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FOIA

F01-055

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
26886	CABLE	#030033Z AUG 82 <i>R</i> 1/28/2008 <i>F01-055</i>	2	8/3/1982	B1
26887	CABLE	#091846Z AUG 82 - LETTER - REAGAN TO THATCHER <i>R</i> 1/28/2008 <i>F01-055</i>	3	8/9/1982	B1
26888	CABLE	#171736Z AUG 82 <i>R</i> 1/28/2008 <i>F01-055</i>	2	8/17/1982	B1
26889	REPORT	PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S VISIT TO CHINA...WITH MAP <i>D</i> 1/9/2007 <i>F01-055; UPHELD 3/18/2011 M09-299 #26889</i>	9	9/20/1982	B1 B3
26890	CABLE	#010835Z OCT 82 - LETTER - THATCHER TO REAGAN <i>R</i> 10/19/2011 <i>F2001-055/1</i>	2	10/1/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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26886

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

File: U/K

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5015 DTG: 030033Z AUG 82 PSN: 029952
EOB517 AN009559 TOR: 215/0241Z CSN: HCE230

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 215015

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XF, LE, IZ, IR
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S JULY 29 MEETING WITH FRANCIS
PYM: THE MIDDLE EAST

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY AND BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCIS PYM, JULY 29, DISCUSSED EFFORTS TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN LEBANON, THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED PYM ON THE PROGRESS OF THE HABIB NEGOTIATIONS. PYM MADE A STRONG APPEAL FOR GREATER US CONSIDERATION OF THE PALESTINIAN NEED FOR A HOMETLAND. END SUMMARY.
3. DURING-A 2-HOUR PLUS DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, THE SECRETARY AND BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCIS PYM DISCUSSED THE DIFFICULTY OF ENDING THE LEBANON CRISIS. PYM SAID THAT FROM THE UK PERSPECTIVE, THE BIGGEST ROADBLOCK WAS THE ABSENCE OF A PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE PALESTINIANS TO FULFILL THEIR LEGITIMATE DESIRES FOR A HOMETLAND, AND THEREFORE, HMG SAW NO INCENTIVE FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO DEPART FROM LEBANON.
4. PYM CHARGED THAT THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE ON THE WEST BANK WAS THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM, AND IT PUT THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE FURTHER OFF. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT DURING HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS HE HAD SAID LOUD AND CLEAR THAT THE MESSAGE OF LEBANON WAS THAT WE NEEDED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THE CONFLICT. THAT MEANT FACING UP TO THE JUST CLAIMS OF THE PALESTINIANS. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS EVEN IN ISRAEL TODAY THERE IS A FEELING THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION CAN NOT GO ON AND THAT LONGER TERM SOLUTIONS MUST BE LOOKED TO. PYM SAID IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS CONVERSATION WITH KING HUSSEIN

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5015 DTG: 030033Z AUG 82 PSN: 029952

THAT JORDAN WAS FEARFUL THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT ATTACK THEM, AND THIS IS ONE REASON THEY ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR A SUMMIT OF ARAB MODERATES.

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES REMARKED THAT ON THE ISSUE OF THE PLO LEAVING LEBANON AMBASSADOR HABIB APPEARED TO BE MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. HOWEVER, HE UNFORTUNATELY MUST SPEND PART OF HIS TIME JUST TURNING OFF THE SHELLING. AMBASSADOR HABIB IS AT PRESENT UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND MOD SHARON TO PRODUCE A BREAKTHROUGH IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO AND THE OTHER ARABS. VELIOTES REMARKED THAT STILL REMAINING IS THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF ANY MULTINATIONAL FORCE, WHERE THE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW TO, THE KINDS OF FORCES LEFT IN THE SOUTH OF LEBANON, AND HOW TO GUARD AGAINST ACTS OF RETRIBUTION AIMED AT THOSE LEFT BEHIND. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT NO ONE WANTS THE PLO IN THEIR COUNTRY AND THAT THIS HAS WORKED TO "DE-LEGITIMIZE" THE PLO. VELIOTES ADDED THAT SOME OF THE OTHER ARABS APPEARED TO WANT TO EXTRACT POLITICAL BENEFITS FROM A PLO WITHDRAWAL WITH THE NET RESULT OF DELAYING THE PROCESS, EVEN THOUGH THE PLO ITSELF APPEARS WILLING TO LEAVE.

6. ON THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, PYM SAID THE UK BELIEVES THAT THE IRAQIS WILL FIGHT MUCH HARDER ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY. THE SECRETARY AGREED, ADDING THAT THE IRANIANS HAD NOT BEEN ABLE SIGNIFICANTLY TO BREAK THROUGH THE IRAQI LINES AND THAT A KIND OF MILITARY STALEMATE EXISTED. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS SOME DANGER THAT IF THE STALEMATE CONTINUES, THE IRANIANS MAY TURN ELSEWHERE WITH THEIR FORCES. PYM IMPLIED THAT THE UK BELIEVED THIS UNLIKELY SINCE THE GOAL OF TEHRAN IS TO DEFEAT THE IRAQIS. THE SECRETARY AND PYM BOTH AGREED THAT AT SOME POINT WE NEED TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH THE IRANIANS.

7. ALSO PRESENT ON THE UK SIDE WERE UK AMBASSADOR HENDERSON, DCM DEREK THOMAS AND UK EMBOFF ALAN GOULTY. ALSO ON THE US SIDE WERE UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT AND EUR/NE KEITH SMITH. SHULTZ
BT

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26887

OUTGOING

DR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 5384 DTG: 091846Z AUG 82 PSN: 039084
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FILE:UIC

OP IMMED
DE WTE #5384 2211906
O 091846Z AUG 82
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH05384

DEAR MARGARET:

I MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR JULY 30 LETTER ON THE SUBJECT OF JOHN BROWN ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH YOU HAVE PLACED OUR DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE SANCTIONS ISSUE. I AM IN THOROUGH AGREEMENT WITH YOU THAT ON THE BROADER SECURITY CONCERNS POSED BY SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND THE CRISIS IN POLAND WE THINK ALIKE. IN CASES WHERE WE DO DISAGREE, I BELIEVE THAT YOUR LETTER EXEMPLIFIES THE TONE AND SPIRIT WHICH OUGHT TO GUIDE U. S. -U. K. RELATIONS.

LET ME ADD HOW MUCH I ALSO APPRECIATED YOUR JULY 29 LETTER AND THE INFORMATION YOU SHARED WITH ME ON YOUR TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN. THESE VIEWS PROVIDED TIMELY BACKGROUND FOR MY OWN MEETING LAST WEEK WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI, AND WITH HIS ISRAELI COUNTERPART, FOREIGN MINISTER YITZCHAK SHAMIR, ON MONDAY.

THE TALKS WITH ALI WERE USEFUL, ALTHOUGH THE EGYPTIANS HAVE HARDENED THEIR POSITION TOWARD ACCEPTING PLO FIGHTERS. ALI'S PRESENTATION WAS SIMILAR TO HIS EXCHANGE WITH FRANCIS

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NLS F01-055 #26887
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 1/28/08

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 5384 DTG: 091846Z AUG 82 PSN: 039084

PYM, AS HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO SEIZE THIS MOMENT TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS-ASPECTS. WHILE MUCH OF THE U.S. AND EGYPTIAN THINKING ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS CONGRUENT, WE DO DISAGREE WITH ALI'S VIEW THAT THE SOLUTION TO WEST BEIRUT SHOULD BE EXPLICITLY LINKED TO THE BROADER PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

AS FOR THE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, I MADE CLEAR TO HIM HOW STRONGLY WE FEEL ABOUT THE DISPROPORTIONATE AND INDISCRIMINATE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON WEST BEIRUT. I ALSO EMPHASIZED OUR OPPOSITION TO ISRAELI PRESSURE TACTICS INVOLVING THE CUT-OFF OF FOOD, WATER, ELECTRICITY AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. SHAMIR REITERATED THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT SUCH TACTICS WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENSURE PLO WITHDRAWAL. I RESPONDED THAT SUCH ACTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONTINUING LEVELS OF EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE, WERE MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PHIL HABIB TO EXTRACT THE PLO BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS AND THAT THIS COULD HAVE THE GRAVEST POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR OWN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

CLEARLY THE ROAD AHEAD REMAINS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER, BUT I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO WORKING AS HARD AS WE CAN TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES, AND A RETURN TO CONDITIONS WHICH WILL PERMIT THE LEBANESE TO FUNCTION AS AN INDEPENDENT PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT.

SINCERELY,

RON

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
MARGARET THATCHER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON
0464

~~SECRET~~

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THE WHITE HOUSE 5384

DTG: 091846Z AUG 82

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26888

FILE:UIC

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PAGE 01 OF 02
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~~S E C R E T~~ LONDON 18181

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, FA, UK, AR, US, UN
SUBJECT: FALKLANDS: U.K. REACTION TO ARGENTINE PROPOSALS
- ON NEW NEGOTIATIONS
REF: SANTO DOMINGO 5572

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN COMMENTING ON LATEST ARGENTINE PROPOSALS FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES, INCLUDING SUPPORT BEING GIVEN BY 19 LATIN GOVERNMENTS, FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR JULIAN BULLARD TOLD ME AUGUST 17 THAT THE BRITISH INTEND TO STONEWALL IN NEW YORK.
3. BULLARD SAID THAT, AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN THE U.K. GOVERNMENT, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THATCHER IS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED, AND THERE IS NO SUPPORT WITHIN THE TORY PARTY, OR INDEED IN THE OPPOSITION, FOR FRESH TALKS.
4. I TOLD BULLARD THAT, THOUGH I WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, I BELIEVED THAT THE BRITISH MIGHT BE TAKING AN UNNECESSARILY STIFF POSITION, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS SUCH WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR NEW TALKS. BULLARD AGREED THAT EVEN THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE CLAMORING FOR TALKS, BUT, HE SAID, "THEY ARE JUST NOT GOING TO HAPPEN." CONTINUING, I NOTED THAT EVEN IF THE UK WERE TO AGREE TO TALKS, THEIR POSITION WOULD BE PROTECTED BY THEIR CLEAR, ON-THE-RECORD STATEMENT THAT THE VIEWS OF THE ISLANDERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. BULLARD, HOWEVER, SAID THAT IT WAS THE READING OF SENIOR U. K. POLITICIANS THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U. K. WOULD SIMPLY NOT SUPPORT TALKS SOON.
5. IN CONCLUDING OUR DISCUSSION OF THE FALKLANDS, I TOLD BULLARD THAT THE BRITISH OUGHT SOON TO MAKE CLEAR PUBLICLY THEIR ATTITUDE ABOUT RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THE RATIONALE FOR THEIR RELUCTANCE TO EMBARK UPON THEM. ALSO, I TOLD HIM THAT THE U. S. AND BRITAIN'S OTHER ALLIES NEEDED A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT ON THE BRITISH POSITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE IN ANTICIPATION OF HEAVY PRESSURES FOR FURTHER ACTION IN THE UN.

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BY 101 NARA, DATE 1/28/08

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 8181

DTG: 171736Z AUG 82 PSN: 049524

6. COMMENT: WE NEED SOONEST U. S. VIEWS RE EMERGING UNGA RESOLUTION TO SUPPLEMENT THOSE JUST RECEIVED IN SANTO DOMINGO 5572. MEANWHILE, IN DEPARTMENT'S TACTICAL PLANNING ON HANDLING OF RESOLUTION, WE HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AS UNGA RELATED NEGOTIATIONS HEAT UP. ALSO DEPARTMENT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT U. K. ATTITUDES ON LIFTING OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WILL BE AFFECTED BY DEVELOPMENTS ON UNGA RESOLUTION, WHICH MAY INDEED AFFORD SOME BARGAINING LEVERAGE ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE.
STREATOR
BT

EXDIS

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~~SECRET~~

FILE:UK

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: KATHY PLOWMAN, USIA
FROM: MORT ALLIN *MA*
SUBJECT: British Interview Requests
REFERENCE: Your Memo of 8/20 to Michael Wheeler

Please advise USIA London that the President will be unable to accept the interview requests from Thames Television or Kenneth Harris of the Observer at this time. We agree that the Observer request is an excellent opportunity with a highly respected interviewer in a well-considered format. We will keep it under serious consideration for a later date, perhaps, as suggested, to mark the second anniversary of the President's term in office. But that is only a possibility and should not be raised with Harris except in the most tentative way. If his interest remains, we suggest that USIA London renew its request in mid-November.

Please also express White House appreciation to USIA London for continuing assistance in thoughtfully evaluating British media requests.

cc: Mike Wheeler
Dennis Blair ✓
Bob Sims
Dave Gergen

**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director



August 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary
National Security Council

FROM : Kathy Plowman
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director

SUBJECT : Possible British TV Interview with
the President

This is in response to your August 12 memorandum concerning a possible British TV interview with the President. London's Thames Television is a commercial station and is not a member of any network. Since it is also not a news channel, there is a question about how Thames would use a Presidential interview.

On August 16, USICA London forwarded another request for a presidential interview to us on behalf of the London Observer's Kenneth Harris. An earlier request by Harris was turned down because of the President's European trip this summer. Harris did interview the President about the time of his election, and this received worldwide dissemination.

Our Embassy urges serious consideration of the Harris request and gives the Observer priority over Thames Television. I have attached copies of cables from our post in London.

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INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION AGENCY

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

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16/1702Z #8036

ACTION OFFICE EU-03
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 PGMF-01 PFW-01 DIS-01 /009 AS 4

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC 1614
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
BT
UNCLAS LONDON 18036

USICA

USICA FOR (A) EU BALDYGA; (B) PGM/FW; WHITE HOUSE FOR
SPEAKES AND ALLIN

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PRESIDENT INTERVIEW BY THE
OBSERVER

REF: LONDON 11280

1. OBSERVER'S EDITOR HAS AGAIN REQUESTED AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BE CONDUCTED BY KENNETH HARRIS. FYI: OBSERVER'S ORIGINAL REQUEST IN MAY (SEE REFTEL) WAS REJECTED BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT'S TIGHT EUROPEAN SCHEDULE.
2. POST URGES THAT SERIOUS AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION NOW BE GIVEN TO REQUEST.
3. KENNETH HARRIS INTERVIEWED THE PRESIDENT AT THE TIME OF HIS ELECTION. THE RESULTANT ARTICLE WAS REPRODUCED WORLDWIDE VIA THE OBSERVER'S SYNDICATION SERVICE. HARRIS IS ONE OF THE UK'S FOREMOST AND MOST HIGHLY REGARDED WRITERS. HE IS CHAIRMAN OF OUTRAM, CHAIRMAN OF OBSERVER INTERNATIONAL AND A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF OBSERVER NEWSPAPERS. HE INTERVIEWS ONLY RARELY, AND THEN ONLY THE MOST SENIOR STATESMEN AND POLITICIANS. NO OTHER UK PUBLICATION HAS AN EXACT COUNTERPART TO THE HARRIS INTERVIEWS.
4. ONLY IN THE CASE OF THE HARRIS INTERVIEWS DOES THE OBSERVER AGREE TO GIVE THE SUBJECT A UNIQUE DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER WHAT APPEARS, AND EVEN OVER WHETHER THE INTERVIEW APPEARS AT ALL. THE INTERVIEWEE IS SENT THE FIRST DRAFT, AT WHICH POINT HE IS FREE TO ALTER, AMPLIFY, DELETE OR EVEN SCRAP THE WHOLE INTERVIEW. THE WHOLE OPERATION IS CONDUCTED IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE INTERVIEWEE GIVES PERMISSION TO PRINT. QUESTIONS ARE SUPPLIED IN ADVANCE AND THE INTERVIEWEE IS INVITED TO SUGGEST TOPICS HE MIGHT WISH TO RAISE. TOPICS HE WOULD RATHER NOT DISCUSS ARE NOT RAISED.
4. THE OBSERVER IS WILLING TO PUBLISH AN ARTICLE AT ANY TIME, BUT APPRECIATE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE MIGHT BE FREER AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. IN WHICH CASE, THEY SUGGEST AN INTERVIEW WHICH COULD MARK THE BEGINNING OF HIS THIRD YEAR OF OFFICE.
5. POST STRONGLY SUPPORTS THIS PROJECT. UNDER THE CONTROLLED CONDITIONS DESCRIBED, WE REGARD IT AS AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO HELP RESOLVE SOME CURRENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

6. PLEASE ADVISE IF, IN PRINCIPLE, THE PRESIDENT AGREES AND IF SO, ADVISE ON TIMING SO THAT HARRIS AND OBSERVER CAN START TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. SNOW
BT

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

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ACTION OFFICE EU-03
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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1634
BT
UNCLAS LONDON 18334

USICA

ATTN: EU FOR GILDEA

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: THAMES TV AND OBSERVER REQUESTS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW

REF: SNOW/GILDEA TELCON 8/18

1. THAMES TV MAIN NETWORKED CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAM,
'TV EYE' CONFIRM THAT THEY HAVE REQUESTED AN INTERVIEW
WITH THE PRESIDENT.

2. OF THE THAMES AND OBSERVER REQUESTS CURRENTLY
PENDING, POST RECOMMENDS THAT PRIORITY BE GIVEN TO THE
OBSERVER REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW TO BE CONDUCTED BY
KENNETH HARRIS. SNOW

BT

*8334

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7. PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS

AMB. OLIVER WRIGHT

UNITED KINGDOM

PARTICIPANTS: FAMILY - LADY WRIGHT
WH - WILLIAM P. CLARK/
- CHARLES P. TYSON
NSC - DENNIS C. BLAIR
STATE - ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
ESCORT - RICHARD GODKIN

-- CAREER DIPLOMAT
-- WAS AMBASSADOR TO DENMARK, FRG
-- HAS SERVED IN NEW YORK WITH U.N. MISSION

o APPRECIATION FOR BRITISH SUPPORT FOR MIDEAST
INITIATIVES

AMBASSADOR WRIGHT

o VALUE OF US-UK SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
o CONFIDENCE THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL WORK OUT
DIFFERENCES ON PIPELINE SANCTIONS AND
STEEL ISSUES

FILE: UK

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 14, 1982

At the invitation of President Reagan, the Queen of England and the Duke of Edinburgh will pay an official visit to the United States of America February 26 to March 7, 1983.

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Revised!
[Signature]

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

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DLB 7/14/2006

File Folder

UNITED KINGDOM - 1982 (08/01/1982-10/03/1982)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
26889	REPORT PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S VISIT TO CHINA...	8	9/20/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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6849
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

1 October 1982

The Honorable
William P Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security
The White House
WASHINGTON DC

WPC HAS SEEN

James Pym

I believe you will be interested to see the enclosed text of the speech by my Foreign Secretary, Mr Francis Pym, to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on 27 September.

Mr Pym's subject was East-West relations. Mr Pym suggests that one of the lessons of the current trans-Atlantic differences over the Siberian pipeline should be the need to work together in establishing a common policy in the field of East-West economic relations.

I should also draw attention to Mr Pym's comments (on page 5 of the text) on the European contribution to the Alliance; and his determination that the Allies remain united in defence of our common values.

Oliver Wright

Oliver Wright



BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES

September 27, 1982

POLICY STATEMENTS

39/82

"EAST-WEST RELATIONS"

THE SPEECH BY MR. FRANCIS PYM,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS,

TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

AT THE WALDORF-ASTORIA

NEW YORK

SEPTEMBER 27, 1982

845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10022, Telephone: (212) 752-8400

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"I am grateful to the Foreign Policy Association for giving me the opportunity to address this distinguished audience. The value of an occasion of this kind is that it is a two-way street: I have come to speak but I have also come to listen, and I hope that when you have heard my views you will use the question session to put forward yours. The better the transatlantic dialogue the better we shall understand one another and the stronger the Alliance will be. So let us exchange ideas with candor and honesty.

"I would like to describe some of the factors which affect the way we in Western Europe look at East-West relations -- factors which are not perhaps always fully understood in the United States. It may be particularly appropriate to attempt this at a moment when the transatlantic debate over the gas pipeline has shown that there can be significant differences of perception between the Allies about the management of East-West relations.

"The pipeline problem has raised difficult issues. As you know, we firmly believe that existing contracts should be fulfilled, and that major decisions affecting us all should not be taken without effective consultation. American measures have caused painful strains within the Alliance because the basis for them, and the purpose of them, are themselves contentious and debatable.

"Those European countries which have decided, having weighed the alternatives, to buy Soviet gas will go ahead. They have considered carefully the argument that the Russians, by

/manipulating ...

manipulating or threatening to manipulate the supply of gas, will be able to influence their policies. But they point out that their degree of dependence on Soviet gas will be too small to provide a basis for blackmail; that satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet an emergency; and that the first suggestion of a threat to supply would irreparably damage Soviet credibility as a dependable trading partner, something which the Russians well know that they cannot afford to do. They point, too, to the shared interest of all energy consumers in encouraging the development of new hydro-carbon resources in the world.

But have done in the past!

"These are just some of the arguments which cause the pipeline to be an uncomfortable problem in relations between the United States and its European allies. We have got to resolve it, and for my part I am doing all I can to that end. And I shall also try to ensure that all of us in the Western Alliance draw the right general conclusion from this particular difficulty: the lesson is surely that we must work together and agree a common policy in the field of East-West economic relations. This task may not be easy but it has to be achieved.

The lesson is it is tough to change the direction of E-W economic relations

"I want to make it clear that the differences that exist today must not be exaggerated. Speculation about the viability of the Alliance is utterly misconceived and reveals a serious misunderstanding of what the Alliance is all about.

"There have always been differences among its members. But one of the greatest advantages of the Alliance is the pooling of different perceptions, the debate that flows from a variety of ideas. Awkward though it can be, diversity is inevitably and

/rightly ...

rightly one of the distinguishing characteristics of a free association of sovereign nations, and one of its greatest assets. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO does not function on the basis of a subservient conformity: as Al Haig said, it is not a 'lock-step' organization. On the contrary, it is a democratic organization in which all views count equally.

"It is one of our greatest strengths that we can express our differences openly and debate them. As I have said, we must not exaggerate them but nor should we be afraid of exploring and explaining them. You in the United States see the Soviet Union above all as a superpower with expansionist pretensions on a global scale. As the only country strong enough to match the weight of the Soviet Union, you are engaged in a world-wide effort to contain Soviet Imperialism, and to protect and promote that diversity which the whole Free World believes to be of inestimable value.

"We see the Soviet challenge in the same terms as you do. The resources at Britain's disposal are not to be compared with yours. But our history and our continuing involvement through connections, friendships and trade in many parts of the world give us too a global perspective; and we not only understand to the full the value of your commitment, we do what we can to help -- politically, economically and on occasion militarily.

"But for us, and for our European Allies, East-West relations are only in part a matter of global politics. They are also about what happens in our own backyard -- about the day to day business of living with a huge and uncertain neighbor with

/vast ...

vast military power. The borders of Eastern Europe are no further from my office in London than Detroit is from New York.

"Of course there is nothing new in this regional consciousness. The Russia of the Czars, like its Soviet successor, was a European power with which other European powers had to coexist more or less uneasily. Nineteenth-Century European history is as much about the story of the Russian Empire as it is about the British, as much about Russian policy towards the Balkans as about the unification of the German or Italian states. If Stalin was at Yalta, Alexander I was at the Congress of Vienna. Geographical proximity and historical experience are factors which have affected the outlook of Europeans for generations in their dealings with the Russians. And these are factors which inevitably are of much less immediate consequence to the United States.

"Living next to the Russians has given us a lively appreciation of the threat which Soviet Communism poses to Western Europe. It is on our doorstep. I am well aware that in the United States there is sometimes a disposition to argue that the European Allies are insufficiently aware of the Soviet threat. Critics suggest that we do not pull our weight in Alliance terms, either because we rely too heavily on the United States to defend us or because we indulge in wishful thinking about the nature and intentions of Soviet power.

"Both attitudes can be found in Europe. But they are far from being representative. The record speaks for itself.

"As far as defense effort goes, let me quote some statistics. During the 1970s, U.S. defense spending declined on average by
/about ...

about 1 percent a year, while during the same period the Western European members of NATO increased their defense spending by about 2 percent a year. We in the U.K. are currently spending about 5 percent of GDP on defense and commit a third of the British Army to the Central Front in Germany. The European Allies maintain about 3 million men and women on active duty. If reserves are included, this figure rises to 6 million. The equivalent figures for the United States are 2 million and 3 million. Of ready forces currently available in the European theater, the West European Allies provide about 90 percent of the ground forces, 90 percent of the armored divisions, 75 percent of the air forces, and 75 percent of the tanks. Proper account must be taken of these points by those who are inclined to accuse the Europeans of not doing enough.

"As for the second charge, that the West Europeans refuse to face up to the Soviet threat and instead indulge in wishful thinking, I reply that for us in Europe the situation is much too stark, much too real, and far too near to be conjured away by any self-deception. For Europe is a continent artificially split in two by the imposition of the Communist system on its Eastern half.

"This is wholly unnatural and unjust, and if anyone had any doubts about the dislike of Europeans for a system which has proved itself incapable of promoting prosperity and happiness, events in Poland in the last two years must surely have stilled them. It has become obvious to all from the political and economic strains which have developed in Eastern Europe that dogmatic Marxist precepts are the political fossils of the

/nineteenth ...

Answer

nineteenth-century rather than the prescriptions for the twenty-first. We understand this in Western Europe; it stares us in the face. In my predecessor's memorable description: 'Poland is a man-made disaster in the heart of Europe.'

"Just as it is difficult for the rest of us in Europe to understand the depth of the psychological impact on the Germans of living in a divided country, so is it difficult for non-Europeans to understand what it is like to live in a divided continent. That is not a criticism -- merely a statement of fact. For what has happened to Germany has also happened to the whole continent of Europe. Eastern Europe is part of that whole, even though the history and experience of the last 30 years have divided it so cruelly from the mainstream.

"Europeans cannot forget how artificial and how unnatural this division is. The legacy of the Second World War has been to impose a division which does great violence to the historical, cultural, and political traditions of Europe, but no European accepts that such a legacy can be natural or permanent.

"For example how can anyone suppose that Poland, a devoutly Catholic country, whose history has been so intimately connected with the European experience, can for ever be cut off from that experience? Whatever the present constraints, no one can suppose that the Polish people can be permanently denied their right to self-determination -- their right to free choice.

"The same could equally be said about Czechoslovakia. When Tomas Masaryk, the first President of independent and democratic Czechoslovakia, gave his inaugural address in December 1918, he

-/said ...

said 'our whole history inclines us towards the democratic powers. Our renaissance is a logical link between us and the democracies of the West.' I have no doubt that these sentiments are just as true now as they were 60 years ago, on both sides of the line that divides us. And because they are true, Europeans cannot accept that this division should remain an immutable fact. We may have to be patient, as we have already been patient for the past 30 years, but all Europeans look forward to the time when, in Masaryk's words, there is another renaissance and the two halves of our continent are reunited, in keeping with their common history and cultural traditions. It is no idle dream that one day we shall welcome the East European countries back as members of the free, democratic world.

"But I am a realist. I do not pretend we can expect quick results. I have said we must be patient, just as the Poles were patient throughout the nineteenth-century when their country was removed from the map of Europe. What astonishing resilience and spirit that proud and valiant people have shown.

"But like them we shall hold fast to an idea, and like them I believe we shall eventually realize it. One thing is evident above all others after the experience of the last few years: it is our system, with its commitment to human dignity and individual liberty, which captures the human imagination, not the reflex repression of totalitarianism -- which acts like a palsy on the human spirit.

"It follows from our sense of belonging to one Europe that we wish to see better relations develop across our divided

/contient ...

more than
highly imperfect -
fundamentally
correct!

- 8 -

continent; and this in turn leads us to believe in the value of dialogue and in the value of a process such as the CSCE. Both are highly imperfect; we recognize that. Our wish for dialogue in no way blinds us to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or to the military clamp-down in Poland. Like you, we in Europe feel passionately about these issues and have made our feelings abundantly clear. Nor does our commitment to the CSCE process blind us to the violations of that agreement of which the Russians are guilty. In Europe we believe just as strongly as you do that the Russians must be held to account for those violations. But we also believe that the very fact that the Russians can be judged against criteria which they and we have all agreed is a stride forward for all of us.

So why
a CSCE?

"From what I have said, you will understand why we believe there must be links between the two halves of Europe -- political, commercial and cultural. We are convinced that as long as these exchanges and contacts are on a reciprocal basis we have nothing to lose and much to gain. Western democracy has so much more to offer people than Soviet-style Communism that the more we can break through the barriers in Eastern Europe, the likelier it is that they will eventually be dismantled altogether.

"The peoples of Eastern Europe themselves understand this very well. And the Russians know this too, just as well as we do. That is why they make such strenuous efforts to limit East-West contacts to the superficial and controllable. That is why they are so fearful of those provisions in the Helsinki Final Act which promote the free movement of people and ideas. That

.../is ...

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What misunderstanding?

is why they try to ignore them. We must not help them by turning our backs on the opportunities the CSCE process provides. I am confident of the outcome of what the Russians call 'the ideological struggle.'

"But we also need to keep the channels of communication open to avoid misunderstanding, and above all to leave the Russians in no doubt about Western concerns. This is crucial at the Super-power level but the proposition is equally valid between the two halves of Europe; Berlin is a case in point.

Some two may be in the other direction!

"We believe that a hard-headed, working relationship with our Soviet neighbor is the only effective way of ensuring stability in Europe. We also believe it is the best way of promoting the evolutionary change in the other half of our continent that we wish to see. It is a painfully slow process; indeed progress may sometimes appear imperceptible; but for those of us living in the immediate shadow of the Soviet Union it seems to offer the hope of breaking down the barriers that now divide West from East.

"We shall surrender nothing of value in pursuing our goal. What I have outlined is not some casuistical justification for a new neutralism. Far from it. Our aim is to restore to all Europeans the freedom of choice, the liberty and dignity that so many of them are now denied. And while we pursue this aim, Western Europe is, as I have said, determined to maintain its defenses and to safe-guard its values in close alliance with the United States.

"Your aims and ours are the same. We both want a world in which liberty can flourish, free of the dead hand of militaristic Marxism. We are both dedicated to work together to that end. But

/we ...

we must not be disconcerted if from time to time, for the geographical, historical and psychological reasons on which I have touched, our perceptions differ about how best to achieve it. It is our acceptance of different points of view which marks us out as free nations; and it is our ability to respect those differences when we cannot immediately reconcile them which marks out the Atlantic Alliance as the most successful in history.

"And the reason for the success of our Alliance is not far to seek, for its inspiration is drawn from the values of our civilization: tolerance, human dignity and individual freedom. In our commitment to those values, we are a beacon for the millions who aspire to share them. We must and shall keep faith with the hopes they place in us."

E N D

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TO WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON D. C.

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PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
DEAR RON

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 28TH SEPTEMBER AND FOR
YOUR INVITATION TO ATTEND THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM 10TH TO 12TH JUNE NEXT YEAR.

2. AS IT HAPPENS, I AM AFRAID THAT THOSE DATES WOULD BE VERY
DIFFICULT FOR ME. BUT THERE IS ANOTHER POINT WHICH I SHOULD
LIKE TO PUT TO YOU. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE JUST COME BACK FROM A
VISIT TO JAPAN (AMONG OTHER PLACES). WHEN I RECEIVED
YOUR MESSAGE I WAS ON THE POINT OF WRITING TO YOU MYSELF TO RAISE
WITH YOU THE POSSIBILITY, WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH MR. SUZUKI,
OF BRINGING THE DATE OF NEXT YEARS SUMMIT FORWARD FROM JUNE
TO EARLIER IN THE YEAR. THE WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION
HAS CONSIDERABLY DETERIORATED SINCE WE MET AT VERSAILLES, AND I
WONDER WHETHER WE CAN WAIT AS LONG AS JUNE BEFORE CONSIDERING
TOGETHER HOW THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES SHOULD RESPOND TO THE
SITUATION AS IT IS NOW DEVELOPING. MR. SUZUKI WELCOMED THIS
SUGGESTION, AND TOLD ME THAT, IF THE REST OF HIS COLLEAGUES
AGREED TO THE PROPOSAL, HE WOULD SUPPORT IT.

3. AS GEORGE SHULTZ WILL HAVE TOLD YOU, THE SUBJECT OF THE NEXT
ECONOMIC SUMMIT CAME UP WHEN HE AND FRANCIS PYM MET OVER DINNER IN
NEW YORK ON 29TH SEPTEMBER WITH THEIR FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES.

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/19/11

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 CABINET OFFICE LON 0001 DTG: 010835Z OCT 82 PSN: 05501

I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS SOME SUPPORT FOR THE VIEW THAT WE MIGHT USEFULLY CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING SOMEWHAT EARLIER. THERE WOULD BE A RISK THAT THE MEDIA WOULD TRY TO BLOW THAT UP AS A CRISIS AND TO RAISE EXPECTATIONS ACCORDINGLY. I AM SURE THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THIS BY SENSIBLE BRIEFING. BUT IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO DO SO IF WE HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED A DATE IN JUNE. IF YOU COULD AVOID ANNOUNCING A DATE FOR THE TIME BEING, SO THAT THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF AN EARLIER MEETING COULD BE CONSIDERED, THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL.

4. PERHAPS THE BEST WAY OF CARRYING THIS FORWARD WOULD BE FOR THERE TO BE AN EARLY MEETING OF OUR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLIER MEETING AND THE QUESTION WHEN. IF THERE WERE TO BE SUCH A MEETING, IT MIGHT BE HELD. I HAVE NO SETTLED VIEWS ON THAT. PERHAPS THE SECOND HALF OF MARCH MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AND AN EARLY MEETING OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE ABLE TO PRODUCE RECOMMENDATIONS TO US IN A REASONABLY SHORT TIME. MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE READY TO ATTEND SUCH A MEETING IN PARIS OR WASHINGTON. OR IF YOU THOUGHT THAT THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL, I SHOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO INSTRUCT HIM TO HOST A MEETING HERE IN LONDON AS SOON AS THAT COULD BE ARRANGED.

5. IN THE MEANTIME, PERHAPS WE MIGHT SUSPEND ACTION ON THE INVITATION WHICH YOU HAVE JUST SO GENEROUSLY SENT US.

WITH WARMEST BEST WISHES.

YOURS EVER.

MARGARET.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10/1

BUD MCFARLANE,

1400

Attached is a privacy channel message to Mrs. Thatcher which Henry Nau and I worked up. I recommend that you (or I will if you wish) call Allen Wallace to clear it with him, then send it back on the privacy channel

Dennis

PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

Dear Margaret:

Thank you for your message concerning the timing of next year's economic summit. Although we announced the location of next year's meeting today, we left the timing vague. My personal representative will be in touch in coming days with your representative and the others to work out an exact date. We will be considering both simple schedule concerns and the more substantive concerns which your message raised.

Sincerely,

Ron

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TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH06772

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING THE TIMING OF NEXT YEAR'S ECONOMIC SUMMIT. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE PROBLEMS BEFORE US ARE URGENT. IT WAS WITH THIS SAME SENSE OF URGENCY, UNDERScoreD BY YOUR MESSAGE, THAT IN OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INVITATION AND VENUE TODAY, WE LEFT THE TIMING VAGUE. MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE IN TOUCH IN COMING DAYS WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVE AND THE OTHERS TO WORK OUT AN EXACT DATE. WE WILL BE CONSIDERING BOTH SIMPLE SCHEDULE CONCERNS AND THE MORE SUBSTATIVE CONCERNS WHICH YOUR MESSAGE RAISED.

SINCERELY,

RON

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By allb NARA, Date 7/13/06

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