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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT: **Withdrawer**
SUBJECT FILE DLB 9/3/2010

File Folder CO151 (SWEDEN) (150000-2999999) **FOIA**
S10-0306/01

Box Number 178 SYSTEMATIC
148

DOC NO	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	CASE FILE	RE: IMMIGRATION CASE 154368	9	7/20/1983	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT:
SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 9/3/2010

File Folder

CO151 (SWEDEN) (150000-2999999)

FOIA

S10-0306/01
SYSTEMATIC

Box Number

178

148

DOC Document Type

No of Doc Date Restriction

NO Document Description

1 CASE FILE

9 7/20/1983 B6

RE: IMMIGRATION CASE

154368

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

189098
3100
CO151

S/S 8329591

Date October 14, 1983

For: Mr. William P. Clark
National Security Council
The White House

ND018
FG006-12

LD

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Prime Minister Palme

Date: September 27, 1983 Subject: Comprehensive Nuclear
Safeguards

WH Referral Dated: _____ NSC ID# _____
(if any)

The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

A draft reply is attached.

A draft reply will be forwarded.

A translation is attached.

An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

Other.

Remarks: Prime Minister Palme is responding to a letter from
President Reagan.

Christie Keane
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

NSC#8307376



PRIME MINISTER

8329591

Date

Dnr

September 27, 1983

Mr. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
of America
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

In reply to your recent letter I would like to express my complete agreement with your view that all ways must be explored to strengthen the regime against the spread of nuclear weapons. Any increase in the number of nuclear weapon states would indeed be critical to the security of all nations.

An effective way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime would, of course, be an early implementation of the disarmament provisions of the NPT.

Another would, as you suggest, be a more stringent export policy than the one practiced by some supplier nations today. Sweden has for many years advocated such an approach. We would be pleased to participate in a discussion of this issue at an informal meeting later this year among supplier states in the nuclear field, either in the United States or in Europe.

./..

We would appreciate learning of the views of other
supplier states on your proposal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Olof Palme". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "O".

Olof Palme

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8307376

RECEIVED 14 OCT 83 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM PALME, OLOF

DOCDATE 27 SEP 83

HILL, C

09 OCT 83

HILL, C

14 OCT 83

KEYWORDS NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

NON PROLIFERATION

SWEDEN

HS

SUBJECT LTR RE HALTING SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ACTION: RECD STATE NO REPLY REQUIRED DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

POLLOCK

SOMMER

COBB

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8329591

LOG 8304964

NSCIFID

(MR MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

September 27, 1983

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President,

In reply to your recent letter I would like to express my complete agreement with your view that all ways must be explored to strengthen the regime against the spread of nuclear weapons. Any increase in the number of nuclear weapon states would indeed be critical to the security of all nations.

An effective way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime would, of course, be an early implementation of the disarmament provisions of the NPT.

Another would, as you suggest, be a more stringent export policy than the one practiced by some supplier nations today. Sweden has for many years advocated such an approach. We would be pleased to participate in a discussion of this issue at an informal meeting later this year among supplier states in the nuclear field, either in the United States or in Europe.

We would appreciate learning of the views of other supplier states on your proposal.

Sincerely,

Olof Palme



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

COPIES TO
TMC
RF(rs)

October 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Alerting NSC on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to President Reagan
from Olof Palme Prime Minister of Sweden.
which is transmitted for your information.

This document was received in the Executive Secretariat
Information Management Section on October 8, 1983

Director, S/S-I - *RS*
Information Management Section
Executive Secretariat
ext. 23836

CO151

**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

JV

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

8404777

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84/02/09

Name of Correspondent: Steven E. Anderson

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Planning banquet honoring Raoul Wallenberg in Aug. in L.A. & wants President to intervene & appeal to King Carl Gustav of Sweden to attend.

ROUTE TO:		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	<u>Cokell</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>84/02/14</u>	<u>TR.</u>	<u>C 8402 24</u>
	<u>✓ DOS</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>84/02/16</u>	<u>TR.</u>	<u>A 84/02/24</u>
			<u> / / </u>		<u> / / </u>
			<u> / / </u>		<u> / / </u>
			<u> / / </u>		<u> / / </u>

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
 - C - Comment/Recommendation
 - D - Draft Response
 - F - Furnish Fact Sheet
 - to be used as Enclosure
 - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 - S - For Signature
 - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
 - B - Non-Special Referral
 - C - Completed
 - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 - Code = "A"
 - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: 2 Individual Codes: 4800 _____

Prime Subject Code: CD151 Secondary Subject Codes: LB LOS A ND016
PR014
CD165

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
n - 0 - Unknown
n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
n - 3 - Ron
n - 4 - Dutch
n - 5 - Ron Reagan
n - 6 - Ronald
n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
n - 0 - Unknown
n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
n - 2 - Nancy
n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
C - Copy
D - Official document
G - Message
H - Handcarried
L - Letter
M - Mailgram
O - Memo
P - Photo
R - Report
S - Sealed
T - Telegram
V - Telephone
X - Miscellaneous
Y - Study

880288

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

84 FEB 23 P 8: 52

S/S 8404777

Date FEB 23 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:


To: President Reagan From: Steven E. Anderson
Date: 2/6/84 Subject: Invite to King Carl
Gustaf to attend banquet honoring Raoul Wallenburg
WH Referral Dated: 2/16/84 NSC ID# 206838
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 X An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
 Other.

Remarks:


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 21, 1984


Mr. Steven E. Anderson
226 N. Crescent Drive - #202
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Dear Mr. Anderson:

The White House has asked that our office reply to your letter of February 6 requesting the President appeal to King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden to attend a dinner honoring Raoul Wallenberg in Los Angeles in June.

We understand and appreciate your work on behalf of Raoul Wallenberg. It is important that his contributions to human rights and the sacrifices he has made continue to be remembered. It would be inappropriate, however, for us to intervene in the travel schedule of a foreign head of state. I suggest you continue to work with Swedish authorities and officials on the possibility of a visit to Los Angeles by King Carl Gustaf.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dennis Finnerty".

Dennis Finnerty
Officer in Charge
Swedish Affairs

8404777

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

FEBRUARY 16, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 206838

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. STEVEN E. ANDERSON
1432 MOUNTAIN VIEW ROAD
SANTA BARBARA CA 93109

SUBJECT: PLANNING BANQUET HONORING RAOUL WALLENBURG
IN AUG IN LOS ANGELES AND WANTS PRESIDENT TO
INTERVENE AND APPEAL TO KING CARL GUSTAV OF
SWEDEN TO ATTEND

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*Received in 5/5-1
2/15/84 - 11:30 p.m.
yng*

20
DOS

2-6-84

President Reagan
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

206838

8404777

Dear Mr. President:

Spelling
First of all I would like to thank you for taking on the challenge of running our great nation for another term. You have instituted great changes which consequently have put power back into perspective where it belongs; with the people. Thank you for running the nation with that premise in mind.

ml
Mr. President I have an important problem on my hands which I believe, if solved, can be beneficial to us both in many ways. First let me run through the situation quickly. I, a christian, have been working with Rabbi Cooper of the Wiesenthal Center here in Los Angeles to make a highly publicized banquet honoring Raoul Wallenburg, whom you gave honorary U.S. citizenship to. The purpose being to show the kinship spirit of Christians and Jews helping each other in brotherhood during times of need.

For this banquet we invited King Carl Gustav of Sweden to represent the good will of the swedish people. This coincides with the King's previously planned trip here to see the Los Angeles Olympics. Of interest also is the fact that Raoul Wallenburg was here in Los Angeles during the 1932 Olympic games.

In any event, my mother, a Swedish-American who knows the King on a more personal level, invited him to this event on behalf of the entire Jewish community of the United States. This was followed by a Telex from the Wiesenthal Center explaining my mothers mission. Not recieving a prompt reply on either communication; my mother then called the King directly. Here is where the trouble began. A man by the name of Lennart Ahren, who is the Marshall of the Courts, intercepted the call and was very belligerent. He stated that the King has no business in dealing with Jewish affairs of any sorts. That seemed rather odd to us involved considering the King has the Royal Wallenburg Committee. Mr. Ahren also spoke concerning the materials and Telex sent stating he had them in front of him. This means that the correspondances were never recieved by the King.

This is where I would like to ask for your help concerning this issue. I know that 1) Secretary of State Schultz issued a strong statement at the Security Conference in Stockholm on behalf of Raoul Wallenburg. 2) You made Raoul Wallenburg an honorary U.S. citizen. 3) You also believe in the brotherhood of the Jews with the Christians. 4) You are deeply religious and realize that the

(2)

stakes here are not only political but moral as well.

This banquet is scheduled for the time of the Olympics which is the end of July. I believe if you can help us in getting the message to the King, to which I am positive he will accept, then this can only help the U.S. position with our Jewish friends.

Mr. President this is the extent of the problem. We were and are going to invite you formally as soon as we have confirmation that the King is coming. Please sir, if you can help in any to get the message to the King or can somehow exert some influence it would be deeply appreciated. I really do believe that only good can come out of the comradary created by having this banquet, especially here in the United States. I am sure that you will have questions so please do not hesitate to call anytime. My number is 213-273-2633. Thank You and may God Bless you and your wonderful wife Nancy.

Respectfully,


Steven E. Anderson
Steven E. Anderson

226 N. Crescent Dr. #202
Beverly Hills Ca. 90210

SEA/

Lillemor (Mrs. Eugene) Anderson
1432 Mountain View Road
Santa Barbara Ca. 93109

ph. (805) 966-6491



SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER
on the campus of yeshiva university of los angeles

October 27, 1983

Rabbi Marvin Hier
Dean

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Elizabeth Taylor
Beverly Hills, CA

William Weinberg
Beverly Hills, CA

Maurice Weiss
Beverly Hills, CA

Morris J. Wosk
Vancouver, B.C.

Rosalie Zalis
Los Angeles, CA

Mrs. Lillemor Anderson
c/o Steve Anderson
226 N. Crescent Drive - #202
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Dear Mrs. Anderson:

It was a pleasure meeting with you early today and we look forward to working closely with you in helping to expose millions of Americans to the legacy of Raoul Wallenberg.

We are most enthusiastic that the King of Sweden considers visiting our institution and participating in ceremonies honoring the greatest hero of World War II. There are many people in Southern California who worked with Mr. Wallenberg or were saved by him and I am sure each would want to be here when the King visits. We would, of course, want to work closely with you to arrange for a type of event that all of us could be proud of and would attract the attention of the world media. We would, of course, keep our schedule flexible to fit the King's schedule although we could not participate in a Saturday program.

I am enclosing some additional materials about the Simon Wiesenthal Center and its involvement with the Wallenberg issue. I invite you to call me directly should you have additional questions. You can reach me at the Wiesenthal Center - 553-9036 or at my home - 276-7462.

Looking forward to working closely with you on this important undertaking,

Sincerely,

Rabbi Abraham Cooper
Associate Dean

AC:1nd
enc.

cc: Rabbi Marvin Hier

1432 Mountain View Road
Santa Barbara, CA. 93109
U S A

November 15, 1983.

H. R. H. King Carl Gustaf
Slottet
S-111 30
Stockholm, Sweden

His Majesty:

In speaking with the Marshall of the Court, Lennart Ahren on October 30th, it was suggested that I send a letter explaining my intentions.

My name is Lillemor Bohlin-Anderson. For quick identification - Barbro Svensson and I grew up in Jarvso together. My husband, Dr. Eugene Anderson and I brought Barbro Svensson and her brother Ulf to the dinner at the Bohemian Club in San Francisco when his Majesty visited California. We later, upon his Majesty's invitation enjoyed a pleasant evening in a night club in Sausalito.

Some Swedish friends to vouch for my integrity, as that is quicker to check on. Miss Svensson, Sven Nykvist, Ann-Louise and Bruno Glenmark, Lily Berglund and Gote Wilhelmson, Dagny and Leif Kronlund, Bengteric Nordell (Swedish Television), Bengt Bedrup, to name a few.

The letter from Rabbi Cooper with the Simon Wiesenthal Center, encapsules my mission and with the events to correlate with the visit of the Royal Couple to Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games, 1984.

To put this in more related terms, this would really be an Ace for Sweden. It would elevate the thoughts and feelings in foreigners, that before knew little about the Swedes. Sweden would be "put on the map" for millions around the world. Having lived in the United States for twenty six years, I know that many, even educated people, still get Sweden and Switzerland mixed up - or think it is one and the same as Denmark - or perhaps the Capitol of Denmark.

Raoul Wallenberg is a hero, not only to the Jewish people, but to every human being interested in justice for all. It needs to be emphasized again, for in times like these we need heroes. Let us then spotlight the greatest one in our span of generations. To give hope to us all, that perhaps Raoul Wallenberg's lift might be an inspiration for others to become heroes for humanity.

The Jewish community would like to thank Sweden, and honor Mr. Wallenberg through Swedens Royal Couple. It was especially expressed that her Majesty, Queen Silvia should be a part of this also.

This could be as small or large a gathering as the Royal Couple would like.

Enclosed is my invitation to the 75th birthday party for Mr. Wiesenthal. One suggestion is to do something similar in the evening, after an afternoon walk through the Simon Wiesenthal Center by the Royal Couple. The latter of course is the essential part. It will take about fifteen minutes, then a public presentation outside. Should there be more than 5,000 people, we have permission to close off Pico Boulevard in front of the Center to accommodate everyone. If the evening affair is not suitable, there could be a luncheon before the ceremonies.


All these are ideas, which are very flexible. I will be glad to fly to Sweden at any time where this can be discussed in person.

The full spectrum World Wide News media are involved and on standby. As there are so many elements to get organized and synchronized, time is already of the essence.

People in many walks of life are very excited about this event. In fact, a well known Swedish magazine will carry it as a "news leak" in their Christmas-Holiday edition. They are running a Success Story about my two sons Steven and Michael Anderson.

For expediency on my part, I have written this in English, even though I am fluent in Swedish. I hope this is forgivable.

Respectfully submitted,



Lillemor Bohlin-Anderson

Enclosures:

- Letter of intent from Rabbi Cooper
- "A Chronicle of Courage" book
- Simon Wiesenthal Center book
- Invitation sample, Mr. Wiesenthal's birthday

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

Embassy mail official

AJ
00151

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JULY 02, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: *H.E. Wilhelm Wachtmeister*
Embassy of Sweden

SUBJECT ~~UNOPENED~~
Amb. Wachtmeister letter to the President
thanking for dinner - Entree at W.H. on Jul 2 84

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE	ORG	84/07/02		<i>C 841081 DL</i> <i>AJ</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>/ /</i>		<i>/ /</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>/ /</i>		<i>/ /</i>
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REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>/ /</i>		<i>/ /</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>/ /</i>		<i>/ /</i>

COMMENTS: ORIGINAL TO LORETTA BRAXTON

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: S INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| * ACTION CODES: | * DISPOSITION CODES: | * OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | * CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| * A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | * A-ANSWERED | * TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| * C-COMMENT/RECOM | * B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| * D-DRAFT RESPONSE | * C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| * F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | * S-SUSPENDED | * COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| * I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| * R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| * S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | | * |
| * X-INTERIM REPLY * | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.



EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
3900 NEBRASKA AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20018

The Ambassador of
Sweden and Countess
Wachtmeister thank
The President and Mrs
Reagan for a most
delightful dinner -
barbecue at the
White House on July 1,
1984.

Washington, July 2, 1984

RECEIVED 05 JUL 84 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM ILONIEMI, JAAKKO

DOCDATE 02 JUL 84

KEYWORDS . SWEDEN

WACHTMEISTER

SUBJECT AMB ~~ILONIEMI~~ 2 JUL LTR TO PRES

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE: 06 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

FORTIER

COBB

COMMENTS *TO NSC/S No reply required Please close out.
Please note the Swedish Ambassador's name is:*

REF# 231169

LOG

WACHTMEISTER
NSCIFID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 7/8 No Reply Required per Sommer

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *WH* (R)

7062
281218

TR 3200

CO-151

ED
ND
FB006-R

JV

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1984

Willy

Dear Count ~~Wachtmeister~~:

Thanks so much for passing on Defense Minister *Anders* Thunborg's presentation to the IISS Conference in September. I found his remarks to be very realistic and perceptive, and I am encouraged by his firm commitment to improve Swedish defense capabilities. As Mr. Thunborg points out, Sweden has for years played an important stabilizing role in Northern Europe. We applaud this effort and are pleased that your government plans no diminution in this vital effort.

Sincerely,

Bud
Robert C. McFarlane

His Excellency
Count Wilhelm Wachtmeister
Embassy of Sweden
Washington, D. C.

NSC 8407062

**National Security Council
The White House**

Imp

System # I

Package # 7062

PV2 P1 05

1451

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull	<u>4</u>		
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>	<u>Ch. 13 TAB I PCs</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		
Situation Room			

DEC 10 1984 D

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Just met Thornborg and he is impressive.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB 

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Swedish Defense Minister's Speech to the IISS

The Swedish Ambassador, Count Wachtmeister, forwarded a copy of Defense Minister Thunborg's presentation to the IISS in September (Tab A), which provides an interesting overview of Swedish defense policy. Thunborg noted:

- Although Sweden is neutral, it is not so naive to think that it could avoid the consequences of a European conflict. In order to defend itself, Sweden is improving its defense capabilities, including a commitment to spend 3% of GNP on defense (high by European standards).
- Emphasis is being placed on preparedness, rapid mobilization, ASW and air defense. Unstated, but implicit, is the orientation of these efforts against Warsaw Pact forces.
- A Swedish Commission ascertained "with absolute certainty" that foreign submarines intruded on the Swedish coast and concluded that these were Soviet subs. Anti-submarine defenses are being improved and defense forces are authorized to use force, without warning, against intruders.
- The Commission concluded that these violations are related to military operational planning, rather than deliberate efforts at political intimidation. No credence is given to the assertion that the "Whiskey on the Rocks" case was the result of navigational errors.

While we continue to have difficulties with Sweden on international political issues, particularly Palme's efforts on Nicaragua, and Nuclear Free Zones/No First Use, Thunborg has brought a sense of realism to the Defense Ministry. Therefore, we recommend that you drop a note to Wachtmeister expressing appreciation for his forwarding the speech and applauding Sweden's efforts to improve its defenses.

Peter  concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the note to Wachtmeister at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I

Letter to Wachtmeister

Tab A - Copy of Thunborg's Presentation

7062

Washington, D.C. September 19, 1984



EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
THE AMBASSADOR

Handwritten signature: R. C. McFarlane

SEP 19 1984

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

You might be interested to glance through this speech by Defense Minister Anders Thunborg which in my view gives an excellent presentation of Swedish security policy.

With warm regards,

Handwritten signature: W. Wachtmeister
W Wachtmeister

"SWEDISH SECURITY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT"

Address by the Swedish Minister of Defence, Mr Anders Thunborg, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 4th 1984

Mr Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by saying that it is an honour and a privilege for me to have been asked to come here this afternoon and to have been given the opportunity to address an audience which I know must be an intellectual challenge to any speaker.

I have been asked to comment upon Swedish security policy, more specifically on the options and challenges facing my country as we look ahead into the future. I hope that you will not regard it as presumptuous if I say that I sense an increased interest in this subject-matter today, an interest which at least in part seems to have been spurred by events succeeding the stranded Soviet Whiskey-class submarine outside the naval base of Karlskrona in Southern Sweden in the autumn of 1981.

Many questions have been asked as to the consequences and the implications of the violations of Swedish territorial waters in recent years. Is Sweden's policy of neutrality no longer a viable option for the future? Will long-standing assessments of the nature of the threat

even abandoned? Do the Nordic countries face an increasing risk of an isolated attack? Is Nordic stability in fact a thing of the past? Will present configurations in the North run the risk of being altered as external and internal pressures increase? Let me try to provide a few tentative answers to at least some of these questions.

Now we all know that the Nordic region has long been regarded as a quiet corner of Europe. Throughout the postwar period tension in the area has, generally speaking, been low, particularly in comparison with other regions of the world. Many factors have contributed to this favourable state of affairs. The manner in which the Great Powers have defined their interests is obviously a key factor. Yet, at the same time an important role has been played by the Nordic countries themselves.

Denmark, Norway, as well as Iceland, are original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, both Denmark and Norway have defined their NATO membership so as to preclude the deployment of nuclear weapons and the permanent stationing of foreign troops on Danish and Norwegian soil in peace-time.

Finland's policy of neutrality has since the mid 1950's been widely recognized. The Finnish-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in 1948 forms the basis of Finland's relations with her Eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union. This treaty has been instrumental in transforming relations previously marked by suspicion and hostility into a stable and predictable relationship. This is a development which has obviously benefitted not only the two contracting parties, but also Nordic stability at large.

There finally is the role played by Sweden in maintaining peace and stability in the North. It is and remains my firm belief that the interests of both Sweden and our Nordic neighbours are best served by postures which help avoid polarization and sharp lines of confrontation in the Nordic area. Clearly Sweden's policy of neutrality has in the past played an important role in limiting great power involvement in the area.

To emphasize stability is not saying that the situation is not subject to change. As noted by many observers the North of Europe, including adjacent sea areas, has over the years acquired an increased strategic importance. The single most important factor in this context is of course the upgrading and modernization of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The bulk or about 2/3 of the Soviet Sea Launched Ballistic Missile force is homeported in the Murmansk area on the Kola peninsula.

If for no other reason developments in the North have in the past decade attracted increasing attention in the strategic force planning of both the United States and the Soviet Union. A focal point of attention for NATO has been the issue of ensuring timely and effective reinforcements for its Northern Flank as well as that of protecting the vital Sea Line of Communication across the Atlantic. Measures that have been suggested and also in part initiated, include the prepositioning of heavy equipment for allied forces in Norway, the modernization of Danish and Norwegian air fields and air base systems, a more pronounced role for the US Navy in Northern waters, as well as an increase in military reconnaissance activities in the North. All of this is well known and there is no need to elaborate the point further.

What has happened is that the Nordic countries have tended to become increasingly affected by the military operational planning undertaken by both sides with a view to various wartime contingencies. Northern Europe can no longer be seen as a peripheral area safely removed from the major centres of crisis. Today it constitutes a strategic core area where the vital interests of both the major alliances will be at stake should there be an outbreak of conflict in Europe. The much publicized incursions by foreign submarines into Swedish territorial waters have in my opinion to be viewed against this general background.

The task facing the Nordic countries is essentially that of preserving stability in the face of increasing external pressures generated by the momentum of military technology and efforts on both sides to achieve a favourable balance of power.

I would, however, argue that increasing pressures do not necessarily spell increasing risks of an isolated or limited attack in the North. I know that there are those who maintain that the preponderance of Soviet military force in the area - which has never been in dispute - might conceivably tempt the Soviet Union to launch a preemptive attack in the North, where the risks involved would presumably be different from those on the Central Front.

Yet, such an attack, particularly if aimed at achieving militarily significant goals, for instance the control of major parts of Northern Norway, is bound to involve many uncertainties. The risks of escalation, although on the face of it smaller than in Central Europe, remain incalculable. Moreover, even a minimal risk should be more than enough to deter, unless we assume the Soviet leaders to be reckless adventurers who look with indifference at the consequences of nuclear confrontation.

At stake will obviously also be the cohesion of the Western alliance as a whole. The Northern Flank cannot be viewed in isolation. The balance of power in the North constitutes part and parcel of the overall military balance in Europe. No doubt the key actors are bound to take into consideration the fact that war on the Northern Flank implies a collision of interests which cannot be defined exclusively in regional terms.

It is thus hard to see why the Soviet Union would under existing circumstances put their high-value assets on the Kola Peninsula at risk for what will at best be limited gains, particularly given the very bleak prospects that they presently face, both internally and externally. In fact, the growing strategic importance of Northern Europe as witnessed in the past ten to fifteen years may in my opinion rather have increased than decreased the restraints on an aggressor.

In Swedish defence planning an isolated attack in the North has traditionally been viewed as a highly improbable contingency, mainly because of the political and military costs involved. Instead we see the

main risks stemming from a major confrontation on the Central Front. In such a case, however, areas in the Nordic region, in particular areas in the extreme North and close to the Baltic Straits, could well become targets of an attack in an initial phase of the war.

A salient feature of the long-term defence decision taken by the Swedish parliament in the spring of 1982 is the emphasis on increased preparedness as well as on the capacity for early and rapid mobilization of the Swedish defence forces at a time of crisis. Measures to enhance air defence, in particular in the North of Sweden, have also been considered to be of special importance. These measures do not however - and this is the point I want to make - imply an upgrading of the limited war-scenario.

In the context of a European war Sweden is unlikely to be a major arena of conflict. I find it difficult to foresee situations in which the major thrust of the contending forces would in actual fact be directed against Swedish territory. Instead, if subjected to an attack, it seems reasonable to assume that only a proportion of these forces would be deployed against Sweden.

With regard to the speculations triggered by the recent submarine incursions I would simply like to say that no Swedish government has ever been or will ever be in a position to guarantee that Sweden simply by pursuing a policy of neutrality will be spared the dire consequences of war. It is obvious that a belligerent state will care little for neutrality, if the advantages of an attack are considered to outweigh the disadvantages resulting from violating the rights and interests of a neutral state. That is exactly why we maintain and will continue to maintain defence forces sufficiently strong to make any potential aggressor think at least twice.

Now I know that the assertion is sometimes made that a neutral country is a country which has opted for "a free ride" in terms of burden-sharing. This is certainly not true in the case of Sweden, where national defence to this day accounts for well over 3 % of the GNP and

some 7 % of total government spending. Moreover, with a conscript system that enables Sweden to mobilize in a few days altogether 850 000 men, with an air force consisting of some 400 combat aircraft, with an internationally competitive armaments industry catering for some 70 % of Sweden's defence contracts, and with a civil defence second only to that of Switzerland, Swedish defence remains strong in comparison with many other small and medium-sized countries. I think that I can safely say that those who have actually had an opportunity to get a close look at our defence forces at work have not remained unimpressed.

The decision taken by the Swedish parliament in June 1982 to pursue the development and procurement of the new JAS multipurpose combat aircraft - designated to be the successor of the Viggen aircraft in the 1990's and well beyond the turn of the century at an estimated cost of more than 30 billion Swedish Crowns - I think also testifies to our determination to ensure strength as well as continuity, despite existing economic constraints.

It would of course be useless to pretend that Swedish defence planners, as defence planners elsewhere, do not confront some quite serious problems in competing for scarce financial resources. The rising costs of modern equipment, budgetary pressures, the fluctuating exchange rate for the dollar, are but some of the factors complicating long-term defence planning today. Solutions to these problems will not come easy. The challenges we face are real and should not be belittled. Yet, I see no cause for alarm or defeatism.

Let me assure you that our policy of neutrality will be pursued with firmness and consistency. This policy is most certainly not being altered or revised under the impact of external or internal pressures. The British columnist Geoffrey Smith was quite right in observing in an article in The Times in March of this year that there is not the slightest chance of Sweden opting for alignment, "submarine or no submarine": the tradition of neutrality is simply "too deeply embedded in the national character".

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History may not always be a reliable guide to the future, yet the impact of historical experience cannot be easily dismissed. One must not forget that Sweden has not been involved as a belligerent in war since 1814, that is a period of 170 years. It is an experience unique in modern European history, comparable only to that of Switzerland. Through a combination of favourable external circumstances, adherence to a policy of neutrality, and also, in fairness, a certain amount of good fortune, Sweden managed to stay outside the First and the Second World War. This fact alone goes a long way in explaining our presentday policy as well as the overwhelming popular support that this policy enjoys.

In discussing the future viability of neutrality it is also important to remember that Sweden's policy of neutrality is geared not only towards times of war. Our policy serves important peace-time functions as well. Our primary goal is, needless to say, that of preserving the peace and independence of Sweden. Yet at the same time, as I have already indicated, Sweden's policy of neutrality constitutes an important integral part of the overall Nordic security pattern. It is a pattern which we think has over the years served all the Nordic countries well, a pattern that we are anxious to maintain.

The increased strategic importance of Northern Europe, and the increase in surveillance and reconnaissance activities in Nordic border areas, requires firmness and vigilance on the part of the Nordic countries. It also, of course, requires prudence and moderation on the part of others.

Subs!

This brings me back to the subject of foreign submarines in Swedish waters. Let me briefly recall some of the facts. The incident involving the stranded Soviet Whiskey-class submarine in the South of Sweden in 1981 is no doubt one with which you are well familiar. There has subsequently been other incursions, admittedly less spectacular ones, among them the events in the Hårsfjärden area south of Stockholm in October 1982 leading to the appointment of a parliamentary Commission Submarine Defence which reported its findings in April last year.

The commission was able to ascertain - "with absolute certainty" - that foreign submarines, including minisubs, had been in the area concerned.

Actually, we had at our disposal a rather impressive series of indications: tracks on the bottom, radio and radar signals, sonar recordings, as well as some optical observations. On the basis of this evidence we were able to conclude that the submarines belonged to the Warsaw Pact, more specifically to the Soviet Union.

The outspoken report by the commission and the simultaneous strong note of protest handed to the Soviet Union can be seen as reflecting the firm determination of my government not to tolerate any incursions that might reflect on Sweden's traditional policy of neutrality. We have through various channels in no uncertain terms made our views and our position known to the Soviet leaders.

response

The rules governing the access and entry of foreign vessels into Swedish territorial waters have been tightened. Thus our defence forces are now empowered to use force, if necessary, without prior warning against foreign submarines detected in Swedish internal waters, that is in the case of extreme and clear-cut violations of our territorial borders.

Declarations of intent are important building-stones in maintaining an effective deterrent. However, equally important is the ability to implement declared intentions. In the 1960's and the 1970's submarine defence related to peacetime requirements was by and large awarded a low priority.

This trend is now being reversed. In the period up til 1992 a total of 1,2 billion Swedish Crowns will be allocated extra to submarine defence.

In actual fact, the problem in the short term is not so much that of funding as getting the proper equipment in place, encouraging organizational reforms, and training people to do the job. The task set before us is not an easy one, as experts on anti-submarine warfare and submarine defence will no doubt agree. The special hydrographic conditions prevailing in the Baltic combined with the very long

Yet, a goal has been set and a crash programme launched to correct existing shortcomings. The risks to an intruder are now successively being raised. And let me just add this: our aim is to deter, to force an intruder to consider the very tangible risks involved, not to seek conflict or confrontation.

Since the autumn of 1982 we have had a number of reports indicating continued violations of our territorial waters. The large majority of these reports have, however, on closer scrutiny proved to be without foundation. Yet, certain observations remain which cannot be disregarded and which we view very seriously indeed. We remain intent on defending the inviolability of our borders and our territorial integrity by all available means.

The observations pertaining to this summer, which have, I may say, been fewer in number than last summer, are presently being analyzed by the Commander-in-Chief. I expect a full report in a few weeks' time. Only then will we have all the cards on the table. Yet, there is every reason to guard against rash and far-reaching conclusions. We will not be intimidated or lose our nerve. Let me say it again: we will persist until success can be claimed.

Causes

I have many times been asked about my views on the motives underlying these incursions. Now what answers there are will at best have to be in the form of informed speculation. Let me just say that the conclusions offered by the Submarine Defence Commission in principle still stand, that is, we tend to see these violations as off-shots of military operational planning rather than, for instance, as deliberate efforts at political intimidation.

There have been no explicit threats nor any concrete demands. The Soviet Union has throughout emphatically denied any knowledge whatsoever of the activities registered by the Swedish authorities. I am here disregarding the "Whiskey on the rocks" which as you most probably know was claimed to have been caused by an error in the navigational system of the submarine, a theory to which we, needless to say, give little credence.

I would also like to say that it is in my opinion an entirely mistaken belief that a country such as Sweden can easily be bullied into silence or submission. The measures undertaken by my government as well as the popular mood in Sweden clearly testify to the contrary. Recent surveys of Swedish public opinion have thus indicated an increased support for Swedish defence. There is simply no evidence to support the suggestion that acquiescence is a foregone conclusion.

To sum up, I think that I am justified in saying, that the Nordic security system has in the past decades proved remarkably resistant to change. Despite some recent developments stability prevails. At the same time, I think that one is well advised to bear in mind that, in the final analysis, the future of the North remains intimately linked to the future of Europe as a whole. Increasing risks of war in Europe imply increasing risks of war in the North as well. There is certainly no simple formula by which present pressures can be alleviated. Yet, the prospects for all of Europe, including the North, will remain bleak as long as present tensions persist and arms control negotiations remain more or less at a standstill.

Small powers do not shape the destinies of the world. Still they should, as all members of the international community, have a right to have a say in matters directly affecting their national security. In the nuclear age and in an increasingly interdependent world security can no longer be defined in regional terms alone.

The future of the Nordic region depends not only on intra-Nordic developments, but also on the ability of leaders in both East and West to steer a different course and to substitute cooperation for confrontation. The present deadlock in important arms control is a matter of legitimate concern to all the European states. The problem is hardly a lack of proposals or strategies for arms control. What is lacking, and sadly lacking today, is the political will to reach solid agreements on terms acceptable to both sides. Pending a change of attitudes we will have to settle for modest steps rather than dramatic new departures.

If we accept that political will is central to the exercise of arms control and disarmament, and that mutual deep-seated suspicions presently block the road to agreement, confidence-building is in many ways the heart of the matter. In this context the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which will reconvene in Stockholm a week from today, obviously has an important part to play.

I am convinced that headway at this conference could provide an important incentive for rethinking attitudes towards arms control and disarmament in a broader context. Thus every effort should be made to ensure progress at the Stockholm Conference.

Sweden has for many years played an important role as a stabilizing factor in the North of Europe. This is a role that we have no intention of relinquishing. Still I would like to add that security, particularly for a small state, cannot be primarily a function of arms and military power. There are other important factors to be taken into account. The political, economic and social cohesion within a country also has a bearing on its security policy.

A policy that lacks a sound economic basis and broad popular support will I think, in the long run, be critically exposed to failure. The Swedish economy has in the past year slowly been moving towards recovery. We still have some way to go, but I think that I can safely say that significant progress has been made. It may perhaps seem as stretching a point, but in this may well ultimately lie the best hope not only for the Swedish welfare state, but also for preserving Sweden's traditional role in the context of Nordic security.

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8407062

RECEIVED 20 SEP 84 16

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WACHTMEISTER, W

DOCDATE 19 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: SWEDEN

SPEECHES

THUNBORG, ANDERS

SUBJECT: THUNBORG SPEECH ON SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY

ACTION: PREPARE REPLY FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 24 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

SOMMER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

MCFARLANE	X	11/27	For Signature	11/28	
	C	12/10	M ^c Jala sgd ltr		COPIES

DISPATCH

37. 12/10

W/ATTCH FILE WA (S)