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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:  
Head of State File: Records, 1981-1989

**Folder Title:** Italy: Prime Minister Craxi - Cables

**Box:** 17

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: HEAD OF STATE FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/22/2009

**File Folder** ITALY: PRIME MINISTER CRAXI - CABLES

**FOIA**

M08-222

**Box Number** 17

GERLINI

1

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description   | No of Pages | Doc Date   | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 62065 | CABLE    | STATE 252387<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 3           | 9/3/1983   | B1           |
| 62066 | CABLE    | STATE 254700<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 3           | 9/8/1983   | B1           |
| 62067 | CABLE    | RE BEIRUT BOMBINGS<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 2           | 10/23/1983 | B1           |
| 62068 | CABLE    | ROME 27109<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 4           | 11/10/1983 | B1           |
| 62069 | CABLE    | 141721Z NOV 83<br><b>PAR 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 2           | 11/14/1983 | B1 B3        |
| 62070 | CABLE    | STATE 012785<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 3           | 1/15/1984  | B1           |
| 62071 | CABLE    | ROME 01276<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 2           | 1/17/1984  | B1           |
| 62082 | CABLE    | RE LETTER FROM RR TO MNF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT<br><b>R 1/22/2009 NLSF96-107 #49 (DUPE)</b> | 1           | 2/3/1984   | B1           |
| 62072 | CABLE    | ROME 06407<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 3           | 3/9/1984   | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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M08-222  
**Box Number** 17 GERLINI

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description   | No of Pages | Doc Date   | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 62073 | CABLE    | ROME 06407 (SAME TEXT AS 62072)<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>                                   | 2           | 3/9/1984   | B1           |
| 62074 | CABLE    | 260148Z SEP 84<br><b>PAR 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 2           | 9/26/1984  | B1 B3        |
| 62075 | CABLE    | ROME 23992 (FIRST TWO PAGES)<br>(DUPLICATE OF PART OF 62078)<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>      | 2           | 9/27/1984  | B1           |
| 62076 | CABLE    | ROME 23992 (THIRD PAGE OF 62075)<br>(DUPLICATE OF PART OF 62078)<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 1           | 9/27/1984  | B1           |
| 62077 | CABLE    | ROME 23992 (FOURTH PAGE OF 62075)<br>(DUPLICATE OF PART OF 62078)<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b> | 1           | 9/27/1984  | B1           |
| 62078 | CABLE    | ROME 23992<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 4           | 9/27/1984  | B1           |
| 62079 | CABLE    | ROME 30585<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 7           | 12/17/1984 | B1           |
| 62080 | CABLE    | STATE 006852<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 2           | 1/9/1985   | B1           |
| 62081 | CABLE    | STATE 007313<br><b>R 1/12/2011 M222/1</b>  | 6           | 1/9/1985   | B1           |

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Ronald Reagan Library

Case:1027

Archivist: David Bridge

| DOC | TYPE   | DATE       | PAGES | CLASS. | CLOSED     |
|-----|--|------------|-------|--------|------------|
| 1   | Cable  | 09-03-1983 | 3     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 030412Z [2-4]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>   |            |       |        |            |
| 2   | Cable  | 09-08-1983 | 3     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 080000Z [5-7]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>   |            |       |        |            |
| 3   | Cable  | 10-23-1983 | 2     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: No Cable Number re: Letter from the Presidente on Beirut Bombings [8-9]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b> |            |       |        |            |

COLLECTION: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Records

SERIES: Head of State Files

TITLE: Italy: Prime Minister Craxi - Cables

OA/ID NUMBER: Box 17

BOX NUMBER: 17

Folder #: 1 of 1

### Restriction Codes

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]  
PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.  
PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.  
PRA-3 -Release would violate a Federal statute.  
PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.  
PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors.  
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C. -Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donors' deed of gift.  
PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.

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FOIA(b)(9) -Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells.

| DOC | TYPE   | DATE       | PAGES | CLASS. | CLOSED     |
|-----|--|------------|-------|--------|------------|
| 4   | Cable  | 11-10-1983 | 4     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 102016Z [10-13]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b> |            |       |        |            |
| 5   | Cable  | 11-14-1983 | 2     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 141721Z [14-15]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b> |            |       |        |            |
| 6   | Cable  | 01-15-1984 | 3     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 150257Z [16-18]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b> |            |       |        |            |
| 7   | Cable  | 01-17-1984 | 2     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 170929Z [19-20]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b> |            |       |        |            |

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| DOC | TYPE  | DATE       | PAGES | CLASS. | CLOSED     |
|-----|---|------------|-------|--------|------------|
| 8   | Cable   | 02-03-1984 | 1     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: No Cable Number re: Letter from President to MNF Heads of Government [21] |            |       |        |            |
|     | <b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>   |            |       |        |            |
| 9   | Cable   | 03-09-1984 | 3     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 091740Z [22-24]   |            |       |        |            |
|     | <b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>   |            |       |        |            |
| 10  | Cable   | 03-09-1984 | 2     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 091740Z [25-26]   |            |       |        |            |
|     | <b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>   |            |       |        |            |
| 11  | Cable   | 09-26-1984 | 2     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 260148Z [27-28]   |            |       |        |            |
|     | <b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>   |            |       |        |            |

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|-----|---|------------|-------|--------|------------|
| 12  | Cable   | 09-27-1984 | 3     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 271312Z [29-32]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>  |            |       |        |            |
| 13  | Cable   | 09-27-1984 | 4     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 271312Z [33-36]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>  |            |       |        |            |
| 14  | Cable   | 12-17-1984 | 6     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 172053Z [37-43]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b>  |            |       |        |            |
| 15  | Cable   | 01-09-1985 | 2     |        | 05-14-2003 |
|     | NSC #: WHORM Subject #:<br>To:<br>From:<br>Subject: 090535Z [44-44A]<br><b>Restriction : FOIA(b)1</b> |            |       |        |            |

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|-----|-------|------------|-------|--------|------------|
| 16  | Cable | 01-09-1985 | 6     |        | 05-14-2003 |

NSC #: WHORM Subject #:  
 To:  
 From:  
 Subject: 091826Z [45-47A]  
**Restriction : FOIA(b)1**

**COLLECTION:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Records

**SERIES:** Head of State Files

**TITLE:** Italy: Prime Minister Craxi - Cables

**OA/ID NUMBER:** Box 17

**BOX NUMBER:** 17

**Folder #:** 1 of 1

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 12/12/83//346

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE390  
OO RUEHC RUEHRO  
DE RUEHC #9139 2162046  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 041936Z AUG 83  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8960  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 219139  
E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC (CRAXI, BETTINO)

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BETTINO CRAXI

1. EMBASSY PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BETTINO CRAXI. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

2. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR ASSUMPTION OF THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC. ITALY OCCUPIES A POSITION OF SPECIAL TRUST AND RESPECT IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. YOU ASSUME LEADERSHIP OF YOUR GREAT NATION AT A TIME OF MAJOR OPPORTUNITY AND POTENTIAL ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE WEST.

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO CONSTRUCTIVE AND CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE LASTING TIES WHICH LINK OUR TWO NATIONS WILL BE STRENGTHENED FURTHER DURING YOUR LEADERSHIP OF ITALY. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT. SHULTZ

BT  
#9139  
NNNN

White House Ct  
By Shultz Date 5/14/83  
FED  
JUL 23, 1997

SENSITIVE

62065

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 531

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 12/12/83//346

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE319  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHC #2787 2460713  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 030412Z SEP 83  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 252387  
E.O. 12356. DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US,IT, NUC  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO CRAXI ON COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR  
SAFEGUARDS: S/S NO. 8326566

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PRESIDENT REAGAN ON AUGUST 19 SIGNED LETTERS TO EIGHT HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT REGARDING COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS.
3. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING CONFIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI.

BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

ON MARCH 31ST, I WROTE PRIME MINISTER FANFANI ABOUT COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS, AND I APPRECIATE HIS CONTRIBUTING HIS IDEAS TO AN EXAMINATION OF WAYS TO BUTTRESS INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS. I HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN SOME DETAIL AT WILLIAMSBURG, BUT THE AGENDA INCLUDED OTHER ISSUES, BOTH COMPLICATED AND PRESSING, THAT REQUIRED URGENT ATTENTION.

AS I INDICATED EARLIER, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE STEP TO PREVENT THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS IS A MATTER OF CRITICAL NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN THAT WE SHARE. IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD TO ADDITIONAL REGIONS, THE DELICATE BALANCE OF REGIONAL STABILITY CAN BE UPSET, THE DANGER OF CONFLICT WILL GROW, SECURITY BURDENS WILL INCREASE, AND EVEN PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WILL BE JEOPARDIZED.

UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES MANIFESTLY ARE A

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-222#62065  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 12/12/83/1346

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOURCE OF CONCERN, WHEREVER THEY MAY EXIST. EVEN WHERE THESE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT INTENDED TO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF EXPLOSIVES DEVELOPMENT, THEY INEVITABLY GENERATE SUSPICION.

FOR THIS REASON, WE MUST SEEK TO PERSUADE THE IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT HALTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A COMMON CAUSE AND THAT THEY SHOULD AGREE TO ACCEPT COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS. BUT WE NEED TO DO MORE. IT WAS THIS CONCERN WHICH LED ME TO SUGGEST AGREEMENT NOW BY THE MAJOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO REQUIRE COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF SIGNIFICANT NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLY COMMITMENTS.

AGREED NUCLEAR RULES OF TRADE, INCLUDING STRONGER SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF SUPPLY, ARE NEEDED ALSO IF WE ARE TO ENSURE THAT LEGITIMATE COMPETITION FOR NUCLEAR TRADE DOES NOT LEAD TO THE USE OF NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS AS A BARGAINING FACTOR IN PURSUIT OF SALES. THE RESULT COULD ONLY BE AN UNRAVELING OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME DAMAGING TO US ALL.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SUPPLIERS ADDS URGENCY TO THE NEED FOR NEW COOPERATIVE ACTION. WE MUST FIND THE WAY TO CONVINCE THESE COUNTRIES TO ADHERE TO SOUND NORMS FOR THEIR OWN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR COMMERCE. BUT IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, WE MUST AGREE NOW ON STRONGER SAFEGUARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRADE, AND BE PREPARED TO STAND BY THEM. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT PERSONAL PRIORITY OF MINE, JUST AS NON-PROLIFERATION IS A VITAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

OUR COUNTRIES HAVE A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TO STRENGTHEN THE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITHIN A SOUND AND EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS REGIME. I SUGGEST AN EARLY MEETING OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES AND THOSE OF THE

OTHER MAJOR SUPPLIER COUNTRIES (INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION) TO EXCHANGE IDEAS AND DEVELOP CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR ADVANCING OUR COMMON GOAL. WE AWAIT YOUR VIEWS.

.....SINCERELY,

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 12/12/83/1346

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
.....RONALD REAGAN

HIS EXCELLENCY,  
BETTINO CRAXI  
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  
OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC  
ROME. END QUOTE.

4. ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO EMBASSY.

5. IN DELIVERING PRESIDENT'S LETTER, FOLLOWING POINTS  
SHOULD BE MADE REGARDING THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF  
MAJOR SUPPLIER COUNTRIES:

-- WE WOULD ENVISAGE THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE SMALL  
AND CONFIDENTIAL, WITH NO FORMAL AGENDA.

-- ITS MAJOR PURPOSE WOULD BE TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO  
SERVE OUR SHARED NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS, INCLUDING  
ESPECIALLY DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS ON COMPREHENSIVE  
SAFEGUARDS THAT WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED TO YOU.

-- WE WOULD HOPE TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND  
DISAGREEMENT, WHILE CONSIDERING HOW A CONSENSUS COULD  
BE FORMED.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE RICHARD  
T. KENNEDY TO REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES.

-- WE PROPOSE THAT THE MEETING TAKE PLACE IN LATE  
NOVEMBER/EARLY DECEMBER, AT A SITE TO BE AGREED UPON  
LATER.

-- WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOST THIS MEETING IN THE  
U.S., OR AT ANY EUROPEAN LOCATION THAT OTHER PARTIES  
MIGHT SUGGEST.

-- WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT ITALY WILL PARTICIPATE.

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PAGE 1 - 475

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 12/12/83//346

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

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OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHC #4700 2510013  
ZNY CCCCC ZH  
O 080000Z SEP 83 ZFF5  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE OOOO  
INFO RUEHMD/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE OOOO  
BT  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 254700 TOSEC 090081  
E.O. 12358 DECL: OADR  
TAGS EAIR CA IT  
SUBJECT: KAL 7 TRAGEDY: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI

1. ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL.
2. PLEASE DELIVER LETTER IN PARAGRAPH THREE BELOW TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE KOREAN AIRLINES TRAGEDY, I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE SPECIFIC STEPS WHICH I BELIEVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THIS BARBARIC ACT BY THE SOVIET UNION WHICH TOOK THE LIVES OF 269 INNOCENT PEOPLE. I TRUST THAT YOU SHARE MY SENSE OF OUTRAGE AT THIS UTTERLY INDEFENSIBLE ACT.

IN MY ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I REPORTED ON THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH I HAD REACHED AS A RESULT OF

CONSULTATIONS WITH MY KEY ADVISERS AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. I MADE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES UNILATERALLY, SUCH AS MY DECISION TO SUSPEND ANY EXTENSION OF OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE CONTINUATION OF OUR SUSPENSION OF AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO THE UNITED STATES, OUR RESPONSE WOULD BE DEVELOPED WITH OTHER CONCERNED

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NLRR MO8-222#62060  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 12/12/83//346

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

COUNTRIES. I ALSO STRESSED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOT ONE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION BUT ONE WHICH INVOLVED THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS A WHOLE, AND THE USSR.

IN THE PERIOD SINCE WE LEARNED OF THIS AWFUL TRAGEDY, WE HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. IN THESE PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES JOIN IN A SUSPENSION OF AEROFLOT SERVICE TO THEIR COUNTRIES FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD, PERHAPS 60-90 DAYS, UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION RESPONDS TO THE CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. DURING THIS PERIOD WE SHOULD ALSO SUSPEND THE SO-CALLED "INTERLINE" ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN OUR AIRLINES AND AEROFLOT. I ALSO BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO SEEK SOVIET RECOGNITION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS EBREGIOUS ACT AND AGREEMENT TO MAKE APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS OF LIVES AND PROPERTY CAUSED BY THE SOVIET ACTION. A FULL ACCOUNTING BY THE SOVIET UNION OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO THE TRAGEDY IS ALSO ESSENTIAL, AS WELL AS COOPERATION IN FACILITATING THE SEARCH EFFORTS. FINALLY, AS FAR AS OUR GOVERNMENTS ARE CONCERNED, WE SHOULD ENHANCE OUR COMMON EFFORTS IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY ICAO, BOTH TO ENSURE FUTURE FLIGHT SAFETY AND EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO THIS BRUTAL SOVIET ACT.

THERE IS ONE OTHER AREA OF ACTIVITY UNDERWAY IN OUR COUNTRIES WHICH IS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE, NAMELY THE PRIVATE EFFORTS TO SUSPEND CIVIL AVIATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REST OF THE WORLD, UNDERTAKEN BY GROUPS SUCH AS AIRLINE PILOTS AND THOSE TRADE UNIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS WHO SERVICE AIRCRAFT IN OUR COUNTRIES. TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH OUR LAWS AND POLICIES, I BELIEVE SUCH POPULAR MANIFESTATIONS OF INDIGNATION OVER THE SOVIET ACT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

YOU WILL HAVE NOTED THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS SUSPENDING AEROFLOT FLIGHTS TO MONTREAL FOR A PERIOD OF 60 DAYS AND WAS TAKING OTHER

STEPS RESTRICTING AEROFLOT'S ACTIVITIES IN CANADA. WE ARE GRATIFIED BY THIS RESOLUTE ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, AND I HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO ADOPT ANALOGOUS MEASURES. AS FAR AS THE

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PAGE 1 - 477

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 12/12/83//346

SITUATION: PNES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, I AM ALSO ASKING OUR APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES TO SUSPEND THE INTERLINE TICKETING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN US AIRLINE COMPANIES AND AEROFLOT AND TO CLOSE THE SMALL AEROFLOT OFFICE IN THE U.S.

THE SOVIET ACTION REPRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF WE DO NOT COLLECTIVELY RESPOND IN A RESOLUTE AND CLEAR MANNER TO THIS ACTION. AT THE SAME TIME, AS I STRESSED IN MY SPEECH, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, THE START TALKS, AND OTHER FORA TO REACH BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH REDUCE THE THREAT OF WAR AND CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU AND OTHER ALLIED NATIONS TOWARDS THESE OBJECTIVES.

SINCERELY,  
/S/ RONALD REAGAN                      FOGLEBURGER  
BT  
#4700  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LWG/PM/RSA:RWGANNON:GCB  
10/23/83 EXT. 29380  
NEA:RWMURPHY

EUR:TWINDMULLER  
S/S:  
LWG:DLMACK

NEA:RHPelletreau  
NSC:  
S/S-0:

NIACT/IMMEDIATE ROME  
IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, LONDON IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, US, IT

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT ON BEIRUT BOMBINGS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. PLEASE PASS AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BETTINO:

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THE LATEST BOMBINGS IN BEIRUT HAVE ATTEMPTED ONCE MORE TO UNDERMINE OUR COLLECTIVE WILL AND SENSE OF PURPOSE AS WE WORK TO SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN ITS EFFORTS TO SECURE A MORE STABLE AND PEACEFUL FUTURE.

DESPITE OUR SORROW AT THE GREAT LOSS OF LIFE, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO OUR JOINT SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN LEBANON. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE DISSUADED BY ACTS OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED BY THOSE WHO ARE SEEKING TO PREVENT LEBANESE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND THE RESTORATION OF

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BY RW  
NLR/M8-227#62067  
NARA DATE 11/21/11  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

| 2

LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER TERRITORY AT PRESENT CONTROLLED BY FOREIGN FORCES.

OUR COMMON GOALS ARE STILL ATTAINABLE; WE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THEM IF WE STAND UNITED AND WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THE FACE OF THESE NEW PROVOCATIONS.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET TO DISCUSS MATTERS CONCERNING THE MNF. I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY SHULTZ TO CALL HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE MNF GOVERNMENTS TO SEE IF A MEETING TIME AND PLACE CAN BE ARRANGED PROMPTLY.

SINCERELY,

RON

END TEXT.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

YYY

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PAGE 1 - 37

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/07/84/1189

SITUATION: PRES MSGS

SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5712

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E.O. 12354: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PARM, PREL, IT, UR, US

SUBJECT: INF: LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER  
CRAXI

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT 1930 LOCAL TIME NOVEMBER 10 CRAXI'S ACTING DIPLOMATIC  
ADVISOR BADINI HANDED THE DCM A MESSAGE FROM CRAXI TO THE  
PRESIDENT, TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS IN EMBASSY TRANSLATION.BADINI MADE CLEAR THAT CRAXI HOPED FOR A RESPONSE FROM THE  
PRESIDENT BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE WHICH BEGINS HERE  
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 14, OR AT LEAST AN INDICATION FROMWASHINGTON THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE MAKING A NEW  
PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA. BADINI SAID THAT THE  
ITALIAN VIEW WAS THAT A NEW PROPOSAL WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY  
BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT FEAR  
A DEFEAT IN PARLIAMENT, BUT IT WANTED TO DO ALL POSSIBLE  
TO CONVINCE THE PUBLIC THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WAS JUST.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT,

I HAVE GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT IN RECENT DAYS TO THE COURSE  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR  
FORCES. I HAVE STUDIED MUCH DATA AND INFORMATION  
ON FORCE RELATIONSHIPS AND HAVE GONE OVER THE SALIENT  
PHASES WHICH PRECEDED AND FOLLOWED THE "TWO TRACK" NATO  
DECISION, I HAVE ANALYZED UNDERSTANDINGS AND PROGRAMS  
ON FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY.MY STUDY LEADS ME TO CONFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF THE  
1978 DECISION, AS IT HAS BEEN AMPLY DESCRIBED TO  
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND TO OUR PUBLIC OPINIONS.I AM ALSO CONFIRMED IN THE CONVICTION THAT IT IS OUR DUTY  
TO CONTINUE TO ASCERTAIN CAREFULLY HOW MUCH SPACE IF ANY  
WE HAVE TO REACH IN GENEVA AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE  
AGREEMENT ON INTERMEDIATE LONG-RANGE MISSILES BEFORE

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NLRR M08-222#62068

BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

SITUATION: PPES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE NATO COUNTRIES BEGIN TO START UP OPERATIONS TO RE-BALANCE FORCES.

I SHALL DESCRIBE THE ANALYTICAL PORTIONS AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF MY REFLECTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THEN TO THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT DURING THE DEBATE ALREADY FIXED FOR NOVEMBER 14-15 IN A PLENARY SESSION OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION WHICH WILL CLOSE THE DEBATE WILL NOT ENTER INTO THE MERITS OF THE DOUBLE DECISION TAKEN BY NATO IN 1979 BUT WILL CONCERN THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT TO APPLY IT.

IT IS MY DESIRE TO FURNISH YOU BRIEFLY IN ADVANCE WITH SOME ASPECTS OF MY CONCLUSIONS.

THERE EMERGES ABOVE ALL FROM MY REFLECTIONS A CONFIRMATION OF THE CLEAR WILL WHICH HAS BEEN SHOWN WITH CONSTANCY AND CONSISTENCY BY OUR COUNTRIES TO MAKE USE OF THE NEGOTIATING COMPONENT OF THE DOUBLE DECISION. THE ZERO-OPTION OFFER WHICH YOU MADE IN NOVEMBER 1981 IN CLOSE HARMONY WITH THE ALLIES FURNISHES THE CLEARST EVIDENCE OF THIS. THE RENOUNCIATION ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS OF SUCH ARMAMENTS SYSTEMS WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE, IN FACT, THE BEST AND SUREST WAY TOWARD THAT GENERALIZED PROCESS OF ARMS REDUCTIONS AND DISARMAMENT WHICH REPRESENT THE GENUINE OBJECTIVE OF FREE SOCIETIES AND THE CONFIDENT HOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE FAILURE ON THE SOVIET SIDE TO ACCEPT THE ZERO-OPTION LED US TO ADVANCE AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL BASED ON AN INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION. WE HAVE URGED, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO IT, THAT A BALANCE BE REACHED ON THE LOWEST POSSIBLE NUMBERS OF THE EQUATION OF FORCES. INDEED, THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATING APPROACH OF THE WEST GOES IN THIS DIRECTION.

THE READINESS WITH WHICH THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS SOUGHT, THE CHOICE OF THE NEGOTIATING METHOD, GRADUALIST AND PRAGMATIC, FOR FIXING GLOBAL AND VERIFIABLE ARMAMENTS LIMITS, THE EXACT DEFINITION OF THE OBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SPECIFICATION OF CRITERIA AND PRINCIPLES FOR A CREDIBLE CONTROL FOR THE ARMS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, ARE INDEED ELEMENTS WHICH SHOW THE SINCERE AND TOTAL COMMITMENT WHICH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE GIVEN IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS AND THEIR SUCCESS.

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SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

## MESSAGE:

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# E C R E T SECTION 7 OF U2 ROHE 27109

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#.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

#TAGS: MARR, PARM, PREL, IT, UR, US

#SUBJECT: INF: LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER  
 CHIRI

THIS LINE OF FLEXIBILITY, LINKED WITH THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE GUARDED THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHTS TO THEIR OWN SECURITY,

HAVE PERMITTED A LIMITED NEARING OF RESPECTIVE POSITIONS WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT, IS AT THE SAME TIME PERCEPTIBLE. THE LAST PROPOSALS

OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, ANDRPOV, ARE UNDOUBTEDLY A FURTHER EFFECT OF THE SOLIDITY AND CORRECTNESS OF OUR POSITION.

THEY CONTINUE HOWEVER TO IMPOSE ON THE NEGOTIATIONS THE DIFFICULTIES REPRESENTED BY THE WELL KNOWN

NEGATIVE PRECONDITIONS, BUT THEY DO CONTAIN ELEMENTS WORTHY OF ATTENTION AND NOT LACKING IN SIGNIFICANCE.

IN FORMULATING THESE LATEST PROPOSALS, AND IN PARTICULAR BY LOWERING THE BALANCE LEVEL FROM 162 TO 14 INTERMEDIATE LONG-RANGE MISSILES, MOSCOW HAS IMPLICITLY ADMITTED

HAVING PROCEEDED IN RECENT YEARS TO AN UNJUSTIFIED REARMAMENT, IT HAS IMPLICITLY ADMITTED HAVING RUN A STRETCH OF ARMAMENTS RACE THAT NO REAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENT MADE NECESSARY.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR TASK NOW IS TO EXPLORE AGAIN AND WITH IMMEDIACY ALL OF THE NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES, WITH THE INTENT OF AVOIDING THE FINAL FAILURE OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

OUR ACTION WILL IN ANY CASE HAVE BEEN USEFUL IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN BECAUSE IT WOULD SERVE TO MAKE CLEAR THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THOSE WHO ARE STILL REFUSING TO DO THEIR PART TOWARD AN EFFORT OF PEACE AND DETENTE. THE WORLD SITUATION WHICH WE ARE ENCOUNTERING AT THE

SITUATION: PRES #SGS

SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WORLD IS FULL OF TENSIONS; THE DANGEROUS HOTBEDS OF  
CRISES AND THE GRAVE CONFLICTS TAKING PLACE HAVE BROUGHT  
EAST-WEST RELATIONS TO A VERY WORRISOME DEGREE OF  
DETERIORATION.

IN THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION YOU, BY DECIDING TO HOLD OPEN  
THE PATH OF DIALOGUE AT GENEVA AFTER THE TRAGIC EPISODE  
OF THE SOUTH KOREAN AIR CRASH, WERE ABLE TO GIVE PROOF  
OF CLEAR VISION AND A HIGH SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

TODAY IT IS PROPER TO MAKE ANOTHER POSITIVE GESTURE  
TO RELAX THE CLIMATE OF DISTRUST AND FEAR WHICH PERVADES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS GESTURE AND THIS SORT OF  
WESTERN INITIATIVE ARE HOPED FOR AND SUPPORTED  
BY OURSELVES.

IT IS THEREFORE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO TAKE A  
COORDINATED LOOK AT THE CONCRETE CONTENT WHICH TOGETHER  
WE CAN GIVE TO THE PROPOSALS AGREED IN THE ATLANTIC  
ALLIANCE AND ANNOUNCED BY YOU IN SEPTEMBER. WHAT IS  
IMPORTANT IS THE PROMPT DEFINITION OF NUMERICAL LEVELS  
FOR THE INF LONG-RANGE GLOBAL CEILING AND FOR REDUCED  
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE. THIS INITIATIVE WILL PERMIT US  
TO CONFIRM ALSO IN THE EYES OF OUR PUBLIC OPINIONS  
THE INITIATIVE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN SO  
FAR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS GIVING TO THE  
NEGOTIATIONS NEW DYNAMISM IN THE SEARCH OF AN AGREEMENT.  
THE EXPERTS OF OUR COUNTRIES ARE ENGAGED IN THE STUDY  
OF THE MODALITIES AND THE TERMS OF A POSSIBLE QUANTIFICA-  
TION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WITH OUR POLITICAL IMPETUS,  
THE STUDY IS BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE  
GROUP WHICH HAS BEGUN ITS WORK IN ROME. I WILL MAINTAIN  
CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU, WITH FEDERAL CHANCELLOR  
KOHLE AND WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, IN THE  
HOPE THAT AFTER THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS TAKEN ON THE  
QUESTION OF ARMS REDUCTIONS WITH THE RECENT MONTEBELLO  
DECLARATION, WE CAN TOGETHER FURNISH INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC  
OPINION WITH A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF OUR READINESS  
FOR DIALOGUE AND OUR OPENNESS TO ARMS ORGANIZING IN THE  
WORLD A PACE WHICH WILL OFFER GUARANTEES TO ALL AND  
SECURITY FOR EACH ONE.

WITH BEST REGARDS, B. CRAXI.

END TEXT. RAB

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SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

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OO [REDACTED]  
DE: [REDACTED] 40445 3181721  
ZNY MNWSP  
O 141721Z NOV 83 7FF4  
FM ROME  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM  
~~TOP SECRET~~ 141721Z NOV 83 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS  
FM: MAXWELL M. RABB, AMBASSADOR, ROME 465  
TO: IMMEDIATE THE WHITE HOUSE.  
EYES ONLY PRESIDENT REAGAN

~~SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVE~~

REF: WHO 8749

1. THE MESSAGE ON POSSIBLE ACTION IN LEBANON CONTAINED IN WHITE HOUSE 140811Z NOV 83 WAS DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI AT OPENING OF BUSINESS NOVEMBER 14. AT 1500 ZULU TIME HIS ACTING DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, BADINI CONVEYED TO ME THE FOLLOWING REACTION FROM CRAXI (WHO HAS GONE TO PARLIAMENT TO REITERATE HIS GOVERNMENT'S INF POLICY):

-- THE NATURE OF THE POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION WAS NOT CLEAR BUT CRAXI BELIEVED IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO LIMIT IT, ON THE GROUND OR POLITICALLY, TO THE PERPETRATORS OF THE ATROCITY AGAINST THE U.S. MNF CONTINGENT. THIS WAS SO, IN CRAXI'S VIEW, BECAUSE SOME CIVILIAN BYSTANDERS MIGHT BE HURT AND BECAUSE ANY MILITARY ACTION, AT THIS TIME WHEN PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN LEBANON REMAINED SLIM, COULD BE SEIZED AS A PRETEXT TO WITHDRAW FROM NEGOTIATIONS AND MIGHT CONCEIVABLY TRIGGER MORE VIOLENCE.

--CRAXI FULLY UNDERSTOOD WHY THE UNITED STATES WAS CONTEMPLATING SUCH MEASURES. HOWEVER, THE MEASURES COULD AFFECT OTHER MNF PARTNERS AS WELL, WHICH ALSO DICTATED CAUTION.

--CRAXI HIMSELF HAD RECEIVED REPORTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER TERRORIST ACTS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE MNF SHOULD PAY UTMOST ATTENTION TO SELF-DEFENSE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES, AND SHOULD OF COURSE PLAN TO COUNTER-ATTACK DURING ANY TERRORIST ATTACK.

--HOWEVER, WHILE CRAXI WAS VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE HE THOUGHT THAT MILITARY ACTION AT THIS MOMENT COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE.

2. BADINI SAID THAT AS OF NOW HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE THE ONLY PERSONS IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE; HE ASSUMED CRAXI MIGHT INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)

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PAGE 1 017. DETENTION MICTM: DATE 02/07/2011 1000

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03  
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TOR: 015/1357Z

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4753  
  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3894

EXDIS

S E C R E T STATE 012785

EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US, FR  
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT ON HIS SPEECH ON  
- - - US-SOVIET RELATIONS

EXDIS

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT
2. ON JANUARY 16 AT 10:00 A.M. EST, THE PRESIDENT WILL DELIVER A MAJOR ADDRESS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. UPON RECEIPT SEPTEL OF TEXT OF SPEECH, AMBASSADOR SHOULD PROVIDE LETTER IN PARA 3 TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON JANUARY 15 OR, IF NECESSARY, OPENING OF BUSINESS MONDAY JANUARY 16. YOU SHOULD ENCLOSE TEXT OF SPEECH. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

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NLRR MD8-222#62070

BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 2785

DTG: 150257Z JAN 84 PSN: 054735

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:

- THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT SUBJECT WITH WHICH AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT DEALS THAN THE UNITED STATES' RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE WAKE OF THE KOREAN AIR LINES TRAGEDY AND MOSCOW'S UNFORTUNATE DECISION TO SUSPEND THE MAJOR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ENTERED AN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT PERIOD. FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE DECIDED TO PRESENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD A STATEMENT OF MY APPROACH TO THE U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND MY HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

- IN MY ADDRESS, WHICH I WILL DELIVER AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON JANUARY 16, I WILL REAFFIRM THE READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO PURSUE A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE POSITIVE AND STABLE LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP. I WILL AS WELL CALL UPON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A COMPARABLE AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. WHILE I WILL NOT ANNOUNCE ANY SPECIFIC NEW INITIATIVES, I WILL SET FORTH A FRAMEWORK FOR OUR FUTURE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, STRESSING MY SINCERE DESIRE TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

- BECAUSE OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND THE SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE I ATTACH TO MY SPEECH, I WANT TO SHARE THE TEXT WITH YOU BEFOREHAND. I GREATLY VALUE THE FRANK ADVICE YOU GAVE ME WHEN WE MET LAST OCTOBER AND HOPE YOU ARE PLEASED THAT I HAVE INCORPORATED INTO MY STATEMENT MANY OF THE IDEAS YOU STRESSED.

- I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT MY STATEMENT MEETS OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES BY SETTING A POSITIVE TONE BOTH FOR THE OPENING OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 2785 DTG: 150257Z JAN 84 PSN: 054735

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- WITH BEST WISHES,
- - RONALD REAGAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ROME 1276  
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TOR: 017/1158Z

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WHSR COMMENT: FYI  
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DE RUEHRO #1276 0170930  
O 170929Z JAN 84  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8092

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1642  
NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T ROME 01276

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US, IT

SUBJECT: ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S  
SPEECH ON U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: STATE 12785

1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. PRIME MINISTER CRAXI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR BADINI TELEPHONED THE CHARGE ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 17 TO SAY THAT CRAXI HAD DEEPLY APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD INFORMED BEFOREHAND OF WHAT HE WOULD BE SAYING IN HIS JANUARY 16 ADDRESS ON U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS.
3. BADINI ADDED THAT CRAXI ALSO WISHED TO CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE CONTENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

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NLRR M08-202#6207

BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ROME 1276

DTG: 170929Z JAN 84 PSN: 058876

EXDIS

CRAXI FULLY AGREED ON THE NEED TO SEND POSITIVE SIGNALS ABOUT PURSUING THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS. IT SEEMED PARTICULARLY WISE TO DO SO ON THE OCCASION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THERE WAS A NEED TO DISPEL MISGIVINGS ON THE OTHER SIDE, AND TO MAKE CLEAR THE WESTERN WILL TO NEGOTIATE, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT MAKING UNJUSTIFIED CONCESSIONS.

EXDIS

4. AS WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY IN OUR PRESS ROUND-UP, OVERALL ITALIAN PRESS REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAS BEEN EXTREMELY FAVORABLE.

BRIDGES

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ORIGINAL full text of document is in  
UNITE) KINGDOM - PM Thatcher cables (4/4)

PRESERVATION COPY

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Authority E96-107 #49 SMF 3/27/00

BY CH NARA DATE 1/24/09

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SECRET

NEA/ARN:WSTANTON:AA  
02/03/84 EXT. 21018  
P:LSEAGLEBURGER

NEA:RHPelletreau  
S/S: CHILL  
PM/RSA:RGALLUCCI  
S/P:PRODMAN

NEA:ARAPHEL  
NEA/ARN:AEJONES  
DOD/ISA:RARMITAGE  
NSC:

IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO MNF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BE DELIVERED TO THE MNF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTEL.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER/~~MADAM PRIME MINISTER/~~ <sup>MARGARET</sup> <sup>FRANCOIS</sup> ~~MR.~~ PRESIDENT:

I KNOW THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, OUR ATTEMPTS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THAT NATION, AND THE SAFETY OF OUR PERSONNEL THERE REMAIN IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR CONCERNS. I, THEREFORE, WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED. THE SECURITY PLAN WHICH WAS PROMISED HAS NOT YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED, AND CRIES OF VIOLENCE ONCE MORE DROWN OUT THE VOICES OF REASON. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE WE MUST PERSEVERE. I AM CONVINCED OF THE JUSTICE OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND I AM COMMITTED TO THE COURSE WE HAVE CHOSEN.

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62072 01

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 6407 00011 DTG: 091740Z MAR 84 PSN: 029035  
SIT171 DATE 03/20/84 TOR: 069/2003Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSKIMM VP SIT TEIC DUR EOBC EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: --CHECKLIST--

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY  
DE RUEHRO #6407 0691741 CCY AD273757 510  
P 091740Z MAR 84  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0410

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 9061  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9126  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4665  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 6107  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4285  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ROME 06407  
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT  
DEPARTMENT PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
PARIS FOR NASA EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE  
TOKYO PASS TO NASA ADMINISTRATOR BEGGS

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NLRR MOB-222#62072

BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 6407

00011

DTG: 091740Z MAR 84 PSN: 029035

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: TSPA, KSCA, IT

SUBJECT: MANNED SPACE STATION PROGRAM: LETTER FROM  
- PRIME MINISTER CRAXI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

REF: STATE 22588

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM PRIME MINISTER CRAXI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER REGARDING COOPERATION ON THE MANNED SPACE STATION PROJECT (REFTEL). FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION. BEGIN QUOTE:

--

ROME, MARCH 6, 1984

YOUR EXCELLENCY RONALD REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
WASHINGTON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEAR PRESIDENT:

I REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE IN WHICH YOU POINT OUT AMERICAN INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING COOPERATION WITH ITALY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT ORBITING STATION WHICH SHOULD BE LAUNCHED INTO SPACE IN THE EARLY 90'S. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT I GREATLY APPRECIATED YOUR MESSAGE, AND THAT I LOOK FORWARD WITH DEEP INTEREST TO THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, NASA ADMINISTRATOR BEGGS, TO KNOW BETTER THE MODALITIES OF THE COOPERATION THAT CAN BE ESTABLISHED.

PRECISELY IN VIEW OF MR. BEGGS' MISSION IN ITALY, I HELD YESTERDAY A CABINET MEETING IN WHICH THE MINISTER FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ITALIAN ADMINISTRATION AND OF THE ACADEMIC-SCIENTIFIC WORLD WHO OPERATE IN THE AEROSPACE FIELD PARTICIPATED. I AM VERY HAPPY TO RECEIVE MR. BEGGS PERSONALLY BEFORE HE HOLDS MORE EXTENSIVE AND IN-DEPTH TALKS WITH THE MINISTER FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND WITH OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE COMPETENT ENTITIES.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 6407

00011 DTG: 091740Z MAR 84 PSN: 029035

WHAT I WISH TO UNDERLINE FROM THIS MOMENT IS THAT THE EFFECTIVE, FRUITFUL AEROSPACE COOPERATION WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE SO FAR BETWEEN ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES DETERMINES THE NEED TO PLACE FUTURE JOINT INITIATIVES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT THE HIGH LEVELS OF SPECIALIZATION THAT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION HAVE ATTAINED IN ITALY. ITALY THEREFORE IS QUITE READY TO STUDY THE TERMS OF SIGNIFICANT COOPERATION, IN THE AWARENESS THAT THE ITALIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND ITALIAN INDUSTRY CAN OFFER A HIGH QUALITY CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NEW CONQUESTS IN SPACE FOR THE BENEFIT OF MANKIND. IT WILL ALSO BE USEFUL TO THINK, AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, OF ESTABLISHING THE PROPER FORMAL INSTRUMENTS WHICH WILL ENSURE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES TO BE AGREED UPON.

IN THE EXPECTATION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE MISSION IN ITALY FOR YOUR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, I KINDLY ASK YOU, DEAR PRESIDENT AND FRIEND, TO ACCEPT MY CORDIAL REGARDS.

--

B. CRAXI

END QUOTE.

2. THE ORIGINAL LETTER, IN ITALIAN, IS BEING SENT BY POUCH TO THE DEPARTMENT TO BE PASSED ON TO THE WHITE HOUSE. RABB

ROME 6407

00011 DTG: 091740Z MAR 84 PSN: 029035

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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PAGE 1 - 10

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/07/84/1189

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHRO 6407 U691741 CCY AD273757 517

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P 001740Z MAR 84

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 410

INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9061

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9126

RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4665

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6107

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4285

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CORRECTED COPY TEXT

DEPARTMENT PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE

PARIS FOR NASA EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE

TOKYO PASS TO NASA ADMINISTRATOR BEGGS

C.O. 1235: N/A

TAGS: TSPA, KSCA, IT

SUBJECT: MANNED SPACE STATION PROGRAM: LETTER FROM

- PRIME MINISTER CRAXI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

REF: STATE 22578

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM PRIME MINISTER  
 CRAXI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER REGARDING COOPERATION  
 ON THE MANNED SPACE STATION PROJECT (REFTFL). FOLLOWING  
 IS INFURAL TRANSLATION. BEGIN QUOTE:

-- ROME, MARCH 6, 1984

YOUR EXCELLENCY RONALD REAGAN

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WASHINGTON

DEAR PRESIDENT:

I REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE IN WHICH YOU POINT OUT AMERICAN  
 INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING COOPERATION WITH ITALY IN THE  
 DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT ORBITING STATION WHICH SHOULD  
 BE LAUNCHED INTO SPACE IN THE EARLY 90'S. I WOULD LIKE TO  
 SAY THAT I GREATLY APPRECIATED YOUR MESSAGE, AND THAT I  
 LOOK FORWARD WITH DEEP INTEREST TO THE FORTHCOMING VISIT  
 OF YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, NASA ADMINISTRATOR BEGGS,  
 TO KNOW BETTER THE MODALITIES OF THE COOPERATION THAT CAN  
 BE ESTABLISHED.

PRECISELY IN VIEW OF MR. BEGGS' MISSION IN ITALY, I HELD

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NLRR M08-222#62073

BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

PAGE 1 - 179

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/07/4/1189

SITUATION: PRES MSGS  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

YESTERDAY A CABINET MEETING IN WHICH THE MINISTER FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ITALIAN ADMINISTRATION AND OF THE ACADEMIC-SCIENTIFIC WORLD WHO OPERATE IN THE AEROSPACE FIELD PARTICIPATED. I AM VERY HAPPY TO RECEIVE MR. REGGS PERSONALLY BEFORE HE HOLDS MORE EXTENSIVE AND IN-DEPTH TALKS WITH THE MINISTER FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND WITH OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE COMPETENT ENTITIES.

WHAT I WISH TO UNDERLINE FROM THIS MOMENT IS THAT THE EFFECTIVE, FRUITFUL AEROSPACE COOPERATION WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE SO FAR BETWEEN ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES DETERMINES THE NEED TO PLACE FUTURE JOINT INITIATIVES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT THE HIGH LEVELS OF SPECIALIZATION THAT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION HAVE ATTAINED IN ITALY. ITALY THEREFORE IS QUITE READY TO STUDY THE TERMS OF SIGNIFICANT COOPERATION, IN THE AWARENESS THAT THE ITALIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND ITALIAN INDUSTRY CAN OFFER A HIGH QUALITY CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NEW CONQUESTS IN SPACE FOR THE BENEFIT OF MANKIND. IT WILL ALSO BE USEFUL TO THINK, AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, OF ESTABLISHING THE PROPER FORMAL INSTRUMENTS WHICH WILL ENSURE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES TO BE AGREED UPON.

IN THE EXPECTATION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE MISSION IN ITALY FOR YOUR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, I KINDLY ASK YOU, DEAR PRESIDENT AND FRIEND, TO ACCEPT MY CORDIAL REGARDS.

--

B. CRAXI

END QUOTE.

2. THE ORIGINAL LETTER, IN ITALIAN, IS BEING SENT BY POUCH TO THE DEPARTMENT TO BE PASSED ON TO THE WHITE HOUSE. RA R

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 7486 DTG: 260148Z SEP 84 PSN: 037753  
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TO AMBASSADOR RABB FOR PRIME MINISTER CRAZI

SEPTEMBER 26, 1984

DEAR BETTINO,

FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS, I AM WELL AWARE OF YOUR STRONG  
DESIRE TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND I WANTED TO SHARE MY  
THOUGHTS WITH YOU ON THE EVE OF MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN  
MINISTER GROMYKO.

IN MY MEETING ON FRIDAY, MY AIM WILL BE TO IMPRESS UPON  
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MY SINCERE DESIRE TO PUT OUR RELATIONS  
ON A MORE POSITIVE TRACK AND, IN PARTICULAR, MY COMMITMENT TO  
NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS TO REDUCE ARMS LEVELS IN A FAIR, BALANCED  
AND VERIFIABLE MANNER. I WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR ARMS  
CONTROL PROPOSALS ARE FLEXIBLE AND THAT IN NEGOTIATIONS, I AM  
FULLY PREPARED TO TAKE LEGITIMATE SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS  
INTO ACCOUNT. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE  
PRUDENT TO MAKE PREEMPTIVE CONCESSIONS AND WILL NOT DO SO.

I DO FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE NEED A BETTER MECHANISM FOR

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
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NLRB M08-282 #62074  
BY RW NARA DATE 11/21/11

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 7486 DTG: 260148Z SEP 84 PSN: 037753

CONSULTING WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON BOTH ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL ISSUES, AND WILL BE MAKING SOME CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS FOR REGULAR HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. MY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE, WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON THE INTERRELATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND WOULD AIM AT FINDING WAYS TO REDUCE ARMAMENT LEVELS SUBSTANTIALLY AND RESTRAIN DESTABILIZING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, MY AIM IS TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR DIRECT U.S. -SOVIET CONFRONTATIONS.

I SHALL, OF COURSE, KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF MY MEETING AND WILL STAY IN TOUCH AS WE PLAN ANY SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATIONS WHICH MAY ENSUE FROM IT.

SHOULD YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE APPROACH I INTEND TO TAKE WITH GROMYKO, OR SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR THE MEETING, I WOULD VALUE THEM GREATLY.

SINCERELY,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 3992  
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 23992

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, UR  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER  
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1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE DCM WAS CALLED TO PALAZZO CHIGI AT 0700  
WASHINGTON TIME SEPTEMBER 27 TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE FROM  
PRIME MINISTER CRAXI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. INFORMAL  
EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS: WE NOTE THAT FOR THE FIRST  
TIME IN A CRAXI-REAGAN MESSAGE, CRAXI USES THE SECOND  
PERSON FAMILIAR FORM ("TU"), TO EMPHASIZE A CLOSE RE-  
LATIONSHIP.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

ROME, SEPTEMBER 27, 1984  
DEAR PRESIDENT AND FRIEND,  
I APPRECIATED VERY MUCH THE MESSAGE THAT YOU SENT ME AND  
I AM HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME THOUGHTS OF

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NLRR 108-222#62075

BY RW NARA DATE 11/2/11

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 3992

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MINE ON RELAUNCHING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE, ON THE EVE OF YOUR IMPORTANT MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

I MUST ABOVE ALL EXPRESS MY PLEASURE OVER THE EMPHASIS WHICH YOU IN YOUR SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS PLACED ON THE SEARCH AND THE NEED FOR PEACE, AS WELL AS OVER THE CONSTRUCTIVE FORMULATION WHICH YOU GAVE TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH THE VIEW TO ENCOURAGING AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEM. AT A MOMENT IN WHICH THERE ARE PREVAILING ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY AND MISTRUST, THERE IS GREAT IMPORTANCE IN ANY ATTEMPT TO RECREATE AN ATMOSPHERE AND ENVIRONMENT OF DIALOGUE FAVORABLE TO AND CAPABLE OF ENCOURAGING SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. I BELIEVE THAT YOUR SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS HAS PROVIDED A VALUABLE PUSH TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE. ONE MUST NOW HOPE THAT THE OFFER OF RECONCILIATION AND OF A SERIOUS AND DEVOTED SEARCH FOR POINTS OF CONVERGENCE ON PROBLEMS OF SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR HUMANITY MAY ENCOURAGE REASONABLENESS AND MODERATION AND MAY INDUCE MOVEMENT TOWARD THAT SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND COMPROMISE WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL FOR OBTAINING TANGIBLE, RECIPROCALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

I FIND PARTICULARLY INTERESTING AND INSTRUMENTAL FOR THE AIMS WHICH WE JOINTLY PROPOSE, THE FLEXIBLE CHARACTER OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH YOU ARE ABOUT TO PUT TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON ARMS CONTROL AND REDUCTION. I BELIEVE THAT AS REGARDS THIS FLEXIBILITY WE SHALL WANT IN CLOSE CONCERT TO REDEFINE TOGETHER THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY FOR A NEW PLATFORM WHICH, RESPECTING MAXIMUM MUTUAL SECURITY, CAN OFFER SUFFICIENT ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION IN RELATION TO SOVIET POSITIONS.

IN ANY CASE I AGREE WITH YOU THAT AT THIS STAGE THE FIRST MOVE IS UP TO THE SOVIETS, WITH THE RENUNCIATION OF THEIR UNREALISTIC PRECONDITIONS AS REGARDS RESUMPTION OF INF NEGOTIATIONS, AND WITH THE DEMONSTRATION OF A CLEAR DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN ANY CASE

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PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 3992

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OPPORTUNE AND APPROPRIATE TO CONCERN OURSELVES FROM NOW ONWARD WITH ENSURING THE NECESSARY LINKS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS NEGOTIATING TABLES, SINCE ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENT, WHATEVER THEIR NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS, SERVE TOGETHER TO DETERMINE THE GLOBAL LEVEL OF THE THREAT AND IT IS TO THIS LEVEL THAT MEASURES OF BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MUST NECESSARILY RELATE.

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I ALSO AGREE ON, INDEED I WOULD ENCOURAGE THE STARTING OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE THE ELEMENTS OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION IN REGIONAL CRISES WHICH INCREASINGLY NEED RESOLUTION, USING TO FULL ADVANTAGE THE ROLE OF COUNTRIES AND PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED, IN FULL RESPECT FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS AND NEEDS. WE WILL CERTAINLY BE ABLE TO OFFER A SHARE IN THESE EFFORTS, WITH GENUINE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

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I WILL BE VERY HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO LEARN YOUR IMPRESSIONS AT THE END OF THE TALKS WHICH YOU WILL HAVE WITH MR. GROMYKO AND I COUNT ON KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU FOR AN EVER DEEPER EXCHANGE OF EVALUATIONS.

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WITH MY BEST AND MOST CORDIAL REGARDS, BETTINO CRAXI.  
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NLRR 108-222#62076

BY RWS NARA DATE 11/24

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
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ROME 3992  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8248

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 23992

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NODIS, PASS WHITE HOUSE ELECTRICALLY  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, UR  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER  
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BY RW NARA DATE 11/2/11

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03  
SIT638

ROME 3992  
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TOR: 271/2002Z

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WHSR COMMENT: ~~NODIS/CHECKLIST~~

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 23992

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NODIS, PASS WHITE HOUSE ELECTRICALLY  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, UR  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER  
CRAXI

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1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. THE DCM WAS CALLED TO PALAZZO CHIGI AT 0700 WASHINGTON TIME SEPTEMBER 27 TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER CRAXI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS: WE NOTE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A CRAXI-REAGAN MESSAGE, CRAXI USES THE SECOND PERSON FAMILIAR FORM ("TU"), TO EMPHASIZE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP.
3. BEGIN TEXT:  
ROME, SEPTEMBER 27, 1984  
DEAR PRESIDENT AND FRIEND,  
I APPRECIATED VERY MUCH THE MESSAGE THAT YOU SENT ME AND

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1108-222#602078  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/14

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 3992

DTG: 271312Z SEP 84 PSN: 042201

I AM HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME THOUGHTS OF MINE ON RELAUNCHING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE, ON THE EVE OF YOUR IMPORTANT MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

I MUST ABOVE ALL EXPRESS MY PLEASURE OVER THE EMPHASIS WHICH YOU IN YOUR SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS PLACED ON THE SEARCH AND THE NEED FOR PEACE, AS WELL AS OVER THE CONSTRUCTIVE FORMULATION WHICH YOU GAVE TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH THE VIEW TO ENCOURAGING AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEM. AT A MOMENT IN WHICH THERE ARE PREVAILING ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY AND MISTRUST, THERE IS GREAT IMPORTANCE IN ANY ATTEMPT TO RECREATE AN ATMOSPHERE AND ENVIRONMENT OF DIALOGUE FAVORABLE TO AND CAPABLE OF ENCOURAGING SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. I BELIEVE THAT YOUR SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS HAS PROVIDED A VALUABLE PUSH TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE. ONE MUST NOW HOPE THAT THE OFFER OF RECONCILIATION AND OF A SERIOUS AND DEVOTED SEARCH FOR POINTS OF CONVERGENCE ON PROBLEMS OF SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR HUMANITY MAY ENCOURAGE REASONABLENESS AND MODERATION AND MAY INDUCE MOVEMENT TOWARD THAT SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND COMPROMISE WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL FOR OBTAINING TANGIBLE, RECIPROCALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

I FIND PARTICULARLY INTERESTING AND INSTRUMENTAL FOR THE AIMS WHICH WE JOINTLY PROPOSE, THE FLEXIBLE CHARACTER OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH YOU ARE ABOUT TO PUT TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON ARMS CONTROL AND REDUCTION. I BELIEVE THAT AS REGARDS THIS FLEXIBILITY WE SHALL WANT IN CLOSE CONCERT TO REDEFINE TOGETHER THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY FOR A NEW PLATFORM WHICH, RESPECTING MAXIMUM MUTUAL SECURITY, CAN OFFER SUFFICIENT ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION IN RELATION TO SOVIET POSITIONS.

IN ANY CASE I AGREE WITH YOU THAT AT THIS STAGE THE FIRST MOVE IS UP TO THE SOVIETS, WITH THE RENUNCIATION OF THEIR UNREALISTIC PRECONDITIONS AS REGARDS RESUMPTION OF INF NEGOTIATIONS, AND WITH THE DEMONSTRATION OF A CLEAR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN ANY CASE OPPORTUNE AND APPROPRIATE TO CONCERN OURSELVES FROM NOW ONWARD WITH ENSURING THE NECESSARY LINKS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS NEGOTIATING TABLES, SINCE ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENT, WHATEVER THEIR NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS, SERVE TOGETHER TO DETERMINE THE GLOBAL LEVEL OF THE THREAT AND IT IS TO THIS LEVEL THAT MEASURES OF BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MUST NECESSARILY RELATE.

I ALSO AGREE ON, INDEED I WOULD ENCOURAGE THE STARTING OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE THE ELEMENTS OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION IN REGIONAL CRISES WHICH INCREASINGLY NEED RESOLUTION, USING TO FULL ADVANTAGE THE ROLE OF COUNTRIES AND PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED, IN FULL RESPECT FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS AND NEEDS. WE WILL CERTAINLY BE ABLE TO OFFER A SHARE IN THESE EFFORTS, WITH GENUINE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

I WILL BE VERY HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO LEARN YOUR IMPRESSIONS AT THE END OF THE TALKS WHICH YOU WILL HAVE WITH MR. GROMYKO AND I COUNT ON KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU FOR AN EVER DEEPER EXCHANGE OF EVALUATIONS.  
WITH MY BEST AND MOST CORDIAL REGARDS, BETTINO CRAXI.  
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
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ROME 3992  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8248

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 23992

NODIS, PASS WHITE HOUSE ELECTRICALLY  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, UR  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PRIME MINISTER  
END TEXT.  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1162

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 30585

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, XF  
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT  
- ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ITALIAN EMBASSY INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT TODAY, DECEMBER 17, THAT A CRAXI LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN SENT TO US ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, AND THAT THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IS NOT SENDING THE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

3. WE RECEIVED A XEROX COPY OF THE LETTER WITH A NOTE FOR THE AMBASSADOR. AN EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: DEAR RON:

ON RETURNING FROM MY VISITS, WHICH I MADE TOGETHER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI DURING THE PAST WEEKS TO CAIRO, RIYADH, ALGIERS AND TUNIS, I WISH TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME IMPRESSIONS AND JUDGEMENTS TAKEN PARTICULARLY FROM THE TALKS I HAD WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, KING FAHD, WITH PRESIDENT BENDJEDID, WITH PRESIDENT BOURGHIBA AND WITH PRIME MINISTER M' ZALI AND WITH ARAFAT.

FROM MY EXCHANGES OF VIEWS, VERY INTENSE AND DEEP, THERE EMERGED AN ANXIOUS AND WORRYING (PREOCCUPATO E PROCCUPANTE) PICTURE OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CONCERNING ABOVE ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION, WHICH REMAIN -- FOR ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONSULTED -- THE CENTRAL POINT OF THE REGION'S PROBLEM. OUR INTERLOCUTORS KEPT EXPRESSING TO US THEIR STRONG UNEASE AT THE PROLONGED STAGNATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY PERCEIVED IN THAT A HIGH POTENTIAL OF DANGER AND OF RISK ON TWO POINTS. ON THE ONE HAND, BECAUSE THE STALEMATE FEEDS FEELINGS OF FRUSTRATION IN THE ARAB POPULATIONS AND FAVORING THE DIFFUSION OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS RADICALISM, COMES TO REPRESENT A GROWING THREAT TO THE STABILITY

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/11

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AND SECURITY OF THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, BECAUSE IT RE-ENFORCES THE INFLUENCE OF THE MOST INTRANSIGENT ARAB GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THE NEGOTIATION OPTION.

I WAS ABLE TO GATHER, PARTICULARLY FROM THE EGYPTIANS AND SAUDIS, THE CLEAREST SYMPTOMS OF DISCOMFORT FOR WHAT THEY JUDGE AS A LACK OF INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES -- AND THE UNITED STATES PRIMARILY -- FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. MUBARAK AND FAHD EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN BITTER TONES WHICH SEEMED TO ME ALL THE MORE NOTEWORTHY IN VIEW OF THEIR VISIBLY RESERVED AND TEMPERED SENTIMENTS OF GREAT FRIENDSHIP, LOYAL AND SINCERE, TOWARD YOU AND YOUR COUNTRY.

IN CAIRO AND RIYADH THERE WAS THUS A VERY VIVID EXPECTATION, AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ONES IN THE UNITED STATES, OF A VIGOROUS RESUMPTION OF THE WESTERN INITIATIVE FOR A PLAN OF NEGOTIATIONS. I NOTED EVERYWHERE HOW THE EXTRAORDINARY AFFIRMATION THAT YOU RECEIVED FROM THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE WAS VALUED AND WELCOMED AS A VERY POSITIVE ELEMENT. THEY RECALLED WITH FAVOR THE REAGAN PLAN OF SEPTEMBER 1982, AND THE REAFFIRMATION THAT YOU MADE IN YOUR SPEECH AT THE UN LAST SEPTEMBER WAS APPRECIATED.

THEY EXPECT NOW, IN THE FORM OF APPROPRIATE ACTS AND DECISIONS, THAT YOU WILL COMPLETE YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE DESIGN FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. A CONFIDENT EXPECTATION IS THEREFORE TURNED PRIMARILY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, WHOSE ROLE CONTINUES TO BE CONSIDERED FUNDAMENTAL FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND GLOBAL PEACE SOLUTION. BUT THEY TURN ALSO TOWARD THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND TO ITALY, WHICH IS PREPARING TO

ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY AND WHOSE TRADITIONAL COMMITMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RECEIVED FULL AND EXPLICIT RECOGNITION.

IT SEEMED TO ME THAT, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A MORE INCISIVE WESTERN ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CAIRO GOVERNMENT IS MOVING DECISIVELY, TAKING COURAGE FROM THE PROGRESSIVE REINSERTION OF EGYPT IN THE ISLAMIC AND ARABIC CONTEXT. THE OBJECTIVE THAT CAIRO POINTS TO (AND FOR WHICH RIYADH ALSO IS AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING A MORE CAUTIOUS POSITION) BT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1163  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 ROME 30585

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, XF  
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

IS A DEFINITIVE CLARIFICATION WITHIN THE PLO, WHICH WILL ALLOW THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT TO DEFINE WITHOUT RETICENCE AND AMBIGUITY A POSITION OF NEGOTIATION AND OF AN UNDERSTANDING WITH JORDAN.

AS CONCERNS THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES, THEY DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA, EVEN KNOWING OF THE DIFFERING SYRIAN POSITIONS. NO ONE INTENDS TO BEGIN A NEGOTIATION WITH PRECONCEIVED ELEMENTS OF HOSTILITY WITH REGARD TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, THESE ALSO BEING PART OF THE CONTROVERSY. IN OUR VIEW, MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE WITH DAMASCUS THUS REMAINS IMPORTANT, WHICH ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WAS EFFICACIOUSLY UNDERTAKEN AND FROM WHICH CAN EMERGE IN THE FIRST PLACE A CONSTRUCTIVE SYRIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. BUT THE REAL IMPULSE TO NEGOTIATE, I BELIEVE I CAN SAY, SHOULD BE CONFERRED UPON, AT LEAST IN AN INITIAL PHASE, EGYPT AND JORDAN, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PLO.

HERE, THEN, WAS THE UTILITY I OBSERVED, WHILE I WAS IN TUNISIA, OF MEETING, ALONG WITH MINISTER ANDREOTTI, WITH THE PALESTINIAN LEADER. WHAT LED ME IN PARTICULAR TO SEE ARAFAT AND TO AGREE TO HAVE WITH HIM A FRANK AND CLOSE CONVERSATION WAS MY STRONG INTEREST, AND I THINK A LEGITIMATE SCRUPLE, TO SCRUTINIZE HIS IDEAS, HIS POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF THE MOST RECENT EVENTS WHICH INVOLVED THE PLO, AND ABOVE ALL THE NECESSITY TO VERIFY THE STRENGTH AND RELIABILITY OF THE SIGNS OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION WHICH, EVEN WITH CONTRASTS AND AMBIGUITIES, IN MY VIEW EMERGED IN AMMAN.

THE MEETING OF THE PNC IS CERTAINLY THE FRUIT OF PRESSING APPEALS DIRECTED TO ARAFAT FOR HIM TO OVERCOME EVERY DELAY AND TO ASSUME THE INITIATIVES LINKED TO DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION: REALISTIC INITIATIVES, ABOVE ALL IN THE SEARCH FOR A BASIC UNDERSTANDING, CERTAINLY ESSENTIAL, WITH THE HASHEMITE SOVEREIGN. AN APPEAL WHICH ARAFAT ACCEPTED, STRIVING FOR THE CONVOCATION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND HAVING IT TAKE PLACE IN AMMAN, WHICH REPRESENTS AN OBVIOUSLY POLITICAL CHOICE.

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DTG: 172053Z DEC 84 PSN: 047463

~~IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO ENTER INTO THE MERIT OF THE DECISIONS REACHED IN AMMAN. HOWEVER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT ARAFAT HAS SOUGHT TO CARRY OUT THE FIRST STEPS ON A PATH, WHICH IF TRAVELLED WITH CONSISTENCY AND CONVICTION, CAN CREATE CONDITIONS MORE FAVORABLE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. I SAID FIRST STEPS BECAUSE THE ROAD TO TRAVEL IS STILL LONG AND CERTAINLY FULL OF UNKNOWNNS. BUT THEY ARE, HOWEVER, CERTAINLY NOT WRONG STEPS AND ONES WHICH MERIT ATTENTION AND CONSIDERATION, FOR THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WHICH ARAFAT HAS DECIDED TO FACE IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME; THE CHALLENGE OF SYRIA, WHICH DID NOT WANT THE PNC TO TAKE PLACE; THE CHALLENGE OF HUSSEIN, WHO WARNED THE PLO TO UNDERTAKE DEFINITELY THE NEGOTIATION OPTION, WHICH PRESENTS DIFFICULT COMPROMISES AT THE END.~~

~~NOT ALL THE QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED AT AMMAN; AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS REMAIN. FOR MY PART, I SAID CLEARLY TO ARAFAT THAT THE PROGRESS MADE IN AMMAN WAS NOT SUFFICIENT AND THAT NEW GESTURES SHOULD BE MADE SO THAT THE PLO CAN MAKE DEFINITIVE AND IRREVERSIBLE THE CHOICE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ABANDONMENT OF ARMED STRUGGLE. I SPECIFIED THAT, IN MY JUDGEMENT, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT, THE ESSENTIAL DRIVING FORCE TO PUT BACK IN MOTION A REAL PACIFICATION PROCESS, AN AGREEMENT THE CONTENTS OF WHICH COULD PRESENT LIKEWISE UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWERS TO ALL ASPECTS CONNECTED TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS. THUS NOT ONLY THE QUESTIONS PERTINENT TO JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS, WITHIN A FUTURE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK STILL TO BE OUTLINED AND MADE PRECISE, BUT ALSO THE TYPE AND FORM OF RELATIONS TO INITIATE WITH ALL STATES OF THE REGION AND~~

~~THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECURITY, RECOGNITION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. I SPECIFIED THAT UNTIL AN ACCEPTABLE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN PLATFORM IS ELABORATED, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FORMALLY TO CARRY OUT THOSE STEPS AND TO ASSURE THE SUPPORT THAT WOULD GIVE THE PUSH AND FORCE NECESSARY TO THE PROSPECT OF A RIGOROUS NEGOTIATING PROCESS.~~

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1164

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 ROME 30585

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, XF  
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

I CAN TELL YOU THAT ARAFAT AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND COMMITTED HIMSELF TO WORK OUT PROPOSALS THAT RESPOND TO THE EXIGENCIES PUT FORWARD AND OF WHICH HE IN ANY CASE WAS AWARE. THE LEADER OF THE PLO NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE HOW FAR HE HAD COME ALONG ALREADY ON THIS PATH, NOT ONLY TO INDICATE THAT EVERY FUTURE CLARIFYING GESTURE REQUIRES A CONSOLIDATION OF HIS POSITION, BUT ALSO SIGNALS THAT IT CAN DEMONSTRATE WITHIN THE PLO, AND OUTSIDE IT, THAT THE OPTION OF DIALOGUE PAYS OFF, THAT IT CAN BE THE TRUE PATH TO A GLOBAL, LASTING AND JUST SOLUTION. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, HE SAID, WITH WHICH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INTEND TO MAINTAIN SOLID AND FUNCTIONING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND COLLABORATION, CANNOT, HOWEVER, REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO ALL OF THAT WHICH, THROUGH GRAVE DIFFICULTIES AND MORTAL RISKS, HE AND THE PLO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DOING. IN THAT REGARD, HE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND KING HUSSEIN IS DEEPER THAN APPEARS PUBLICLY AND THAT HE HOPED THAT FUTURE FAVORABLE EVENTS COULD ILLUMINATE ALL OF ITS IMPORTANCE AND FULL SIGNIFICANCE. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO ADD THAT THE DEMONSTRATION OF COURAGE THAT THE PLO SUCCEEDED IN GIVING BY LIBERATING ITSELF FROM CONDITIONING FORCES, PULLING ITSELF THUS OUT OF A POLITICAL SERVITUDE AND MANIPULATION THAT COULD HAVE EXACERBATED THE STALLED SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH A GRAVE RISK OF INSTABILITY AND NEW CONFLICTS, WAS CERTAINLY NOT A SECONDARY FACTOR. HE INTENDED TO PURSUE PATIENT WORK IN PURSUIT OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS; HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN ROLE, AND HE SHOWED HIMSELF CONFIDENT OF BEING ABLE TO COUNT ON THE EVERMORE CONVINCED SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRIES THAT TRULY WANT TO WORK FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. HE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IN OUR MEETING THE ABILITY TO BE OPEN, IF CONDITIONS WILL ALLOW HIM TO BE, TO UNEQUIVOCAL ACTS OF RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, BUT THAT, HE SAID, WOULD OCCUR ONLY IN THE MOMENT IN WHICH THERE WILL EMERGE WITH CLARITY THE READINESS OF EVERYONE TO PUT THEIR OWN CARDS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN THE TORMENTED AND CRUEL GAME THAT UNFORTUNATELY HAS BEEN PLAYED IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR TOO MANY YEARS.

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EXDIS

I DID NOT, NEVERTHELESS, HIDE FROM ARAFAT MY PROFOUND RESERVATIONS AND PERPLEXITY OVER THE VIABILITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, TO TAKE PLACE EVENTUALLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN. I TOLD HIM IN ALL FRANKNESS THAT TO INSIST ON THIS OPTION WOULD MEAN TO DELAY THE POSSIBILITY OF BEGINNING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHILE IT MUST BE IN THE COMMON INTEREST TO SEEK REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC WAYS SUCH AS THAT OF SMALL STEPS AND OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

EXDIS

ARAFAT DID NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE INDIFFERENT TO THIS LINE OF REASONING, OBJECTING ONLY WITH REGARD TO HIS LACK OF FAITH IN ISRAEL'S REAL WILL TO MOVE TOWARD A REASONABLE COMPROMISE. FOR THIS REASON HE SEES AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS A MEANS OF EXERCISING STRONGER AND MORE CONCENTRIC PRESSURE ON ISRAEL IN ORDER TO ATTENUATE ITS INTRANSIGENCE AND RENDER THE GOVERNMENT IN TEL AVIV MORE OPEN TO A COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES. HERE, PERHAPS, IS A FURTHER REASON TO REFLECT ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE WITH GESTURES THAT COULD INDICATE A READINESS TO SEEK POINTS OF CONSENSUS ON WHICH TO CONSTRUCT A MORE SOLID BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING. PERMIT ME THEN, DEAR PRESIDENT AND FRIEND, TO PUT BEFORE YOU AN INVITATION TO UNITE OUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE A PROCESS OF MOVEMENT BY WHICH TO RE-ENFORCE THE SIGNALS OF DIALOGUE, AND TO PREDISPOSE OURSELVES TO EVALUATE IN A TIMELY FASHION THE MEANS AND THE FORMS FOR AN INITIATIVE OF OUR OWN, TO ADOPT AT A MOMENT IN WHICH THE FRAME OF REFERENCE WILL BE CLEARER AND THE TERRAIN WILL BE FREED OF AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS.

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I BELIEVE THAT THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE HAVE MANY FRIENDS AMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIES

SHOULD PUSH US IN THIS DIRECTION. OUR DUTY IS TO NOT DISAPPOINT THESE FRIENDS AND TO SHOW THEM THE MAXIMUM OPENNESS AND READINESS TO UNDERSTAND THEIR EXPECTATIONS IN A FRAMEWORK OF JUSTICE AND SECURITY FOR ALL. BUT WE CERTAINLY CANNOT HIDE FROM OURSELVES THE FACT THAT IN THE ARAB WORLD THERE ARE ALSO COUNTRIES THAT SHOW A HOSTILITY THAT CAN UNDERMINE THE PROSPECT OF PEACE AND JUSTICE WHICH INSPIRE US AND WE MUST NOT FURNISH THEM  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1165

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 ROME 30585

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IT, US, XF  
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

WITH THE PRETEXTS THAT MAKE SUCH ACTION EASIER.

I WANTED TO PUT THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF MINE BEFORE YOU  
IN THE HOPE OF CONTINUING AND DEEPENING A CLOSE AND  
EFFECTIVE CONSULTATION ON A QUESTION SO INSTRUMENTAL  
(STRUMENTALE) FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE AND AT AN  
HISTORIC JUNCTURE OF UNIQUE IMPORTANCE.

WITH ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP,

/S/ B. CRAXI END QUOTE.

4. WE APOLOGIZE FOR THE ENGLISH (THE ITALIAN WAS A  
STRUGGLE) AND ARE POUCHING A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL TO  
EUR/WE. THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT THE LETTER  
TO INTERESTED POSTS.

WHITMAN  
BT

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ACTION: POL-5 INFO: AMB DCM E/MIN E/COUNS A/COUNS CHRON D/CHRON/11+1D

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EXDIS

**IMMEDIATE**

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, US, IT, XF  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO CRAXI'S  
LETTER ON THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: ROME 30585

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IN PARA. 5 IS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY, DATED JANUARY 8, TO CRAXI'S LETTER TO HIM ON THE MIDDLE EAST (REFTEL). SIGNED ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO ROME.
3. FOR LONDON: PASS TO MCFARLANE, TOGETHER WITH TEXT OF CRAXI'S LETTER BEING REPEATED TO YOU (REFTEL).
4. FOR ROME: HOLD FOR MCFARLANE, TO BE PRESENTED BY MCFARLANE AND AMBASSADOR RABB TO CRAXI OR ANDREOTTI.
5. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BETTINO:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR DECEMBER 16 LETTER CONVEYING YOUR IMPRESSIONS FROM YOUR RECENT TRIPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, AND YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS.

IT REMAINS OUR BELIEF THAT THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS RESTS WITH THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, AND WE CONTINUE TO MAKE THIS POINT WITH THE PARTIES IN THE REGION. ITALY, WITH ITS SPECIAL INSIGHT ON THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL, CERTAINLY UNDERSTANDS OUR APPROACH.

AS WE SET OUR COURSE FOR THE IMPORTANT WORK OF PEACE YET TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT HIGHLY PUBLICIZED ACTIONS BY OUTSIDE POWERS, BEFORE THE PARTIES IN THE REGION HAVE TAKEN THE NECESSARY DECISIONS TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD

*Letter to Craxi  
from the President*

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NLR 108-202#62080  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/12/01

BE PREMATURE AND UNPRODUCTIVE.

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN IS THE ESSENTIAL STEP TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, AND I BELIEVE THAT ANYONE WHO WOULD WANT TO MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS SHOULD ENCOURAGE ISRAEL AND JORDAN TOWARD THAT GOAL. WE SHALL WATCH, WITH PARTICULAR INTEREST, KING HUSSEIN'S EFFORT TO ACQUIRE PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR HIS ENTRY INTO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR COMMITMENT TO THE POSITIONS SET FORTH IN MY SEPTEMBER 1, 1982 MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE. THOSE POSITIONS, BASED UPON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, CONTINUE TO BE REALISTIC AND WORKABLE, AND COULD POINT THE WAY TO AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH ITALY DURING ITS PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) RON

HIS EXCELLENCY  
BETTINO CRAZI  
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ITALIAN  
REPUBLIC  
ROME. END TEXT.  
DAM

ACTION: POL-5 INFO: AMB DCM E/MIN E/COUNS A/COUNS CHRON D/CHRON/11+1D

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 5359

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 007313

EXDIS - FOR MCFARLANE

**NIACT IMMEDIATE**

LOC: DISK 025 726

09 JAN 85 1841

CN: 13695

CHRG: STA

DIST: POLX

*Craxi letter to  
the President  
of 16 Dec 84*

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IT, US, XF

SUBJECT: CRAXI LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE  
MIDDLE EAST

REF: A) STATE 006852 B) 84 ROME 30585

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. LONDON PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO MILITARY ASSISTANT PAUL THOMPSON FOR MCFARLANE PRIOR TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER'S DEPARTURE FOR ROME.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CRAXI'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST AS TRANSLATED AND TRANSMITTED DECEMBER 17 BY EMBASSY ROME (REFTEL B).

4. QUOTE: DEAR RON:

ON RETURNING FROM MY VISITS, WHICH I MADE TOGETHER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI DURING THE PAST WEEKS TO CAIRO, RIYADH, ALGIERS AND TUNIS, I WISH TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME IMPRESSIONS AND JUDGEMENTS TAKEN PARTICULARLY FROM THE TALKS I HAD WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, KING FAHD, WITH PRESIDENT BENDJEDID, WITH PRESIDENT BOURGHIBA AND WITH PRIME MINISTER M'ZALI AND WITH ARAFAT.

FROM MY EXCHANGES OF VIEWS, VERY INTENSE AND DEEP, THERE EMERGED AN ANXIOUS AND WORRYING (PREOCCUPATO E PROCCUPANTE) PICTURE OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CONCERNING ABOVE ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION, WHICH REMAIN -- FOR ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONSULTED -- THE CENTRAL POINT OF THE REGION'S PROBLEM. OUR INTERLOCUTORS KEPT EXPRESSING TO US THEIR STRONG UNEASE AT THE PROLONGED STAGNATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY PERCEIVED IN THAT A HIGH POTENTIAL OF DANGER AND OF RISK ON TWO POINTS. ON THE ONE HAND, BECAUSE THE STALEMATE FEEDS FEELINGS OF FRUSTRATION IN THE ARAB POPULATIONS AND, FAVORING THE DIFFUSION OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS RADICALISM, COMES TO REPRESENT A GROWING THREAT TO THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES. ON THE OTHER

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 BY RW NARA DATE 11/2/11

HAND, BECAUSE IT REINFORCES THE INFLUENCE OF THE MOST INTRANSIGENT ARAB GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THE NEGOTIATION OPTION.

I WAS ABLE TO GATHER, PARTICULARLY FROM THE EGYPTIANS AND SAUDIS, THE clearest symptoms of discomfort for what they judge as a lack of initiative on the part of the western countries--and the United States primarily--for a resumption of the negotiating process. Mubarak and Fahd expressed themselves in bitter tones, which seemed to me all the more noteworthy in view of their visibly reserved and tempered sentiments of great friendship, loyal and sincere, toward you and your country.

In Cairo and Riyadh there was thus a very vivid expectation, after the parliamentary elections in Israel and the presidential ones in the United States, of a vigorous resumption of the western initiative for a plan of negotiations. I noted everywhere how the extraordinary affirmation that you received from the American electorate was valued and welcomed as a very positive element. They recalled with favor the Reagan plan of September 1982, and the reaffirmation that you made in your speech at the UN last September was appreciated.

They expect now, in the form of appropriate acts and decisions, that you will complete your constructive design for the Middle East. A confident expectation is therefore turned primarily toward the United States, whose role continues to be considered fundamental for

the achievement of a just and global peace solution. But they turn also toward the countries of the European Community and to Italy, which is preparing to assume the presidency and whose traditional commitment in the Middle East has received full and explicit recognition.

It seemed to me that, in the framework of a more incisive western action in the Middle East, the Cairo government is moving decisively, taking courage from the progressive reinsertion of Egypt in the Islamic and Arabic context. The objective that Cairo points to (and for which Riyadh also is available, although at the same time maintaining a more cautious position) is a definitive clarification within the PLO, which will allow the Palestinian movement to define without reticence and ambiguity a position of negotiation and of an understanding with Jordan.

AS CONCERNS THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES, THEY DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA, EVEN KNOWING OF THE DIFFERING SYRIAN POSITIONS. NO ONE INTENDS TO BEGIN A NEGOTIATION WITH PRECONCEIVED ELEMENTS OF HOSTILITY WITH REGARD TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, THESE ALSO BEING PART OF THE CONTROVERSY. IN OUR VIEW, MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE WITH DAMASCUS THUS REMAINS IMPORTANT, WHICH ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WAS EFFICACIOUSLY UNDERTAKEN AND FROM WHICH CAN EMERGE IN THE FIRST PLACE A CONSTRUCTIVE SYRIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. BUT THE REAL IMPULSE TO NEGOTIATE, I BELIEVE I CAN SAY, SHOULD BE CONFERRED UPON, AT LEAST IN AN INITIAL PHASE, EGYPT AND JORDAN, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PLO.

HERE, THEN, WAS THE UTILITY I OBSERVED, WHILE I WAS IN TUNISIA, OF MEETING, ALONG WITH MINISTER ANDREOTTI, WITH THE PALESTINIAN LEADER. WHAT LED ME IN PARTICULAR TO SEE ARAFAT AND TO AGREE TO HAVE WITH HIM A FRANK AND CLOSE CONVERSATION WAS MY STRONG INTEREST, AND I THINK A LEGITIMATE SCRUPLE, TO SCRUTINIZE HIS IDEAS, HIS POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF THE MOST RECENT EVENTS WHICH INVOLVED THE PLO, AND ABOVE ALL THE NECESSITY TO VERIFY THE STRENGTH AND RELIABILITY OF THE SIGNS OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION WHICH, EVEN WITH CONTRASTS AND AMBIGUITIES, IN MY VIEW EMERGED IN AMMAN.

THE MEETING OF THE PNC IS CERTAINLY THE FRUIT OF PRESSING APPEALS DIRECTED TO ARAFAT FOR HIM TO OVERCOME EVERYDELAY AND TO ASSUME THE INITIATIVES LINKED TO DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION: REALISTIC INITIATIVES, ABOVE

ALL IN THE SEARCH FOR A BASIC UNDERSTANDING, CERTAINLY ESSENTIAL, WITH THE HASHEMITE SOVEREIGN. AN APPEAL WHICH ARAFAT ACCEPTED, STRIVING FOR THE CONVOCATION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND HAVING IT TAKE PLACE IN AMMAN, WHICH REPRESENTS AN OBVIOUSLY POLITICAL CHOICE.

IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO ENTER INTO THE MERIT OF THE DECISIONS REACHED IN AMMAN. HOWEVER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT ARAFAT HAS SOUGHT TO CARRY OUT THE FIRST STEPS ON A PATH, WHICH IF TRAVELLED WITH CONSISTENCY AND CONVICTION, CAN CREATE CONDITIONS MORE FAVORABLE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. I SAID FIRST STEPS BECAUSE THE ROAD TO TRAVEL IS STILL LONG AND CERTAINLY FULL OF UNKNOWNNS. BUT THEY ARE, HOWEVER, CERTAINLY NOT WRONG STEPS AND ONES WHICH MERIT ATTENTION AND CONSIDERATION, FOR THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WHICH ARAFAT HAS DECIDED TO FACE IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME; THE CHALLENGE OF SYRIA, WHICH DID NOT WANT THE PNC TO TAKE PLACE; THE CHALLENGE OF HUSSEIN, WHO WARNED THE PLO TO UNDERTAKE DEFINITELY THE NEGOTIATION OPTION, WHICH PRESENTS DIFFICULT COMPROMISES AT THE END.

NOT ALL THE QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED AT AMMAN; AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS REMAIN. FOR MY PART, I



SAID CLEARLY TO ARAFAT THAT THE PROGRESS MADE IN AMMAN WAS NOT SUFFICIENT AND THAT NEW GESTURES SHOULD BE MADE SO THAT THE PLO CAN MAKE DEFINITIVE AND IRREVERSIBLE THE CHOICE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ABANDONMENT OF ARMED STRUGGLE. I SPECIFIED THAT, IN MY JUDGEMENT, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT, THE ESSENTIAL DRIVING FORCE TO PUT BACK IN MOTION A REAL PACIFICATION PROCESS, AN AGREEMENT THE CONTENTS OF WHICH COULD PRESENT LIKEWISE UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWERS TO ALL ASPECTS CONNECTED TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS. THUS NOT ONLY THE QUESTIONS PERTINENT TO JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS, WITHIN A FUTURE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK STILL TO BE OUTLINED AND MADE PRECISE, BUT ALSO THE TYPE AND FORM OF RELATIONS TO INITIATE WITH ALL STATES OF THE REGION AND THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECURITY, RECOGNITION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. I SPECIFIED THAT UNTIL AN ACCEPTABLE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN PLATFORM IS ELABORATED, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FORMALLY TO CARRY OUT THOSE STEPS AND TO ASSURE THE SUPPORT THAT WOULD GIVE THE PUSH AND FORCE NECESSARY TO THE PROSPECT OF A RIGOROUS NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I CAN TELL YOU THAT ARAFAT AGREED

WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND COMMITTED HIMSELF TO WORK OUT PROPOSALS THAT RESPOND TO THE EXIGENCIES PUT FORWARD AND OF WHICH HE IN ANY CASE WAS AWARE. THE LEADER OF THE PLO NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE HOW FAR HE HAD COME ALONG ALREADY ON THIS PATH, NOT ONLY TO INDICATE THAT EVERY FUTURE CLARIFYING GESTURE REQUIRES A CONSOLIDATION OF HIS POSITION, BUT ALSO SIGNALS THAT IT CAN DEMONSTRATE WITHIN THE PLO, AND OUTSIDE IT, THAT THE OPTION OF DIALOGUE PAYS OFF, THAT IT CAN BE THE TRUE PATH TO A GLOBAL, LASTING AND JUST SOLUTION. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, HE SAID, WITH WHICH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE INTEND TO MAINTAIN SOLID AND FUNCTIONING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND COLLABORATION,

CANNOT, HOWEVER, REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO ALL OF THAT WHICH, THROUGH GRAVE DIFFICULTIES AND MORTAL RISKS, HE AND THE PLO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DOING. IN THAT REGARD, HE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND KING HUSSEIN IS DEEPER THAN APPEARS PUBLICLY AND THAT HE HOPED THAT FUTURE FAVORABLE EVENTS COULD ILLUMINATE ALL OF ITS IMPORTANCE AND FULL SIGNIFICANCE. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO ADD THAT THE DEMONSTRATION OF COURAGE THAT THE PLO SUCCEEDED IN GIVING BY LIBERATING ITSELF FROM CONDITIONING FORCES, PULLING ITSELF THUS OUT OF A POLITICAL SERVITUDE AND MANIPULATION THAT COULD HAVE EXACERBATED THE STALLED SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH A GRAVE RISK OF INSTABILITY AND NEW CONFLICTS, WAS CERTAINLY NOT A SECONDARY FACTOR. HE INTENDED TO PURSUE PATIENT WORK IN PURSUIT OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS; HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN ROLE, AND HE SHOWED HIMSELF CONFIDENT OF BEING ABLE TO COUNT ON THE EVERMORE CONVINCED SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRIES THAT TRULY WANT TO WORK FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. HE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IN OUR MEETING THE ABILITY TO BE OPEN, IF CONDITIONS WILL ALLOW HIM TO BE, TO UNEQUIVOCAL ACTS OF RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, BUT THAT, HE SAID, WOULD OCCUR ONLY IN THE MOMENT IN WHICH THERE WILL EMERGE WITH CLARITY THE READINESS OF EVERYONE TO PUT THEIR OWN CARDS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN THE TORMENTED AND CRUEL GAME THAT UNFORTUNATELY HAS BEEN PLAYED IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR TOO MANY YEARS.

I DID NOT, NEVERTHELESS, HIDE FROM ARAFAT MY PROFOUND RESERVATIONS AND PERPLEXITY OVER THE VIABILITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, TO TAKE PLACE EVENTUALLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UN. I TOLD HIM IN ALL FRANKNESS THAT TO INSIST ON THIS OPTION WOULD MEAN TO DELAY THE POSSIBILITY OF BEGINNING THE

NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHILE IT MUST BE IN THE COMMON INTEREST TO SEEK REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC WAYS SUCH AS THAT OF SMALL STEPS AND OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

ARAFAT DID NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE INDIFFERENT TO THIS LINE OF REASONING, OBJECTING ONLY WITH REGARD TO HIS LACK OF FAITH IN ISRAEL'S REAL WILL TO MOVE TOWARD A REASONABLE COMPROMISE. FOR THIS REASON HE SEES AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS A MEANS OF EXERCISING STRONGER AND MORE CONCENTRIC PRESSURE ON ISRAEL IN ORDER TO ATTENUATE ITS INTRANSIGENCE AND RENDER THE GOVERNMENT IN TEL AVIV MORE OPEN TO A COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES. HERE, PERHAPS, IS A FURTHER REASON TO REFLECT ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE WITH GESTURES THAT COULD INDICATE A READINESS TO SEEK POINTS OF CONSENSUS ON WHICH TO CONSTRUCT A MORE SOLID BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING. PERMIT ME THEN, DEAR PRESIDENT AND FRIEND, TO PUT BEFORE YOU AN INVITATION TO UNITE OUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE A PROCESS OF MOVEMENT BY WHICH TO REINFORCE THE SIGNALS OF DIALOGUE, AND TO PREDISPOSE OURSELVES TO EVALUATE IN

A TIMELY FASHION THE MEANS AND THE FORMS FOR AN INITIATIVE OF OUR OWN, TO ADOPT AT A MOMENT IN WHICH THE FRAME OF REFERENCE WILL BE CLEARER AND THE TERRAIN WILL BE FREED OF AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS.

I BELIEVE THAT THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE HAVE MANY FRIENDS AMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD PUSH US IN THIS DIRECTION. OUR DUTY IS TO NOT DISAPPOINT THESE FRIENDS AND TO SHOW THEM THE MAXIMUM OPENNESS AND READINESS TO UNDERSTAND THEIR EXPECTATIONS IN A FRAMEWORK OF JUSTICE AND SECURITY FOR ALL. BUT WE CERTAINLY CANNOT HIDE FROM OURSELVES THE FACT THAT IN THE ARAB WORLD THERE ARE ALSO COUNTRIES THAT SHOW A HOSTILITY THAT CAN UNDERMINE THE PROSPECT OF PEACE AND JUSTICE WHICH INSPIRE US AND WE MUST NOT FURNISH THEM WITH THE PRETEXTS THAT MAKE SUCH ACTION EASIER.

I WANTED TO PUT THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF MINE BEFORE YOU IN THE HOPE OF CONTINUING AND DEEPENING A CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE CONSULTATION ON A QUESTION SO INSTRUMENTAL (STRUMENTALE) FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE AND AT A HISTORIC JUNCTURE OF UNIQUE IMPORTANCE.

WITH ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP,

/S/ B. CRAXI        END QUOTE.

DAM