WITHDRAWAL SHEET
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File Folder: Iran-Iraq I 1983-4/31/84 (6) Box 91354

Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F96-127 (Battle)
Date: 02/25/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Robinson to McFarlane re Iran-Iraq Energy Briefing 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #230	2/29/84	~~P1/F1~~
2. talking points	Talking points for McFarlane 2/29/84 5p	n.d.	P1/F1
3. memo	Fortier/Dur to McFarlane re Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team 1p PART 3/02/01 F96-127/2 #232	3/5/84	P1/F1
~~4. memo~~	~~Koch to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs re Final Trip Report 1p~~ R 12/20/00 NLSF96-127/2 #233	~~2/22/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
~~5. memo~~	~~Thomson to Assistant Secretary of Defense re Military Planning Team Report 1p~~ R " " #234	~~2/14/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
6. report	Military Planning Team Trip Report 10p P " " #235	n.d.	P1/F1
7. memo	original of doc #3 1p Part. 3/02/01 F96-127/2 # 236	3/5/84	P1/F1
~~8. memo~~	~~original of doc #4 1p~~ R 12/20/00 NLSF96-127/2 #237	~~2/22/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
~~9. memo~~	~~original of doc #5 1p~~ R " " #238	~~2/14/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
10. report	original of doc #6 10p P " " #239	n.d.	P1/F1
11. memo	duplicate of doc #3 1p Part. 3/02/01 F96-127/2 #240	3/5/84	P1/F1
~~12. memo~~	~~duplicate of doc #4 1p~~ R 12/20/00 NLSF96-127/2 #241	~~2/22/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
~~13. memo~~	~~duplicate of doc #5 1p~~ R " " #242	~~2/14/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
14. report	duplicate of doc #6 10p P " " #243	n.d.	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

wl

1018

National Security Council
The White House

84 FEB 29 P12:13 System # I

Package # 1422

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	KC	
John Poindexter	2		
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	OBE	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		N
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by: ASAP -- For 2/29 meeting
(Date/Time)

Received too late

230

1422 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

February 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

NOTED

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON

SUBJECT: 29 February Iran-Iraq Energy Briefing

Agenda. Attached at Tab I is a proposed agenda for your meeting on Wednesday with Secretaries Shultz, Clark and Hodel. We suggest that you deliver a brief introduction, a status report on the threat and a presentation on policy options. Bill Martin, Rich Beal, Ben Bonk and I will provide short presentations on the current oil market, potential economic impact, a recap of past experience and a review of NSC crisis management.

Talking Points. Attached at Tab II are your revised talking points. These include recent developments as reflected in the morning update prepared by Rich Beal as well as revisions resulting from a change in audience.

Don Fortier, Bill Martin, Rich Beal RB and Ben Bonk BBB concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve the agenda at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you approve the talking points at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Agenda
II Talking points

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F96-127/2 # 230
BY kml NARA DATE 1/23/11

AGENDA

IRAN-IRAQ ENERGY BRIEFING

29 FEBRUARY 1984

I.	Introduction	Mr. McFarlane
II.	Threat Status/Political Overview	Mr. McFarlane
III.	Oil Market Situation	Mr. Bonk
IV.	Disruptions/Economic Impact	Mr. Robinson
V.	Past Experience	Mr. Martin
VI.	Policy Considerations	Mr. McFarlane
VII.	Crisis Management	Dr. Beal

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NSC/S PROFILE ~~SECRET~~ onf 2/25/00 ID 8401633

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 27 FEB 84 18

TO POINDEXTER FROM KOCH, N DOCDATE 22 FEB 84

SUSPENSE

KEYWORDS IRAN IRAQ

PERSIAN GULF OIL VULNERABILITY

SUBJECT TRIP RPT OF MILITARY PLANNING TEAM RE IRAN IRAQ CONFLICT

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE. 01 APR 84 STATUS S FILES 14

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
KEMP	FORTIER	MARTIN	DUR
	LEVINE		ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (JF)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
C	7/30	ONR		

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 1633

SUSPENSE

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE March 5, 1984

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR
DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team

Attached at Tab I is the trip report of the USCENTCOM/JCS Team led by Commodore Gleim. The report is organized by country and the reactions of each country visited to both the intelligence briefing and the U.S. concept of operations to manage the Iranian threat are provided.

In general, the trip seems to have been most useful in sensitizing the Gulf States to the severity of the Iranian threat and the extent to which the U.S. is prepared to cooperate with them [redacted] It is also clear that while their appreciation of the threat is keen, the Gulf States are, for political reasons, not yet ready to undertake [redacted] planning for [redacted] These results are somewhat surprising in view of the more optimistic readout we received while the mission was in the field. [redacted]

The report concludes with several recommendations including continued unilateral U.S. planning, more discussion with key U.S. Allies, more exercises to improve interoperability, and initiatives to provide anti-terrorist training for the Gulf States within the limits of present law and policy. The DOD recommendations are basically not contentious with the possible exception of advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Here we have a significant policy issue (internally) and we may raise concerns among some key European Allies (e.g., UK, France) and complicate other initiatives, if we are seen as advancing U.S. aircraft sales at the expense of European manufacturers.

The delay in receiving this report is noteworthy in that more than a month went by between conclusion of the trip and this report prepared in response to your request of January 13. In the future, we might request lateral distribution of the reporting cables which are submitted by the team. After all, we get the State SITREPS when the political consultations are in progress.

Geoff Kemp concurs

Attachment
Tab I - Koch Memo to Poindexter of February 22, 1984

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F96-127/2 #23
By CAS NARA Date 3/6/21

SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1633

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28 FEB 1984

I-21645/84

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team (U)

(S) In response to your verbal request of 13 January 1984, attached is a final trip report of the Iran-Iraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Team (referred to as the Military Planning Team).

NOEL C. KOCH
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

J-5M 0260-84
14 FEB 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Military Planning Team Report (U)

(C) Reference your message*, at the attachment is the military planning team's final report. It is provided, as requested, for forwarding to the National Security Council.

HERMAN O. THOMSON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Plans and Policy

Reference:
* SECDEF Washington DC 130053Z Jan 84

When Enclosure is Detached
This document is downgraded
to Confidential

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-5
DECLASSIFY ON: CADR

21645/8

SECRET

MILITARY PLANNING TEAM

TRIP REPORT

1. (S) As directed,* discussions with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States were conducted 14-17 December 1983 and 28 December 1983 - 17 January 1984. The following report of these discussions is provided.

2. (U) These discussions included:

a. (S) An assessment of the threat.

b. (S) A proposed concept to counter the threat.

c. (S) A synopsis of operational recommendations in terms of US and GCC forces required.

d. (S) A review of logistical and other support needed by US forces.

(NOTE: The brief in Kuwait did not include points c and d above.)

3. (S) The threat assessment addressed *REDACTED* *REDACTED* *REDACTED* *REDACTED* *REDACTED* *REDACTED* *REDACTED* *REDACTED*

4. (S) The concept to counter the threat indicated that the

counter force must be capable of [redacted]

REDACTED

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5. (S) The synopsis of operational recommedations and logistical support needed was based on the generic concept and was also country-specific.

6. (U) The generally favorable responses may be summarized as follows:

a. (S) General agreement with the US assessment of the threat (all states emphasized the terrorist threat).

b. (U) Understanding of the concept.

c. (S) With the exception of [redacted] a political decision

was required before further discussions or detailed planning could begin.

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9. (U) GCC country spokesmen contacted and the essence of their responses follow:

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10. (U) Recommended follow-on actions:

a. (S) Future talks. The initiative for the next round of talks lies with the GCC states. Requests for follow-on talks could come from [redacted] before the GCC Ministers of Defense meeting in mid-to-late February; however, other requests will most likely come after the defense ministers' meeting. At an appropriate time after the meeting, each state should be queried regarding its willingness to begin detailed combined planning.

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d. (S) Allied cooperation. The Department of State-led political initiative to obtain allied approval for subsequent military-to-military talks should continue.

e. (S) Exercises. Special emphasis is being placed on exercises to increase interoperability in the event combined operations become necessary. [redacted] Initial

exercise proposals will be relatively low-key and low-visibility to allow the security relationship to mature at a pace that is comfortable to host governments.

f. (S) Anti-terrorist training. [redacted]

g. (S) Advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Given the favorable change in US-GCC relations regarding security cooperation, the current Persian Gulf Advanced Fighter Aircraft Sales Policy needs review. [redacted] the sale of an advanced fighter was raised by the host government directly or through the country team. While the current threat will probably have disappeared by the time an advanced fighter could be delivered and absorbed, a decision to offer such aircraft can, in the near-term, further improve US security relations in the Persian Gulf and is in the long-term US interest of strengthening indigenous forces to fight alone, or in coalition with US forces. An improved Regional Integrated Air Defense Systems, US access, host nation support and interoperability with US forces over the longer term, would be facilitated if an advanced fighter aircraft could be offered to all GCC member countries.

11. (S) Comments: [redacted] In view of the foregoing, we must develop our planning objectives carefully and present them patiently and deliberately in a step process if and when approval for further discussion is received.

12. (S) The team remains established in accordance with paragraph 12 of reference (a) and is available for further duty as may be directed.

Reference:

*JCS WASHINGTON DC 291730Z NOV 83 (Terms of Reference)

SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

USD/P INTEROFFICE CONTROL SHEET

DATE (Yr, Mo, Day): 84-02-16

I- 21645/84

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report: Military Planning Team (U)

CURRENT SUSPENSE DATE (Yr, Mo, Day): N/A

SUMMARY: *(Describe briefly the origin, purpose, action recommended and coordination — (Attach original tasking — SD Form 14, etc.))*

ORIGIN: Verbal request by NSC for final trip report.

Purpose: Comply with NSC request,

Action recommended: Sign memorandum next under.

Coordination: None required.

(Signed) Noel C. Koch 22 FEB 1984
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

John D. Stempel
DASD/NESA Acting

NOTE: For memoranda items forwarded to SecDef/DepSecDef, external coordination at the office head or principal deputy level will be shown on the cover memo. External coordination in other cases may be shown on the memo or on a supplemental sheet.

SEQ NO.	DIR/OFC	INITIAL	DATE (Mo, Day)	SEQ NO.	DIR/OFC	INITIAL	DATE (Mo, Day)	SEQ NO.	DIR/OFC	INITIAL	DATE (Mo, Day)
	OUSD/P				**ISA (Con't)**				**ISP (Con't)**		
	USD/P				AFR				INF REP		
	MA				D/AFR				PDASD/ISP		
	AUSD/POL-RES								MA		
	COUN				EAP						
	SA				D/EAP				D/RESEARCH		
	R&C				PW/MIA						
	ADMIN								EUR-NATO		
	STATE DEF EX				NESA				MA		
	ICA DEF EX				D/NESA				PD/EUR-NATO		
									EUR POL		
	ODUSD/P				POL ANAL				NATO POL		
	DUSD/P				MA						
	MA				D/PLAN & REQ				STRAT TNF POL		
	ADUSD/P				D/POL PLAN				MA		
	NTS				D/IEEA				TNF		
	DEF GUIDANCE								STRAT POL		
	PUB DIPL				I-A				MULTI-NEGOT		
	IP&S POL				D/I-A				STRAT ARMS		
	C2 POL								VERIF POL		
	CSP				**DSAA**						
	SPEC ADV STF				DIR				IETSP		
	EMERG-PLAN				DEP DIR				MA		
	DIS				PLANS				PD/IETSP		
					OPS				ECON POL		
	ISA				COMPT				TRADE POL		
	ASD/ISA				CONG REL				MUN CONT		
	MA	B			LEGAL				TECH SECURITY		
	SA										
					ISP				NET ASSESSMENT		
2	PDASD/ISA				ASD/ISP				NA		
1	MA				MA						
	FMRA				SPEC COUN						
	SPEC PLAN				START REP						

LAST NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICIAL	DIRECTORATE	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE
KIRKPATRICK	ISA/NESA	x53890	

SD Form 161
83 Jun

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

NSC/S PROFILE ~~SECRET~~ ID 8401633

RECEIVED 27 FEB 84 18

TO POINDEXTER FROM KOCH, N DOCDATE 22 FEB 84

DUR 05 MAR 84

FORTIER 05 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: IRAN IRAQ

PERSIAN GULF OIL VULNERABILITY

SUBJECT: TRIP RPT OF MILITARY PLANNING TEAM RE IRAN IRAQ CONFLICT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 01 APR 84 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION		FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
KEMP	FORTIER	MARTIN	DUR
	LEVINE		ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (JF CT)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 8/27	Original Recd NSC/S		GK

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

[redacted] 1031

System # I

Package # 1633

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	[redacted]	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	✓	I
Bob Kimmitt	6	K	A
NSC Secretariat	7		N
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS **Should be seen by:** _____ (Date/Time)

Bob,

What about a memo to Will Taft on cable traffic? OK

Handled separately

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 1633

MEMORANDUM

NOTED [illegible] HAS SEEN

INFORMATION NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE March 5, 1984

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR
DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team

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It is also clear that while their appreciation of the threat is keen, the Gulf States are, for political reasons, not yet ready to undertake [redacted] planning [redacted] These results are somewhat surprising in view of the more optimistic readout we received while the mission was in the field. [redacted]

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Geoff Kemp concurs

Attachment
Tab I - Koch Memo to Poindexter of February 22, 1984

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F96-127/2 #1
By 3/02/01, NARA, Date CAS

SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1633

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 FEB 1984

I-21645/84 Too late.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

84 FEB 27 P4:41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team (U)

(S) In response to your verbal request of 13 January 1984, attached is a final trip report of the Iran-Iraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Team (referred to as the Military Planning Team).

NOEL C. KOCH
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

SECRET

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

J-5M 0260-84
14 FEB 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Military Planning Team Report (U)

(C) Reference your message*, at the attachment is the military planning team's final report. It is provided, as requested, for forwarding to the National Security Council.

HERMAN O. THOMSON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Plans and Policy

Reference:
* SECDEF Washington DC 130053Z Jan 84

When Enclosure is Detached
This document is downgraded
to Confidential

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-5
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

I-01645/84

SECRET

MILITARY PLANNING TEAM

TRIP REPORT

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(NOTE: The brief in Kuwait did not include points c and d above.)

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e. (S) Exercises. Special emphasis is being placed on exercises to increase interoperability in the event combined operations become necessary. [redacted]

[redacted] Initial

exercise proposals will be relatively low-key and low-visibility to allow the security relationship to mature at a pace that is comfortable to host governments.

f. (S) Anti-terrorist training. [redacted]

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

g. (S) Advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Given the favorable change in US-GCC relations regarding security cooperation, the current Persian Gulf Advanced Fighter Aircraft Sales Policy needs review. [redacted] the sale of an advanced fighter was raised by the host government directly or through the country team. While the current threat will probably have disappeared by the time an advanced fighter could be delivered and absorbed, a decision to offer such aircraft can, in the near-term, further improve US security relations in the Persian Gulf and is in the long-term US interest of strengthening indigenous forces to fight alone, or in coalition with US forces. An improved Regional Integrated Air Defense Systems, US access, host nation support and interoperability with US forces over the longer term, would be facilitated if an advanced fighter aircraft could be offered to all GCC member countries.

11. (S) Comments: [redacted] In view of the foregoing, we must develop our planning objectives carefully and present them patiently and deliberately in a step process if and when approval for further discussion is received.

12. (S) The team remains established in accordance with paragraph 12 of reference (a) and is available for further duty as may be directed.

Reference:

*JCS WASHINGTON DC 291730Z NOV 83 (Terms of Reference)

sanf 2/25/00 ~~SECRET~~ SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

USD/P INTEROFFICE CONTROL SHEET

DATE (Yr, Mo, Day): 84-02-16

I- 21645/84

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report: Military Planning Team (U)

CURRENT SUSPENSE DATE (Yr, Mo, Day): N/A Bd 2/17

SUMMARY: *(Describe briefly the origin, purpose, action recommended and coordination — (Attach original tasking — SD Form 14, etc.))*

ORIGIN: Verbal request by NSC for final trip report.

Purpose: Comply with NSC request.

Action recommended: Sign memorandum next under.

Coordination: None required.

(Signed) Noel C. Koch 22 FEB 1984

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

John D. Stempel
DASD/NESA Acting

NOTE: For memoranda items forwarded to SecDef/DepSecDef, external coordination at the office head or principal deputy level will be shown on the cover memo. External coordination in other cases may be shown on the memo or on a supplemental sheet.

SEQ NO.	DIR/OFC	INITIAL	DATE (Mo, Day)	SEQ NO.	DIR/OFC	INITIAL	DATE (Mo, Day)	SEQ NO.	DIR/OFC	INITIAL	DATE (Mo, Day)
	OUSD/P				**ISA (Con't)**				**ISP (Con't)**		
	USD/P				AFR				INF REP		
	MA				D/AFR				PDASD/ISP		
	AUSD/POL-RES								MA		
	COUN				EAP						
	SA				D/EAP				D/RESEARCH		
	R&C				PW/MIA						
	ADMIN								EUR-NATO		
	STATE DEF EX				NESA				MA		
	ICA DEF EX				D/NESA				PD/EUR-NATO		
									EUR POL		
	ODUSD/P				POL ANAL				NATO POL		
	DUSD/P				MA						
	MA				D/PLAN & REQ				STRAT TNF POL		
	ADUSD/P				D/POL PLAN				MA		
	NTS				D/IEEA				TNF		
	DEF GUIDANCE								STRAT POL		
	PUB DIPL				I-A				MULTI-NEGOT		
	IP&S POL				D/I-A				STRAT ARMS		
	C2 POL								VERIF POL		
	CSP				**DSAA**						
	SPEC ADV STF				DIR				IETSP		
	EMERG-PLAN				DEP DIR				MA		
	DIS				PLANS				PD/IETSP		
					OPS				ECON POL		
	ISA				COMPT				TRADE POL		
	ASD/ISA				CONG REL				MUN CONT		
	MA	B			LEGAL				TECH SECURITY		
	SA										
					ISP				NET ASSESSMENT		
2	PDASD/ISA				ASD/ISP				NA		
1	MA				MA						
	FMRA				SPEC COUN						
	SPEC PLAN				START REP						

LAST NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICIAL	DIRECTORATE	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE
KIRKPATRICK	ISA/NESA	x53890	

SD Form 161
83 Jun

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE ~~SECRET~~ ID 8401633

DUPLICATE FILE UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 27 FEB 84 18

TO POINDEXTER FROM KOCH, N DOCDATE 22 FEB 84

KEYWORDS IRAN IRAQ

PERSIAN GULF OIL VULNERABILITY

SUBJECT TRIP RPT OF MILITARY PLANNING TEAM RE IRAN IRAQ CONFLICT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 01 APR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
~~KEMP~~	FORTIER	MARTIN	DUR
DUR	LEVINE		ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (JF HW

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
McFarlane X	3/6	For Information		
CR	7/30	OBE/Original not returned		

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 1633

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE March 5, 1984

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR
DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team

Attached at Tab I is the trip report of the USCENTCOM/JCS Team led by Commodore Gleim. The report is organized by country and the reactions of each country visited to both the intelligence briefing and the U.S. concept of operations to manage the Iranian threat are provided.

In general, the trip seems to have been most useful in sensitizing the Gulf States to the severity of the Iranian threat and the extent to which the U.S. is prepared to cooperate with them [redacted]

It is also clear that while their appreciation of the threat is keen, the Gulf States are, for political reasons, not yet ready to undertake [redacted] planning [redacted] These results are somewhat surprising in view of the more optimistic readout we received while the mission was in the field. [redacted]

The report concludes with several recommendations including continued unilateral U.S. planning, more discussion with key U.S. Allies, more exercises to improve interoperability, and initiatives to provide anti-terrorist training for the Gulf States within the limits of present law and policy. The DOD recommendations are basically not contentious with the possible exception of advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Here we have a significant policy issue (internally) and we may raise concerns among some key European Allies (e.g., UK, France) and complicate other initiatives, if we are seen as advancing U.S. aircraft sales at the expense of European manufacturers.

The delay in receiving this report is noteworthy in that more than a month went by between conclusion of the trip and this report prepared in response to your request of January 13. In the future, we might request lateral distribution of the reporting cables which are submitted by the team. After all, we get the State SITREPS when the political consultations are in progress.

Geoff Kemp concurs

Attachment
Tab I - Koch Memo to Poindexter of February 22, 1984

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1633

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 FEB 1984

I-21645/84

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report of the Military Planning Team (U)

(S) In response to your verbal request of 13 January 1984, attached is a final trip report of the Iran-Iraq Conflict Escalation Containment Military Planning Team (referred to as the Military Planning Team).

NOEL C. KOCH
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

SECRET

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

J-5M 0260-84
14 FEB 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subject: Military Planning Team Report (U)

(C) Reference your message*, at the attachment is the military planning team's final report. It is provided, as requested, for forwarding to the National Security Council.

HERMAN O. THOMSON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Plans and Policy

Reference:
* SECDEF Washington DC 130053Z Jan 84

When Enclosure is Detached
This document is downgraded
to Confidential

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-5
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

J-21645/84

MILITARY PLANNING TEAM

TRIP REPORT

1. (S) As directed,* discussions with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States were conducted 14-17 December 1983 and 28 December 1983 - 17 January 1984. The following report of these discussions is provided.

2. (U) These discussions included:

a. (S) An assessment of the threat.

b. (S) A proposed concept to counter the threat.

c. (S) A synopsis of operational recommendations in terms of US and GCC forces required.

d. (S) A review of logistical and other support needed by US forces.

(NOTE: The brief in Kuwait did not include points c and d above.)

3. (S) The threat assessment addressed *REDACTED*

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

4. (S) The concept to counter the threat indicated that the

counter force must be capable of [redacted]

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDAC

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDA

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDA

5. (S) The synopsis of operational recommedations and logistical support needed was based on the generic concept and was also country-specific.

6. (U) The generally favorable responses may be summarized as follows:

a. (S) General agreement with the US assessment of the threat (all states emphasized the terrorist threat).

b. (U) Understanding of the concept.

c. (S) With the exception of [redacted] a political decision

was required before further discussions or detailed planning could begin.

REDACTED

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REDAC

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REDACTED

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REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDA

9. (U) GCC country spokesmen contacted and the essence of their responses follow:

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10. (U) Recommended follow-on actions:

a. (S) Future talks. The initiative for the next round of talks lies with the GCC states. Requests for follow-on talks could come from [redacted] before the GCC Ministers of Defense meeting in mid-to-late February; however, other requests will most likely come after the defense ministers' meeting. At an appropriate time after the meeting, each state should be queried regarding its willingness to begin detailed combined planning.

REDACTED

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REDACTED

d. (S) Allied cooperation. The Department of State-led political initiative to obtain allied approval for subsequent military-to-military talks should continue.

e. (S) Exercises. Special emphasis is being placed on exercises to increase interoperability in the event combined operations become necessary. [redacted] Initial

exercise proposals will be relatively low-key and low-visibility to allow the security relationship to mature at a pace that is comfortable to host governments.

f. (S) Anti-terrorist training. [redacted]

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

g. (S) Advanced fighter aircraft sales policy. Given the favorable change in US-GCC relations regarding security cooperation, the current Persian Gulf Advanced Fighter Aircraft Sales Policy needs review. [redacted] the sale of an advanced fighter was raised by the host government directly or through the country team. While the current threat will probably have disappeared by the time an advanced fighter could be delivered and absorbed, a decision to offer such aircraft can, in the near-term, further improve US security relations in the Persian Gulf and is in the long-term US interest of strengthening indigenous forces to fight alone, or in coalition with US forces. An improved Regional Integrated Air Defense Systems, US access, host nation support and interoperability with US forces over the longer term, would be facilitated if an advanced fighter aircraft could be offered to all GCC member countries.

11. (S) Comments: [redacted] In view of the foregoing, we must develop our planning objectives carefully and present them patiently and deliberately in a step process if and when approval for further discussion is received.

12. (S) The team remains established in accordance with paragraph 12 of reference (a) and is available for further duty as may be directed.

Reference:

*JCS WASHINGTON DC 291730Z NOV 83 (Terms of Reference)

SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

USD/P INTEROFFICE CONTROL SHEET

DATE (Yr, Mo, Day): 84-02-16

I: 21645/84

SUBJECT: Final Trip Report: Military Planning Team (U)

CURRENT SUSPENSE DATE (Yr, Mo, Day): N/A Bal 2/17

SUMMARY: *(Describe briefly the origin, purpose, action recommended and coordination — (Attach original tasking — SD Form 14, etc.))*

ORIGIN: Verbal request by NSC for final trip report.

Purpose: Comply with NSC request,

Action recommended: Sign memorandum next under.

Coordination: None required.

(Signed) Noel C. Koch 22 FEB 1984
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

John D. Stempel
DASD/NESA Acting

NOTE: For memoranda items forwarded to SecDef/DepSecDef, external coordination at the office head or principal deputy level will be shown on the cover memo. External coordination in other cases may be shown on the memo or on a supplemental sheet.

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	MA				D/AFR				PDASD/ISP		
	AUSD/POL-RES								MA		
	COUN				EAP						
	SA				D/EAP				D/RESEARCH		
	R&C				PW/MIA						
	ADMIN								EUR-NATO		
	STATE DEF EX				NESA				MA		
	ICA DEF EX				D/NESA				PD/EUR-NATO		
									EUR POL		
	ODUSD/P				POL ANAL				NATO POL		
	DUSD/P				MA						
	MA				D/PLAN & REQ				STRAT TNF POL		
	ADUSD/P				D/POL PLAN				MA		
	NTS				D/IEEA				TNF		
	DEF GUIDANCE								STRAT POL		
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	IP&S POL				D/I-A				STRAT ARMS		
	C2 POL								VERIF POL		
	CSP				**DSAA**						
	SPEC ADV STF				DIR				IETSP		
	EMERG-PLAN				DEP DIR				MA		
	DIS				PLANS				PD/IETSP		
					OPS				ECON POL		
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	FMRA				SPEC COUN						
	SPEC PLAN				START REP						

LAST NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICIAL	DIRECTORATE	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE
KIRKPATRICK	ISA/NESA	x53890	

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83 Jun

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

NSC/S PROFILE ~~SECRET~~ ID 8401422

RECEIVED 21 FEB 84 20

TO MCFARLANE FROM ROBINSON DOCDATE 21 FEB 84

ROBINSON 23 FEB 84

ROBINSON 01 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: IRAN IRAQ

ENERGY

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR BRIEFINGS RE IRAN - IRAQ THREAT TO OIL FLOWS

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: 24 FEB 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MCFARLANE		FORTIER
		MARTIN
		BEAL

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C FEB 2 9 1984	Mcfarlane noted		Robinson

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)