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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/17/2015

File Folder USSR (4/1/83) (2)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 24

SKINNER

316

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171475 MEMO	C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST	1	4/1/1983	B1
171477 REPORT	RE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST	2	3/31/1983	B1
171476 MEMO	COPY OF DOC #171475 (C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST)	1	4/1/1983	B1
171478 REPORT	RE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST (COPY OF DOC #171477)	2	3/31/1983	B1
171479 MEMO	B. LINHARD THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE GROMYKO DAY GAMEPLAN (W/ADDED NOTE)	1	ND	B1

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1

NON - PROLIFERATION

2

Non-Proliferation Talks with the Allies

Q. How and when will the President discuss non-proliferation with our Allies?

A. The President is scheduled to meet with the leaders of other Western nations at the Williamsburg economic summit in May. Non-proliferation is likely to be one of the many issues addressed at that meeting.

m

Non-Proliferation Policy

Q. The President's speech raises non-proliferation as an issue of great concern to the U.S. Can you summarize the Administration's policy in this area?

A. -- President Reagan has committed the US to a strong and active non-proliferation policy, concentrating on realistic means to pursue more effectively our goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

-- By helping friendly nations to meet their legitimate security needs, we are seeking to reduce motivations that can lead countries to seek nuclear weapons.

-- In close consultation with other nuclear suppliers, we are working to improve international export controls on nuclear equipment, materials, and technology and to strengthen the system of IAEA safeguards on nuclear facilities.

-- We are working to restore our reputation as a reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation in order to secure more effective cooperation with our allies in coping with proliferation problems.

-- We are continuing efforts to encourage more countries to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under which 116 countries have already renounced acquisition of nuclear weapons, or to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco creating a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America.

D

Non-Proliferation Policy and the Allies

- Q. What does the President mean when he speaks of the special responsibilities our Allies bear in the non-proliferation area?
- A. Our Allies include most of the technically advanced countries which are the principal suppliers of nuclear technology. The supplier nations have a special responsibility to take steps to ensure that the facilities, materials, and equipment they provide are used only for peaceful purposes and are adequately safeguarded against misuse. We are working closely and cooperatively with other nuclear suppliers to improve nuclear export controls and to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. We are also urging other suppliers to require safeguards on all of a country's nuclear activities as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.

5

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

March 29, 1983

U.S. INITIATIVE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL

Q: The United States has tabled in Geneva what it calls its detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban. What are these?

A: -- The document we tabled at the Committee on Disarmament on February 10 is a new U.S. chemical weapons arms control initiative. It outlines in detail our views on all aspects of a complete, effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban. These proposals include a framework for systematic international verification, including on-site inspections, so that all nations could have confidence that the ban would be faithfully observed.

March 29, 1983

CBW Arms Control and Soviet CW Use

Q: Isn't it inconsistent for the US to be sitting down to negotiations on a chemical weapons ban at the very time the Soviets and others are using chemical and toxin weapons in violation of existing arms control agreements covering these weapons?

A: -- No. Evidence that existing arms control arrangements are inadequate makes it all the more important to conclude agreements which contain effective provision for verification and compliance. We seek to conclude a verifiable and effective international agreement which would totally eliminate chemical weapons from the arsenals of all states. We also supported the UNGA resolution calling for a meeting of the states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to strengthen its verification and compliance provisions.

8
March 29, 1983

Multilateral versus Bilateral CW Arms Control

Q: Why is the U.S. supporting multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) on chemical weapons, rather than its traditional course of bilateral arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union? Isn't this really just proof that the U.S. is not seriously interested in concluding a chemical weapons ban?

A: -- No. Chemical weapons arms control directly affects the interests of a large number of countries - not just the U.S. and USSR. Any state with a chemical industry, in fact, has the means to develop a chemical weapons capability.

-- To be truly effective, a chemical weapons ban must have the widest possible international adherence. To secure this, negotiations must ensure that the diverse concerns of the various potential parties to the future agreement have been fully taken into account - not just those of the U.S. and USSR.

-- The 40-nation Committee on Disarmament provides the best forum today for carrying out this task. The U.S. and USSR are members of this body and, therefore, will both be participants in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons.

-- The possibility of resuming bilateral US/Soviet negotiations on a chemical weapons convention also remains open. However, the Soviet Union must demonstrate genuine readiness to negotiate effective verification and compliance arrangements, and to abide by their obligations under existing agreements. Without this, there can be little hope that such bilateral talks would be productive.



a

10
March 29, 1983

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

Q: How do you see the course of the MBFR negotiations in the months ahead?

A. Last year, the US and its Allies undertook a major initiative in MBFR by tabling a draft treaty designed to take legitimate Eastern security concerns into account. We hope the East will give that initiative the constructive response it deserves. Our goal in MBFR is to enhance security and stability in Europe through:

- significant manpower reductions to equal levels
- a verifiable agreement to ensure that the reduced levels are maintained.

Q. What is your response to the new Eastern initiative proposing an informal agreement on US and Soviet withdrawals by mutual example?

A. We are studying the new proposal which has not been fully spelled out. However, it does not seem to include adequate verification measures and guarantee significant reductions to equal levels.

12



CDE

Q. What are the prospects that a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) will take place?

A. -- That is one of the questions which was being discussed at Madrid in the latest round of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

-- We are seeking a balanced outcome in Madrid.

-- We are looking for real progress on human rights not just security issues, but if we do get progress in both areas, then the prospects for a CDE are good.

CDE

- Q. The neutrals have proposed a compromise on all areas, including human rights. Can we accept?
- A. The most important factor in our evaluation of this compromise will be the need for balanced progress including progress in human rights.

91

NUCLEAR FREEZE

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Q. Why does the Administration oppose a freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons?

A. We share the concern about the risk of nuclear war and we are doing everything possible to reduce that risk.

-- A freeze at current levels would seriously handicap our efforts to negotiate arms reductions because it would lock in existing Soviet military advantages, and prevent us from carrying out necessary modernization of our nuclear forces..

-- It would thus reduce Soviet incentives to discuss seriously proposals for cuts in nuclear arsenals.

-- Although a freeze appears simple, because of its broad coverage, it would require extensive and lengthy negotiations to agree on the terms. This would divert us from the task of seeking reductions. Moreover, a comprehensive freeze cannot be effectively verified.

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Q. The House of Representatives will soon be voting on a nuclear freeze resolution and it is expected that it will be approved. What is wrong with the resolution and why does the Administration oppose it?

A. The House of Representatives voted against a nuclear freeze proposal last year by a narrow margin and voted instead for a resolution that called for deep reductions in the levels of nuclear forces. The matter is again before the House of Representatives although this year's resolution is more ambiguous with respect to a nuclear freeze and what a freeze would cover.

The Reagan Administration has made clear its reasons for opposing a nuclear freeze. A freeze would preserve today's high and unstable levels of nuclear forces and would undercut our negotiations which seek deep reductions in nuclear weapons levels. A freeze would not be verifiable and a freeze would preserve the Soviets in a position of military advantage while preventing the United States from replacing obsolete and deteriorating military equipment.

The House of Representatives should consider these serious drawbacks to what has been and is a superficially attractive, simple and wrong solution to our arms control problems.

Q. What would be the effect of passage of a freeze resolution in Congress on our START and INF negotiations?

A. That would depend on the kind of resolution passed.

There are over a dozen resolutions on nuclear arms control and the freeze before the House now: all of these resolutions are non-binding. The effects of the two major freeze proposals on our ongoing negotiations would be very different. A freeze at current levels could undermine the START and INF negotiations and hamper our efforts to achieve a sound agreement by reducing Soviet incentives to negotiate for reductions. It could undo the progress we have already made in convincing the Soviet Union to negotiate for substantial reductions.

The proposal for a freeze after reductions to equal and verifiable levels supports the goals we are seeking in the negotiations, and would contribute to their achievement.

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Q: Why shouldn't we freeze first and then negotiate reductions?

A: Because a freeze would allow the Soviets to preserve their current nuclear advantages. They would have little incentive to discuss reductions. Moreover, although a freeze sounds simple, reaching agreement on the elements to be frozen, verification measures, etc. would be lengthy and difficult, thus delaying negotiations for actual reductions. We can do much better by continuing to negotiate vigorously for reductions.

VF

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8302227

20

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 APR 83 13

12/27/15 KOB

TO CLARK

FROM HILL

DOCDATE 01 APR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

MIDDLE EAST

MEDIA

SUBJECT: SOVIET GOVT STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

REF# 8309717

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171478	REPORT RE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST (COPY OF DOC #171477)	2	3/31/1983	B1

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12/17/15 EOB

RECEIVED 01 APR 83 19

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FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 01 APR 83

BOVERIE

01 APR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SUBJECT: GROMYKO DAY GAMEPLAN

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION

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CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DEC 0 8 1983 McFarlane noted

RL ✓

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National Security Council
The White House

604M

1910P

APR 0 1 1983

Package # 9045

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>✓</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room	<u>2</u>		<u>DACOM</u> <u>to JP</u>

I Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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PAGES ONE

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DACOM # 85

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PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG 020045Z APR 83

ROUTINE

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1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. *[Signature]* RADM POINDEXTER / SANTA BARBARA / TOR: 020052Z

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ATTACHED: GROMYKO DAY GAMEPLAN

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