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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File

**Folder Title:**

USSR (04/02/1983) (1 of 2)

**Box:** RAC Box 24

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

<b>Collection Name</b>	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE	<b>Withdrawer</b>
		KDB 12/18/2015
<b>File Folder</b>	USSR (4/2/83) (1)	<b>FOIA</b>
		F03-002/5
<b>Box Number</b>	24	SKINNER
		318
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages

171485 REPORT	FBIS 22	2 4/2/1983 B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>
171486 REPORT	FBIS 24	2 4/2/1983 B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>
171487 REPORT	FBIS 26	2 4/2/1983 B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>
171488 REPORT	FBIS 27	2 4/2/1983 B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>
171489 REPORT	FBIS 29	2 4/2/1983 B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>
171490 REPORT	FBIS 31	2 4/2/1983 B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>
171491 REPORT	FBIS 32	2 4/2/1983 B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171492 REPORT	FBIS 33	2	4/2/1983	B3
	<b>R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171493 REPORT	FBIS 36	2	4/2/1983	B3
	<b>R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171494 REPORT	FBIS (UNNUMBERED)	2	4/2/1983	B3
	<b>R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171495 REPORT	FBIS 45	2	4/2/1983	B3
	<b>R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171496 REPORT	FBIS 46	2	4/2/1983	B3
	<b>R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171497 REPORT	FBIS 52	3	4/2/1983	B3
	<b>R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171498 REPORT	FBIS 53	2	4/2/1983	B3
	<b>R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			

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171499 REPORT	FBIS 54	2	4/2/1983	B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171500 REPORT	FBIS 55	2	4/2/1983	B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171501 REPORT	FBIS 56	2	4/2/1983	B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			
171502 REPORT	FBIS 57	2	4/2/1983	B3
<b>R</b>	<b>1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-9-1-1</b>			

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	171485 REPORT FBIS 22	2	4/2/1983	B3

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171485

FBI'S 22 (SUB FOR 13, 14)

GROMYKO HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

TAKE 1 -- GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE

LIM20843 MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 0700 GMT 2 APR 83

(PRESS CONFERENCE BY ANDREY ANDREYEVICH GROMYKO, - CPSU  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO MEMBER, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE  
USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND USSR FOREIGN MINISTER, IN THE  
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESS CENTER IN MOSCOW --  
LIVE)

(TEXT) FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO GREET THE ESTEEMED  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION. AS FOR  
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, FIRST OF ALL I WOULD  
LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT -- NOT A VERY LONG ONE -- ABOUT CERTAIN  
QUESTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE FOREIGN POLICY  
OF THE SOVIET UNION. AFTER THAT THERE WILL BE A QUESTION AND  
ANSWER SESSION. THOSE PRESENT MAY PUT ANY QUESTION AND I WILL  
TRY TO ANSWER THEM. THE QUESTIONS MAY BE POSED IN WRITTEN  
FORM OR ORALLY. ALL OF THEM WILL HAVE EQUAL VALIDITY. IF  
THERE ARE NO OTHER WISHES, WE WILL CONSIDER THAT THE MODE OF  
ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

WHAT WOULD I LIKE TO SAY AT THE BEGINNING OF MY STATEMENT?  
THE REASON, AS IT WERE, FOR THE PRESS CONFERENCE IS THE LATEST  
SPEECHES BY THE U.S. PRESIDENT. NOT ONLY THE LATEST ONES,  
BUT MAINLY THE LATEST ONES. HE HAS TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF  
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, THE  
UNITED STATES' AND THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICY. HE ALMOST NEVER  
FAILS TO SPEAK ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICY. THIS IS NOT  
THE ONLY REASON FOR THE PRESS CONFERENCE. CERTAIN OTHER  
QUESTIONS HAVE ACCUMULATED THAT CERTAINLY NEED COVERAGE IN THE  
PRESS AND ON RADIO AND TELEVISION.

RCM HAS SEEN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLR 012-346-249-1-1

BY C/N NARADATE 1/3/12

WHAT DID THE U.S. PRESIDENT DRAW ATTENTION TO, FIRST AND FOREMOST, IN HIS SPEECHES - IN BOTH HIS RECENT SPEECHES THE SPEECH ON 30 MARCH AND, I WOULD SAY, THE 1 APRIL SPEECH -- IF YOU GO BY EUROPEAN TIME? THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY THE UNITED STATES, OR RATHER THE CURRENT U.S. ADMINISTRATION, PURSUES LOFTY MORAL VALUES, SEEKS TO DEFEND AND PROTECT THE PEOPLES' RIGHTS, AND SEEKS TO PROPERLY DEFEND U.S. INTERESTS WHEREVER THEY MIGHT BE, IN WHATEVER PART OF THE EARTH THESE INTERESTS MIGHT BE.

OF COURSE, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAS HAD AND CONTINUES TO HAVE HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF BOTH THESE AND OTHER THINGS. HIGH MORAL VALUES CANNOT BE DEFENDED BY A STATE THAT IS PREPARING FOR WAR, ABOVE ALL NUCLEAR WAR. INDEED, EVERYONE PRESENT AND EVERY HONEST PERSON, IF HE CONSIDERS WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEFEND HIGH MORAL VALUES AT THE PRESENT TIME AND AT THE SAME TIME PREPARE FOR A NUCLEAR WAR THAT WOULD CONSUME HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE -- AND MANY POLITICIANS AND ALMOST ALL SCIENTISTS ARE NOW CORRECTLY SAYING THAT THIS WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE FOR THE WHOLE OF EARTH'S CIVILIZATION.  
(SENTENCE AS HEARD)

I WOULD GO FURTHER AND SAY THAT A GOVERNMENT THAT IS PREPARING FOR NUCLEAR WAR AT THE PRESENT TIME IS NOT ENTITLED TO SPEAK ABOUT DEFENDING HIGH MORAL VALUES IN CONNECTION WITH ITS FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES. CONCERNING THE DEFENSE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS, THIS WOULD BE FINE IF IT WERE A QUESTION OF DEFENDING THE UNITED STATES' LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND, INDEED, WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT HOW WASHINGTON UNDERSTANDS THE FORMULA FOR DEFENDING U.S. INTERESTS IS NOW WIDELY KNOWN -- AND IN GENERAL THERE ARE FEW PEOPLE IN THE WORLD WHO ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS. IN THIS WAY IT COMES OUT THAT ANY CORNER OF THE WORLD WHERE WASHINGTON SIMPLY CONSIDERS THAT SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO OBTAIN SOMETHING IN THE MATERIAL, POLITICAL AND, EVEN MORE SO, MILITARY-STRATEGIC REGARD IS DECLARED A PLACE WHERE AMERICAN INTERESTS EXIST THAT NEED TO BE DEFENDED WITH EVERY FORCE, INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE.

(MORE)

02 APR 1112Z NB/MJ

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	<i>Document Description</i>			
	171486 REPORT FBIS 24	2	4/2/1983	B3

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(7/14/86)

FBIS 24

TAKE 2 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE.

L1020939

(TEXT) IF I WERE TO USE CONCRETE FACTS, IT WOULD REQUIRE MUCH TIME -- VERY MUCH TIME. LET EVERYONE HERE THINK ONLY ABOUT THE PERSIAN GULF ZONE AND THE WATERS ADJACENT TO THE PERSIAN GULF. THEN HE WILL MOST LIKELY RECEIVE A FAIRLY CONVINCING ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN, THE PEOPLES' RIGHTS. IN ITSELF, THE FORMULA IS A GOOD ONE; THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THE SOVIET NATION, OUR COUNTRY AND LEADERSHIP, HAVE NEVER OBJECTED TO THE FACT THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF EACH STATE SHOULD BE STEEPED, IF ONE CAN PUT IT THAT WAY, IN THE IDEA OF DEFENDING THE PEOPLES' RIGHTS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, DEFENDING THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

SINCE THE DAYS OF LENIN, THAT DEMAND OF THE PEOPLES' RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN HAS BEEN AN INSEPARABLE PART OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. BUT WE ARE WELL AWARE OF HOW THAT FORMULA -- NOT A BAD ONE IN ITSELF, EVEN A GOOD ONE -- IS EXPLOITED WHEN OTHER INTERESTS ARE DOMINANT IN POLITICS, HOW THE TRUE CONTENT OF THE FORMULA OF DEFENDING PEOPLES' RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, IS EMASCULATED AND OTHER DEMANDS ARE SUBSTITUTED -- DEMANDS THAT SUIT A CERTAIN POWER'S POLITICAL, MILITARY-STRATEGIC AND, NOT LASTLY, ECONOMIC PURPOSES.

WHAT CAN BE SAID OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY? OUR FOREIGN POLICY, THE SOVIET UNION'S FOREIGN POLICY, IS DEFINED BY THE CONGRESSES OF OUR PARTY, THE RULING PARTY, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND DECISIONS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IT IS EXPRESSED IN MANY OF OUR ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE MAJOR ACTIONS THAT WE WOULD THINK ARE FAMILIAR TO EVERYONE.

3  
RECORDED / RELEASED  
NLRB FILE # 748-279-1-1  
BY CN NARA DATE 1/13/12

IT IS REFLECTED IN OUR STATESMEN'S SPEECHES ON CONCRETE ISSUES OF POLICY, ON CONCRETE PROPOSALS -- ABOVE ALL IN THE SPEECHES BY YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I THINK YOU REMEMBER THOSE SPEECHES, MOST OF WHICH WERE MADE RECENTLY. IT IS A PEACEFUL POLICY, A POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP AMONG PEOPLES. IT IS A POLICY OF NONINTERFERENCE IN OTHER STATES' INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT IS A POLICY AIMED AT RELAXING TENSION IN THE WORLD AND ELIMINATING TENSION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IT IS AIMED AT REVERSING THE MINDLESS ARMS RACE AND, ABOVE ALL, ARRIVING AT WAYS TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ARMAMENTS, WHICH IS A GOOD FORMULA, AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, WAYS TO ELIMINATE ARMAMENTS. FOR SOME REASON, IN THE WEST THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CONCERNING UNIVERSAL AND FULL DISARMAMENT IS NOT CURRENTLY SPOKEN OR WRITTEN ABOUT.

I WOULD EMPHASIZE THIS IN FRONT OF EVERYONE HERE: AFTER THE END OF THE WORLD WAR II, THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED TWO THINGS THAT WILL GO DOWN IN HISTORY IN LETTERS OF GOLD -- AND IT CAN BE SAID THAT IT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED. THE FIRST CONCERNED CONCLUDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION BANNING THE APPLICATION AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PERPETUITY. SECOND, THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED FULL AND UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT.

IT EMERGED THAT OTHER STATES INTENDED TO DRAG OUT THE PROCESS OF DECIDING ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS, ON VARIOUS PRETEXTS -- HOW TO DEFINE RATIOS, HOW TO APPROACH REDUCTION IN WEAPONS OF THE TYPE OR ANOTHER, PRECISELY AND HOW TO COMBINE ALL THIS. UNDER THE PRETEXT OF COMPLEXITY THEY BEGAN TO FRUSTRATE THE SOLUTION OF THE TASK. THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED: LET US CUT SHORT THE DISPUTES. LET US WORK TOWARDS FULL AND UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT.

(MORE)

02 APR 1140Z PL5/MJ

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	171487 REPORT	2	4/2/1983	B3
	FBIS 26			

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171487

FBI 26

TAKE 3 -- 22 (GRONYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///AND UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT.

LIV2113

(TEXT) THEN OUR PARTNERS BEGAN TO ASK HOW CAN WE IMPLEMENT FULL AND UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT WITHOUT BEING CONVINCED THAT IT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED IN PRACTICE? IN OTHER WORDS, THEY RAISED THE QUESTION OF CONTROL, THINKING THAT HERE THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE LEANED ON AND MADE TO FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE. THE SOVIET UNION THEN PROPOSED FULL AND UNIVERSAL CONTROL. FULL AND UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT MUST BE COMBINED WITH FULL AND UNIVERSAL CONTROL. THIS PROPOSAL OF OURS REMAINS IN FORCE TODAY. I REPEAT: IN THE WEST IT IS NOT CUSTOMARY TO WRITE ABOUT THIS. A PITY! YET THE REASON IT IS NOT WRITTEN ABOUT IS MORE OR LESS UNDERSTANDABLE: IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL AND UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PURSUING A POLICY OF PREPARING FOR WAR, IMPLEMENTING THE ARMS RACE, ESCALATING MILITARY BUDGETS AND SO ON.

I SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS THESE TWO THINGS AT THE VERY BEGINNING. FURTHER, I SHOULD LIKE TO TELL THOSE PRESENT THAT RECENTLY THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED STEPS THAT NOBODY HAS THE RIGHT TO IGNORE WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR OWN FEEBLENESS, IF YOU LIKE, AND UNCONDITIONAL, OPEN -- I REPEAT: OPEN -- ADHERENCE TO MILITARIST POLICY.

5  
DECLASSIFIED/2005  
NLRR 112-746-249-1-1  
NY CN MARA DATE 11/3/2

WHAT ARE THESE STEPS? FIRST, THE SOVIET UNION HAS UNILATERALLY PLEDGED THAT IT WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT DID NOT WAIT FOR OTHER POWERS' AGREEMENT TO THIS. THIS STEP IS RESOLUTE AND BOLD. I THINK THAT EVERYONE PRESENT WILL PROBABLY AGREE WITH THIS. THE OTHER POWERS ARE NOT EVEN MAKING THE SLIGHTEST MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION AND YET THE SOVIET UNION PLEDGES NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. YES, IT IS A BOLD, PEACE-LOVING STEP. IN THE WEST THEY ARE NOT VERY KEEN ON COVERING THIS PROBLEM. THAT IS A PITY.

SECOND: AT THE SESSION OF THE CONSULTATIVE POLITICAL COMMITTEE THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE WARSAW PACT ADOPTED A DECISION TO PROPOSE A TREATY TO THE NATO COUNTRIES ON THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS -- NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY -- NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THAT IS, NOT TO USE FORCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES.

WHY SHOULD SUCH A PROPOSAL BE MADE IN THIS FORM? BECAUSE IN THE WEST THERE HAS BEEN VERY MUCH DEMAGOGUERY REGARDING THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT ATTACK ONE STATE OR ANOTHER OR A GROUP OF STATES -- THAT IT COULD CARRY OUT AGGRESSION, AND NOT NECESSARILY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT COULD DO THIS USING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. I REPEAT: OF COURSE, THIS WAS DEMAGOGUERY. BUT UNINFORMED PEOPLE, PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT EXPERIENCED IN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, COULD BE MISLED BY THIS. THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES' PROPOSALS KNOCK OUT THE ARGUMENT -- KNOCK OUR OPPONENTS' (PROTIIVNIKI) ARGUMENT COMPLETELY OUT OF HAND.

EVEN TODAY WE ARE READY TO SIT WITH THE NATO COUNTRIES AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, DISCUSS THIS ISSUE AND, EVEN BETTER, SIGN THE RELEVANT DOCUMENT. THE TREATY WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS NOT TO USE FORCE AGAINST EACH OTHER. HOW THEY REACT -- I THINK THOSE HERE HAVE A GENERAL IDEA OF HOW THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, THE NATO COUNTRIES, REACT TO THIS PROPOSAL OF OURS.

(MORE)

02 APR 1220Z NB/MJ

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17488

FBI 27

TAKE 4 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///PROPOSAL OF OURS.

LIN21114

(TEXT) MOST OF THEM GIVE US REPLIES OF THIS SORT -- THAT THE PROPOSAL IS BEING STUDIED. BUT HOW MUCH TIME HAS PASSED, AND STILL IT IS BEING STUDIED. NOT SO LONG AGO, I WAS IN WEST GERMANY. CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ALSO DECLARE THAT THE PROPOSAL IS BEING STUDIED. SO IT IS IN THE OTHER COUNTRIES, AND THAT IS WHAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO SAY.

THERE IS A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT REACTION FROM AMERICAN STATESMEN. THEY ARE NOT GIVING AN OFFICIAL, FINAL, NEGATIVE RESPONSE -- THEY ARE HOLDING BACK FROM THAT. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS A TACTICAL CONSIDERATION. FROM THE SEPARATE HINTS THAT ARE BEING GIVEN, ONE CAN DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPOSAL IS NOT TO WASHINGTON'S LIKING. WE ARE SORRY IF THAT IS THE CASE. ONE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THIS PROPOSAL BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WILL FIND UNDERSTANDING, WILL BE ATTENTIVELY EXAMINED. IF THERE ARE ANY QUESTIONS TO BE PUT TO US, WE ARE READY TO MEET TOGETHER TO EXAMINE THOSE QUESTIONS, AND PERHAPS THEY WILL BE REMOVED OR (?TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION). PERHAPS THERE ARE SOME SORT OF AMENDMENTS; WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS SUCH AMENDMENTS TOGETHER. PERHAPS FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, THEY OR SOME OF THEM, WILL BE ACCEPTED. PERHAPS THERE ARE PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE SOME OF THE FORMULATIONS CONCERNING THE VARIOUS PARTIES' PLEDGES -- WE ARE ALSO READY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THOSE MATTERS. PERHAPS THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WILL LEAD TO THE TREATY'S BEING AMENDED; BUT IN THE END A COMMON LANGUAGE WILL HAVE BEEN FOUND.

REF ID: A62746247-1-1  
EX-CLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/12/2023

8

COMRADES AND GENTLEMEN, HERE ONE HAS TWO THINGS. IF THERE IS THE WILL FOR PEACE, THERE IS NO CONVINCING ARGUMENT AGAINST ACCEPTING THIS PROPOSAL. JUST THINK. THIS IS A PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO WAR, THAT ONE STATE OR GROUP OF STATES SHOULD NOT USE FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER STATE OR ANOTHER GROUP OF STATES. CAN THERE REALLY BE ANY SENSIBLE OBJECTION TO SUCH A PROPOSAL IF PEOPLE, IF MANKIND WISH TO LIVE IN PEACE? NO. THERE CAN BE NO SENSIBLE OBJECTIONS. IT IS CONFRONTED BY THE COURSE TOWARD THE ARMS RACE, THE COURSE TOWARD MILITARIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND LIFE AS A WHOLE, THE COURSE TOWARD PREPARATION FOR WAR -- AND ONLY THAT, ONLY THAT. WE ADDRESS OUR PROPOSAL -- A PROPOSAL THAT, WE SAY, EXPRESSES THE WILL OF THE PEOPLES OF THE SOCIALIST STATES; -- TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND, OF COURSE, TO THE PEOPLES, AND APPEAL TO THEM TO WEIGH EVERYTHING UP AND TO COME TO A FINAL CONCLUSION. AND THE PROPOSAL WE HAVE MADE WILL BE RECORDED IN GOLD LETTERS IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

CERTAIN MATTERS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE GLOBAL SENSE -- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS -- AND EUROPEAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- HAVE NOW, OF COURSE, COME TO THE FOREFRONT. THEY ARE NOW IN THE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE. THE PEOPLES, POLITICIANS AND PUBLIC FIGURES IN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ACTIVELY CONCERNED WITH THEM BECAUSE ALL THE PEOPLES AND POLITICIANS REALIZE WHAT KIND OF ISSUES THEY ARE: WHAT THEIR INFLUENCE IS, HOW THEY COULD BE RESOLVED OR FAIL TO BE RESOLVED, AND WHAT THAT ENTRAILS.

(MORE)

02 APR 1238Z PLS/MJ

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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	171489 REPORT FBIS 29	2	4/2/1983	B3

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#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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171489

FBI'S 29

TAKE 5 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///WHAT THAT ENTAILS.

LB021118

171489  
OCT  
NLR-748-249-1-1  
BY CV NARA DATE 1/3/12

(TEXT) I WOULD LIKE TO DWELL ON THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IN CONNECTION WITH THE TALKS BEING HELD BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES AND ON HOW WE PERCEIVE THE NEAR FUTURE AND HOW WE ASSESS THE CURRENT SITUATION REGARDING IT. ONE WOULD FIRST AND FOREMOST LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE INCORRECTNESS OF ASSERTIONS BEING MADE IN WASHINGTON THAT, IN GENERAL, SERIOUS TALKS ARE UNDERWAY IN GENEVA, THAT THERE ARE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS AND THAT THE THING IS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION, TO HARDEN THE POSITION, AND THEN THINGS WILL START ROLLING. THEY EVEN GO FURTHER AND SAY, THE MORE PRESSURE WE PUT ON THE USSR, THE GREATER THE CHANCE OF REACHING AN ACCORD. THIS IS REFLECTED IN CONCRETE PROPOSALS BEING PROPOSED DURING THE COURSE OF THE TALKS. SUCH STATEMENT CONTAIN A GREAT MANY UNTRUTHS, FALSE ASSERTIONS, CHEATING AND JUGGLING OF FACTS, INASMUCH AS WHAT WE ARE DEALING WITH IS FACTUAL DATA AND IT IS NECESSARY TO DWELL ON THE MATTER. ABOVE ALL, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DWELL UPON AN ASSERTION THAT HAS BEEN FORMULATED WITH THE GREATEST PRECISION IN THE RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT, THE ASSERTION ALLEGING THAT HIS PROPOSALS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE THE WAY TOWARD AN AGREEMENT AND THE WAY TOWARD PEACE.

NO THAT IS AN INCORRECT ASSERTION. IT IS NOT THE WAY TO PEACE, AND NOT THE WAY TO AGREEMENT. THE GAP BETWEEN AGREEMENT AND THOSE PROPOSALS WILL BECOME EVEN WIDER.

DOES NOT EVERYONE KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT IS LEAVING ASIDE ENTIRE COMPONENTS OF HUGE SCALE AND SIGNIFICANCE? HE LEAVES THEM ASIDE AND DOES NOT TOUCH ON THEM. I REFER TO AVIATION, AIRCRAFT THAT ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CARRIERS. THEY ARE MISSING IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS AND REASONING. NEITHER POLITICAL NOR MILITARY FIGURES HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE THAT COMPONENT FROM THE TALKS AND FROM THE AGREEMENTS. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE TO PEOPLE WHETHER THEY DIE FROM A NUCLEAR CHARGE DELIVERED BY A MISSILE OR A NUCLEAR CHARGE DELIVERED BY AN AIRPLANE? ISN'T IT WELL-KNOWN THAT WHAT WAS DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI WAS DROPPED FROM AN AIRPLANE? BUT NOW MORE TERRIBLE WEAPONS EXIST THAT CAN BE DELIVERED BY AIRCRAFT. HOW CAN THIS ENTIRE COMPONENT BE EXCLUDED?

= =

THE DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA TRIED TO DISCUSS THAT MATTER. THEY APPROACHED IT. HOWEVER, NOTHING EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSSION. WHY? BECAUSE THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE MATTER. FOR EXAMPLE, I WILL CITE THIS EXAMPLE: YOU SEE, THEY SAY THERE ARE MEDIUM-RANGE AIRCRAFT THAT CAN DELIVER BOTH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND COMPLETELY PEACEFUL OBJECTS. THEY CAN HAVE BOTH A MILITARY PURPOSE AND A PEACEFUL PURPOSE. THEREFORE, THEY CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CARRIERS. BUT THAT IS THE SAME IF SOMEBODY WERE TO SAY THAT THE MOST POWERFUL, TERRIBLE -- LET'S SAY GROUND-BASED -- BALLISTIC MISSILE CAN BE DESCRIBED IN THIS WAY: TRUE, IT CAN DELIVER A NUCLEAR CHARGE, BUT IT CAN ALSO BE USED FOR METEOROLOGICALAIMS. AND THEREFORE, IT IS BETTER NOT TO INCLUDE IT IN THE NUMBER OF THOSE THAT COULD DELIVER NUCLEAR CHARGES.

THEREFORE, IT IS ABSURD -- YES, COMPLETELY ABSURD -- BUT INDEED, THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES EXPRESSING THE OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DECLARE SUCH A POSITION.

(MORE)

2 APR 1307Z PLS/TM

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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171490

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NIE 748-24-9-1-1

or NARA DATE 1/31/2

FBI 31

TAKE 6 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///SUCH A POSITION.

LIA021158

(TEXT) FURTHER, IN THE WEST THEY HARDLY EVER WRITE ABOUT THAT, AND THEY DO NOT WRITE ABOUT IT AT ALL IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE UNITED STATES POSSESSES AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, AND SEA-BORNE AIRCRAFT. THERE ARE MANY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS -- OR GROUPS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS -- IN THE UNITED STATES. ACCORDING TO THE FIGURES, WHICH ARE WIDELY KNOWN, THERE ARE AT LEAST SIX OF THEM. THEY HAVE TAKEN A LIKING TO EUROPE, BEING DEPLOYED EITHER IN THE WATERS OF EUROPE, IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, OR AROUND IT. THEY COULD CROSS ANY LINE DIVIDING EUROPEAN FROM NON-EUROPEAN WATERS IN MINUTES, IN SECONDS IF YOU LIKE. IT IS A HUGE FORCE, EACH CARRIER HAVING AT LEAST 40 AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- NOTHING OTHER THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SO SURELY WE, THE SOVIET UNION, ARE NOT ABOUT TO SHUT OUR EYES TO THAT, AND NOT COUNT THEM. IT IS ABSURD. THE INTENTIONS OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT, WHICH SUGGESTS WE CLOSE OUR EYES AND NOT SEE THIS, ARE NOT SERIOUS. THEREFORE, ANY PROPOSAL THAT EXCLUDES THE WHOLE, ONE COULD SAY TERRIBLE, COMPONENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, SUCH AS AVIATION, IS NOT A SERIOUS PROPOSAL. AND ONE CANNOT LOOK FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS.

THE SECOND IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE PICTURE -- AND ONE NEEDS TO KNOW THIS, OTHERWISE ONE WOULD GET MUDDLED, BECAUSE SO MANY WORDS ARE SAID, SO MANY STATEMENTS MADE, THAT WITHOUT KNOWING THE SPECIFICS, ONE HAS TO KNOW AT LEAST A MINIMUM. WITHOUT KNOWING A MINIMUM, ONE MIGHT GET MUDDLED, WITHOUT WISHING TO, OF COURSE. BRITAIN AND FRANCE HAVE WEAPONS, MISSILES, NUCLEAR MISSILES. THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE TALKS. ONE CANNOT CLOSE ONE'S EYES TO THEM, AS IF THEY DID NOT EXIST, AND ONLY AGREE ON AMERICAN WEAPONS. FOR THOSE MISSILES THEMSELVES ARE PART OF THE OVERALL FORCES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. HOW MANY DECLARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE OF THAT? HUNDREDS, THOUSANDS, IF YOU WILL, OF DECLARATIONS OF THE MOST SOLEMN NATURE, INCLUDING ONE RECENTLY DURING THE TALKS IN GENEVA. IT WAS DECLARED IN GENEVA THAT, YES, THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF NATO-AS A WHOLE. IT IS BEING PROPOSED THAT WE SEEK AGREEMENT LEAVING ASIDE THOSE NUCLEAR FORCES. NOT A SERIOUS PROPOSAL.

IMAGINE THAT A TERRIBLE TRAGEDY HAS OCCURRED. A BRITISH MISSILE, SAY, IS FLYING WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. WHAT THEN, DO YOU DO? PERHAPS HANG A LABEL ON IT SAYING, I'M BRITISH. BUT IF IT DROPS ITS CHARGE, PEOPLE ARE STILL GOING TO GET KILLED, JUST AS WITH ANY OTHER MISSILE. A FRENCH ONE IS FLYING. IT MAY ALSO BE FLYING WITH A LABEL SAYING, I'M FRENCH -- YOU DON'T COUNT ME. ABSURD. IT WILL KILL PEOPLE JUST THE SAME AS ANY OTHER ONE. THEREFORE, SUCH MISSILES -- BOTH THE ENGLISH AND THE FRENCH -- NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE OVERALL NUMBER. THAT IS THE ONLY POLITICAL APPROACH THAT IS JUSTIFIED. IN THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC RESPECT, SCIENTIFICALLY, TECHNICALLY, AND, HOWEVER YOU WILL, IT IS THE ONLY CORRECT APPROACH. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS IS AS CLEAR AS COULD BE. BUT, EVEN UP TO NOW THE POSITION HAS NOT BEEN CHANGING AND HAS NOT CHANGED, JUDGING BY THE LATEST STATEMENTS BY THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT.

(MORE)

2 APR 1330Z PLS/TH

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	171491 REPORT FBIS 32	2	4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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17491  
13  
FBI 32

TAKE 7 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT.

LID21159

(TEXT) FURTHER -- THIS IS ALSO CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE STATEMENTS REFERRED TO -- THE DEMAND IS MADE: WELL, IF WE'RE TALKING ABOUT ANY REDUCTION OF MISSILES IN EUROPE, BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO REDUCE AND ABOLISH THOSE MISSILES IN EUROPE. IT IS NECESSARY TO ABOLISH THE CORRESPONDING CLASS OF MISSILES IN ASIA AS WELL. WHY ASIA ALL OF A SUDDEN? ASIA WAS PREVIOUSLY ABSENT. THEY MUST BE ABOLISHED IN ASIA, TOO! IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THIS TOO, BY ITSELF -- AND THIS ALONE MAKES ACCORD IMPOSSIBLE.

ON WHAT GROUNDS IS ASIA BROUGHT IN? WE CONCEDE, AS YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV SAID IN INTRODUCING THE RELEVANT PROPOSAL -- WHICH IS WELL-KNOWN -- WE CONCEDE THAT WE MIGHT TRANSFER -- I REPEAT, IF AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED -- SOME OF OUR MISSILES FROM EUROPE, FROM THE EUROPEAN ZONE, TO ASIA. THAT IS OUR AFFAIR, AND OUR RIGHT. AND WE ARE WILLING TO PUT THEM IN AN AREA FROM WHICH THEY WILL NOT REACH CENTRAL EUROPE. AND WE HAVE SAID THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION KNOWS IT. I REPEAT: WE WILL TRANSFER THEM TO AN AREA FROM WHICH THEY WILL NOT REACH THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE ARE TOLD: NO, THAT IS NOT ENOUGH. ALL THE ARGUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, AND OF THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY, ARE TO THE EFFECT THAT THOSE MISSILES MUST ALSO BE ABOLISHED. TAKE THAT DEMAND ALONE, AND IT ALREADY EXCLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT.

THOSE MISSILES POSE NO THREAT TO THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. BUT WHY ARE THEY NEEDED? THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS THEM IN ORDER TO MAKE ITSELF SECURE. AFTER ALL, IT IS WELL-KNOWN BY WHAT RING OF MILITARY BASES THE SOVIET UNION IS ENCIRCLED BY THE UNITED STATES.

DECLASSIFIED/REBASD

REF ID: A62-748-2497-1

BY CI NARA DATE 1/13/12

1A

JAPAN AND THE WATERS SURROUNDING JAPAN ARE STUFFED FULL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CORRESPONDING LAUNCHERS (NOSITELI). THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA IS AN ENORMOUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASE. SOUTH KOREA IS AN ENORMOUS BASE, OR MORE PRECISELY A COMPLEX OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASES. THE INDIAN OCEAN, ESPECIALLY THE DIEGO GARCIA BASE, IS STUFFED FULL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABLE OF REACHING THE SOVIET UNION. THE PERSIAN GULF AND ADJACENT WATERS ARE STUFFED FULL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AND WHAT IS MORE -- TAKE NOTE, I ASK YOU TO PAY ATTENTION -- THAT IT IS A MATTERS OF MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS. ALL THOSE WEAPONS ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY. MOREOVER -- AND IF ANYONE IS UNAWARE OF THIS, THEN WHAT I AM ABOUT TO SAY WILL PROBABLY BE OF SPECIAL INTEREST -- MOREOVER, THEY COVER ALL OF SIBERIA, ALL OF THE ASIAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. EVEN THE NORTHERNMOST PART, THE ISLAND OF TAYMYR, IS ALSO COVERED.

WHAT IS MORE, WE ARE ONLY TALKING ABOUT MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS. WE DO NOT MEAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN THIS CONTEXT, WHICH EXIST AND ARE DEPLOYED IN THE SAME AREAS I HAVE BEEN MENTIONING. STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE CONTROLLED BY ANOTHER AGREEMENT, BY A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT, BUT SO FAR, IN EFFECT, THE PARTIES HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON EXTENDING THE PERIOD OF OPERATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY WE ARE ONLY TALKING ABOUT MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS. THOSE WEAPONS COVER THE ENTIRE ASIAN TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION. SO THE QUESTION ARISES: CAN IT BE THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT, FOR PURPOSES OF DEFENSE -- FOR PURPOSES OF DEFENSE -- TO HAVE SOMETHING TO OPPOSE THOSE WEAPONS?

IT DOES HAVE THE RIGHT.

(MORE)

2 APR 1330Z PLS/SRH

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	171492 REPORT FBIS 33	2	4/2/1983	B3

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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16  
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FBI 33

TAKE 8 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///HAVE THE RIGHT.

L0021200

(TEXT) THEY DO NOT PAY ATTENTION TO ALL OF THIS, DO NOT MENTION IT PUBLICLY, AND DO NOT TELL THE TRUTH TO THE PEOPLE. IF THE TRUTH WERE TOLD AND EXPLAINED TO PEOPLE ON EACH ONE OF THESE MATTERS, WE ARE SURE THAT THERE WOULD BE A CHANGE OF OPINION AND IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH IGNORE THESE ASPECTS AND FACTS. THEY SIMPLY DO NOT SPEAK -- THEY SIMPLY DO NOT SPEAK ABOUT IT. THEY DO NOT SPEAK OF IT IN THE PRESS, THEY DO NOT SPEAK OF IT ON THE RADIO, THEY DO NOT SPEAK OF IT ON TELEVISION. THEY PASS OVER IT IN SILENCE.

AND IF YOU TAKE THE UNITED STATES, THEY HEAR ONLY ONE THING FROM MORNING TO NIGHT -- THE SOVIET UNION IS A THREAT, THE SOVIET UNION IS A THREAT -- IT IS NOT MOVING TOWARD AGREEMENT, IT SUBMITS A PROPOSAL THAT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES' LINE. HOWEVER, FACTUAL MATERIAL, EVEN FACTUAL MATERIAL FOR A PERSON TO REFLECT ON, IS NOT PROVIDED. THIS MAY SOUND SHARP, BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP FROM SAYING THAT IN GENERAL THE POPULATION IS BEING PRESENTED DECEITFUL PROPAGANDA. AN IDEA IS BEING FORMED AMONG PEOPLE -- WHO, THROUGH NO FAULT OF THEIR OWN, ARE POORLY INFORMED -- THAT IS DISTORTED, TOTALLY DISTORTED.

AS FOR THE ASSERTION THAT THE MORE PRESSURE PUT ON THE SOVIET UNION, THE GREATER THE CHANCES OF AGREEMENT, IT IS ALSO COMPLETELY LACKING IN SUBSTANCE. IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN IT TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET UNION -- LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF OUR CHARACTER, IF YOU LIKE -- BUT THE PROPOSAL IS NOT SERIOUS AND IS NOT DESIGNED TO CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT. THIS IS WHAT WE THINK -- THAT IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT.

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THEREFORE, WITHOUT KNOWING HOW THEY WILL REGARD THIS IN WASHINGTON, WE CALL FOR A MORE OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO THE MATTER, FOR A MORE OBJECTIVE RENUNCIATION OF UNILATERALISM, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL FACTORS; TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND WE CALL FOR A LINE TO BE TAKEN TOWARD AGREEMENT, TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT (SBLIZHENIYE) WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE LINE THE UNITED STATES IS CURRENTLY TAKING AT THE TALKS IS NOT A LINE TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT, BUT A LINE OF MOVING AWAY FROM AGREEMENT, A LINE OF COMPLICATING THE SITUATION, A LINE TOWARD SPIRALING THE ARMS RACE EVEN FURTHER, IN ORDER TO FURTHER WORSEN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN EVER GREATER INCREASE IN MILITARY BUDGETS, IN ORDER TO EVEN FURTHER FETTER THOSE FORCES THAT STAND FOR FINDING A COMMON LANGUAGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT.

INCIDENTALLY, FROM TIME TO TIME, WASHINGTON, AND FIRST AND FOREMOST THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ADMINISTRATION, TALK ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' MOVE FOR A FREEZE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALLEGEDLY BEING ALMOST INSPIRED BY THE SOVIET UNION. OR THEY SAY IT MIGHT BE INSPIRED OR IT MIGHT BE LED BY THE SOVIET UNION. ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WE MUST POINT OUT THE ABSURDITY OF SUCH AN ASSUMPTION, THE ABSURDITY OF SUCH STATEMENTS, IN THE MOST CATEGORICAL MANNER. THE MOVEMENT IS A SPONTANEOUS AMERICAN MOVEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT THE MOVEMENT IS BASED ON A DESIRE TO PROMOTE THE FINDING OF A COMMON LANGUAGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OR THAT IT DESIRES TO FETTER THE FORCES PREPARING FOR WAR -- MILITARISTIC FORCES. WE CAN ONLY EXPRESS SOLIDARITY WITH THE MOVEMENT, BECAUSE WE ARE OF LIKE MIND REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF WAR AND THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT, FOR A SEARCH FOR AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDING (DOGOVORENNOSTI) ON THESE ISSUES..

ONE CANNOT CHARGE EITHER THE MOVEMENT OR US WITH SOME KIND OF UNIFIE CENTER FOR WHICH RESPONSIBILITY IS TO BE BORNE BY THE SOVIET UNION OR THE LEADERS OF THAT MOVEMENT. WE SHALL HOPE THAT THOSE REPROACHES WILL NOT LIVE LONG AND THAT THEY WILL BE DISPelled, AND THAT THE PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND -- INTENSELY, ONE MAY SAY -- WHAT CORRESPONDS TO THE INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND WHAT DOES NOT, WILL MAKE THEMSELVES FELT IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES EVEN MORE EFFECTIVELY AND WITH AN EVEN LOUDER VOICE.

(MORE)

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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///THE UNITED STATES.

LID021253

(TEXT) SO, IN CONCLUSION, IN VIEW OF THE LATEST PRONOUNCEMENTS, CHIEFLY THE PRESIDENT'S WE CAN SAY THAT THE SO-CALLED INTERIM SOLUTION -- WHICH IS WHAT THE PRESIDENT CALLED HIS IDEA -- IS UNACCEPTABLE. IT IS UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: FIRST, IT DOES NOT TAKE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING 162 MISSILES, INTO ACCOUNT; SECOND, IT DOES NOT TAKE MANY HUNDREDS OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-CARRYING AIRCRAFT BASED IN WESTERN EUROPE AND ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS INTO ACCOUNT; AND THIRD, SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE SOVIET (AS HEARD) PART OF THE USSR WOULD BE DISMANTLED (LIKVIDATSIVR) EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE NO RELATION TO EUROPE. AS A WHOLE, IF NATO NOW HAS A 1 AND 1/2 SUPERIORITY IN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WARHEADS (BOYEZARYADY) IN EUROPE, THEN IF THE PRESIDENT'S INTERIM OPTION WERE IMPLEMENTED, NATO WOULD HAVE ALMOST 2 AND 1/2 TIMES AS MANY SUCH WARHEADS AS THE SOVIET UNION HRS.

THAT, IN SHORT, IS OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION'S SO-CALLED INTERIM PROPOSAL. MOREOVER, WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT WASHINGTON DID NOT COUNT ON A DIFFERENT REACTION FROM US. WE HAVE REASONS FOR THIS.

BEFORE ENDING MY STATEMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THOSE PRESENT TO TWO CIRCUMSTANCES, WITHOUT WHICH THE PICTURE WOULD PROBABLY BE INCOMPLETE -- FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE PEOPLE WHO PROVIDE THE NEWS TODAY, TOMORROW AND THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE, AT ANY RATE. THIS WOULD BE USEFUL FOR PEOPLE:

ONCE AND FOR ALL EVERYONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT NOT ONE OF OUR WEAPONS -- THAT IS OUR MISSILE WEAPONS -- IN EUROPE WILL REACH U.S. TERRITORY. THAT TASK, OF COURSE, IS NOT SET. THAT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER. THE MISSILES CANNOT REACH AND ARE NOT CAPABLE OF REACHING THE UNITED STATES. IN THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN WEAPONS THAT ARE TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE, EACH MISSILE CAN REACH THE SOVIET UNION'S TERRITORY. THAT IS A FACTOR OF GEOGRAPHY. IN WHOSE FAVOR DOES THIS FACTOR OPERATE? IT OPERATES IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR COMPENSATION FOR THAT AND WE ARE NOT RAISING THE ISSUE. BUT IN ORDER TO SCRUPULOUSLY AND PRECISELY WORK OUT OF THE BALANCE WE COULD RAISE THE MATTER OF COMPENSATION.

FURTHER: A MISSILE IS A MISSILE, AND A MISSILE FLIES. WELL, NOW, THE FLIGHT TIME FOR AN AMERICAN MISSILE FROM WESTERN EUROPE TO SOVIET TERRITORY IS ROUGHLY SIX TO SEVEN TIMES SHORTER THAN THE FLIGHT TIME OF A MISSILE FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVENT OF A TERRIBLE TRAGEDY BEFALLING HUMANKIND.

(MORE)

2 APR 1423Z PLS/TM

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>	
171494	REPORT FBIS (UNNUMBERED)	2      4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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(TEXT) THE SOVIET UNION ALSO HAS TO SCRUPULOUSLY AND PRECISELY APPROACH AND CONSTRUCT AN APPROPRIATE EQUATION FOR OBSERVING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY. IT ALSO HAS THE RIGHT AND WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO BRING UP THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION. BUT WE ARE NOT BRINGING UP THAT ISSUE AND WE ARE WITHDRAWING THAT FACTOR, AS IT WERE, INTO PARENTHESIS. WHY? IN THE INTERESTS OF MAKING THE PATH TO AGREEMENT EASIER -- IN SUCH INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, WE CONSIDER THAT IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, IT WOULD THEN BE EVIDENT THAT STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN TOWARD FURTHER, MORE RADICAL REDUCTIONS, AND PERHAPS -- WHO KNOWS? -- TO THE COMPLETE ERADICATION OF MISSILES WEAPONRY -- TO THE COMPLETE ERADICATION OF MISSILE WEAPONRY.

171494

I ALSO ASK YOU TO BEAR THIS CIRCUMSTANCE IN MIND. HERE WE ARE DISPLAYING EXTREME FLEXIBILITY -- EVEN MAGNANIMITY, IF YOU LIKE -- IN THE INTERESTS OF AGREEMENT, BEARING IN MIND, AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, THAT THE AIM THAT HAS TO BE SOUGHT, WHAT THE WORLD HAS TO SEEK, IS THE COMPLETE ERADICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PURELY PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND PURELY FOR THE GOOD OF HUMANITY. OUR POLICY ON THESE MATTERS, MATTERS OF BOTH MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS OUTSIDE THE CONFINES OF EUROPE, IS TO PRESERVE THE EQUALITY -- THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY -- COME WHAT MAY. THIS HAS COME ABOUT OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS.

YOU COULD SAY THAT LIFE ITSELF HAS BROUGHT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY INTO BEING. IT IS NOT THE RESULT OF MERE BUREAUCRATIC LABORS. LIFE ITSELF. WE ARE FOR PRESERVATION. U.S. POLICY IS DIRECTED TOWARDS BREAKING -- DEMOLISHING -- THAT PRINCIPLE. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE, WHETHER AN AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED OR NOT.

IF THE PRINCIPLE IS VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF ACTION BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND NATO, THEN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD MOST CERTAINLY -- AND NO ONE CAN WAVER AND NO ONE CAN HAVE ANY DOUBTS -- TAKE STEPS TO GUARD ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND SEE WHAT THAT PRINCIPLE CONTINUES TO OPERATE. THAT WE WILL DO. THAT WE WILL DO. WE HAVE THE MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITY -- OF THAT THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT. WE THINK THAT, IN FACT, EVEN THOSE WHO BEAR THE GUILT FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION KNOW THAT TOO.

THERE I CONCLUDE MY STATEMENT. IF THERE ARE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE ASK THEM AND I WILL TRY TO ANSWER THEM.

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6/ MARADATE 1/3/12

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ASKED IN RUSSIAN BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS. ALL QUESTIONS ARE  
ANSWERED IN RUSSIAN BY GROMAKO

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM IZVESTIYA POLITICAL OBSERVER  
MATVEYEV. IT SEEMS THAT WASHINGTON IS STILL CALCULATING THAT AS OF  
THE END OF THE YEAR APPROXIMATES, WHEN THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN  
MISSILES IN EUROPE IS PLANNED, THE USSR WILL BE MORE  
COMPLAINT. WHAT CAN YOU SAY ABOUT THAT?

(ANSWER) THAT IS NOT A CORRECT VIEWPOINT. IT IS A PROFOUNDLY  
MISTAKEN ONE. IT IS AN EXPOSURE, YOU KNOW, OF THE TACTICS,  
THE TACTICAL ASPECT, THAT SHOWS THAT IN FACT PEOPLE THINK  
TOO LITTLE. THAT CANNOT BE THE SITUATION. ON THE CONTRARY,  
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE FURTHER FROM AN  
AGREEMENT THAN NOW -- ALL THE FURTHER FROM AN AGREEMENT. (AS  
HEARD) THEREFORE, THE INFORMATION MEDIA -- THE PRESS, RADIO  
AND TELEVISION -- WILL DO A GOOD SERVICE IF THEY SPEAK THE TRUTH  
AND SAY THAT AN AGREEMENT REQUIRES ACCORD, CONSIDERATION FOR THE  
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE  
OF EQUALITY.

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM AMERICAN ABC TELEVISION COMPANY  
CORRESPONDENT (WALTER ROGERS). WHAT WILL THE SOVIET UNION'S  
RESPONSE BE IF THE AMERICANS DEPLOY THE PERSHING AND CRUISE  
MISSILES. WILL INSTALLATIONS OF THE MISSILES BE IN ANY  
WAY SIMILAR TO THE CUBAN NUCLEAR MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962?

(ANSWER) IN MY STATEMENT I SAID THAT IF THIS OCCURS -- IF THE  
MISSILES ARE INSTALLED AND AN AGREEMENT IS FOILED AND THERE IS  
NO ACCORD -- THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ENDEAVOR IN MATERIAL AND OTHER  
WAYS TO GUARD ITS INTERESTS. WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE PARITY -- OR  
THE BALANCE, IF YOU LIKE TO CALL IT THAT -- TO BE UPSET. WITH  
US THERE WILL BE NO DIVERSION BETWEEN WORD AND DEED. WE DO  
POSSESS THE POTENTIAL. WE DO POSSESS THE POTENTIAL AND WE  
HAVE REPEATEDLY PROVED THIS. BUT THAT IS THE WORSE COURSE.  
IT WOULD BE A FORCED MEASURE ON OUR PART. OUR FIRST AND  
PREFERRED POSITION IS THAT THE ISSUE BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS  
OF AN ACCORD WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NATO.

(MORE)

2 APR 1610Z PLS/SRH

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	171495 REPORT FBIS 45	2	4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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FBI 45

TAKE 11 -- 22 (GRONYKO PRESS CONFERENCE) 171495

//STATES AND NATO.

LD021503

(TEXT) (QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM MIKHAYLOV, MEMBER OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA: THE SOVIET UNION UPHOLDS THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND IDENTICAL SECURITY. THE U.S. SIDE, ON THE OTHER HAND, SPEAKS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIMITS. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO?

(ANSWER) IF YOU HAD ASKED THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARE NEGOTIATING WHAT THE FORMULA EQUAL RIGHTS AND EQUAL LIMITS MEANS THEY WOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN YOU AN ANSWER. THEY WOULD HAVE GIVEN YOU A COMPLETELY FEEBLE ANSWER -- MADE A FEEBLE STATEMENT -- BECAUSE THEY THEMSELVES DO NOT KNOW WHAT IT MEANS. ONE CAN GUESS THAT AT THE CENTER OF THIS IS THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES, THEIR LIMITS AND RIGHTS. WE ARE NOT TOLD: IF YOU DON'T MIND, THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES ARE NOT AMERICAN ONES, AND IT IS THE AMERICANS WHO ARE CONDUCTING TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HOW CAN WE INCLUDE THEM AND RESOLVE QUESTIONS RELATING TO THEM?

ONE CAN ASSUME THAT THE POINT AT ISSUE HERE IS THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES. THIS STEMS FROM CERTAIN REMARKS -- FROM THE LOGIC, SO TO SPEAK, OF THE TALKS. BUT THIS FORMULA HAS BEEN SPECIALLY DEvised TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE. IMAGINE, IF YOU WILL, ASKING THE FIRST PERSON YOU MEET ON THE STREET: DO YOU KNOW WHAT IDENTICAL RIGHTS AND IDENTICAL LIMITS, WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE ESPOSING, MEANS? WHAT DOES THE FORMULA, WHICH THEY ARE GOING BY, MEAN? HE WOULD JUST SHRUG HIS SHOULDERS AND SAY NOTHING. FURTHERMORE, I WOULD SAY THAT IF AN INTELLIGENT, CULTURED, EDUCATED PERSON WERE TO SIT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE -- OR EVEN A SHORT DISTANCE FROM IT -- HE WOULD ALSO BE UNABLE TO SAY.

THE MATHEMATICALLY AND POLITICALLY PRECISE FORMULA THAT IS ACCEPTABLE FROM A MILITARY-STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW IS EQUALITY -- EQUALITY AND IDENTICAL SECURITY, TAKING ALL FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT. FOR EXAMPLE, I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN ABOUT CENTRAL ASIA AND A FEW OTHER THINGS. ALL FACTORS. THIS IS A SIMPLE BUT SCIENTIFICALLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
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FOR DENMARK'S RADIO AND TELEVISION. MISTER MINISTER, YOU HAVE RECENTLY STATED THAT THE PUBLIC IN THE WEST WOULD BE DELAYING ITSELF IF IT THOUGHT THAT THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD CONTINUE DESPITE THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MISSILES. DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL BREAK OFF THE TALKS THE MOMENT THE FIRST AMERICAN MISSILE IS DEPLOYED?

(ANSWER) I SHOULD TELL YOU THAT THIS FACT WILL BE A VERY NEGATIVE ONE FOR EUROPE AND WORLD AS A WHOLE. THE POSITION WILL BE SUCH THAT WE WILL BE BOUND TO REEXAMINE IT AS ATTENTIVELY AS POSSIBLE, TAKING ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES INTO CONSIDERATION -- I EMPHASIZE THIS: TAKING ALL CIRCUMSTANCES INTO ACCOUNT -- TO ARRIVE AT A RELEVANT DECISION.

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM (IEVI MURARKA), CORRESPONDENT FOR THE FINNISH PAPERS AAMULEHTI AND HUFVUDSTADSBLADET: MISTER MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: IN HIS LATEST SPEECHES PRESIDENT REAGAN TERMED THE USSR AN EMPIRE AND CENTER OF EVIL. HOW DO YOU APPRAISE THESE ASSERTIONS?

(ANSWER) YES, WE ARE AWARE THAT THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT IS PRONE TO SUCH TURNS OF PHRASE, THAT HE ORGANIZES A CRUSADE OR PREDICTS ONE -- BUT ORGANIZES RATHER THAN JUST PREDICTS IT. NOW HE PROCLAIMS THE USSR TO BE THE CENTER OF EVIL; NOW HE PROCLAIMS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO BE THE CENTER OF EVIL -- WELL, IT IS NOT AS IF HE WERE THE FIRST IN HISTORY TO DO SO. HISTORY HAS HAD INSTANCES OF STATESMEN WHOSE APPROACH TO THIS WAS TO PREDICT THE DEMISE OF SOCIALISM WHEN SOCIALIST SCIENCE WAS IN ITS INFANCY. THEN, WHEN SOCIALIST STATES WERE FORMED THEY PREDICTED THE DEMISE OF SOCIALISM. AS FOR SOCIALISM, IT FOLLOWS ITS OWN COURSE. SIMPLE MATHEMATICS TESTIFY TO THIS, AS WELL AS SOME OTHER THINGS, TOO. IT PROCEEDS, GATHERING STRENGTH, AND ITS COURSE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE.

WE DO NOT THINK THAT THESE PREDICTIONS WILL ADD TO THE AUTHORITY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THEY WILL SHAKE SOCIALISM, ITS FOUNDATIONS, OR OUR FOREIGN POLICY BY EVEN ONE IOTA. IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT NEVER IN THE PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR II HAS THE USSR'S STAR, OUR BANNER AND THE BANNER OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY, SHONE AS BRIGHTLY AS IT DOES TODAY FOR THE WHOLE WORLD -- IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH AND IN THE WEST AND THE EAST.

(MORE)

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	171496 REPORT FBIS 46	2	4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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///AND THE EAST.

LID21526 (TEXT) (ANSWER CONTINUES) AS FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF COLONIALISM, WOULD IT, GENERALLY SPEAKING, HAVE BEEN AT ALL POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE USSR AND OUR VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST THE FASCIST AGGRESSORS? NO, NOT A SINGLE DISCRIMINATING, REASONING, AND CLEVER PERSON WOULD SAY THAT.

OUR THEORY AND IDEOLOGY ARE FOUNDED ON THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE LAWS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SOCIETY. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY SOCIALISM, THE SOCIALIST STATES AND, ABOVE ALL, THE SOVIET UNION IS A GRANITE FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE ACTIVITY -- A FOUNDATION THAT SERVES OUR PEOPLE WELL AS THEY GO FORWARD TO FULFILL THEIR PLANS, AND SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL MANKIND. IT SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE.

NONINTERFERENCE IN OTHER STATES' INTERNAL AFFAIRS IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. BUT AN EXAMPLE IS AN EXAMPLE: YOU CANNOT DESTROY IT. EVEN IF SOMEBODY GOES ON A CRUSADE (A KRESTOM KTO-LIBO POYDET) HE CANNOT LIQUIDATE IT. I REPEAT: WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT WILL INCREASE OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

YOU KNOW, THESE INSULTS, THESE STRONG WORDS THAT THE LEADERS IN WASHINGTON PRACTICE AND LOVE TO PRACTICE, ONLY DEMONSTRATE, YOU KNOW, WHAT THRESHOLD OF DECORUM IN CONDUCTING AFFAIRS WITH OTHER STATES, ESPECIALLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN WASHINGTON -- JUST HOW THEY CONDUCT AFFAIRS.

JUST HOW DO THEY CONDUCT AFFAIRS? IMAGINE THE CORRESPONDING U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES MEETING AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE EXCHANGING SUCH WORDS. SOME WOULD TRY TO PROVE THAT -- YOU KNOW -- YOU ARE THE CENTER OF EVIL AND THE OTHERS WOULD, OF COURSE, GIVE A REBUFF AND TRY NOT TO BE OUTDONE.

WHAT SORT OF TALKS WOULD THAT BE? WHAT SORT OF TALKS WOULD THAT BE?

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IF SOMEONE WERE TO START COMPILING A TABLE OF OF EVIL -- A TABLE OF INDICES FOR EVIL -- I ASSURE YOU THAT SUCH A TABLE WOULD BE HUNDREDS OF TIMES LONGER FOR THE UNITED STATES.

THOSE WHO ARE HARMED BY THE UNITED STATES, THOSE ON WHOSE TOES THE UNITED STATES STEPS BY PROCLAIMING WHOLE TERRITORIES AND DOZENS OF COUNTRIES TO BE THE ZONE OF U.S. INTERESTS -- ALMOST THE UNITED STATES' BACKYARD OR OWN LAKE -- APPEAL TO US TO DEFEND THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. THEY APPEAL TO US. WELL, WHAT IS THIS THEN? DO THEY APPEAL TO THE CENTER OF EVIL? NOTHING OF THE KIND. WELL THEN, WAS IT THE CENTER OF EVIL THAT PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS AT THE UN TO LIQUIDATE COLONIALISM AND THE COLONIAL SYSTEM? THEY WERE PUT FORWARD BY A SOCIALIST STATE, THE USSR. THIS IS AN OPEN BOOK. EVERYONE CAN READ IT.

WAS IT THE CENTER OF EVIL THAT IN 1946 PROPOSED AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION THAT WOULD PROCLAIM THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH MANKIND'S CONSCIENCE AND PROVIDE FOR BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TURNING NUCLEAR POWER TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES FOR THE BENEFIT OF MANKIND? WHAT WAS IT, THEN? THE CENTER OF EVIL? NO, IT WAS THE SOVIET SOCIALIST STATE. THEN IS IT THE CENTER OF EVIL THAT IS NOW PROPOSING TO CURTAIL MILITARY BUDGETS; TO PLEDGE NOT TO USE FORCE AMONG STATES -- THAT IS TO SAY, TO PREVENT WAR AND BUILD RELATIONS UPON A PEACEFUL FOUNDATION -- IS THIS THE CENTER OF EVIL? NO, IT IS A STATE THAT BEARS THE POLICY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG PEOPLES.

WE DO NOT IMPOSE OUR IDEOLOGY ON ANYONE. OUR IDEOLOGY IS A REFLECTION OF WHAT IS OBJECTIVELY TAKING PLACE IN HUMAN SOCIETY. IF I WERE TO ENLARGE ON THIS MORE, IN ALL PROBABILITY SOMEONE WOULD SAY THAT IT IS PROPAGANDA. BUT THERE IS PROPAGANDA, AND PROPAGANDA. SURELY YOU WOULD NOT AGREE, ALL OF YOU PRESENT HERE, TO BEING CALLED -- ONE AND ALL -- SIMPLY PROPAGANDISTS. BUT TO SOME EXTENT YOU ARE PROPAGANDISTS, BECAUSE YOU DISSEMINATE INFORMATION AMONG PEOPLE AND THERE IS INFORMATION, AND INFORMATION THAT OPENS UP PEOPLE'S EYES. IT IS TRUTH, AND THE STRENGTH OF OUR POLICY LIES IN TRUTH.

(MORE)

2 APR 1642Z PLS/SAH

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	171497 REPORT FBIS 52	3	4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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171497  
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///LIES IN TRUTH.

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BY CW NARA DATE 1/13/12

(TEXT) (ANSWER CONTINUES) THAT IS WHY THE PRESIDENT'S OR SOMEONE ELSE'S EXERCISE IN ASSIGNING LABELS, LIKE THE CENTER OF EVIL, IN PICKING ALL KINDS OF SPICY WORDS IS A THANKLESS TASK AND NOT A VISIBLE ONE. IT IS NOT A VISIBLE ONE. IT MAY WELL BE THAT IT WILL SHINE FOR SOMEONE WHO HAPPENS TO STAND OR SIT NEAR THE PRESIDENT, BUT IT WILL WITHER WITHOUT FAIL. WE ARE PROUD OF THE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY THE SOVIET STATE, AND WE KNOW THERE ARE MANY STATES -- THE MAJORITY OF STATES IN THE WORLD -- THAT GIVE THAT ROLE ITS DUE. WE ARE PROUD. WE ARE IN THE GREAT STRUGGLE OF PEOPLES FOR PEACE AND AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR. WE HAVE, IN THIS RESPECT, MANY PARTNERS, IF YOU WILL, AND MANY ALLIES.

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM TASS OBSERVER BOGACHEV. WHAT IS CONCEALED BEHIND THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL ON THE GLOBAL LIMITATION OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES?

(ANSWER) YOU PROBABLY HAVE THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL OR DEMANDS TO ELIMINATE MISSILES IN THE ASIAN PART OF THE USSR IN MIND. I HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT ON THE MATTER OF THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE POSSIBILITY -- AND OUR RIGHT -- OF TRANSFERRING SOME OF THE MISSILES TO THE ASIAN PART OF THE USSR'S TERRITORY, THE UNITED STATES HAS PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS THAT THE MISSILES SHOULD BE ELIMINATED, AND NOT JUST IN THE EUROPEAN PART, BUT ALSO IN THE ASIAN PART. AND ALL THE SAME, THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING THE SHARP REDUCTION OF SOVIET MISSILES ENCOMPASSES THE ASIAN PART ALSO. IF WE TRANSLATE ALL THIS INTO CONCRETE LANGUAGE, IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD THEN HAVE ALMOST 2 AND 1/2 TIMES MORE WARHEADS (BOYEZARYAD). WHY DO I SAY WARHEADS, AND NOT MISSILES? BECAUSE WARHEADS IS BEING MORE PRECISE, MATHEMATICALLY IT IS A MORE PRECISE EXPRESSION OF; WELL, THE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO USE A WORD THAT IS IN COMMON CURRENCY.

(QUESTION) IN YOUR VIEW, IS THE INTERIM VERSION PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN NOW REALLY A WAY OF SEEKING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, OR DOES IT PURSUE SOME SORT OF OTHER AIM, PERHAPS PROPAGANDIST OR SOME OTHERAIMS?

(ANSWER) WE DEFINITELY THINK THAT IT PURSUES OTHER AIMS. AND THOSE OTHER AIMS ARE THAT THE UNITED STATES, THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, TO BE MORE PRECISE, HAS SET ITSELF THE TASK OF ACHIEVING, AT ALL COSTS, THE DEPLOYMENT IN WEST EUROPE OF ADDITIONAL TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NOT ALLOWING ANY AGREEMENTS. THIS IS THE REAL AIM.

(QUESTION) (IN ENGLISH) (STEWARD PARKER), CABLE NEWS NETWORK. I TAKE IT FROM EVERYTHING THAT YOU SAID IN YOUR STATEMENT HERE AND YOUR RESPONSE TO THE IZVESTIYA QUESTION, THAT YOU SEE NO HOPE AT ALL ... (FADES INTO RUSSIAN TRANSLATION -- FBIS). YOU SAID THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. FIRST, IS THIS ASSERTION CORRECT? SECOND, CONNECTED WITH THIS QUESTION, YOU HAVE JUST BEEN APPOINTED FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. DOES THIS MEAN THAT YOU WILL BE SPENDING LESS TIME ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND WHAT WILL BE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS FIRST DEPUTY PREMIER?

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(QUESTION, RE-PRESENTED IN RUSSIAN) REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN COMPANY, CABLE NEWS. I HAVE TWO QUESTIONS. AS I UNDERSTAND IT FROM THE REPLY, FROM YOUR REPLY TO THE QUESTION FROM THE IZVESTIYA CORRESPONDENT, YOU, IN ESSENCE, DO NOT FEEL ANY HOPE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES (POMEZHUTOCHNOY DALNOSTI) BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR. DO I UNDERSTAND THE POSITION CORRECTLY? AND MY SECOND QUESTION: YOU WERE RECENTLY APPOINTED FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. DOES THIS MEAN THAT YOU WILL NOW BE SPENDING LESS TIME ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND WHAT WILL YOUR ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES BE IN THIS CONNECTION?

(ANSWER) SO, THE FIRST QUESTION.

(QUESTION, REPEATED IN RUSSIAN) WOULD IT BE CORRECT TO SUPPOSE THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR?

(ANSWER) THIS IS HOW I WOULD ANSWER THE FIRST QUESTION. IF THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS TO BE AS IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED, THEN THERE ARE NO CHANCES OF AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION ADOPTED A MORE OBJECTIVE POSITION IN KEEPING WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF PRESERVING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND FULL CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OF ALL STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT.

(MORE)

2 APR 1809Z PLS/TM

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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	171498 REPORT FBIS 53	2	4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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28  
171498

FBI 53

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/4 THE WARSAW PACT.

Y CY NARA DATE 1/13/2

L0021609

(TEXT) (ANSWER CONTINUES) REGARDING YOUR SECOND QUESTION, IT CONCERNED ME PERSONALLY. I COULD, INDEED, REFRAIN FROM ANSWERING IT, BUT I WOULD SAY THAT I VERY MUCH DOUBT THAT THERE WILL BE LESS WORK IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (LAUGHTER) RATHER, I THINK THAT THERE WILL BE MORE WORK, AND IT WILL CONCERN THE INCREASED VOLUME OF WORK OF COORDINATING -- TO PUT IT BRIEFLY -- FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY.

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM (BANKO STOSEC), CORRESPONDENT OF THE YUGOSLAV PRESS AGENCY TANJUG: ESTEEMED ANDREY ANDREYEVICH, DESPITE THE U.S. POSITION, DO YOU CONSIDER AN IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS POSSIBLE? DO YOU BELIEVE THAT, IN GENERAL, IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES?

(ANSWER) HE HAS ASKED A VERY EASY QUESTION. I SHALL JUST SAY ONE THING: WE WOULD LIKE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR TO IMPROVE. HOW MANY TIMES HAVE STATEMENTS ON THIS THEME COME FROM OUR SIDE -- FROM THE ROSTRUMS OF THE PARTY CONGRESSES, THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY MEETINGS. YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV HAS ALSO SPOKEN ON THIS. I REPEAT: WE WOULD LIKE THIS. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. IT WANTS THE USSR TO MAKE RADICAL CONCESSIONS TO THE DETRIMENT OF ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS -- ITS LEGITIMATE AND JUSTIFIED INTERESTS. THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED AND IT NEVER WILL.

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THEREFORE, WE WOULD APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES TO ADOPT A MORE OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO QUESTIONS OF SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS AND TO UNDERSTAND THAT NORMAL, AND, WHAT WOULD BE EVEN BETTER, GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR ARE IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE WORLD AS A WHOLE BUT ALSO THE INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. IN THE PAST WE HAVE FREQUENTLY SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

IN ORDER TO PREVENT WAR, PRIMARILY NUCLEAR WAR, IT IS FIRST OF ALL NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE NATURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES FOR THE BETTER. WE ARE IN FAVOR OF THIS. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT THIS. IT IS NOT INAPT TO RECALL THAT WE WERE ONCE WARTIME ALLIES. THAT MEANS THAT WE FOUND COMMON GROUND FOR COOPERATION AT THAT TIME, EVEN THOUGH OUR STATES HAD DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND DIFFERENT IDEOLOGIES. WE CONSIDER THAT TWO POWERS -- POWERS WITH VAST MILITARY POTENTIAL -- CAN ARRANGE NORMAL RELATIONS IN SPITE OF THESE DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL SYSTEM AND IDEOLOGY. WE ARE SURE THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES, WOULD BREATHE MORE EASILY FOR THIS.

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM (GUPTA), CORRESPONDENT OF THE INDIAN AGENCY PRESS TRUST OF INDIA: WOULD YOU BE SO KIND AS TO DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS THAT, AS IS REPORTED, YOU MADE TO THE CHINESE SIDE LAST MONTH IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE NORMALIZATION OF SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS.

(ANSWER) I SHALL SPEAK IN VERY GENERAL TERMS. CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEGUN BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR. THE CONSULTATIONS DEAL WITH MANY QUESTIONS. THEY HAVE NOT YET GONE FAR ENOUGH TO DRAW DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS, AND ALL THE MORE SO ON THE MAJOR QUESTIONS. THE SIDES HAVE AGREED TO CONTINUE THE CONSULTATIONS. THE ATMOSPHERE DURING THE CONSULTATIONS IS NORMAL ON THE WHOLE. THE CONSULTATIONS WILL BE CONTINUED. WE CONSIDER IT A GOOD THING THAT THEY HAVE BEGUN AND WILL CONTINUE. WE SHALL SEE WHAT HAPPENS NEXT. WE ARE IN FAVOR OF NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

(MORE)

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

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FRIS 54

171499  
30

TAKE 15 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

LB021618

(TEXT) (QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM CORRESPONDENTS OF THE BULGARIAN NEWSPAPER RABOTNICHESKO DELO, (GORNIINSKI) AND (KUSEVA): WASHINGTON CONTINUES TO CLAIM THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT OBSERVING THE UNILATERAL MORATORIUM IT ANNOUNCED ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR. WHAT CAN YOU SAY ON THAT?

(ANSWER) I CAN ANSWER THAT BRIEFLY. IT IS A FRAUDULENT (OBMANNOYE) STATEMENT. THERE IS NO DIVERGENCE IN THE WORDS AND DEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THAT APPLIES IN THIS CASE TOO. THAT IS ALL.

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM (BERNARD), AMERICAN TELEVISION COMPANY NBC NEWS: YURIY ANDROPOV SAID THAT THERE ARE SOLUTIONS THAT WILL NOT INFRINGE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER OF THE SIDES. HOWEVER, YOUR POSITION SEEMS INFLEXIBLE. WILL THE SOVIET UNION AGREE TO ANY NEW DEVELOPMENT OF MISSILES?

(ANSWER) WE, IN THE COURSE OF TALKS, HAVE EXPRESSED OUR OPINION AND WE HAVE HEARD THE OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT BASIC POLICY LINES IN THESE TALKS, BOTH OURS AND THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES. WHAT IS NOW KNOWN ABOUT U.S. POLICY EXCLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCORD. WE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT TOMORROW, BUT THE APPARENT, VISIBLE PROSPECT IS NOT VERY GOOD, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE AMERICAN POSITION ALREADY BEING DRAWN UP NOW APPLIES TO THE FUTURE, TOO. IT IS BEING SPECIALLY EMPHASIZED THAT MISSILES ARE TO BE DEPLOYED ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE -- ARE TO BE, ARE TO BE, ARE TO BE -- IT IS MAINTAINED EVERY HOUR, EVERY DAY. ONE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER, BUT FOR THE TIME BEING IT IS NOT EVIDENT.

L OOOZ /Release  
R 142-748249-1  
Cv NARA DATE 1/3/2

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM A CORRESPONDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN NEWSPAPER NEPSZABADSAG, (MEDVEDSZKY): THE UNITED STATES, ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, CONSIDERS EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ONE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ANY AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL. WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS QUESTION?

(ANSWER) ESTEEMED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA, I WANT TO STRESS MOST DECISIVELY THAT VERIFICATION HAS NEVER BEEN A BOTTLENECK IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS OR OF TALKS DURING AGREEMENTS (AS HEARD), ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE OTHER SIDE A GREAT DEAL OF DEMAGOGUERY ON THIS SUBJECT, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TABLE. WHEREVER VERIFICATION IS NECESSARY, WE ARE FOR VERIFICATION. WHERE THERE IS NO NEED FOR SPECIAL VERIFICATION, WELL, THAT MEANS THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR IT. BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THIS, INCIDENTALLY, MEANING OF COURSE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

LET ME STRESS: MANY PEOPLE POSSIBLY DO NOT KNOW THAT SINCE IT IS A QUESTION OF CERTAIN TREATIES -- IN PARTICULAR THE SALT II TREATY, WHICH BECAUSE OF THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE DID NOT COME INTO FORCE AND WAS NOT RATIFIED -- MUCH WAS BASED ON BILATERAL, INDEPENDENT NATIONAL VERIFICATION -- BILATERAL IN THE SENSE THAT EACH SIDE, OR RATHER BOTH SIDES, ACTED ITS OWN WAY ON THIS QUESTION. BILATERAL, NOT JOINT: NATIONAL VERIFICATION.

(MORE)

2 APR 1992 FMS/SRH

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	171500 REPORT FBIS 55	2	4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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FBI'S 55

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///JOINT: NATIONAL VERIFICATION.

LID021700

(TEXT) (ANSWER CONTINUES) AND THERE WAS NO SERIOUS CRITICISM OF ANY KIND. THIS SUITED BOTH SIDES. NOW, IT IS SOMETIMES SAID THAT THERE ARE DOUBTS -- INCIDENTALLY, THEY DO NOT SAY TO US DIRECTLY THAT VIOLATIONS ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE -- THAT THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT HOW FAR VARIOUS OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION ARE BEING OBSERVED. IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT DOUBTS, WE, TOO, HAVE MORE THAN ONCE EXPRESSED THEM, YES. SO AS NOT TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED STATEMENTS, I WILL CITE ONE INSTANCE. IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS -- IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONDUCT THEM WITH RESTRAINT AND HONESTY -- WE SUDDENLY NOTICE THAT FOR SOME TIME CERTAIN OBJECTS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE BEING CONCEALED FROM OBSERVATION. WE RAISE A QUESTION. WE ARE TOLD, YES, THEY ARE BEING CONCEALED; WE ARE BEING HINDERED BY THE WEATHER. A MONTH OR TWO PASSES, EVEN MORE. WE RAISE THE QUESTION AGAIN: CERTAIN OBJECTS ARE BEING CONCEALED. THEY MUST NOT BE CONCEALED. SO THAT WE MAY SEE THEM WITH THE MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL THEY MUST NOT BE CONCEALED AT ALL. IT WAS AGREED THAT THEY MUST NOT BE CONCEALED. WE GET THE ANSWER: LOOK, IT'S RAINING. IT'S RAINING, WE HAVE TO COVER THEM. WELL, OF COURSE WE, HALF SERIOUSLY, HALF IRONICALLY, ASK: WHEN ARE THESE COVERS OF YOURS COMING OFF? HAVE YOU HAD RAIN FOR MONTHS ON END? WHAT IS THIS, THE SECOND FLOOD? IT WAS A RUSE, OF COURSE, BUT WE TOOK IT FAIRLY CALMLY, AND IT DIDN'T HAPPEN AGAIN. THERE WERE OTHER CASES, TOO, BUT WE DON'T WANT TO EXPLOIT THAT FOR PROPAGANDA. WE ADMIT THAT IN SOME SECONDARY MATTERS THERE MAY BE SOMETHING OF THE KIND, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING SERIOUS FROM OUR SIDE. WE DO NOT INTEND -- IT IS NOT A FEATURE OF OUR POLICY -- TO ENSHRINE ONE THING IN A TREATY OR AGREEMENT AND THEN ACT IN ANOTHER WAY. IF THE UNITED STATES BEHAVED THE SAME IT WOULD A GOOD THING

(QUESTION) A QUESTION FROM (FARUQ), A CORRESPONDENT FOR THE SYRIAN NEWSPAPER AL-B'RATH: HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE SITUATION WHICH HAS NOW COME ABOUT IN THE NEAR EAST? HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON THE ESSENCE OF ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE SCHEMES AGAINST SYRIA? HAVE THERE BEEN CONTACTS RECENTLY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN THAT REGION?

(ANSWER) BETWEEN THE USSR... (FARUQ) INTERRUPTS)

(QUESTION) AND THE UNITED STATES, YES.

(ANSWER) (WORDS INDISTINCT) I SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE FINAL POINT. THERE ARE NO SYSTEMATIC CONTACTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. IF THERE ARE SUCH CONTACTS, USUALLY THERE ARE MUTUAL REPRESENTATIONS (PREDSTAVLENIYA), REPRESENTATIONS, WHICH MEAN THAT SPARKS OF ELECTRICITY FLY. IT WOULD BE BETTER, OF COURSE, TO CONDUCT MATTERS DIFFERENTLY, IN A CALMER FORM, BUT -- ONE HAS SOMETIMES TO TELL THE TRUTH, THE UNPLEASANT TRUTH, MAYBE EVEN IN QUITE SHARP TERMS -- HOW CAN ONE SPEAK MILDLY ABOUT WHAT IS NOW GOING ON IN THE NEAR EAST, PARTICULARLY IN LEBANON? HOW CAN ONE SPEAK MILDLY ABOUT WHAT IS REQUIRED OF PEOPLE IN TERMS OF NERVES AND FRAME OF MIND NOT TO ABSORB IN THE MOST LIVELY AND ENERGETIC WAY, AND WITH GREAT ALARM, WHAT IS GOING ON? AFTER ALL, THERE WAS A TIME WHEN, IN CONNECTION WITH A CERTAIN ACTION, AN AGGRESSIVE ACTION, BY ISRAEL TOWARD LEBANON, WASHINGTON MADE A STATEMENT: WASHINGTON WOULD NOT SEND ITS FORCES TO LEBANON. SOME TIME WENT BY. A STATEMENT IS MADE: YES, BY ALL MEANS, IT CAN SEND FORCES, BUT ONLY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD, IF ASKED. SOME TIME GOES BY: THEY APPEAR HERE, CONTINGENTS OF AMERICAN FORCES. AGAIN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT IS MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATION. YES, THERE ARE AMERICAN FORCES THERE AND WASHINGTON, FOR THE TIME BEING, IS NOT ABOUT TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES; IT DOES NOT HAVE A DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL.

(MORE)

2 APR 18262 FMS/SAH

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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171501

FBIS 56

TAKE 17 -- 22 (GRONYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL.

LIM21646

(TEXT) (ANSWER CONTINUES) THIS IS THE AMERICAN POSITION, AS EVERYONE KNOWS. WASHINGTON THEREFORE (?URGENTLY) PLACES ITS CONTINGENTS IN LEBANON. OR THEY SAY: YES, THE AMERICANS WILL LEAVE LEBANON WITH THEIR MILITARY CONTINGENTS, BUT ISRAEL AND ALL OTHER FOREIGN TROOPS MUST ALSO LEAVE. THEN ISRAEL SAYS: I DO NOT INTEND TO LEAVE; AND WASHINGTON SAYS: AH! SINCE ISRAEL DOES NOT INTEND TO LEAVE, NEITHER DO I. I THINK THAT IT IS NOT DIFFICULT FOR THESE TWO PARTNERS TO AGREE ON THE DIVISION OF ROLES BETWEEN THEMSELVES. EVERY OBJECTIVE, THINKING OUTSIDE OBSERVER DRAWS THE CORRECT CONCLUSION: YES, THERE IS, IN FACT, COLLUSION. THE SOVIET UNION IS IN FAVOR OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON, ALL OF THEM. SYRIA IS IN FAVOR OF THIS. ISRAEL DOES NOT WISH THIS; IT WANTS TO KEEP A PART OF LEBANON FOR ITSELF; IT WANTS TO BREAK LEBANON UP INTO PARTS. THIS IS, GENERALLY SPEAKING, A SMALL COUNTRY. AND BREAKING IT UP INTO PARTS -- WHAT HAPPENS? IT CESES TO EXIST.

WASHINGTON HAS STATED THAT IN THE VICINITY -- ACTUALLY, A HUGE REGION THAT ENCOMPASSES 19 COUNTRIES -- THERE ARE STATES OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. THESE ARE STATES TO WHICH THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES ARE SPREAD, AND A SPECIAL COMMAND HAS EVEN BEEN FORMED. A STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER HAS BEEN SET UP FOR THESE REGIONS. IN THE LIST OF TASKS PURSUED BY WASHINGTON IS THE TASK OF EVEN INTERFERING WHEN CERTAIN INTERNAL EVENTS ARE TAKING PLACE THAT DO NOT SUIT AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THESE COUNTRIES.

Oral (Releasable)  
Ref ID: A6-748-24-94-1  
CIV NARA DATE: 1/3/12

35

THE NEAR EAST IS FALLING (PODPADAT). THE NEAR EAST IS FALLING. WHAT RIGHTS EXIST HERE, WHAT LOFTY MORALS ARE HERE, WHAT HIGH MORAL PRINCIPLES? WHAT CAN BE DEFENDED HERE IF ONE APPROACHES THE MATTER WITH OBJECTIVITY AND HONESTY? IF SOME INTERNAL SOCIAL CHANGES TAKE PLACE IN THESE COUNTRIES, THEN WASHINGTON GIVES ITSELF THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE AND EVEN USE ARMED FORCE. WHAT IS ONE TO CALL THIS? I DO NOT WISH TO USE TOO STRONG WORDS.

WE, OF COURSE, SYMPATHIZE WITH THE ARAB CAUSE. WE ARE IN FAVOR OF PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL'S EXISTING AS A STATE. NO ONE CAN REPROACH US WITH HAVING CHANGED OUR POSITION TOWARD ISRAEL AS A STATE. WHEN THE QUESTION OF THE FATE OF PALESTINE WAS BEING DISCUSSED THE USSR RAISED ITS HAND IN FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE, THE CREATION OF, A SPECIAL STATE OF ISRAEL. WE CONTINUE TO THINK SO NOW.

WE DO NOT SHARE THE POINT OF VIEW OF EXTREMIST ARAB CIRCLES THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. THIS IS AN UNREALISTIC AND UNJUST POINT OF VIEW. BUT ISRAEL SHOULD BE A PEACE-LOVING STATE. IT SHOULD ARRANGE GOOD AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. THAT IS THE SORT OF ISRAEL STATE OF WHICH WE ARE IN FAVOR. UNFORTUNATELY, EVERYTHING THAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN DOING OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS SIMPLY UNDERCUTS THE BASIS, THE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BASIS, WHICH WAS DEFENDED IN GENERAL BY ALL OF THOSE WHO SUPPORTED THE CREATION OF ISRAEL AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IN VOTING FOR ISRAEL, WE WERE VOTING FOR A PEACEFUL ISRAEL, NOT FOR AN AGGRESSIVE ISRAELI STATE. PERHAPS THIS WILL NOW SOUND OLD-FASHIONED, BUT ALL THE SAME, I WISH THAT ISRAEL WOULD IN THE END POSSESS HEALTHY REALISTIC TENDENCIES IN ITS POLICY, IN POLITICAL LIFE, IN ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE, FAVORING THE IDEA THAT ISRAEL LIVE IN PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

(MORE)

2 APR 18332 FMS/TH

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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	171502 REPORT FBIS 57	2	4/2/1983	B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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FBI 57

TAKE 18 OF 18 -- 22 (GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE)

///WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

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(TEXT) (ANSWER CONTINUES) WE SUPPORT THE ARABS; WE SUPPORT THEIR JUST CAUSE; WE SUPPORT THE PALESTINIANS AND BELIEVE THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT, ALBEIT SMALL, PALESTINIAN ARAB STATE.

(QUESTION) ONE MORE, FINAL QUESTION, ANDREY ANDREYEVICH. THERE ARE OTHER QUESTIONS BUT THEY IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER REPEAT THOSE THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN PRESENTED. A QUESTION FROM THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK NEWSPAPERS MLADA FRONTA AND SNEHA ZDENEK: AS IS KNOWN, IN FEBRUARY THIS YEAR, THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE VIENNA TALKS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SUBMITTED A SERIES OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AIMED AT BREAKING THE DEADLOCK IN THE VIENNA TALKS. WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES? WHAT RE THE FURTHER PROSPECTS FOR THE VIENNA TALKS?

(ANSWER) TO BEGIN AT THE END, THE PROSPECTS ARE BAD. THE PROSPECTS ARE FELT TO BE B. BECAUSE WASHINGTON, LONDON AND OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS -- OUR PARTNERS IN THE TALKS -- ARE NOT DEVOTING SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THEM AND THEIR POSITIONS ARE FIRMLY CEMENTED. WE HAVE SEVERAL TIMES MADE APPROACHES FROM VARIOUS DIRECTIONS; WE HAVE MADE PROPOSALS AND SHOWN FLEXIBILITY IN THE HOPE THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THINGS WOULD BEGIN TO MOVE. NOT SO LONG AGO -- ONLY 2 OR 3 MONTHS AGO -- WE SUBMITTED PROPOSALS TO SIMPLIFY THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF TROOPS. WE HAD PROPOSED SIMPLIFYING THIS AND DISMISSING ANY LATERAL CIRCUMSTANCES. UNFORTUNATELY, NOT MUCH INTEREST WAS DISPLAYED IN THIS ALTHOUGH NO OFFICIAL ANSWER HAS YET BEEN GIVEN. THIS METHOD HAS BEEN ADOPTED FAIRLY FIRMLY OF LATE IN CERTAIN WESTERN CAPITALS. WE DO NOT HAVE AN ANSWER TO OUR PROPOSAL AND THERE IS NO MOVEMENT IN THESE TALKS, NO MOVEMENT. NOR IS THERE ANY MOVEMENT AT THE TALKS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THERE IS NO MOVEMENT IN A NUMBER OF OTHER AREAS CONCERNING TALKS THAT HAVE BEGUN AND THOSE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEGUN. OUR PARTNERS DO NOT WANT TO HOLD TALKS ON CESSION OF TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE REPROACH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES -- ABOVE ALL, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION -- FOR THEIR REFUSAL TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION OR EVEN TO HOLD TALKS.

STRANGE AS IT MAY SEEM, EVEN THE MADRID FORUM HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED. YET, GIVEN ANYTHING LIKE AN OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED LONG AGO BECAUSE THE MAIN POLITICAL FRAMEWORK HAS ALREADY BEEN DETERMINED BY THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE CONCRETE QUESTION THAT ARISE AND HAVE ARisen SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THAT BASIC AGREEMENT; IF THE DESIRE WERE THERE, THEY WOULD BE RESOLVED. LET US HOPE THAT IN THE END THAT FORUM WILL ALSO BE COMPLETED WITH POSITIVE RESULTS. ONE WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL.

I MUST THANK ALL THOSE PRESENT. I HOPE THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS PRESS CONFERENCE WILL BE REPORTED OBJECTIVELY. I ADDRESS MYSELF ESPECIALLY TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOREIGN NEWS MEDIA CONCERNING THIS LAST WISH. THANK YOU. I LEAVE YOU MY BEST WISHES. GOODBYE. (APPLAUSE)

(ENDALL)

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