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Withdrawer

KDB 12/17/2015

File Folder USSR (4/1/83) (1)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 24

SKINNER

315

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171474	MEMO	C. HILL TO W. CLARK RE GROMYKO'S APR. 2 PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE U.S. RESPONSE	3	4/1/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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NSC/S PROFILE

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II ID 8302227

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE RECEIVED 04 APR 83 13
12/17/15 GOS

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 01 APR 83

HILL, C

01 APR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

MIDDLE EAST

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

ARMS CONTROL

INF

MEDIA

SUBJECT: GROMYKO 2 APR PRESS STATEMENT & POSSIBLE US RESPONSE

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NONE

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MYER

STEARMAN

KEMP

COMMENTS

REF# 8309717

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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83 APR 1 PIO: 55

April 1, 1983

HOUSE
SITING ROOM

TO: NSC - Robert McFarlane

FROM: S/S - Clay McManaway *CM*

With reference to the attached package, Charlie left a message for you with Wilma, but asked that I repeat it in case the two don't get married up there. The message is as follows:

- The Secretary has not seen this material.
- We think it's a pretty solid package, but obviously we can't predict what Gromyko will in fact say.
- With regard to public responses to Gromyko, we think that almost regardless of what he says we should open our response with a positive statement about our position; i.e., we want a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union but...
- We believe we should consult carefully in the morning, once we know what Gromyko has said, before we decide on our response.

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Points for Inclusion in
State Department Statement on
Gromyko's Remarks at his Press Conference

Foreign Minister Gromyko's remarks suggest that the Soviet Union is not yet prepared to respond to the positive proposals to reduce armaments and to resolve US-Soviet disagreements in other areas that President Reagan has put forward. We regret this Soviet attitude, but we will persist in seeking to put the US-Soviet relationship on a more stable and secure footing, based on respect for each other's interests and restraint in international conduct.

In pursuit of these objectives, the United States has launched the most comprehensive program of arms control initiatives ever undertaken. We have put forward proposals in the talks on strategic, intermediate-range, and conventional forces that seek substantial reductions in the level of East-West military confrontation. We have also proposed a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and a wide range of measures to reduce the risk of war from accident or miscalculation. We hope that Moscow will give serious consideration to our proposals. At the same, time, we have made clear that we will ensure a stable military balance through appropriate defense efforts.

In addition to our arms control initiatives, we have sought to engage the Soviet Union in an intensive dialogue on the many other problems in US-Soviet relations: human rights, Soviet expansionism beyond its frontiers, economic relations and other bilateral issues. We have made clear -- not only in words, but in deeds -- that we will leave no stone unturned in the search for mutually acceptable solutions to these problems.

We are disappointed that the Soviet Foreign Minister has spoken so critically of the President's proposal for an interim agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear missiles on an equal basis. Mr. Gromyko seems to be saying that no equal level

of intermediate-range missiles could form the basis for a satisfactory agreement. The President's offer could produce tangible progress in the Geneva negotiations toward the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons entirely. Our Allies in Europe and Asia strongly support it.

The Soviet Union owes the world a more positive response; we hope that during the recess between rounds of the INF talks, taking into account the concerns of other nations, the Soviet Union will take a more flexible view. As the President's proposal makes clear, we intend to return to Geneva in a constructive search for a solution which provides for equality at reduced levels. As he said, "it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many."

[Following rebuttal paragraphs as appropriate]

[If explicit rejection on INF: It is unfortunate that the Soviet Union has chosen to reject our new proposal even before exploring it with us in Geneva. We hope that this initial, hasty and negative response will not stop the Soviet Union from considering our proposal carefully, and returning to the bargaining table in Geneva next month prepared for serious negotiations.]

[If door left open on INF: We are hopeful that Gromyko's comments on the President's proposal mean we can look forward to serious negotiations when the Delegations reconvene in Geneva next month.]

[If threat of INF counterdeployments: We note that Mr. Gromyko has repeated previous Soviet threats of countermeasures in the event NATO's INF deployments proceed on schedule. Such threats do not contribute to the task of negotiating a fair and equitable INF agreement, and obscure the fact that the USSR has an overwhelming advantage in missiles that threaten U.S. friends and Allies in both Europe and Asia.]

[START: We cannot agree with Mr. Gromyko's characterization of the status of the START negotiations. The United States has proposed equal, substantially reduced limits on the various categories of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, with particular focus on reducing those systems most destabilizing for the strategic balance. Moreover, the U.S. Delegation has made a conscientious effort to move the negotiations forward, including the tabling in the latest round of a draft of the basic elements of a Treaty on the comprehensive reductions of strategic arms. We call upon the USSR to take a similarly constructive approach to the negotiations.]

[TTBT/PNET: We are disappointed that Mr. Gromyko has reaffirmed the Soviets' negative response to the U.S. proposal to negotiate verification improvements to the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Based on exhaustive analysis, the U.S. has concluded that we cannot adequately verify compliance with the 150-kiloton limit, and that the verification measures of these treaties, even if implemented, would do no more than marginally improve the situation. If the Soviets refuse to engage in discussions on improved verification measures for these treaties, we would be forced to question the sincerity of their commitment to effective limitations on nuclear testing.]

[CTB: A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term goal, but we believe that, under present circumstances, conclusion of such a treaty does not appear realistic. There are continuing, serious difficulties with respect to verification. Further, we believe that a comprehensive test ban should be considered in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions and expanded confidence-building measures.]

[BMD: We regret that Mr. Gromyko has once again repeated previous distortions of the substance and intent of the President's proposal to initiate a major review of technologies and other areas related to ballistic missile defense systems. The President made clear

that his aim is to explore the possibilities for reducing reliance on destabilizing offensive ballistic missile systems, and not to "disarm" or gain unilateral advantage over the USSR. We seek a more stable military balance, which will enhance the security of the United States, the USSR, and all other nations.

The President has stated explicitly that the effort called for in his speech will be conducted consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty, which does not prohibit research into ballistic missile defense concepts. Indeed there is only one nation which has a deployed ABM system, which is carrying out an intensive research program in this area, and which has a demonstrated capability to attack unarmed satellites -- the Soviet Union.

Drafted:EUR/SOV:AVershbow
1116m

Cleared:EUR:JDobbins
PM:JTHowe
OSD:RPerle

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INF

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PM PRESS GUIDANCE

April 1, 1983

INF

Q: Is the U.S. going to propose a specific number in the INF negotiations?

A: The President has put forward a proposal for equal levels of warheads on land-based, longer-range INF missile launchers which demonstrates maximum U.S. flexibility. If the Soviets are seriously interested in reaching agreement, the ball is now in their court. For 18 months, the Soviets have insisted they will not accept zero-zero. Now we are asking what equal level they will accept.

Drafted: PM/TMP:OGrobel:dlj
4/1/83: Ph. 632-3136
WANG # 1124P

Clearances: PM - RDean
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JCS - Col. T. Giles

INF: Gromyko's Press Conference

Contingency 1 -- Gromyko rejects the President's new INF initiative in highly categorical terms which indicate that the Soviet Union sees no positive elements in it:

Q: In his press conference today, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made it clear the President's new INF proposal is completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Any comment?

A: We regret this unconstructive initial Soviet reaction, made less than five days after our proposal was introduced. There has not even been time for a full discussion of the proposal at the negotiating table in Geneva. While making clear that we continue to regard the elimination of the entire class of land-based longer range INF missiles as the best solution, the President has offered to negotiate an interim agreement calling for reduced and equal levels of warheads on both sides. This is an eminently fair proposal which demonstrates very great flexibility and takes full account of the security needs of both sides. It has been strongly and unanimously endorsed by the NATO Allies. The US position is based on the principle of equality. As the President said, with regard to these missiles, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many. By contrast, as is clear from Mr. Gromyko's statement, the Soviets remain attached to their goal of preserving their unacceptable and destabilizing monopoly on longer-range land-based INF missiles. Mr. Gromyko seems to be

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saying that no equal level of LRINF missiles could form the basis for a satisfactory agreement. By turning their backs on our open-ended proposal, the Soviets contradict their own claims to be negotiating seriously.

Ambassador Nitze presented the new US initiative in Geneva March 29. He will be pursuing it when the talks reconvene May 17. We hope the Soviet Union, despite this initial reaction, will consider our proposal carefully during this period and will return to the bargaining table prepared to negotiate seriously to achieve an agreement in the interests of the security of all nations.

Contingency 2 -- Gromyko sharply criticizes the President's initiative, but appears to stop short of a final and unconditional rejection:

Q: Do you see any positive elements in Gromyko's statement on the President's INF initiative?

A: We are not surprised at Mr. Gromyko's allegations, which are both familiar and ill-founded. At the same time, we hope the Soviets are giving the President's new initiative the most serious consideration. The President has put a significant new offer on the table, demonstrating great flexibility. He has reaffirmed that we continue to see the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles as the best solution for both sides in Geneva. At the same time, he has offered to negotiate an interim agreement providing for reduced and equal levels of warheads on both sides. As the President said, when it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many. Our offer is an equitable one which takes account of the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is a demonstration of our flexibility, and has been strongly and unanimously endorsed by the NATO Allies. We hope the Soviet Union will take this into account, and return to the bargaining table ready to negotiate seriously when the talks resume May 17.

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Q. Why is the United States not prepared to accept the Soviet demand that they be compensated for British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations?

A. The Soviet Union has raised this demand not as a serious negotiating objective but as an obstacle to reaching agreement.

-- The Soviets, of course, know that British and French systems are different in type and function from the U.S. and Soviet systems under negotiation.

-- They know that British and French systems are nationally based strategic deterrents, designed to defend France and Britain, not to deter attacks upon the other countries of NATO.

-- They know that only new American INF missiles can offset Soviet SS-20's, and ensure retention of the necessary link between American strategic power and the security of Europe.

-- They know that the British and French forces consist almost exclusively of sea-based, submarine-launched strategic missiles, not land based INF missiles like the SS-20, Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile.

-- They know that their own nuclear forces are a hundred times more powerful and their nuclear weapons are eighty times more numerous than those of the UK and France combined.

-- They know that, in addition to their strategic forces targeted upon the United States, they have a very substantial superiority in nuclear forces targeted upon Europe, a superiority which more than offsets the British and French forces.

-- They know that the United States has rejected these same Soviet demands for compensation for British and French systems

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in the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. Like the SALT talks, the INF negotiations are bilateral, and neither France nor Britain would permit its forces to be included.

-- Finally, the Soviets must realize that their demand to be allowed nuclear forces as large as every other country of the world combined is tantamount to a demand for effective military superiority, and thus global hegemony.

We hope that the Soviet Union, in responding to President Reagan's latest initiative, will drop this artificial barrier to progress in the negotiations and bargain seriously on the basis of U.S.-Soviet equality, which is the only reasonable foundation for arms control agreements between our two countries.

Q. How is your new proposal better than the Andropov proposal for reductions to 162 missiles?

A. We are proposing equal limits for the US and USSR, covering all land-based, longer-range INF missile systems on a global basis.

Under their latest proposal, the Soviets would retain over 800 warheads on SS-20 launchers and there would be more for the US. Of these Soviet warheads, there would be 486 in Europe and the 324 currently in Asia. In addition, Soviet SS-20s in the Far East would be completely unconstrained, and the excess in Europe (currently 243 warheads) could simply be transferred to Asia. Their proposal would actually leave them with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiations began in 1981.

As NATO Defense Ministers said in their communique of March 23:

"The Soviet proposals have not substantially changed since the beginning of the negotiations. In fact, their most recent proposal would leave the Soviet Union with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiations began, deny NATO the right to modernize its means of deterring this threat, allow them to have an unlimited number of mobile SS-20s east of the Urals which would still pose a

threat to NATO Europe and almost totally eliminate from the European continent United States aircraft which are indispensable to NATO's conventional defences. The result would be to preserve the Soviet monopoly in the field of land-based LRINF missiles, to erode seriously the linkage between the United States' strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe and to further the Soviet long-term aim of dividing the Alliance."

INF: Press guidance

Drafted:EUR/RPM:THOchiltree *THO*
4/1/83 (0155B) ext. 20710

- EUR/RPM:JHHawes
 - EUR:JDobbins
 - EUR/Sov:
 - PM:JHowe
 - ACDA:HGrady
 - OSD:RPerle
 - JCS:Col. Giles
 - NSC:RLinhard
- JHO*

AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

Q: Have you detected any Soviet willingness to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict there?

A: We have detected no real change in the Soviet position in Afghanistan. The Soviets continue to press military operations within the country and have given no clear sign, in any channel, that they are ready to discuss a settlement.

The U.S. goal remains constant and is shared by many other countries: to achieve a political solution that will get Soviet troops completely out of Afghanistan, provide for self-determination for the Afghan people, create an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan, and lead to the return of refugees in safety and honor.

We have expressed our support for the UN process undertaken by Under Secretary Cordovez as a way of realizing these objectives and implementing UNGA resolutions on Afghanistan.

If the Soviets are serious about a settlement, they certainly have been given an opportunity to show it. The world community awaits some tangible sign of movement toward a settlement from Moscow.

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START

Q. The Soviets claim that no progress is being made in START. Is that a correct assessment?

A. Details of the Geneva negotiations are kept confidential. It is certainly correct to say that there are many serious differences between our position and that of the Soviets. However, given the complexity of the issues, the exchanges have been useful and we continue to believe that a sound equitable agreement is possible. Unfortunately, achieving such an agreement does not depend on us alone.

Q. Does the U.S. proposal limit bombers?

A. We have made clear to the Soviets that we are willing to accept limits on heavy bombers.

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START NEGOTIATIONS

Q. Does the U.S. proposal limit cruise missiles?

A. Our proposal places highest priority on ballistic missiles -- the most destabilizing systems. Nevertheless, the President has stated that "everything is on the table."

Q. Is it true that U.S. proposals would have a one-sided impact on Soviet forces?

A. Because the Soviets have forged ahead in certain areas, particularly ICBMs, some of their reductions must be greater than ours in order to achieve an equal outcome. However, it is important to understand that our proposal would require substantial reductions in U.S. forces as well. For example, we would be required to cut our deployed ballistic missiles by about one-half and the warheads on those missiles by about one-third.

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F

B

SALT II VIOLATIONS

March 29, 1983

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT II

Q. Has the Soviet Union violated SALT II Treaty Ban on no more than one new type of ICBM?

A. -- The Soviets tested a missile on February 8, which is different from a new type ICBM tested earlier. The February 8 missile may also be different from ICBM's currently deployed. We are evaluating the preliminary data on this test -- the U.S. monitors compliance with existing arms control agreements on a continuing basis and evaluates all relevant information. As the President said, however, we "don't have the full answers on that one yet."

-- Based on the information we now have, we do have concerns about the consistency of this new missile with SALT II Treaty provisions, but final conclusions must wait until analysis is complete.

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Q. Why don't we ratify the SALT II Treaty?

A. The SALT II Treaty contained serious flaws which would not be in our interest as a legal obligation. These are graphically illustrated by the uncertainties surrounding the recent Soviet missile tests and continuing concerns about encryption of missile telemetry data.

Therefore, I have chosen to place our emphasis and our energies toward achieving real, significant reductions in START.

CB

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Q. You mentioned new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in your speech. What did you have in mind?

A. We have spent a good deal of time consulting with members of Congress in putting together a package of CBMs which are designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. We have solicited inputs from all areas of government in putting together this comprehensive package. The details of our proposal will be unfolding in the next few weeks. I will say this, the proposals are broad in scope concerning a number of potential agreements.

Q. Did you propose a Crisis Control Center as part of your CBM package?

A. We have reviewed a large number of initiatives from State, Defense and Congressional sources that were designed to reduce the risk of nuclear war. A proposal on a Crisis Control Center was part of that review.

Q. Have you been working with Congress in the development of your CBM package?

A. Yes, we have been working key members of Congress for several months on this comprehensive package of proposals of all possible initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during time of crisis. In particular, we have been working with Senators Nunn and Jackson.

Q. What does the Administration think of the Congressional CBM proposal?

A. We have closely examined all ~~the popular~~ Congressional proposals and many have special merit. We have incorporated several of their proposals and, as a result, I feel the Administration's package is stronger and broader based and will have a great impact on lowering, still further, the risk of accidental nuclear war.

Q. How does the Congressional CBM package differ from yours?

A. The Administration and Congressional proposals share a common goal--to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. We have taken parts of the Congressional proposal which had special merit and folded them into our own.

Q. Have you submitted your CBM report to Congress?

A. No, we haven't submitted our report to the Congress as yet. It is currently at the White House for review after which it will be sent to the Congress by Secretary Weinberger. The report will be submitted in response to Section 1123(a) of Public Law 97-252 of the DoD Authorization Act, 1983, which directed SecDef to conduct a complete study.

COHEN-NUNN PROPOSAL

Q. Do you have any comment on the proposal by Senator Cohen for a "mutual, guaranteed nuclear arms build-down" under which the US and USSR would eliminate two old warheads for any new warheads deployed?

A. Senator Cohen's proposal has a number of interesting features. We share the spirit and the intent of his proposal -- to achieve substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals while allowing for necessary modernization and maintenance of deterrent forces. In this sense, it is consistent with the objectives of our arms control proposals at the START and INF negotiations in Geneva. The proposal will have to be considered with respect to its effect in enhancing stability and equality of forces.

Q. Earlier, in Berlin, you talked about negotiating confidence building measures with the Soviets. What is the status of that initiative?

A. We have proposed to the Soviets, in Geneva, a number of measures -- expanded exchanges of forces data, advance notification of major military exercises and advance notification of strategic and LRINF ballistic missile launches. These are part of our discussions in START and INF and I am hopeful we will be able to reach agreement on these.

NUNN-JACKSON PROPOSALS

Q: What do you think of the various proposals for confidence-building measures (including proposals for crisis control centers) which have been advanced by prominent legislators such as Senators Nunn and Jackson?

A: We share the concern Senators Nunn, Jackson and others have expressed over the need to reduce as much as possible the risks of accidental nuclear war. In our study of this issue we have intensively examined the Senators' proposals, and have incorporated many of their ideas into specific concepts which will be reported to the Congress in the near future.

Q. Are you planning to propose any changes to the Hotline link between Washington and Moscow?

A. The President noted in his address of November 22 that "the existing hotline is dependable and rapid with both ground and satellite links. But because it is so important, I've also directed that we carefully examine any possible improvements to the existing hotline system." We are looking at improvements very carefully and will announce the results of that study in the near future.

SOVIET CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Q. Have the Soviets proposed any confidence-building measures in START?

A. Yes, the Soviets have proposed several measures in the START talks. These measures, along with the proposals set forth in November, are presently under discussion in Geneva. [If pressed as to US response to Soviet proposals: We do not comment on the substance of ongoing negotiations.]

NUCLEAR TESTING

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ADMINISTRATION REACTION

Q: What is the Administration's interpretation of the Soviet response not to join in negotiations to improve TTBT and PNET verification?

A: We are very disappointed in the Soviet response. We will be discussing this with them more in the future.

If they continue to refuse to discuss our concerns, we would be forced to question how genuine their commitment is to effective limitations on nuclear testing.

Q. What are the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty? Of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty?

A. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed in July 1974, established a nuclear "threshold" by prohibiting underground nuclear weapons tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (the equivalent of one hundred fifty thousand tons of TNT). Underground nuclear explosions carried out for peaceful purposes were specifically exempted however.

The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in May 1976, governs all nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside the weapons tests sites specified under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The PNET obligated the US and USSR not to carry out any individual nuclear explosions having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; not to carry out any group explosions (consisting of a number of individual explosions) having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosions unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures.

Q. Is it true that the Soviets have violated their undertaking to observe the 150-kt limit?

A. Because of uncertainties in monitoring techniques, we cannot conclude with certainty whether Soviet tests have exceeded the 150-kt limit. However, certain Soviet tests have been of sufficient magnitude to raise serious questions. When questioned, the Soviet Union asserted that it has not tested above 150 kt. These ambiguities in the test measurements clearly demonstrate the need for improved verification procedures for those treaties.

U.S. TESTS ABOVE 150 kt

Q. Does the U.S. intend to continue to abide by the 150-kiloton limit of the TTB and PNE Treaties?

A. We have no current plans to test above this level.

EXISTING VERIFICATION PROVISIONS

Q. Why are the verification provisions of the TTBT and PNET inadequate?

A. Since 1976, our estimates of the yields of a number of Soviet tests have led to serious concerns regarding whether the Soviets are observing the threshold.

We have determined that if we were to implement the provisions of the Treaties, the improvements in our ability to monitor the yield of Soviet nuclear tests over the existing situation would be marginal.

Thus, we believe that the verification measures of these treaties need to be improved.

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Q. Why have you decided not to resume the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations?

A. While we continue to view a comprehensive test ban as a long-term goal, under present circumstances conclusion of such a treaty does not appear realistic.

There are continuing, serious difficulties with respect to verification -- thus we support further discussion of ways to improve verification related to CTB in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

We believe that a comprehensive test ban should be considered in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures, and improved verification capabilities.

Nuclear testing plays a very important role in ensuring the continued credibility of our deterrent and in maintaining our expertise in nuclear weapons technology. In addition to the development and certification of new nuclear weapons, the U.S. employs nuclear testing to ensure the continued reliability of existing weapons and to incorporate modern safety and security features.