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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/22/2015

File Folder USSR (6/25/83-6/28/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 24

SKINNER

335

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171649	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SUMMITRY	6	ND	B1
171650	MEMO	W. CLARK TO G. SHULTZ RE U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS PAR 10/12/2010 CREST NLR-748-24-27-2-0	1	7/5/1983	B1
171651	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS	1	6/25/1983	B1
171652	MEMO	W. CASEY TO W. CLARK RE SUMMITRY R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-27-4-8	1	6/27/1983	B1
171653	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE	1	6/28/1983	B1
171655	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE U.S. AND SOVIET USE OF WORDS	1	6/17/1983	B1
171658	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE	1	6/9/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FOIA

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Box Number 24

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171660	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE	2	ND	B1
171656	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #171655 (J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE U.S. AND SOVIET USE OF WORDS)	1	6/17/1983	B1
171657	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (SAME AS DOC #171658)	1	6/9/1983	B1
171661	MEMO	SAME AS DOC #171660 (W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE)	2	ND	B1
171659	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #171658 (J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE)	1	6/9/1983	B1
171662	MEMO	SAME AS DOC #171661 (W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE)	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171654	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #171653 (J. MATLOCK TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE)	1	6/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
OF CLASSIFIED (S)
12/22/85 KOB

RECEIVED 25 JUN 83 13

TO CLARK

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 25 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: USSR SUMMITRY ISSUES

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO DUE: STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390129 NSCIFID (B /)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 27 JUN 83 09

TO CLARK

FROM DOBRIANSKY 12/22/85 (CDS)

DOCDATE 25 JUN 83

KEYWORDS. USSR

SUBJECT US - SOVIET RELATIONS / NEXT STEPS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES STI

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8390641

NSCIFID NSDD0075 (C/b)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	JUL 0 1 1983	Clark approved		
Kimmit	S JUL 0 1 1983	for signature		
	JUL 0 1 1983	Kimmit sig		
	JUL 0 5 1983	Clark sig		10, 10, 10

DISPATCH ed both by JUL 0 5 1983

W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

System II
90802

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

171650

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

July 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps (U)

As you know, the President has approved in principle the desirability of negotiating a US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges Agreement and the establishment of new consulates in Kiev and New York, and has requested that a negotiating strategy be developed. (S)

We request that the State Department convene restricted interagency meetings to draft terms of reference for the two sets of possible negotiations. Representatives of the NSC, 25X1 FBI and USIA should participate in the preparation of terms of reference on the exchanges agreement, and representatives of the NSC, FBI, in the group working on consulates. If you deem it essential, representatives of other appropriate agencies with a direct interest in these subjects (e.g., DOD) can be consulted, but participation in these preparations should be limited to those persons absolutely essential to proper staffing. (S)

Given the urgency in developing approved positions on these subjects, the proposed terms of reference should be forwarded to the NSC by c.o.b. Monday, July 11. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

State Dept. review completed

William P. Clark

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR/CREST
BY CN NARA DATE 7/2/13

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
12/22/15 COB
Reg Number 90802
Date JUL 05 1983

Subject: US - USSR RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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| _____ Adm. Poindexter | _____ Mr. Fortier | _____ Mr. Manfredi | _____ Mr. Robinson | _____ Mr. Weiss |
| _____ Sit. Room | _____ Mr. Helm | _____ Mr. Martin | _____ Gen. Russell | _____ Mr. Wettering |
| _____ Mr. Bailey | _____ Mr. Kemp | _____ Mr. Matlock | _____ Col. Rye | _____ Exec. Secretary |
| _____ Mr. Brazil | _____ Mr. Kraemer | _____ Mr. McMinn | _____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch | _____ NSC Secretariat |
| _____ Mr. Beal | _____ Mr. Laux | _____ Mr. Morris | _____ Mr. Sigur | _____ NSC Registry |
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| _____ Mr. De Graffenreid | _____ Mr. Levine | _____ Mr. Pollock | _____ Mr. Sommer | |
| _____ Ms. Dobriansky | _____ Col. Lilac | _____ Mr. Poe | _____ Mr. Teicher | |

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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12/22/18 CAS

Log Number 90802

Date JUL 05 1983

Subject: US - USSR RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Judge Clark	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Lord	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Col. Myer	_____ Capt. Sims	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ltc. Cobb	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Shull	_____ NSC MSG Center
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Poe	_____ Mr. Teicher	

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12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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July 1, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

White House
By KDB
Date August 23, 1997
12/22/05

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
The Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on US-Soviet Relations (S)

The National Security Council Meeting which had been scheduled for July 10 and had been postponed is now cancelled. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90802

Date JUL 05 1983

13

Subject: NSC MTG

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OF CONFIDENTIAL LEVEL (S)
12/27/15 GDB

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

ADDITIONAL ADDRESSEES SHOULD INCLUDE ADDRESS AND ROOM NUMBER TO INSURE PROMPT/APPROPRIATE DELIVERY

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CHARLES HILL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPT OF STATE

ORIGINAL 7/5/83 4:32 pm Charles G. Jackson Jr.

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Date **JUL 05 1983**

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Subject: NSC MTG

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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~~EXECUTIVE SECRETARY~~
DEPT OF STATE

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4:5

J. Hill

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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USSR (6/25/83-6/28/83)

FOIA

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335

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171651	MEMO P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS	1	6/25/1983	B1

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91544

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
Clark	
McFarlane	C
Poindexter	C
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

J
Brian,
File in 545
II. Copy to
Matlock - eyes only
when he gets back
J

C : Copy

O : Original

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12/22/15 CDB

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PAGES 1

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 12

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PRIORITY

DEX # _____

DTG 301850Z Jun 83

ROUTINE

TTY # _____

FROM/LOCATION/

1. Bob Kimmitt / L.A.

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADM John Paindexter / WHSR

TOL / 301857Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

03 JUN 83 13:05

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1983

John

This seems to have a very high likelihood of giving the liberal press an excuse to suggest a deferral in deployment given the "spirit of turtle bay (the UN)."

Bud

cc: Jack Matlock

WPC HAS SEEN

Judge

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

FDB -
0990

171652

SEEN

DECLASSIFIED

Oct 1
NLR 112-748-242748

CN NARA DATE 11/3/12

27 June 1983

PR

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Summitry

As I told you on Sunday, after my quick reading, I like your memorandum on summitry. Reading it carefully again, I have two reservations and one suggestion. The reservations are in the paragraph on the critical issue of Third Areas on page 3. They are these:

1. The Soviets have little or no interest in drawing us into a form of geopolitical "horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence." They have their spheres of influence nailed down, they are presently targetting and expanding in other areas which we have shown little capacity to defend. For example, why would they give up the prospect in Central America in return for a free hand in Poland, which to all intents and purposes they already have.

2. We hardly have to make it clear that "irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations." They have been told that by at least five Presidents and in each case they have demonstrated that they were not willing to give up their efforts to expand their influence in the Third World in return for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Now for my suggestion. I agree that we don't want a summit without adequate preparation. I further believe that there is no way the Soviets would do a summit meeting in mid-1984 because they will do nothing to help President Reagan be reelected. But what they might find to be in their interest is a non-substantive meeting in New York at the UN. This would have to be informal with no White House hype to build up expectations, no intent to arrive at agreements, but merely an opportunity to get acquainted and talk about the agenda before the two countries. This would be sufficiently before the crunch period on deployment. It might serve Andropov's domestic purposes. The President would be showing flexibility and willingness to talk to the American public as well as the Europeans. If the Soviets were to decline the meeting that word would get out both at home and in Europe which would help the President. It could be an afternoon's talk followed by a small dinner or a small dinner followed by an evening's talk, perhaps with the Director General of the UN as host to minimize protocol problems.

Bill
William J. Casey

National Security Council
The White House

722

Package # 90731

RECEIVED

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
83 JUN 28 7:01 PM John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Jacque Hill	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Judge Clark	4	<i>[Signature]</i>	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

*Let's send info memo to Pro
when he goes to Camp David -
MK*

National Security Council
The White House

732

Package # 90731

RECEIVED

93 JUL 6 9:14

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>LENCZOWSKI</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

John, 7/6
 Please prepare an info memo
 for the President describing what
 we are going to do.

[Signature]

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Ronald Reagan Library

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ID 8390731 ²⁴

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KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: USSR CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION & PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

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DOC DATE 09 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: USSR CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION & PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

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National Security Council
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Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

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171655	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE U.S. AND SOVIET USE OF WORDS	1	6/17/1983	B1

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
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28



Losing the Semantic War

Jim Guirard

In a 1978 Senate speech, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned of the dangers of "semantic infiltration." He explained how simple words and phrases are used by Soviet propagandists—and parroted by naive Western leaders and journalists—to distort our thinking about the political systems which compete for our minds and loyalties.

Moynihan observed that such watchwords as "peace," "people," "democratic," and "liberation" were once democratic symbols "which the anti-democratic forces are somehow able to seize." He condemned our failure to combat the communist rhetoric by which "the most brutal totalitarian regimes in the world call themselves 'liberation movements.'"

The Senator reminds us that words are the primary tools by which the mind operates. False words and concepts move men in false directions, distracting from the truth. Repeat the false word often enough, make certain the truthful alternative is never clearly perceived, and you are able to imprison people within their own minds.

According to political historian Robert Tucker, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin felt that "of all monopolies enjoyed by the state, none would be so crucial as its monopoly on the definition of words. The ultimate weapon of political control would be the dictionary." Let Stalin choose the words by which you think and Stalin will tell you what to think—or not to think.

Yet, the watchword factor remains so hidden, so subtle, that even such experts on Soviet disinformation as Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss overlooked it in their bestseller novel "The Spike." They failed to show how a news story too hot to be "spiked"—kept entirely out of the press—can be distorted by manipulation of a single theme word or phrase. For instance, referring to Marxist terrorists as "progressive forces" or as a "patriotic front" greatly legitimizes their cause.

Consider these further examples of the warped semantics which distort the psychology of our conflict with Marxism-Leninism:

* Why do we foolishly refer to Soviet and Cuban *imperialism* by so positive a word as "adventure"?

* In a world which despises *colonialism*, why do we call Soviet colonies "satellites" and "client states"?

* Why not challenge the fraud by which one-party *dictatorships* call themselves "people's democracies"?

* Why did we persist in referring to Iranian *terrorists* who kidnapped our diplomats as "students"?

* Why do we label *political prisoners* in Poland by such neutral terms as "detainees" and "internees"?

The deception is endless: The *military dictator* of Poland is called a "martial law leader." One-party *communist police states* are called "socialist," the same as multi-party civil-libertarian states as Sweden, France, Greece, etc. *Dialectical materialists*, who say there is no God or abstract morality, mask as "Christian Marxists." *Slave laborers* on the Siberian gas pipeline are euphemistically labeled "guest workers."

But perhaps the most obscene semantic perversion of all is the insidious lie hidden within the concept of ideological "far-left" versus "far-right." Language conditions us to see conflicting ideologies in the left-right continuum. Thus, when we correctly recoil from the fascist evils of the ultra-right, we tend to slide mindlessly toward its apparent opposite, the ultra-left. Left is opposite right, n'est pas?

Such a windfall for communism: to be perceived by so many naive souls as a proper and moral alternative to the fascism it really is. In light of this misperception, how can a self-respecting progressive rise up against what his vocabulary and his mind's eye tell him is the opposite, the enemy, of fascism? And why should civil-libertarians react against the threat of enemies so apparently *unthreatening* as "democratic" socialism, or "progressive" fronts, or "liberation" movements?

These same human rights advocates would surely answer a call to arms against the spectre of world fascism. After all, who but the most craven and pseudo-liberals would knowingly hold hands with fascists? The tragic irony is that so many honest liberals fail to realize that this is exactly what they are doing—however unintentionally.

Imagine what historic reversals an awakening to this unsavory fact might make in prevailing liberal attitudes on such divisive issues as Vietnam, Central America, draft registration, the CIA, defense

spending, Radio Marti . . . On and on goes the list of issues over which so many "liberals" and "conservatives" fight each other tooth and nail, but on which they could easily become natural allies—if only they could agree on who the communists are and why they must be defeated.

In his famous 1978 speech at Harvard, Alexander Solzhenitsyn wondered why so many Americans seem to lack the willpower, the patriotic resolve and the spirit of sacrifice to oppose the Soviet plan for world domination. Such traits, he should have realized, must be rooted in a clear perception of what good it is we stand for and what evil it is we are supposed to be mobilizing against.

At present, perverted semantics tend to deny us this perception. We are confused not only about the identity and ambitions of our enemies but, even worse, about the propriety and justice of what we ourselves stand for.


Such national confusion and its concomitant failure of national resolve expose us to the terrible danger of which the great British philosopher Edmund Burke once warned: "All that is needed for the forces of evil to win is for enough good men to do nothing."

Dr. James Schlesinger may have described the dilemma best. Contending that while most people favor "good" and oppose "evil," they need to know which is which. They need to know "who the fellows are in the white hats and who the fellows are in the black hats." If we permit the communists to choose the words and images by which the distinction is made it is obvious who will be wearing the black hat and who the halo.

Needed instead is a truth-in-labeling system which begins to pull down the semantic masks behind which the Gestapo-left has for so long hidden its ugly, soul-less face.

Perhaps then the truly *liberal* Left—which, like the civil-libertarian Right supports such freedoms as speech, press, assembly, religion, emigration, privacy, property, information, due process, independent unionism and multi-party political options—will recognize the *illiberal* Left as the vicious enemy it really is. (Susan Sontag calls it "successful fascism . . . Fascism with a human face.")

Perhaps then true liberals and progressives will cease their unseemly search for ways of excusing communism's inherent brutality toward human beings and its rampant imperialism toward nations.



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171658	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE	1	6/9/1983	B1

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171660	MEMO W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE	2	ND	B1

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peace, not a deal between the imperialist powers concerning the division of the booty by the capitalist and their governments, but a really lasting and democratic peace which cannot be achieved without a proletarian revolution in a number of countries" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 31, p. 55).

The change in world politics from an imperialist peace, with the wars that grow out of it, to a durable democratic peace, which lays the foundation for the complete elimination of wars, began with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. In the first enactment of the Soviet government, the Decree on Peace, the program of democratic peace was organically linked to the new principle of international relations engendered by the socialist revolution—the principle of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist systems. The creation of the crucial guarantees for a stable peace has been approached gradually. During the period between the two world wars, the Soviet state and the international working class, led by the parties of the Third International, struggled for the new principles of world politics proposed by socialism. The development and strengthening of the might of the first socialist power and later, of the world socialist system also contributed to the establishment of guarantees of peace.

The contemporary statement of the issue of peace, as set forth by the Communist and workers' parties at the international conferences of 1957, 1960, and 1969, rests on a new evaluation of the changed relationship between the power of socialism and capitalism. It proceeds from the fundamental fact that another world war is no longer inevitable owing to the consistently peaceful policies of the USSR and other socialist states, the growing influence of the concerted policies of these countries on world events, the redoubling of the struggle of the working class and the toiling masses in the capitalist countries, the growth of the national liberation movement, and the activity of democratic forces throughout the world in defense of peace.

As a result of the unprecedented growth in the destructive power of military weapons, peace has become a problem for all of humanity. Essential to its resolution is joint action in defense of peace by all who have an interest in saving the fruits of mankind's labor and creativity, regardless of their convictions and political views. On the one hand, the struggle for peace is inseparable from the development of the anti-imperialist movement; it merges with the struggle for the freedom of nations, for progress, and for democracy. On the other hand, the consolidation of peace creates favorable conditions for the liberation struggle of the toilers.

Communists reject both the pseudorevolutionary extremist idea that socialism and peace are consolidated as a result of war and the right-wing opportunist conception that peace is a repudiation of the class struggle and of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and politics. Because the offensive against imperialism—the source of the threat of war—has intensified, it is possible to gain a decisive victory over imperialism and to defeat its aggressive policies, to impose peaceful coexistence on the imperialists, and to realize the striving of peoples for peace. The chief preconditions for peace are the cessation of the arms race, disarmament, the abolition of military blocs and hotbeds of war, the repudiation of acts of aggression and international tyranny, and the development of international cooperation. In the first half of the 1970's the struggle of the Soviet state and other peace-loving forces to bring about fundamental change in the direction of détente led to a new situation, in which guaranteeing the irreversibility of progress toward peace and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems became a practical task.

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E. G. FANFILOV [16-908-3]

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, a type of relation between states with different social systems. The underlying principles of peaceful coexistence include the renunciation of war and the adoption of negotiations as a means of resolving disputes between states; equal rights, mutual understanding, and trust between states, as well as consideration of each other's interests; noninterference in the internal affairs of another state; and recognition of each people's right to choose freely its own socioeconomic and political system. In addition, peaceful coexistence presupposes a rigorous respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the development of economic and cultural cooperation based on full equality and mutual benefit. A policy aimed at establishing and developing this type of relations between states is called a policy of peaceful coexistence. Its intent is to eliminate from the international arena relations of dominance and subjugation and to affirm the general democratic norms that have been crudely violated by imperialism.

Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. The struggle is waged between two ruling classes, each of which possesses full state power. The basically antagonistic conflict between the two opposing socioeconomic systems is transferred from the level of military clashes to that of economic competition, comparison of political systems and ways of life, and ideological struggle. The organic relationship and unity of struggle and cooperation are characteristic of peaceful coexistence and are both the source of its internal contradictoriness and a continual stimulus for seeking mutually acceptable solutions that preclude military conflict.

The feasibility of peaceful coexistence as a system of relations, as a practical policy, and as a theoretical concept stems from a fundamental peculiarity of the historical process—the uneven development of the world socialist revolution. With the appearance of the first socialist state in 1917, the coexistence of the two socioeconomic systems became a fact. The question was, what kind of coexistence it should be and what kind it would be. The imperialists supported the formula proposed by the French premier G. Clemenceau: "Intervention and blockade." The communists expressed their point of view in Lenin's Decree on Peace. "What we prize most is peace and an opportunity to devote all our efforts to restoring our economy," declared Lenin (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 42, p. 313).

The elaboration of the concept of peaceful coexistence was one of the greatest achievements of the political theory of Leninism. While upholding on the battlefield the right of a socialist state to exist, Soviet Russia clearly formulated its view of the coming postwar period. "Our slogan has been and remains the same," proclaimed the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs delivered at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920. "Peaceful coexistence with other governments, no matter what kind they are. Reality has made it necessary for us to establish long-term relations between the workers' and peasants' government and the capitalist governments" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 2, 1958, p. 639). This conclusion, which was derived from an analysis of the international situation, particularly the condition of world economic ties and the conflicts among the imperialist powers, expressed the conviction that the preservation of the gains of the October Revolution and the building of socialism were the main internationalist duties of Russia's working class.

The principles of peaceful coexistence were affirmed in a sharp struggle with various left-extremist elements, including L. Trotsky and N. Bukharin, who rejected the possibility of "peaceful cohabitation" between the socialist republic and the imperialist powers and defended the right of "red intervention." Lenin proved that the irreconcilability of the class interests of the world bourgeoisie and the triumphant proletariat is not an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful relations between socialist and

capitalist countries. The struggle to establish such relations became one of the most important tasks of the socialist state's foreign policy.

The defeat of the foreign and internal counterrevolution and the stabilization of the situation in the country and on its borders confirmed that Lenin's position on peaceful relations between capitalist and socialist countries was correct. As early as 1921 he had ascertained the development of "a certain equilibrium, though a highly unstable one" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 291) in the relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world. Because of the extremely unstable character of this equilibrium and the sober realization that it was highly probable that the balance of forces of that time would encourage new attempts by imperialism to destroy the emerging socialist world by force, the limited goal of achieving a "peaceful breathing space" was given priority in the foreign policy of the Republic of Soviets. The Soviet state achieved this goal, and war was avoided for two decades.

The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism, the formation of the world socialist system, the collapse of colonial empires, and the general upsurge in mass democratic movements led to radical changes in the international arena. The new balance of forces was characterized by the growing superiority of international socialism over imperialism. The forces of peace gained a real opportunity to narrow substantially the field of activity of the forces of war and aggression. Particularly after the USSR developed nuclear missiles, imperialism's reliance on a world thermonuclear war as a means of achieving political objectives became untenable. All of these changes created the preconditions for a substantial broadening of the framework and content of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The world communist movement endorsed the fundamental conclusion reached by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, that the prevention of a new world war is possible. As stated in the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries (1957), the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between the two systems "is a stable basis for the foreign policy of the socialist countries and a reliable basis for peace and friendship of peoples" (*Programmnye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratiu i sotsializm*, 1964, p. 9). The Statement of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties (1960) emphasized that "through the united efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, all countries that oppose war, and all peace-loving forces, a world war can be prevented" (*ibid.*, p. 57). This profound conviction became the basis of the international foreign policy of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces. Favorable conditions for détente and peace in Europe were created by the signing of treaties between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and between Poland and the FRG (1970), the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (1971), the treaty on the principles of relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the FRG (1972), and the treaty on the normalization of relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the FRG (1973).

Major advances have been made in Soviet-American relations. Both countries are committed to do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Summarizing the results of the implementation of the Peace Program proposed by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, the April 1973 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed the change from the cold war to détente and noted that the principles of peaceful coexistence have received wide recognition as a norm of relations among states with different social systems. The Plenum set the goal of ensuring that the changes achieved in the international situation become irreversible.

The theoretical and political problems associated with the interpretation and embodiment of the principles of peaceful coexistence are focal points of the contemporary ideological struggle. Three groups of ideas are contrary to a correct understanding of peaceful coexistence: right-wing bourgeois ideology, certain liberal bourgeois points of view, and various leftist views.

Right-wing bourgeois ideologists stubbornly adhere to the idea that the policy of peaceful coexistence is a Communist "trap," "ruse," or "tactical maneuver" designed to cover up "the export of revolution." In practice, however, contemporary international relations and all of the actions of the socialist states in foreign policy serve as evidence that the policy of peaceful coexistence is not a tactical device but one of the fundamental elements of the foreign policy strategy of socialism. This strategy, which is oriented toward the attainment of a durable, stable peace, as well as security for the peoples of the world, makes a principled rejection of the export of revolution—that is, the forcible artificial imposition of revolutionary transformations on any people. F. Engels wrote: "The victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.*, 2nd ed., vol. 35, p. 298). V. I. Lenin, who held the same views, wrote that people who believed revolution could break out in a foreign country to order or by agreement were either mad or provocateurs (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 36, p. 457). "We exercise our main influence on the international revolution," wrote Lenin, "through our economic policy. . . . The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale" (*ibid.*, vol. 43, p. 341). The policy of peaceful coexistence is the logical culmination of this way of posing the question of world revolution.

Lenin wrote that no forces would have been able to undermine capitalism if it had not been undermined by history. Communists proceed from the premise that the capitalist social structure is doomed by its own internal laws of development. The fate of capitalism will be decided not by the export of revolution but by the class struggle in the capitalist countries.

The liberal group of bourgeois ideologists, and the Social Democrats and revisionists, lean toward a very expansive interpretation of the potential of peaceful coexistence, which is viewed as a way to extinguish the political and ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism and bring about the gradual convergence of the two systems. At best, this point of view is utopian. The struggle of the two systems is rooted in deep-seated social processes and in the opposition of the fundamental principles of the organization of society. Thus, ideological coexistence and the gradual interpenetration of the two social structures are ruled out. The policy of peaceful coexistence does not and cannot solve the cardinal social problems of our time and cannot prevent political and ideological clashes, which may occasionally be very sharp. Indeed, it is not required to solve these problems. It has a very different purpose—to preserve world peace, to prevent a global thermonuclear conflict, and to find mutually acceptable principles for cooperation between socialist and capitalist states.

The third group of false interpretations of the policy of peaceful coexistence is associated with various leftist views. Their spokesmen attempt to prove that in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the socialist countries bar their own way from actively supporting revolutionary processes. Thus, from their point of view, peaceful coexistence contradicts the pursuit of proletarian socialist internationalism and impedes the development of mass anti-imperialist movements. As an alternative to peaceful coexistence they essentially propose increasing international tension, intensifying the confrontation of the two systems, and exporting revolution. Historical experience teaches that peaceful coexistence does not hinder but stimulates the world revolutionary process. In rejecting the export of revolution, victorious socialism is by no means isolating itself from liberation movements. Lenin said that the world socialist revolution "must be helped." However, he immediately added that "we have to know how to help it" (*ibid.*, vol. 35, p. 396).

By pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence and imposing it on imperialism, the socialist countries create favorable preconditions for the rapid development of their economies and for the all-around progress of socialist social relations. The stronger the world socialist system and the more fully its ideals are implemented, the greater its revolutionizing influence on the masses of the working people will be, and the broader the possibilities for supporting revolutionary movements, which is by no means the same as artificially spurring them on. Under the conditions

of peaceful coexistence, imperialism's opportunities for aggressive actions in the international arena and for exporting counter-revolution are sharply curtailed. The policy of peaceful coexistence also influences the domestic situation in capitalist countries. In connection with a conference in Genoa, Lenin declared that it was a task of socialism "to split the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 408). In carrying out this task, the policy of peaceful coexistence promotes the growth of all democratic, anti-imperialist forces. It blocks the imperialists' attempts to overcome internal conflicts, impeding their efforts to aggravate international tension, and it promotes the development of the class struggle against imperialism on a national and worldwide scale. The policy of peaceful coexistence "meets the overall interests of the revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation" (*Mezhdunarodnoe Soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: Dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow, 1969, p. 318).

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a compromise in the sense that it is based on a quest for a reasonable balance of interests and for mutually acceptable agreements. Of course, within the framework of these agreements each side seeks to uphold its own principled, fundamental interests.

Lenin clearly defined the principles on which possible accords between a socialist state and capitalist states should rest. "Of course, an advocate of proletarian revolution may conclude compromises or agreements with capitalists. It all depends on what kind of agreement is concluded and under what circumstances. Here and here alone can and must one look for the difference between an agreement that is legitimate from the angle of the proletarian revolution and one that is treasonable, treacherous (from the same angle)" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 40, pp. 289-90). Concretizing his ideas about the "price" of a compromise, Lenin wrote: "We must make it a rule not to make political concessions to the international bourgeoisie . . . unless we receive in return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie to Soviet Russia, or to other contingents of the international proletariat which is fighting capitalism" (*ibid.*, vol. 45, p. 142). Lenin's methodology forms the basis of the practical activities of the USSR and other socialist countries in establishing mutually beneficial cooperation with the capitalist world.

As the main principle of conducting international affairs, the principle of peaceful coexistence is applicable in theory only to relations between the two world systems—capitalism and socialism. In practice, however, there is a tendency to use and to regard peaceful coexistence as a regulatory principle of the entire system of international relations—that is, of relations between states, regardless of their socioeconomic systems. Without disputing the historical validity and political reality of this tendency, it is necessary to emphasize that the highest principle of relations between socialist countries is socialist internationalism. Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence still has meaning in this context. In a sense, it is taken for granted as a natural, minimal basis for relations between states. The center of gravity shifts to mutual assistance among fraternal socialist states on the basis of class solidarity.

With the growth in power and size of the world socialist system, with the deepening of progressive transformations in the Third World countries, with the further strengthening of ties between the socialist and the developing states, the principle of internationalism will play an increasingly important role in the evolution of international relations. Its consistent implementation leads to the creation of additional opportunities for solidifying peace and peaceful coexistence. The converse relationship between the implementation of a policy of peaceful coexistence and the growth of internationalism is not as clear-cut. In some instances, the relaxation of international tension dulls the sense of class solidarity and stimulates a weakening of internationalist bonds. Therefore, a well thought-out, realistic policy of peaceful coexistence that soberly takes into account all the positive and negative aspects of the situation presupposes a purposeful struggle for the further cohesion of the socialist countries and all states actively opposing imperialism.

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A. E. BOVIN [16-929-3]

PELEE, MOUNT (Montagne Pelée), an active volcano on Martinique, in the West Indies. Elevation, 1,397 m. Mount Pelée is known for its catastrophic eruption in 1902, when a heavy hot cloud of ash and volcanic bombs and blocks destroyed the city of St. Pierre and its 26,000 inhabitants. The eruption led to the classification of such volcanoes as Pelean. Mount Pelée was less strongly active in 1929-32. [16-162-2]

PENNATULARIA (sea pens), an order of marine invertebrates of the class Actinozoa. A colony consists of a large main polyp, which forms the trunk of the colony, and usually numerous small secondary polyps, located on the upper end or on special lateral processes of the main polyp. In the latter case, the colony has the form of a feather. The base of the main polyp is embedded in the sea bottom. There are approximately 300 species of sea pens, distributed predominantly in tropical and subtropical waters from the littoral zone to a depth of 6 km. In the USSR, six species are found in the seas of the Far East, and four in the northern seas (including *Umbellula encrinus*—which is up to 2.6 m tall). Many sea pens are luminescent. [16-1762-1]

PERENNIAL FORAGE GRASSES, herbaceous plants cultivated for livestock feed that have a life span of more than one year. The yearly life cycle of these grasses consists of the following phases: spring sprouting, tillering, heading, flowering, fruiting with repeated tillering, autumn vegetation, and winter dormancy. Plants of the families Gramineae (timothy, foxtail, wheatgrass) and Leguminosae (clover, alfalfa, sainfoin) are among those cultivated most often for forage. Grasses and legumes are generally sown together; this combination favorably affects the quality of the forage and the fertility of the soil. Because of the repeated tillering, it is highly advisable to fertilize perennial forage grasses in the second half of the vegetative stage. [16-1097-2]

PERENNIALS (also perennial plants), herbs and shrubs that persist through more than two winters. Some perennials live several years, and others 20 to 30 years. Some species have a life-span of 100 years (for example, tau-saghyz). Upon reaching a certain age, perennials may flower and bear fruit every year (polycarpic plants); this contrasts with annuals and biennials (monocarpic plants), which flower and bear fruit only one time. Some perennials retain their leaves year round (evergreens). In unfavorable periods (winter, drought), the leaves and other aboveground organs of most perennials die, and only the underground organs remain alive (rhizomes, tubers, bulbs, and roots). In some perennials the aboveground shoots are partially preserved as well (rosettes, creeping shoots, and the lower parts of erect stems).

Sometimes the division of plants into annuals, biennials, and perennials is conditional. For example, the tropical perennial castor oil plant (*Ricinus communis*) grows as an annual in moderate climates, and annual bluegrass (*Poa annua*), which generally grows on plains, develops as a perennial in the mountains. Trees and shrubs are sometimes referred to as perennials.

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171656	MEMO SAME MEMO AS DOC #171655 (J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE U.S. AND SOVIET USE OF WORDS)	1	6/17/1983	B1

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Losing the Semantic War

Jim Guirard

In a 1978 Senate speech, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned of the dangers of "semantic infiltration." He explained how simple words and phrases are used by Soviet propagandists — and parroted by naive Western leaders and journalists — to distort our thinking about the political systems which compete for our minds and loyalties.

Moynihan observed that such watch-words as "peace," "people," "democratic," and "liberation" were once democratic symbols "which the anti-democratic forces are somehow able to seize." He condemned our failure to combat the communist rhetoric by which "the most brutal totalitarian regimes in the world call themselves 'liberation movements.'"

The Senator reminds us that words are the primary tools by which the mind operates. False words and concepts move men in false directions, distracting from the truth. Repeat the false word often enough, make certain the truthful alternative is never clearly perceived, and you are able to imprison people within their own minds.

According to political historian Robert Tucker, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin felt that "of all monopolies enjoyed by the state, none would be so crucial as its monopoly on the definition of words. The ultimate weapon of political control would be the dictionary." Let Stalin choose the words by which you think and Stalin will tell you what to think — or not to think.

Yet, the watchword factor remains so hidden, so subtle, that even such experts on Soviet disinformation as Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss overlooked it in their bestseller novel "The Spike." They failed to show how a news story too hot to be "spiked" — kept entirely out of the press — can be distorted by manipulation of a single theme word or phrase. For instance, referring to Marxist terrorists as "progressive forces" or as a "patriotic front" greatly legitimizes their cause.

Consider these further examples of the warped semantics which distort the psychology of our conflict with Marxism-Leninism:

* Why do we foolishly refer to Soviet and Cuban imperialism by so positive a word as "adventure"?

* In a world which despises colonialism, why do we call Soviet colonies "satellites" and "client states"?

* Why not challenge the fraud by which one-party dictatorships call themselves "people's democracies"?

* Why did we persist in referring to Iranian terrorists who kidnapped our diplomats as "students"?

* Why do we label political prisoners in Poland by such neutral terms as "detainees" and "internees"?

The deception is endless: The military dictator of Poland is called a "martial law leader." One-party communist police states are called "socialist," the same as multi-party civil-libertarian states as Sweden, France, Greece, etc. Dialectical materialists, who say there is no God or abstract morality, mask as "Christian Marxists." Slave laborers on the Siberian gas pipeline are euphemistically labeled "guest workers."

But perhaps the most obscene semantic perversion of all is the insidious lie hidden within the concept of ideological "far-left" versus "far-right." Language conditions us to see conflicting ideologies in the left-right continuum. Thus, when we correctly recoil from the fascist evils of the ultra-right, we tend to slide mindlessly toward its apparent opposite, the ultra-left. Left is opposite right, n'est pas?

Such a windfall for communism: to be perceived by so many naive souls as a proper and moral alternative to the fascism it really is. In light of this misperception, how can a self-respecting progressive rise up against what his vocabulary and his mind's eye tell him is the opposite, the enemy, of fascism? And why should civil-libertarians react against the threat of enemies so apparently unthreatening as "democratic" socialism, or "progressive" fronts, or "liberation" movements?

These same human rights advocates would surely answer a call to arms against the spectre of world fascism. After all, who but the most craven and pseudo of liberals would knowingly hold hands with fascists? The tragic irony is that so many honest liberals fail to realize that this is exactly what they are doing — however unintentionally.

Imagine what historic reversals an awakening to this unsavory fact might make in prevailing liberal attitudes on such divisive issues as Vietnam, Central America, draft registration, the CIA, defense

spending, Radio Marti . . . On and on goes the list of issues over which so many "liberals" and "conservatives" fight each other tooth and nail, but on which they could easily become natural allies — if only they could agree on who the communists are and why they must be defeated.

In his famous 1978 speech at Harvard, Alexander Solzhenitsyn wondered why so many Americans seem to lack the willpower, the patriotic resolve and the spirit of sacrifice to oppose the Soviet plan for world domination. Such traits, he should have realized, must be rooted in a clear perception of what good it is we stand for and what evil it is we are supposed to be mobilizing against.

At present, perverted semantics tend to deny us this perception. We are confused not only about the identity and ambitions of our enemies but, even worse, about the propriety and justice of what we ourselves stand for.

Such national confusion and its concomitant failure of national resolve expose us to the terrible danger of which the great British philosopher Edmund Burke once warned: "All that is needed for the forces of evil to win is for enough good men to do nothing."

Dr. James Schlesinger may have described the dilemma best. Contending that while most people favor "good" and oppose "evil," they need to know which is which. They need to know "who the fellows are in the white hats and who the fellows are in the black hats." If we permit the communists to choose the words and images by which the distinction is made it is obvious who will be wearing the black hat and who the halo.

Needed instead is a truth-in-labeling system which begins to pull down the semantic masks behind which the Gestapo-left has for so long hidden its ugly, soul-less face.

Perhaps then the truly liberal Left — which, like the civil-libertarian Right supports such freedoms as speech, press, assembly, religion, emigration, privacy, property, information, due process, independent unionism and multi-party political options — will recognize the illiberal Left as the vicious enemy it really is. (Susan Sontag calls it "successful fascism . . . Fascism with a human face.")

Perhaps then true liberals and progressives will cease their unseemly search for ways of excusing communism's inherent brutality toward human beings and its rampant imperialism toward nations.

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171657	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (SAME AS DOC #171658)	1	6/9/1983	B1

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peace, not a deal between the imperialist powers concerning the division of the booty by the capitalist and their governments, but a really lasting and democratic peace, which cannot be achieved without a proletarian revolution in a number of countries" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 31, p. 55).

The change in world politics from an imperialist peace, with the wars that grow out of it, to a durable democratic peace, which lays the foundation for the complete elimination of wars, began with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. In the first enactment of the Soviet government, the Decree on Peace, the program of democratic peace was organically linked to the new principle of international relations engendered by the socialist revolution—the principle of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist systems. The creation of the crucial guarantees for a stable peace has been approached gradually. During the period between the two world wars, the Soviet state and the international working class, led by the parties of the Third International, struggled for the new principles of world politics proposed by socialism. The development and strengthening of the might of the first socialist power and later, of the world socialist system also contributed to the establishment of guarantees of peace.

The contemporary statement of the issue of peace, as set forth by the Communist and workers' parties at the international conferences of 1957, 1960, and 1969, rests on a new evaluation of the changed relationship between the power of socialism and capitalism. It proceeds from the fundamental fact that another world war is no longer inevitable, owing to the consistently peaceful policies of the USSR and other socialist states, the growing influence of the concerted policies of these countries on world events, the redoubling of the struggle of the working class and the toiling masses in the capitalist countries, the growth of the national liberation movement, and the activity of democratic forces throughout the world in defense of peace.

As a result of the unprecedented growth in the destructive power of military weapons, peace has become a problem for all of humanity. Essential to its resolution is joint action in defense of peace by all who have an interest in saving the fruits of mankind's labor and creativity, regardless of their convictions and political views. On the one hand, the struggle for peace is inseparable from the development of the anti-imperialist movement; it merges with the struggle for the freedom of nations, for progress, and for democracy. On the other hand, the consolidation of peace creates favorable conditions for the liberation struggle of the toilers.

Communists reject both the pseudorevolutionary extremist idea that socialism and peace are consolidated as a result of war and the right-wing opportunist conception that peace is a repudiation of the class struggle and of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and politics. Because the offensive against imperialism—the source of the threat of war—has intensified, it is possible to gain a decisive victory over imperialism and to defeat its aggressive policies, to impose peaceful coexistence on the imperialists, and to realize the striving of peoples for peace. The chief preconditions for peace are the cessation of the arms race, disarmament, the abolition of military blocs and hotbeds of war, the repudiation of acts of aggression and international tyranny, and the development of international cooperation. In the first half of the 1970's the struggle of the Soviet state and other peace-loving forces to bring about fundamental change in the direction of détente led to a new situation, in which guaranteeing the irreversibility of progress toward peace and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems became a practical task.

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E. G. PANFILOV [16-906-5]

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, a type of relation between states with different social systems. The underlying principles of peaceful coexistence include the renunciation of war and the adoption of negotiations as a means of resolving disputes between states; equal rights, mutual understanding, and trust between states, as well as consideration of each other's interests; noninterference in the internal affairs of another state; and recognition of each people's right to choose freely its own socioeconomic and political system. In addition, peaceful coexistence presupposes a rigorous respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the development of economic and cultural cooperation based on full equality and mutual benefit. A policy aimed at establishing and developing this type of relations between states is called a policy of peaceful coexistence. Its intent is to eliminate from the international arena relations of dominance and subjugation and to affirm the general democratic norms that have been crudely violated by imperialism.

Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. The struggle is waged between two ruling classes, each of which possesses full state power. The basically antagonistic conflict between the two opposing socioeconomic systems is transferred from the level of military clashes to that of economic competition, comparison of political systems and ways of life, and ideological struggle. The organic relationship and unity of struggle and cooperation are characteristic of peaceful coexistence and are both the source of its internal contradictoriness and a continual stimulus for seeking mutually acceptable solutions that preclude military conflict.

The feasibility of peaceful coexistence as a system of relations, as a practical policy, and as a theoretical concept stems from a fundamental peculiarity of the historical process—the uneven development of the world socialist revolution. With the appearance of the first socialist state in 1917, the coexistence of the two socioeconomic systems became a fact. The question was, what kind of coexistence it should be and what kind it would be. The imperialists supported the formula proposed by the French premier G. Clemenceau: "Intervention and blockade." The communists expressed their point of view in Lenin's Decree on Peace. "What we prize most is peace and an opportunity to devote all our efforts to restoring our economy," declared Lenin (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 42, p. 313).

The elaboration of the concept of peaceful coexistence was one of the greatest achievements of the political theory of Leninism. While upholding on the battlefield the right of a socialist state to exist, Soviet Russia clearly formulated its view of the coming postwar period. "Our slogan has been and remains the same," proclaimed the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs delivered at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920. "Peaceful coexistence with other governments, no matter what kind they are. Reality has made it necessary for us to establish long-term relations between the workers' and peasants' government and the capitalist governments" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 2, 1958, p. 639). This conclusion, which was derived from an analysis of the international situation, particularly the condition of world economic ties and the conflicts among the imperialist powers, expressed the conviction that the preservation of the gains of the October Revolution and the building of socialism were the main internationalist duties of Russia's working class.

The principles of peaceful coexistence were affirmed in a sharp struggle with various left-extremist elements, including L. Trotsky and N. Bukharin, who rejected the possibility of "peaceful cohabitation" between the socialist republic and the imperialist powers and defended the right of "red intervention." Lenin proved that the irreconcilability of the class interests of the world bourgeoisie and the triumphant proletariat is not an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful relations between socialist and

capitalist countries. The struggle to establish such relations became one of the most important tasks of the socialist state's foreign policy.

The defeat of the foreign and internal counterrevolution and the stabilization of the situation in the country and on its borders confirmed that Lenin's position on peaceful relations between capitalist and socialist countries was correct. As early as 1921 he had ascertained the development of "a certain equilibrium, though a highly unstable one" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 291) in the relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world. Because of the extremely unstable character of this equilibrium and the sober realization that it was highly probable that the balance of forces of that time would encourage new attempts by imperialism to destroy the emerging socialist world by force, the limited goal of achieving a "peaceful breathing space" was given priority in the foreign policy of the Republic of Soviets. The Soviet state achieved this goal, and war was avoided for two decades.

The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism, the formation of the world socialist system, the collapse of colonial empires, and the general upsurge in mass democratic movements led to radical changes in the international arena. The new balance of forces was characterized by the growing superiority of international socialism over imperialism. The forces of peace gained a real opportunity to narrow substantially the field of activity of the forces of war and aggression. Particularly after the USSR developed nuclear missiles, imperialism's reliance on a world thermonuclear war as a means of achieving political objectives became untenable. All of these changes created the preconditions for a substantial broadening of the framework and content of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The world communist movement endorsed the fundamental conclusion reached by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, that the prevention of a new world war is possible. As stated in the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries (1957), the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between the two systems "is a stable basis for the foreign policy of the socialist countries and a reliable basis for peace and friendship of peoples" (*Programmnye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratsiiu i sotsializm*, 1964, p. 9). The Statement of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties (1960) emphasized that "through the united efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, all countries that oppose war, and all peace-loving forces, a world war can be prevented" (*ibid.*, p. 57). This profound conviction became the basis of the international foreign policy of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces. Favorable conditions for détente and peace in Europe were created by the signing of treaties between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and between Poland and the FRG (1970), the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (1971), the treaty on the principles of relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the FRG (1972), and the treaty on the normalization of relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the FRG (1973).

Major advances have been made in Soviet-American relations. Both countries are committed to do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Summarizing the results of the implementation of the Peace Program proposed by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, the April 1973 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed the change from the cold war to détente and noted that the principles of peaceful coexistence have received wide recognition as a norm of relations among states with different social systems. The Plenum set the goal of ensuring that the changes achieved in the international situation become irreversible.

The theoretical and political problems associated with the interpretation and embodiment of the principles of peaceful coexistence are focal points of the contemporary ideological struggle. Three groups of ideas are contrary to a correct understanding of peaceful coexistence: right-wing bourgeois ideology, certain liberal bourgeois points of view, and various leftist views.

Right-wing bourgeois ideologists stubbornly adhere to the idea that the policy of peaceful coexistence is a Communist "trap," "ruse," or "tactical maneuver" designed to cover up "the export of revolution." In practice, however, contemporary international relations and all of the actions of the socialist states in foreign policy serve as evidence that the policy of peaceful coexistence is not a tactical device but one of the fundamental elements of the foreign policy strategy of socialism. This strategy, which is oriented toward the attainment of a durable, stable peace, as well as security for the peoples of the world, makes a principled rejection of the export of revolution—that is, the forcible artificial imposition of revolutionary transformations on any people. F. Engels wrote: "The victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.*, 2nd ed., vol. 35, p. 298). V. I. Lenin, who held the same views, wrote that people who believed revolution could break out in a foreign country to order or by agreement were either mad or provocateurs (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 36, p. 457). "We exercise our main influence on the international revolution," wrote Lenin, "through our economic policy . . . The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale" (*ibid.*, vol. 43, p. 341). The policy of peaceful coexistence is the logical culmination of this way of posing the question of world revolution.

Lenin wrote that no forces would have been able to undermine capitalism if it had not been undermined by history. Communists proceed from the premise that the capitalist social structure is doomed by its own internal laws of development. The fate of capitalism will be decided not by the export of revolution but by the class struggle in the capitalist countries.

The liberal group of bourgeois ideologists, and the Social Democrats and revisionists, lean toward a very expansive interpretation of the potential of peaceful coexistence, which is viewed as a way to extinguish the political and ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism and bring about the gradual convergence of the two systems. At best, this point of view is utopian. The struggle of the two systems is rooted in deep-seated social processes and in the opposition of the fundamental principles of the organization of society. Thus, ideological coexistence and the gradual interpenetration of the two social structures are ruled out. The policy of peaceful coexistence does not and cannot solve the cardinal social problems of our time and cannot prevent political and ideological clashes, which may occasionally be very sharp. Indeed, it is not required to solve these problems. It has a very different purpose—to preserve world peace, to prevent a global thermonuclear conflict, and to find mutually acceptable principles for cooperation between socialist and capitalist states.

The third group of false interpretations of the policy of peaceful coexistence is associated with various leftist views. Their spokesmen attempt to prove that in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the socialist countries bar their own way from actively supporting revolutionary processes. Thus, from their point of view, peaceful coexistence contradicts the pursuit of proletarian socialist internationalism and impedes the development of mass anti-imperialist movements. As an alternative to peaceful coexistence they essentially propose increasing international tension, intensifying the confrontation of the two systems, and exporting revolution. Historical experience teaches that peaceful coexistence does not hinder but stimulates the world revolutionary process. In rejecting the export of revolution, victorious socialism is by no means isolating itself from liberation movements. Lenin said that the world socialist revolution "must be helped." However, he immediately added that "we have to know how to help it" (*ibid.*, vol. 35, p. 396).

By pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence and imposing it on imperialism, the socialist countries create favorable preconditions for the rapid development of their economies and for the all-around progress of socialist social relations. The stronger the world socialist system and the more fully its ideals are implemented, the greater its revolutionizing influence on the masses of the working people will be, and the broader the possibilities for supporting revolutionary movements, which is by no means the same as artificially spurring them on. Under the conditions

of peaceful coexistence, imperialism's opportunities for aggressive action in the international arena and for exporting counter-revolution are sharply curtailed. The policy of peaceful coexistence also influences the domestic situation in capitalist countries. In connection with a conference in Genoa, Lenin declared that it was a task of socialism "to split the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 408). In carrying out this task, the policy of peaceful coexistence promotes the growth of all democratic, anti-imperialist forces. It blocks the imperialists' attempts to overcome internal conflicts, impeding their efforts to aggravate international tension, and it promotes the development of the class struggle against imperialism on a national and worldwide scale. The policy of peaceful coexistence "meets the overall interests of the revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation" (*Mezhdunarodnoe Soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: Dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow, 1969, p. 318).

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a compromise in the sense that it is based on a quest for a reasonable balance of interests and for mutually acceptable agreements. Of course, within the framework of these agreements each side seeks to uphold its own principled, fundamental interests.

Lenin clearly defined the principles on which possible accords between a socialist state and capitalist states should rest. "Of course, an advocate of proletarian revolution may conclude compromises or agreements with capitalists. It all depends on what kind of agreement is concluded and under what circumstances. Here and here alone can and must one look for the difference between an agreement that is legitimate from the angle of the proletarian revolution and one that is treasonable, treacherous (from the same angle)" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 40, pp. 289-90). Concretizing his ideas about the "price" of a compromise, Lenin wrote: "We must make it a rule not to make political concessions to the international bourgeoisie . . . unless we receive in return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie to Soviet Russia, or to other contingents of the international proletariat which is fighting capitalism" (*ibid.*, vol. 45, p. 142). Lenin's methodology forms the basis of the practical activities of the USSR and other socialist countries in establishing mutually beneficial cooperation with the capitalist world.

As the main principle of conducting international affairs, the principle of peaceful coexistence is applicable in theory only to relations between the two world systems—capitalism and socialism. In practice, however, there is a tendency to use and to regard peaceful coexistence as a regulatory principle of the entire system of international relations—that is, of relations between states, regardless of their socioeconomic systems. Without disputing the historical validity and political reality of this tendency, it is necessary to emphasize that the highest principle of relations between socialist countries is socialist internationalism. Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence still has meaning in this context. In a sense, it is taken for granted as a natural, minimal basis for relations between states. The center of gravity shifts to mutual assistance among fraternal socialist states on the basis of class solidarity.

With the growth in power and size of the world socialist system, with the deepening of progressive transformations in the Third World countries, with the further strengthening of ties between the socialist and the developing states, the principle of internationalism will play an increasingly important role in the evolution of international relations. Its consistent implementation leads to the creation of additional opportunities for solidifying peace and peaceful coexistence. The converse relationship between the implementation of a policy of peaceful coexistence and the growth of internationalism is not as clear-cut. In some instances, the relaxation of international tension dulls the sense of class solidarity and stimulates a weakening of internationalist bonds. Therefore, a well thought-out, realistic policy of peaceful coexistence that soberly takes into account all the positive and negative aspects of the situation presupposes a purposeful struggle for the further cohesion of the socialist countries and all states actively opposing imperialism.

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A. E. BOVIN [16-929-3]

PELEE, MOUNT (Montagne Pelée), an active volcano on Martinique, in the West Indies. Elevation, 1,397 m. Mount Pelée is known for its catastrophic eruption in 1902, when a heavy hot cloud of ash and volcanic bombs and blocks destroyed the city of St. Pierre and its 26,000 inhabitants. The eruption led to the classification of such volcanoes as Pelean. Mount Pelée was less strongly active in 1929-32. [16-162-2]

PENNATULARIA (sea pens), an order of marine invertebrates of the class Actinozoa. A colony consists of a large main polyp, which forms the trunk of the colony, and usually numerous small secondary polyps, located on the upper end or on special lateral processes of the main polyp. In the latter case, the colony has the form of a feather. The base of the main polyp is embedded in the sea bottom. There are approximately 300 species of sea pens, distributed predominantly in tropical and subtropical waters from the littoral zone to a depth of 6 km. In the USSR, six species are found in the seas of the Far East, and four in the northern seas (including *Umbellula encrinus*—which is up to 2.6 m tall). Many sea pens are luminescent. [16-1762-1]

PERENNIAL FORAGE GRASSES, herbaceous plants cultivated for livestock feed that have a life span of more than one year. The yearly life cycle of these grasses consists of the following phases: spring sprouting, tillering, heading, flowering, fruiting with repeated tillering, autumn vegetation, and winter dormancy. Plants of the families Gramineae (timothy, foxtail, wheatgrass) and Leguminosae (clover, alfalfa, sainfoin) are among those cultivated most often for forage. Grasses and legumes are generally sown together; this combination favorably affects the quality of the forage and the fertility of the soil. Because of the repeated tillering, it is highly advisable to fertilize perennial forage grasses in the second half of the vegetative stage. [16-1097-2]

PERENNIALS (also perennial plants), herbs and subshrubs that persist through more than two winters. Some perennials live several years, and others 20 to 30 years. Some species have a life-span of 100 years (for example, tau-saghyz). Upon reaching a certain age, perennials may flower and bear fruit every year (polycarpic plants); this contrasts with annuals and biennials (monocarpic plants), which flower and bear fruit only one time. Some perennials retain their leaves year round (evergreens). In unfavorable periods (winter, drought), the leaves and other aboveground organs of most perennials die, and only the underground organs remain alive (rhizomes, tubers, bulbs, and roots). In some perennials the aboveground shoots are partially preserved as well (rosettes, creeping shoots, and the lower parts of erect stems).

Sometimes the division of plants into annuals, biennials, and perennials is conditional. For example, the tropical perennial castor oil plant (*Ricinus communis*) grows as an annual in moderate climates, and annual bluegrass (*Poa annua*), which generally grows on plains, develops as a perennial in the mountains. Trees and shrubs are sometimes referred to as perennials.

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peace, not a deal between the imperialist powers concerning the division of the booty by the capitalists and their governments, but a really lasting and democratic peace, which cannot be achieved without a proletarian revolution in a number of countries" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 31, p. 55).

The change in world politics from an imperialist peace, with the wars that grow out of it, to a durable democratic peace, which lays the foundation for the complete elimination of wars, began with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. In the first enactment of the Soviet government, the Decree on Peace, the program of democratic peace was organically linked to the new principle of international relations engendered by the socialist revolution—the principle of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist systems. The creation of the crucial guarantees for a stable peace has been approached gradually. During the period between the two world wars, the Soviet state and the international working class, led by the parties of the Third International, struggled for the new principles of world politics proposed by socialism. The development and strengthening of the might of the first socialist power and later, of the world socialist system also contributed to the establishment of guarantees of peace.

The contemporary statement of the issue of peace, as set forth by the Communist and workers' parties at the international conferences of 1957, 1960, and 1969, rests on a new evaluation of the changed relationship between the power of socialism and capitalism. It proceeds from the fundamental fact that another world war is no longer inevitable owing to the consistently peaceful policies of the USSR and other socialist states, the growing influence of the concerted policies of these countries on world events, the redoubling of the struggle of the working class and the toiling masses in the capitalist countries, the growth of the national liberation movement, and the activity of democratic forces throughout the world in defense of peace.

As a result of the unprecedented growth in the destructive power of military weapons, peace has become a problem for all of humanity. Essential to its resolution is joint action in defense of peace by all who have an interest in saving the fruits of mankind's labor and creativity, regardless of their convictions and political views. On the one hand, the struggle for peace is inseparable from the development of the anti-imperialist movement; it merges with the struggle for the freedom of nations, for progress, and for democracy. On the other hand, the consolidation of peace creates favorable conditions for the liberation struggle of the toilers.

Communists reject both the pseudorevolutionary extremist idea that socialism and peace are consolidated as a result of war and the right-wing opportunist conception that peace is a repudiation of the class struggle and of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and politics. Because the offensive against imperialism—the source of the threat of war—has intensified, it is possible to gain a decisive victory over imperialism and to defeat its aggressive policies, to impose peaceful coexistence on the imperialists, and to realize the striving of peoples for peace. The chief preconditions for peace are the cessation of the arms race, disarmament, the abolition of military blocs and hotbeds of war, the repudiation of acts of aggression and international tyranny, and the development of international cooperation. In the first half of the 1970's the struggle of the Soviet state and other peace-loving forces to bring about fundamental change in the direction of détente led to a new situation, in which guaranteeing the irreversibility of progress toward peace and peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems became a practical task.

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E. G. PANFILOV [16-908-3]

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, a type of relation between states with different social systems. The underlying principles of peaceful coexistence include the renunciation of war and the adoption of negotiations as a means of resolving disputes between states; equal rights, mutual understanding, and trust between states, as well as consideration of each other's interests; noninterference in the internal affairs of another state; and recognition of each people's right to choose freely its own socioeconomic and political system. In addition, peaceful coexistence presupposes a rigorous respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the development of economic and cultural cooperation based on full equality and mutual benefit. A policy aimed at establishing and developing this type of relations between states is called a policy of peaceful coexistence. Its intent is to eliminate from the international arena relations of dominance and subjugation and to affirm the general democratic norms that have been crudely violated by imperialism.

Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. The struggle is waged between two ruling classes, each of which possesses full state power. The basically antagonistic conflict between the two opposing socioeconomic systems is transferred from the level of military clashes to that of economic competition, comparison of political systems and ways of life, and ideological struggle. The organic relationship and unity of struggle and cooperation are characteristic of peaceful coexistence and are both the source of its internal contradictoriness and a continual stimulus for seeking mutually acceptable solutions that preclude military conflict.

The feasibility of peaceful coexistence as a system of relations, as a practical policy, and as a theoretical concept stems from a fundamental peculiarity of the historical process—the uneven development of the world socialist revolution. With the appearance of the first socialist state in 1917, the coexistence of the two socioeconomic systems became a fact. The question was, what kind of coexistence it should be and what kind it would be. The imperialists supported the formula proposed by the French premier G. Clemenceau: "Intervention and blockade." The communists expressed their point of view in Lenin's Decree on Peace. "What we prize most is peace and an opportunity to devote all our efforts to restoring our economy," declared Lenin (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 42, p. 313).

The elaboration of the concept of peaceful coexistence was one of the greatest achievements of the political theory of Leninism. While upholding on the battlefield the right of a socialist state to exist, Soviet Russia clearly formulated its view of the coming postwar period. "Our slogan has been and remains the same," proclaimed the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs delivered at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920. "Peaceful coexistence with other governments, no matter what kind they are. Reality has made it necessary for us to establish long-term relations between the workers' and peasants' government and the capitalist governments" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 2, 1958, p. 639). This conclusion, which was derived from an analysis of the international situation, particularly the condition of world economic ties and the conflicts among the imperialist powers, expressed the conviction that the preservation of the gains of the October Revolution and the building of socialism were the main internationalist duties of Russia's working class.

The principles of peaceful coexistence were affirmed in a sharp struggle with various left-extremist elements, including L. Trotsky and N. Bukharin, who rejected the possibility of "peaceful cohabitation" between the socialist republic and the imperialist powers and defended the right of "red intervention." Lenin proved that the irreconcilability of the class interests of the world bourgeoisie and the triumphant proletariat is not an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful relations between socialist and

capitalist countries. The struggle to establish such relations became one of the most important tasks of the socialist state's foreign policy.

The defeat of the foreign and internal counterrevolution and the stabilization of the situation in the country and on its borders confirmed that Lenin's position on peaceful relations between capitalist and socialist countries was correct. As early as 1921 he had ascertained the development of "a certain equilibrium, though a highly unstable one" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 291) in the relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world. Because of the extremely unstable character of this equilibrium and the sober realization that it was highly probable that the balance of forces of that time would encourage new attempts by imperialism to destroy the emerging socialist world by force, the limited goal of achieving a "peaceful breathing space" was given priority in the foreign policy of the Republic of Soviets. The Soviet state achieved this goal, and war was avoided for two decades.

The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism, the formation of the world socialist system, the collapse of colonial empires, and the general upsurge in mass democratic movements led to radical changes in the international arena. The new balance of forces was characterized by the growing superiority of international socialism over imperialism. The forces of peace gained a real opportunity to narrow substantially the field of activity of the forces of war and aggression. Particularly after the USSR developed nuclear missiles, imperialism's reliance on a world thermonuclear war as a means of achieving political objectives became untenable. All of these changes created the preconditions for a substantial broadening of the framework and content of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The world communist movement endorsed the fundamental conclusion reached by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, that the prevention of a new world war is possible. As stated in the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries (1957), the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between the two systems "is a stable basis for the foreign policy of the socialist countries and a reliable basis for peace and friendship of peoples" (*Programmnye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratiyu i sotsializm*, 1964, p. 9). The Statement of the Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties (1960) emphasized that "through the united efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, all countries that oppose war, and all peace-loving forces, a world war can be prevented" (*ibid.*, p. 57). This profound conviction became the basis of the international foreign policy of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces. Favorable conditions for détente and peace in Europe were created by the signing of treaties between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and between Poland and the FRG (1970), the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin (1971), the treaty on the principles of relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the FRG (1972), and the treaty on the normalization of relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the FRG (1973).

Major advances have been made in Soviet-American relations. Both countries are committed to do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Summarizing the results of the implementation of the Peace Program proposed by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, the April 1973 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed the change from the cold war to détente and noted that the principles of peaceful coexistence have received wide recognition as a norm of relations among states with different social systems. The Plenum set the goal of ensuring that the changes achieved in the international situation become irreversible.

The theoretical and political problems associated with the interpretation and embodiment of the principles of peaceful coexistence are focal points of the contemporary ideological struggle. Three groups of ideas are contrary to a correct understanding of peaceful coexistence: right-wing bourgeois ideology, certain liberal bourgeois points of view, and various leftist views.

Right-wing bourgeois ideologists stubbornly adhere to the idea that the policy of peaceful coexistence is a Communist "trap," "ruse," or "tactical maneuver" designed to cover up "the export of revolution." In practice, however, contemporary international relations and all of the actions of the socialist states in foreign policy serve as evidence that the policy of peaceful coexistence is not a tactical device but one of the fundamental elements of the foreign policy strategy of socialism. This strategy, which is oriented toward the attainment of a durable, stable peace, as well as security for the peoples of the world, makes a principled rejection of the export of revolution—that is, the forcible artificial imposition of revolutionary transformations on any people. F. Engels wrote: "The victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.*, 2nd ed., vol. 35, p. 298). V. I. Lenin, who held the same views, wrote that people who believed revolution could break out in a foreign country to order or by agreement were either mad or *provocateurs* (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 36, p. 457). "We exercise our main influence on the international revolution," wrote Lenin, "through our economic policy. . . . The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale" (*ibid.*, vol. 43, p. 341). The policy of peaceful coexistence is the logical culmination of this way of posing the question of world revolution.

Lenin wrote that no forces would have been able to undermine capitalism if it had not been undermined by history. Communists proceed from the premise that the capitalist social structure is doomed by its own internal laws of development. The fate of capitalism will be decided not by the export of revolution but by the class struggle in the capitalist countries.

The liberal group of bourgeois ideologists, and the Social Democrats and revisionists, lean toward a very expansive interpretation of the potential of peaceful coexistence, which is viewed as a way to extinguish the political and ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism and bring about the gradual convergence of the two systems. At best, this point of view is utopian. The struggle of the two systems is rooted in deep-seated social processes and in the opposition of the fundamental principles of the organization of society. Thus, ideological coexistence and the gradual interpenetration of the two social structures are ruled out. The policy of peaceful coexistence does not and cannot solve the cardinal social problems of our time and cannot prevent political and ideological clashes, which may occasionally be very sharp. Indeed, it is not required to solve these problems. It has a very different purpose—to preserve world peace, to prevent a global thermonuclear conflict, and to find mutually acceptable principles for cooperation between socialist and capitalist states.

The third group of false interpretations of the policy of peaceful coexistence is associated with various leftist views. Their spokesmen attempt to prove that in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the socialist countries bar their own way from actively supporting revolutionary processes. Thus, from their point of view, peaceful coexistence contradicts the pursuit of proletarian socialist internationalism and impedes the development of mass anti-imperialist movements. As an alternative to peaceful coexistence they essentially propose increasing international tension, intensifying the confrontation of the two systems, and exporting revolution. Historical experience teaches that peaceful coexistence does not hinder but stimulates the world revolutionary process. In rejecting the export of revolution, victorious socialism is by no means isolating itself from liberation movements. Lenin said that the world socialist revolution "must be helped." However, he immediately added that "we have to know how to help it" (*ibid.*, vol. 35, p. 396).

By pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence and imposing it on imperialism, the socialist countries create favorable preconditions for the rapid development of their economics and for the all-around progress of socialist social relations. The stronger the world socialist system and the more fully its ideals are implemented, the greater its revolutionizing influence on the masses of the working people will be, and the broader the possibilities for supporting revolutionary movements, which is by no means the same as artificially spurring them on. Under the conditions

of peaceful coexistence, imperialism's opportunities for aggressive actions in the international arena and for exporting counter-revolution are sharply curtailed. The policy of peaceful coexistence also influences the domestic situation in capitalist countries. In connection with a conference in Genoa, Lenin declared that it was a task of socialism "to split the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp" (*ibid.*, vol. 44, p. 408). In carrying out this task, the policy of peaceful coexistence promotes the growth of all democratic, anti-imperialist forces. It blocks the imperialists' attempts to overcome internal conflicts, impeding their efforts to aggravate international tension, and it promotes the development of the class struggle against imperialism on a national and worldwide scale. The policy of peaceful coexistence "meets the overall interests of the revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation" (*Mezhdunarodnoe Soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: Dokumenty i materialy*. Moscow, 1969, p. 318).

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Lenin clearly defined the principles on which possible accords between a socialist state and capitalist states should rest. "Of course, an advocate of proletarian revolution may conclude compromises or agreements with capitalists. It all depends on what kind of agreement is concluded and under what circumstances. Here and here alone can and must one look for the difference between an agreement that is legitimate from the angle of the proletarian revolution and one that is treasonable, treacherous (from the same angle)" (*Poln. sobr. soch.*, 5th ed., vol. 40, pp. 289-90). Concretizing his ideas about the "price" of a compromise, Lenin wrote: "We must make it a rule not to make political concessions to the international bourgeoisie . . . unless we receive in return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie to Soviet Russia, or to other contingents of the international proletariat which is fighting capitalism" (*ibid.*, vol. 45, p. 142). Lenin's methodology forms the basis of the practical activities of the USSR and other socialist countries in establishing mutually beneficial cooperation with the capitalist world.

As the main principle of conducting international affairs, the principle of peaceful coexistence is applicable in theory only to relations between the two world systems—capitalism and socialism. In practice, however, there is a tendency to use and to regard peaceful coexistence as a regulatory principle of the entire system of international relations—that is, of relations between states, regardless of their socioeconomic systems. Without disputing the historical validity and political reality of this tendency, it is necessary to emphasize that the highest principle of relations between socialist countries is socialist internationalism. Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence still has meaning in this context. In a sense, it is taken for granted as a natural, minimal basis for relations between states. The center of gravity shifts to mutual assistance among fraternal socialist states on the basis of class solidarity.

With the growth in power and size of the world socialist system, with the deepening of progressive transformations in the Third World countries, with the further strengthening of ties between the socialist and the developing states, the principle of internationalism will play an increasingly important role in the evolution of international relations. Its consistent implementation leads to the creation of additional opportunities for solidifying peace and peaceful coexistence. The converse relationship between the implementation of a policy of peaceful coexistence and the growth of internationalism is not as clear-cut. In some instances, the relaxation of international tension dulls the sense of class solidarity and stimulates a weakening of internationalist bonds. Therefore, a well thought-out, realistic policy of peaceful coexistence that soberly takes into account all the positive and negative aspects of the situation presupposes a purposeful struggle for the further cohesion of the socialist countries and all states actively opposing imperialism.

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A. E. BOVIN [16-929-3]

PELEE, MOUNT (Montagne Pelée), an active volcano on Martinique, in the West Indies. Elevation, 1,397 m. Mount Pelée is known for its catastrophic eruption in 1902, when a heavy hot cloud of ash and volcanic bombs and blocks destroyed the city of St. Pierre and its 26,000 inhabitants. The eruption led to the classification of such volcanoes as Pelean. Mount Pelée was less strongly active in 1929-32. [16-162]-2]

PENNATULARIA (sea pens), an order of marine invertebrates of the class Actinozoa. A colony consists of a large main polyp, which forms the trunk of the colony, and usually numerous small secondary polyps, located on the upper end or on special lateral processes of the main polyp. In the latter case, the colony has the form of a feather. The base of the main polyp is embedded in the sea bottom. There are approximately 300 species of sea pens, distributed predominantly in tropical and subtropical waters from the littoral zone to a depth of 6 km. In the USSR, six species are found in the seas of the Far East, and four in the northern seas (including *Umbellula encrinus*—which is up to 2.6 m tall). Many sea pens are luminescent. [16-1762-1]

PERENNIAL FORAGE GRASSES, herbaceous plants cultivated for livestock feed that have a life span of more than one year. The yearly life cycle of these grasses consists of the following phases: spring sprouting, tillering, heading, flowering, fruiting with repeated tillering, autumn vegetation, and winter dormancy. Plants of the families Gramineae (timothy, foxtail, wheatgrass) and Leguminosae (clover, alfalfa, sainfoin) are among those cultivated most often for forage. Grasses and legumes are generally sown together; this combination favorably affects the quality of the forage and the fertility of the soil. Because of the repeated tillering, it is highly advisable to fertilize perennial forage grasses in the second half of the vegetative stage. [16-1097-2]

PERENNIALS (also perennial plants), herbs and subshrubs that persist through more than two winters. Some perennials live several years, and others 20 to 30 years. Some species have a life-span of 100 years (for example, tau-saghyz). Upon reaching a certain age, perennials may flower and bear fruit every year (polycarpic plants); this contrasts with annuals and biennials (monocarpic plants), which flower and bear fruit only one time. Some perennials retain their leaves year round (evergreens). In unfavorable periods (winter, drought), the leaves and other aboveground organs of most perennials die, and only the underground organs remain alive (rhizomes, tubers, bulbs, and roots). In some perennials the aboveground shoots are partially preserved as well (rosettes, creeping shoots, and the lower parts of erect stems).

Sometimes the division of plants into annuals, biennials, and perennials is conditional. For example, the tropical perennial castor oil plant (*Ricinus communis*) grows as an annual in moderate climates, and annual bluegrass (*Poa annua*), which generally grows on plains, develops as a perennial in the mountains. Trees and shrubs are sometimes referred to as perennials.

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