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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 12/18/2015

**File Folder** USSR (4/4/83) (2)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 24

SKINNER

321

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171522	LETTER	TO SEN. SYMMS (DRAFT)	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 31 AUG 83 13

TO

PRESIDENT

12/8/85 EOB

FROM SYMMS, STEVE

DOCDATE 04 APR 83

SYMMS, STEVE

12 AUG 83

TURNER, PAMELA

24 AUG 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

CO

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE SOVIET VIOLATION OF SALT I ABM TREATY

ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG DUE: 06 SEP 83 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

LEHMAN, C

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

KRAEMER

COMMENTS

REF# 164040

LOG

NSCIFID

( I / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	— 11/4	Recd State draft reply		CL, JM
Kraemer	S 11/7	Memo Kimmitt to Perdicelli	11/10	
	C 11/27	OBE per Kraemer		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

... April 26

Sandie,

All of these actions should be closed out by referencing President's Arms Control Compliance Report of January 23 as having constituted the comprehensive, updated and interagency-cleared response.

Sven

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~  
(Classification)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

12/18/15 KDB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8326578

Date 11/4/83

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: Steve Symms  
Date: Aug. 4, 1983 Subject: Violation of SALT ABM Treaty


WH Referral Dated: Aug. 31, 1983 NSC ID# 8306079  
(if any)

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- x   A draft reply is attached.  
       A draft reply will be forwarded.  
       A translation is attached.  
       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
       Other.

Remarks:

  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~  
(Classification)

DECL: OADR

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171522	LETTER  TO SEN. SYMMS (DRAFT)	4	ND	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

REFERRAL

DATE: 31 AUG 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE DEPT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: SYMMS, STEVE

DATE: 04 APR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

CO

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES RE SOVIET VIOLATION OF SALT I ABM TREATY

-----  
REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 05 SEP 83

COMMENTS:

*Jennifer*

FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ID # 107870

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

100105

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 83108115

Name of Correspondent: Steve Symms

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) PPRES (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Expresses concern over reports of Soviet violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Also raises questions in this regard: Did Soviets admit last fall the construction of a 6th ABM battle-management radar; Would you support Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on military implications of current Soviet ABM activity, and; Do you agree with Ken Duberstein's letter stating the U.S. can propose amendments to the Treaty at any time?

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LADUBE</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>83108115</u>	<u>PT</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>83108215</u>
<u>NS at Sec. Secretariat</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>830825</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>

**ACTION CODES:**

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

**DISPOSITION CODES:**

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: 100105 = 100105 + 100139



# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 1220 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: C0165 Secondary Subject Codes: ND018  
FO006-03 \_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

### SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence
  - n - 0 - Unknown
  - n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
  - n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
  - n - 3 - Ron
  - n - 4 - Dutch
  - n - 5 - Ron Reagan
  - n - 6 - Ronald
  - n - 7 - Ronnie

### CLn - First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

### CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

### MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

6079 11  
ID # 164040  
00165

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 83, 08, 15

Name of Correspondent: Steve Symms

MI Mail Report      User Codes: (A) PRES (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Expresses concern over reports of Soviet violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Also raises questions in this regard: Did Soviets admit last fall the construction of a 6th ABM battle-management radar; Would you support Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on military implications of current Soviet ABM activity, and; Do you agree with Ken Duberstein's letter stating the U.S. can propose amendments to the Treaty at any time?

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LADUBE</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>8310815</u>	<u>PT</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>830824</u>
<u>NS at Secretary's</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>830825</u>			<u>1-1</u>
					<u>1-1</u>
					<u>1-1</u>
					<u>1-1</u>

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
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  - D - Draft Response
  - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
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- X - Interim Reply

- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
  - B - Non-Special Referral
  - C - Completed
  - S - Suspended

**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**  
 Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
 Code = "A"  
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: see id # 135569 & 100139

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 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

12

August 24, 1983

Dear Senator Symms:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your August 12 letter in which you raised additional questions concerning Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.

Let me assure you that your grave concerns have been brought to the President's direct attention, and we have shared with his national security advisers the specific points which you raised. In the interim, please know that your urgent questions are receiving close attention and careful review.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Pamela J. Turner  
Deputy Assistant to the  
President for Legislative  
Affairs (Senate)

The Honorable Steve Symms  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO: CMP: KRJ:

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for DRAFT response

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL

August 24, 1983

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Sincerely,

Pamela J. Turner  
Deputy Assistant to the  
President for Legislative  
Affairs (Senate)

The Honorable Steve Symms  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO: CMP: KRJ:

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for DRAFT response

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1983

64040

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Recent press reports describe a new Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile radar allegedly being built in violation of the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty. These reports suggest the existence of a clear-cut, overt violation of the ABM Treaty entailing as many as five key provisions.

Mr. President, I wrote to you on April 4, 1983 about a whole series of Soviet ABM Treaty violations. I have yet to receive any response. Meanwhile, my constituents have expressed concern about Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Several additional questions have arisen in my mind:

(1) When the second, five-year ABM Treaty review was conducted last fall with the Soviets in the SALT Standing Consultive Commission (SCC), did the Soviets admit to the U.S. that they had a sixth ABM battle-management radar then under construction? If not, does this silence constitute yet another serious case of Soviet deception?

(2) Are there any lessons for the present from Winston Churchill's alarums in the 1930s about Nazi rearmament in violation of several arms control agreements?


(3) Would you support Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on the military implications of current Soviet ABM activity?

(4) A letter to me by Ken Duberstein dated November 10, 1982, states that the U.S. can propose amendments to the Treaty at any time. Do you agree?

Mr. President, thank you for considering these urgent questions.

With Warmest Personal Regards,

(Attachment)  
SS/MD

U.S.S.  


15

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 4, 1983

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I strongly congratulate you on your recent public statements that the Soviets are violating five arms control treaties. You have exercised statesmanlike leadership in the highest tradition of the American Presidency.

You have made the following positive statements on Soviet arms control treaty violations:

1) Soviet violation of the unratified SALT II Treaty.

President Reagan, press breakfast, February 23, 1983, on Soviet flight testing of a second new type ICBM in violation of SALT II:

"...This last one comes the closest to indicating that it is a violation..."

President Reagan, speech, March 31, 1983:

"And I am sorry to say, there have been increasingly serious grounds for questioning their (i.e., Soviet) compliance with the arms control agreements that have already been signed and that we have both pledged to uphold. I may have more to say on this in the near future..."

The Washington Post of April 1, 1983, added:

"Administration officials said the President was referring to reported Soviet deployment of the SS-16 missile and the testing of two types of missiles, instead of one, in violation of the SALT II Treaty."

(Emphasis added.)

The Washington Post of April 3, 1983, noted:

"An interagency study group is likely to report to President Reagan that the Soviet Union has violated the terms of the unratified SALT II Treaty limiting nuclear arms. Administration sources said last night, ...in the panel's thinking, that test (i.e., on February 8 of a second Soviet new type ICBM) is a violation..." (Emphasis added.)

2) Soviet violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of October 28, 1962.

This agreement would "halt further introduction of such weapons systems (i.e., Soviet offensive weapons which Khrushchev defined as including Soviet troops) into Cuba as "firm undertakings" on the part of "both" the U.S. and the Soviet governments. President Reagan press conference, May, 1982:

"...You know, there's been other things we think are violations also of the 1962 Agreement."

3) Soviet violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974

President Reagan stated on March 28, 1983:

"... We have reason to believe that there have been numerous violations..."

4&5) Soviet violations of the Biological and Chemical Warfare Conventions of 1975 and 1925

President Reagan, January 26, 1983:

"...There is overwhelming evidence of Soviet violations of international treaties concerning chemical and biological weapons."

President Reagan, June 17, 1982:

"The Soviet Union and their allies are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925...and the 1972 Biological Warfare Convention. There is conclusive evidence..."

Finally, President Reagan made the following statement on general Soviet compliance with arms control treaties, May 9, 1982:

"So far, the Soviet Union has used arms control negotiations primarily as an instrument to restrict U.S. defense programs and in conjunction with their own arms buildup, as a means to enhance Soviet power and prestige. Unfortunately, for some time suspicions have grown that the Soviet Union has not been living up to its obligations under existing arms control treaties."

In view of your above positive statements, I am puzzled, however, by an article in The Washington Post of April 2, 1983. It was reported by White House spokesmen that you met privately with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin sometime in February. The meeting was intended "to assure him (Dobrynin) of U.S. determination to improve East-West relations," according further to White House officials. Your above statements on Soviet arms control violations suggest that it is the Soviets who should be the diplomatic demandeurs for better relations, not the U.S. Indeed, it would be disappointing if you did not mention the pattern of Soviet arms control non-compliance at this meeting.

In March, 1983, Henry Kissinger, writing in Time, said in regard to the Soviet response to his own arms control proposals:

"...One of three conclusions is inescapable:  
a) Their (Soviet) arms program aims for strategic superiority if not by design, then by momentum;  
b) they believe strategic edges can be translated into political advantages; c) arms control to the Soviets is an aspect of political warfare whose aim is not reciprocal stability but unilateral advantage."

Kissinger's assessment of Soviet arms control behavior, especially as applied to the history of arms control, is sound.

Mr. President, on May 12, 1981, twenty-one Senators wrote to you inquiring about whether Soviet construction of five large Anti-Ballistic Missile Battle Management Radars violated the 1972 ABM Treaty. (letter attached.) In early January, 1981, the Joints Chiefs of Staff reported to Congress that :



"Soviet phased array radars, which may be designed to improve impact predictions and target handling capabilities for ABM battle management, are under construction at various locations throughout the USSR. These radars could perform some battle management functions as well as provide redundant ballistic missile early warning coverage. The first of these radars is expected to become operational in the early 1980s." (Emphasis added.)

Article I of the ABM Treaty states:

"...Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense..." (Emphasis added.)

The above JCS statement, made at the end of the Carter Administration, strongly implies that the Soviets are in violation of Article I of the ABM Treaty, by deploying ABM Battle Management Radars which are a base for a defense of its national territory.

For a year, no answer was received to the May 12, 1981 letter from 21 Senators. In early 1982, another letter was sent to you requesting that you answer the May 12, 1981 letter from the 21 Senators. Still, there is no answer to the May 12, 1981 letter -- almost two years later.

On September 15, 1982 The Washington Times reported a John Lofton interview with the chief architect of the SALT I ABM Treaty, Dr. Henry Kissinger. Kissinger was asked if the Soviets had ever violated the ABM Treaty. Kissinger answered: "On actual violations, I'm familiar with one..." This Soviet ABM Treaty violation was, he explained, Soviet flight-testing of Surface to Air Missiles in the prohibited ABM mode. Thus, the Soviets have already violated the ABM Treaty, in the opinion of Kissinger, whose reference was to over 50 illegal SAM-5 ABM mode tests between 1973 and 1975.

On September 16, 1982, three Senators wrote to you requesting that you delay the second five-year review of the ABM Treaty scheduled for last November. (This letter is also enclosed.) We requested that the review be deferred until after the MX deployment decision was made, in order to keep open the option to deploy an ABM defense around MX. But the recommendation of our letter was ignored, and the ABM Treaty review proceeded as scheduled, reportedly between November 9 and December 15, 1982 in the SALT Standing Consultative Commission.

The March, 1983 issue of the Heritage Foundation's National Security Record reports on page 5 that the State Department stated:

"The U.S. and the Soviet Union...announced the completion of their review of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty."

But this review was conducted totally in secret with the Russians. Your long standing failure to answer the letter to the 21 Senators questioning Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty may help to explain why the review was conducted in secret. Is it possible that the U.S. has again acquiesced in Soviet SALT violations? But the Senate's Constitutional role in treaty-making and appropriations for the "Common Defense" suggests that a report to the Senate on Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty would be warranted. Indeed, there are serious questions raised by the delay in such a report and the secret nature of the ABM Treaty review.

Another factor also suggests the advisability of a report to the Senate on Soviet ABM Treaty compliance. Soviet leader Yuri Andropov recently unjustifiably stated that your recently announced U.S. space-based ABM concept is a U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty. It would be ironic if it turned out that the Soviet Union was violating the ABM Treaty today in the present, while falsely accusing the U.S. of ABM Treaty violations which were still in the conceptual phase and 15 to 20 years away from development or deployment. Thus, a Presidential report to the Senate on Soviet compliance could affect the debate over a U.S. space-based ABM defense, and other defense and arms control proposals.

There is a further matter of concern. The Wall Street Journal of Friday, March 25, 1983, reported:

"There is even a possibility that the Soviets themselves are in violation of the ABM Treaty, or nearly so, with a missile, the SA-12, soon to be in production, that may have the capability of intercepting ICBMs."

Mr. President, the above concerns require me to reiterate the questions raised in the May 12, 1981 letter from 21 Senators, and to add some new questions. I request that you answer these questions as soon as possible, so that the Senate can more fully deliberate on the requirements for the "Common Defense:"

- 1) Do the five Soviet ABM Battle Management Radar by now almost completed provide a base for a Soviet nationwide ABM defense? Do they violate Article I of the ABM Treaty?

- 2) Did the numerous ABM-mode tests of the Soviet SAM-5 between 1973 and 1975 violate the ABM Treaty, as even Dr. Kissinger has conceded?
- 3) Do the Soviets have in series production and deployment around Moscow a mobile or a rapidly deployable new ABM system, the ABM-3? Are mobile ABMs banned by the ABM Treaty? Does this production of a rapidly deployable or mobile ABM also provide them with the base for a nationwide ABM defense, also in violation of Article I?
- 4) Did the Soviets test the SAM-10 in a prohibited ABM mode?
- 5) Has the SAM-12 been tested in an ABM mode, and is it capable of intercepting ballistic missile re-entry vehicles? Does the Intelligence Community believe that the SAM-12 can intercept Pershing re-entry vehicles? Are Pershing re-entry vehicles similar to Poseidon and Trident I SLBM re-entry vehicles? Is the SAM-12 therefore an ABM system, which is mobile and about to be deployed nationwide?
- 6) Do the five ABM Battle Management Radars have the capability to contribute to the use of SAM-5s, SAM-10s, SAM-12s, and ABM-3s as ABM interceptors in a nationwide ABM defense? If the five ABM Battle Management Radars and the SAM and ABM interceptor systems are being mass produced and widely deployed, do the Soviets now have a nationwide ABM defense in violation of the ABM Treaty? Have they already broken out of the ABM Treaty?
- 7) Have the Soviets violated the ABM Treaty with SAM upgrade tests (as Henry Kissinger has conceded), ABM Battle Management Radars, ABM camouflage and concealment, creation of a new ABM test range without prior agreement, and falsification of ABM deactivation?
- 8) If the Soviets have violated the ABM Treaty, why have you never answered the letter from the 21 Senators? Has there been a cover-up of Soviet SALT violations?
- 9) Did the last ABM Treaty review conclude that the Soviets have violated the ABM Treaty? If not, why not? If so, why was this not reported to the Senate and the American people?

Thank you, Mr. President, for your prompt answers to these important questions.

Very respectfully,

  
Steve Symms  
United States Senator

21

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 16, 1982

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We believe that it is strategically and politically unwise for the September 1982 ABM Treaty review with the Soviets to occur before the December 1, 1982 MX deployment decision. We request that you postpone the ABM Treaty review until after the MX deployment decision is made, so as to ensure that all options for defending America's number one defense program are protected.

It is now time to make a hard decision on compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty versus MX deployment. In view of the Administration's decisions to redesign the B-1B bomber to comply with SALT II, to unilaterally deactivate 292 strategic delivery vehicles counted in SALT II, to limit the MX throw-weight and payload in accordance with SALT II, and to accept cancellation of deployment of 50 Minuteman III ICBMs in accordance with SALT II, we are concerned that SALT II may also constrain MX Densepack deployment. Are you willing to set aside SALT II and renegotiate the SALT I ABM Treaty, in order to deploy the MX in the densepack mode with an ABM defense?

With warmest personal regards,

Steve Symms Jesse Helms  
John East

US 22  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 10, 1982

Dear Senator Symms:


On behalf of the President, I would like to respond further to your recent letter concerning the ABM Treaty Review. As you know, Article XIV of the ABM Treaty calls for a review of the Treaty every five years. Since the last review took place in the autumn of 1977, we agreed with the Soviets last June that the next review would begin a few days following the Standing Consultative Commission's current session, which began on September 14. In addition, a review of issues connected with Article XI of the Treaty will be conducted during the current round of the START negotiations which began on October 6.

While it is not feasible or desirable to delay initiation of the ABM Treaty Review, the United States will not take any actions at the review which would restrict our ability to provide for the security of our Nation. The Administration is approaching this review with care and caution to ensure that we do not foreclose any options which we may want to exercise during our strategic modernization program. In this connection, it should be noted that, although the current review will be under way before important decisions about MX are completed, we retain the right to propose amendments to the Treaty at any time. Indeed, on the sole occasion so far on which the Treaty has been modified (by the Protocol of 1974), the amendment was proposed and negotiated through diplomatic channels and not during a formal review conference.

Thank you again for apprising us of your concerns.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Kenneth M. Duberstein  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Steve Symms  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

ID: 164040 BASIC CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING PAGE A01  
OP ID: TR REC TYPE: IBA INCOMING/OUTGOING  
RECEIVED: 830815 DOC DATE: 830812 CREATED: UPDATED:  
STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN OFFICE: PRREAG

(PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST) (SUFFIX)  
THE HONORABLE STEVE SYMMS  
TITLE:

ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES SENATE

STREET:

CITY: WASHINGTON STATE: DC ZIP: 20510

COUNTRY:

SALUTATION: SPOUSE:

ADDITIONAL NAMES: MEDIA: L INDIV CODES: 1220

SUBJECT CODES: CO 165 ND 018 FO 006-03

REPORT CODE: USER CODE: PRES

SUBJ/DESC: EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER REPORTS OF SOVIET  
VIOLATION OF THE SALT I ABM TREATY. ALSO  
RAISES QUESTIONS IN THIS REGARD: DID SOVIETS  
ADMIT LAST FALL THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 6TH ABM

20

ID: 164040 BASIC CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING PAGE A02  
OP ID: TR REC TYPE: IBA INCOMING/OUTGOING  
RECEIVED: 830815 DOC DATE: 830812 CREATED: UPDATED:  
STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN OFFICE: PRREAG

(PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST) (SUFFIX)  
THE HONORABLE STEVE SYMMS  
TITLE:

ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES SENATE

STREET:

CITY: WASHINGTON STATE: DC ZIP: 20510  
COUNTRY:

SALUTATION: SPOUSE:  
ADDITIONAL NAMES: MEDIA: L INDIV CODES:

SUBJECT CODES: CO 165

REPORT CODE: USER CODE:

SUBJ/DESC: BATTLE-MANAGEMENT RADAR; WOULD YOU SUPPORT  
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON  
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT SOVIET  
ABM ACTIVITY, AND; DO YOU AGREE WITH KEN

25

ID: 164040 BASIC CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING PAGE A03  
OP ID: TR REC TYPE: IBA INCOMING/OUTGOING  
RECEIVED: 830815 DOC DATE: 830812 CREATED: UPDATED:  
STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN OFFICE: PRREAG

(PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST) (SUFFIX)  
THE HONORABLE STEVE SYMMS  
TITLE:

ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES SENATE

STREET:

CITY: WASHINGTON STATE: DC ZIP: 20510

COUNTRY:

SALUTATION:

SPOUSE:

ADDITIONAL NAMES: MEDIA: L INDIV CODES:

SUBJECT CODES: CO 165

REPORT CODE:

USER CODE:

SUBJ/DESC: DUBERSTEIN'S LETTER STATING THE U.S. CAN  
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY AT ANY TIME?