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FOIA F01-055

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages
26891 REPORT	UNITED KINGDOM-FRANCE: EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION, PAGES 23-26 ONLY	4 10/13/1982 B1 B3
	D 1/9/2007 F01-055	
26892 NOTES	MEETING OF WILLIAM CLARK WITH OLIVER WRIGHT, 10/04/1982	2 ND B1
	R 1/28/2008 F01-055	
26893 LETTER	THATCHER TO REAGAN	1 10/19/1982 B1
	R 1/28/2008 F01-055	
26894 CABLE	#011819Z NOV 82	2 11/1/1982 B1
	R 1/28/2008 F01-055	
26895 CABLE	#012006Z NOV 82; MESSAGE - REAGAN TO THATCHER	4 11/1/1982 B1
	R 1/28/2008 F01-055	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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26891 REPORT 4 10/13/1982 B1

UNITED KINGDOM-FRANCE: EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION, PAGES 23-26 ONLY

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FILE:UK Meting of William P. Clark with Butter the bassador Sin Oliver Weight Oct. 4, 1962 / 0:30 pm. Peter Tenkins attending with Wright Lewis Blair otherding with Clark On triddle tast, Wright repeated ak support for President's initiative and said UK was doing what it could to support On Morthern Ireland, Wright stated that The Phios place was closiqued to they to start responsible political activity in Northern Ireland.

Wright printed out the neassity to the show progress in the JUF talk 30 3 3 in the Geneva to keep the European place movement down

Short discussion of The country orzit by the Owen. Apparently Seaver's office working directly with weight on this visit. Discussion of the Whiles- European strains. Wright generally optimistic That we will get Thursde The current difficulties. However mentioned That U.S. sauchous wer having a "ripple effect" un Me U. K.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 14, 1982

20

MEMORANDUM FOR JACQUE HILL

FROM:

DENNIS BILL

SUBJECT:

Request for Meeting with Judge Clark by

U.K. Defense Minister Hurd '

The British embassy has requested that Clark schedule a meeting with Douglas Hurd on October 27. The subjects of the meeting would be the Middle East, and defense/arms control issues. I recommend against the meeting. Hurd can deal with State on these issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you inform me that Clark will not be able to meet with Douglas Hurd on October 27.

WC:

I recall you met with Hurd at State and it was not very productive.

Recommend you not see him.

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be travellers enflores in aftern

Jufrued Prolienteur Pakenteur

Beni:

National Security Council REHE White House

Package	#	
- WOHLING	**	

82 0CT21 P1: 08

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION			
John Poindexter			. •			
Bud McFarlane	-		***			
Jacque Hill						
Judge Clark		-01				
John Poindexter		1	-			
Staff Secretary						
Sit Room			4			
BLAIR	2					
I-Information A-Act	ion R-Retain	D-Dispatch	N-No further Action			
DISTRIBUTION						
cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other						
COMMENTS						
Ithinks .	the Pres	udt	would			
be to so	ce hay	sgies.	comments,			
			John			

ADVANCE COPY

21 OCT 1982



FROM THE AMBASSADOR

BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

15 October 1982

The Honorable
William P Clark
National Security Advisor
The White House
WASHINGTON DC

Sen tage,

I thought you might like to see the enclosed passage about defence and the North Atlantic Alliance in the Prime Minister's speech at the Conservative Party Conference at Brighton on 8 October.

how ea,

Oliver Wright

First, I want to come to something that dwarfs party politics - indeed, to an issue that dwarfs every other issue of our time.

We have invented weapons powerful enough to destroy the whole world. Others have created political systems evil enough to seek to enslave the whole world. Every free nation must face that threat. Every free nation must strain both to defend its freedom and to ensure the peace of the world.

The first duty of a British Government is the defence of the realm, and we shall discharge that duty.

Ever since the war the principal threat to our country's safety has come from the Soviet bloc. Twenty-six years ago the Russians marched into Hungary. Twenty-one years ago they built the Berlin Wall. Fourteen years ago they reconquered Czechoslovakia. Three years ago they entered Afghanistan. Two years ago they began to suppress the first stirrings of freedom in Poland.

They knew the strengh of the human spirit. They knew that if freedom were allowed to take root in Poland it would spread across Eastern Europe and perhaps to the Soviet Union itself. They knew that the beginning of freedom spelt the beginning of the end for Communism.

Yet despite these regular reminders of the ruthless actions of the Kremlin there are still those who seem to believe that disarmament by ourselves alone would so impress the Russians that they would obligingly follow suit.

But peace, freedom and justice are only to be found where people are prepared to defend them. This government will give the highest priority to our national defence, both conventional and nuclear.

I want to see nuclear disarmament. I want to see conventional disarmament as well. I remember the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I remember, too, the bombs that devastated Coventry and Dresden. The horrors of war are indivisible. We all want peace, but not peace at any price. Peace with justice and freedom.

We seek agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control. We want to reduce the levels of both conventional and nuclear forces. But those reductions must be mutual, they must be balanced and they must be verifiable.

I understand the feelings of the unilateralists. I understand the anxieties of partners with children growing up in the nuclear age. But the fundamental question for all of us is whether unilateral nuclear disarmament would make a war less likely.

I have to tell you that it would not. It would make war more likely. Aggressors attack because they think they are going to win, and they are more likely to attack the weak than they are to attack the strong.

The springs of war lie not in arms races, real or imaginary, but in the readiness to use force or threaten force against other nations. Remember what Bismarck said: "Do I want war? Of course not. I want victory". The causes of wars in the past have not changed, as we know to our cost. But because Russia and the West know that there can be no victory in nuclear war, for 37 years we have kept the peace in Europe, and that is no mean achievement.

That is why we need nuclear weapons, because having them makes peace more secure.

A strong and united Western Alliance is a guarantee of our peace and security. It is also a beacon of hope to the oppressed people of the Soviet bloc. Britain is a reliable ally, and will always remain so, reliable in NATO, reliable beyond NATO, an ally and a friend to be trusted.

U.K.

COVERING UK CONFIDENTIAL



FROM THE AMBASSADOR

BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: 202, 462-1340

26 October 1982

The Honorable
William P Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington DC 20500

Des . sono Cram,

I enclose two letters from the Prime Minister to President Reagan which I have been asked to pass to you for onward transmission.

1 12

Oliver Wright

COVERING UK CONFIDENTIAL

7680%



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 October 1982

hear von.

Thank you very much for your letter about Don Rumsfeld's visit to discuss the Law of the Sea Convention. I shall, of course, be delighted to see him. Arrangements are being made through the usual channels.

Levery food with.

The President of the United States of America

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-055 # 26893

NLS VAPA DATE 1/28/087





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 October 1982

Than Ron.

Thank you both very much for remembering my birthday. I am extremely grateful to you for this kind thought.

With all best wishes.

Layanes

The President of the United States of America

7489



IO DOWNING STREET

16 October 1982

THE PRIME MINISTER

han Ron

Thank you both very much for remembering my birthday. I am extremely grateful to you for this kind thought.

with all best wishes.

tomore . Oayane

The President of the United States of America

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2

LONDON 3744 ANØØ2322

DTG: Ø11819Z NOV 82 PSN: Ø43312 TOR: 3Ø5/1910Z PSN: HCEØ34 TOR: 3Ø5/191ØZ

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S E CR E T LONDON 23744

EXDIS E. O. 12356: DECL: 11/1/12

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, UK, US

SUBJECT: BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN LEBANESE PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS REF: (A) STATE 306087, (B) STATE 304454, (C) STATE 304322, (D) LONDON 23404

- 1. S ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. SUMMARY: THE BRITISH WILL BE RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE A BATTALION-SIZE FORCE TO THE MNF, UNLESS WE PERSUADE THATCHER TO PARTICIPATE. THERE FOLLOW SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE AND THE LEBANESE CAN PUT OUR BEST CASE FORWARD. END SUMMARY.
- 3. WE BELIEVE HMG CAN BE PERSUADED TO HELP TRAIN LEBANESE ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL BUT WILL BE RELUCTANT TO COMMIT A BATTALION-SIZE FORCE TO THE MNF. OUR SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT THE FCO THINKS BRITAIN UNQUESTIONABLY SHOULD JOIN THE MNF; THAT THE MOD IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY ADDITIONAL UK SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN THE POST-FALKLANDS PERIOD; THAT THE TREASURY WILL ARGUE AGAINST PARTICIPATION ON GROUNDS THAT BRITAIN CANNOT AFFORE IT; AND THAT THATCHER HAS HARDENED AGAINST FURTHER MILITARY COMMITMENTS ABROAD. THESE RESERVATIONS WERE PROBABLY REFLECTED IN DOUGLAS HURD'S EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS REMARKS IN WASHINGTON (REF C), WHICH DIFFERED FROM HIS COMMENT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO ON BRITISH TELEVISION THAT BRITAIN WOULD CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY A REQUEST TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO LEBANON (LONDON 20947) AND PYM'S FAVORABLE VIEWS IN COPENHAGEN ABOUT PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE IN LEBANON (LONDON 20478).
- 4. OUR SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT THATCHER HERSELF MUST BE CONVINCED THAT BRITAIN SHOULD JOIN THE MNF BEFORE HMG WILL BUDGE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR WASHINGTON TO PURSUE THE ISSUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF HMG IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE REQUEST, AND TO KEEP IN MIND THAT A DIRECT APPROACH TO THATCHER FROM PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND GEMAYEL ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE PERSUASIVE ON AN ISSUE WHERE POSITIONS HERE HAVE ALREADY HARDENED THAN MESSAGES PASSED UP BY PYM. CHANCES OF SUCCESS WOULD BE ENHANCED IF WE CUT BY HALF THE SIZE OF THE UK TROOP REQUEST AND/OR SHORTEN THE DURATION OF COMMITMENT TO THREE-SIX MONTHS.

DECLASSIFIED

NARA, DATE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 LONDON 3744

DTG: Ø11819Z NOV 82 PSN: Ø43312

- 5. FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS COULD BE USEFULLY WORKED INTO U. S. /LEBANESE APPROACHES:
- -- STRICT REASSURANCES SHOULD BE CONVEYED THAT BRITAIN WILL NOT BE AGREEING TO AN OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT. THE BRITISH SHOULD BE TOLD EXPLICITLY THAT THEIR MNF CONTINGENT WILL BE WITHDRAWN NO LATER THAN A DATE CERTAIN REGARDLESS OF PROGRESS MADE IN EXPANDING THE CAPABILITIES AND SIZE OF THE LAF.
- -- MESSAGES TO THATCHER SHOULD REMIND HER OF LEBANON'S SUFFERING, STRESS LEBANESE DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE SELF-RELIANCE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, INDICATE RESPECT FOR BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBLE AND ACTIVE ROLE IN EFFORTS TO SECURE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE ARE AWARE OF BRITAIN'S THINLY STRETCHED MILITARY RESOURCES. LOUIS

NODIS

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø4 SECSTATE WASHDC 64Ø9 DTG: Ø12ØØ6Z NOV 82 PSN: Ø43499

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WHSR COMMENT: FYI

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 3210

INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 7007 -USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3594

S E C R E T STATE 306409

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: FA, UNGA, UK, AR SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT ON UNGA FALKLANDS RESOLUTION

- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER TODAY, NOVEMBER 1, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:



SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 6409 DTG: 012006Z NOV 82 PSN: 043499

I HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE ISSUES RAISED BY YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 25. I UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE TO YOU OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS. AND APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERNS.

WHEN WE WERE FIRST APPROACHED BY THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTA-TIVES ON THEIR PROPOSED RESOLUTION, WE MADE VERY CLEAR OUR OBJECTION TO MUCH OF ITS CONTENT. THEY WERE THE SAME OBJECTIONS WHICH YOUR LETTER IDENTIFIES. WE EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY RESOLUTION WHICH

PREJUDGED THE QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY OR THE OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATION. WE FURTHER STRESSED THAT WE COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION WITH UNREALISTIC DEADLINES ON NEGOTIATIONS OR OTHER PROCESSES OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

ARGENTINA. HOWEVER, NOW PROPOSES TO DELETE REFERENCES TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT'S COMMUNIQUES WHICH SPECIFICALLY PREJUDGE THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, TO REAFFIRM EXPRESS-LY PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER CONCERNING NON-USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND TO MAKE OTHER CHANGES WHICH MAKE THE RESOLUTION MORE MODERATE. WHILE THE REVISED VERSION SUGGESTS NEGOTIATIONS AT AN EARLIER RATHER THAN LATER DATE, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE A STRICT DEADLINE. WE CONCLUDE THAT THE RESOLUTION IN ITS REVISED FORM DOES NOT LEGALLY PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF EITHER PARTY IN THE DISPUTE.

THE UNITED KINGDOM IS JUSTIFIABLY CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO THE RECENT HOSTILITIES OR TO SELF-DETER-MINATION IN THE RESOLUTION. THE MOST RECENT REVISIONS TO THE DRAFT EXPRESSLY REFER TO THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES NOT TO RENEW THEM. COUPLED WITH REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. THE UNITED STATES ASSUMES THAT ANY NEGTIATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 6409 DTG: 012006Z NOV 82 PSN: 043499

UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA WOULD NECESSARILY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS. THE REFER-ENCE TO RESOLUTION 1514 OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNDER-SCORES THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE REVISED DRAFT NOW EXPRESSLY REFERS TO THE NECESSITY OF TAKING THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS INTO ACCOUNT.

OUR SUPPORT FOR YOUR POSITION DURING THE HOSTILITIES WAS BASED ON OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT DISPUTES BETWEEN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. WE CONTINUE TO HOLD THAT BELIEF AND SUPPORT YOUR POSITION THAT ANY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE CONTEXT OF ALL RELEVANT ELEMENTS OF THE UN CHARTER. WE-DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESOLUTION, AS CURRENTLY WRITTEN, PREJUDICES THAT POSITION AND CONSIDER THAT IT IS MODERATELY POSITIVE IN REAFFIRMING THE FUNDA-MENTAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE CHARTER CONCERNING THE NON-USE OF FORCE. FOR THESE REASONS WE BELIEVE IT REASONABLE NOW TO VOTE FOR THE SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED RESOLUTION.

WE UNDERSTAND YOUR RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS

WHEN LOSS OF LIFE REMAINS FRESH IN EVERYONE'S MIND; WE CAN APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE FOR A COOLING OFF PERIOD AND MORE CONCRETE EVIDENCE FROM ARGENTINA THAT IT WILL NOT RESORT AGAIN TO FURTHER USE OF FORCE. NEVERTHELESS. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE OPTIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS OR OTHER MEANS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT NOT BE FORECLOSED, PARTICU-LARLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGEN-TINA NOW SUGGESTING NEGOTIATIONS IS A DIFFERENT ONE FROM THE ONE WHICH LAUNCHED THE AGGRESSION.

MARGARET, I KNOW HOW YOU HAVE ANGUISHED OVER THIS CONFLICT FROM THE BEGINNING. YOUR COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP THROUGH-OUT HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF DEEP PERSONAL INSPIRATION TO ME.

COPART

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SEGREI

PAGE Ø4 OF Ø4 SECSTATE WASHDC 6409 DTG: Ø12006Z NOV 82 PSN: Ø43499

I COUNT IT AS A PRIVILEGE TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SUPPORT YOU AND BRITAIN AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT. YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT THAT - I WOULD DO IT ALL AGAIN THE SAME WAY.

SINCERELY, /S/ RON. END TEXT. SHULTZ BT