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Folder Title:

USSR President's Soviet Speech
(01/16/1984) (2 of 5)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 7/30/2009

File Folder PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (2)

FOIA

F00-204/2

Box Number 25

FISCHER

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
74624	MEMO	DEAVER/MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE SPEECH	2	1/5/1984	B1
74625	MEMO	FORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET SPEECH	3	1/7/1984	B1
74626	DRAFT	DRAFT SPEECH	31	ND	B1
74627	MEMO	STEARMAN TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	1/12/1984	B1
74628	DRAFT	ATTACHMENT PAGES 12-15 FROM 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF US-USSR RELATIONS	4	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

sup 1/30/09

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8400045

RECEIVED 03 JAN 84 20

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 03 JAN 84

KEYWORDS SPEECHES

USSR

SUBJECT: MTG ON PRES SPEECH RE US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>1 PAN 0 4 1984</i>	<i>for information</i>		<i>VP, G, J, B, M, D</i>
	<i>1 JAN 0 6 1984</i>	<i>Pres noted</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (6)

National Security Council
The White House

909 ²

8 JAN 3 P 7: 06

System # I
Package # 0045
pa

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

Copy for Review Imp, please

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 1/4/04 3:00 pm
(Date/Time)

Bud,

Deaver wanted to set this up.

*Due in Darman's ofc at 3 PM
TODAY*

3 P7: 44

**National Security Council
The White House**

RECEIVED

84 JAN 3 P 6: 21

System # J

Package # C045

PK

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>Done</u>	<u>Redo</u>

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0045

A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

CONFIDENTIAL

January 4, 1984

RR

MEETING ON SOVIET SPEECH

DATE: ~~Thursday~~ ^{Friday} ~~January 5~~ ⁶, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: ~~4:00~~ ¹¹³⁰ P.M.
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE ^{cmj}

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss draft of speech on U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

You are scheduled to make the subject speech on January 12 at the National Press Club.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Edwin Meese III
James A. Baker, III
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Richard G. Darman
David R. Gergen
Jack F. Matlock
Ben Elliott

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Comment on speech draft as you desire and solicit comments of others.

DECLASSIFIED
Sec 3.407, E.O. 11652, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept 11, 1983
BY NARA ^{cmj} DATE 7/30/09

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0045

5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 4, 1984

MEETING ON SOVIET SPEECH

DATE: Thursday, January 5, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 4:00 P.M.
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss draft of speech on U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

You are scheduled to make the subject speech on January 12 at the National Press Club.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Edwin Meese III
James A. Baker, III
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Richard G. Darman
David R. Gergen
Jack F. Matlock
Ben Elliott

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Comment on speech draft as you desire and solicit comments of others.

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2001
BY NARA *smf*, DATE *7/30/09*

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *[Signature]*

SECRET

SUBJECT: Meeting on Presidential Speech: U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached at Tab I, for your signature, is a briefing memorandum for the President's meeting Thursday, January 5, to discuss the draft of a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. The President is scheduled to make a speech on January 12 at the National Press Club.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Briefing Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b) - 3.4(c) - 3.4(d) - 3.4(e) - 3.4(f) - 3.4(g) - 3.4(h) - 3.4(i) - 3.4(j) - 3.4(k) - 3.4(l) - 3.4(m) - 3.4(n) - 3.4(o) - 3.4(p) - 3.4(q) - 3.4(r) - 3.4(s) - 3.4(t) - 3.4(u) - 3.4(v) - 3.4(w) - 3.4(x) - 3.4(y) - 3.4(z)
White House, Washington, D.C. 20503
BY NARA *[Signature]* DATE 7/30/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~

RECEIVED 05 JAN 84 13

TO PRESIDENT

FROM MCFARLANE *smf 7/30/09*

DOCDATE 05 JAN 84

DEAVER, M

05 JAN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SUBJECT. PRES SPEECH ON US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION.	FOR INFORMATION	DUE.	STATUS	IP	FILES	PA
	FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE				FOR INFO
	PRESIDENT					

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID	(VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i> JAN 0 6 1984	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>VP</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *(B)*

Jan 5, 1984 8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Mr. McFarlane

FROM: Jack Matlock

SUB: Compliance Report and Speech

Regarding timing of the speech, I feel it is not necessary to delay it until after the verification/compliance report goes to Congress. I would consider it more important to get the speech on record several days before the Stockholm meeting than to wait for the report.

I feel that the compliance report is fully consistent with the policy enunciated in the speech - it is an element of realism - and should not be seen as any way inconsistent. The lesson we draw should be that Soviet violations underscore the need for more attention to verification in any future agreements, not that we cannot negotiate at all.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 7/30/2009

File Folder

PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (2)

FOIA

F00-204/2

FISCHER

Box Number

25

12

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
74624	MEMO DEAVER/MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE SPEECH	2	1/5/1984	B1

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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

National Security Council The White House

System # ~~OES~~

Package # 0102

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	<i>K</i>	
John Poindexter	2	<i>J</i>	
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	<i>✓</i>	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS _____
 Should be seen by: 3:00 1/5
 (Date/Time)

Speechwriters are nearing completion of their draft (as of 11³⁰ am). This memo would cover the new draft for today's 4 pm session.

Jan 5, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Mr. McFarlane

FROM: Jack Matlock

SUB: Compliance Report and Speech

Regarding timing of the speech, I feel it is not necessary to delay it until after the verification/compliance report goes to Congress. I would consider it more important to get the speech on record several days before the Stockholm meeting than to wait for the report.

I feel that the compliance report is fully consistent with the policy enunciated in the speech - it is an element of realism - and should not be seen as any way inconsistent. The lesson we draw should be that Soviet violations underscore the need for more attention to verification in any future agreements, not that we cannot negotiate at all.

smf 7/30/09

1A

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8400179

RECEIVED 09 JAN 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 07 JAN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPEECHES

SUBJECT: SOVIET SPEECH

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION
MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(JF)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
MATLOCK NSC/S	S JAN 10 1984	further action No further action Required	1/11	
C	1/17	No Further Action per Matlock		JM ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MR

S.
939
ib

RECEIVED

National Security Council
The White House

84 JAN 13 AM: 05

System # 7
Package # 0179

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>Wn</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

URGENT

✓10

**National Security Council
The White House**

84 JAN 10 5:21

System # I

Package # 079

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Stuff for immediate action to Matlock only.
New language due to PEM by COB 1/11/84.
Handcarry
Z

RECEIVED

URGENT

920

17

National Security Council
The White House

JAN 9 P 3:06

System # I

Package # 0179

Ra

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>wfa</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>RCM HAS SEEN</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>7</u>		<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat			<u>at all</u>
Situation Room			
<u>JP</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>J</u>	

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-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Don raises some very good points. Jack has a copy but is reluctant to make major changes in speed draft. I say we should make changes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/10

Jack Matthews,

But think we should go ahead and make some changes in the speech. Rather than get the speech writers all worked up at this point, why don't you work on changes along the line that Don covers and then send over to us before it goes to speechwriters. Then we can help in brokering the changes through the system including the President. J

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: President's Soviet Speech

Attached at TAB I is a clean copy of the text of the speech worked out yesterday in a meeting with Dick Darman, John Poindexter, Rick Burt and the speech writers.

State is still checking on the accuracy of the reference to a statement by Ustinov at the bottom of page 8.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the text for transmittal to the President.

Approve

J per Bond

Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I Text of speech

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3A(2), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Apr. 19, 2006
BY NARA *sm* DATE *7/30/09*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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SMF 7/30/2009

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PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (2)

FOIA

F00-204/2

FISCHER

Box Number

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12

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
74625	MEMO FORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET SPEECH	3	1/7/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (2)

FOIA

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25

12

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74626	DRAFT DRAFT SPEECH	31	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 12 JAN 84 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 12 JAN 84

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

inf 7/30/09

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPEECHES

SUBJECT: PRES SPEECH ON US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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NSCIFID

(VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

CJAN 13 1984

Ponderexter noted

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DISPATCH

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FILE

(A)

(C)

✓ 928 ✓

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National Security Council
The White House

84 JAN 12 P 5:49

System # I
Package # 0311
2a

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

<u>I = Information</u>	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Copy sent to MADLOCK, WM

The thought here is captured in speech draft.

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	WF	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	3	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS _____ Should be seen by: _____
Copy sent to MATLOCK. WM (Date/Time)

The thought here is captured in speech draft.



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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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SMF 7/30/2009

File Folder

PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (2)

FOIA

F00-204/2

FISCHER

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
74627	MEMO STEARMAN TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	1/12/1984	B1

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74628	DRAFT ATTACHMENT PAGES 12-15 FROM 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF US-USSR RELATIONS	4	ND	B1

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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
1800 K STREET, N. W., SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 833-2408

62
NAME HAS BEEN

1. 13. 84
3.25 pm.

Bud :

Just some hasty reactions
and some suggestions. It needs
something explicit on our concern
for European as well as Japanese
and Chinese interests. Between the
lines, as it now reads, it could have
the effect of generating foreign suspicions
that it is an appeal for a bilateral
US-Sov. deal.

Bud,

Zbig.

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 13, 1984
8:00 a.m.

63
Z.B.
comments in
red inside.
Z.S.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
JANUARY 16, 1984

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and 33 other nations at a European disarmament conference in Stockholm. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm with the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through times of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We have come a long way since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self-doubt and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During the last decade, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's,

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five times as many tanks and twice as many combat aircraft. And they began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range missile at a time when the United States had no comparable weapon.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is now in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. If so, I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: America's

deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve.

Yes, we are safer now. But to say that our restored deterrence has made the world safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through

negotiations. That is why 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace, we must do more to find areas of mutual interest and then build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 100 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Today, there are armed conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

mention martial law in Poland?

Most of these conflicts have their origins in local problems, but many have been exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting violence only exacerbate local tensions, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Further, such activity carries with it the risk of larger confrontations.

Would it not be better and safer if we could work together to assist people in areas of conflict in finding peaceful solutions to their problems? That should be our mutual goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet

perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed, we should be able to move beyond this immediate objective.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on armed forces -- some 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the simple truth is, American's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. *Soviet is at the highest.*

Just 3 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability and build confidence.

a good place to mention the total no. of SS 20's vs. U. Europe and China/Japan

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties. Compliance is important because we seek truly effective arms control. Unfortunately, there has been mounting evidence that provisions of agreements have been breached and that the Soviet Union takes advantage of any ambiguity in an agreement.

In response to a congressional request, a report to the Congress on these Soviet activities will be submitted in the next few days. It is clear that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled. We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and the broader arms control process.

future agreements should minimize areas of ambiguity - be easier to monitor

The examples I have cited illustrate why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working on these tasks, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Competition is normal; euphoria about détente and hysteria about Cold War are not.

Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak, we can do neither. Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is our strength of spirit, and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Our strength is necessary to deter war and to facilitate negotiated solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America can now offer something in return.

Strength and dialogue go hand-in-hand. We are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiations. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

Need something on loyalty to our friends and allies; we will not sacrifice their interests.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders, who have never shied from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

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Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed, over 2 years ago, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is the time to move from words to deeds.

The opportunity for progress in arms control exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it. We have proposed a

set of initiatives that would reduce substantially nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation.

Should note
the Soviets did so
in order to intimidate
the Europeans
and to
decouple US-
European
security.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has not set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START, and MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

An
outrageous
threat.

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed to exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct channels of communication. Last week, we had productive discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires both of us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

*Be careful. Smacks of a US-Soviet deal on the Middle East. 12
Should note the S.U. has consistently sabotaged all peace efforts in the M.E.*

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing sophisticated weapons and thousands of its military personnel into Syria. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in the region. Our efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets should use their influence to reduce tensions in the Middle East. The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad. We cannot remain silent to the tragic plight of such courageous people as Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Scharansky and Yosuf Begun.

Strange no mention of martial law in Poland.

Our request is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace

between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation will serve our two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. As I have said, we will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild war-ravaged economies in Europe and the Far East, including those of nations who had been our enemies. Indeed,

those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our ~~challenge~~ ^{good will}. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are poverty, disease and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences --" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose, for a moment, Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments? Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice,

she also teaches music." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.