAKES: No, we were not. We were opposed to the resolution and we remain opposed to it. But the reason we did -- we changed was because, after review, we decided it was not sufficient degree of difference to justify a "no" vote; so, therefore, we would have preferred to abstain.

Q Larry, does the administration feel it has any reason to be embarrassed by this episode?

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q Larry, was Judge Clark involved in these consultations at all, or were they confined exclusively to the State Department?

MR. SPEAKES: I just don't think we'll go into that precise detail.

Q Larry --

MR. SPEAKES: Patrick.

Q From what you've observed, Larry, does the President have the same degree of confidence in Secretary Haig that he had at this time yesterday?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes, sir.

Q Larry -- the result of your --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's go to Patrick here.

Q Larry, do you anticipate that the -- the fact that you wanted to abstain -- wound up vetoing it, is that going to create any problems with you with the Latin American nations?

MR. SPEAKES: I -- that will just be -- it will have --

Q Question.

MR. SPEAKES: Any problems with the Latin American nations on the action there? I wouldn't -- I couldn't pass judgment on it, Patrick. We'll

MORE

#341-6/5



just have to see.

Q Who made the decision last night not to wake the President?

MR. SPEAKES: This just wasn't a matter that required it because the President's position on this matter was clear. Had there been a fundamental change, as I've indicated, from no to yes, then certainly we would have discussed it with the President. But this was a degree of change.

Q Who decided that it was not a matter that required the President to be awakened because it didn't involve a fundamental change?

MR. SPEAKES: I don't think I can help you create another one of those.

Q How much has the meeting yesterday with Mrs. Thatcher influenced your review?

MR. SPEAKES: I could not pass judgment on that.

Q You referred earlier on to the imprecision about the date for withdrawal.

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q As a result of the review, what view have you formed about the likely date for Argentine withdrawal?

MR. SPEAKES: I have no idea on that. You would have to ask the Argentines that. We're dealing with a UN Resolution that called for withdrawal but was somewhat imprecise.

Q Dealing with the UN Resolution, you referred just now to changes at the UN in the early hours of Paris time. Now, one thing that hadn't changed was the actual text of the resolution -- the resolution that you decided ought to have abstained was the same resolution that you had told Mr. Pym that you would definitely veto. So, the changes were not so much at the UN because there was no change in the text that would have prompted the U.S. to change its mind.

If you decided to change your mind on that same text, did the decision come from here or did it come from New York? What was changing in New York?

MR. SPEAKES: I didn't indicate anything was changing in New York. I said fast moving events at the UN. Our review of the resolution --

Q -- the UN, you said.

MR. SPEAKES: Look back to my original statement.

Q How will the vote appear on the record -- as a vote against or as an abstention --

MR. SPEAKES: Vote against. The Ambassador indicated that last night.

Q Will the U.S. then make a further proposal which it can abstain on? (Laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: I just can't address that.



Q What did the President do this morning?

Q Assuming the --

MR. SPEAKES: I have a question here from the press from the United States.

The President was up last night until about 11:30 p.m. After the dinner, there was a coffee session and he remained up reading briefing material, preparing for the summit meetings this morning.

Q Wait a minute. A coffee --

MR. SPEAKES: A coffee that followed the session, the dinner last night, which I think included heads of government. He remained up reading briefing material.

At 8:00 a.m. this morning he met with Jim Baker, Mike Deaver, and Judge Clark. The purpose was his customary morning review of intelligence data -- his foreign policy briefing. At 8:30 a.m.

Q -- Haig there?

MR. SPEAKES: Pardon?

Q Was Haig at that meeting?

MR. SPEAKES: No, I'm coming to that.

At 8:30 a.m. this morning, he had breakfast in the room that adjoins his suite in the Grand Trianon. That breakfast included Secretaries Haig and Reagan and Jim Baker, Mike Deaver, and Bill Clark. The purpose of that was to review this morning's activities.

At 9:20 a.m. he went to the session and he's been there ever since with the exception of a coffee break at about 11:30 a.m.

Q Larry, is that when he got a fill-in of what had happened while he was asleep on this whole UN thing?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q And he had no reaction that you can report to us?

MR. SPEAKES: Correct.

Q At 8:30 a.m., at 8:30 a.m. or 8:00 a.m.?

MR. SPEAKES: Both.

Q Do you expect a reaction from the President later in the day to come out in view of the fact that he's now doing the --

MR. SPEAKES: I don't anticipate it.

Q You don't expect any --

Q Larry, has the British government registered any displeasure or protest or its reported dismay with the United States government over this?

MR. SPEAKES: Not except here in the press room.

Q Has he talked with Mrs. Thatcher in the session about this even briefly, do you know?



MR. SPEAKES: Pardon?

Q Has he talked with Mrs. Thatcher this morning --

MR. SPEAKES: Not having seen him since he went into the sessions with her, I don't know.

I would presume being the close friends that they are that they certainly might mention the matter.

Q Will you have any subsequent report on this, Larry --

MR. SPEAKES: Don't anticipate it. You'll have Secretary Haig late this evening.

We have Secretary Regan arriving on a white horse. So, if you can open the doorway there, and we'll let Secretary Regan in.

END

1:00 P.M. Local Time

: : :