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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas

File Folder: USSR Vol. XVI 3/1/84 - 4/31/84 [7 of 7] - Box ~~10~~ 24

Date: May 12, 1999

2/29/84 - 3/2/84

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	1549z 1 p. partial P 7/17/60 F99-002 #21	3/2/84	P3, F3
2. cable	1650z 1 p. partial P " " #22	3/2	P3, F3
3. cable	1607z 2 p. p. 2, partial P " " #23	3/2	P3, F3
4. cable	1623z 1 p. partial P " " #24	3/2	P3, F3
5. cable	1627z 1 p. partial P " " #25	3/2	P3, F3
6. cable	1641z 2 p. p. 2, partial P " " #26	3/2	P3, F3
7. cable	1704z 2 p. p. 2, partial P " " #27	3/2	P3, F3
8. cable	1707z 2 p. p. 2, partial P " " #28	3/2	P3, F3
9. cable	1718z 2 p. p. 2, partial P " " #29	3/2	P3, F3
10. cable	1728z 2 p. p. 2, partial P " " #30	3/2	P3, F3
11. cable	1812z 2 p. p. 2, partial P " " #31	3/2	P3, F3
12. cable	1819z 2 p. p.2, partial P " " #32	3/2	P3, F3
13. cable	1820z 2 p. p.2, partial P " " #33	3/2	P3, F3
14. cable	1831z 2 p. p.2, partial P " " #34	3/2	P3, F3
15. cable	1901z 2 p. p.2, partial P " " #35	3/2	P3, F3
16. cable	1941z 2 p. p.2, partial P " " #36	3/2	P3, F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE
File Folder: USSR Vol. XVI 3/1/84 - 4/3/84 [7 of 7] Box ~~10~~ 24

Archivist: cas
Date: May 12, 1999

2/20/84 - 3/2/84

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. cable	1841z 3 p. p.3, partial P 7/17/00 F99-002 #37	3/2	P3, F3
18. cable	021917z 12 p.	3/2/84	P1, F1
19. report	re Review of Soviet Military Power p. 6-17 only (42 p.)	nd	P1, F1
20. memo	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane 1 p. R 7/17/00 F99-002 #39	3/1/84	P1, F1
21. memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane re Gromyko speech on foreign policy 2 p. R " " " #40	2/29/84	P1, F1
22. profile sheet	1 p. R 7/17/00 F99-002 #42	3/1/84	P1, F1
23. memo	charles Hill to various 1 p. (1725)	2/29/84	P1, F1, P3, F3
24. paper	re collision 1 p.	nd	P1, F1
25. chronology	re collision 3 p.	nd	P1, F1
26. map	1 p.	nd	P1, F1
27. diagram	1 p.	nd	P1, F1
28. memo	Matlock to McFarlane re meeting of President with Russian emigre writers 1 p. R 7/17/00 F99-002 #48	4/2/84	P1, F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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FBI 049

TEXT OF CHERNENKO SPEECH TO ELECTION MEETING

TAKE 1 -- CHERNENKO SPEECH

LD021524 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1510 GMT 2 MAR 84

(*PARTY AND PEOPLE UNITED* -- TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW MARCH 2 TASS -- FOLLOWS THE FULL TEXT OF TODAY'S SPEECH BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO TO VOTERS WHO NOMINATED HIM AS THEIR CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR:

"DEAR CONRADES,

ALLOW ME TO EXTEND MY SINCERE THANKS TO ALL THE SPEAKERS HERE, TO ALL WORKING PEOPLE OF MOSCOW'S KUYBYSHEV DISTRICT WHO NOMINATED ME AS THEIR CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR. I REGARD THEIR CONFIDENCE AS SUPPORT FOR OUR PARTY'S LENINIST COURSE, AS APPROVAL OF THE ACTIVITY OF ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE, OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL DO MY BEST TO JUSTIFY THE HIGH HONOUR OF BEING YOUR DEPUTY.

QUITE RECENTLY, WE SUFFERED A HEAVY LOSS -- YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV, AN OUTSTANDING FIGURE OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE, PASSED AWAY. HE WAS A LEADER OF THE LENINIST TYPE. HE COULD NOT STAND ROUTINE AND STEREOTYPE, * (WORDS INDISTINCT) HOW) TO OVERCOME INERTIA AND ATTUNE PEOPLE TO CONCERTED WORK IN THE NAME OF STRENGTHENING THE MOTHERLAND'S RIGHT, IN THE NAME OF PEACE ON EARTH. IT IS UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE LAUNCHED MAJOR POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S LIFE.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1549Z

* ROUTINE AND STEREOTYPE, AND KNEW HOW

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 899-002 # 21

C/S NARA, Date 7/17/00

RELEASED

FBIS 063

CORRECTION 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH),.

LD021604

MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH AT 1525 GMT ON 2 MARCH RETRANSMITS THE FIRST TASS TAKE OF THE CHERNENKO SPEECH RUN AS FBIS 049 WHICH ALLOWS FOR THE FOLLOWING FILL:

LAST PARAGRAPH, LINE FOUR, MAKE READ///ROUTINE AND STEREOTYPE, AND KNEW HOW TO OVERCOME///(SUPPLYING INDISTINCT WORDS).

2 MAR 1650Z

DECLASSIFIED IN PART **RELEASED**
NLS **199-002 # 22**
CAS NARA, DATE **7/17/00**

FBI 053

TAKE 2 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///THE COUNTRY'S LIFE.

LD021538

(TEXT) THE COLLECTIVELY DEVELOPED GUIDELINES ON THE KEY DIRECTIONS OF SOCIETY'S DEVELOPMENT, EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OF LATE CONSTITUTE A WEIGHTY POLITICAL CAPITAL, AND WE WILL TAKE CARE OF IT, AND MULTIPLY IT.

COMRADES,

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS NEARING COMPLETION. THIS YEAR, IT WAS CHARACTERISED BY GREAT ACTIVITY, BUSINESSLIKE COURSE OF VOTERS' MEETINGS. IT BECAME VIVID EVIDENCE OF THE UNSHAKEABLE UNITY OF THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE. THE CPSU ATTACHES IMMENSE IMPORTANCE TO THE ELECTIONS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET. FOR THIS IS, IN FACT, AN ACCOUNT BY SOVIET POWER TO THE WORKING PEOPLE. THIS IS ALSO A FORM OF THE MASSES' CONTROL OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF THOSE WHOM THEY EMPOWERED TO GOVERN THE SOCIALIST STATE.

IT IS IN KEEPING WITH THE PARTY'S TRADITIONS TO CONDUCT AN OPEN, HONEST CONVERSATION WITH THE MASSES. PRECISELY THIS APPROACH PERMEATES THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S ADDRESS SETTING FORTH THE PARTY'S ELECTION PLATFORM.

WHEN ADDRESSING VOTERS, MY COLLEAGUES IN THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SPOKE IN DETAIL ABOUT OUR HOME AND FOREIGN POLICY, ABOUT PLANS FOR THE FUTURE. ALLOW ME AS WELL TO SET FORTH SOME IDEAS ON THIS MATTER.

1.

YOU KNOW WELL HOW MUCH ATTENTION THE PARTY IS GIVING TO ECONOMIC ISSUES. THEY FEATURED MOST PROMINENTLY IN THE WORK AND DECISIONS OF THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS. THEY WERE SUBJECT OF A REALISTIC ANALYSIS AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S PLENUMS IN NOVEMBER 1982 AND IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR. THE IMPORTANCE OF A NUMBER OF CARDINAL PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS STRESSED AT THE FEBRUARY PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

WHAT CAN BE SAID IN THIS RESPECT ABOUT THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE PREVIOUS ELECTIONS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET?

(MORE)

2 MAR 1607Z

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

BY SP8 F99-002 #23

045 NARA Date 7/17/00

///THE SUPREME SOVIET?

LD021544

(TEXT) ON THE WHOLE, THIS WAS A FRUITFUL PERIOD. THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTIVE FORCES BECAME STRONGER AND SUBSTANTIALLY RENOVATED. MORE THAN A THOUSAND INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, FITTED OUT WITH MODERN MACHINERY, WERE MADE OPERATIONAL. THE RECONSTRUCTION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE OPERATING PLANTS AND FACTORIES WERE CONDUCTED ON A LARGE SCALE. BUT, I'LL PUT IT BLUNTLY, LESS WAS DONE IN THIS SPHERE THAN WE WOULD LIKE. THE FUEL AND ENERGY BASE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY WAS DEVELOPED. ABOUT 40,000 KILOMETRES OF TRUNK GAS PIPELINES WERE BUILT -- UNPRECEDENTED SCALES AND TENPO IN WORLD PRACTICE. WE SUCCEEDED IN TRANSFERRING A MULTITUDE OF FACTORIES, CITIES AND VILLAGES TO USE OF NATURAL GAS. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE USING GAS AT HOME GREW BY 30 MILLION.

THESE YEARS SAW SUBSTANTIAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN MANY OTHER FIELDS TOO. A UNIQUE NUCLEAR REACTOR WITH A CAPACITY OF 1.5 MILLION KILOWATT, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS DEVELOPED IN OUR COUNTRY. POWERFUL ATOMIC ICE-BREAKERS, BUILT IN OUR COUNTRY, OPENED A NEW CHAPTER IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE ARCTIC. MINERAL PROSPECTING WITH THE HELP OF ULTRADEEP WELLS WAS STARTED. TECHNICAL LASERS ARE NOW EXTENSIVELY USED IN INDUSTRY AND MEDICINE.

QUITE A LOT WAS DONE TO DEVELOP AGRICULTURE. POWER AVAILABILITY PER WORKER IN THIS SPHERE INCREASED BY 30 PER CENT. MINERAL FERTILIZER DELIVERIES TO COLLECTIVE AND STATE FARMS GREW NEARLY BY A THIRD. COMBINED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE OF NEW FORMS OF ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, THIS PRODUCES TANGIBLE RESULTS.

JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES. WE WERE UNLUCKY WITH THE WEATHER LAST YEAR AS WELL, BUT THE GRAIN CROP EXCEEDED 190 MILLION TONNES. PRODUCTIVITY OF LIVE-STOCK FARMING NOTICEABLY GREW TOO. ALL THIS CONFIRMS ONCE AGAIN THAT WELL-ORGANIZED, PERSISTENT WORK YIELDS FRUIT EVEN IN DIFFICULT CONDITIONS. THE CONCRETE POINT AT ISSUE NOW IS MOBILIZING PEOPLE, PREPARING ALL MACHINERY AND ENSURING A SMOOTH ORGANIZATION OF FIELD-WORK. THERE IS NO TIME TO WASTE -- THE SPRING SOWING IS NOT FAR OFF. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO SEE TO THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WINTERING OF CATTLE.

(MORE)

FBIS 057

TAKE 4 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///WINTERING OF CATTLE.

LD021548

(TEXT) DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS, THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE COMPELLED US TO DIVERT CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES TO THE NEEDS CONNECTED WITH THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY. BUT WE DID NOT EVEN THINK OF CURTAILING SOCIAL PROGRAMMES, SINCE THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF ALL OUR WORK IS IMPROVING THE WELL-BEING OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. AND OUR APPROACH TO THIS TASK IS BROAD. WE WANT THE PEOPLE NOT ONLY TO BE BETTER OFF MATERIALLY, BUT ALSO HEALTHY PHYSICALLY, DEVELOPED SPIRITUALLY, ACTIVE IN SOCIAL LIFE.

FOUR-FIFTHS OF THE NATIONAL INCOME WERE DIRECTED OVER THE PAST PERIOD TO PEOPLE'S WELL-BEING. THE REAL INCOMES OF THE POPULATION INCREASED. THE PUBLIC CONSUMPTION FUNDS BECAME RICHER AS WELL. AND THIS IS THE SOURCE FROM WHICH MONEY IS DRAWN FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH SERVICE, PAYMENT OF PENSIONS, AND UPKEEP OF HOUSES.

OUR FOOD PROGRAMME, AS WELL AS THE PROGRAMME OF DEVELOPING THE MANUFACTURE OF CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES SYSTEM, CURRENTLY BEING DRAWN UP, ARE ALSO DIRECTED AT RAISING THE PEOPLE'S WELL-BEING. MUCH IS BEING DONE NOW TO EXPAND THE PRODUCTION OF POPULAR COMMODITIES OF GOOD QUALITY. THE MODERNIZATION OF LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES HAS BEEN STARTED. IN THIS AREA, WE ARE ACTIVELY COOPERATING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

AMONG THE PARTY'S PERMANENT PRIORITIES ARE SUCH VITAL PROBLEMS AS CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING, CHILD-CARE CENTRES, EXPANSION OF THE NETWORK OF HOSPITALS AND POLYCLINICS. LAST YEAR, MORE THAN TWO MILLION FLATS WERE BUILT -- MORE THAN IN ANY OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS. THE HOUSING CONSTRUCTION TARGET FOR THE CURRENT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD IS VERY HIGH. BUT THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT IT WILL BE MET.

WE REALIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THE HOUSING PROBLEM IS FAR FROM BEING RESOLVED, AND WE WILL LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE FURTHER HOUSING CONDITIONS. WHAT THIS IMPLIES IS NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTION WITH STATE MONEY. IT APPEARS THAT THE EXPANSION OF COOPERATIVE AND INDIVIDUAL CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED MORE VIGOROUSLY. AS TO KINDERGARTENS AND NURSERIES, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN EASING THE TENSION HERE. MUCH, HOWEVER, REMAINS TO BE DONE.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1623Z

DECLASSIFIED IN PART / RELEASED
NLS #99-002 #124
By CAS, NARA, Date 7/17/00

FBIS 058

TAKE 5 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///TO BE DONE.

LD021558

(TEXT) IT IS PLANNED TO INCREASE IN THE COMING YEARS THE SALARIES OF TEACHERS AND OTHER WORKERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EDUCATION. ATTENTION WILL BE GIVEN IN THE FUTURE AS WELL TO WAR AND LABOUR VETERANS, LARGE FAMILIES, NEWLY-WEDS, AND TO IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE IN GENERAL.

IT IS, PROBABLY, WORTHWHILE MAKING SPECIAL MENTION OF THE YEAR 1983. AS YOU KNOW, THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WORKED OUT IN NOVEMBER 1982 A PACKAGE OF MEASURES WHICH IMPARTED GREATER DYNAMISM TO OUR ECONOMY. WE STARTED OVERCOMING THE UNFAVORABLE TREND OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD WHEN ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES HAD SLOWED DOWN. OF PARTICULAR VALUE IS THAT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY STARTED GROWING FASTER AND THAT QUALITY INDICATORS IN MANY BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY IMPROVED.

TO TAKE YOUR DISTRICT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ENTIRE INCREMENT IN INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT HAS BEEN OBTAINED WITHOUT INCREASING THE WORKFORCE. YOU HAVE ACTIVELY JOINED THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN FOR OVERFULFILLING THE PLAN ASSIGNMENT ON LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND REDUCTION OF PRODUCTION COSTS. ALLOW ME TO CONGRATULATE WITH PERSONAL LABOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS MARIA DMITRIYEVNA POLESCHCHUK, A WEAVER, ALEKSANDR MIKHAILOYICH GORBUNOV, A TURNER, NINA SERGEYEVNA IZHAILOVA, A GLASS-BLOWER, ALEKSANDR NIKOLAYEVICH SEROV, A FITTER, ALL FRONT-RANKING WORKERS OF KUIBYSHEY DISTRICT.

OF COURSE, COMRADES, WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IS ONLY A BEGINNING OF GREAT WORK. THERE ARE STILL MANY THINGS, AND URGENT ONES, TO BE DONE. WE CAN AND WE WANT TO MOVE FORWARD FASTER. WE CAN AND SHOULD BE MUCH MORE VIGOROUS IN SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF INTENSIFYING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. FOR IT IS ONLY ON THIS BASIS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO MEET EVER FULLER THE MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1627Z

899-002 #25
CAS 2/17/00
/RELEASED

FBIS 061

TAKE 6 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

//OF THE PEOPLE.

LD021612

(TEXT) IN BRIEF, SPEAKING ABOUT PLANS FOR THE FUTURE, ONE SHOULD NEVER FORGET ONE SIMPLE TRUTH: IN ORDER TO LIVE BETTER, IT IS NECESSARY TO WORK BETTER. IN ORDER TO ADVANCE SUCCESSFULLY IN IMPLEMENTING OUR SOCIAL PROGRAMMES, IT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A STABLE, DYNAMIC GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY AND, ABOVE ALL, ITS EFFICIENCY. THIS WAS THE TOPIC BOTH AT THE DECEMBER AND THE FEBRUARY PLENUMS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

WE HAVE SUCCEEDED SO FAR IN IMPROVING ECONOMIC INDICATORS CHIEFLY THROUGH RESERVES LYING, SO TO SAY, AT HAND, ON THE SURFACE. WE STARTED ENHANCING ORDER, ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE. AND THIS IMMEDIATELY PRODUCED A NOTICEABLE ECONOMIC EFFECT.

IT IS NECESSARY TO ADVANCE FURTHER -- TOWARDS PROFOUND QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

OUR ECONOMY STILL HAS NO FEW SECTORS WHERE LAGGING JUST LEAPS TO THE EYE. THE AVAILABLE PRODUCTION POTENTIAL IS FAR FROM BEING FULLY USED. THE EXPERIMENTAL BASE OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING IS IMPERMISSIBLY WEAK. THE SHARE OF ARDUOUS MANUAL AND UNSKILLED WORK IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION IS BEING REDUCED SLOWLY.

IT IS A MUST THAT WE ENSURE A SWIFT AND CONTINUOUS MODERNIZATION OF ALL BRANCHES OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST ACHIEVEMENTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. THIS IS ONE OF OUR BASIC TASKS. WITHOUT THIS, PROGRESS OF THE SOCIETY IS SIMPLY UNTHINKABLE.

THE PARTY ALSO LAYS KEEN EMPHASIS UPON THE ISSUE OF STARTING A LARGE-SCALE IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM. THE MAIN GUIDELINES FOR THIS WORK HAVE BEEN DEFINED. THEY FULLY ACCORD WITH THE LENINIST PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM.

WE SHOULD, NO DOUBT, STRENGTHEN CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING, ENSURE THAT THEY ARE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE AND FLEXIBLE. THINGS SHOULD BE ARRANGED IN SUCH A WAY THAT NATIONAL-LEVEL ECONOMIC BODIES DIRECT ALL THEIR RESOURCES AT RESOLVING THE QUESTIONS OF REALLY KEY IMPORTANCE FOR THE COUNTRY. SOME OF THEIR PRESENT DUTIES CAN WELL BE HANDED OVER TO SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS, EITHER BRANCH OR LOCAL ONES.

WE HAVE AND WILL CURB ANY ACTIONS THAT ARE DICTATED BY NARROW DEPARTMENTAL OR PAROCHIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

BUT, CONRADES, NO DENYING IT, THERE ARE STILL INSTANCES WHEN LOCAL INITIATIVE IS FETTERED UNDER THE PRETEXT OF CURBING PAROCHIALISM. THAT WON'T DO AT ALL. ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC INITIATIVE, CREATIVE WORK AT THE LEVELS OF ECONOMIC REGIONS, AMALGAMATIONS AND FACTORIES IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS PRECISELY AS A COUNTRY-WIDE CHARACTER.

THIS IS, I'D SAY, ALSO THE QUESTION OF FURTHER CONSOLIDATING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRY -- ONE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE PARTY'S LENINIST POLICY. IT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A GROWTH OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF EACH REPUBLIC TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPING THE SOVIET UNION'S ECONOMY AS A SINGLE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMPLEX. OF COURSE, THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE SHOULD BE PLACED HIGHEST. THIS DIRECTLY FOLLOWS FROM THE INTERNATIONALIST NATURE OF OUR SOCIETY; FROM OUR WORLD OUTLOOK.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1641Z

CAS F99-002426
7/17/00
/Teleased

FBIS 066

TAKE 7 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///OUR WORLD OUTLOOK.

LD021626

(TEXT) FORMS OF MANAGEMENT, COMRADES, SHOULD CORRESPOND TO PRESENT-DAY DEMANDS. THIS WILL BE, UNDOUBTEDLY, FACILITATED BY THE CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS. THEIR ESSENCE IS THAT MORE RIGHTS BE GIVEN TO ENTERPRISES AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY ENHANCED, WHILE EXCESSIVE SUPERVISION FROM THE CENTRE BE REMOVED. EXPERIMENTAL TESTING WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO TURN FROM THE STAGE OF SEARCH TO CONFIDENT ADVANCE. BUT, OF COURSE, COMRADES, THE SEARCH FOR AND INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO ENTERPRISES INVOLVED IN THIS OR ANOTHER EXPERIMENT.

- IT IS, FOR EXAMPLE, OBVIOUS FOR ALL THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO THE UNIVERSAL INTRODUCTION OF COST-ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES. EVERYTHING THAT IS STANDING IN ITS WAY SHOULD BE REMOVED.

ONE OF OUR CHIEF CONCERNS IS THAT THE SOCIALIST PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO ONE'S WORK BE PUT INTO LIFE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE. THOSE WHO WORK WITH COMPLETE DEVOTION SHOULD BY ALL MEANS HAVE A BETTER PAY. SOME MAY SAY: BUT WE CAN, EVEN TODAY, PUNISH SLACKERS FINANCIALLY AND AWARD BONUSES TO CONSCIENTIOUS WORKERS. THIS IS SO. BUT, IT SEEMS, THE PENALTIES STILL LACK STRICTNESS, WHILE MATERIAL INCENTIVE LACKS PROPER FAIRNESS AND, SOMETIMES, I WOULD SAY, GENEROSITY. THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DEALT WITH, AND WITHOUT DELAY EITHER.

IT IS NECESSARY TO OVERCOME RESOLUTELY AND CONSERVATISM AND SLUGGISHNESS. IN BRIEF, THE SLOGAN OF THE DAY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE SHOULD BE: FROM THE CORRECT IDEA, PRIMED WITH EXPERIENCE -- TO BOLD ACTIONS!

AS YOU SEE, COMRADES, A GREAT DEAL OF WORK IS BEING DONE TO RAISE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. THIS, NATURALLY, IS NOT EASY WORK. AND THEN, AT THE HEIGHT OF THIS WORK, IN JUNE LAST YEAR, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE GATHERED FOR A PLENARY MEETING TO EXAMINE QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL WORK OF THE PARTY AMONG THE MASSES. WHY? WHAT CONNECTION IS THERE WITH OUR ECONOMIC TASKS? THE RELATIONSHIP IS DIRECT, INSEPARABLE.

THE MATTER IS THAT TODAY, AS NEVER BEFORE, SUCCESSES OF PARTY GUIDANCE OF SOCIETY DEPEND ON THE CONSISTENT OBSERVANCE OF THE LENINIST PRINCIPLE OF THE UNITY OF IDEOLOGICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND ECONOMIC WORK. BUILDING SOCIALISM AND PERFECTING IT MEANS NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN FACTORIES AND POWER PLANTS, MAKING OUR LAND, OUR VILLAGES AND CITIES MORE BEAUTIFUL. THIS IS A NECESSARY, BUT FAR FROM SOLE CONCERN OF COMMUNISTS. WHILE TRANSFORMING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF PEOPLE, IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE FOR THEIR IDEOLOGICAL AND MORAL ELEVATION. OBVIOUSLY, THE TASKS OF PERFECTING DEVELOPED SOCIALISM CANNOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TO SPIRITUALLY DEVELOP PEOPLE AND THEIR SOCIALIST EDUCATION.

- IT IS PRECISELY THE ESSENCE OF THE JUNE PLENUM'S DECISIONS THAT ALL CREATIVE FORCES, CONTAINED IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION OF THE MASSES, BE PUT INTO MOTION. THIS IS THE BASIS OF THEIR LABOUR AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1704Z

DECLASSIFIED IN PART (Releases)
 NLS #99-002 d 27
 By OAS NARA Date 7/17/00

FBIS 067

TAKE 8 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY.

LD021634

(TEXT) I HAVE MENTIONED THE NEED FOR A DRASTIC RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. IT IS APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT IMPROVEMENT OF THIS SYSTEM IS IN NO WAY LIMITED TO ELIMINATING SHORTCOMINGS IN THE WORK OF THE; SO TO SAY, MANAGERS BY PROFESSION. ANOTHER THING IS NO LESS IMPORTANT: CONDITIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR ENHANCING THE INITIATIVE AND CREATIVE SPIRIT OF THE BROADEST SECTIONS OF THE WORKING MASSES IN THEIR ENTIRE FRUITFULNESS AND STRENGTH.

I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS HAVE STARTED PERFORMING SOME PRODUCTION OPERATIONS AT SEVERAL ENTERPRISES OF YOUR DISTRICT. THERE WILL BE MORE OF THEM WITH TIME, OF COURSE. BUT EVEN THEN, I ASSURE YOU, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CALL THE HUMAN FACTOR OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS WILL NOT BE LESSENER. BY THIS WE MEAN THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE, THE INTERESTS AND MOOD OF PEOPLE. FOR WORK IS DONE BY MAN AND RENOWNED THROUGH MAN. THIS OLD TRUTH WILL NEVER BE MADE OBSOLETE BY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS.

IN PRODUCTION, THE SOVIET MAN SHOULD ALWAYS BE THE FULL-FLEDGED AND RESPONSIBLE MASTER. THIS AIM IS SERVED BY THE LAW ON WORK COLLECTIVES WHICH WAS ADOPTED LAST YEAR. IT IS AIMED AT FURTHER DEVELOPING PRECISELY THE MANAGERIAL INITIATIVE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE.

THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE OF MORAL INCENTIVES IS TREMENDOUS IN THE LIFE OF EVERY WORK COLLECTIVE. IN OUR COUNTRY WORK IS THE BASIS FOR THE SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF MAN, HIS SOCIAL PRESTIGE. THE PEOPLE ARE JUSTLY INDIGNANT AT SHIRKERS, JOB-SWITCHERS AND DRUNKARDS, WHO TRY TO USE THE LOFTY NAME OF THE WORKING MAN AS A COVER FOR THIER OWN LAZINESS AND SLIPSHODNESS, AND EVEN DEMAND PUBLIC RESPECT FOR THESELVES. ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE EDUCATIONAL WORK IS TO FORM AND STRENGTHEN IN SOCIETY AN ATMOSPHERE OF RESPECTFULL ATTITUDE TO WORK AND, AT THE SAME TIME, OF INTOLERANCE AND CONTEMPT TO ALL KINDS OF IDLENESS, SLOPPINESS AND IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAKE SPECIAL MENTION OF THE FOLLOWING. THE PARTY AND THE STATE, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE STEPPED UP THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SUCH DISGRACEFUL PHENOMENA AS SQUANDERING OF STATE FUNDS, EYEWASH AND ABUSE OF OFFICE, EMBEZZLEMENT AND BRIBES. THIS IS NOT A TEMPORARY CAMPAIGN. THIS IS A LINE WHICH WILL BE PURSUED PERMANENTLY AND UNDEVIATINGLY. THERE IS AN THERE WILL BE NO INDULGENCE TO ANYBODY IN THIS RESPECT. NOBODY SHOULD HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THAT. THEREFORE, IT TAKES EVEN HIGHER RESPONSIBILITY AND INSISTENCE ON HIGH STANDARDS ON THE PART OF EXECUTIVES; PERMANENT ATTENTION TO THOSE ISSUES OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND WORK COLLECTIVES; ALL SOVIET PEOPLE; EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL, LAW, ORDER AND JUSTICE ORGANS.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1707Z

Out *F99-002* *(Released)*
4428
7/17/00

FBIS 069

TAKE 9 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND JUSTICE ORGANS.

LD021646

(TEXT) COMRADES, THERE IS, PERHAPS, NO SUCH CORNER IN OUR VAST COUNTRY, WHERE THE PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOVIET SCHOOL WERE NOT DISCUSSED. THE QUESTION OF ITS REFORM HAS LEFT NOBODY INDIFFERENT. IT CONCERNS LITERALLY, AS THEY SAY, BOTH OLD AND YOUNG. THE NATION-WIDE DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT REFORM OF THE GENERAL EDUCATIONAL AND VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IS GRAPHIC EXAMPLE OF HOW ISSUES OF GENERAL STATE SIGNIFICANCE ARE RESOLVED BY THE SOVIET POWER, AN EXAMPLE OF TRUE DEMOCRACY. YOU ARE, CERTAINLY, FAMILIAR WITH THE GUIDELINES OF THAT REFORM. I WOULD LIKE TO DWELL HERE ONLY ON ONE ASPECT -- THE LABOUR EDUCATION.

LABOUR WILL NEVER BE AN AMUSEMENT, A PASTIME, EVEN UNDER COMMUNISM IT WILL REMAIN, AS MARX PUT IT, A DEVILISHLY SERIOUS MATTER. WORKING IS DIFFICULT, AND NOTHING CAN BE DONE ABOUT THAT. YET PARENTS ARE AT TIMES TEMPTED TO SPARE THEIR CHILDREN OF DIFFICULTIES. BUT IT IS ONLY SOCIALLY USEFUL LABOUR THAT MAKES HUMAN LIFE MEANINGFUL. THAT IS WHY CHILDREN SHOULD BE TAUGHT NOT WHAT IS EASY, THEY WILL THEMSELVES COPE WITH THAT, BUT WHAT IS DIFFICULT. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES OF EDUCATION IS TO INSTILL IN THE SCHOOLCHILDREN LOVE FOR WORK, TO INCLUDE, IN FULL MEASURE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCTIVE LABOUR INTO THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION.

THE POINT, AS YOU UNDERSTAND, IS BY NO MEANS TO BELITTLE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENERAL CULTURAL STANDARDS, OF KNOWLEDGE, TO INTRODUCE SOMETHING LIKE LABOUR CONSCRIPTION. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE REFORM OF THE SCHOOL HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE IDEAS, THAT ARE DISHED BY HOSTILE RADIO VOICES. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS DIFFERENT: A MAN, WHO HAS NOT BEEN EDUCATED TO WORK, CANNOT BE A CONSCIOUS BUILDER OF THE NEW WORLD.

WE TAKE PERMANENT CARE TO TRAIN SUCH YOUNG PEOPLE WHO WILL NOT FALTER; NOT BEND BENEATH THE HEIGHT OF HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTRY'S DESTINY; FOR THE DESTINY OF SOCIALISM AND PEACE. SUCH YOUNG PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE ABLE NOT ONLY TO ASSIMILATE THE EXPERIENCE OF THE OLDER GENERATIONS; BUT ALSO TO ENRICH IT WITH THEIR OWN ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THIS IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOOL AND THE FAMILY; BUT NOT ONLY OF THEM. THIS IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE; TRADE UNIONS AND WORK COLLECTIVES.

THIS IS A MAJOR TASK OF THE PARTY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT IS THE QUESTION OF RELIABLY ENSURING OUR SOCIALIST HOMETLAND'S FUTURE. WE ARE RESOLVING THIS TASK. AND DOING IT SUCCESSFULLY.

3.

COMRADES, IT WAS WAY BACK ON THE EVE OF THE BIRTH OF THE WORLD'S FIRST STATE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS THAT LENIN WROTE: "UNDER SOCIALISM...THE MASS OF THE POPULATION WILL RISE TO TAKING AN INDEPENDENT PART, NOT ONLY IN VOTING AND ELECTIONS; BUT ALSO IN THE EVERY-DAY ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE." AND TODAY THE KEY TO FRESH SUCCESSES IN THE WORK OF THE BODIES OF OUR PEOPLE'S POWER; ABOVE ALL; OF THE SOVIETS; LIES IN THE EVER-WIDER DRAWING IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE OF CONSCIOUS, POLITICALLY MATURE AND CREATIVELY THINKING CITIZENS. THESE ACTIVISTS OF THE SOVIETS; WHO NUMBER TENS OF MILLIONS; SHOULD BE REALLY ACTIVE. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THAT HAVE CONSIDERABLY GROWN IN RECENT YEARS. THE ROLE OF THE SOVIETS OF ALL LEVELS HAS GROWN IN RESOLVING DIVERSE ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL TASKS.

(MORE)

2 MAR 17 1982

CAS 199-002 # 29
7/17/00
RELEASED

FBIS 072

TAKE 10 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND SOCIO-POLITICAL TASKS.

LD021700

(TEXT) IT IS TOTALLY JUSTIFIED THAT THE LOCAL SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO COORDINATE TO A GREATER EXTENT THE ACTIVITIES OF ENTERPRISES OF DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES IN THEIR TERRITORIES. AND IT IS A GOOD THING THAT THEY ENHANCE CONTROL OVER THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SERVICES, OVER ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE SOVIETS' FUNCTIONS OF CONTROL SHOULD BE ENHANCED FURTHER. THERE IS MUCH ROOM FOR WORK HERE.

IT IS INVALUABLE FOR THE FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC BASIS OF THE SOVIET STATE TO KEEP PEOPLE BETTER INFORMED OF THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS AND TO ENHANCE PUBLICITY IN THE WORK OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS. THE MASS MEDIA HAVE A GREAT ROLE TO PLAY HERE. THEIR WORK HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT INTENSIFIED DURING THE RECENT PERIOD. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT FROM THEM MORE INDEPTH AND INTERESTING MATERIALS ABOUT THE LIFE OF THE COUNTRY AND THE WORLD AT LARGE, AND A BOLDER APPROACH TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.

AND, OF COURSE, IT IS ALWAYS NECESSARY TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE PROPOSALS AND CRITICAL REMARKS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE AND TO BE INTOLERANT OF ANY FORM OF THE SUPPRESSION OF CRITICISM.

WE COMMUNISTS TAKE PRIDE IN THE FACT THAT THE PARTY AS THE NUCLEUS OF THE ENTIRE POLITICAL SYSTEM HAS A GREAT INFLUENCE IN THE SOVIETS. MOREOVER, THIS IS ENSURED NOT BY THE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF PARTY MEMBERS IN THE SOVIETS: AS EVERYONE KNOWS, WE HAVE MORE NON-PARTY DEPUTIES. THE PARTY ASSERTS ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN SOCIETY BY TIRELESS EFFORTS FOR THE GOOD AND HAPPINESS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE AND BY THE ABILITY TO DRAFT AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY MEETING THE NEEDS OF ONE STAGE OF OUR DEVELOPMENT OR ANOTHER.

THE PARTY ATTACHES MUCH IMPORTANCE TO ANALYSING THE SPECIFIC FEATURE OF THE PRESENT PERIOD AND TO DETERMINING IN A SOBER, ENTIRELY NON-UTOPIC WAY THE LEVEL OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATURITY OF THE NEW SOCIETY WE HAVE ACHIEVED. DETERMINING IT, WE WORK OUT STRICTLY SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE CPSU'S POLICY.

A GREAT ROLE IS PLAYED HERE BY THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM AS AN HISTORICALLY PROTRACTED PERIOD, AT THE BEGINNING OF WHICH OUR COUNTRY IS NOW. IT IS IN THE PROCESS OF ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS OF PERFECTING DEVELOPED SOCIALISM THAT GRADUAL ADVANCE TOWARDS COMMUNISM IS TAKING PLACE.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO OVERESTIMATE THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE PARTY. THEY MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR SOCIETY IN ALL ITS COMPLEX, CONTROVERSIAL AND MULTIFACETED ENTIRETY. THEY HELP TO REMOVE IN PRACTICE THOSE DISCREPANCIES WHICH HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN ALLOWED TO OCCUR BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS, BETWEEN THE REAL POSSIBILITIES OF SOCIETY AND UNSUBSTANTIATED FORECASTS. IT IS WITH THESE POINTS IN VIEW THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS DOING TODAY THE EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT WORK OF PREPARING A NEW EDITION OF THE CPSU PROGRAM.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1728Z

DECLASSIFIED IN PART / Re/ECED
REF # 899-002 # 30
By CAS, NARA, Date 7/17/00

///THE CPSU PROGRAM.

LD021723

(TEXT) THE PARTY IS STRIVING TO ENSURE THAT LENIN'S STYLE IN ALL ITS DIVERSITY AND RICHNESS BECOMES A HEARTFELT NEED AND AN IRREPLACEABLE WORKING TOOL OF EVERY PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL. OUR LEADERS HAVE VAST POWERS AND RIGHTS; BUT ALSO BEAR VAST RESPONSIBILITY. THERE CAN BE NOTHING WORSE FOR A LEADER THAN ARROGANCE AND CONCEIT, AND "USING THE POWER CRUDELY," IN LENIN'S WORDS; "AS NOTHING BUT POWER, AS THOUGH TO SAY: 'I HAVE THE POWER, I HAVE GIVEN MY ORDERS, AND YOU MUST OBEY'." THE STRENGTH OF THE LEADER LIES IN HIS ABILITY TO BLEND TOGETHER HIS AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICIAL AND THAT OF A PERSONALITY.

PARTY AND GOVERNMENT CADRES WIN THE AFFECTION AND RESPECT OF THE MASS OF PEOPLE FIRST AND FOREMOST IN PRACTICAL PUBLIC ACTIVITY, WIN THEM WITH THEIR ENERGY AND KNOWLEDGE, BY THEIR PERSONAL EXAMPLE AND CONDUCT THAT ARE FREE OF ANYTHING WHICH OFFENDS THE MORAL FEELINGS OF THE PEOPLE. THE LEADER CAN BE EXACTING TOWARD OTHERS PRECISELY BECAUSE HE IS EVEN MORE EXACTING TOWARDS HIMSELF. IN THIS WAY HE GETS A MORAL RIGHT IN ADDITION TO HIS OFFICIAL RIGHT TO SHOW FIRMNNESS WHEN IT IS BETTER, AS THE SAYING GOES, "TO SPARE WORDS WHEN AUTHORITY MUST BE INVOKED." THE BASIS OF THE LEADER'S AUTHORITY IS POPULAR APPROVAL AND SUPPORT. AND THOSE WHO LOSE THEM, WHO ARE DEAF TO THE OPINION OF THE MASS OF PEOPLE, CANNOT AND MUST NOT HOLD POSTS OF AUTHORITY.

THERE IS ANOTHER MATTER. WE HAVE QUITE A FEW EFFECTIVE FORMS OF THE INITIATIVE OF THE MASS OF PEOPLE AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOCIETY AND THE STATE. BUT THERE ALSO ARE ARTIFICIALLY INVENTED FORMS, WHICH SHOULD BE DROPPED.

FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS AN UNDUE LIKING IN SOME DISTRICTS AND REGIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL SORTS OF HEADQUARTERS AND COMMISSIONS ON ANY OCCASION. SOMETIMES THERE ARE SO MANY OF THEM THAT THE ORGANIZERS THEMSELVES CANNOT SORT OUT WHO HAD TO DO WHAT AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT. SOME OFFICIALS CHAIR WELL NIGH A DOZEN DIFFERENT COMMISSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE PREJUDICE OF THEIR IMMEDIATE OFFICIAL DUTIES. ALL THIS ONLY DRAWS AWAY PEOPLE TO ATTEND SUPERFLUOUS MEETINGS, SCATTERS FORCES BUT IN NO WAY HELPS BUSINESS. SOMETIMES CERTAIN OFFICIALS, INSTEAD OF TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR JOB, ONLY "TAKE SHELTER BEHIND COMMISSIONS."

OUR DEMOCRACY IS ESSENTIALLY A DEMOCRACY THAT ACTS, WORKS. ITS EXTENSION AND THE PERFECTION OF SOVIET STATEHOOD IN ITS ENTIRETY CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT DIRECTION OF THE ADVANCE OF OUR SOCIETY, AND THE PARTY IS THE POWER PACK, THE MOTIVE FORCE OF THIS PROGRESS. BY ITS ENTIRE INTERNAL LIFE IT SETS AN EXAMPLE OF GENUINELY SOCIALIST DEMOCRATISM, OF A HARMONIOUS COMBINATION OF INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND IRREVOCABLE DUTIES.

4.

NOW LET US TURN TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND INSISTENT INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET VOTERS WAS, IS AND WILL REMAIN THE INSTRUCTION TO SAFEGUARD PEACE LIKE THE APPLE OF OUR EYE AND TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF OUR HOMELAND. I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE PARTY AND THE SOVIET STATE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING UNSWERVINGLY THIS INSTRUCTION, DOING SO IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

YOU KNOW THAT THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE SEEN A DRAMATIC INTENSIFICATION OF THE POLICY OF THE MORE AGGRESSIVE FORCES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM, A POLICY OF BLATANT MILITARISM, CLAIMS TO WORLD DOMINANCE, RESISTANCE TO PROGRESS, AND VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLES. THE WORLD HAS SEEN QUITE A FEW EXAMPLES OF THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THIS POLICY. THESE INCLUDE THE INVASION OF LEBANON, THE OCCUPATION OF GRENADA, THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA, THREATS TO SYRIA AND, FINALLY, THE TURNING OF WESTERN EUROPE INTO A LAUNCHING SITE FOR U.S. NUCLEAR MISSILES TARGETED AT THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1812Z

CGS 109-002 #31
7/17/00
RELEASED

FBIS 080

TAKE 12 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND ITS ALLIES.

LD021737

(TEXT) ALL THIS COMPELS US TO ATTACH MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENCES. THE SOVIET PEOPLE WANT NOT AN ARMS BUILDUP BUT THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY BOTH SIDES. BUT WE MUST TAKE CARE TO ENSURE SUFFICIENT SECURITY FOR OUR COUNTRY, ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THIS IS PRECISLY WHAT IS BEING DONE. AND LET EVERYONE KNOW THAT NONE OF THOSE GIVEN TO ARMED VENTURES WILL CATCH US UNAWARES AND NO POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR CAN HOPE TO AVOID DEVASTATING RETALIATION.

AT THE SAME TIME IT IS PRECISELY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION THAT COMPELS US TO REDOUBLE AND TRIPLE OUR EFFORTS IN PURSUING A POLICY OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

ONE CAN HARDLY RECALL A PROBLEM OF IMPORTANCE TO STRENGTHENING PEACE ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS CONCRETE AND REALISTIC PROPOSALS. THE INITIATIVES OF OUR COUNTRIES ARE WINNING EVERY BROADER SUPPORT FROM OTHER STATES. THIS HAS BEEN FORCEFULLY CONFIRMED BY THE LATEST SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IMPERIALIST POLITICIANS ARE TRYING IN EVERY WAY TO LIMIT THE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO IMPAIR THEIR COHESION AND TO ERODE THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM WHEREVER THEY THINK THEY CAN COUNT ON SUCCESS. IN THESE CONDITIONS IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE SOLIDARITY OF FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE LEADERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AGAIN UNANIMOUSLY EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION OF THIS DURING THEIR RECENT MEETING IN MOSCOW.

THE USA USES AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND MILITARY THREATS AGAINST SOCIALIST CUBA. BUT THE HOPES TO SCARE IT AND TO MAKE IT SWERVE FROM ITS CHOSEN ROAD ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE. THIS IS GUARANTEED BY THE INFLEXIBLE WILL OF THE HEROIC CUBAN PEOPLE RALLIED AROUND THEIR COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS IS GUARANTEED BY THE SOLIDARITY DISPLAYED WITH THE ISLAND OF FREEDOM BY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND BY MANY PARTICIPANTS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE CUBAN PEOPLE ARE RESOLUTELY SUPPORTED BY THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. AS FOR THE USSR, IT WAS, IS AND WILL REMAIN ON CUBA'S SIDE IN FAIR WEATHER AND IN STORM.

THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA COULD, OF COURSE, CONTRIBUTE TO THE GROWTH OF THE ROLE OF SOCIALISM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE ARE CONSISTENT PROPONENTS OF THIS NORMALISATION. POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS SHOW, HOWEVER, THAT THERE REMAIN DIFFERENCES ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. IN PARTICULAR, WE CANNOT MAKE ANY AGREEMENTS TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE INTERESTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS CONTINUES, HOWEVER, AND WE CONSIDER IT USEFUL. THE SOVIET UNION STANDS FOR THE LEVEL OF CONTACTS BEING RAISED TO THE EXTENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

IT IS ALSO USEFUL THAT MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL CONTACTS IN THE ECONOMY, CULTURE, SCIENCE AND OTHER FIELDS ARE BEING GRADUALLY RE-ESTABLISHED. THIS IS NOT TO THE LIKING OF THOSE WHO WANT TO BENEFIT BY THE AGGRAVATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA. BUT IT IS TO THE GOOD OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE OVERALL WORLD SITUATION.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1819Z

FOIA-002 432 (RELEASED)
CAS 7/17/00

FBI 081

TAKE 13 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///OVERALL WORLD SITUATION.

LD021746

(TEXT) THE DANGER OF THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF THE INCESSANT ESCALATION OF TENSION HAS BECOME OBVIOUS. THE GRAVER THREAT IT POSES TO HUMAN CIVILISATION, THE STRONGER MANKIND'S FORCES OF SELF-PRESERVATION GROW. INDIGNATION IS RISING IN WESTERN EUROPE OVER THE ACTIONS OF THOSE WHO ARE SACRIFICING ITS SECURITY TO THE IMPERIAL AMBITIONS OF WASHINGTON. MILLIONS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANTI-MISSILE MOVEMENT ARE QUITE VOCAL IN MAKING THIS KNOWN.

ALSO, FAR FROM ALL THE LEADERS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES AND INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL PARTIES APPROVE THE ADVENTURISM OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. IT WORRIES A CONSIDERABLE SEGMENT OF THE U.S. PUBLIC ITSELF AS WELL. THEY ARE REALIZING EVER CLEARER THERE THAT THE INTENSIVE MILITARISATION AND THE AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAVE NOT BROUGHT NOR ARE GOING TO BRING THE USA MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS. THEY ONLY LEAD EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD TO THE ESCALATION OF CRITICISM OF WASHINGTON'S BELLIGERENT COURSE. PEOPLE WANT PEACE AND TRANQUILITY RATHER THAN WAR HYSTERIA. I CAN SAY THAT OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF MANY FOREIGN DELEGATIONS WHO ATTENDED THE FUNERAL OF YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV CONFIRMED THAT WITH SUFFICIENT FORCEFULNESS.

ALL THIS INSPIRES THE HOPE THAT DEVELOPMENTS WILL EVENTUALLY BE TURNED AROUND TOWARDS PEACE, THE LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

DETENTE HAS STRUCK DEEP ROOTS. THIS IS EVIDENCED, IN PARTICULAR, BY THE CONVOCAION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

OF COURSE, IT IS THE BRIDLING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE THAT IS OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO PEACE AND THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES. THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION ON THAT ISSUE IS CLEAR. WE ARE AGAINST RIVALRY IN BUILDING UP NUCLEAR ARMS ARSENALS. WE WERE AND REMAIN PROPONENTS OF THE PROHIBITION AND ELIMINATION OF ALL TYPES OF THOSE WEAPONS. OUR PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE WERE SUBMITTED LONG AGO, BOTH TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, BUT DISCUSSION ON THEM IS BEING BLOCKED BY THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

AS FOR EUROPE, WE STILL STAND FOR IT BEING FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BOTH MEDIUM-RANGE AND TACTICAL ONES.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1820Z

CAS F99-002 H33
7/17/00
|Released

FBIS 082

TAKE 14 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND TACTICAL ONES.

LD021806

(TEXT) ATTENTION WAS DRAWN WORLDWIDE TO THE FACT THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH EVERYTHING WHAT THE PRESENT UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID, AND, WHICH IS THE MAIN THING, DONE AND CONTINUES DOING IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ASSURANCES OF ITS GOOD INTENTIONS CAN BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY ONLY IF THEY ARE SUBSTANTIATED WITH REAL ACTIONS. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOR A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO CONCRETE QUESTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES, FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEACE. THERE ARE QUITE A FEW SUCH QUESTIONS. AND THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVE ITS PERCEABLENESS BY DEEDS.

WHY SHOULD NOT THE USA, FOR EXAMPLE, RATIFY THE TREATIES WITH THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, WHICH WERE SIGNED ALMOST TEN YEARS AGO, AND NOT TO COMPLETE DRAWING UP AN AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS? I WILL REMIND THAT THE TALKS ON THESE ISSUES WERE BROKEN OFF BY THE UNITED STATES. THE USA CAN ALSO MAKE A NO SMALL CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE BY CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE. THE USSR IS KNOWN TO HAVE PROPOSED IT FOR A LONG TIME.

THE PERCEivable ASSURANCES BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD INSPIRE BY FAR MORE TRUST HAD IT ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL ON A MUTUAL FREEZE ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SO MANY WEAPONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCUMULATED THAT THIS STEP WOULD NOT CREATE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THE GENERAL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, AND, IT MUST BE BELIEVED, WOULD FACILITATE REACHING AGREEMENT ON A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

A VERY IMPORTANT TASK IS TO DELIVER MANKIND FROM THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TALKS ON THAT HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS ALREADY FOR A LONG TIME, BUT NOW IT SEEMS THAT PREREQUISITES ARE BEGINNING TO RIPEN FOR RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION, DESTRUCTION OF ALL OF ITS STOCKPILES. WE ARE FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THAT CONTROL SHOULD COVER THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- FROM BEGINNING TO END.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1831Z

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 199-002 #34

By CFS, NARA, Date

RELEASED
7/17/00

FBIS 082 (SUB FOR FBIS 082)

TAKE 14 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND TACTICAL ONES.

LD021806

(TEXT) WE STAND FOR BOTH SIDES MAKING THE FIRST MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WITHOUT WASTING TIME. IN SO DOING, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO INTENTION OF STRENGTHENING ITS SECURITY AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS BUT WANTS EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL.

REGRETTABLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS TURNED ITS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS ON THIS SUBJECT INTO A TOOL OF PROPAGANDA TO CAMOUFLAGE THE ARMS RACE AND COLD WAR POLICY. WE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THIS GAME. THE AMERICANS CREATED OBSTACLES TO THE TALKS BOTH ON "EUROPEAN" AND ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY DEPLOYING THEIR MISSILES IN EUROPE. IT IS THE REMOVAL OF THESE OBSTACLES (WHICH WOULD ALSO REMOVE THE NEED FOR OUR MEASURES TAKEN IN RESPONSE) THAT OFFERS THE WAY TO WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD.

THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS LATELY BEGUN TO MAKE PERCEABLY SOUNDING STATEMENTS, URGING US TO ENTER A "DIALOGUE."

ATTENTION WAS DRAWN WORLDWIDE TO THE FACT THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH EVERYTHING WHAT THE PRESENT UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID, AND, WHICH IS THE MAIN THING, DONE AND CONTINUES DOING IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ASSURANCES OF ITS GOOD INTENTIONS CAN BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY ONLY IF THEY ARE SUBSTANTIATED WITH REAL ACTIONS. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOR A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO CONCRETE QUESTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES, FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEACE. THERE ARE QUITE A FEW SUCH QUESTIONS. AND THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVE ITS PERCEABLENESS BY DEEDS.

WHY SHOULD NOT THE USA, FOR EXAMPLE, RATIFY THE TREATIES WITH THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, WHICH WERE SIGNED ALMOST TEN YEARS AGO, AND NOT TO COMPLETE DRAWING UP AN AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS? I WILL REMIND THAT THE TALKS ON THESE ISSUES WERE BROKEN OFF BY THE UNITED STATES. THE USA CAN ALSO MAKE A NO SMALL CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE BY CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE. THE USSR IS KNOWN TO HAVE PROPOSED IT FOR A LONG TIME.

THE PERCEABLE ASSURANCES BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD INSPIRE BY FAR MORE TRUST HAD IT ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL ON A MUTUAL FREEZE ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SO MANY WEAPONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCUMULATED THAT THIS STEP WOULD NOT CREATE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THE GENERAL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, AND, IT MUST BE BELIEVED, WOULD FACILITATE REACHING AGREEMENT ON A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

A VERY IMPORTANT TASK IS TO DELIVER MANKIND FROM THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TALKS ON THAT HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS ALREADY FOR A LONG TIME, BUT NOW IT SEEMS THAT PREREQUISITES ARE BEGINNING TO RIPEN FOR RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION, DESTRUCTION OF ALL OF ITS STOCKPILES. WE ARE FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THAT CONTROL SHOULD COVER THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- FROM BEGINNING TO END.

(MORE)
2 MAR 1962

CLASSIFIED IN PART / RELEASED
199-002 #35
7/17/00
C/S

FBIS 094

TAKE 15 OF 15 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///BEGINNING TO END.

LD021909

(TEXT) IT IS NOT RULED OUT THAT REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ISSUES WOULD SIGNAL THE START OF A REAL DRASTIC CHANGE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE. WE WOULD WISH SUCH A DRASTIC CHANGE. NOW IT IS UP TO WASHINGTON TO ACT.

THE POLICY OF THE POWERS POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN OUR TIMES. THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE OF MANKIND, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATESMEN TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS REQUIRE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE POWERS SHOULD BE REGULATED BY CERTAIN NORMS. OUR IDEA OF THESE NORMS IS AS FOLLOWS:

-- TO REGARD THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF ONE'S FOREIGN POLICY. TO PREVENT SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH NUCLEAR CONFLICT. IN THE EVENT SUCH A DANGER EMERGES, URGENT CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE HELD TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR CONFLAGRATION FROM BREAKING OUT.

-- TO RENOUNCE THE PROPAGANDA OF NUCLEAR WAR IN ANY OF ITS VARIATIONS -- EITHER GLOBAL OR LIMITED.

-- TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES, IN WHOSE TERRITORY THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS. TO RESPECT THE STATUS OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ALREADY CREATED AND TO ENCOURAGE THE CREATION OF NEW NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE WORLD.

-- TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY FORM; NOT TO HAND OVER THESE WEAPONS OR CONTROL OVER THEM TO ANYBODY; NOT TO DEPLOY THEM ON THE TERRITORY OF THE COUNTRIES, WHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS; NOT TO SPREAD THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE TO NEW SPHERES, INCLUDING OUTER SPACE.

-- TO PRESS STEP BY STEP, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY FOR THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, UP TO THEIR COMPLETE LIQUIDATION IN ALL THEIR VARIETIES.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE THESE PRINCIPLES THE FOUNDATION OF ITS POLICY. WE ARE READY TO REACH AGREEMENT AT ANY TIME WITH THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS ON THE JOINT RECOGNITION OF NORMS OF THIS KIND AND IMPARTING THEM A MANDATORY CHARACTER. I THINK THAT THIS WOULD MEET THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE WORLD.

COMRADES, ALL WE HAVE, ALL WE ARE PROUD OF -- THE FREEDOM AND RIGHT OF THE HOMELAND, ITS HIGH PRESTIGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, THE FULL-BLOODED PEACEFUL LIFE OF THE PEOPLE -- WE ALL OWE TO THE INTENSIVE CREATIVE WORK OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. IT IS THIS WORK THAT IS AN INEXHAUSTIBLE SOURCE OF OUR CONFIDENCE OF THE FUTURE.

THE WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE FARMERS, SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS AND WORKERS IN CULTURE, TEACHERS AND SERVICEMEN ARE MEETING THE ELECTIONS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET WITH NEW ACHIEVEMENTS IN THEIR WORK. MAY THESE ACHIEVEMENTS FURTHER MULTIPLY. AND THEN OUR STATE -- THE BULWARK OF LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLES -- WILL BE EVEN STRONGER. THEN THE LIFE OF EVERY SOVIET FAMILY WILL BECOME EVEN BETTER. THEN OUR COUNTRY WILL EVEN MORE SUCCESSFULLY ADVANCE ALONG THE ROAD OF BUILDING COMMUNISM."

(ENDALL)

2 MAR 1941Z

CAS 499-002 #36 (2E/LEASE)
7/17/00

FURTHER ON CHERNENKO 2 MARCH MEETING WITH ELECTORS

LD021539 FOR YOUR INFORMATION

AT 1458 GMT MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE AND MOSCOW TELEVISION SERVICE IN RUSSIAN TO RELAY CHERNENKO'S MEETING WITH THE VOTERS. CHERNENKO IS SHOWN STANDING UNAIDED, WHILE THE CAMERA SHOWS THE AUDIENCE APPLAUDING UNTIL HE REACHES THE ROSTRUM. AT THE ROSTRUM HE IS SHOWN STANDING AND RESTING HIS HANDS ON THE DESK, READING HIS SPEECH QUICKLY, BREATHING HEAVILY AND AUDIBLY AFTER EVERY HALF-DOZEN OR SO WORDS. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 5 MINUTES HE DONS A PAIR OF GLASSES, AND DELIVERS HIS SPEECH SO RAPIDLY THAT SOME OF THE WORDS ARE MUMBLED AND DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND.

CHERNENKO THANKS PREVIOUS SPEAKERS AND THOSE WHO NOMINATED HIM. HE EXPRESSES GRIEF AT ANDROPOV'S DEATH, NOTING THE PARTY'S AND COUNTRY'S PROGRESS UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. HE SPEAKS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS AND THE PARTY'S APPROACH.

CHERNENKO THEN SPEAKS OF THE COUNTRY'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN MODERNIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, ALTHOUGH HE REMARKS THAT LESS HAS BEEN DONE THAN IS DESIRABLE. HE NOTES PROGRESS IN ENERGY AND SCIENCE, AND THEN TURNS TO LAST YEAR'S GRAIN HARVEST SAYING THAT IT AMOUNTED TO 190 MILLION METRIC TONS. HE SAYS THAT MORE HAS TO BE SPENT ON DEFENSE BECAUSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, BUT THAT THE AIM IS STILL TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THE FOOD PROGRAM IS STILL GOING AHEAD, HE CONTINUES. THERE IS ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH CEMA AND HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PARTY. HE SAYS TEACHERS ARE TO RECEIVE AWAGE INCREASE NEXT YEAR AND THAT THERE ARE TO BE BETTER PROVISIONS LARGE FAMILIES AND NEWLYWEDS.

REFERRING TO 1983 IN PARTICULAR, CHERNENKO NOTES THE NEW MEASURES AND THAT THE DECLINE IN GROWTH HAS BEEN HALTED. HE RECOMMENDS THAT PEOPLE BE MORE ENERGETIC IN DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY; THERE HAVE TO BE MORE PROFOUND CHANGES; THE POTENTIAL IS NOT BEING FULLY EXPLOITED. HE SAYS THAT THE NARROW LOCAL APPROACH MUST BE ERADICATED BUT THAT LOCAL INITIATIVES MUST NOT BE SHACKLED. HE ADDS THAT CURRENT EXPERIMENTS GIVE MORE RESPONSIBILITY AND POWERS TO ENTERPRISES, THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF HIGH PAYMENT FOR BETTER WORK MUST BECOME UNIVERSAL, AND THAT THE PARTY IS PRESSING AHEAD WITH WORK ON IMPROVING THE ECONOMY'S EFFICIENCY.

CHERNENKO CONTINUES TO SPEAK, GAINING STRENGTH IN DELIVERY, AND AT 1523 GMT A MAN BRINGS A GLASS OF AMBER LIQUID TO HIM AT THE ROSTRUM AND REMOVES A SIMILAR GLASS.

CHERNENKO SPEAKS OF THE JUNE PLENUM DECISIONS, THE NEED FOR THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO BE IMPROVED AND THE WORKING MASSES' INITIATIVE TO BE ENCOURAGED. HE EXPRESSES INDIGNATION AT IDLERS AND DRUNKARDS, SAYING THAT AN IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD WORK MUST NOT BE TOLERATED. HE ADDS THAT THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION WILL CONTINUE. HE SPEAKS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND FOREIGN CRITICISM OF IT.

CHERNENKO OBSERVES THAT CITIZENS ARE BECOMING MORE INVOLVED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE AFFAIRS, SAYING THAT ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS CRITICISM SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. HE REMARKS THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS NOW WORKING ON THE NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY'S PROGRAM, SAYING THAT THE LENINIST STYLE OF WORK IS A SPIRITUAL REQUIREMENT, DENOUNCING ARROGANCE IN MANAGERS, AND URGING PARTY MEMBERS TO SET A PERSONAL EXAMPLE. THOSE MANAGERS NOT UP TO THESE PRINCIPLES SHOULD NOT BE IN MANAGEMENT POSTS, CHERNENKO STATES. HE DENOUNCES THE TREND OF SETTING UP MANY COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS.

TURNING TO FOREIGN POLICY, CHERNENKO REMARKS THAT LAST YEAR THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE AGGRESSIVE TENDENCIES OF IMPERIALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AND THERE WERE INVASIONS IN LEBANON AND GRENADA. ON THE U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN WEST EUROPE HE SAYS THAT "THIS OBLIGES US TO GIVE MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING OUR DEFENSE," AND THAT "NO LOVERS OF MILITARY ADVENTURES WILL CATCH US UNAWARES; NO AGGRESSOR WILL AVOID A CRUSHING RETURN STRIKE." HE ADDS THAT THE USSR'S PROPOSALS ARE REALISTIC AND GAINING SUPPORT. HE STRESSES SUPPORT FOR CUBA, NOTING THE USEFULNESS OF CONTACTS WITH IT. HE SAYS THE DANGERS OF IMPERIALIST POLICIES ARE EVER MORE APPARENT, COMMENTING THAT MILLIONS ARE PARTICIPATING IN ANTI-WAR MOVEMENTS IN WEST EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. CHERNENKO STATES: "WE HOPE TO TURN EVENTS BACK INTO THE PATH OF DETENTE, FURTHERING THE CAUSE OF PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION." HE SAYS THAT THE USSR OPPOSES THE BUILDUP OF MILITARY ARSENALS, BUT THE UNITED STATES IS BLOCKING ITS PROPOSALS.

AS HE SPEAKS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVING OPPORTUNITIES TO SHOW GOOD WILL IF IT WISHES, CHERNENKO SEEMS TO LOSE HIS PLACE. THERE IS A 5 TO 6 SECOND PAUSE, THE AUDIENCE APPLAUDS, AND CHERNENKO RESUMES HIS SPEECH. DURING THE SILENCE THE CAMERA SWITCHES TO THE AUDIENCE AND THEN RETURNS TO CHERNENKO AS HE BEGINS TO SPEAK.

CHERNENKO SAYS THAT IT COULD BE POSSIBLE REACH AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE SAYS THE USSR IS PREPARED TO RESPECT NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NO ARMS IN SPACE, AND THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE REDUCED AND EVENTUALLY COMPLETELY LIQUIDATED IN ALL THEIR FORMS ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS. HE ADDS THAT THE USSR IS READY TO COME TO AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER STATES ON THIS BASIS.

HE CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT ALL OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF THE WORK OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND EXPRESSES WISHES FOR FURTHER ADVANCEMENT. AT 1547 GMT CHERNENKO'S SPEECH ENDS TO PROLONGED APPLAUSE. A DISTANT SHOT SHOWS HIM WALKING BACK FROM THE ROSTRUM. THE AUDIENCE STANDS, AS DOES THE PRESIDIUM, INCLUDING CHERNENKO, WHO IS THE FIRST TO SIT DOWN.

AT 1550 GMT, PROKOFYEV GIVES A VOTE OF THANKS, WHILE THE CAMERA SHOWS CHERNENKO SCRATCHING BEHIND HIS EAR AND COUGHING. GRISHIN IS SHOWN SPEAKING TO CHERNENKO, WHO ACKNOWLEDGES HIM WITH A NOD OF THE HEAD. AS PROKOFYEV CALLS ON ALL TO VOTE FOR CHERNENKO, THERE IS PROLONGED APPLAUSE.

AT 1553 GMT THE MEETING IS DECLARED CLOSED. THE PRESIDIUM, INCLUDING CHERNENKO, ALL STAND AND THE CAMERA SWINGS FROM THEM TO THE AUDIENCE.

THE RELAY ENDS AT 1554 GMT.

2 MAR 1841Z

CAS

199-002

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KEYWORDS MILITARY POSTURE

USSR

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER -- 1984 / CHAPTER 1

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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March 1, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

(ATTN: CDR ROY WALLACE, USN; TEL: 632-4102)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

(ATTN: MR. JIM SIMON; TEL: 281-8475)

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

(ATTN: DR. RON LEHMAN; TEL: 395-3330)

DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

(ATTN: LT COL JOHN OSETH, USA; TEL: 485-8644)

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

(ATTN: Q-3--MR. ADDIE PAUL; TEL: 688-6527)

SUBJECT: Review of Soviet Military Power--1984, Chapter 1

Attached for review and concurrence/comment is the revised page proof of Chapter 1, Soviet Military Power--1984. Request concurrence or comments no later than 1200, Friday, March 2, 1984.

Responses should be provided to CDR Richard E. Goolsby, USN (OSD Executive Secretariat, The Pentagon, Room 3E854; Tel: 695-0028/697-3133).


John H. Stanford
John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary

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DECL. (CASE)
FILE # 199-002 # 39
BY C45 DATE 7/17/00

The Soviet Military Establishment

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) controls military concepts, resources and personnel. The top Party leadership establishes military doctrine and approves Soviet military strategy. The Defense Council, dominated by the Party leadership controls the defense budget and makes the decisions to develop and deploy all major weapon systems. Senior officers are selected from a Central Committee list, and all major organizational changes in the Soviet military are approved by the Defense Council. Compliance with Party control of the Soviet military establishment is exercised by the Central Committee's uniformed political officers through the regular Party organization in the Armed Forces.

Military Command Structure

The CPSU General Secretary's chairmanship of the Defense Council underscores the Party's dominance over the entire command structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. Officially described by the Soviets as part of the government structure, the USSR Defense Council is, in reality, the senior and most critical Party decisionmaking body for all aspects of national security policy. In peacetime its power over the Armed Forces is exercised directly through the Ministry of Defense and the Soviet General Staff. The Defense Council's authority covers virtually all major military issues, including strategic and nuclear weapons policy, international negotiations positions, weapons acquisition choices, shifts

The SS-X-25 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, one of two new fifth generation ICBMs being tested from the Plesetsk rangehead, is likely designed for mobile deployment — operating on off-road, wheeled transporter-erector-launchers from home bases fitted with sliding roof launcher sheds — increasing Soviet ICBM force survivability.

in military doctrine and the use of military forces. The Defense Council fully integrates the senior cadre of Soviet political, military and economic leadership, which, from the Soviet perspective, is an essential prerequisite for the rapid and effective development of Soviet military power.

The primary administrative organ of the peacetime military command structure is the Ministry of Defense. It is responsible for directing the development of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The top level of authority in the Ministry consists of Marshal D.F. Ustinov, three First Deputies and 11 Deputy Ministers, the highest ranking of whom is the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov. In addition to the Deputies who are Commanders-in-Chief of the five services, other ministers and chiefs are responsible for a broad range of administrative and technological matters, such as civil defense, rear services, military construction, armaments and personnel. Ustinov serves as the principal link between the military and the Party-state apparatus. Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov is the military figure who heads the unified military establishment and the chiefs of the five services.

The General Staff also plays an important role at the national level by providing the most authoritative information to the Defense Council. It is the most important link between the political leadership and the armed forces themselves. Because the General Staff exercises actual operational control over the Armed Forces, it has the responsibility for translating strategy, doctrine and policy into action.

These command responsibilities make Marshal Ogarkov the single most important individual in the day-to-day operations of the Armed Forces. He is assisted by a professional military staff characterized as the "brain of the Army." The General Staff organization is designed to provide a basic command structure for controlling the Soviet Armed Forces.

Nationally, the Soviet Union is organized into 16 military districts which serve as a geographical framework for military-administrative purposes. These districts are territorial extensions of the Ministry of Defense, encompassing various local military units and organizations and military-educational institutions. The main functions served by the

districts are training and mobilization. The districts also act as agents for the coordination and implementation of civil defense measures. Each is headed by a district commander, who is assisted by a military council and a district staff.

The Soviets' peacetime command structure serves two primary purposes: it provides Party leaders with the means for building modern military forces, and provides the basic framework for their planned wartime military command structure. The Soviets attach great importance to their ability to effect a rapid transition from peace to war with a minimal disruption of their command structure. Consequently, during wartime, the Soviets would create a command structure derived directly from their peacetime command structure.

The STAVKA (Headquarters) of the Supreme High Command (or VGK) would exercise control of an actual military effort in wartime. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief would serve as chairman of the STAVKA, since the organization is subordinate to the Wartime Defense Council. STAVKA members would include civil and military authorities, with support from the General Staff.

In war the Supreme High Command would control the Armed Forces through intermediate level commands established in the Theater of Military Operations (TVD), that particular territory within whose limits a portion of the armed forces of a country or coalition operates in wartime. The control of the military forces (fronts, armies and fleets) in each of the Theaters would come under the authority of a TVD commander, who, in turn, would be subordinated to the General Staff and Supreme High Command.


Within the Soviet Union itself, the military districts provide the VGK with an administrative structure for controlling a range of domestic wartime functions. In that regard, the military districts would concentrate on the mobilization of additional manpower and resources. They would implement civil defense and air defense measures designed to limit disruption of the rear. District commanders would also follow Defense Council and Supreme High Command directives on matters concerning the conduct of the war in their particular area. This would include district commanders operating in a semi-autonomous manner, if necessary, following guidelines arranged in advance.



Stavka of the Soviet Supreme High Command



**C-in-C Soviet
Armed Forces**
K. U. Chernenko



**Minister of
Defense**
D. F. Ustinov



**Chief of
Main Political
Directorate**
A. A. Yepishev




**First Deputy
Minister of Defense**
N. V. Ogarkov
(Chief of the
General Staff)




**First Deputy
Minister of Defense**
V. G. Kulikov
(C-in-C Warsaw
Pact Forces)



**First Deputy
Minister of Defense**
S. L. Sokolov




**Deputy Minister
of Defense**
V. I. Petrov
(C-in-C Ground Forces)




**Deputy Minister
of Defense**
S. G. Gorshkov
(C-in-C Naval Forces)



**Deputy Minister
of Defense**
P. S. Kutakhov
(C-in-C Air Forces)



**Deputy Minister
of Defense**
V. F. Tolubko
(C-in-C Strategic
Rocket Forces)



**Deputy Minister
of Defense**
A. I. Kostin
(C-in-C Air Defense
Forces)

**Supreme High
Command (VGK)**

First Deputy
Ministers of Defense

Chief,
Main Political
Directorate

C-in-Cs of
Soviet Forces

General Staff
(Executive Agent of VGK)

Wartime Defense Council

Chairman, KGB

Chairman, USSR
Council of Ministers

Chairman, GOSPLAN

Other Party
and State
Figures as Required

The Soviets, thus, have in place a military command structure, dominated and controlled by the Communist Party apparatus, which provides for continued Party rule over the Soviet Union during peace or war. The key elements in this command structure are designed to shift to wartime operations with a minimal amount of organizational disruption. The Soviets believe that this command structure provides the national leadership with the flexible and efficient mechanism necessary to meet their peacetime military requirements in domestic and foreign affairs and provides a high degree of confidence that they can control their forces in either conventional or nuclear conflict.

Military Doctrine and Strategy

Soviet statements on war are ambiguous. Since 1981, political statements have stressed the unwinnability and madness of nuclear war. The Soviet military, however, has been ambivalent in its treatment of the subject. On the one hand, it has recognized the grave consequences of nuclear war, asserted that it would only be initiated by an aggressor and claimed that Soviet military doctrine is defensive. On the other hand, it has suggested that nuclear war nevertheless, is winnable and has focused Soviet strategy on a war-fighting capability.

Soviet military doctrine defines the nature of a future war, probable adversaries, objectives, general characteristics of the forces required and preparedness policies. By Soviet definition, military strategy specifies how the objectives are to be achieved, forces and weapons required, interrelationships among military requirements, economic and technological capabilities, service missions, war management, civil defense, resources and logistics requirements, leadership, command of military forces and an assessment of the strategic views of the probable enemy. The Soviets consider war to be an extension of politics by violent means. Soviet military doctrine and strategy have changed somewhat over the past 25 years. The Soviets in the early 1960s expected war between the two superpower coalitions to be nuclear from the outset, but by the end of the 1960s modified their doctrine to allow for a conventional phase in a war with NATO. Now it appears that the Soviets are considering that a war could remain non-nuclear. At the same time, Soviet leaders have always recognized the political,

coercive value of nuclear weapons.

Soviet military doctrine and strategy for global war are:

- A war between the USSR/Warsaw Pact and the US/NATO would be a decisive conflict between socialism and imperialism to determine which social system would prevail. Such a war would be an intercontinental, coalition war between the two superpowers and their Allies.

- The war would be a just war for the USSR but unjust for the West.

- If war occurs, the USSR and its Allies would seek to defeat enemy military forces globally and occupy enemy territory in Eurasia. The war might begin under a variety of circumstances; it might be relatively brief—a few weeks; it could turn into a more protracted conflict.

- The Soviets perceive that any conflict between themselves and the West could easily escalate to the nuclear level. They also believe that an effective nuclear strategy and execution would decide the course of such conflict. Nonetheless, they believe that territory can be held only with troops and that even on a nuclear battlefield final victory could only be won by ground armies reaching and controlling their ultimate objectives. Hence, the Soviets plan to continue their conventional arms offensives during and after any nuclear phase of a general war.

- Soviet forces must be ready for any level of conflict. Soviet strategic nuclear strikes would be decisive but could not defeat the enemy completely, hence an initial strategic exchange would be followed by a theater combined arms offensive.

- Priority targets of all Soviet forces would be the enemy's nuclear delivery systems and weapons, nuclear command, control and communications, air defenses and politico-administrative centers.

Specific Soviet aims in a nuclear war would be:

- to ensure continuity of Communist Party control over the Soviet Government, military, police and internal security organs and the population;


- to provide continuity of the Soviet politico-military-economic system;
- to defeat NATO forces, occupy NATO countries and use Europe's economic assets to assist Soviet recovery;
- to neutralize the United States and the PRC by disorganizing and destroying their military forces;
- to minimize losses to Soviet leadership, scientific-technical elites and other essential personnel to the general population and to the economy; to repair immediate damage, and to organize recovery; and
- to dominate the post-war world in which "socialism" will have replaced "imperialism" as the basic politico-economic system in all nations.

Decisionmaking Process

The attainment of military goals and objec-

tives, the use of force to suppress domestic dissent and the application of force in foreign policy are facilitated by the governmental structure in the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders today perpetuate a powerful and rigidly centralized state that strives to control every national resource, under the guise of ensuring national survival in a hostile environment. This they achieve through the one-party system in which the Communist Party apparatus has an undisputed monopoly of power over the decisionmaking process. This monopoly was formally recognized in the 1977 Constitution, which described the Party as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system for all state and public organizations.

Official Party representatives permeate and control the state and military apparatus. Military doctrine, national security policies, economic planning and administration are all developed by the Party hierarchy. This con-



The Communist Party of the Soviet Union establishes policy. The government, as at this session of the Supreme Soviet, implements that policy.

SOVIET

BALTIC FLEET

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 48
 OTHER SURFACE COMBATANTS 354
 NAVAL AVIATION 270

NORTHERN FLEET

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 78
 OTHER SURFACE COMBATANTS 143
 NAVAL AVIATION 440

55 NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS

30 SOVIET DIVISIONS

EASTERN EUROPE

22 DIVISIONS

USSR

BLACK SEA FLEET/ CASPIAN FLOTILLA

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 82
 OTHER SURFACE COMBATANTS 308
 NAVAL AVIATION 400

NUCLEAR FORCES

ICBMs

SS-11	520
SS-13	60
SS-17	150
SS-18	308
SS-19	360

LRINF

SS-4	224
SS-5	13
SS-20	378

SLBMs

SS-N-5	45
SS-N-6	368
SS-N-8	292
SS-N-17	12
SS-N-18	224
SS-N-20	40

BOMBERS


BACKFIRE	235*
BISON	45
BEAR	115+
BADGER	316
BLINDER	139

* Including 105 Soviet Naval Aviation

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 6,280

MILITARY FORCES



PACIFIC FLEET

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS	82
OTHER SURFACE COMBATANTS	368
NAVAL AVIATION	620

GROUND FORCES*

MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS	136
TANK DIVISIONS	50
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS	7
COASTAL DEFENSE DIVISIONS	1

* Totals exclude 17 mobilization divisions

AIR DEFENSE FORCES



INTERCEPTORS 1,200



OPERATIONAL ABM LAUNCHERS 32



SAM LAUNCHERS 9,600+

NAVAL FORCES



PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS	286
OTHER SURFACE COMBATANTS	1,163
SUBMARINES	378
AUXILIARIES	780
NAVAL AVIATION	1,530

centration of power in the hands of a political elite is most evident at the national level, where Party, state and military responsibilities are often within the purview of one individual.

The job of the Soviet Government is to implement Party policy under the eye of the ever-present Party officials. The Party pervades all Soviet organizations, official and unofficial. All are penetrated and monitored by the Party watchdog, the Committee for State Security (KGB). Several members of the Politburo simultaneously hold key posts in the state apparatus. All government ministers and most senior military commanders are members of the CPSU Central Committee. All responsible government positions are filled by trusted Party members.

Centers of political power outside the Party do not exist within the USSR; thus, Soviet decisionmaking can produce policies with a force and constancy not achievable in more democratic and pluralistic political systems. The relatively small number of senior Party members holding key Party and government positions, their age and often long tenure have produced a well-entrenched, rather homogeneous decisionmaking elite. This Party elite has a shared heritage and maintains common interests as to basic directions in both domestic and foreign policy, a factor which helps to account for the marked continuity of its policies.

The late General Secretary Andropov served as an excellent example of this leadership elite and of the total domination of the Communist Party over all aspects of Soviet affairs. His accumulated experience as a Party member covered over four decades. He worked both at the regional and national level in the Party apparatus. As Ambassador to Hungary, Andropov acquired a knowledge of the Soviet style of diplomacy and played a key role in the Soviet invasion in 1956. From 1967 to 1982, he headed the KGB and, in that capacity, engineered the crackdown on the Soviet human rights/dissident movement. Most recently, and until his death, Andropov held the three most important positions in the Soviet Union: head of the Communist Party; chief of the Soviet Government; and Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The power by which the General Secretary is derived from the Party itself. At the apex of the Party's centralized, hierarchical structure

is the Politburo, which exercises power through a disciplined Party bureaucracy. Essential support to the Politburo's national decisionmaking role is provided by the Central Committee (CC) Secretariat. At present, it consists of 11 members, headed by a General Secretary and is concerned with the full spectrum of national policy issues, as well as monitoring government performance, controlling lower-level Party appointments, ideology and internal Party matters. The CC Secretariat is supported by a staff of several thousand full-time employees. This staff is organized into over 20 departments paralleling elements of the government. Through these mechanisms, the Party maintains control of the day-to-day activities of the Soviet state.

The Military in Soviet Society


In Soviet society, military forces exist not as a separate institution, but rather as an inherent part of a system in which militarism itself has been institutionalized; one is just as likely to find a uniformed soldier in the offices of a research institute as in the barracks of a field unit.

Marxist-Leninist ideology preaches a militant activism in which the rights and desires of the individual are subordinated to the needs and requirements of the state. Economic successes are glorified much like victories won on a battlefield. Similarly, economic failures or acts of corruption are publicly vilified because they threaten the security of the nation.

The Soviet Union maintains Armed Forces both for external and for internal operations. These include five combat services: Strategic Rocket, Air, Ground, Naval and Air Defense Forces. Additionally, they include the troops of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

KGB troops consist of at least 200,000-to-250,000 Border Guards and another 30,000-to-50,000 troops assigned to special communications units charged with providing reliable and secure communications to top party and government entities.

KGB Border Troops have heavy equipment, including tanks and artillery, and sometimes engage external forces. This was the case during the border clashes with the Chinese in 1967-69. The principal purpose of the KGB's Border Troops, however, is to seal Soviet borders.



Some 250,000 KGB troops are used primarily for internal operations, to seal Soviet borders.


The MVD currently has at least five divisions. MVD troops reinforce police, when necessary, to quell internal disturbances. In addition, MVD troops man the watch towers of the Soviet concentration camps (GULAG) and guard the inmates working on forced labor projects.

The Soviet obsession with security has played a central role in influencing the Party's approach to the development of the

Soviet state and the evolution of its Armed Forces. From the time the Communists first seized power they have cultivated a special relationship with the Armed Forces. M.V. Frunze, the Bolshevik military leader who replaced Leon Trotsky in 1925 as head of the Red Army, argued that the next war could be won only through the "militarization of the entire population."

The Great Patriotic War, as the Soviets call World War II, bore out Frunze's predictions. The Soviets mobilized the entire country behind the war effort. That undertaking left a mark on Soviet society that is evident to this day, reminding Soviet citizens of the sacrifices made and the necessity for military preparedness. The war is still glorified and commemorated. Anniversaries of key battles are honored. In addition, the Armed Forces always play a prominent role in important holidays, such as the annual November celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution.

The constant reminders of the Great Patriotic War are part of a broader military presence that every Soviet citizen is subjected to in a strict, formalized manner. The Soviet Law on Universal Military Service specifies that every male citizen is subject to military ser-



*NEW
CAPTION*

vice until age 50 and that military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honorable duty of Soviet citizens. The Soviet system of universal military service is supported by a vast military-educational complex designed to prepare the individual for the Armed Forces long before he or she enters the service.

Premilitary training occurs both in the school system and through a number of official youth organizations. Soviet students are taught to respect the importance of military service and to honor the role of the Armed Forces in society. Grade school children learn of the military through visits to war memorials, class projects that eulogize war heroes and glorify the campaigns of local military units, and through direct contact with forces stationed in the area. Soviet boys and girls, in the 8-to-15 age group, generally join the Pioneers, an organization supported by the CPSU. The Pioneers sponsor numerous activities, including nationwide military-sports games such as the Zarnitsa. Youth battalions, organized as military units, compete in the annual Zarnitsa for much coveted citations. The Pioneers have other responsibilities, such as guarding war monuments and shrines.

In addition to the Pioneers, a Soviet 14 year-old is also likely to join a unit of the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and the Fleet, known by its acronym DOSAAF. DOSAAF is an organization of over 330,000 different units scattered throughout the USSR, numbering over 80 million students and workers.


DOSAAF units play an important role in providing pre-service basic training to Soviet youth. Special courses give students the opportunity to operate military equipment. Through various sports functions, young people can learn other skills that prepare them for military service, including sharpshooting, parachuting and scuba diving. DOSAAF's role, as part of the Soviet military-educational system is perhaps best symbolized by the fact that its chief is a Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union, Georgiy M. Yegorov.

Military education in the Soviet Union does not focus on the youth alone. Citizens can be called back into active service until age 50. In addition, large numbers of military academies and schools provide specialist training for both active duty and reserve officers. Finally, the public at large participates in a nation-

wide civil defense educational program that is the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and run by an active-duty general officer.

In his speech accepting the post of General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, the late Yuri Andropov stated that, "We well know that peace cannot be begged from the imperialists. It can only stand on, it can only rest on, the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces."

The USSR's willingness to use military force under certain conditions to achieve the objectives of the State and the prominent role of the military in Soviet society present a serious threat to world peace. Ideological precepts and national structure alone, however threatening, do not portray the full picture. The State is fully committed to developing, supporting and sustaining military forces for use internally, regionally and globally. The dedication of the Soviet leadership and Armed Forces to these objectives is examined in the following chapters.



For two decades, the USSR has pressed ahead with a large naval construction program, with the continuing introduction of new classes of surface warships, submarines and aircraft carriers, including the MINSK of the KIEV-Class carriers.

RECEIVED 01 MAR 84 08

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 29 FEB 84

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 5/12/99

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT. GROMYKO SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 05 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# 8406280

LOG

NSCIFID

(CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
McFarlane	1X 3/1	For info		
	3/3	JP Noted		JM

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

Cen

RECEIVED
National Security Council
The White House

84 MAR 1 3:07

1024

System # I
Package # 1723

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	<u>...</u>	X
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information
 A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)
Bud may want to see before 2¹⁵ meeting.

04 MAR 2 PI: 23

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I
Package # 1723

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>RCM see by</u>	<u>X</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)
Bud may want to see before 2¹⁵ meeting

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 1, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Gromyko Speech on Foreign Policy

State has sent a memorandum (TAB I) which analyzes Gromyko's February 27 speech on foreign policy.

According to State, Gromyko's condemnation of U.S. policy combined with expressions of interest in improving East-West relations suggests an effort to keep the U.S. on the defensive while the Soviets work through the problem internally of how and when to engage the U.S. in a serious dialogue. I concur with this analysis, and would note that it will be interesting to compare the tone on Chernenko's "election" speech -- scheduled for tomorrow -- with Gromyko's.

Attachment:

Tab I - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of February 29, 1984

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-002 #40

CAS

NARA

7/17/00

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 21 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RECEIVED 01 MAR 84 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 28 FEB 84

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 5/12/99

KEYWORDS USSR

AP

MASSIE, SUZANNE

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES MTG W/ MASSIE ON 1 MAR

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 01 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

TYSON

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8400288

NSCIFID

(HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
resident	10/2/84	For information		JF, E, J, S, M, P
	3/01	Pres noted		JM ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) MR

**National Security Council
The White House**

1017

FEB 29 9:25

System # I

Package # 1653

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>wpl</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 2/29 1500 to Durham
(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____

Received 1984 1653

1984 FEB 29 PM 3:45

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 29, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH MRS. SUZANNE MASSIE

OR

DATE: March 1, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 12:00 - 1:00 (Lunch)
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

I. PURPOSE:

To have private meeting.

II. BACKGROUND:

Mrs. Massie met with you on January 17. She has since visited the Soviet Union, where she had extensive discussions with Soviet cultural and Church figures.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Mrs. Suzanne Massie
Robert C. McFarlane
Michael Deaver

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The informal setting will give you the opportunity to hear from Mrs. Massie about her recent trip to Moscow and her impressions of the mood among Soviet intellectuals. You might also wish to seek her views on steps we might take to bolster our influence among the Russian people.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points/card

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By *OKS* NARA, Date *5/2/99*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President
James Baker
Mike Deaver
Ed Meese

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking Points

- I enjoyed our discussion in January, and thank you for coming to Washington to continue it.

- Was the mood in Moscow different during your recent trip from what you found last fall?

- I've tried to make clear that we have no quarrel with the Russian people and that our problems are with the Communist regime. Is this message getting through?

- I've heard that there is something of a revival of religious feeling in Russia. Is this true? How much is the Orthodox Church a tool of the Communist regime?

- How much confidence do the Russian people have in their own government? Do they really believe what Soviet propaganda tells them?

- Is there anything more we can do to bring our influence to bear on the Russian public -- and on the other nationalities in the Soviet Union?

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Meeting Scheduled for March 1 with
Suzanne MassieIssue

To have private meeting.

Background

Mrs. Massie met with the President on January 17. She has since visited the Soviet Union, where she had extensive discussions with Soviet cultural and Church figures.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Talking Points/cards

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
 By CAS NARA, Date 5/14/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 1, 19 84

for President of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY).

MASSIE, Suzanne

NSC

Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing Requested by Rachel C. Ashley
Room No. Oval Office (for lunch) Room No. 368 Telephone 5112
Time of Meeting 1200 Date of request Feb. 29, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

RECEIVED 01 MAR 84 08

TO KIMMITT

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 29 FEB 84

NL F99-002 #42
CAS NARA DATE 7/17/00

KEYWORDS USSR

INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF MTG TO DISCUSS RPT ON APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF
EQUIVALENCE & RECIPROCITY TO SOVIETS ON MAR 5

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

FORTIER

DEGRAFFENREID

Thompson

COMMENTS

REF# 8406264

LOG 8401407

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(CM CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 23-27 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

1092 ml
National Security Council
The White House

System # I
 Package # 2653

ED

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Dep. Exec. Secretary</i> Bill Martin	1	PT	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	K	
Wilma Hall	4	✓	
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
Bob Kimmitt	6	K	
NSC Secretariat	7		■ A
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			



I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*Route to Hatlock for further action.
 Eventually will need Kimmitt -> Deaver memo.*

10

2 10



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 2, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Meeting of President with Russian Emigre Writers

Mike Deaver has requested your opinion regarding the possibility of the President meeting with three Russian emigre writers living in the United States, Vasili Aksyonov, Sergei Dovlatov and Yuz Aleshkovsky.

I believe that the President would find it very interesting to hear the views of these writers on some of the questions he has been discussing with other recent visitors, particularly those relating to Russian and Soviet psychology and the role of Communist ideology in regime thinking.

If he has a meeting with emigre writers, however, I believe it should include some from genres other than the novel (Josef Brodsky, for example, is one of the finest Russian poets writing today). We should also give some thought to the orientation of members of the group as regards other Russian emigres. It would be unfortunate to be seen favoring one faction over another. Of the three writers mentioned in the Times article, I know only Aksyonov personally. He is a brilliant writer who is an excellent conversationalist.

In sum, if you think the President would be interested, I would recommend that we draw up a list of not more than five Russian emigre writers and invite them to a meeting or a private lunch. Some of them do not speak English well, so an interpreter will probably be necessary.

Walt Raymond concurs.

Recommendation:

That I discreetly consult some persons knowledgeable about the Russian emigre cultural scene (including Suzanne Massie), and develop a list of about five emigre writers to be invited to a meeting or lunch with the President.


Approve *JM*

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Memo from Deaver's office and New York Times article~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: WALT RAYMOND *WR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Russian Emigre
Writers

I have reflected on this question. If the basic purpose is to give the President a genuine opportunity to have an exchange of views with Russians who have comparatively recently left the Soviet Union I would propose two alternative approaches.

-- A lunch with Mr. & Mrs. Solzhenitzn. As you know there was some bruised feelings when the earlier White House invitation aborted. Judgement may be made that no further invitation should be extended. Nevertheless, Solzhenitzn is the best writer and possibly the most insightful person. He will not come to a group meeting but his qualities are such that he does indeed stand alone. The only other person who could participate is Mstislav Rostropovich. ✓

-- A group of exiled writers/intellectuals that I would recommend include the following:

Aksyonov
Neivestny
Brotsky
Lev Kopelev
Rostropovich
Nekrich
Alex Godunov
Pavel Litvinov

A brief comment about this group. I think the first five would give you good balance. Kopelev is ~~✗~~ more liberal, Rostropovich is a Russian nationalist, the others are centrists. If you wanted to substitute one of the above Nekrich is a good historian who divides his time between Paris and Cambridge. Godunov is an articulate ballet dancer and Pavel Litvinov is a very impressive representative of the democratic movement. The problem with Litvinov is that he also came to the first luncheon. He is the only one who did, but that probably disqualifies him. ✓