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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 7/30/2009

File Folder PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (1)

FOIA

F00-204/2

Box Number 25

FISCHER

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
74623	DRAFT	11/22/83 DOS SPEECH DRAFT	24	11/22/1983	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8308653

RECEIVED 30 NOV 83 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 29 NOV 83

HILL, C

30 NOV 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPEECHES

SUBJECT SPEECH ON US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 02 DEC 83

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SIMS

ROBINSON

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# 8336691

8336849

LOG

NSCIFID

(CB VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 1/24 noted by MCFarlane

Jan

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

2

National Security Council The White House

System # I
Package # 0641

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Staff to Larry action
 Thompson } cont
 Sign }
 Memo -> P due 1/23

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RCM HAS SEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT: Presidential Address on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached at TAB A is the draft speech sent over by State on November 30. I believe that it is basically sound in terms of the policy it embodies, although it is longer than necessary and should be edited from the stylistic point of view.

The only addition I would recommend would be a paragraph or two directed to the "lessons of detente," which could be used to highlight the difference between our current policy and those of the past, and thereby put a specific Reagan Administration stamp on it. This could help forestall comment that his approach is too reminiscent of the policy of the mid-seventies.

You should be aware that State earlier sent us an entirely different draft (TAB B). This one is by Jeremy Azrael, and I understand that Secretary Shultz had read neither before they were sent over. Although it is not a bad speech, it does not spell out our policy for the future as clearly as the draft at TAB A, and I would recommend therefore that the latter be used as the basis for the speech.

If you and Secretary Shultz agree on the thrust of the draft at TAB A, necessary editing could be done rapidly.

DECLASSIFIED
 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
 BY NARA *smf* DATE *2/30/97*



8653 k
Add-on

8336849
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 30, 1983

83 NOV 30 PII: 01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

November 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Address on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Herewith a second draft speech of an address on
U.S.-Soviet relations that you requested.

Bonnie McKinlay
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State, July 21, 1997

By *Amf* NARA, Date *1/20/09*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (1)

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8336691 8653 30
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

83 NOV 29 10:43
NOV 29 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Speech on US-Soviet Relations

Per your request, please find attached the latest draft of the speech on US-Soviet relations.

for *Charles Hill*
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Last month marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of US-Soviet diplomatic relations. In announcing this step, President Roosevelt expressed his "trust" that US-Soviet relations would grow "closer and more intimate with each passing year." Unfortunately that trust has not been vindicated. Nor have our nations been able, as he hoped, "to cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of peace."

Experience has long since taught us not to premise our relations with Moscow on trust. We know we are in a long-term competition with a rival whose respect for our interests depends on our political resolve and economic and military strength. At the same time, however, we continue to share President Roosevelt's belief that it is essential to maintain an active dialogue with Moscow and to do everything possible to direct US-Soviet relations toward "the peaceful purposes of the civilized world." In an age of nuclear weapons, our responsibility to keep the peace means that we cannot afford to stop talking.

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For a brief but vital interlude during World War II, US-Soviet relations were overwhelmingly cooperative. Caught up in the spirit of this cooperation, optimists found it easy to think that it might last. They thought that the post-war Soviet regime might decisively curtail the domestic and international practices that had delayed recognition for sixteen years. Trusting that their own good will would prove contagious, these optimists hoped that there would be no repetition of the systematic mass murders and repressions of the 1920's and '30's; that Moscow's efforts to subvert foreign governments and foment Communist insurrections were a thing of the past; that the unprovoked invasions of Finland and Poland, and the Baltic states by the Red Army were wartime aberrations.

In the event, the war brought no change in Moscow's predatory conduct. The Soviets rejected the opportunity to maintain their alliance with us. They showed no interest in trying to translate our common victory into an enduring system of collective welfare and security. Instead, they presented us with an almost uninterrupted series of provocations and challenges.

As a result, the process of building a safer and more humane world became an uphill struggle -- a struggle in which our attempts to control the atom, to put an end to colonialism, to erect safeguards against aggression, and to foster international contacts and communication were countered by Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan, by the subjugation of the countries of Eastern Europe, by the invasion of South Korea, and by the lowering of an almost impenetrable Iron Curtain behind which tens of millions of people were deprived of their most elementary human rights. Moreover, the underlying Soviet drive to dominate and control has persisted to the present day. It has in many respects become even more threatening.

If we are to deal realistically with the continuing Soviet challenge to our values and interests, we must face the unpalatable facts. We are confronted by a regime that continues to oppress its own people and to stifle their aspirations for individual freedom and collective self-expression. The infamous Gulag still holds thousands of innocent prisoners whose only crimes are their religious convictions, their political principles, or their ethnic affiliations and commitments. Courageous spokesmen for civil rights continue to be confined in psychiatric prisons or, like Academician Andrei Sakharov, to be kept under virtual house arrest in remote provincial cities.

Would-be emigrants continue to be denied exit visas, while would-be reformers are stripped of their citizenship and driven into foreign exile. Political censorship is still ubiquitous; foreign broadcasts continue to be jammed; history continues to be rewritten; and privilege and power remain the monopoly of a self-perpetuating ruling elite that continues to sacrifice popular well-being to its own appetite for military might and foreign adventure.

The high priority that the Soviet leadership gives to increasing its military power is indicated by the uninterrupted growth in Soviet defense spending during the past fifteen years. In this period the military has consistently consumed between 13 and 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product. What makes this relentless military buildup so ominous is not only the resultant accumulation of highly destabilizing weapons but also, and above all, the fact that it has continued in international and domestic circumstances that would have led any other government to reconsider its course. Internationally, the buildup persisted throughout the period of "detente." It continued despite cutbacks in Western defense spending, despite agreements on arms limitations, and despite improvements in East-West political, economic, and cultural relations.

Domestically, the Soviet military buildup has persisted despite declining rates of economic growth, rising consumer dissatisfaction, and increasingly severe shortages of capital for badly needed plant modernization and investment in new industries..

Even allowing a large margin for Soviet tendencies toward "overinsurance," this military buildup greatly exceeds any reasonable defensive requirements. This is even clearer when one examines the actual mix of Soviet forces and weapons with their heavily offensive orientation. The evidence virtually compels one to conclude that the sustained buildup of the past fifteen years was undertaken to provide the wherewithal for precisely the sort of intimidation and aggression with which the Soviet Union has in fact confronted us in recent years.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union does not appear satisfied merely to accumulate military power. It uses it. Thirty years ago, Soviet tanks were employed against stone-throwing protesters in East Berlin -- just as they were subsequently employed to imprison the entire population of that city behind the unspeakable Berlin wall. In 1956, Soviet forces invaded Hungary to suppress the reform efforts of a Communist regime -- an operation that was repeated in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, where the Communist government had the temerity to come out in favor of "socialism with a human face."

Then, in 1979, came the Christmas-Eve invasion of Afghanistan, followed over the next two years by the heavy-handed political and military intimidation of Poland, which culminated in the Soviet-sponsored installation of General Jaruzelski's martial law regime. Not to speak of the Soviet proxy war against the peoples of Cambodia and the Soviet-supported deployment of Cuban forces to Ethiopia, Angola, and, most recently, Nicaragua. For Soviet leaders, military power is clearly something to be used without compunction wherever this can be done with impunity.

When Chairman Andropov took office the hope was widely voiced that he would take steps to reduce the scope and severity of the US-Soviet competition. Mindful of earlier disappointments, we were not willing to lower our guard in anticipation of a radical change in Soviet behavior. Neither, however, were we insensitive to the possibilities of change. We intensified our dialogue with Moscow in order to make certain that our concerns and our desires for an improved relationship are clearly understood. And we reciprocated the few small steps that could be interpreted as possible harbingers of greater Soviet responsiveness and flexibility.

We were heartened by Soviet willingness to end the long ordeal of the Pentecostalist families who took refuge in the US Embassy in Moscow five years ago.

We were also pleased that the Soviets stopped withholding certain data that were essential for a serious evaluation of their START position. And we were gratified when they finally acknowledged that warheads should be the unit of account at the INF talks in Geneva. We did not overestimate the significance of these steps, but we welcome them and hope that they would be followed by others of greater substance.

It was against this background that I prepared for the extensive talks I was scheduled to hold with Foreign Minister Gromyko this past September. [It was against this background that I instructed Secretary of State Shultz to plan to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko both in Madrid and then again in New York this past September.] Had Foreign Minister Gromyko approached our talks in a constructive spirit, the President had authorized me to invite him to the White House for a follow-on meeting for rapid progress. [Had Foreign Minister Gromyko approached these talks in a constructive spirit, I had authorized Secretary Shultz to invite him...] In the event, of course, the ruthless shutdown of Korean Airlines Flight 7, Moscow's brazen and deceitful reaction to that tragedy, and Foreign Minister Gromyko's unacceptable behavior at the first of our scheduled meetings in Madrid [at the first of his scheduled meetings with Secretary Shultz in Madrid] made it clear that no real progress in our relations was immediately in the offing.

Thanks to our in-depth understanding of the nature of the Soviet system and the realism of our underlying approach to US-Soviet relations, we were neither surprised nor disoriented by the fact that our hopes had once again been disappointed. However, we found it discouraging that Moscow could still not bring itself to observe even minimal standards of international civility.

Far from utilizing the KAL shootdown as an excuse to freeze US-Soviet relations, as Soviet spokesmen like to allege, we have combined our decisive condemnation of Moscow's irresponsible conduct with a clear demonstration of our willingness -- indeed, our determination -- to continue our quest for a more stable and productive relationship. While acting together with others to protest the Soviet Union's trigger-happiness and stonewalling, we have participated actively and constructively in the preparations for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which is scheduled to open next month in Stockholm and to consider a range of measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack and accidental war. And, we have tabled new and yet more forthcoming proposals at both the START talks and the INF talks in Geneva. In our eyes, there is no contradiction between firmness in the face of Soviet misconduct and flexibility in the pursuit of equitable agreements.

On the contrary, we have always believed that our strategy of building strength and defending human rights should complement and reenforce a parallel strategy of serious and comprehensive negotiation.

Unfortunately, the Soviet approach to our most important negotiations has been heavily onesided and essentially propagandistic. Instead of joining us in an effort to resolve common problems through a process of mutual give-and-take, they have coupled verbal reassurances and token concessions with intransigent demands and take-it-or-leave-it offers. Most recently, they chose to walk out of the INF [and START] negotiations in Geneva instead of seriously addressing the new proposals we had just put forward in an effort to meet many of their expressed concerns. Such bullying will not work and is utterly inconsistent with the Soviet Union's responsibility as a nuclear superpower. What is needed is not a display of petulance but a display of statesmanship on behalf of international stability and peace. Accordingly, we call on the Soviets to resume negotiations.....

For our part, we recognize that no true negotiating outcome can incorporate all of the preferences of just one of the parties. As has been true in the past we are prepared to be flexible and to entertain any forthcoming, compromises that are

consistent with our fundamental objectives and protect our vital interests. These absolutely indispensable preconditions mean that there will be certain issues on which we cannot and will not bend. But, given reciprocity, there will be other issues on which we can. This was the spirit in which we approached the US-Soviet negotiations on the Long-Term Grain Agreement which was concluded in August. It is the spirit that governed our conduct at the long but successful CSCE negotiations in Madrid. And it is the spirit behind our START and INF positions, as well as the confidence-building measures we will propose at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Our goal in all of our negotiations with Moscow is to foster better and safer relations on the basis of real improvements in Soviet conduct. If we can achieve this, we can reduce the costs of competition, the risks of confrontation, and the possibilities of conflict. We believe this is a goal that is entirely consistent with the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union. It is a goal that we believe prudent and responsible Soviet leaders ought to share.

In bargaining with the Soviets, we are prepared for modest advances as well as major breakthroughs. We have made ambitious proposals that, if accepted, could put the

Soviet-American relationship on a fundamentally new and much safer footing. We have also made more limited proposals designed to stabilize the competition at the margins.

Our arms control strategy is the best illustration of how we have set our sights both high and low. We have offered a plan for the deepest cuts in strategic weapons ever proposed in Soviet-American talks on this subject. In accordance with the guidelines of the Scowcroft Commission and the counsel of congressional leaders of both parties, we have tabled a START proposal that calls for a mutual build-down of both Soviet and American strategic forces under a formula that requires the destruction of two missiles for every new missile that is deployed. We have also proposed the full abolition of an entire class of nuclear weapons -- intermediate-range missiles -- on our side as well as theirs. At the same time, I have instructed our negotiators to explore any indication of Soviet flexibility. In INF, while continuing to believe zero is the most desirable outcome, we have offered the Soviets an agreement that would require less drastic reductions. We have asked whether 420 warheads on each side would be acceptable, given Moscow's apparent determination to retain the better part of its overblown arsenal.

In other arms talks as well, we have favored any steps, however small, that promised to strengthen stability. We are hopeful, for example, that agreement will be possible on such steps as improving the "hot line". As I have already mentioned, other so-called "confidence- and security-building measures" have been under discussion directly with the Soviets, and similar proposals will be discussed at the Europe-wide conference that will open next month in Stockholm. Working again with our allies, we are also actively exploring ways to make long-overdue progress at the Vienna talks on a mutual, balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

In dealing with Soviet policies in the Third World, we have followed the same two-fold approach -- doing what we can to keep the competition in bounds while exploring the possibility of more fundamental improvement. Naturally, our first priority has had to be to prevent new instances of Soviet expansionism and interference in the Third World. This goal has guided us in trying to create a shield for the independence of Caribbean and Central American nations.

But, perhaps more ambitiously, we have also tried to point the Soviet Union toward a more constructive role. We have given our full support to UN mediation to secure a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Because withdrawal of Cuban

forces from Angola would contribute so much to final achievement of independence for Namibia, we have kept this set of issues high on the Soviet-American agenda. And, because the development needs of the Third World are so great, we have called on the Soviet Union to assume an appropriate share of the effort in this area, and to pursue policies that complement those of other industrialized nations.

Finally, in all our dialogue with the Soviet Union we have paid constant attention to human rights. And here too we have expressed our interest in two kinds of changes. We have pressed for concrete, specific, immediate improvements, both in the treatment of particular individuals and in the way in which these issues are discussed between East and West. We have, for example, in concluding the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, been able to agree on two human rights follow-on meetings in the next two years, to address such specific issues as family reunification. Similarly, the Soviets know that US law explicitly links most-favored nation trading status to freedom of emigration.

But, even as we focus on these matters, we have tried to reiterate the larger significance of human rights for the future of the Soviet-American competition. The ever-broader enjoyment of human rights by Soviet citizens would be a real

and enduring contribution to peace. It was with this in mind that the Western nations put so much effort into widening the obligations that European governments assume toward their own people when they participate in CSCE. Nothing would so strengthen European security as Soviet respect for those obligations.

Our approach on every one of these issues is flexible but also demanding. Above all, we know the difference between major results and minor ones. We will never dismiss small gains as valueless, but neither will we settle for a little and pretend that it is a lot. The American people have had more than enough of a cycle of exaggerated expectations and extreme disappointments. Nor will we mistake progress in a single area for a more comprehensive breakthrough. A true restructuring of such a deeply competitive relationship requires real commitment and follow-through. We hope the Soviet leadership understands this point clearly: if they desire a major improvement in relations, then minor adjustments in their policies, let alone cosmetic changes, will not suffice.

If we were to see more significant changes in Soviet behavior, we would be prepared to respond appropriately. If we could eliminate some of the most important points of conflict, it would prove much easier to solve the remaining problems that

divide us. On this basis we could begin to develop a relationship of very broad mutual benefit indeed. We hope that the Soviet leadership is ready to rethink its behavior sufficiently thoroughly to bring such a relationship about.

This is the outlook that has guided -- and will continue to guide -- this Administration at the bargaining table. Its practical meaning should be clear enough. In particular, it indicates the very pointed questions that the Soviet leaders should ask themselves as they review their policies.

If, for example, the Soviet Union will not accept equitable arms agreements and refuses to yield any of the one-sided advantages they have built up, then the United States and its allies will have to continue their modernization programs to neutralize these advantages. Is there any Soviet gain in this result? We believe not. We believe that Soviet interests were not well served in the past by rejecting American proposals -- such as the arms control offers put forward by President Carter in March 1977, at the beginning of his term. At that time he offered a choice between radical cuts and more limited but stabilizing measures. Looking back, surely the Soviet leadership must wonder what, if anything, it gained -- in the long run -- by flatly rejecting both.

Similarly, if the Soviet Union insists on pursuing policies in the Third World, and not least in our own hemisphere, that threaten us and our friends, then we will have to respond equally strongly. Isn't the level of tension in the third-world too high already? We believe so, and believe the Soviet view should be the same. Looking back, surely the Soviet leadership must wonder what it gained --in the long run-- from its confrontation with the United States in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Finally, if improvement in Soviet human rights performance means nothing more than occasional, cynically manipulated releases of individuals, then the Soviets cannot expect that international -- and internal -- pressures for better performance will stop growing. Doesn't the Soviet Union pay a price at home and abroad for this censure, and for the isolation that goes with it? We believe the price is large and steadily increasing. Let the Soviets review the record themselves. Looking back, surely the leadership must have had second thoughts about what was really gained --in the long run-- by rejecting the cooperative possibilities of the Marshall Plan and denying its own citizens and the citizens of Eastern Europe the benefits of membership in a broader European community.

We hope the Soviets are reflecting on some of the opportunities that have been lost as a result of their failure to make major changes in their conduct. If so, they may draw appropriate lessons for the future. Isn't it clear that the West would respond differently to Soviet initiatives -- such as proposed pledges of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- once the Soviet conventional threat to Europe had been reduced? Wouldn't the Soviet Union be able to claim a legitimate role in international peacemaking if it did not consistently stimulate or prolong conflicts that obstruct the peacemaking efforts of others? And would not other countries view cooperation with the Soviet leadership differently if it were at last prepared to cooperate with its own people?

Nothing in our experience entitles us to expect that the Soviet leaders will answer these questions as we hope. Yet we should not assume that they have learned less from their history than we. We believe that in weighing their choices the Soviet leadership must eventually conclude, if only to themselves, that the policy of rejection has not served their country well. Furthermore, they must realize that it is bound to prove even more costly in the future thanks to our success in rebuilding both our own economic, political, and military strength and the strength of our friends and allies.

As a result of our success, we believe that we have shaken Moscow's former confidence that what it calls "the correlation of forces" has permanently shifted in its favor. Our credibility as a tough and resolute competitor has undoubtedly been enhanced, and the Soviet leadership now knows that it must bear the full consequences of continued efforts to encroach on Western interests. This has not prevented Moscow from testing our resolve and threatening to escalate US-Soviet competition. On the contrary, the Soviets have repeatedly tried to intimidate us and our allies and have recently tried to foster a full-fledged war scare. Nevertheless, Moscow's growing respect for our deterrent power has almost certainly reinforced Moscow's caution and diminished the actual risk of a US-Soviet military confrontation. The Soviets are no more eager than we are to commit mutual suicide -- and no less aware of the absolutely catastrophic effects of a nuclear war.

The avoidance of nuclear war is by far the most important interest we and the Soviets have in common. But it is by no means the only one. While we are fated to be competitors, we do not believe that our competition has to -- or should be allowed to -- preclude important elements of cooperation. If Moscow insists on more intensive competition, we are prepared for it. For our part, however, we remain ready and eager to improve relations. Accordingly, we invite the Soviet

leadership to remember the historic opportunities it has missed and to capitalize on the opportunities that are now at hand -- opportunities to reduce the danger of war, to curb the arms race, to peacefully settle destabilizing regional conflicts, and to promote the welfare of our own citizens and the social and economic development of the peoples of the "third world."

It is long past time to seize these opportunities together. President John F. Kennedy spoke of a similar challenge not long before his death when he reminded us that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. There could be no greater tribute to President Kennedy than to embark on that journey today. [To this end, I have invited/I have instructed Secretary Shultz to invite Foreign Minister Gomyko to meet with me/him in Stockholm in mid-January in conjunction with the opening of the CDE.] I call on the Soviet Union to accept this invitation, to take a constructive approach to the talks, and to join us in a journey down the road to peace.

S/P:JAzrael

Wang. no 0194C