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WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC Office of the: Records Country File File Folder: Iran-Iraq I 1983-4/31/84 (6) Box 91354

Archivist: smf/smf FOIA ID: F96-127 (Battle) Date: 02/25/2000

DOCUMENT DATE RESTRICTION

1. memo	Robinson to McFarlane re Iran-Iraq Energy Briefing 1p	2/29/84	- P1/F1
2. talking points	R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #230 Talking points for McFarlane 2/29/84 5p	n.d.	P1/F1
3. memo	Fortier/Dur to McFarlane re Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team 1p	3/5/84	P1/F1
4memo	PARL 3/02/01 F96-127/2 74232 Koch to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security	2/22/84	- <u>P1/F1</u>
5 memo	Affairs re Final Trip Report 1p <i>R</i> 12/20/00 NLSF96-127/27233 Thomson to Assistant Secretary of Defense re Military Planning Team	2/14/84	P1/F1_
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6. report	Military Planning Team Trip Report 10p	n.d.	P1/F1
7. memo	$\frac{P}{PCV+1} = \frac{11}{3} \frac{\#_{235}}{F_{10}} = \frac{1}{5} \frac{\#_{235}}{F_{10}}$	3/5/84	P1/F1
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10. report	original of doc #6 10p	n.d.	P1/F1
11. memo	duplicate of doc #3 1p Por f. 3 02 11 F96 - 127 / 2 # 240 duplicate of doc #4 1p	3/5/84	P1/F1
12. memo	duplicate of doc #4-1p- R 12/20/00 NLSF96-127/2# 241	2/22/84	<u>P1/F1</u>
13. memo	$\frac{\text{duplicate of doc #5-1p}}{\mathcal{R}}$	2/14/84	-P1/F1
14. report	duplicate of doc #6 10p f u u u u u u u	n.d.	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]. P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]. F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

February 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON

SUBJECT: 29 February Iran-Iraq Energy Briefing

Agenda. Attached at Tab I is a proposed agenda for your meeting on Wednesday with Secretaries Shultz, Clark and Hodel. We suggest that you deliver a brief introduction, a status report on the threat and a presentation on policy options. Bill Martin, Rich Beal, Ben Bonk and I will provide short presentations on the current oil market, potential economic impact, a recap of past experience and a review of NSC crisis management.

Talking Points. Attached at Tab II are your revised talking points. These include recent developments as reflected in the morning update prepared by Rich Beal as well as revisions resulting from a change in audience.

Don Fortier, Bill Martin, Rich Beal and Ben Bonk concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve the agenda at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove _____

2. That you approve the talking points at Tab II.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

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BY KML NARA DATE

Attachments

- Tab I Agenda
 - II Talking points

Declassify on: OADR

AGENDA IRAN-IRAQ ENERGY BRIEFING 29 FEBRUARY 1984

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I.	Introduction	Mr.	McFarlane
II.	Threat Status/Political Overview	Mr.	McFarlane
III.	Oil Market Situation	Mr.	Bonk
IV.	Disruptions/Economic Impact	Mr.	Robinson
v.	Past Experience	Mr.	Martin
VI.	Policy Considerations	Mr.	McFarlane
VII.	Crisis Management	Dr.	Beal

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER ______ LISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

onf 2/25/00 NSC/S PROFILE ID 8401633 -SECRET UNCLASSIBLE UPON NEMOVAL OF RECEIVED 27 FEB 84 18 CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) DOCDATE 22 FEB 84 то POINDEXTER FROM KOCH, N KEYWORDS IRAN IRAQ PERSIAN GULF OIL VULNERABILITY SUBJECT TRIP RPT OF MILITARY PLANNING TEAM RE IRAN IRAO CONFLICT _____ ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE. 01 APR 84 STATUS S FILES _____ _____ FOR INFO FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE KEMP FORTIER MARTIN DUR LEVINE ROBINSON

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MEMORANDUM

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SUBJECT:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

March 5, 1984

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FROM: PHILIP A. DUR DONALD R. FORTIER

Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team

Attached at Tab I is the trip report of the USCENTCOM/JCS Team led by Commodore Gleim. The report is organized by country and the reactions of each country visited to both the intelligence briefing and the U.S. concept of operations to manage the Iranian threat are provided.

In general, the trip seems to have been most useful in sensitizing the Gulf States to the severity of the Iranian threat and the extent to which the U.S. is prepared to cooperate with them

It is also clear that while their appreciation of the threat is keen, the Gulf States are, for political reasons, not yet ready to undertake the source planning for the second states are somewhat

surprising in view of the more optimistic readout we received while the mission was in the field.

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The report concludes with several recommendations including continued unilateral U.S. planning, more discussion with key U.S. Allies, more exercises to improve interoperability, and initiatives to provide anti-terrorist training for the Gulf States within the limits of present law and policy. The DOD recommendations are basically not contentious with the possible exception of advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Here we have a significant policy issue (internally) and we may raise concerns among some key European Allies (e.g., UK, France) and complicate other initiatives, if we are seen as advancing U.S. aircraft sales at the expense of European manufacturers.

The delay in receiving this report is noteworthy in that more than a month went by between conclusion of the trip and this report prepared in response to your request of January 13. In the future, we might request lateral distribution of the reporting cables which are submitted by the team. After all, we get the State SITREPS when the political consultations are in progress.

Geoff Kemp concurs

Tab I - Koch Memo to Poindexter of February 22, 1984

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Attachment

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team (U)

(S) In response to your verbal request of 13 January 1984, attached is a final trip report of the Iran-Iraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Team (referred to as the Military Planning Team).

NOEL C. KOCH

Acting Assistant Connetary of Defence International Country Alfelrs

NES <u>F96-127/2</u> #**3**3 NES <u>1/30/01</u>



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

> J-5M 0260-84 14 FEB 1984

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Military Planning Team Report (U) (C) Reference your message*, at the attachment is the military planning team's final report. It is provided, as requested, for forwarding to the National Security Council.

Hesman Wionson

HERMAN 0. THOMSON Lieutenant General, USAF

Reference: * SECDEF Washington DC 130053Z Jan 84

DECLASSIFIED NES <u>F-96-127/2#234</u> BY <u>LOI</u>, NARA, DATE <u>1/30/01</u>

When Enclosure is Detached This document is downgraded to Confidential



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MILITARY PLANNING TEAM

TRIP REPORT

1. (S) As directed,* discussions with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States were conducted 14-17 December 1983 and 28 December 1983 - 17 January 1984. The following report of these discussions is provided.

2. (U) These discussions included:

a. (S) An assessment of the threat.

b. (S) A proposed concept to counter the threat.

c. (S) A synopsis of operational recommendations in terms of US and GCC forces required.

d. (S) A review of logistical and other support needed by US forces.

(NOTE: The brief in Kuwait did not include points c and d above.)

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 3.	(s)	The	threat	assessment	addressed.	REDACTE	D	
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4. (S) The concept to counter the threat indicated that the SECRET 1

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counter force must be capable of

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5. (S) The synopsis of operational recommedations and logistical support needed was based on the generic concept and was also country-specific.

6. (b) The generally favorable responses may be summarized as follows:

a. (S) General agreement with the US assessment of the threat (all states emphasized the terrorist threat).

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b. (N) Understanding of the concept.

c. (S) With the exception of

a political decision

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was required before further discussions or detailed planning could begin.

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9. (U) GCC country spokesmen contacted and the essence of their responses follow:

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10. (8) Recommended follow-on actions:

a. (S) <u>Future talks</u>. The initiative for the next round of talks lies with the GCC states. Requests for follow-on talks could come from the before the GCC Ministers of Defense meeting in mid-to-late February; however, other requests will most likely come after the defense ministers' meeting. At an appropriate time after the meeting, each state should be queried regarding its willingness to begin detailed combined planning.

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political initiative to obtain allied approval for subsequent military-to-military talks should continue. e. (S) <u>Exercises</u>. Special emphasis is being placed on

exercises to increase interoperability in the event

combined operations become necessary.

Initial

exercise proposals will be relatively low-key and lowvisibility to allow the security relationship to mature at a pace that is comfortable to host governments.

f. (\$) <u>Anti-terrorist training</u>.

g. (S) <u>Advanced fighter aircraft sales policy</u>. Given the favorable change in US-GCC relations regarding security cooperation, the current Persian Gul<u>f Advanced Fighter</u> Aircraft Sales Policy needs review.

the sale of an advanced fighter was raised by the host government directly or through the country team. While the current threat will probably have disappeared by the time an advanced fighter could be delivered and absorbed, a decision to offer such aircraft can, in the near-term, further improve US security relations in the Persian Gulf and is in the long-term US interest of strengthening indigenous forces to fight alone, or in coalition with US forces. An improved Regional Integrated Air Defense Systems, US access, host nation support and interoperability with US forces over the longer term, would be facilitated if an advanced fighter aircraft could be offered to all GCC member countries.

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11. (S) <u>Comments</u> :	
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the foregoing, we must develop our planning	ng objectives
carefully and present them patiently and	deliberately in a step

process if and when approval for further discussion is

received.

12. (S) The team remains established in accordance with paragraph 12 of reference (a) and is available for further duty as may be directed.

Reference:

*JCS WASHINGTON DC 291730Z NOV 83 (Terms of Reference)

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
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National Security Council The White House



Package # 1633

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1984

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1633

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

PHILIP A. DUR DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT:

Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team

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It is also clear that while their appreciation of the threat is keen, the Gulf States are, for political reasons, not yet ready to undertake 🕻 planning

These results are somewhat surprising in view of the more optimistic readout we received while the mission was in the field.

The report concludes with several recommendations including continued unilateral U.S. planning, more discussion with key U.S. Allies, more exercises to improve interoperability, and initiatives to provide anti-terrorist training for the Gulf States within the limits of present law and policy. The DOD recommendations are basically not contentious with the possible exception of advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Here we have a significant policy issue (internally) and we may raise concerns among some key European Allies (e.g., UK, France) and complicate other initiatives, if we are seen as advancing U.S. aircraft sales at the expense of European manufacturers.

The delay in receiving this report is noteworthy in that more than a month went by between conclusion of the trip and this report prepared in response to your request of January 13. In the future, we might request lateral distribution of the reporting cables which are submitted by the team. After all, we get the State SITREPS when the political consultations are-in progress.


Geoff Kemp concurs

Attachment

Tab I - Koch Memo to Poindexter of February 22, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team (U)

(S) In response to your verbal request of 13 January 1984, attached is a final trip report of the Iran-Iraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Team (referred to as the Military Planning Team).

NOEL C. KOCH Acting Assistant Scoretary of Defense International Security Affairs

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

> J-5M 0 2 60 - 84 14 FEB 1984

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Military Planning Team Report (U)

Reference your message*, at the attachment is the military planning team's final report. It is provided, as requested, for forwarding to the National Security Council.

Nesula Showson

HERMAN 0. THOMSON Lieutenant General, USAF Director, Plans and Policy

Reference: * SECDEF Washington DC 130053Z Jan 84

When Enclosure is Detached This document is downgraded to Confidential

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MILITARY PLANNING TEAM

TRIP REPORT

1. (S) As directed,* discussions with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States were conducted 14-17 December 1983 and 28 December 1983 - 17 January 1984. The following report of these discussions is provided.

2. (W) These discussions included:

a. (S) An assessment of the threat.

b. (S) A proposed concept to counter the threat.

c. (E) A synopsis of operational recommendations in terms of US and GCC forces required.

d. (S) A review of logistical and other support needed by US forces.

(NOTE: The brief in Kuwait did not include points c and d above.)

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(S) The concept to counter the threat indicated that the 4. 1 SECRET

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counter force must be capable of

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5. (S) The synopsis of operational recommedations and logistical support needed was based on the generic concept and was also country-specific.

6. (b) The generally favorable responses may be summarized as follows:

a. (S) . General agreement with the US assessment of the threat (all states emphasized the terrorist threat).

b. (N) Understanding of the concept.

c. (S) With the exception of a political decision secret 2



was required before further discussions or detailed planning could begin.

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9. (V) GCC country spokesmen contacted and the essence of

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10. (b) Recommended follow-on actions:

a. (S) <u>Future talks</u> . The initiative for the next round of
talks lies with the GCC states. Requests for follow-on
talks could come from before the GCC
Ministers of Defense meeting in mid-to-late February;
however, other requests will most likely come after the
defense ministers' meeting. At an appropriate time after
the meeting, each state should be queried regarding its
willingness to begin detailed combined planning.

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	d. (S) Allied cooperation. The Department of State-led	
	political initiative to obtain allied approval for	
	subsequent military-to-military talks should continue.	
	e. (S) <u>Exercises</u> . Special emphasis is being placed on	
	exercises to increase interoperability in the event	•
_	combined operations become necessary.	
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exercise proposals will be relatively low-key and lowvisibility to allow the security relationship to mature at a pace that is comfortable to host governments.

	f. (S) <u>Anti-terrorist training</u> .	
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g. (S) <u>Advanced fighter aircraft sales policy</u>. Given the favorable change in US-GCC relations regarding security cooperation, the current Persian Gulf <u>Advanced Fighter</u> Aircraft Sales Policy needs review.

the sale of an advanced fighter was raised by the host government directly or through the country team. While the current threat will probably have disappeared by the time an advanced fighter could be delivered and absorbed, a decision to offer such aircraft can, in the near-term, further improve US security relations in the Persian Gulf and is in the long-term US interest of strengthening indigenous forces to fight alone, or in coalition with US forces. An improved Regional Integrated Air Defense Systems, US access, host nation support and interoperability with US forces over the longer term, would be facilitated if an advanced fighter aircraft could be offered to all GCC member countries.

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carefully and present them patiently and deliberately in a step process if and when approval for further discussion is received.

12. (S) The team remains established in accordance with paragraph 12 of reference (a) and is available for further duty as may be directed.

Reference:

*JCS WASHINGTON DC 291730Z NOV 83 (Terms of Reference)



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MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1984

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FROM: PHILIP A. DUR H DONALD R. FORTIER

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team

Attached at Tab I is the trip report of the USCENTCOM/JCS Team led by Commodore Gleim. The report is organized by country and the reactions of each country visited to both the intelligence briefing and the U.S. concept of operations to manage the Iranian threat are provided.

In general, the trip seems to have been most useful in sensitizing the Gulf States to the severity of the Iranian threat and the extent to which the U.S. is prepared to cooperate with them

It is also clear that while their appreciation of the threat is keen, the Gulf States are, for political reasons, not yet ready to undertake

surprising in view of the more optimistic readout we received while the mission was in the field.

The report concludes with several recommendations including continued unilateral U.S. planning, more discussion with key U.S. Allies, more exercises to improve interoperability, and initiatives to provide anti-terrorist training for the Gulf States within the limits of present law and policy. The DOD recommendations are basically not contentious with the possible exception of advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Here we have a significant policy issue (internally) and we may raise concerns among some key European Allies (e.g., UK, France) and complicate other initiatives, if we are seen as advancing U.S. aircraft sales at the expense of European manufacturers.

The delay in receiving this report is noteworthy in that more than a month went by between conclusion of the trip and this report prepared in response to your request of January 13. In the future, we might request lateral distribution of the reporting cables which are submitted by the team. After all, we get the State SITREPS when the political consultations are in progress.

Geoff Kemp concurs

Attachment)


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Tab I - Koch Memo to Poindexter of February 22, 1984

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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INTERNATIONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team (U)

(S) In response to your verbal request of 13 January 1984, attached is a final trip report of the Iran-Iraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Team (referred to as the Military Planning Team).

NOEL C. KOCH Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs

NLS F96-127/2 #241 BY 101 NARA, DATE 1/30/01



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON D.C. 20301



J-5M 0260-84 14 FEB 1984

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Military Planning Team Report (U)

Reference your message*, at the attachment is the military planning team's final report. It is provided, as requested, for forwarding to the National Security Council.

Nesula Showson

HERMAN 0. THOMSON Lieutenant General, USAF Director, Plans and Policy

Reference: * SECDEF Washington DC 130053Z Jan 84

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MILITARY PLANNING TEAM

TRIP REPORT

1. (S) As directed,* discussions with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States were conducted 14-17 December 1983 and 28 December 1983 - 17 January 1984. The following report of these discussions is provided.

2. (U) These discussions included:

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a. (S) An assessment of the threat.

b. (S) A proposed concept to counter the threat.

c. (S) A synopsis of operational recommendations in terms of US and GCC forces required.

d. (S) A review of logistical and other support needed by US forces.

(NOTE: The brief in Kuwait did not include points c and d above.)

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5. (S) The synopsis of operational recommedations and logistical support needed was based on the generic concept and was also country-specific.

6. (b) The generally favorable responses may be summarized as follows:

a. (S) General agreement with the US assessment of the threat (all states emphasized the terrorist threat).

b. (N) Understanding of the concept.

c. (S) With the exception of a political decision SECRET 2

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was required before further discussions or detailed planning could begin.

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9. (W) GCC country spokesmen contacted and the essence of their responses follow:

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10. (V) Recommended follow-on actions:

a. (S) <u>Future talks</u>. The initiative for the next round of talks lies with the GCC states. <u>Requests</u> for follow-on talks could come from the before the GCC Ministers of Defense meeting in mid-to-late February; however, other requests will most likely come after the defense ministers' meeting. At an appropriate time after the meeting, each state should be queried regarding its willingness to begin detailed combined planning.

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	d. (S) Allied cooperation. The Department of State-led	
	political initiative to obtain allied approval for	
	subsequent military-to-military talks should continue.	
	e. (S) <u>Exercises</u> . Special emphasis is being placed on	
	exercises to increase interoperability in the event	

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combined operations become necessary.

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exercise proposals will be relatively low-key and lowvisibility to allow the security relationship to mature at a pace that is comfortable to host governments.

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g. (S) <u>Advanced fighter aircraft sales policy</u>. Given the favorable change in US-GCC relations regarding security cooperation, the current Persian Gulf <u>Advanced Fighter</u>

Aircraft Sales Policy needs review.

the sale of an advanced fighter was raised by the host government directly or through the country team. While the current threat will probably have disappeared by the time an advanced fighter could be delivered and absorbed, a decision to offer such aircraft can, in the near-term, further improve US security relations in the Persian Gulf and is in the long-term US interest of strengthening indigenous forces to fight alone, or in coalition with US forces. An improved Regional Integrated Air Defense Systems, US access, host nation support and interoperability with US forces over the longer term, would be facilitated if an advanced fighter aircraft could be offered to all GCC member countries.

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the foregoing, we must develop our planning objectives carefully and present them patiently and deliberately in a step process if and when approval for further discussion is received.

12. (S) The team remains established in accordance with paragraph 12 of reference (a) and is available for further duty as may be directed.

Reference:

*JCS WASHINGTON DC 291730Z NOV 83 (Terms of Reference)

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