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THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

20086

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JUNE 24, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. MARIO G. OBLEDO

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING THE TERRORISTS IN BEIRUT

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
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COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: _____ MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
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| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
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| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY | * | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE | * | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY | * | | * |
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LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

316618



League of
United Latin
American Citizens

Office of National President
MARIO G. OBLEDO

Handwritten notes:
LULAC
Mario G. Obledo

June 21, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Please don't say uncle to the terrorists in Beirut.

LULAC recommends that you do not succumb to the demands of extremists who put the lives of American citizens in jeopardy. America must always demonstrate its strength, and particularly at difficult times such as this one.

Sincerely,

Mario G. Obledo
National President

MGO/lc

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

0086

DATE RECEIVED: JANUARY 18, 1986

8602358

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: SHEIKH AMINE AWAD

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING THE CHRISTIAN AREA IN
LEBANON AND ASKS THE U.S. TO INTERVENE IN ITS
DIFFICULTIES WITH SYRIA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
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MANAGEMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8602358

Date February 12, 1986

For: VADM John M. Poindexter
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Sheikh Amine Awad

Date: January 17, 1986 Subject: Christian area in
Lebanon and asks the U.S. to intervene in its difficulties
with Syria


Referral Dated: January 27, 1986 ID# 367073
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- x An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 12, 1986

Sheikh Aminé Awad
President
World Maronite Lebanese Union
4370 34th Street
Orlando, Florida 32805

Dear Sheikh Amine:

The President has asked me to reply to your telegram of January 19 concerning the status of the Christian community in Lebanon.

We continue to follow the situation closely and we share your concern for the innocent people of Lebanon, who have suffered so much during the last eleven years. It remains our firm conviction that there is no military solution to the political problems of that troubled country. We will continue to support a dialogue among the various factions in an effort to reach a genuine consensus on Lebanon's political future. We firmly believe that any solution, if it is to be viable, will require broad support in all communities.

In a very real sense, all Lebanese lose from the continuation of violence. We continue to urge all parties to resume the dialogue essential to the establishment of a political consensus. We deplore the continuing cycle of violence that has so plagued the country.

Rest assured that we will remain steadfast in our support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon - as well as for the peace and prosperity of the Lebanese people.

Sincerely,

Roscoe S. Suddarth
Deputy Assistant Secretary

8602358

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

JANUARY 27, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
APPROPRIATE ACTION

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 367073

MEDIA: TELEGRAM, DATED JANUARY 17, 1986

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: SHEIKH AMINE AWAD
PRESIDENT
WORLD MARONITE UNION
4370 34TH STREET
ORLANDO FL 32805

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING THE CHRISTIAN AREA IN
LEBANON AND ASKS THE U.S. TO INTERVENE IN ITS
DIFFICULTIES WITH SYRIA

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

recd 5155 JAN 24 1986
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J. Kofchis

367073

8602358

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MR RONALD REAGAN
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
WHITE HOUSE

1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE
WASHINGTON DC 20500

MR PRESIDENT NOW THAT ENTIRE CHRISTIAN POPULATION IN LEBANON HAVE
REFUSED TO SIGN AN ACCORD WITH SYRIA SINCE SUCH ACCORD IS ONLY
LEAVING SYRIA TO ANNEX LEBANON THAT SYRIA ARMY IS USING MANY OF
ITS PAID PEOPLE TO BOMBARD ALL THE CHRISTIAN AREA THUS GOING BACK
TO WHAT WE WERE TWO YEARS AGO STOP IN THE NAME OF GOD 11 YEARS ARE
ENOUGH PLEASE HAVE YOUR GOVERNMENT STOP SYRIA AND THE FOREIGN TROUPES
ENTER IN OUR LIFE AND INDEPENDENCE STOP THE LEBANESE HAVE THE ABILITY
TO ARRANGE ANY DIFFICULTY AMONG THEM BUT WITH NO OUTSIDE
INTERFERENCE STOP DONT YOU THINK MR PRESIDENT THAT AFTER
THE DEATH OF 3 HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE WE DESERVE THE
ATTENTION OF WASHINGTON LIKE YOU ARE DOING FOR NICARAGUA
STOP THE MARONITE CATHOLIC ALONG REPRESENT 7 MILLION PEOPLE IN THE

DIASPORA AND OTHER CHRISTIAN REPRESENT 14 MILLION STOP WE ARE
PRO FREEDOM COMMA PRO LIBERTY WE ARE PRO U S PLEASE HELP US AGAIN
IN THE NAME OF GOD OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST STOP THANK YOU

WORLD MARONITE UNION SHEIKH AMINE AWAD

PRESIDENT

4370 34 ST ORLANDO FLORIDA 32805

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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Feb 6, 1986

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Dear Mr. Basil:

Have been remembering of your visit and letter for some weeks now; and I just wanted to drop you this note to say that, while I share your concern over what is happening to your mother country, there is little I can do. Unfortunately, our own country is not today what we were in 1958 - and for that, good people all over the world are paying a terrible price.

With my regards, Pat Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Robert Basil
Executive Committee
American Lebanese League
Suite 1185
National Press Building
Washington, D.C. 20005

re: the survival of Lebanon



American Lebanese League

22 January 1986

Honorable Patrick Buchanan
Assistant to the President and
Director of Communications
The White House
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Buchanan:

The American Lebanese League, a nationwide organization representing the ideals of 2.5 million Americans of Lebanese descent, is gravely concerned about the survival of a democratic, sovereign Lebanon and, equally importantly, of its Christian community.

Lebanon, the only democracy in the Arab World, and its Christians, the only free, secure Christian community in the entire Islamic World, are both in peril. Both are inextricably interwoven, one with the other, in that Lebanon and its free, democratic institutions are a unique Christian creation in the Arab World and both must survive for either to do so.

The so-called "Peace Accord" Syria is trying to force upon Lebanon essentially guarantees Syrian-imposed internal stability in return for Lebanon's giving away its sovereignty. This agreement (Tab A), signed by militia leaders who represent neither the people nor the constitutional process, reads like a document between the Soviet Union and an Eastern European satellite, with the first pages full of social justice and democracy, and the final portion, Chapter IV, demanding Syrian control over Lebanese foreign policy, military policy and army, economy, education, free press, and national security; in other words, to have the free, democratic institutions become a mirror-image of the totalitarian, dictatorial institutions of Syria. Worse, it sets in motion joint agreements and initiatives which transform over several years the values and national charter of Lebanon into those of Syria.

The implications of this agreement, if adopted, would be enormous for Lebanon, the U.S., and the Free World. Lebanon would be forced, against its will, out of the Community of Free Nations, and to abandon its fierce, traditional, pro-U.S., pro-West character and policies. Lebanon would be forced to become an extension of Syrian-Iranian terrorism, such as the slaughter at the U.S. Marine barracks, and be an active supporter of anti-U.S., pro-Soviet objectives.

We understand the importance placed by the U.S. policy-makers upon getting President Assad's cooperation in regional matters. However, the U.S. should not permit Lebanon's sovereignty to be sold as a price for an illusory goal of Syrian-imposed stability. How can anyone expect the inherently most radical, unstable country in the region, Syria, to guarantee



American Lebanese League

anyone stability ? The Lebanese Christians are eager to see justice and equality more than any other community. However, they are rightly fearful that a process, in the disguise of being democratic, will be set in motion to achieve an undemocratic result: a radical, fundamentalist, non-free state so typical of the region.

The American Lebanese community urges the Administration to take all steps necessary to insure that the present agreement Syria is trying to impose, through violence, shelling of civilians, car bombing, military action, and political threats, be changed to preserve both Lebanon's sovereign, democratic character, and its free, secure Christian community.

We have also sent our request to President Gemayel (Tab B).

Respectfully,

Executive Committee
American Lebanese League

MR. PRESIDENT, YOU, REPRESENTING LEGALITY IN LEBANON, MUST GUARANTEE THAT ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE MINDS AND HEARTS OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. THIS SUPPORT AND APPROVAL CANNOT BE OBTAINED BY THE SIGNATURES OF MILITIA LEADERS WHO ARE NOT FREE AGENTS OR WHO HAVE NARROW INTERESTS, BUT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS FUNDAMENTAL TO ANY DEMOCRACY, ESPECIALLY LEBANON. OTHERWISE, IT IS AN OUTRAGE AGAINST THE MOST BASIC DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES.

LEBANON IS PART OF THE FREE WORLD, WITH DEEP VALUES OF LIBERTY, PLURALISM, AND THE DIGNITY OF FREE MAN IN A FREE SOCIETY. WHAT A DARK DAY FOR THE FREE WORLD IF THIS FRAGILE FLOWER OF DEMOCRACY, STRUGGLING FOR SURVIVAL IN A HARSH AND UNFORGIVING ENVIRONMENT, IN A REGION WHERE FREEDOM IS RARE, WERE TO FADE. LEBANON AND SYRIA HAVE MUCH TO GIVE TO EACH OTHER. LEBANON'S GREATEST GIFT TO SYRIA AND TO THE REGION WOULD BE THE GIFT OF PRESERVING LEBANON'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY, UNIQUE NATIONAL CHARACTER, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, AND FREE AND SECURE COMMUNITIES AND CITIZENS COMMITTED TO THE NATION, AS A SHINING EXAMPLE FOR A TROUBLED REGION.

RESPECTFULLY,

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
AMERICAN LEBANESE LEAGUE

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Preamble:

Amid the tragic, extraordinary circumstances that have been afflicting Lebanon, the conferees have drawn up a national solution based on our people's aspirations toward liberating the land from the Israeli occupation, restoring security and peace to the homeland, and establishing a sound, democratic regime by upholding justice and equality, both politically and socially, and realizing the Lebanese people's ambitions in all fields. This solution requires a comprehensive national commitment and pan-Arab strength represented in implementing special relations with fraternal Syria, which did not and will never spare any effort, under President struggler Hafez el-Assad's leadership, to deliver Lebanon and protect its independence, unity, and Arab affiliation and to lead it toward a democratic solution for its various struggles.

Chapter I: General Principles.

Lebanon's Identity: Lebanon is an independent, free, and sovereign state in terms of its territory, people, and institutions within its boundaries outlined in the Lebanese Constitution that are internationally recognized. It is of Arab affiliation and identity; an active, founding member of the Arab League; and is committed to the various Arab League charters. The state embodies these principles in various fields and areas without exception. Lebanon is also a member of the United Nations and is committed to the UN charter.

Lebanon's Unity: Absolute adherence to Lebanon's unity. All partition plans, all forms of discrimination, and all proposals of political decentralization such as federations, cantons, and decentralization in security and development are rejected. This position makes inevitable the imposition of personal safety and settlement in any Lebanese site in any form and regardless of the period of this settlement.

The Political System: Lebanon is a democratic, parliamentary republic established on the basis of respect for public freedoms, particularly the freedom of opinion and creed. It is also based on the principles of separation of powers and social justice and equality of duties and rights of all citizens, without any discrimination or preference, within a free economic system based on comprehensive scientific planning of various resources, needs and activities in all areas. It is a country of human dignity and cultural ambitions.

Lebanon's Liberation:

1. Continuing the escalation of resistance to liberate Lebanon from the Israeli occupation, liquidate its direct as well as indirect presence, reject all sorts of security arrangements and their suspect tools, and thwart any local tool that is tied to or dealing with the occupation.
2. Providing all resources and pooling all official efforts to back the national resistance in the South in terms of manpower and funds, in its capacity as the main base for the process of liberation and the correct bases of unifying Lebanon.
3. Supporting the firmness and steadfastness of the southern Lebanese citizen on his land by providing human, material, and economic means of development.
4. Working to implement Resolution 425 and all UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to comprehensively removing the Israeli occupation and rejecting all Israeli conditions and restrictions.
5. Adhering to the armistice agreement signed on 23 March 1949.

Chapter II: The Principles of the Political System.

Efforts to strengthen the spirit of national growth and democratic practice require replacement of the current sectarian formula with a national one that can guarantee the people's participation and representation in a political authority capable of expressing the people's aspirations and ambitions on the national level and on the basis of freedom, social justice, equality, equal opportunities, development, and security. Hence, it was agreed that the building of Lebanon's future and the establishment of a modern, developed state that is free from the legacy of the past necessitate the cancellation of the sectarian system. As a result, a new constitution will be drafted on the basis of reinforcing the homeland's unity, independence, Arab affiliation, and democratic system, as well as a full equality among the citizens. This constitution, which will be drafted within one year at the most, will include the following basic principles and provisions:

1. The Lebanese system is republican, democratic, and parliamentary.
2. The people are the source of authorities and will practice their national supremacy through constitutional institutions as outlined in the future constitution.
3. The Lebanese are equal before the law and enjoy equal civil, political, and social rights and assume public duties without any discrimination.
4. Regarding the assumption of public positions and posts, no Lebanese has any special privileges apart from his qualifications within the legal conditions.
5. Personal freedom shall be safeguarded and protected by the law and the freedom of belief shall be protected. In this regard, stress is put on Article 9 of the current

constitution, as well as on public freedoms regarding opinion, expression, education, parties, societies, residence, labor, election, gatherings, possessions, and trade union work. All these should take place within the limit of law on a par with democratic countries.

6. The economic system shall be considered as free, organized, and capable of guaranteeing individual initiative so long as it does not conflict with the general order and public interest. This system is based on a comprehensive scientific development of various energies, needs, and activities in all areas. It is also based on a long term development plan, considering Lebanon's unity an indivisible unit.

7. Social justice shall prevail; social cooperation shall be considered a national obligation; national education shall be the citizens' right and duty. Compulsory education shall be provided for all citizens through the end of the intermediary course.

8. A new election law will be drafted to secure the broadest and best representation of a national basis and to consider each province as one electorate in order to safeguard national unity and to express the will to coexist. All citizens-men and women-have the right to vote when they become 18 years old in accordance with conditions defined by the constitution.

9. A senate will be established to assume, together with the chamber of deputies, legislative powers regarding fateful issues: amending the constitution, war and peace, international treaties and agreements, factional civil status, the citizenship law, the senate elections.

10. The new government will immediately form a preparatory committee to draft the new country's constitution in preparation for approval.

The Stage of Moving toward Complete Non-Sectarianism:

1. Moving from the sectarian formula to another formula that guarantees national cohesion under the canopy of the democratic, parliamentary, republican system involves a transitional and gradual stage toward complete non-sectarianism. At this stage, reforms and measures of a constitutional, systematic, and legal nature mentioned in this document will be adopted in accordance with the following:

A. A new government will be formed immediately. The beginning of the transitional stage will be the date this government is formed.

B. The stage of ending the state of war in Lebanon will be no more than one year beginning with the date of forming the new government in accordance with what is stated in Chapter V of this agreement.

C. The present Chamber of Deputies will be entrenched and expanded after forming the new government by appointing new deputies in accordance with the principles of equal sharing between Muslims and Christians and equality among the three greater

sects, and on the basis of the numbers determined by this agreement. Within a period of one year at the most, all legal and constitutional texts relating to implementing the transitional reforms mentioned in this document will be applied.

D. The transitional stage will end when the Chamber of Deputies makes a decision to determine the beginning of the date for working for a total cancellation of sectarianism in accordance with the following:

a. After the restoration of normal situation in the country, the government will call for electing a new Chamber of Deputies on the basis of a new electoral law in accordance with the principles mentioned in this agreement.

b. During the second half of the term of the first elected Chamber of Deputies, the government will propose a plan to determine the date for beginning work to cancel sectarianism in parliamentary representation, the three executives [the prime minister, the president, and speaker of the Chamber of Deputies], the ministries, and class A jobs equivalent jobs. The majority required for approving the plan will be two-thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies.

c. If the plan is not approved, the vote required for its approval will become 55 percent beginning with the second half of the term of the second elected Chamber of Deputies.

d. If the plan is not approved the cancellation of sectarianism in parliamentary representation, in the presidencies, the ministries, the class A jobs or those equivalent, during the first half of the term of the third elected Chamber of Deputies, will be decided legally.

Chapter III: The Rules of the Transitional Stage.

During the transitional stage, and in order to establish sound balance in jurisdictions between the legislative and executive powers, along with guaranteeing the independence of the judicial system under the canopy of the democratic, parliamentary, republican system, the following rules will be adopted and the constitutional or organizational laws and articles will be issued, amended, or suspended in accordance with the principles that would guarantee their application:

In the Executive Power:

I. The President of the Republic:

1. The election of the President: After reforming the conditions of the legislative power in accordance with the principles that will follow, the majority required for electing the President of the Republic will be 55 percent of the legal number of the Chamber of Deputies in the sessions that will follow the first session. The legal quorum for conducting elections in all sessions will be seven-tenths of the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies.

2. The Powers of the President of the Republic:

A. The President of the Republic is considered the head of state and symbol of the country's unity. He is responsible for respecting the constitution and for safeguarding Lebanon's independence, unity, territorial integrity, and national unity. The President of the Republic shall take a constitutional oath.

B. The President of the Republic is considered the supreme commander of the Army.

C. The President of the Republic signs all decrees and issues laws within limited periods after approval by the competent authorities. He also transfers draft laws to the legislative power. He also has the right to oppose [laws], in accordance with the principles stated in this document, within the periods defined in it. During the forty day period, the President of the Republic shall also issue all the laws of a top-priority nature that the Council of Ministers transfer to the Chamber of Deputies.

D. The President of the Republic names the prime minister and issues decrees forming the cabinet in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of this chapter. He will also issue decisions considering the cabinet as resigned in cases enunciated in this document. Until the legislative power is reformed by increasing the number of deputies in accordance with this agreement, the government will be formed in accordance with the requirements of reconciliation and in a way conducive to implementing this program.

E. The President of the Republic presides over and participates in discussions-with no voting power-during meetings of the following:

1. The Supreme Defense Council.

2. The Council of Ministers in limited cases pertaining to approving the policy statement that defines the policy of the government; declaring a state of peace or war, general mobilization, or a state of emergency; dissolving the Chamber of Deputies; and approving the constitutional draft law, election law, budget law, and general amnesty.

3. The President of the Republic can call the cabinet into emergency session in certain cases when the country is seriously threatened.

4. The President of the Republic can call the cabinet into session once a month at most in order to discuss draft laws that he may have turned down, provided the agenda of such session does not include any other topics.

F. The President receives credentials, receives diplomatic representatives, and presides over official receptions.

G. The President grants state medals.

H. The President is not held responsible for the consequences of his exercising his powers except in cases which the constitution terms as high treason.

I. The President grants special reprieves and proposes and issues the general amnesty

law.

J. The President issues decrees accepting the resignation of any of the cabinet ministers after agreement by the Prime Minister. He can ask any minister to resign after the agreement by the cabinet.

K. Whenever the need arises, the President can address messages to the Chamber of Deputies and the ministers if he deems it necessary.

L. The President chooses the employees of the presidency from among the employees of the state administration.

II. The Council of Ministers:

1. The Council of Ministers is composed of its chairman, a number of ministers of state, and ministers with ministerial portfolios. The necessary quorum for a cabinet meeting is two-thirds of its members.

2. The executive power will be the prerogative of the Council of Ministers, which exercises all executive and administrative powers and draws up the state's general policy in its capacity as the body solely responsible to the legislative power and the people. These powers include:

A. Drawing up the state's general policy in the political, economic, defensive, financial, developmental, educational, and social fields as well as in other areas.

B. Drawing up draft laws and decrees, making the necessary decisions to implement state policy, and assigning top-priority precedence to draft laws whenever it deems this necessary.

C. Insuring implementation of laws and regulations and monitoring the performance of all state organs and establishments, including the military ones.

D. Enacting and cancelling the state of emergency as well as war, general mobilization, and international treaties and agreements, taking into consideration the prerogatives of the legislative power.

E. Directing and coordinating the work of the ministries and all state administrations and general establishments.

F. Drawing up the state budget bill and laying down comprehensive and long-term development plans.

G. Dissolving the Chamber of Deputies by a justified decision and calling the Chamber of Deputies into extraordinary sessions.

H. Appointing class A employees or their equals and asking them to resign or accepting their resignation in accordance with legal practice.

III. The Ministerial Council.

The Ministerial Council is made up of the prime minister and the government's ministers and makes its decisions on a consensus basis. In case of dispute, the issue will be presented to the Council of Ministers to make the appropriate decision. This Council's duties are:

1. To continue efforts to achieve the required reform in all areas.
2. To continue efforts to implement the plan to end the war within the period defined for it.
3. To continue efforts to secure transitional conditions for implementation of the new constitution.
4. To propose the broad lines of state policy and to define its basic options to be presented to the Council of Ministers.
5. To prepare for and present to the Council of Ministers plans, trends, and concepts.
6. To approve all decrees that do not need a decision from the Council of Ministers including relieving one or more ministers of their posts.
7. The members of the Ministerial Council are considered members of the Supreme Defense Council.
8. The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers comprises a number of assistant secretaries general, councillors, and specialized persons who form a special organ for the Council of Ministers-an organ which is linked to the prime minister and which carries out any work demanded by the Council of Ministers.

IV. The Prime Minister:

1. The prime minister presides over the Council of Ministers meetings in all cases except in other cases mentioned elsewhere in this document. He also conducts sessions, proposes agendas, and participates in discussions when he has the right to vote.
2. He presides over meetings of the Ministerial Council in all cases.
3. He accepts the resignation of one or more ministers and refers the decree to the President.
4. He is the deputy of the head of the Supreme Defense Council.
5. He oversees implementation of the Ministerial Council's recommendations and decisions and the Council of Ministers' decisions and follows up the work of ministries and departments.

V. The Formation and Resignation of the Government and the Time Limit for issuing laws and decrees:

1. The government is formed in accordance with the following procedures: A. The

President holds mandatory parliamentary and political consultations and, in light of them, issues a decree naming the prime minister-designate.

B. Following parliamentary and political consultations, the prime minister designate forms the government and presents a list of the government members to the President. If he agrees, he issues decrees.

C. If the President refrains from signing the decree within two weeks after receiving the list, the prime minister designate will submit his case to the parliament. If his view point wins 55 percent of the parliament members' votes, the President should issue the decree. If the parliament does not approve the government, the prime minister will be considered as relieved of his post and consultations will be renewed.

D. If the prime minister refrains from presenting the list of government members to the President within one month following his designation, he will be considered incapable of forming the government. In this case, consultations will be renewed.

2. Following this agreement the government will be formed and the prime minister and ministers will be named in accordance with the requirements of the accord in order to implement this program. This will continue until the legislative power is reformed by increasing the number of parliament members in accordance with this agreement.

3. The government should win parliament's confidence.

4. All decrees and draft laws will bear the signatures of the President, the prime minister, the minister concerned, taking into account the power of the Ministerial Council, except in naming the prime minister or accepting the cabinet's resignation or considering the cabinet as having resigned in the following cases:

A. If the prime minister resigns.

B. If the Council withholds confidence.

C. If half of the cabinet members resign.

5. A 30-day period will be given for signing draft decrees and decrees of transferring laws approved at the Council of Ministers by the President of the Republic or turning these decrees down within this period for justified reasons. This period will be effective from the date the draft decrees are submitted to the general directorate of the presidency of the republic. When the period ends without signing or turning down the draft decrees for justified reasons, the decree will be effective by law. If he turned it down, it will be resubmitted to the Council of Ministers, and the Council of Ministers insists on its decision, the President of the Republic then shall sign the decree. These periods also apply to ordinary decrees.

In case of differences, and if the prime minister and minister in charge of the draft so decree, the draft decree then will be transferred to the Council of Ministers for settlement. The same period will be given to the prime minister and the Ministerial Council as of submitting the draft decrees for the general secretariat. However, laws

approved by the Chamber of Deputies will be applied within periods stated in Article 56 of the current Constitution.

In the Legislative Power:

1. During the transitional stage, popular representation will be expanded by increasing the number of deputies to 198 in a manner that will achieve the soundness and justice of this representation within the framework of equal sharing between Muslims and Christians and equality among the three greater sects in accordance with the principles of this document until the sectarianism in representation is cancelled after the end of the transitional stage.
2. In order to allow elections to be held, temporary appointment of deputies shall take place to fill vacant seats, seats that may become vacant, or those seats newly made by the Council of Ministers.
3. The speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, his deputy, and member of the Chamber of Deputies will be elected for a 2-year term renewable.
4. During the transitional period, the government shall be granted exceptional powers for legislation in all fields except the state's general budget for one year renewable.

In Civil Service Jobs:

1. The rule of sectarian representation shall be canceled in civil service jobs, the judicial organ, and security and military institutions. In order to guarantee just implementation of this principle, the rights of wronged sects shall be settled within a period of 6 months.
2. Exception of this cancelation are class A jobs or their equivalent in the public and mixed administrations and institutions, independent institutions, and the judicial organ. These jobs shall be within the framework of equal sharing between Muslims and Christians. In no way will this mean a monopoly of any job by any sect.
3. During the transitional stage, the government will supervise the reforming and purging of the state's civil and military institutions in accordance with the principles mentioned in this document.

In the Supreme and Constitutional Courts:

A Supreme Council for trying presidents and ministers as stated in the Constitution and a constitutional court to control the constitutional nature of laws and to settle all conflicts resulting from parliamentary and presidential elections shall be formed. The president of the constitutional court shall be appointed in accordance with the Council of Ministers proposal and approval by the Chamber of Deputies.

In the Social and Economic Council:

A Social and Economic Council to represent economic, social, trade unions, and scientific functionaries shall be established. The law shall determine the fields of specialization of this council.

In the Administrative Decentralization:

The administrative system stated in Legislative Decree No. 116 dated 12 June 1959 to reinforce the administrative decentralization shall be reexamined:

1. By increasing and redistributing governorates in a manner that will secure the citizens' interests and national cohesion.
2. By strengthening municipal councils and unions and governorates and expanding their powers.
3. By adopting popular representation in councils in the governorates.
4. By transferring most administrative responsibilities and duties from the central authority to the local authority, thus facilitating and speeding up services for the people.
5. By reforming the judiciary in order to ensure direct services to disputant parties.

Note: The prerogatives of the establishments mentioned in this agreement, in accordance with the new Constitution, will be confined to economic reform and development as follows:

1. Laying down a policy of economic rehabilitation and reconstruction and comprehensive development which will be defined in a coordinated, clear program and which will be supervised mainly by the state. This will require a speedy reform of its administration, and enhancement of its performance, and the forming of specialized administrations or expansion of existing ones. The provisions of this program aim at revitalizing the various sectors of national economy on the basis of integration and harmony, taking into consideration the need to preserve natural and environmental wealth, provided this is based on the principle of free economy.
2. Devoting special attention to areas that were affected by war and to those areas that have been deprived for decades. A development plan should be drawn up for these areas so that the best possible income and wealth can be distributed among citizens and areas and so that fair, integrated developmental equilibrium can be realized for the homeland.
3. Working to realize comprehensive social justice through financial, economic, and social reforms; adopting the five-year plan in economic and financial planning of the budget; and completing the stages of generalizing the social security system, including security for the aged and ensuring free medical care for all citizens.
4. Preserving private property and individual enterprise, which must not harm public

interest. This requires reforming taxation laws, monitoring their application, protecting the rights of the treasury, and supporting the structure of the public sector.

5. Drawing up a comprehensive housing program, giving first preference to displaced persons and those who were harmed by the war, and encouraging cooperative housing societies.

6. Drawing up a comprehensive program to utilize water resources and implementing projects that meet this desire, particularly the Al-Litani river project.

Education and Learning:

1. Placing education and learning in the service of building the future Lebanon on national, nonsectarian basis and utilizing Lebanon's manpower.

2. Supporting education in a way that will lead to spreading it and making it general, free, and compulsory; developing educational programs; and unifying educational curricula, particularly books on history and social upbringing.

3. Supporting formal education on all levels and stressing the national role of the university of Lebanon by giving it the necessary and sufficient backing, particularly in the technical colleges, in order to allow it to play its role in uniting the Lebanese society and making room for all the Lebanese people to acquire the necessary level of education to promote their economic, social, and cultural development.

4. Stressing the role of technical and vocational education by giving it first preference and linking it to the comprehensive construction process in Lebanon.

5. Preserving the system of private education.

6. Supporting scientific research by providing the necessary assistance for public establishments in this field.

Concerning the issue of nationality:

1. Enacting a new law of nationality and settling outstanding issues that are being discussed. Special courts will be formed to look into problems of nationality for one year.

2. Canceling the mention of religion on identity cards.

In the Military and Security Fields:

1. The Army:

The Army's basic task is to protect the nation from any foreign aggression, particularly Israeli aggression against Lebanon. The Army's most important role in this regard is resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. As for reconstructing the Army, this will be effected in accordance with a nationalist, ideological creed to

whose principles all Army personnel will be committed and which will be based on the principles that define Lebanon's identity and affiliation with its Arab surroundings. The Army's structure will be in harmony with Lebanon's pursuit of strategic coordination and integration with Syria.

In accordance with this concept, the following principles will be adhered to:

- A. The duties of the Army are defined within the Supreme Defense Council in accordance with the defense law.
- B. In order to rehabilitate the Army, it is to be withdrawn to its camps in accordance with a comprehensive security plan to be approved by the national unity government, which will demand Syria's help during that rehabilitation in the following fields: training courses, exchange of expertise and information, and national cohesion.
- C. The national unity government will make decisions and measures to work out programs for rebuilding and rehabilitating the Army in accordance with the principles in this documents, including the drafting of a new defense law.
- D. The Army will be kept away from internal and political conflicts.
- E. The compulsory military service law will be implemented immediately.
- F. Army intelligence work is restricted to military and tactical security.

2. The Internal Security Forces:

The duty of maintaining security in Lebanese territory is entrusted to the internal security forces. These forces will thus be reinforced in equipment and numbers and their central organs and regional units will be reorganized as quickly as possible. This requires recruitment so that the forces can be used effectively to protect the citizens' security in all Lebanese areas. Organs for collecting information will also be reinforced.

3. The Public Security:

The public security should be strengthened so that it can carry out the basic duty represented in controlling the international border in addition to its other duties stipulated in the laws and regulations that govern its work such as issuing passports and taking care of foreign nationals. This requires units to protect land and sea borders as well as ports and airports except the border with Israel, which is the duty of the Army.

Chapter IV: The Distinguished Relations Between Lebanon and Syria:

The most prominent meaning in Lebanon's Arabism lies in its distinguished relationship with Syria and its inevitable, fateful link to Syria. Proceeding from this principle, relations should be based on a strategic integration concept between Lebanon and Syria because their fateful issues are one as a result of their affiliation, history, and geography, a fact that requires a high degree of coordination in various

fields. We believe that Lebanon's distinguished relations with Syria should be genuine so that every understanding between the two countries can be included in clear cut bilateral agreements which will be translated into legal frameworks in both countries in order to prevent any political party from tampering with these firm principles. Thus, relations will not remain at the mercy of whims, interests, and regional and international factors.

The word "integration" in this agreement means the following:

The potentialities and capabilities of each country should complement the potentialities and capabilities of the other in order to reinforce each country's situation and achieve their joint interests, on the condition that this would be defined and interpreted within the framework of the bilateral agreements mentioned in this agreement.

The areas of the distinguished relations between the two countries are wide and diversified.

1. In the field of foreign policy:

Complete and firm coordination should cover all Arab, regional, and international issues on the condition that the two countries agree on the requirements of this coordination, one after another and in accordance with proposed issues and subjects, so that they can take positions on them. In this regard, direct, guaranteed, and secret means of communications should be provided for senior officials in charge of foreign policy in both countries.

2. In the field of military relations:

The fateful struggle which Syria is waging in its efforts to establish a strategic parity with Israel as a result of well known Arab circumstances, such as the exclusion of Egypt from the arena of struggle and the emergence of Arab-Palestinian axis with the aim of confusing Syria politically, militarily, and in the field of security, makes it incumbent on Lebanon not to allow itself to be the gateway through which Israel can deal any blow to or threaten Syria. Therefore, agreement must be reached to allow stationing of Syrian military units in specific points in Lebanon that will be defined by joint military committees in accordance with the requirements of the Syrian and Lebanese strategic security until such time as the Lebanese Army is rebuilt and rehabilitated in accordance with a national, militant ideology that will differentiate between the genuine friend and the true enemy and which will be in harmony with Lebanon's affiliation and national options. When such an army, which have defensive tasks against the enemy, is completely built, it will take its real, strategic role in the strategic balance in the region through its role on Lebanese soil.

3. In the field of security relations:

The saying that Lebanon's security is part of Syria's security and that Syria's security is part of Lebanon's security is correct. It should be implemented on the

ground through Lebanese-Syrian security integration that will be expressed in the following:

A. Joint definition of the main threats that endanger the security, independence, and system of government in both countries.

B. Unified view toward such primary threats and hence, an agreement on deep-rooted remedies for such threats that will be commensurate with sovereignty of both countries and which will realize their cherished goal. These remedies will be administered by the competent local organs of both countries.

C. Agreements should be approved to ensure coordination among the security organs, each in accordance with its interest in both countries and in the two countries' interests.

4. In the field of economic relations:

Coordination and integration will be maximized in this field despite the different systems of government. As for the organizing of this coordination, it will be defined by an expert committee from both countries that will supervise proposing of bilateral agreements and laws implementing them.

5. In the field of education:

Coordination in the field of education is the pillar of entrenching kinship between the future generations of both countries through a national upbringing based on Arab affiliation and the correct practice of this affiliation. This coordination will be effected through joint committees that will draw up nationalist, integrated educational basis. Within this framework, and in accordance with the principles of educational reform in Lebanon, the freedom of education will be preserved, taking special care to prevent this freedom from becoming a new seed of division among the Lebanese people or creating hostility toward the Arabs and Syria.

6. In the field of information:

Ensuring the continuation of the special relations without sabotage is represented in preventing any Lebanese-generated media attacks against such relations. This requires that the Lebanese media be on high level of national and pan-Arab responsibility and adhere to the principles and aims enunciated in the national policy that is agreed and approved constitutionally and legally, taking into consideration the respect of the freedom of opinion and expression.

7. The practical application:

Upon the beginning of the transitional phase of the national solution project, the new government will form a ministerial committee that will supervise the provisions of this chapter and put it into practice.

Chapter V: The Mechanism of Ending the War.

The phase of ending the war in Lebanon will be limited to one year beginning with the date the new government is formed. During this year, all constitutional and legal texts pertaining to implementing the transitional reforms of this document will be approved and implemented. The mechanism of ending the war is based on the following principles and rules:

1. Immediate cease-fire with Syria's help, opening roads and crossing points, and stopping supplies of weapons and ammunition by land, sea, and air.
2. Strengthening the role of the security committee and expanding the area of its jurisdiction to include all Lebanese territory. Representatives of the internal security forces and Syrian officers will be included in this committee. Accordingly, Syrian forces will be stationed in agreed upon points, which will lead to extending moral support and military backing to the internal security forces during the phase to end the war in accordance with a comprehensive security plan which the national unity government will approve.
3. Strengthening the internal security forces and general security, opening the door to recruitment, and entrusting the internal security forces with a task of safeguarding security in all Lebanese areas in order to spread the state's authority in these areas without exception.
4. Liquidating the militias and military and paramilitary organizations in their various forms and working to delute their elements in the country and in the nation's institutions.
5. Collecting weapons, with the state to buy them from both the Lebanese and non-Lebanese parties.
6. Ensuring the freedom of movement for Lebanese citizens and guaranteeing their work and residence in all parts of Lebanon.
7. Finding a deep-rooted solution for the problem of the displaced Lebanese persons; recognizing the right of each displaced Lebanese person since 1975 to return to his land, house, and work; enacting the necessary laws that guarantee this right; and ensuring the necessary means to begin rebuilding. The return of displaced persons will begin within three months of the formation of the new government. This return will gradually continue in light of the available security requirements and will completely end within three years.

[Dated] 28 December, 1985

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 086

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JULY 23, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: D.R ANTOINE J. ABRAHAM

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES COPY OF HIS ARTICLE "THE LEBANESE
LABYRINTH" AND REQUESTS A MEETING TO DISCUSS
THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING A U.S.
SPONSORED PEACE PLAN FOR LEBANON

REGRET
Date 7/29/86
forwarding materials appropriate office (NSC)

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
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MARY RAWLINS		ORG	86/07/23			
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
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COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:      *DISPOSITION      *OUTGOING      *
*                   *                   *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED      *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM     *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER      *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE    *C-COMPLETED     * CODE = A       *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED     *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                   * OUTGOING      *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                   *                   *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE     *                   *                   *
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KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

September 2, 1986

Dear Professor Abraham:

Thank you for your recent letter in which you request a meeting with the President to discuss the subject of your article entitled The Lebanese Labyrinth.

Unfortunately, the President's projected calendar commitments for the fall and winter preclude the appointment you request. Therefore, I shall forward your material to the appropriate office for attention.

The President appreciates your thoughtfulness in writing and sends his best wishes.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
Director, Presidential
Appointments and Scheduling

Professor Antoine J. Abraham
Department of Political Science
New York Institute of Technology
1055 Broadway
New York, NY 10023

FJR/KC/ckb 9FJR

bcc w/inc to NSC for appropriate action

40-1327

NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
1855 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10023
(212) 399-8391-2

Center for General Studies

July 20, 1986

*Scheduling
(open)*


The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The continuing crisis situation in Lebanon has prompted me to forward a copy of my article The Lebanese Labyrinth to you. I do hope that you will find it both informative and thought provoking. *encl*

If possible, I would be pleased to meet with you or your representative to discuss the possibility of implementing a U.S. sponsored peace plan for Lebanon, as suggested in the enclosed article.


Sincerely yours,



Prof. Antoine J. Abraham, Ph.D.

NYIT

Dept. of Political Science



transnational perspectives

Volume 12, Number 1, 1986



Managing Regional Armed Conflict

THE LEBANESE LABYRINTH

Antoine J. Abraham, and Ahmed Abdul Majid

Long before the European colonists landed in the New World, Lebanon, as a geo-political entity, had evolved into an open, pluralistic, society in a troubled corner of the Mediterranean World.

Left to themselves, the Lebanese created an energetic trading culture and a prosperous and tranquil spot in the turbulent seas of Arab diplomacy. Lebanon was, until the decade of the 1970's, a living tribute to the best of civilizations, past and present.

However, by the mid 1970's, Lebanon's transparent tranquility began to fade, as external forces began to impinge upon existing fringe groups within the tiny nation, to pressure and threaten the factional, sectarian, structure of the state. And, finally, external conspiracies struck at the heart of the Lebanese system of government, to break its lifeline to the Free World and to terminate its liberal, western oriented, economic and social system, as well as its unique form of political democracy.

As Lebanon fell into disarray, besieged from within and without, it slipped dangerously deeper into a political morass that has now resulted in a paucity of thought on how to best resolve its multifaceted, multifarious, conflict, within the context of a sovereign state.

The Near and Middle East, consists of irreconcilable and irreducible religious and ethnic minorities that exist in varying degrees of animosity or outright hostility towards one another. The attempts to fit the various groups into a single political-religious mold has heightened those tensions. Thus, the high mountains of Lebanon proved to be an ideal breeding ground for the numerous heterodox socio-religious groups seeking to avoid persecution, by preserving a degree of autonomy and cooperation, under the ever watchful eyes of their political-religious elites. In time, Lebanon's two indigenous communities, the Maronite Christians and the Moslem Druze, were augmented by several other Christian and Moslem sects, particularly the Shi'ite Moslems who sought safety from their Sunnite Moslem brothers-in-faith. Thereafter, the stage was set for the evolution of modern Lebanon.

The modern history of Lebanon is said to have begun with the Ottoman Turkish conquest of the Near East (1516); it brought the Lebanese region (coterminous with ancient Phoenicia and the areas ruled by Lebanese princes) into the Porte's embrace. The Turkish hold on Lebanon became somewhat precarious when the Maronite Patriarchate launched an initiative

at independence in 1841 and 1845; it proved to be untenable when the Turks enlisted the aid of the Druze against the Maronite Catholic sect. Since then, those two communities have eyed each other with increased distaste and distrust. (The socio-national factors inherent in that conflict are still of major consequence in the anti-government stance taken by the Druze of the Junblatt clan against the Maronite Christian presidency of Lebanon; it should not be underestimated, for the present.)

When the nineteenth century hostilities ended in 1860, the European Powers and the Turkish authorities imposed a newly diminished political structure on Lebanon. The governor of the mountain district enlisted the aid of a religious council representing the major faiths, Christian and Moslem, to increase stability in that troubled province. Thus, the Confessional System of government was born. Lebanon's unique political system evolved from that time, with the expressed aim of preventing the victimization of any sect at the hands of the others.

The Ottoman Empire's uneasy, tenuous, hold on Lebanon ended abruptly with the collapse of the Central Powers, at the end of W.W.I. And, Lebanon slipped quickly and quietly into French hands as a consequence of the League of Nation's Mandate system. In the 1920's, Lebanon was reconstituted into its original political whole, by incorporating parts of the country with large Moslem populations. Only the Sunnite Moslems preferred annexation by Syria, a Sunnite state; Syria put forth its claim that both Lebanon and Palestine were districts of its state, rejecting the national movements in those countries.

Christian fears, Moslem loyalties and international rivalries all boiled together in a Lebanese « melting pot » to produce its Confessional system of government. Religious representation and rivalries became institutionalized promoting stability and security; France recognized those realities and simply created a modern political system incorporating them, to maintain a balance of power within Lebanon.

Under the French Mandate, Lebanon progressed peacefully, but in the late 1940's, the stirrings of nationalism could be sensed among all sects. The Lebanese political leaders with the notable exception of the Sunnite Moslems saw Lebanon's future as an independent state, a « haven where Christians and heterodox Moslems feel safe, and gradually forget their fear of Pan-Arabism and Sunni domination. » Eventually, the Sunnite Moslem establishment came to the realization that union with Syria would render them a

very small cog in a very large Syrian wheel, ending the power and prestige they had acquired in Lebanon.

The need for a political formula that would, conceivably, establish a modern, pro-western, state that could accommodate the various religious groups had to be found. Therefore, a combination of the old and the new, in a political sense, was synthesized to create the Lebanese Formula. The president would be chosen from among the Maronite community, the prime minister would be selected from the Sunnite Moslem sect, the chairman of the chamber of deputies (the parliament) would be a Shi'ite Moslem, and the minister of defense or the chief of staff would be allocated from the Druze community. Consequently, the idea of balancing religious and political power was retained; and Lebanon could chart an even-handed course in Arab and European affairs, under the unwritten agreement known as the National Pact.

As long as the external and internal forces remained stable or static, the state functioned reasonably well by giving each community a special post in the government and a position in the Presidential Cabinet. To this day, the office of the president has remained the preserve of the Maronite Christians to safeguard Lebanon's Christian character. Studies on that subject reflect the role of the French High Commissioner and the fact that a 1932 census showed the Maronites to be in the majority.

All those studies of the Lebanese political system failed to go beyond those easily discernible observations. Analyzing the Lebanese Formula further will reveal that Lebanon's political weaknesses and instabilities remained submerged:

1. Why should the Moslems accept the Lebanese Formula especially when it was clear to them and obvious to the Christians that the Moslem birthrate would overtake the Christian birthrate within a few decades and, hence, upset any formula or ratios that favored the Christians or put them in a position of power?

In Islam, there is no separation of church and state. The Quran, Islam's Holy Book, intertwines religious precepts with legal theory and political administration. Thus, the political and legal ideology of a Moslem state is Islam, and only Islamic principles.


If the Lebanese presidency were shifted to a Moslem sect, then the Moslem president would be obligated, as a matter of faith and duty, to install an Islamic administration under Islamic law, thereby ending Lebanon's Christian culture, as it now exists. The Christian political leaders would be outside the ideology of the state, seen as disloyal to it, and, eventually, removed from all significant political power. And, within the Moslem community, crisis would arise over which sect would the proposed president represent, in a state filled with hostile religious minorities. To avoid a major crisis from developing, the Lebanese Formula was accepted by all, quite harmoniously.

2. During the Mandate period, modern political parties began to form, usually under the leadership of the old class of notables; but, despite party politics, anyone elected to national office must conform to the

Lebanese Formula, described above. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, a Lebanese left, composed of Christian Communists and Moslem Marxist, outside the mainstream of Lebanese political power, began to challenge the Lebanese Formula, which has *absolutely* no place in it for them. Their main objective became a campaign to discredit, weaken, and reduce the power of the central government, to blame the Lebanese Formula for all the problems in the nation, and to obstruct any and all attempts at conflicts resolution undertaken by the Beirut government. They stood on the sidelines awaiting their moment of glory, to topple a pro-western Lebanon and replace it with a Marxist state, perhaps similar to South Yemen.

3. Lebanon has a hybrid culture, but, it is also safe to say that basically it has a Christian and Moslem cultural base unlike any other state in the area.

For the Christian Lebanese, the tiny republic represents the only state in the Moslem World where Islam and Christianity can meet on an equal footing — politically, socially, economically and culturally. The Maronite Christians labored long and hard to achieve some real progress in the area of human rights for all the communities, and their prosperity is largely due to human resource development and, certainly, not to the subjugation of any other sect, as those who are prejudiced against them have charged. The Christians of Lebanon, particularly the Maronite community, are a tribute to the theory of modernization through human resource development.



For the Maronite Christians, there is a meaningful identity between Lebanon and the Western World, an identity rooted in the ideas of freedom of religion and thought, social justice and human dignity, humane values and a commitment to liberalism, and open criticism and a western outlook on life. Furthermore, the Christians of Lebanon see themselves as part of a Mediterranean-based Christian culture, and the Free World's first link in a pro-western chain that runs through Jordan and on to Saudi Arabia. Within Lebanon, however, Christian loyalties have placed Lebanese nationalism before its Arab national or Islamic content.

Much of Lebanon's Moslem population, in general, supported Lebanese assertions, as stated above, until recently when the rise of « Islamic fundamentalists » appealed to them at a very basic level, in the guise of an « Islamic Arab nationalism. » The Moslem leadership in Lebanon was criticized for being too complacent with the Lebanese Formula, too status quo oriented, and unwilling to fight for an Islamic state in Lebanon.


The emotional impact of that message prompted new groups with foreign support to challenge the Lebanese state structure, and to seek the replacement of the old leadership. Consequently, new leaders such as Walid Junblatt, Nabih Berri and others came to power, as the old leadership retreated from the political scene or were assassinated by outsiders. As the new leaders of the Druze and Shi'ite communities won recognition, they sought increased power for their constituency.

Of all the external factors and rivalries impinging upon the Lebanese scene in the early 1970's, the Palestinian presence was a major contributor to the instability of the state and, therefore, deserves some comment. Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, there has been a very large Palestinian refugee population, numbering several hundred thousand, in tiny Lebanon. They were largely docile, until 1970, when a major clash occurred between the forces of King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO forces stationed in his kingdom. One result of that extremely bloody conflict was the transfer of the PLO leadership and their heavily armed troops into Lebanon. The PLO in Lebanon then split into two major factions. The largest of the two, al-Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat, attempted to maintain a degree of neutrality in Lebanese affairs, while the others, the radical left of the PLO, allied themselves with the Lebanese left, in an attempt to topple Lebanon's pro-western government and use Lebanon as a base of operations against the « Zionist State. » By 1975, the PLO was, clearly, the strongest military force in Lebanon.

The main problem in Lebanon, at present, is on the Moslem side of the power structure. Both the Druze and the Shi'ites are no longer satisfied with their share of the pie. The Druze still believe that they have been short changed in the power distribution and dream of past glories, now lost. The Shi'ite Moslems have become the largest single minority, and they want increased power and prestige, but they have been rebuffed in their quest primarily by the Sunnite Moslems who still consider them as a heretical sect in the Arab World. Both the Druze and the Shi'ites have been armed and equipped by Syria, which has used them quite successfully for its own designs. And, finally, another destabilizing factor has emerged. A small but forceful Islamic fundamentalist movement has entrenched itself in the Bekka Valley and in the northern coastal city of Tripoli. (They seek to transform Lebanon into an Islamic state.)

The initial clash of the Lebanese civil war began with an attempt on the life of a right-wing leader, Shaykh Pierre Gemayel, on April 13, 1975, precipitating a larger clash between the Lebanese right and the

PLO left. There are numerous accounts of the conflict in Lebanon and its stages have been, more or less, delineated. Briefly, the first stage of the war was fought between the Lebanese right, and the Lebanese and PLO left; with the left on the run, the second stage shifted to a Lebanese-Palestinian battle for supremacy in Lebanon; and, today, after the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the withdrawal of the PLO forces from Beirut and South Lebanon, the last stage of the conflict is being fought between the Lebanese themselves. The Shi'ite and Druze militias have been locked in battle with the Lebanese Forces, a rightist coalition of Christian parties, over the future orientation of Lebanon. Will Lebanon be submerged deeper into the Arab World's political arena, or will it retain its neutrality in regional politics and maintain its respect for freedom of religion and thought.?



The U.S. peace initiative in Lebanon has proven to be weak, indecisive, and stillborn over the past ten years, nevertheless, U.S. support for President Gemayel's government should not be abandoned. Working with Syria, a major regional power involved in Lebanese affairs, the U.S. should undertake new scenarios to end the morass that has developed, and to keep Lebanon in the Free World. Only an external effort in a « no win, no loss scenario » can be accepted today by the Lebanese leaders. Therefore, the U.S. should meet with Lebanon's new leaders: Berri, Junblatt and the leaders of the Lebanese right, Elie Hobeika and Elie Karame, individually or collectively, to suggest a realignment of power along these lines:

1. The Lebanese presidency should remain in Maronite hands, thus guaranteeing freedom of religion and legal equality for all the citizens of the state.
2. The office of prime minister should remain with the Sunnite Moslems for Lebanon's convenience and its future relations with the Sunnite-dominated Arab World. The prime minister, however, should be made responsible to the parliament as well as the president who nominates him.
3. The office of speaker of the parliament should be transferred from the Shi'ites who now hold it to the Druze. The speaker has the responsibility to introduce new legislation to the parliament and, consequently, has considerable political power. (This change would

give the small Druze sect substantial power in the affairs of state.)

4. The Lebanese parliament should be divided equally between the Christians and Moslems and the Shi'ite sect should be given additional seats in proportion to their percentage of the total Moslem population, to satisfy their quest for increased political representation.

5. The parliament should remain balanced regardless of any future demographics.

The foregoing suggestions are just a beginning, a starting point, for meaningful conflict resolution in Lebanon. Other proposals that have been put forth in the past, such as secularization of the state, partitioning of the state into Christian and Moslem halves, reorganization into cantons or creating a religiously-balanced council for every major post, would have a far more drastic effect and impact on the future of Lebanon and, perhaps, a negative one at that. None of those suggestions have been accepted by the Lebanese leadership to date. Thus, a modified Lebanese Formula is still Lebanon's best bet for peace.

The survival and well-being of a democratic Leba-

non, is directly in the interest of the West; therefore, the Lebanese Formula must be improved, and not removed from Lebanon's future.

Clearly, however, steps must be taken now, or in the near future, along the lines stated above to resolve Lebanon's problems or Lebanon may decompose and be swallowed up by its neighbors or destroyed in the next round of the never ending Arab-Israeli war. In either case, the U.S. and Europe would lose a true and tested friend in an area of the world that is increasingly growing hostile to western culture.

For the Lebanese people, they must reconstitute the balance of power in the government, re-establish a consensus on internal issues, and foster neutrality in foreign affairs, or they may conceivably become the new Palestinians of the Arab World.

Antoine Abraham and Ahmed Abdul Majid are members of the Department of Social and Political Sciences, New York Institute of Technology. Professor Abraham's « The Theory and Practice of Islamic Fundamentalists » was published in *Transnational Perspectives* Vol. 11, N°4, 1985.



SUNDAY

Verona Bratesch

When I think of leaves, I am quiet,
although the next gust of wind separates them
forever from their paternal branch.

I want to be calm and worry-free like them
only today, Sunday, when no wind stirs
to sadden the mind.

I hear birds call without haste
and others answer to the love call.
The day exercises a tranquil waiting,
and it darkens slowly toward the moon.

Translated from the German
by Werner Manheim

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 086

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 26, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE KENNETH HAHN

SEP 26 1986

SUBJECT: URGES TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THE
HUMANITARIAN RELEASE OF DAVID JACOBSEN AND
THE OTHER HOSTAGES HELD IN LEBANON

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
CRISTY BACH		ORG	86/09/26	<u>AB</u>	<u>C 86/10/8</u>
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COMMENTS:

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- *ACTION CODES:
- *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
- *C-COMMENT/RECOM
- *D-DRAFT RESPONSE
- *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
- *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
- *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
- *S-FOR-SIGNATURE *
- *X-INTERIM REPLY *
- *DISPOSITION
- *A-ANSWERED
- *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
- *C-COMPLETED
- *S-SUSPENDED
- *OUTGOING
- *CORRESPONDENCE:
- *TYPE RESP=INITIALS
- *OF SIGNER
- *CODE = A
- *COMPLETED = DATE OF
- *OUTGOING

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
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KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

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e. Bach

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 PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN RPT DLY MGM
 WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON DC 20500

86 SEP 24 P 2: 11

DEAR PRESIDENT REAGAN

DAVID JACOBSEN, A FORMER LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEE AND FORMER EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF HARBOR GENERAL HOSPITAL-UCLA MEDICAL CENTER FOR 6 YEARS, ALONG WITH 3 OTHER AMERICANS, HAVE BEEN HELD HOSTAGE IN LEBANON FOR THE PAST 2 YEARS. I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THE HUMANITARIAN RELEASE OF JACOBSEN AND THE OTHER HOSTAGES, WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE WORLD HAS SEEN THE RELEASE OF REPORTER NICHOLAS DANILOFF, AND IS WATCHING CLOSELY THE FATE OF THE OTHERS.

ERIC JACOBSEN, THE SON OF DAVID JACOBSEN, FEELS AS THOUGH AMERICA HAS NOT PUT FORTH THE SAME EFFORT TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF HIS FATHER AND THE 3 OTHER AMERICANS, AS WAS USED TO BRING ABOUT THE SWIFT RELEASE OF DANILOFF FROM A MOSCOW PRISON.

FATHER LAWRENCE MARTIN JENCO WAS FREED IN JULY OF THIS YEAR AND PETER
KILBURN WAS MURDERED IN APRIL. 4 HOSTAGES REMAIN IN LEBANON.

WE SHOULD NOT ABANDON OR FORSAKE THE OTHER AMERICANS WHO DO NOT HAVE
THE BENEFIT OF WORLDWIDE PUBLICITY.

SINCERELY YOURS

KENNETH HAHN SUPERVISOR

SECOND DISTRICT

LOS ANGELES COUNTY

383 HALL OF ADMIN 500 WEST TEMPLE ST

LOS ANGELES CA 90012

1305 EST

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