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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC Office
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Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F96-127 (Battle)
Date: 02/25/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTIONS
1. memo	Robinson to McFarlane re Energy Briefings 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 # 244	2/23/84	P1/F1
2. talking points	Talking points (short form) for McFarlane 6p R " " " # 245	2/24/84	P1/F1
3. talking points	Talking points for McFarlane 11p R " " " # 246	n.d.	P1/F1
4. memo	Hill to McFarlane re Proposed White House Energy Working Groups 2p	n.d.	P1/F1
5. memo	Martin to McFarlane re Iraq-Iran Emergency Energy Working Groups 1p R 8/23/11 F96-127/2 # 248	1/12/84	P1/F1
6. cable	re Arab-Israel Highlights 6p	2/8/84	P1/F1
7. map	1p	n.d.	P1/F1
8. cable	290500Z 6p	11/29/83	P1/F1
9. NSC profile sheet	1p PARTIAL 3/13/01 F96-127/2 # 250	11/29/83	P1/F1
10. memcon	from Stempel 2p	11/29/83	P1/F1
11. cable	021805Z 5p	12/2/83	P1/F1
12. cable	101302Z 2p	1/10/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

National Security Council
The White House

✓ ml
1005

84 FEB 23 P 1: 58

System # I
Package # 1422

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	<u>✓</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>✓</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: 2/24 4:15
(Date/Time)
Iran - Iraq Meeting

~~SECRET~~

244

1422 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 23, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

KCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq Energy Briefings

I would like to raise two final points with respect to the Iran-Iraq energy briefings scheduled for 24 and 29 February.

- o In case you do not wish to make the entire presentation, we have prepared a shorter set of talking points (Tab I) which would allow you to concentrate on the policy aspects of the current situation. We would be prepared to brief the economic portions of the presentation.
- o We have been concerned that at the 29 February briefing, Secretary Shultz might mirror Allen Wallis' approach of sole reliance on free market forces. This might delay or kill our attempt to build a Cabinet-level consensus around a policy of coordinated international action. Since Allen Wallis will be out of town until 28 February, Dick Fairbanks will be preparing a pre-briefing memo for Secretary Shultz. As a result, our position will have received a favorable initial presentation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you will deliver the entire Iran-Iraq Energy Briefing.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you will deliver the short version, relying on us to present the economic portion of the Iran-Iraq Energy Briefing.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Fortier
Beal

Attachment
Tab I Talking points (short form)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F96-127/2 #244

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

BY KML NARA DATE 11/23/11

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS (SHORT FORM)
FOR
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

IRAN-IRAQ ENERGY BRIEFING

I. INTRODUCTION

AS I POINTED OUT IN MY LETTER, I HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT WE ARE NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARED TO DEAL WITH A DISRUPTION OF OIL FLOWS RESULTING FROM AN ESCALATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. I AM AWARE OF THE EXCELLENT START WE HAVE ALREADY MADE IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS UNDERWAY AT STATE AND DOE, BUT I HOPE THAT BY HOLDING A SERIES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS LIKE THIS ONE, I CAN SEEK THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS WHO HAVE A STAKE IN THIS ISSUE AND DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON THE NEXT STEPS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE AS AN ADMINISTRATION.

THESE STEPS CAN THEN BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION BEING COORDINATED BY THE NSC.

I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY HAVING BEN BONK PRESENT OUR VIEW OF THE ENERGY SITUATION.

II. PRESENT OIL SITUATION

III. THE IRAN/IRAQ THREAT TO OIL FLOWS -- DESPITE THE WEAK MARKET, THE WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF POSES A CLEAR THREAT TO THE FLOW OF OIL

A. IRAQI STRATEGY

1. THE WAR IS AT ANOTHER TURNING POINT

-- IRANIAN SHELLING OF IRAQI CITIES AND THE NEW GROUND OFFENSIVE COULD TRIGGER IRAQI RETALIATORY STRIKES

V. PAST EXPERIENCE - CONFIRMS THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF THE PREDICTIONS MADE BY THE ECONOMIC FORECASTERS

A. 1973/74 ARAB OIL EMBARGO

1. OIL PRICES QUADRUPLED FROM \$3 PER BARREL TO OVER \$11
2. HIGHER OIL PRICES TRIGGERED A MAJOR RECESSION:

GRAPHICS: 1979/1980 COMPARISON

B. 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION

1. COMPLETE HALT OF IRANIAN CRUDE OIL EXPORTS FOR ONE QUARTER
2. UNCERTAINTY OVER FUTURE SUPPLIES AND FEAR OF SPREADING ISLAMIC REVIVAL SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED A MASSIVE STOCK BUILD
3. GOVERNMENT COOPERATION BROKE DOWN
 - WEAK INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS DID NOT PREVENT A SCRAMBLE FOR OIL
4. AS A RESULT, PRICES ROSE FROM LESS THAN \$13 PER BARREL IN 1978 TO A PEAK OF NEARLY \$35 BY EARLY 1981.
5. HIGHER OIL PRICES AGAIN TRIGGERED A MAJOR RECESSION:
 - REAL GNP IN THE US, WHICH HAD BEEN GROWING AT ABOUT 5%, STAGNATED.
 - UNEMPLOYMENT INCREASED FROM LESS THAN 6% TO NEARLY 9%
 - INFLATION RATE ROSE FROM 9% TO OVER 13%

C. 1980 IRAN-IRAQ WAR

1. PRODUCTION FROM BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ WAS DISRUPTED.
 - SIZE OF THE PRODUCTION DISRUPTION WAS SIMILAR TO THE ONE AFTER IRANIAN REVOLUTION
2. GREAT UNCERTAINTY PREVAILED IN THE MARKET AT THE OUTSET.
3. DECLINING CONSUMPTION AND THE LARGE INCREASE IN OIL INVENTORIES ACCUMULATED AFTER THE IRANIAN

REVOLUTION, HOWEVER, PROVIDED US WITH A CUSHION.

4. THE RESPONSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS ALSO DIFFERENT.
 - THE EXPERIENCE OF 1979 WAS STILL FRESH IN EVERYONE'S MIND.
 - IEA REACHED A FIRM AGREEMENT TO:
 - 0 LOWER STOCKS
 - 0 AVOID ABNORMAL SPOT PURCHASES
 - AGREEMENTS ENCOURAGED JAPANESE AND EUROPEAN ACTION.
 - AS A RESULT, PRICE INCREASES WERE ALL BUT AVOIDED.

VI. PRESENT SITUATION

A. SENSE OF DEJA VU

1. SITUATION IS VERY SIMILAR TO 1979.
2. OIL STOCKS ARE LOW EXCEPT IN THE US WHICH HAS BUILT UP ITS STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE.
3. THE CURRENT SLACK MARKET, COMBINED WITH EXCESS PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY, HAS ENCOURAGED COMPLACENCY AMONG CONSUMERS.
 - GAS LINES HAVE BECOME A DIM MEMORY.

B. NOW THAT THE WORLD ECONOMY IS RECOVERING, GOVERNMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN MAY BE UNWILLING TO RISK CHOKING OFF THE RECOVERY FOR LACK OF OIL.

1. MAY CHOOSE TO BUY OIL AT ANY PRICE IN AN ATTEMPT TO SUSTAIN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.

C. COMBINED WITH THE INEVITABLE SCRAMBLE FOR OIL BY THE MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED OIL COMPANIES, THE STAGE IS SET FOR A BIDDING WAR WHICH WILL SIGNIFICANTLY DRIVE THE PRICE OF OIL UPWARD.

VII. POLICIES TO MEET THE CHALLENGE

- ### A. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT PRICE INCREASES, QUICK, DECISIVE AND COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT ACTION SHOULD BE ABLE TO PREVENT PRICE LEAPFROGGING AND MODERATE THE IMPACT OF A DISRUPTION

B. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

GRAPHIC:

-
1. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
 2. DOMESTIC RESPONSE
-

1. IF WE CAN EFFECTIVELY CALM THE OIL MARKET IN THOSE FIRST DAYS OF UNCERTAINTY, WE CAN BETTER CONTAIN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT.
2. WE WILL ALSO BE BUYING TIME TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND IMPLEMENT OTHER MEASURES. (INCLUDING MILITARY)
3. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN:
 - IEA COORDINATED POSITION ON STOCK DRAWDOWN TO PREVENT SPECULATIVE STOCK BUILDUP AND REDUCE PRESSURE ON PRICES.
 - COORDINATED CALL FOR RESTRAINT FROM ABNORMAL SPOT MARKET PURCHASES.
 - CONSULTATIONS TO ENCOURAGE FULL UTILIZATION OF SPARE CAPACITY.
 - IEA DECISIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL TO GUARANTEE HIGH LEVEL COMMITMENT.
 - US ASSISTANCE TO STRATEGIC COUNTRIES IN MEETING THEIR OIL OR FINANCIAL NEEDS.
 - UNIFIED POSITION ON IEA TRIGGER: (ACTIVE OIL COMPANY PARTICIPATION WILL REQUIRE RENEWAL OF EPCA 252 WHICH EXPIRED AT THE END OF 1983.)

C. DOMESTIC RESPONSE

1. ISSUE PAPERS DISCUSSING OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE DOMESTIC SIDE OF THE QUESTION ARE BEING PREPARED BY VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AT THIS TIME.
2. SOME OF THESE ISSUES ARE DISPLAYED ON THE SCREEN.
3. IF OUR POLICY OF RELIANCE ON FREE MARKET FORCES IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE DOMESTIC ARENA, WE MUST ENSURE THAT PANIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL

MARKET IS PREVENTED THROUGH COORDINATED GOVERNMENT ACTION.

D. STATUS OF INTERAGENCY PROCESS

GRAPHIC: FINAL PRODUCTS

1. WE BEGAN WORK ON AN OIL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR ROOM 208 ABOUT 2 MONTHS AGO.
2. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUPS WERE ESTABLISHED TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO THE POTENTIAL CRISIS.
3. THEIR WORK SCHEDULES CALL FOR COMPLETION OF THE ENTIRE PROCESS BY THE END OF THIS MONTH.
4. THE END PRODUCTS OF THIS INTERAGENCY EXERCISE WILL BE USED TO COMPLETE THE OIL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR ROOM 208.
 - COMMON BRIEFING BOOK
 - MATRIX PLAN OF ACTION
 - INFORMATION DISSEMINATION PLAN

E. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

GRAPHIC: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1. ON THE SCREEN IS A SIMPLIFIED MOCK-UP OF THE MATRIX PLAN OF ACTION WHICH IS CURRENTLY BEING DEVELOPED BY STATE DEPARTMENT.
2. DR. BEAL HAS ACQUIRED THE SOFTWARE TO ALLOW US TO PUT THE MATRIX INTO A PERT COMPUTER PROGRAM IN ROOM 208.

F. THE COURSE AHEAD

1. FORGE CABINET-LEVEL CONSENSUS ON INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
2. I PLAN ON MEETING WITH OTHER CABINET-LEVEL OFFICIALS OVER THE COMING DAYS TO WORK TOWARD OBTAINING SUCH A CONSENSUS
3. WORK THROUGH IEA TO OBTAIN COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL POSITION WITH OUR ALLIES
4. SOLIDIFY AGREEMENTS WITH DISCUSSIONS AT THE LONDON SUMMIT

TALKING POINTS
for
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F96-127/2#24

BY KML NARA DATE 11/23/11

Iran-Iraq Energy Briefing

I. Introduction

As I pointed out in my letter, I have become increasingly concerned that we are not adequately prepared to deal with a disruption of oil flows resulting from an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war. I am aware of the excellent start we have already made in the interagency process underway at State and DOE, but I hope that by holding a series of informal meetings like this one, I can seek the opinions of others who have a stake in this issue and develop a consensus on the next steps that we should take as an Administration.

These steps can then be incorporated into the National Plan of Action being coordinated by the NSC.

I would like to begin by presenting my view of the energy situation.

II. Present Oil Situation

A. Oil Supply

-
- * GRAPHICS: 1. FREE WORLD OIL PRODUCTION PIE CHART
 - 2. FREE WORLD SURPLUS OIL PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
-

- 1. Free World oil production is averaging about 44 million barrels per day (b/d)
 - Persian Gulf countries account for about 30% of the total
- 2. Surplus capacity available to help offset a disruption totals about 8 million b/d

- Only 3 million b/d is outside the Persian Gulf
- One-third of non-Persian Gulf surplus is in Libya.

B. Dependence on Persian Gulf oil -- despite the high percentage of Persian Gulf oil in world trade, US dependence is low.

GRAPHIC: 1. REPLACE PRODUCTION GRAPHIC WITH OIL FLOWS GRAPHIC

1. US relies on Persian Gulf oil for only 3 percent of its oil consumption.
2. The rest of the OECD receives about 6 million b/d from the Gulf
 - Japan depends on Persian Gulf oil for 54% of its consumption
 - Western Europe meets 23% of its consumption needs with Gulf oil
 - The rest of the world relies on the Gulf for 31% of its consumption

C. Stocks

1. Stocks are at their lowest level since before the Iranian Revolution
 - Commercial Stocks

* GRAPHICS: OIL STOCKS PIE CHART

- o Primary commercial stocks in the industrialized world total about 3 billion barrels or 79 days of consumption
- o Large portion of commercial stocks -- about 55 days of consumption -- represent minimum operating levels
- o Another 15 days represent compulsory stocks -- maintained by companies to meet government requirements

- o The balance -- about 9 days --
represent usable commercial stocks
- Strategic Stocks
- o Government stocks total about 500
million barrels -- about 70 percent
of which are in the US SPR

D. Conclusion

1. US is in relatively good shape
 - Imports are low
 - Stocks are high
2. However, Japan, Europe and most LDCs are not in
this favored position
 - Highly dependent on the Gulf
 - Low commercial stock levels
 - Have not seriously built government
strategic stockpiles
3. US could not insulate itself from the economic
impact
 - As prices rise and
 - Available oil is redistributed

III. The Iran/Iraq Threat to Oil Flows -- Despite the weak
market, the war in the Persian Gulf poses a clear threat
to the flow of oil

A. Iraqi Strategy

1. The war is at another turning point.
 - Iranian shelling of Iraqi cities and the
new ground offensive could trigger Iraqi
retaliatory strikes

-
- GRAPHICS:
1. RADIUS OF SUPER ETENDARD
(SHOWING LOCATION OF KHARG)
 2. PHOTO OF KHARG ISLAND
-

2. One possible retaliatory option would be attacks on oil tankers calling at Kharg Island, Iran's main oil export terminal
3. Iraqi objectives in attacking Iran's oil lifeline
 - Impair Iran's warmaking capacity
 - Force Iran to begin negotiations
 - Force Western powers to intervene, guaranteeing the safety of all oil exports
4. Iraqi Options
 - Super Etendard most likely weapon because of simplicity and low risk
 - Super Frelon helicopters armed with Exocets also have the range to strike Kharg, but Baghdad believes their slowness makes them vulnerable
 - Soviet-supplied Scud surface-to-surface missiles can reach Kharg but could not target specific installations
 - Iraq has had the capability to launch massive airstrikes using medium bombers and fighter bombers since the beginning of the war, but has never done so

GRAPHICS:

1. MAP SHOWING OIL FIELDS AND RANGE OF IRANIAN AIRCRAFT
 2. MAP OF STRAIT OF HORMUZ
-

B. Iranian Response

1. As you are aware, Iranian officials have threatened to attack oil installations elsewhere in the Persian Gulf and block the Strait of Hormuz if Iranian oil exports are significantly impaired
2. Tehran has the capability to retaliate by:
 - Attacking targets in Iraq
 - Harassing ships in the Persian Gulf
 - Striking out at oil facilities via

- o Direct military attacks, or by
- o Sponsoring sabotage or terrorism by local Shia sympathizers
- Temporarily closing the Strait of Hormuz by using mines or declaring a blockade
- 3. In order to avoid a Western military response and keep its own remaining exports and imports moving, initial response would probably be at lower end of escalatory ladder
- 4. Hardliners in Tehran, however, playing on the regime's ideological underpinnings, might force the most extreme military reaction at the outset
 - Ayatollah Khomeini would decide
 - His hatred for Saddam Husayn could result in drastic action

IV. Potential Disruptions and Economic Impact

- A. Escalation of fighting in the Persian Gulf could initially result in the disruption of relatively insignificant amounts of oil

-
- GRAPHICS: 1. PERSIAN GULF OIL FACILITIES
 2. FACTORS INFLUENCING ECONOMIC IMPACT
-

1. Should the disruption spread beyond the two belligerents, the oil market might not be able to cope
- B. Economic impact will depend on:
- 1. Expectations of the duration and magnitude of disruption
 - 2. Actual duration and magnitude
 - 3. Petroleum stock levels and stockholder response
 - 4. Availability of alternative fuels
 - 5. Government Initiatives

-
- * GRAPHICS: MATRIX OF ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
-

- ~~SECRET~~
- C. I would like to briefly summarize the potentially disastrous economic consequences that could result from a significant oil shortfall. These three cases are drawn from preliminary interagency projections being done for contingency planning already underway.
- D. Case 1. Loss of Iraqi and Iranian oil exports
1. Net production loss to market: 0 million b/d
 2. If it were feared conflict might spread, prices could begin rising
- E. Case 2. Complete loss of Iraqi, Iranian and Kuwait oil exports as well as a partial disruption of Saudi exports
1. Net loss: 2-3 million b/d
 2. Oil prices might increase to \$45-75 per barrel. (compared to current price of \$29)
 3. Impact on the US:
 - US GNP growth declines by as much as 3 percentage points
 - Inflation rate increases by as much as 5 percentage points
 - Unemployment rate increases by up to 1.5 percentage points
 4. In all of these cases, economic impact on the rest of the OECD would be similar to impact on the US
- F. Case 3. Complete disruption of Persian Gulf oil for 6 months
1. Net Loss: 5-8 million b/d
 2. Oil prices might double or triple (\$60-100 per barrel)
 3. Impact on the US:
 - US GNP growth declines by as much as 5 percentage points
 - Inflation rate increases by 5-10 percentage points -- potential return to double digit inflation

- Unemployment rate increases by 2 percentage points

G. Impact on LDCs

1. Even a modest oil price increase could have severe repercussions on many LDCs and the international financial system
2. If high prices were maintained, heavily indebted LDCs
 - Would be unable to finance oil imports
 - Barring new rescheduling, could be forced to delay repayments, possibly resulting in a breakdown in increasingly strained debtor-creditor cooperation.

V. Past Experience - Confirms the order of magnitude of the predictions made by the economic forecasters

A. 1973/74 Arab Oil Embargo

1. Oil prices quadrupled from \$3 per barrel to over \$11
2. Higher oil prices triggered a major recession:
 - US real GNP which had been growing at 6%, declined in 1974 and 1975.
 - The unemployment rate increased from around 5 percent to 8.5 percent
 - Inflation rate quadrupled from 3% in 1972 to 11% in 1974.

* GRAPHIC: - 1979/1980 COMPARISON

B. 1979 Iranian Revolution

1. Complete halt of Iranian crude oil exports for one quarter.
2. Uncertainty over future supplies and fear of spreading Islamic revival subsequently caused a massive stock build.
3. Government cooperation broke down
 - Weak international agreements did not prevent a scramble for oil.

4. As a result, prices rose from less than \$13 per barrel in 1978 to a peak of nearly \$35 by early 1981.
5. Higher oil prices again triggered a major recession:
 - Real GNP in the US, which had been growing at about 5%, stagnated.
 - Unemployment increased from less than 6% to nearly 9%
 - Inflation rate rose from 9% to over 13%

C. 1980 Iran-Iraq War

1. Production from both Iran and Iraq was disrupted.
 - Size of the production disruption was similar to the one after Iranian Revolution
2. Great uncertainty prevailed in the market at the outset.
3. Declining consumption and the large increase in oil inventories accumulated after the Iranian Revolution, however, provided us with a cushion.
4. The response in the international community was also different.
 - The experience of 1979 was still fresh in everyone's mind.
 - IEA reached a firm agreement to:
 - o lower stocks
 - o avoid abnormal spot purchases
 - Agreements encouraged Japanese and European action.
 - As a result, price increases were all but avoided.

VI. Present Situation

A. Sense of deja vu

1. Situation is very similar to 1979.

2. Oil stocks are low except in the US which has built up its strategic petroleum reserve.
3. The current slack market, combined with excess productive capacity, has encouraged complacency among consumers.
 - Gas lines have become a dim memory.
- B. Now that the world economy is recovering, governments in Western Europe and Japan may be unwilling to risk choking off the recovery for lack of oil.
 1. May choose to buy oil at any price in an attempt to sustain economic activity.
- C. Combined with the inevitable scramble for oil by the most seriously affected oil companies, the stage is set for a bidding war which will significantly drive the price of oil upward.

VII. Policies To Meet The Challenge

- A. While it is impossible to prevent price increases, quick, decisive and coordinated international government action should be able to prevent price leapfrogging and moderate the impact of a disruption
 - B. International Response
-

GRAPHIC:

1. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
 2. DOMESTIC RESPONSE
-

1. If we can effectively calm the oil market in those first days of uncertainty, we can better contain the economic impact.
2. We will also be buying time to assess the situation and implement other measures.
(including military)
3. Actions to be taken:
 - IEA coordinated position on stock drawdown to prevent speculative stock buildup and reduce pressure on prices.

- Coordinated call for restraint from abnormal spot market purchases.
- Consultations to encourage full utilization of spare capacity.
- IEA decisions should be taken at the ministerial level to guarantee high level commitment.
- US assistance to strategic countries in meeting their oil or financial needs.
- Unified position on IEA trigger: (Active oil company participation will require renewal of EPCA 252 which expired at the end of 1983.)

C. Domestic Response

1. Issue papers discussing options for dealing with the domestic side of the question are being prepared by various departments at this time.
2. Some of these issues are displayed on the screen.
3. If our policy of reliance on free market forces is to be successful in the domestic arena, we must ensure that panic in the international market is prevented through coordinated government action.

D. Status of Interagency Process

GRAPHIC:

FINAL PRODUCTS

1. We began work on an oil crisis management system for Room 208 about 2 months ago.
2. Shortly afterwards, interagency working groups were established to develop a coordinated response to the potential crisis.
3. Their work schedules call for completion of the entire process by the end of this month.

4. The end products of this interagency exercise will be used to complete the oil crisis management system for Room 208.
 - Common briefing book
 - Matrix plan of action
 - Information dissemination plan

E. Crisis Management

GRAPHIC:

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1. On the screen is a simplified mock-up of the matrix plan of action which is currently being developed by State Department.
 2. Dr. Beal has acquired the software to allow us to put the matrix into a PERT computer program in Room 208.
- F. The Course Ahead
1. Forge Cabinet-level consensus on international response
 2. I plan on meeting with other Cabinet-level officials over the coming days to work toward obtaining such a consensus
 3. Work through IEA to obtain coordinated international position with our allies
 4. Solidify agreements with discussions at the London Summit

TO MCFARLANE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM MARTIN

*sent
2/25/00*

RECEIVED 12 JAN 84 14

DOC DATE 12 JAN 84

KEYWORDS IRAQ IRAN
EMERGENCY PREPARED "S ENERGY

SUBJECT IRAQ - IRAN EMERGENCY ENERGY WORKING GROUPS

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: 12 JAN 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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wm

✓ 928

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 0286

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>		
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			<u>✓</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>✓ N</u>
Situation Room		<u>OB</u>	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: 1/13/84 10³⁰ mtg
(Date/Time)

Bud, this memo, prepared by Ben Bonk, assumes that State and Cabinet Affairs can settle their dispute over turf. This meeting has the potential to be highly contentious, therefore we must proceed cautiously. A meeting of principles may yet, ^{have} to be called to settle the differences. In any event we wanted you to have your background material in the event you chose to go. A copy of State's objection is attached. Bud: Shultz will not like the fact that this meeting was held and Meese wouldn't schedule a meeting with him.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0286

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Iraq-Iran Emergency Energy Working Groups

Summary. Ed Meese has decided that the Iraq-Iran Emergency Energy Working Groups should begin work immediately despite continued State Department objections to the organizational structure. As a result, a joint meeting of the DOE chaired Energy Response Working Group and the NSC chaired International and National Energy Security Working Group has been tentatively scheduled for this Friday, January 13 at 10:30 a.m. Secretary Hodel will be attending the meeting with Mr. Meese scheduled to deliver some opening remarks.

Background. The agenda for Friday's meeting (Tab I) is designed to provide participants with: background on the President's decision establishing the two working groups, a preliminary identification of the issues, and the proposed organization of the groups (Tab II).

The NSC chaired group will consist of three staff working groups. These groups will be responsible for examining international economic policy and military fuel requirements as well as coordinating bilateral consultations. A detailed outline of issues to be considered is included at Tab III.

I have had a set of talking points (Tab IV) prepared for you to use in making a few, brief introductory remarks if you are able to attend the meeting. An attempt will be made to schedule Friday's meeting into Room 208.

RECOMMENDATION

That you plan to attend Friday's meeting and deliver a few opening remarks on the implications for our national security of a possible expansion of the Iraq-Iran war.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Agenda
- II Proposed organization chart
- III Outline
- IV Talking points

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
NLRR F96-127/2#248
BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/11

ENERGY RESPONSE WORKING GROUP

Information Coordination Group 1/
 o Congressional Liaison
 o Public Information

Legal Issues Group 1/

Staff Working Groups



IDAT Membership
 CIA
 DOD
 DOE
 NSA
 DIA
 NSC

Membership
 DOE
 CIA
 Treasury
 OMB
 CEA
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 DOC
 NSC

Membership
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Membership
 DOE-NSC
 Treasury
 State
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 FEMA

ISSUES RESPONSIBILITY

- o Scenario Definition
- o Data Base Documentation
- o Model Assumptions
- o Model Runs Macro Impacts
- o Limitations
- o Policy Variation
- o Model Redefinition
- o Information & Data Release Policy
- o Crisis Management Information System

- o Income Transfer Impacts
- o Fiscal Policy
- o Monetary Policy
- o General Tariff Policy
- o Block Grants to States
- o Recycle Actions
- o Low Income Assistance

- o SPR Policy
- o Crude/Product Exports Policy
- o Oil Import Restrictions and Fees
- o Gasoline Taxes
- o Price and Allocation Controls
- o Private Stock Policy
- o State Pre-emption and Set Asides
- o Bilateral Energy Commitments
- o IEA Policy and Programs
- o Coordinated Stock Management

1/ To be constituted at the direction of the Energy Response Working Group Chairman.

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY WORKING GROUP

Staff Working Groups ^{1/}

<u>International Economic Policy Group</u>	<u>National Security Energy Requirements Groups</u>	<u>Bilateral Consultations Group</u>
<u>Membership</u>	<u>Membership</u>	<u>Membership</u>
Treasury/NSC State DOE OMB DOC	NSC DOD DOE	State NSC Treasury DOE DOD

ISSUES RESPONSIBILITY

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| o OECD Economic Impacts | o Scenario Definition | o Producer Countries |
| o LDC Economic Impacts | o Military Fuel Requirements | o Key Strategic Countries
(non-energy issues) |
| o IMF | o Coordination with NSDD-87
Efforts | |
| o Trade Balances & Exchange
Rate Effects | | |

1/

Data Base and Projections Staff Working Group of the Energy Response Working Group to provide necessary staff support.

AGENDA
JOINT MEETING
ENERGY RESPONSE WORKING GROUP
AND
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY WORKING GROUP

10:30 A.M.

January 13, 1984

I. OPENING REMARKS

- | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|
| Mr. Meese | - | Background of President's decision; purposes and basic organizational concepts for Working Groups |
| Secretary Hodel | - | Summary: Energy situation and economic impacts |
| Mr. McFarlane | - | Summary: National security situation |

II. PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES

- | | | |
|-----------------|---|--|
| Secretary Hodel | - | Data base and projections capability |
| | - | Domestic and international energy policy |
| | - | Domestic economic policy |
| | - | Public information |
| | - | Legal issues |
| Mr. Martin | - | International economic policy |
| | - | National security energy requirements |
| | - | Bilateral consultations coordination |

III. ORGANIZATION OF WORKING GROUPS

- | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|
| Secretary Hodel | - | Interrelationship between Working Groups |
| | - | Organization charts for Energy Response Working Group |
| | - | Assignment of policy issues |
| | - | Functioning of staff working groups |
| | - | Issue development methodology |
| Mr. Martin | - | Organization chart for International and National Energy Security Working Group |
| | - | Additional comments |

IV. PARTICIPANTS' COMMENTS

- I. International Economic Policy Group
 - A. Economic Impact of a Disruption (with support from Data Base and Projections Group).
 - 1. OECD
 - 2. LDCs
 - 3. Financial markets
 - 4. Trade balances and exchange rate effects.
 - B. Economic/Financial Aid Requests
 - 1. Identification of countries likely to request aid.
 - 2. Identification of type of aid likely to be requested.
 - C. US policy options in responding to aid requests
 - 1. IMF policy
 - 2. Bilateral aid policy

- II. National Security Energy Requirements Group
 - A. Scenario Definition -- Direct Military Fuel Requirements
 - 1. Business as usual -- Current direct fuel requirements
 - 2. Conservation scenario -- Minimum activity, designed to reduce short run fuel requirements when no military threat is perceived.
 - a. Impact on military preparedness
 - b. Impact on military fuel inventories
 - 3. Military conflict fuel requirements
 - a. Limited conflict (in the Persian Gulf)
 - i. Direct fuel requirements
 - b. Major conflict (major ground war in the Middle East or elsewhere).
 - i. Direct and indirect military fuel requirements
 - B. Military Fuel Supplies
 - 1. Guaranteed supplies -- Supplies unlikely to be interdicted by Iraq-Iran escalation.

2. Supplies at risk -- Likely to be cut off or interdicted by Iraq-Iran escalation.
 - a. Persian Gulf
 - b. Non-Persian Gulf, if any.
3. Shortfall required to be covered under various scenarios outlined in II A.
4. Potential sources and policy options
 - a. Military fuel reserves (including impact on military preparedness)
 - b. Commercial purchases
 - i. Within the US
 - ii. Outside the US
 - iii. Potential impact on the market.
 - c. SPR set-aside recommendations if necessary to meet direct/indirect military fuel requirements.
 - d. DPA recommendations
- C. Coordination with NSDD-87 activities.

III. Bilateral Consultations Coordination Group

- A. Producer Countries
 1. Identification of countries likely to have spare capacity -- from Data Base and Projections Group
 - a. Countries to be approached diplomatically -- to ensure increased output if possible
 - i. Saudi Arabia
 - ii. UAE
 - iii. Kuwait
 - iv. Nigeria
 - v. Venezuela
 - vi. Other (including OECD producers)
 - b. Identification of countries unlikely to cooperate with US initiatives
 - i. Iran
 - ii. Libya

2. Issues to be raised by the US during its demarches to producers
 - a. Market stability -- emphasis on the economic havoc resulting from 1973-74 and 1979-80 price increases which was harmful to both producers and consumers.
 - b. Security issues
 - c. Recommendations on direct Presidential initiatives to ensure increased output (i.e. letters to selected heads of state.)
 3. Non-energy issues likely to be raised by producing countries.
 - a. Israel
 - b. Security issues
 - c. Arms
 - d. US policy positions to be taken on the above issues.
 4. Requests for or offers of US military assistance -- advance preparation of US responses options.
- B. Key Strategic Countries
1. Identification of countries likely to seek assistance (Turkey, Israel, Portugal, Korea, Philippines, etc.)
 2. Types of assistance likely to be requested
 - a. Energy (Existing bilateral energy commitments may be handled by the International Energy Policy Group.)
 - b. Military
 3. US policy positions and initiatives to satisfy above requests.

Talking Points
Robert C. McFarlane
Joint Meeting
Energy Response Working Group
and
International and National Energy Security Working Group
10:30 A.M.
January 13, 1984

I. Opening Remarks

- o As Secretary Hodel has so vividly pointed out, the economies of the oil consuming countries of the world remain susceptible to a major disruption of international oil flows.

II. The Threat

- o Currently the threat of escalation in the Iraq-Iran war and the potential spread of fighting to the rest of the Gulf threatens the flow of oil.
- o Iraqi military activity continues to be directed against both military and economic targets.
- o Iraq continues to threaten Iranian crude oil exports.
- o Iran has not backed off its threat to retaliate against Iraq and its Arab supporters if its oil flows are substantially interdicted.
 - oo Whether they choose to employ it or not, Tehran has the capability to reach all major Gulf oil facilities.

III. Present Oil Market

- o The current oil market is characterized by glut, not scarcity.
- o Nevertheless, US and its allies remain dependent on Persian Gulf.
- o 30% of free world's oil comes from the Persian Gulf.
- o 60% of surplus oil productive capacity is in the Persian Gulf.
- o Nearly one-third of spare capacity outside the Gulf is in Libya.

IV. Oil Stocks

- o Key factor in market psychology.
- o Recently, sizeable reduction in commercial stocks.
- o Stocks are lower than in 1979.
- o Only the US has a meaningful strategic oil reserve.

V. Impact on National Security

- o More than just energy markets could be harmed by a disruption.
- o Security of international economic and financial systems dependent on the flow of oil.
- o Ensure no degradation in our military preparedness by examining options to guarantee military fuel requirements are met.


VI. International Cooperation

- o Impossible for the US to insulate itself from worldwide impact of a major disruption.
- o Necessary for US to take a leading role.
- o US must be a model for avoiding panic buying and hysteria.
 - oo Must encourage our allies, through all channels, to do likewise.
- o We have been challenged to develop a sound set of policy options to ensure that any crisis will be managed successfully.

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY WORKING GROUP

CHAIR: NSC

Staff Working Groups ^{1/}



CHAIR:

Treasury/NSC

CHAIR:

NSC

CHAIR:

State

1/

Data Base and Projections Staff Working Group of the Energy Response Working Group to provide necessary staff support.

ENERGY RESPONSE WORKING GROUP


CHAIR DOE

Information Coordination Group ^{1/}

- o Congressional Liaison
- o Public Information

Legal Issues Group ^{1/}

Staff Working Group



^{1/} To be constituted at the direction of the Energy Response Working Group Chairman.

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TO KIMMITT

FROM STEMPER, J

DOCDATE 29 NOV 83

KEYWORDS IRAN

IRAQ

NUCLEAR ENERGY

OIL



SUBJECT. MEMCON / IRANIAN CURRENT EVENTS & NUCLEAR INTERESTS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-26089/83
29 NOV 1983

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Iranian Current Events and Nuclear Interests (S)

Participants



John D. Stempel
Director, NESA

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

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(U) He is therefore much more concerned about an oil shortfall in the world market than Western oil economists seem to be.

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
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John D. Stempel
Director
Near East South Asia

WHSR
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Time Stamp

STAFF...	C/O
McFarlane	
Poindexter	C
SDO	C
MR	C
Kimmitt	C
Merchant	O
NSC S/S	

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Bill

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TO CLARK

FROM KAMINSKY, PHYLLIS

DOCDATE 25 JUL 83

KEYWORDS: IRAN

IRAQ

UN

SUBJECT: UN SECRETARY-GENERAL RPT RE IRAN - IRAQ WAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 01 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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KEMP

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COMMENTS

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John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u><i>J</i></u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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(Date/Time)

83 AUG 3 10: 34

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MEMORANDUM**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

July 29, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PATRICK A. PUTIGNANO

SUBJECT: U.N. Mission To Inspect Damaged Areas
In Iran and Iraq**NOTED**

AUG 1 10 1983

Phyllis Kaminsky, Acting Director of the United Nations Information Center, sent you the attached copy of the U.N. report on civilian damage in Iran and Iraq. The report is worth skimming perhaps, but its potential value is greater than the text would first suggest. Necessarily, the Commission had to limit itself to observations only; no blame is apportioned. Nevertheless, the report is significant in these respects:

- o The Iranians agreed to the U.N. Commission. This is a significant development because the Iranians had not previously regarded the U.N. as objective.
- o The issue of damage to civilian areas is an Iranian one because the Iraqis have leveled whole cities which were not necessarily military targets.
- o The Iraqis regard the report as fair even though they are shown in a bad light. There are two possible explanations for this:
 - oo The Iraqis want a U.N. Commission on prisoners of war because the key judgments on that issue are likely to be against Iran.
 - oo Iraq would welcome a negotiated end of the war.

Perhaps this Commission is an important first step.

Conclusion

The costs of the war are beginning to outweigh the benefits, as viewed by many Iranians. Since Khomeini is steadfast in pressing on with the war, there is a battle for his mind. The Commission's report may strengthen those who favor a negotiated settlement.

During the past week, the Iranians have launched an attack in the Kurdish Northwest (of Iran) with modest success. By claiming "victory," Iranian moderates may yet change the course of the war which has become increasingly costly, in Iranian lives (martyrdom notwithstanding) and to the treasury. Finally, the Iranian

government has been seeking to increase economic development but the war detracts from their chances of doing so.

In another significant and related development, we have rightly condemned Iranian threats to commercial shipping. We should add that the obvious consequence of any Iranian action would likely foreclose expanded economic development with the West by cutting off their source of hard currency.

Dick Higgins, Iran Desk Officer at State, and I have discussed these points. He is in general agreement. Geoff Kemp has reviewed this analysis.

Attachment

Tab A Incoming letter from Phyllis Kaminsky



United Nations Information Centre, Washington, D.C., 20006

1889 F Street, N.W.

296-5370

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83 JUL 27 P 5: 51

July 25, 1983

Dear Bill:

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Iran and Iraq. Upon request of the Government of Iran and in agreement with the Government of Iraq, the Secretary-General dispatched a mission to investigate damage to civilian areas in both countries caused by the war.

A secondary objective of the mission was to investigate what kind of munitions might have caused the damage. Each government specified which sites were to be inspected, although the mission included some other areas based on information received.

I trust this report will be useful in providing additional information on one of the most serious conflict areas in the world today.

Sincerely yours,

Phyllis

Phyllis Kaminsky
Acting Director,
United Nations
Information Centre

Judge William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/15834
20 June 1983

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MISSION TO INSPECT CIVILIAN AREAS IN IRAN AND IRAQ
WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO MILITARY ATTACK

Report of the Secretary-General

1. On 2 May 1983, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran called on me to convey his Government's request that I send a representative to visit civilian areas in Iran which have been subject to military attack by Iraq. He indicated that, should the Government of Iraq wish to invite the representative to visit Iraq, the Government of Iran would welcome it.
2. I assured the Permanent Representative of Iran that I would give full consideration to his request and indicated that, since as Secretary-General, I had exercised my good offices under a mandate from the Security Council virtually from the beginning of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, I intended to keep the Security Council informed of any action I might take. I also informed him that I would take up the question with the Permanent Representative of Iraq. On 3 May 1983, I discussed the matter with the Permanent Representative of Iraq, who, after consulting his Government, informed me on 12 May 1983 that Iraq would also wish the representative to visit civilian areas in Iraq which had been subject to military attack by Iran. Relevant letters from the Government of Iran had been circulated in Security Council documents S/15729, S/15735, S/15739, S/15747, S/15763, S/15796, S/15798, and from the Government of Iraq in Security Council documents S/15743, S/15765, S/15804, S/15825 and S/15826.
3. I informed the Security Council on 12 May of my intention to dispatch a small mission, following which I communicated that decision to the Permanent Representatives of both countries. As agreed with the two Governments, the task assigned to the mission was to survey and assess, as far as possible, the damage to civilian areas in the two countries said to have suffered war damage and to indicate, where possible, the types of munitions that could have caused the damage. The mission was not expected to ascertain the number of casualties or the value of property damage in those areas. The mission was assigned the responsibility of presenting to me an objective report on its inspections and observations. I informed the Security Council and both the Permanent Representatives of my intention to transmit that report to the Security Council.

4. Each Government was requested to convey to me appropriate assurances that the safety of the mission would be secured during its entire stay in the area, i.e., not only in the war zone in its own territory but also while the mission was in the war zone in the other State's territory. Thus, it was expected that each Government would issue the appropriate instructions to its military authorities in the war zone. Those assurances were received before the mission departed from Headquarters on 18 May 1983.

5. The two Governments were further requested to specify the itineraries that they wished the mission to follow in their respective territories. Each itinerary was communicated to the other Government for the purpose of ensuring the necessary conditions of safety for the mission. The two Governments were also requested to provide appropriate means of transport for the mission outside their respective capitals. I should like to express my appreciation to the two Governments for the arrangements made to facilitate the work of the mission.

6. On the completion of its itinerary in Iran, the mission was requested by the Government to inspect an additional site, Baneh, which was said to have been attacked during the mission's presence in Iran. The mission was authorized to carry out the additional visit on the condition that the dates of its scheduled tour of Iraq were not affected. The mission also informed the authorities in Iraq, on its arrival in Baghdad, of its readiness to visit any additional sites the Iraqi authorities might wish to propose.

7. The members of the mission were Brigadier-General Timothy K. Dibuama, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, and Mr. Iqbal Riza, Principal Officer, Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs. Since the mission required expertise in the field of munitions, the Government of Sweden was requested to second the services of a senior munitions specialist and a senior artillery officer. The Government of Sweden very kindly and promptly provided the following two experts to assist the mission: Dr. Ake Persson, Chief of Division for Weapons Effects, Swedish National Defence Research Institute, and Lt. Col. Bertil Mattsson, Commander, Artillery Regiment, Swedish Army. I wish to place on record my appreciation to the Government of Sweden for their ready and speedy co-operation in seconding the two officials whose expertise was essential to the task of the mission.

8. The mission has reported to me that during discussions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each State, there was mention of alleged violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Further, in those discussions, the Government of Iraq took the position that the hostilities commenced on 4 September 1980, while the Government of Iran took the position that the hostilities commenced on 22 September 1980. The two sides also stated that parts of their respective territories were under the occupation of forces of the other side. It should be noted that the mission made no comment on those issues or on other political issues that were raised by the Governments during the discussions, because they were clearly not within its mandate.

9. The mission has reported to me that it met officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva to discuss its findings as well as the

relevant portions of the ICRC memorandum of 7 May 1983 circulated to States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

10. I should like to record my appreciation for the dedication with which the members of the mission and the experts worked with objectivity to complete a difficult task under strenuous conditions.

11. The report that the mission has submitted to me is annexed.

Annex

REPORT OF THE MISSION

INTRODUCTION

1. The mission toured war zones in Iran from 21 May to 26 May 1983, and war zones in Iraq from 28 May to 30 May 1983. A map of the area covering the locations visited is contained in appendix A, and the detailed itineraries are given in appendix B.
2. The mission was instructed (a) to determine whether civilian areas had been subject to damage or destruction by military means, such as air bombardment, artillery shelling, missile and rocket attacks or use of other explosives; (b) to assess the extent of such damage and destruction as far as possible; (c) to indicate, where possible, the types of munitions used. While the mission was not expected to ascertain the number of casualties, it kept in view the obvious correlation between the extent of damage to civilian areas and the probable extent of loss of life, taking into consideration the degree to which such areas were populated at the time the damage was inflicted. The statistics on casualties provided by the two Governments are mentioned in the report of the mission without comment.
3. In performing its task, the mission used such indicators as the normal population before the hostilities; the current population and reasons for any change; the distance from the border and from front lines and/or military installations; the proximity to communications and/or economic installations of strategic or military significance; the dates of the alleged attacks and the types of munitions alleged to have been used. It also paid special attention to the approximate area and extent of destruction at each site. On arrival at each place designated by the host Government, the mission requested the head of the civilian administration or the military commander responsible for operations in the area, or both, for briefings on each of the above questions. Those and other officials were then asked to provide clarification on any supplementary information that the mission considered necessary. The mission then visited the sites of damage selected by the local authorities and, in some cases, additional sites selected by the mission on the basis of the information received. Evidence that could indicate the types of munitions used was examined by the experts either at the site or at any other place where such exhibits were presented. The damaged sites, the type of damage and any evidence of the types of munitions possibly used, e.g., shell or bomb parts and fragments, were photographed. Relevant selected photographs are available for inspection. Each of the four members of the mission separately took notes on the briefings and details of the damage and evidence of possible munitions used. Those notes were then compared and summarized into fact sheets for use in the report.
4. The mission wishes to place on record that, in the circumstances in which it worked, it was not in a position to verify the information given by the authorities concerned relating to the location of military units or installations, distances

from lines of hostilities, situation of communications or economic installations of strategic or military significance etc. Therefore, the mission had to rely in that regard essentially on the information provided by the respective Government, supplemented by whatever information it could ascertain by its own observations.

5. In accordance with its instructions, the members of the mission at no point discussed with any official of either Government or any other person the possible content of its report. Also, it made it a point not to discuss with one Government what it had observed or ascertained during its visit to the territory of the other State. The members of the mission did not make any substantive statement or comment to the press.

6. The mission expresses its deep appreciation to the authorities in Iran and Iraq, and, in particular, to the officials directly involved who accompanied the mission on its tours for the painstaking arrangements made in their respective territories to enable the mission to perform its task.

I. TOUR OF WAR ZONES IN IRAN

7. The itinerary drawn up by the Government of Iran included visits to civilian areas which had suffered war damage relatively recently as well as in the past. The dates of its visits to the various sites are indicated in brackets. The times indicated are local times. Casualty figures relate to civilians.

A. Dezful

(21 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

8. The city had a population of 167,000 before the hostilities. Its current population is 185,000, the increase being due to an influx of refugees from other areas affected by the hostilities. The distance to the border is approximately 80 km.

9. The authorities said that the city had been attacked on 20 April, 22 April and 12 May 1983, on each occasion by a surface-to-surface missile from a westerly direction. Three sites of impact within the city were the Chollian area, the Afshar hospital area and the Siah-Poshan area, respectively. The damage and casualties reported were as follows:

Site	Buildings destroyed	Buildings damaged	Casualties	
			Killed	Injured
Chollian	35	75	17	120
Afshar	30	70	36	210
Siah-Poshan	76	300	6	76

/...

Some buildings had had to be demolished by bulldozers to gain access to the third site to evacuate the dead and wounded, and many bodies were said to be still buried under the debris.

10. The distance to the lines of hostilities was not provided. A major air base is situated 8 km north-west of the city towards Andimeshk. There are no troops stationed in the city, and the nearest major area where combat troops were deployed was about 80 km away. There are air defence detachments deployed in the city. There are no factories of any military significance in the city.

11. The mission was also informed that there had been over 50 previous missile attacks from September 1980 to date. There had been, in the same period, over 6,000 impacts from aerial bombardment and shelling. Those had caused total casualties of 600 killed and more than 2,500 injured. There had been destruction of varying degree to 1,300 houses, 32 schools and 22 mosques.

Observations by the mission

12. Dezful is a sizeable city situated on the southern bank of the Dez River, which separates it from the air base area located to the north of the city. There is a dam about 20-25 km to the north-east. There are two bridges over the Dez River in the city. The city is not situated on any major communications route. Within the time available, the mission was unable to determine whether there were installations of strategic or economic importance located in the city other than those indicated by the Iranian authorities.

13. The three sites, all in residential districts, that had sustained recent damage were inspected by the mission. The distances between them were of the order of 1 km. The area of total destruction in each measured approximately 75 m x 75 m. The first two sites had largely been cleared of debris. The third site was still full of rubble, and clearing work was under way. It was a district of very old houses of brick and mud construction, built close to one another, which might account for the larger number of houses destroyed in the area. Most of the houses around each area showed heavy damage, and some of them were beyond repair. At the point of impact in the second site, there was a crater measuring about 10 m in diameter and 2 m deep, and partly filled with debris.

14. A number of pieces of shrapnel were found in all three sites. They could not be positively identified but could have come from missiles. The type and extent of damage indicated that a warhead of at least 300 kg of high explosive had caused the damage at each site. A large number of metal parts and fragments, collected together in a government building, were shown to the mission, which was informed that they had been collected from sites in Dezful, including the three recently affected, and from the site in Andimeshk. The parts and fragments showed no signs of corrosion. Several of the parts could be positively identified as belonging to Scud-B missiles, since they carried the marking 8K14. These missiles are known to have a range of approximately 270 km. No evidence was presented or found of the warheads having been delivered by aircraft.

15. The mission was also taken to visit two sites, in residential and shopping areas, which were said to have been attacked by missiles some six to eight months

earlier. The areas had been cleared and partly rebuilt and repaired. The affected areas appeared to be of approximately the same dimensions as the other three sites. The mission did not observe any damage to the air base which could have been caused by missile impacts.

16. The observations by the mission and examination of the evidence presented to it support the claim that the first three sites were hit by surface-to-surface missiles, which the team identified as Scud-B missiles. Although the mission could not inspect all the damaged buildings, the extent of the property damage claimed appears to be plausible.

17. The mission subsequently was also shown parts of the tail assemblies of two missiles which could be positively identified as belonging to Frog missiles. Those parts were heavily corroded, and it was estimated that they were at least one year old.

B. Andimeshk

(21 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

18. The population of the city was 70,000 before the hostilities but has increased to 90,000, owing to the influx of refugees from other areas affected by the conflict. The distance from the border is about 80 km.

19. The authorities informed the mission that the city had been hit on 12 May 1983 at 0830 hours by a surface-to-surface missile from a westerly direction. Casualties were 24 killed and 143 wounded. The authorities said that 66 houses were completely destroyed, 14 more houses and shops were damaged to a varying degree and a school was half-destroyed.

20. The distance to the current line of hostilities was not given. The distance to the Dezful air base is 6 km, and the nearest military garrison is 12 km distant. There are no factories in the city producing war material.

Observations by the mission

21. Andimeshk is a small city 14 km north-west of Dezful. It is densely populated. It lies on the Abadan-Teheran railway line and has a large railway station. It lies on the main road running north from Dezful.

22. The site of the impact was in a densely populated residential area not far from the railway station. The area of impact and destruction, measuring about 100 m x 75 m, had been largely cleared of debris. Most of the houses around the area were heavily damaged, and some of them were beyond repair. At the point of impact was a crater partially filled with debris, measuring about 4 m x 2 m. The crater was towards the west side of the affected area.

23. One large, crumpled sheet of metal, which could have come from a missile casing, was found at the site. The type and extent of damage indicated that a warhead of at least 300 kg of high explosive had caused the damage. Parts of missiles shown to the mission in Dezful were said to have been collected from the Andimeshk site. Some of those parts were positively identified as belonging to a Scud-B missile. No evidence was presented or found of the warhead having been delivered by an aircraft.

24. The observations by the mission and examination of the evidence presented to it support the claim that the site was hit by a surface-to-surface missile from a westerly direction. The type and extent of the damage indicates that it was caused by a missile similar or identical to the type used in Dezful. While the mission could not inspect all the damaged units, the extent of damage claimed appears plausible.

C. Pol-e-Dokhtar

(22 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

25. The town's population of 20,000 has remained unchanged since the beginning of the hostilities. The distance to the border is 85 km.

26. According to the authorities, the town was attacked on 25 April 1983 by two aircraft from a south-westerly direction at low altitude. It was strafed by three bombs and machine-gun fire. Two bombs impacted near the main mosque, and a third fell outside the town, 500 m to the north-east. Ten houses, a school and a bakery were completely destroyed, and about 100 houses and shops were damaged to a varying extent. Twenty-three people were killed, and 113 were injured.

27. The distance to the current line of hostilities was not given. The nearest major military installation is near Dezful, which is 110 km away. There is a small gendarmerie unit located just outside the town. No factory of any military consequence is located in the town.

Observations by the mission

28. Pol-e-Dokhtar is a small town situated astride the Kashkan River. A local bridge connects the two sides of the town. The road through the town does not lead to any other town and terminates in the fields on the west side. East of the town is the main road from Dezful to Qasr-i-Shireen. This road crosses the Kashkan River 15 km to the north-east. No installations of strategic or economic significance were observed.

29. The site of the main impact was near the centre of the town, about 100 m from the local bridge. An area of about 50 m x 25 m contained debris of masonry and some remains of household goods. Some houses around the area were heavily damaged by shrapnel and blast effects. Several houses around the area were pockmarked by

bullets fired from at least two different directions. The second impact area observed, which was not inspected, was located about 25 m from the local bridge. The mission did not visit the third point of impact outside the town.

30. A number of metal fragments from high explosives, the exact type of which could not be identified, were found at the main site. The type and extent of damage indicated that a warhead of at least 50 kg of high explosive had caused the damage. Later, the mission was shown parts of the munitions said to have been found in the impact area. Among those positively identified as belonging to an aerial bomb were:

- (a) A braking parachute of 4-m diameter for an aerial bomb;
- (b) A bomb casing of a diameter of 430 mm;
- (c) A connecting clamp marked 0514240299;

(d) A large metal fragment measuring 1 m in length, 30 cm in width and of 10 mm thickness, of which 9 mm was steel and 1 mm a liner. Remains of high explosive were found on the liner. On one side was a welded clamp to hang the bomb to the aircraft.

Bullet holes and other signs of impact on houses and other objects in the area indicated that machine-guns of two different calibres of approximately 10 mm and 20 mm had been used. The angle of penetration indicated that they had been fired from an aircraft.

31. From its observations and examination of the evidence presented to it, the mission is of the view that the town was subjected to aerial bombardment and machine-gun attack. Although the mission could not visit all the affected houses, the extent of damaged property claimed appeared reasonably accurate.

D. Musian

(22 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

32. The mission was informed that the town had a population of 5,000 people, mostly Arabic speaking. It is 6 km from the border. The area is mainly agricultural and is not in a military zone. However, there were oil installations nearby in Abu Ghareib and Biad. It was occupied on about 8 October 1980 after 15 days of fighting during which 60 persons were killed. The number of injured was not known, since most of the inhabitants had fled on the outbreak of hostilities. It was recaptured on 22 March 1982 after one week of fighting. The authorities further stated that the town had been largely destroyed before it was retaken and that many buildings had been blown up by explosives. Thirty-three outlying villages had also been destroyed. Five hundred and eighty families had been taken

prisoner. Since its recapture, it had been under frequent bombardment until a month prior to the mission visit. The distance to the front line was not given.

Observations by the mission

33. The visits to Musian and Dehloran were substituted for the scheduled visit to Mehran, which the authorities considered risky because of the recent discovery of minefields there. At the site of Musian, in flat, open country, the mission observed that large parts of the town had been levelled. In other parts some buildings were still standing, heavily damaged and beyond repair. One of houses inspected gave the impression of having been demolished by the high-explosive charges.

34. The mission formed the impression that the buildings still standing had been damaged by shelling and direct fire, and, in some cases, by planting high explosives. However, in the areas that had been razed to the ground the extent of destruction indicated that high-explosive charges and engineering equipment might have been used.

E. Dehloran

(22 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

35. Dehloran is located about 25 km from the border. The mission was informed that it had been attacked more than 50 times by air since the outbreak of hostilities in September 1980 and that about 60 per cent of it had been destroyed. One hundred persons had been killed, and 500 others injured. The town had been occupied three times by Iraqi forces, and, in the course of the latest occupation, the power station and waterworks had been destroyed. Most of the inhabitants had fled the town during the first attack, and the population of 45,000 before then had dwindled to 5,000. There is no factory located within or near the town. No troops were stationed in the area in 1980. The authorities stated that since March 1982, when the town was recaptured by Iranian troops, no military units have been deployed in the area. There are, however, a small air defence detachment, a gendarmerie unit and a reconstruction unit stationed in the town. The distance to the front line was not given.

Observations by the mission

36. Dehloran lies on a minor road from Dezful to Mehran. The town was largely deserted and appeared to be abandoned by most of the civilian population. From what the mission could observe, more than half the town had been heavily damaged beyond repair. Almost all the buildings in the other areas were damaged to varying degrees. The damage appeared to have been caused by both shelling and aerial bombardment.

37. Apart from the air defence and the gendarmerie units located in the town, the mission observed a number of personnel in military uniform and military vehicles. It was informed that they belonged to reconstruction teams.

38. The mission was also shown the complete canister of a bomb which was said to have been found in the town. It was positively identified as belonging to a cluster bomb of the same type found in other towns, such as Baneh.

39. The mission is of the view that the destruction described was caused by aerial bombardment and exchange of fire on the occasions when the town changed hands and by subsequent shelling.

F. Abadan

(23 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

40. The population of the city before the hostilities was 400,000, with another 200,000 people in its suburbs. The authorities stated that soon after the town was attacked in September 1980 most of the population had been evacuated. The city remained subject to heavy shelling and aerial bombardment. Only about 70,000 inhabitants remained and were currently helping in the reconstruction of the city. Twelve hundred persons had been killed and 7,000 injured, of which 79 were maimed. Civilians taken prisoner numbered 2,228. The damage to 40,000 houses ranged from 20 per cent to 100 per cent. The city was still under shelling and direct fire, and daily casualties averaged 1 person killed and 6 or 7 injured. There was very little aerial bombardment. Before the hostilities, there had been one gendarmerie border post and no military units located in the city. The nearest military unit, one infantry battalion was stationed in Khorramshahr some 30 km away. After the city was attacked and the road to Ahvaz cut on 20 October, military units to defend the city had had to be brought in by air and through the Bahmanshir River.

41. The mission was taken to one of the oldest and largest hospitals in the city, whose location was well known, and was informed that it had been hit the previous day by a 120-mm mortar shell which had caused no casualties. The mission was also later taken to a second hospital on the outskirts of the city which was said to have been bombed from the air at an early stage in the hostilities.

42. An oil refinery complex located near the city was said to have been almost destroyed and the remaining installations to be under constant attack. The mission was not taken to that area because, the Iranian authorities said, it was not a civilian area and could be considered an economic installation of military significance and, therefore, a legitimate target.

Observations by the mission

43. The city is situated on the border between the Shatt-al-Arab and the Bahmanshir River, south-east of Khorramshahr. On approaching the city, the mission

saw a number of destroyed tanks and other military vehicles, signs of very heavy fighting which must have occurred a considerable time before. The outskirts of the city were heavily damaged, but towards the centre there were greater distances between sites of heavy damage, although a large number of buildings showed scars of fragment hits.

44. On inspecting the first hospital, the mission was shown various points of past damage. It found shrapnel and glass fragments caused by one very recent impact of a shell which had made a gaping hole in the corner of one of the wards. The mission also observed that the roof of another ward, which was clearly marked with a red cross on both sides, had received several direct hits, four of which had penetrated the roof and caused damage inside. The mission was also shown a part of a canister of a bomb which was said to be one of two found in the hospital grounds and was positively identified as belonging to a cluster bomb of the same type found in other cities, such as Baneh and Dehloran.

45. The second hospital building showed signs of considerable damage that had been repaired. The mission was shown a canister of a bomb said to have been found after an air raid and many old large fragments which could have come from bombs.

46. The city is still largely deserted, although some reconstruction has started. It is also evident that the city remains under fire.

47. During the visit to the first hospital, at about 0900 hours on 23 May 1983, the mission heard sounds of artillery or mortar fire. While in Khorramshahr, the mission was informed that three shells had hit the Abadan refinery, and one had dropped in the city a kilometre from the first hospital the team visited. That could not be verified by the mission.

48. From its observations, the mission is of the opinion that the evidence supports the claim that the city had been under a prolonged siege. It was clear that the destruction seen had been caused by aerial bombardment, artillery fire and direct fire.

G. Khorramshahr

(23 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

49. Before September 1980, the population of Khorramshahr had been 200,000. On 22 September 1980, it had been heavily bombarded and attacked by two army divisions. An infantry battalion stationed in the city, supported by civilians, had resisted for 40 days, after which the larger part of the city north of the Karun River was occupied by Iraqi forces and remained under occupation until late March 1982. Two hundred persons, including whole families, had been killed in the initial fighting. During the evacuation of the population several thousand civilians had been killed, and thousands more wounded, and a large number had been taken prisoner (no precise figures were given).

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50. The Iranian authorities stated that their troops had recaptured the city in March 1982 without much fighting. Of about 23,000 residential and other units, it was found that 8,000 buildings had been totally levelled, including 120 mosques and religious establishments, 100 schools, 2 colleges, 4 major hospitals and several clinics. Of about 15,000 residential units, 60 per cent had been destroyed and were beyond repair. A large number of shops had been looted and burned. From 50 to 60 vessels of foreign registration had been sunk or heavily damaged. Another 1,000 private vessels of Iranian registration, of all types and sizes, had also been destroyed or sunk.

51. In the occupied part of the city whole rows of buildings had been demolished and large areas cleared to provide open fields of fire. Many of those areas had been mined. Rows of damaged buildings still standing and overlooking the cleared areas had been fortified with rubble from the clearings and turned into strongholds and defensive lines. To the north of the city, large open areas had been planted with all available utility poles uprooted from elsewhere and cars up-ended as defence against paratroop attacks.

52. The authorities stated that operations of clearing the debris of destruction, mines and other unexploded munitions were in progress. Reconstruction work had already started and was under way.

Observations by the mission

53. The city lies on the border on the Shatt-al-Arab and straddles the Karun River. The mission toured both parts of the city, on either side of the river. The southern part, which had not been under occupation, had been very heavily damaged, evidently by air and artillery bombardment. However, most of the walls were still standing, except along the river, where almost all the buildings appeared to have collapsed from the bombardment.

54. Both banks of the river were littered with wrecks of vessels of all descriptions and sizes. A large bridge joining the southern and northern ends of the city was demolished, and a temporary floating bridge was being used.

55. The scene in the northern part of the city supported the version of events given by the authorities. Although the mission could not conduct detailed inspections, the nature and extent of the destruction gave the impression that, apart from air and artillery bombardment, high-explosive charges and engineering equipment had been used. Work was in progress to clear and reopen roads which had been buried under the debris. The mission was not in a position to determine whether the open spaces had been mined, and, if so, to what extent they had been cleared.

56. From what it could observe of the almost total devastation of the city, the mission is of the opinion that in those parts where buildings were still standing the destruction was the result of intensive shelling and bombardment in the course of the hostilities. However, in those areas of the city which were completely levelled, it was evident that other means, such as high-explosive demolition charges and engineering equipment, must have been deliberately employed.

H. Hoveyzeh

(23 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

57. At the site of Hoveyzeh, about 35 km from the border, the mission was informed that before September 1980, the town had a population of 12,000, with another 23,000 people in 76 surrounding villages. The population was largely Arabic speaking. The town had contained about 1,900 houses. It was an agricultural town and was not in a military area. It was occupied early in the hostilities, and remained occupied until May 1982. According to the authorities, 200 persons had been killed during the hostilities, and 5,000 captured. No figures for the injured were provided.

58. The authorities stated that on recapturing the town, it was found to have been levelled to the ground, with only two damaged buildings still standing: a mosque, which had been used as an observation post, and a house, which had been used as a command post. All the trees had been uprooted. According to the authorities, while some damage had been caused in the course of the hostilities, the actual destruction of the town was the result of demolition by high explosives and the use of bulldozers.

Observations by the mission

59. The mission saw that the whole area had been levelled, except for the two buildings mentioned. There were no trees to be seen. The old bridge across the river Khark-e-Nur had been demolished, and a new bridge had been built. Some new houses were being constructed outside the old town limits.

60. Because of the time that had elapsed since the events described, the mission was unable to examine evidence, such as any shell or bomb fragments or parts. The mission, however, is of the opinion that the state of the site at the time of its visit indicated that the town must have been subjected to means of destruction other than shelling and direct fire, such as the use of high-explosive charges and engineering equipment.

I. Susangerd

(23 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

61. Susangerd is situated about 30 km from the border. Before September 1980, the town had a population of 30,000, with another 100,000 persons in the surrounding villages. It was mainly an agricultural area. According to the authorities, soon after the hostilities started, the town was attacked by ground forces, supported by tanks. During the first two months of hostilities, the town had been entered three times, and, after heavy street fighting, the attacking forces had finally been

repulsed on 14 November 1980. Regarding property, 3,500 houses had received damage ranging from 20 per cent to total destruction. Most of the population had not been evacuated from the city. About 400 persons had been killed, an unknown number wounded and 106 captured. The city remained under siege until early 1982 and was currently outside the shelling range of Iraqi guns. Extensive reconstruction was in progress.

Observations by the mission

62. The mission was in the town for a very short time and was able to tour only a limited part of it. While the mission did not see a large number of damaged buildings, the extent of repair and reconstruction work already completed and in progress supported the claims regarding the damage to property during the hostilities. It should be pointed out that the last military action was reported to have taken place more than a year before the visit of the mission.

J. Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab

(24 May 1983)

Information presented by the Iranian authorities to the mission

63. The town is some 25-30 km from the border. Before the hostilities, the town's population numbered 35,000, with another 65,000 persons in the surrounding villages. The authorities stated that the town had been attacked by air and artillery and had been occupied for only one day, 23 September 1980, during which time the occupying forces had used tanks to destroy it. After a week's fighting outside the town, the withdrawing forces had taken positions on the heights a few kilometres away, and started to shell the town. At that stage, the total population was evacuated. The heights were partially retaken on 4 June 1982, but some of them were still occupied, and shelling continued. There had been no air attacks since May 1982, and a small part of the population had returned.

64. Regarding property damage, 700 houses in the town had been completely destroyed, 2,000 required extensive repairs, and another 2,000 needed repair to a varying extent. There were 835 shops in need of major repairs. Of the outlying villages, 96 had been completely destroyed, 30 extensively damaged and the rest partly damaged. Orchards and palm groves had been destroyed. Ninety-five civilians had been killed in the town before the evacuation, and 26 had been captured. The figures for the villages were not known. The authorities stated that the town had been shelled the day before the visit of the mission.

Observations by the mission

65. The mission was taken to Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab instead of to nearby Qasr-i-Shirin as scheduled. The town lies on the road from Dezful to Qasr-i-Shirin. No military units could be observed in the town. The nearest military garrison was about 10 km away. The distance to the front line was not given.

66. The town was deserted and appeared to have been abandoned by most of the civilian population. From what the mission could observe, parts of the town had been heavily damaged and were beyond repair. Almost all the buildings seen by the mission had been damaged to varying degrees. The damage appeared to have been caused by aerial bombardment and shelling.

67. The mission was shown a damaged building said to have been shelled the day before, but the evidence did not indicate the damage to be so recent.

K. Qasr-i-Shirin

(24 May 1983)

Preliminary note

68. Upon its arrival at Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab, the mission was informed by the local commander that it could not be taken to Qasr-i-Shirin because the town had been shelled by Iraqi guns shortly before the arrival of the mission, whose safety could therefore not be assured. As Qasr-i-Shirin was reported to be one of the towns completely destroyed, the mission insisted on undertaking the visit to verify that report. The mission was conducted by the military authorities, with reluctance, to the town.

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

69. Qasr-i-Shirin is some 2-3 km from the border and was a major customs post before the hostilities. The town's population before September 1980 was 50,000. The town served as the headquarters of the border guard units located in the area. It also had a gendarmerie unit. The authorities stated that on 12 September 1980, 12 border outposts had been captured. By 18 September, the town had been besieged; by 22 September, it had been occupied; and by 3 October, the inhabitants had all been expelled. The town had remained under occupation until it was retaken on 12 June 1982, when it was found to have been totally destroyed, with 5,600 residential units razed to the ground. The exact number of casualties was not known, as the population had been scattered and was still unable to return because the town remained under shelling. It had been shelled that day very shortly before the mission's arrival.

Observations by the mission

70. Qasr-i-Shirin is in a battle zone, very close to the lines of the opposing sides. While driving towards the town, the mission heard sounds of firing and could see two columns of smoke near the town which might have been the result of shelling. Many destroyed military vehicles and trucks could be seen along the route.

71. The military authorities said that, under the conditions prevailing, the mission could not be taken to tour the town. It was taken directly to a fortified command post. Subsequently, on being told that one of the shells that day had hit

within the town, the mission insisted on inspecting the point of impact and was taken there on foot. No evidence could be found on the spot to support the authorities' claim, and it appeared that any shells fired that day must have hit outside the town limits. The mission was shown wounded soldiers in a field hospital who were said to have been injured in that day's shelling.

72. Although, under the conditions prevailing, the mission could not conduct a detailed inspection of the town, it was able to observe the extent of destruction during its drive to the command post and its search on foot for the point of impact of the shell said to have hit the town that day. From those observations, the mission is of the opinion that the destruction of the town had been caused by shelling and direct fire. However, the extent of destruction also gave the impression that other means, such as high-explosive charges and engineering equipment, may have been used.

L. Baneh

(26 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iranian authorities

73. Baneh has 13,000 inhabitants and is about 20 km from the border. The mission was informed that the town had been attacked on the day before its visit, that is, on 25 May, at about 1015 hours by two or four aircraft coming from a westerly direction. Twenty-two bombs had been dropped in the north-eastern section of the town, of which some had landed outside the town limits. Five had failed to function. The rest had fallen in an area 300 m in diameter. The aircraft had also strafed the town with machine-guns. Eight persons had been killed, of whom 3 were women and 5 were children. Seventy-three had been injured, of whom about 70 per cent were children, 20 per cent women and 10 per cent men.

74. The authorities stated that, since the outbreak of hostilities, no military operations had been conducted in that part of the country by either side, except for the air attack the previous day. There is no major military installation in the area. There is a small supply depot of about 150 men solely in support of internal security operations. It is located about 1-1.5 km from the area of impact, to the north-east of the town. The town is on a very small side road, with no industry of military significance.

Observations by the mission

75. Baneh is a small town situated in mountainous terrain. It is half-circled by hills from the west to the north-east. It is not near any major communication lines and has no industry of any significance, being mainly an agricultural town. The only military installation observed was the small supply depot already mentioned, which contained several large trucks.

76. The area affected is residential and showed a large number of fragment marks, but there was no major property damage. A large number of window panes had been

broken. The mission saw a partially dried pool of blood in one spot and a relatively fresh splash of blood on a wall. The ground in the area was full of very small craters, a few centimetres deep and some 20-30 cm in diameter. The distance between them in one area inspected ranged from 1.5 m to 4 m.

77. Although the mission was not, in general, expected to estimate the number of casualties, it felt that, in the circumstances, it would be inappropriate not to take note of the evidence of an incident which had occurred only one day before its visit.

78. The mission was taken to the graveyard to see the bodies of the dead just before burial. There were the bodies of two women and five children in open coffins. The mission was informed that another woman who had been evacuated to a hospital in a nearby town had succumbed to her wounds.

79. The mission was then taken to a hospital where 56 of the wounded were said to be under care, the others having been sent to hospitals in nearby towns. Two doctors showed the mission 1 young boy, 8 women and 14 children of ages 2-12 who had suffered moderate to severe wounds the preceding day. One baby had been prematurely delivered by Caesarian operation, as its mother was severely wounded. Because of the time factor the mission could not visit the other wounded.

80. In the affected area, the mission found one canister from a main bomb and a large number of parts from bomblets. The mission was also shown 13 bomb canisters, some fuses from main bombs and several unexploded or partly exploded bomblets. All seem to have been used very recently. The canisters were in two parts, one the main body and one the tail. The dimension of the whole canister was 2.2 m in length and 0.335 m in diameter. The canisters bore the marking PbK-230-275/AO-ICY/A-lx-2. The bomblets measured 155 mm long and 48 mm in diameter and were fitted with impact fuses and fins. Each weighed about 1.1 kg, and contained approximately 100 g of high explosive. The wall thickness of the steel body was 12 mm. The bombs were positively identified as 250 kg cluster bombs, each containing approximately 150 bomblets.

81. From its observations and examination of the evidence presented to it, the mission is of the view that the town had been subjected to aerial bombardment with cluster bombs. Such bombs are mainly effective against personnel, and this would explain the high number of casualties and the relatively low damage to property. The mission is therefore of the opinion that the details of the incident as reported were reasonably accurate. The mission is not in a position to judge whether the intended target could have been the supply depot.

82. Owing to shortage of time, the mission could not investigate the claim that the town was strafed by machine-guns.

II. TOUR OF WAR ZONES IN IRAQ

83. The itinerary drawn up by the Government of Iraq included visits to civilian areas which had suffered war damage relatively recently as well as in the past.

The dates of its visits to the various sites are indicated in brackets. The times indicated are local times. Casualty figures relate to civilians.

A. Zurbatiyah

(28 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iraqi authorities

84. Zurbatiyah is some 8-10 kms from the border and the current front line. The population of the town before September 1980 was 11,000. The authorities said that it had come under shelling beginning 4 September 1980, as a result of which 5,000 inhabitants were evacuated to Badra, a town 10 km away. When Iraqi troops crossed and advanced some 25 km beyond the border in retaliation, the town fell outside the range of Iranian guns. However, in July 1982, when the Iraqi troops withdrew to the border, the town again fell within range of Iranian artillery, and the remaining 6,000 inhabitants were evacuated. Since the start of the hostilities, 68 persons had been killed and 180 injured, including 40 maimed, in both Zurbatiyah and Badra. Of these 248 casualties, 60 were children. The authorities stated that 25 per cent of Zurbatiyah had been damaged beyond repair.

85. No forces had been located at any time in the town, except for air defence units on its outskirts, which had been brought in after the town came under attack. The nearest military installation was a supply unit deployed 30 km from Badra. The town had not been subjected to air attacks. There are no economic installations of military significance in the town. The town had been hit by a shell the day before the mission's visit.

Observations by the mission

86. Zurbatiyah lies on an all-weather road which runs parallel to the border. The town was completely deserted. Except for air defence units deployed around the town, the mission saw no other military units within the town limits. There were, however, several military emplacements seen along the approaches to the city.

87. The mission saw two houses which showed moderate damage from fragment impacts. A third house, on the outskirts, had received a direct hit. The mission was also shown a mosque which had slight pockmarks from shrapnel. On inquiry about the previous day's hit, the mission was told that the impact point had not been located, as it was inside some palm groves.

88. The mission was not shown any part of the town that was heavily damaged or any building destroyed beyond repair. From its observation, the mission estimates the total damage to the town to have been around 5 per cent. The mission formed the impression that the town had been evacuated because of the potential danger from shelling, since it was once more well within the range of Iranian guns.

B. Mandali

(28 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iraqi authorities

89. Mandali, 7 km from the border, had 14,000 inhabitants before 4 September 1980, when it came under shelling. The authorities stated that, in retaliation, Iraqi forces had advanced 10 km beyond the border. As the town remained under shelling, it was partially evacuated. Most the evacuation had taken place in June 1982, when the forces withdrew to the border. The current population was about 5,000. Up to June 1982, 116 persons had been killed and 800 injured, including 70 maimed.

90. The mission was further informed by the Iraqi authorities that the town had been attacked by air twice, once in 1980 and a second time about two months before the visit of the team. A school had been partially destroyed by two rockets, which had killed 10 children and wounded 60 others. Four rockets had hit outside the town. Ten per cent of the town had been destroyed beyond repair. The town had not been used for launching military operations, and the nearest units were some 7 km away, except for air defence units and militia. There were no factories of military significance. The town had been hit by four or five shells two days before and, again, one day before the mission's visit.

Observations by the mission

91. The mission toured the town and found it to be largely deserted. The mission inspected the school, which had received two direct hits by rockets that were positively identified, from parts found, as BM-21 rockets. The damage could be repaired. The mission observed damage to other sites in the town caused by previous shelling. One building had been damaged beyond repair. One house on the outskirts had been destroyed by an aerial bomb. The mission was not shown any area of the town that had sustained heavy damage. Therefore, the mission formed the impression that the extent of damage was less than 10 per cent. It also formed the impression that the town had been evacuated because of its proximity to the border and the fact that it was well within the range of Iranian artillery. On inquiry about the previous day's hit, the mission was taken to an open site and shown a shallow crater said to be the impact point of the shell. Some new shell fragments were found at the point of impact but no houses had been damaged.

C. Khanagin

(28 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iraqi authorities

92. Khanagin is 8 km from the border. Its population was 52,000 before the hostilities began. The town and a nearby oil refinery had been shelled and bombarded by air even before 4 September 1980. Many residential areas had been evacuated. The authorities stated that on 22 September 1980, Iraqi forces had

crossed the border in retaliation and subsequently advanced some 45-50 km beyond it. Between September 1980 and June 1982, the town had been beyond artillery range but had been attacked three times by air. On 18 June 1982, the Iraqi forces had started to withdraw from their advanced position and, by 28 June, had withdrawn to the border. Since then, the town had been under rocket and artillery attack. Sites affected included hospitals and schools. About 4 per cent of the town had been damaged beyond repair. The distance to the front line was not given.

93. In an attack on a residential area on 4 September 1982, 8 women and children had been killed and 19 injured, and some houses had been destroyed. On 18 December 1982, a school had been hit, 20 children and 1 teacher had been killed and 50 children injured. About two months prior to the mission's visit a supermarket had been hit by rockets. Seven persons had been killed and 19 injured, including women and children. In all, 66 inhabitants had been killed and 455 injured, including 33 maimed. The last artillery attack, on 16 May 1983, had resulted in 1 person killed and 8 injured.

94. The authorities stated that no major military operations had been mounted from the town at any time. No military units were stationed in the city, except for air defence detachments comprising militia men. There were two supply routes 6-10 km from the town. An oil refinery is located at a distance of 2 km from the town.

Observations by the mission

95. The mission visited the school, the supermarket and the residential areas mentioned. On inspection, it saw that the schoolyard had been hit by two shells, many fragments of which had shattered windows and penetrated into two classrooms. There was one impact outside the supermarket entrance which had scattered fragments against the facade. In the residential area on the outskirts attacked in September 1980, four houses had been badly damaged and two more lightly damaged. The nearby refinery and its residential area had been heavily damaged. In that area a number of military emplacements were seen.

96. In the opinion of the mission, the oil refinery was the main target of the attack, but a number of civilian targets at some distance from it had also been hit. The estimate of damage to the town appeared to be accurate.

97. During its visit to Khanaqin, the mission heard sounds of four rounds of artillery or mortar fire from the direction of the border. It was informed that these came from Iranian guns, but that claim could not be verified.

D. Kirkuk

(29 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iraqi authorities

98. The population of the city was 200,000 before September 1982, and remains at the same level. The city is 140 km from the border and, thus, not within range of

Iranian artillery. The nearest land operations were near the border 70 km north of Khanaqin. According to the authorities, the city had been heavily raided by air from 23 September 1980 until 26 February 1982. The raids, which were particularly intense in the first days of the hostilities, had been concentrated on residential areas, and targets hit included a hospital, a school, a market-place and a graveyard. There was a good civil defence system, and, therefore, casualties were limited. There had been a total of about 50 successful raids and a great number that were not successful. The authorities stated that cluster and fragmentation bombs, rockets and machine-guns were used, as were napalm and booby-traps in civilian areas.

99. There was heavy damage to residential areas, 120 units as well as 15 public buildings having been destroyed, of which nearly all had been rebuilt, as it was government policy to restore damaged property as quickly as possible. Such reconstruction work also was the target of attacks. Casualties since September 1980 had totalled 30 killed and 245 injured.

100. An air base and a training centre for logistic personnel were located about 25 km and 10 km respectively, from the city. Kirkuk is in an oil-producing area, and the nearest oil installation was 10 km away. There were numerous small factories and workshops of no military significance in the city, many of which had been destroyed by attacks and then rebuilt.

Observations by the mission

101. The mission was taken to five sites. At the first site, it was shown one house which had been destroyed in a residential area located about 200 m from an oil-storage area where four of seven storage tanks had also been destroyed. At the second site, in a residential area across from a railway station and bus terminal, a house had been destroyed and two other buildings damaged and rebuilt. At the third site, in another residential area, a local health centre had been destroyed and some houses damaged. In yet a fourth residential area, two houses had been destroyed and rebuilt. At the fifth site, a shopping area in the old part of the city had been destroyed, and the area of 75 m x 75 m had been cleared of debris but was not yet rebuilt. The mission was informed that at that particular site, rockets had been used, resulting in 12 persons killed and 53 injured. The facade of a nearby mosque had been slightly damaged. The distances between the five sites averaged 1 km. The incidents were well documented, and, to support their claim, the authorities showed the mission photographs of the munitions allegedly used, including cluster bombs, and of the damaged buildings before they were rebuilt. The mission was not shown parts of the munitions used, as those were said to have been sent to Baghdad. All of the damage had occurred between 25 September and 8 October 1980.

102. Since those events had taken place in an early stage of the hostilities, and most of the damage had been repaired, the mission was unable physically to inspect or verify the type of the munitions used in the various sites. However, the mission is of the view that the evidence, i.e., photographs and still visible damage, supports the claims concerning damage to property.

E. Az-Zubayr

(30 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iraqi authorities

103. The population of the town was 112,000 before the hostilities and remained unchanged. The town is 40 km from the border. According to the authorities, at the start of the hostilities, there had been many attempted air raids. Only one had been successful, when a hospital was hit on 22 September 1980. Three persons had been killed and 14 wounded. The last attempted air raid had taken place in May 1981. After that, the town had come under long-range shelling from artillery from 24 October 1982 to the time of the mission's visit. The town had been shelled 12 times, with a total of 47 shells, resulting in 20 killed and 63 wounded. There had been hits close to a bridge over a canal 15 km from the town. There were no military installations in the town, the nearest being 20 km away. The town had only local industries; power was received from Basrah, and there was no local power station. The distance to the front line was not given.

Observations by the mission

104. The mission was taken to visit five sites. In two incidents on 24 October 1982, a shell had hit the street in an old residential area, and fragment marks on the walls and a fragment hole in a metal pole was seen. The mission was informed that 9 persons had been killed there and 34 injured. Another shell had hit another street, with no casualties. At the third site, a dwelling had been damaged by a shell on 18 April 1983. The mission was told that 2 persons had been killed, and was shown four children who were said to have been injured in that attack. Fragments presented to the mission were examined and were positively identified as belonging to a large-calibre artillery shell. At the fourth site, on the outskirts, a fuelling station had been hit and one tank damaged on 28 March 1983, without casualties. At the fifth site, in a residential area, a house had been partially destroyed on 18 April 1983, with no casualties. Parts, including fragments and a fuse, were shown to the mission and were positively identified as belonging to a large-calibre artillery shell.

105. From its inspection, the mission is of the opinion that the town was shelled but that no appreciable damage was caused. From its observations of shell parts and fragments, and taking into consideration the distance from the border, the mission is of the opinion that the only artillery that could have been used is 175-mm extended-range artillery.

F. Al-Faw

(30 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iraqi authorities

106. The town had 42,000 inhabitants before the hostilities started. The current population is about 3,000, most of its inhabitants having abandoned the town by

mid-1981, since it had come under almost daily bombardment from September 1980. It is located on the border about 500 m from the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, which is about 800 m wide. At this time, it is the only station in Iraq used for off-shore loading of oil in the Gulf. There is no oil refinery.

107. According to the authorities, between September 1980 and December 1981, there had been 136 air raids, the last having taken place in December 1981. Since the outbreak of hostilities, the town had been under daily shelling, with an average of 20-30 shells every day. The town was also under direct fire from tanks and machine-guns from across the river. Total casualties to date were 96 killed and 236 injured, of whom many were maimed. Eighty per cent of the casualties were from shelling, 10 per cent from air attacks and 10 per cent from other means. Three thousand houses had been hit, of which 50 per cent had been totally destroyed, and 30-40 per cent were beyond repair. No repairs had been attempted because of the constant threat from shellings. There are no military units located near the town, but Iraqi artillery deployed about 10 km from the town has been used to return fire from the other side. The town had not been used at any time for launching military operations, and the river had not been crossed in either direction during the hostilities. There were no military units in the city, except for border forces along the Shatt-al-Arab.

Observations by the mission

108. The mission was taken to visit six sites. At the first, it was shown an unoccupied house which, it was told, had been hit two days earlier by a shell. One wall of the house had collapsed, but no point of impact or shell fragments were found. At the second, a power plant on the edge of the town towards the river and several workshops in the vicinity had been hit on 20 May 1983, and three people were said to have died, but the plant was still functioning. At the third site, 8 houses, 400 m from a transformer, had been destroyed by an air raid in early 1981. At the fourth site, near some oil-storage tanks 8-10 prefabricated houses had been destroyed, as had most of the tanks. At the fifth site, in a residential area, two houses had been completely destroyed and several more damaged to varying degrees evidently by artillery. The sixth site was five km outside the town, where water-storage tanks had been destroyed at the start of the hostilities.

109. During its tour, the mission saw about 40 large oil-storage tanks, grouped in various parts of the town. Most of the tanks had been destroyed or damaged.

110. The mission is of the opinion that the oil installations were the main target of the attacks. The power station could have been another target. However, it was clear that in the course of the shelling, a large number of residential and other buildings had been hit and heavily damaged.

G. Abu-Al-Khasib

(30 May 1983)

Information presented to the mission by the Iraqi authorities

111. The population of the town was 79,000 before the start of hostilities, and remains the same. The town is located 1 km from the Shatt-al-Arab, along which it stretches 15 km to the outskirts of Basrah, and it is about 8 km from the border. The authorities stated that at the start of the hostilities, it had been strafed once by machine-gun fire from the air. One person had been killed. Since then, it had been exposed to constant shelling; the last having occurred on 28 May 1983, when 15 shells hit the town, killing 1 person. In all, the town had been hit by 3,078 shells, of which about 2,400 had hit a fertilizer factory and its grounds located some 5 km south of the town and 650 had hit the town itself. Another 2,200 had hit outside the town. Overall, a total of 6 people had been killed and 132 wounded, and 34 houses had been damaged to a varying degree.

112. The town is in an agricultural area, with no industry, except for a fertilizer factory nearby. The factory grounds include residential quarters for its employees, located some 50-200 m from the factory buildings. The nearest military installation is at Shalamyeh, 15 km distant.

Observations by the mission

113. The mission was taken to a school in the town which had been damaged by a direct hit on its roof. The school was located about 5 km south-west of the factory. The mission was also taken to the factory, which had been heavily damaged at the start of the hostilities and had not functioned since. It visited the factory's residential area, which had been evacuated, and saw at least four heavily damaged units.

114. The mission examined various parts and fragments of munitions, which were on exhibit inside the factory. They were positively identified as fragments from different calibre shells, including 203 mm and from BM-21 rockets. Judging from the distribution of the shelling, the mission is of the opinion that the factory has been the main target of attack and that the town could have been hit by stray rounds.



MAP NO. 3246 UNITED NATIONS
 JUNE 1983

Appendix B

ITINERARIES OF THE MISSION

May-June 1983

Friday, 20 May	Arrival in Teheran
Saturday, 21 May	Dezful/Andimeshk area
Sunday, 22 May	Pol-e-Dokhtar and the Musian/Dehloran area
Monday, 23 May	Abadan/Khorramshahr/Hoveyzeh/Susangerd area
Tuesday, 24 May	Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab/Qasr-e-Shirin area
Wednesday, 25 May	Return to Teheran
Thursday, 26 May	Baneh
Friday, 27 May	Departure from Teheran; arrival in Baghdad
Saturday, 28 May	Zurbatiyah/Mandali/Khanaqin area
Sunday, 29 May	Kirkuk area
Monday, 30 May	Az-Zubayr/Al-Faw/Abu-al-Khasib area
Tuesday, 31 May	
Wednesday, 1 June	Stay in Baghdad
Thursday, 2 June	Departure from Baghdad
