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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 12/17/2015

**File Folder** USSR (3/24/83-3/25/83)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 24

SKINNER

313

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171453	MEMO	W. RAYMOND TO W. CLARK RE PROJECT DEMOCRACY	1	3/24/1983	B1
	<i>D</i>	<i>9/13/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-4-1-6</i>			
171454	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S	1	3/24/1983	B1
171455	NOTE	TO JUDGE CLARK RE PAPER	1	3/26/1983	B1
171456	MEMO	S. KRAEMER, K. DEGRAFFENREID, AND R. LINHARD THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION PAPER	4	3/24/1983	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171459	REPORT	NSC STAFF SUMMARY (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #171457)	2	ND	B1
171461	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET ICBM TESTS <i>R</i> <b>6/5/2013</b> <b>CREST NLR-748-24-4-5-2</b>	1	3/19/1983	B1
171460	REPORT	RE SOVIET ICBM TESTS	13	ND	B1
171462	CABLE	MOSCOW 3545 <i>R</i> <b>6/4/2013</b> <b>CREST NLR-748-24-4-6-1</b>	3	3/25/1983	B1
171463	NOTE	FROM REAGAN RE SOVIET ICBM TESTS <i>R</i> <b>6/4/2013</b> <b>CREST NLR-748-24-4-7-0</b>	1	ND	B1
171464	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET SALT COMPLIANCE AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS (W/NOTATIONS)	8	3/25/1983	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8301981

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 MAR 83 16

*12/7/83 000*

FROM RAYMOND

DOC DATE 24 MAR 83

TO CLARK

KEYWORDS: PROJECT DEMOCRACY  
USSR

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
MEDIA

SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTACKS AGAINST PROJECT DEMOCRACY

-----  
ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION  
CLARK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
LENCZOWSKI  
LORD

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID *10380077* ( N / )

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO  
*C APR 04 1983 Clark noted* *WR*

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

595

Package # 1981

MAR 25 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

*[Handwritten notes and signatures in the comments section, including "VP Meese" and "Baker Deaver"]*

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS  
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12 NOV 82 07 29z

FORGERY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 249222  
PASS TO PAO'S

E.O. 12421: N/A  
TAGS: PGOV  
SUBJECT: **DEMOCRATIZATION IN COMMUNIST STATES**

A STUDY, BEING PREPARED BY AN INTERAGENCY GROUP, THE AIM OF WHICH IS TO BRING ABOUT DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN COUNTRIES RULED BY COMMUNIST REGIMES SETS NEW TASKS FOR ALL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AS WELL AS THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

NOT ALL EMBASSIES HAVE SENT THEIR ACTION PLANS WITHIN THE PREVIOUSLY SET DEADLINE /OCTOBER 29/. PART OF THE ALREADY TRANSMITTED PROPOSALS DOES NOT MEET THE ADMINISTRATIONS EXPECTATIONS. SINCE THE STUDY OUTLINE IS SERIOUSLY BEHIND SCHEDULE, WE ARE REQUESTING ALL EMBASSIES THAT THEY SPEED UP THE TRANSMITTAL OF THEIR PROPOSALS. WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS, THAT ALL FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS WILL BE FULLY REIMBURSED FROM A SPECIAL FUND.

FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS WE WOULD LIKE TO SUPPLEMENT CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS SENT EARLIER:

--THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION OF COMMUNIST STATES MUST FIRST OF ALL BEGIN FROM THE INSIDE. THEREFORE, ALL INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE TO EMBASSIES OF BRINGING ABOUT CHANGES IN THOSE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE FULLY UTILIZED;

--TARGETING FOR THE CIA FOR TRAINING AND SENDING TO THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN ACTIVIST EMIGRES, WHO HAVE HITHERTO KEPT THEMSELVES OUT OF THE LIME-LIGHT /THIS CONCERNS FIRST OF ALL SWEDEN, FRG AND FRANCE/;

--MAINTAINING PERMANENT CONTACTS WITH THE DEMOCRATICALLY ORIENTED INTELLECTUAL ELITE. SUPPLY BOOKS AND PERIODICALS. ARRANGE FINANCIAL HELP;

--EXTEND PARTICULAR CARE TO DISSIDENT ELEMENTS,  
ESPECIALLY LEADERS;

--INCREASE INFLUENCE IN REGARD TO THE CHURCH AND IT'S  
INSTITUTIONS. SUPPORT THAT PART OF THE CHURCH HIERARCHY,  
WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY-OUT THE  
ADMINISTRATIONS OBJECTIVES;

--INTENSIFY CONTACTS WITH THE ACADEMIA. SELECT STUDENTS  
AND FACULTY MEMBERS FOR STIPENDS IN THE UNITED STATES,  
BOTH, THOSE DEMOCRATICALLY ORIENTED, AS WELL AS THOSE,  
WHOSE PARENTS HOLD HIGH POSITIONS IN THE STATE AND PARTY  
HIERARCHIES;

--BROADEN DIRECT COOPERATION WITH THE PROPER SECTIONS  
OF VOICE OF AMERICA, RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY.

AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN SPREADING THE THEORY OF  
MARXISM-LENINISM IS PLAYED BY COMMUNIST PARTIES AND  
PARTIES WHOSE PROGRAMS ARE ALIEN TO OUR IDEALS OPERATING  
IN ALLIED COUNTRIES. EMBASSY PROPOSALS SHOULD ALSO TAKE  
INTO CONSIDERATION WAYS OF INFLUENCING THESE PARTIES.  
DETERMINED ACTION OF BOTH, ALL GOVERNMENTAL AS WELL  
NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS MUST LEAD TO COMPROMISING  
AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, ELIMINATING THOSE PARTIES FROM  
THE POLITICAL SCENE IN ALLIED COUNTRIES /OUR ALLIES  
SHOULD NOT BE THUS INFORMED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES/.

DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,  
COMMERCIAL CONTACTS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR WITH EASTERN  
EUROPEAN STATES SHOULD BE BROADENED TO THE MAXIMUM  
EXTENT POSSIBLE. THIS IS ONE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF TRANS-  
FORMING COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, WEAKNING THEIR TIES WITH  
THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS A FORM OF ELIMINATING COM-  
PETITION FROM THE MARKET.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD LIKE  
TO THANK THE EMBASSIES FOR THEIR EFFORT IN SHAPING  
GOVERNMENT PLANS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEY WOULD LIKE TO  
UNDERLINE, THAT ACTIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE  
SECTOR INSTITUTIONS IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS MUST FIRST OF ALL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT  
U.S. INTERESTS. END. DAM

BT

#9222



MEDIA CONDEMN U.S. 'PUBLIC DIPLOMACY' PROGRAM

## TASS Statement: U.S. 'Interference'

LD171856 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Feb 83

["TASS Statement" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 17 Feb (TASS) -- A "program of democracy and public diplomacy" has been proclaimed in Washington with great pomp. The essence of this program is that the United States is attempting to assume the right, under the pretext of "defending democracy," to mass interference in the affairs of other states, first and foremost the developing countries, whom it would like to hitch up to U.S. policy. It is with this aim that a special coordination center headed by a presidential assistant has been set up, specific directions and methods of subversive activity have been defined, and large allocations are being set aside.

The fact that it has become a normal thing for the United States, with its striving for hegemonism, to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states is, of course, nothing new.

There are more than enough examples of this: from the secret operations to destabilize governments disagreeable to Washington and the organization of and attempts on the lives of progressive political figures to direct armed interventions and act of genocide.

What is, perhaps, new is the fact that now the Government of the United States is openly, in the form of an official state directive, stating its intention to foist the American system on the rest of the world as the only possible and binding [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 February 1983 Second Edition carries on page 3 a version of the "TASS Statement" and here uses the word "obligatory" (obyazatelnyye) one. The task is set to create in other countries a corresponding "infrastructure," in other words to form a type of "fifth column," which, as is directly said, will include "people and institutions, which have made the commitment to promote democratic development," it goes without saying, in the American manner.

This is, in particular, to be done by means of timely training of leading cadres for third countries, which will then, on taking power, be able to defend American interests. Large sums are being allocated for the infiltration of parties, trade unions, business circles, religious organizations, local authorities and the institutions of the judiciary and police. Special attention has been paid to stepping up the subversive work of the CIA and its branches, the various "radio voices."

The question arises of why the U.S. authorities have decided to flout so impudently the recognized norms of relations among states.

The global sabotage that Washington has set in motion is an attempt to create a pseudoideological foundation for the imperialist, expansionist policy of the United States in every sphere: military-strategic, political and economic. The "crusade" against communism proclaimed by the U.S. President in his London speech in the summer of last year is now being conceived of as a crusade against all who do not accept the policy of "diktat" and arbitrary rule which Washington is endeavoring to impose.

By malicious attacks against the Soviet Union and the socialist world, that are spiced with homilies about its own "moral excellence" [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA here uses "exclusiveness" (isklyuchitehost)] the American Administration is, as it were, justifying its aspirations to do just as it pleases.

Thus, the given case too reveals the essence of American policy, which is directed at fanning hostility, an unrestrained arms race and the amalgamation of all reactionary regimes and forces on a platform drawn up in Washington. The leaders of the United States continue to see the world in the light of confrontations, strong-arm techniques and forcible methods as the most effective ways of resolving all problems. Washington is continuing to bank on confrontation and not on cooperation and on blocking a solution of the urgent problems facing mankind, above all the problems of averting war and strengthening peace.

Everything that was painstakingly hidden from view before is becoming clear. The U.S. Administration has nothing to offer against the truly peace-loving constructive proposals of the socialist countries. It can offer the peoples nothing except slander and racist ideology and practice.

Today, it is becoming even more clear than yesterday why the United States does not want to try to reach agreement on ending the arms race and why it evades discussing the peace-loving proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Soviet ruling circles are of the opinion that such a policy of Washington's, which is aimed at undermining the foundations of interstate relations and at crude interference in the affairs of other countries, contains a serious threat to universal peace. It asks for [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA here uses "this policy requires"] the most severe condemnation.

PRAVDA: 'Act of Subversion'

LD170835 Moscow TASS in English 0759 GMT 17 Feb 83

[Text] Moscow February 17 TASS -- PRAVDA political news analyst Vitaliy Kirionov describes the program of democracy and public diplomacy, which was unveiled by the U.S. State Department, as "a program for even more blatant and cynical interference by Washington in the internal affairs of sovereign states, including those Asian, African and Latin American countries that have opted for independent development".

This program, he says, "is another link in the chain of U.S. ruling circles' acts of ideological subversion against the freedom-loving nations".

The authors of the program leaned over backwards to make it appear decorous, Vitaliy Korionov notes. It is strewn with phrases about "defense of the principles of democracy" and about "exchanges of ideas and information". But what this program means in fact are the "democracy" and "information" that are called upon to forge forward above all the goals of the U.S. Administration's aggressive policy.

The program, the article says further, sets the task of training foreign executives capable of catering to U.S. monopolistic capital. It provides for giving aid, including money grants, to the pro-American political parties in other countries and for bribing the mass media, trade unions, religious and other organisations which may toe Washington's line.

The program is openly spearheaded also against the countries and nations fighting for national emancipation and social progress. In particular, it envisions substantial increases in the number of young people from these countries to be trained by American educational establishments with a view to later advancing them to high offices in developing countries. It is also these countries first of all that are the target of a plan to broaden the scope of student exchanges, which, it is hoped by those who drew it up, will help boost favourable publicity for the U.S. political system and "the American way of life". In fact, it is an attempt to rear a kind of a "fifth column" to project the interests of imperialism in developing countries.

It is planned to mobilise the mass media, universities, companies, judiciary agencies, police, religious centres, local organisations and their ilk to promote these wicked ends, the PRAVDA news analyst writes.

The publication of the State Department's program indicates that, using the terms of "democracy and public diplomacy" as a cover, the U.S. Administration is looking for fresh opportunities for flouting other nations' rights and imposing on them its will and views.

In addition to former methods when mostly "secret-war" techniques were used against governments disliked by Washington, now an attempt is being made to raise, so to say, a legal "fifth column" -- a ramified system for exerting influence on other countries and nations, which is openly financed by the U.S. Government.

This U.S. latest propaganda effort, the PRAVDA analyst says in conclusion, has been prompted by the desire to plug holes in the bilge of the ideological ship of U.S. imperialism. There is no doubt that Washington's fresh act of subversion against the peace-and freedom-loving states will be firmly rebuffed by the peoples.

#### 'Psychological' Warfare

LD172238 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 17 Feb 83

[From the Vremya newscast]

[Text] A propaganda hullabaloo has been unleashed in Washington around the decision of the United States to begin conducting a so-called program for the development of democracy. Over to political observer Boris Kalyagin:

Greetings, comrades. The new program, in the words of U.S. Under Secretary of State Eagleburger, is called upon to promote the strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions abroad. The Reagan administration plans to allocate \$65 million on carrying it out in the next fiscal year alone. However, one would seek in vain among the recipients of these funds for genuine supporters of democracy. The money will go to the needs of those who are prepared to come out against socialism. The U.S. Government intends to finance pro-American political parties, to suborn newspapers, trade unions, religious and other organizations whose activities correspond with the aims of U.S. policy.

U.S. emissaries will use the allocated millions to recruit people. Young men and women from the developing countries will be enticed to U.S. colleges to prepare future leading cadres suitable to Washington. These are plans to create fifth columns. It is no wonder that, having heard such plans, even old hand observers of the U.S. bourgeois press were worried. Will the intended operation not overstep the line where interference in the internal affairs of other countries begins? This question was put to Eagleburger at the briefing which took place for U.S. journalists. It was explained that this prospect does not perturb Washington officials. If we help, say, trade unions in a foreign country, the under secretary of state answered, then there will indeed be grounds to assert that we are invading someone else's parish, but we must proceed from what are the main values which we want to support abroad. What these values are is well known -- the interests of American corporations, obtuse anticommunism, the great-power ambitions of the rulers of the United States. It is in their name that the present U.S. leadership considers it has the right to unceremoniously impose its will on other peoples. The new program will be one of the fronts of the psychological war unleashed by Washington against the world of socialism. The tone was set by the chief of the White House in his speech in the British Parliament when he announced an anticommunist crusade. A special staff has been set up in Washington to conduct it -- a committee at the level of Cabinet ministers which is headed by the assistant to the President on national security. An active role is also played by the CIA.

Ideological subversion has been given a grand style but, all the same, one can see nervousness behind this bellicose campaign. The United States is losing the battle for minds. The aggressiveness, egoism and adventurist nature of Reagan's policy alienate people. The U.S. leadership has decided to use the usual methods to retain its positions -- with the aid of new millions. Washington is unable to understand that not everything can be bought for dollars.

AEROFLOT BOMB EXPLOSION 'CRIMINAL PROVOCATION'

LD180932 Moscow TASS in English 0715 GMT 18 Feb 83

[Text] Washington February 18 TASS -- A new terrorist act against a Soviet institution in the United States has been perpetrated with the connivance of the American authorities. Late in the evening of February 17 unknown bandits blew up a bomb near the building housing the Aeroflot office in Washington. The blast caused material damage. By sheer luck there were no casualties. This act of banditism was immediately reported to the Department of State of the United States and the police.

This is not the first time that criminal provocations are staged against Soviet institutions and citizens in the United States by fascist thugs from groupings of the type of the "Jewish Defense League", the anti-Cuban and other scum. Although the American authorities know very well about their bandit actions that jeopardise the life of Soviet people, in the majority of cases the actions of the terrorists remain unpunished.

Provocations against Soviet institutions are enhanced by the anti-Soviet hysteria that is being whipped up by the present Washington administration.

U.S. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST REPORTED

LD180942 Moscow TASS in English 0613 GMT 18 Feb 83

[Text] Washington February 18 TASS -- The United States has staged the second underground nuclear weapon test this year at the range in Nevada. The Department of Energy announced that 603 nuclear explosions were carried out since 1951 in the framework of the programmes of the development of new types of armaments.

HART DECISION TO RUN FOR PRESIDENCY NOTED

LD180031 Moscow TASS in English 1925 GMT 17 Feb 83

[Text] New York February 17 TASS -- Gary Hart, senator from Colorado, has officially announced his decision to run for the Democratic Party nomination to the post of U.S. president. The 45-year-old legislator, speaking in the state capital Denver, accused the Reagan administration of pursuing policies which benefit only the upper walks of society.

At a time when a handful of people in this country enjoy unprecedented wealth, too many have to endure suffering. This is unfair from the moral viewpoint and dangerous economically, the senator said.

He declared that freeze of nuclear armaments and talks with the Soviet Union on their reduction are the most urgent task.

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
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12

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

This can be very effective if handled properly.

  
John

Approve

Disapprove

3/30/80

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

12/17/15 CDD

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171456 MEMO

4 3/24/1983 B1

S. KRAEMER, K. DEGRAFFENREID, AND R.  
LINHARD THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK  
RE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION PAPER

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171457	MEMO  CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET ICBM TESTING	3	ND	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171458	REPORT  NSC STAFF SUMMARY (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #171457)	3	ND	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171459	REPORT  NSC STAFF SUMMARY (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #171457)	2	ND	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NLRR 748-244-5-2

BY 1603 NARA DATE 6/5/83 March 19, 1983

171461


~~SECRET/NOFORN/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response to New Soviet ICBM Tests

Attached is the interagency approved paper on Response to New Soviet ICBM Tests. It proposes a plan with alternatives for dealing with the issue of new missile tests with the Soviet Union and sets out talking points for use in a second demarche to the Soviet Union. The paper also has talking points for use in public and in Congressional consultations.

We present options on: the forum for follow-up to the recent US demarche to the Soviet Union, the level at which a follow-up demarche would be made, and whether the demarche should demand a Soviet answer in a short, defined period of time; including individual agency views where they differ.

  
for L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171460	REPORT  RE SOVIET ICBM TESTS	13	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

March 11, 1983

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:


This letter is regarding treaty violations on part of the Soviet Union.


In the 1983 edition of Soviet Military Power, Secretary of Defense Weinberger reported that the Soviet Union has tested two new ICBM's (the PL-4 & PL-5), and that they have two others ready for testing later this year. In addition, that publication reports that the Soviets have expanded their ABM deployment around Moscow to include very large phased array radars and new missile interceptors.


These incidents have been reported in the press as possible Soviet violations of existing international agreements, and on February 23 you said, "This last one comes the closest to indicating that it is a violation." These reports are the most recent in a series that includes telemetry encryption of Soviet missile tests and the possible deployment of the SS-16 ICBM. Together, they indicate an expanding pattern of Soviet activities that are contrary to existing agreements.

The 1980 Republican Platform stated that, "The Republican Party deplores the attempts of the Carter Administration to cover up Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements..." What are the facts about these recent reports? Are the Soviets violating these international agreements, and if so shouldn't these violations be brought to the attention of the American people?

The House of Representatives is in the midst of debating the nuclear freeze resolution. The issue of Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements is vitally important to this debate. If the Soviets are in violation of existing arms control agreements, it is imperative that we announce these violations in order to have an open and thorough debate of the nuclear freeze issue. An announcement of the violations now would be of tremendous benefit to us as we support your arms reduction initiatives.

  
GERALD B. SOLOMON  
Member of Congress

Sincerely,  
  
WILLIAM CARNEY  
Member of Congress

  
TRENT LOTT  
Member of Congress

ROBERT E. BADHAM  
Member of Congress

ROBERT S. WALKER  
Member of Congress

JACK KEMP  
Member of Congress

MICKY EDWARDS  
Member of Congress

PHILIP M. CRANE  
Member of Congress

DUNCAN HUNTER  
Member of Congress

DAVID DREIER  
Member of Congress

WILLIAM L. DICKINSON  
Member of Congress

THOMAS F. HARTNETT  
Member of Congress

CONNIE MACK  
Member of Congress

- cc: The Honorable William Clark
- The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
- The Honorable George Shultz
- The Honorable William Casey

# United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

March 11, 1983

1712

The Honorable William Clark  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing a letter that I and other Senators sent to the President yesterday outlining violations of the SALT II understanding by the Soviet Union.


Although the letter is fairly comprehensive, it does not of course detail all Soviet violations. It does discuss several major actions taken by Russia which are wholly inconsistent with and which "undercut" SALT II.

Omitted from our letter, for example, is the Soviets disregard for SALT II in arming the Backfire bomber with an Air Launch Cruise Missile with range in excess of 3000 kilometers, a step which makes Backfire countable under SALT limits.

In view of the matter stated in the letter to the President, I feel that it is important for the President actually to see the letter. I therefore ask your assistance in assuring that it is brought to his attention.

Additionally, I urge that you consider recommending to the President that he announce to the public the determination made this Tuesday by the inter-agency group on SALT that the Soviet Union is indeed not observing SALT II. In my judgment, an announcement of that type now by the President could do much to convince all Americans of the folly of the nuclear freeze proposal and of the necessity for the United States to rearm without any additional delay.

Sincerely,



John P. East

JPE:c11

PERSONAL/BY HAND



STEVIE STYMMMS  
IDAHO

47

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 9, 1983

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Recently there have been press reports of yet another new Soviet violation of the SALT II Treaty. You and your Administration have already accused the Soviet Union of violating the Biological Warfare Convention, the Chemical Warfare Convention, and the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement which resolved the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Your Administration has expressed concern that the Soviets may be violating the Thresh-hold Test Ban Treaty. Last September, Dr. Henry Kissinger conceded that the Soviets had violated the SALT I Agreements. Official Defense and State Department documents of 1962 and 1959 accused the Soviets of violating 50 other treaties. Thus there are now official U.S. government sources supporting the conclusion that the Soviets have violated almost every international agreement and arms control treaty they have signed since 1917.

The Preamble to the SALT II Treaty explicitly states that the treaty "proceeds" from the 1972 agreement on Basic Principles of U.S. - Soviet Relations, yet there is overwhelming evidence that the Soviets are violating the Basic Principles Agreement by their aggressive actions in Cuba, Afghanistan, Poland, Central America, Southern Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe, and Japan. Thus the very foundation of SALT II is being violated by the Soviets.

Specifically, there are press reports that the Soviets are exceeding the 2250 SALT II ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles, and also the 1320 ceiling on MIRVed missiles and bombers equipped with Long-range cruise missiles. There is Administration testimony before Congress that the Soviets are producing more than 30 Backfire bombers per year in violation of SALT II. Your Administration has expressed strong concern that the Soviets are almost completely encrypting the telemetry on their new missiles, in violation of the SALT II ban on deliberate interference with U.S. verification. Finally,

President Ronald Reagan  
Page 2  
March 9, 1983

there are reports that the Soviets are testing a second new type of ICBM, the PL-5, that is specifically disallowed by Article IV, paragraph 9, of the SALT II Treaty.

In your meeting with the press on February 23, you stated that:

"This last one comes the closest to indicating that it is a violation."

Thus you are on the record with a virtual accusation the Soviet PL-5 violates SALT II.

We have several specific questions. First, do your Defense and State Departments agree that the PL-5 violates SALT II? Second, what is your view on the other SALT II compliance issues? Third, what is the definition of Soviet actions which would "undercut" SALT II, and how would you define Soviet "equal restraint?" Fourth, if the U.S. is still uncertain about Soviet violations of SALT II, what specific time and U.S. resources will be required to resolve this uncertainty? Finally, is there still a tendency by the bureaucracy to apologize for Soviet misbehavior and violations which you criticized other Administrations for exhibiting? We believe these are important questions that need to be answered.

We agree with you that the SALT II Treaty is "fatally flawed," unequal, destabilizing, and not in the U.S. national security interest. It is our view that U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II in the face of Soviet non-compliance even further undermines our national security. If the arms control process is to ever become meaningful and productive, we must hold the Soviets to the highest standards of compliance with the spirit and letter of SALT II, just as we have historically, strictly complied with arms control treaties ourselves.

Very respectfully,

John P. East      Steve Symms  
Jesse Helms      [Signature]  
Jim M. Clure      Chuck Grassley

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 872

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

171462

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE271  
UTS4729  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHMO #3545/01 0841010  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 251008Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4675

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLR 748244-6-1

BY GDB NARA DATE 6/4/83

BT  
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 03545

~~SECRET~~  
NO DIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, US, UR  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S SPEECH: DISCUSSION WITH KORNIYENKO  
REF: STATE 79521

1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO FOUND NO POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 23 SPEECH. HE CONCEDED THE AMBASSADOR'S POINT THAT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK COULD BE CONDUCTED ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LETTER OF THE ABM TREATY, BUT SAW THE U.S. MOVE AS CONTRADICTORY TO THE BASIC PREMISE OF THAT TREATY, I.E., THERE IS NO RELIABLE DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR MISSILES. HE BELIEVED THE UNITED STATES WAS OPENING A NEW AVENUE OF THE ARMS RACE. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAD ACCUMULATED SUBSTANTIAL ABM EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. HE FURTHER ARGUED THAT NOTHING IN THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. KORNIYENKO REMAINED UNCONVINCED. END SUMMARY.
3. THE AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY ADCM KAMMAN, CALLED ON KORNIYENKO LATE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 24. PRESENT WITH KORNIYENKO WAS USA DIVISION CHIEF BESSMERTNYKH AND INTERPRETER BRATCHIKOV. THE AMBASSADOR MADE THE POINTS IN REFTTEL, CONCLUDING BY PRESENTING THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH (AS RECEIVED VIA USINFO).
4. KORNIYENKO SAID HE HAD READ ONLY WIRE SERVICE EXCERPTS OF THE SPEECH, BUT HIS FIRST IMPRESSION WAS THAT IT CONTAINED NOTHING POSITIVE. IN FACT, HE CONTINUED, THE SPEECH MADE AN UNFAVORABLE IMPRESSION BOTH IN ITS DISTORTION OF THE ACTUAL MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR AND ITS MISLEADING ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY THE NEW ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. POSITION AS DEFENSIVE.

SENSITIVE

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PAGE 1 - 873

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE CONTRARY WAS TRUE, KORNIYENKO ASSERTED. THE UNITED STATES WAS OPENING UP A WHOLE NEW AVENUE OF THE ARMS RACE. KORNIYENKO CONCEDED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT DENOUNCING THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES COURSE OF ACTION WAS WITHIN THE LETTER OF THE TREATY. BUT THIS WAS ONLY THE FORMALISTIC, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION. WHEN THE TWO COUNTRIES CONCLUDED THE ABM TREATY, WHICH WAS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, THEY HAD BOTH WISELY ADOPTED THE PREMISE THAT THERE IS NO DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILES IN OUR AGE. WHILE SMALL AREAS, SUCH AS CAPITALS, COULD THEORETICALLY BE DEFENDED, THE REALITY WHICH UNDERLAY THE ABM TREATY AND THE SALT INTERIM TREATY ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WAS THAT DEFENSE WAS NOT POSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENT WAS NOW BREAKING WITH THAT CONCLUSION, AND TO SAY THAT THE ABM TREATY WAS STILL IN FORCE WAS JUST A WAY OF FOOLING PEOPLE. IT WAS NOT A SERIOUS POSITION.

5. KORNIYENKO THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SHOWED THAT THE NEW PUBLIC RELATIONS GROUP FORMED IN WASHINGTON HAD BEGUN TO HAVE AN EFFECT. THE UNINFORMED MIGHT THINK THE EMPHASIS ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS WAS POSITIVE AND REASONABLE, BUT FOR ANYONE WHO KNEW THE FACTS, THIS WAS ONLY A THREADBARE EFFORT TO DRESS UP THE PROPOSAL. IF WASHINGTON EXPECTS APPLAUSE FROM MOSCOW, THEY WILL BE DISAPPOINTED.

6. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WAS TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY HAD ACCUMULATED MORE EXPERIENCE WITH ABM SYSTEMS THAN THE UNITED STATES BY DEPLOYING ALMOST THE MAXIMUM NUMBER ALLOWED UNDER THE TREATY. HE ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AN R AND D PROGRAM ON MISSILE DEFENSE. THE RESULT OF THE U.S. RESEARCH MIGHT CONFIRM THAT AN ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE DEFENSE WAS IMPRACTICAL. IF THAT WERE THE CASE, CONGRESS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REFUSE TO APPROVE FUNDS FOR IT. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE NOT ANNOUNCING A CHANGE IN POLICY, MERELY THE BEGINNING OF INVESTIGATION. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ABLE TO WATCH THE OPEN DEBATE ABOUT THE ISSUE AS WE SOUGHT TO DRAW OUR CONCLUSIONS. MOREOVER, NOTHING IN THE PROPOSAL PRECLUDED SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE MISSILES. IF AN ABM SYSTEM WAS REALISTIC, IT MIGHT EVEN PROVE POSSIBLE TO GO TO EVEN LOWER LEVELS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

BT

#3545

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SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 871

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE273

STU6444

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHMO #3545/02 0841011

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 251008Z MAR 83

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4676

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 03545

MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S SPEECH: DISCUSSION WITH KORNIYENKO  
7. KORNIYENKO SAID THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL WERE PERFECTLY CLEAR. THE MORE WORK THE UNITED STATES CONDUCTS ALONG THE LINES ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT, THE MORE BOTH SIDES WILL SEEK TO DEVELOP OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THAT OVERCOME ABM DEFENSES. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THIS KIND OF REACTION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN EVALUATING ANY PROPOSED ABM SYSTEM. KORNIYENKO ASKED WHY THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD GO THROUGH THE WHOLE EXERCISE. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER KORNIYENKO WAS INSISTING THAT THE TECHNICAL CONCLUSIONS REACHED SEVERAL YEARS AGO WERE STILL VALID. ALL THE UNITED STATES WANTED WAS TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION. KORNIYENKO SAID THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD BROKEN THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN 1972. NOW THE UNITED STATES WAS REVIVING THE ISSUE. HE DIDN'T KNOW IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD REACH A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION, BUT THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WAS HEADING COULD ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS BAD.

8. TRUE TO FORM, KORNIYENKO CONDUCTED THE CONVERSATION IN A CORDIAL, MEASURED TONE BUT GAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST HINT THAT WITHIN HOURS THERE WOULD BE AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF GROMYKO'S ADDED TITLE OF FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HARTMAN

BT

#3545

NNNN

SENSITIVE

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8390363

47

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
2/17/85 CMB

RECEIVED 26 MAR 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM LENCZOWSKI

DOCDATE 25 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SALT

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: USSR SALT COMPLIANCE & US RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8390335

NSCIFID NSDD0075

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*Pres*

MAR 2 8 1983

MAR 2 8 1983

JAN 0 4 1984

*cy to Weinberger  
for info via POB  
Pres noted w/ comment*

DISPATCH

*al mem D sheet*

MAR 2 8 1983

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-24-470

BY 1028 NARA DATE 6/4/13

171463

SYSTEM II  
90363

28

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1. I think we should seriously discuss with Sec. Shultz a strong demarche - re the test of the P.L.S.
2. Of course we make a strong fight on these issues before long. Decision has been reached on I.N.F.
3. We know the answer to these questions is - the Soviets and detente as done or attempted was not the answer. There is some truth however that the Soviets are mis-trusting of us because they are Russians. They've had a centuries & inferiority complex for centuries. We can be realistic about them & still try for peace. Not to do so is unthinkable.

**National Security Council  
The White House**

595 <sup>19</sup><sub>X</sub>

Package # 90363

MAR 2 5 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bud McFarlane		<u>separate copy</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>sent to Pres with</u>		
Sit Room	<u>PDB on 3/28</u>		
			<u>J</u>
<u>I</u> -Information	<u>A</u> -Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch
			N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

*Judge,  
You should read this soon and  
then I would like to discuss  
it with you.*

*Done*



50

90363

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number \_\_\_\_\_

Date MAR 28 1983

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
*12/17/15 (C.D.)*

Subject: USSR SALT COMPLIANCE

CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  ~~SECRET~~  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED

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_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Guhin	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Reed	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. McGaffigan	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Cmdr. Blair	_____ Mr. Kimmitt	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Col. Russell	_____ Col. Wheeler
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_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Admin. Office
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Pipes	_____ Capt. Sims	
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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

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March 25, 1983

INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR 748-24-4-8-9

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

NOTED

BY COB NARA DATE 6/3/13

SUBJECT: Soviet SALT Compliance and U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Immediate Issue

1. The immediate issue is how to handle the latest apparent Soviet arms control violation: the testing of the PL-5. The intelligence community unanimously believes that this test has raised enough questions about Soviet compliance that a major diplomatic demarche is necessary. The problem here is that this issue cannot be treated in isolation without causing severe problems for the President and his overall foreign policy.

The Surrounding Immediate Issues

2. Coming up very soon are several critical issues, all related: the Adelman vote, the MX votes, the nuclear freeze votes, the defense budget vote, and a decision on how to proceed at the INF negotiations -- whether to present a new fall back proposal or not. Each one of these issues hinges on the answer to one question: how will the President conduct U.S.-Soviet relations? Each one of these issues represents a challenge to the President's views and policies. What the President must decide is whether or not he will try to win each battle by presenting the strongest case he can make or whether he is willing to risk losing these battles by compromising his views and thus making a weaker case in order to accommodate his critics.

The Real Issue

2. To view these various issues and upcoming battles in Congress in the context of the compliance issue presents a situation that cuts to the core of how we conduct our policy toward the USSR. This situation compels us to address several key questions:

- Who is responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions?
- Who is responsible for progress or lack of progress in arms control negotiations?
- Is it possible to trust the Soviets?

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- Is it unreasonable, provocative or belligerent to conduct a policy based on a suspicion about true Soviet motivations and behavior, especially in the field of arms control?
- Is true peace and accommodation possible between the U.S. and the USSR, between democracy and communism?

Each of these questions depends upon a certain theory about the nature of the Soviet system and communism. Thus, the compliance issue in combination with its surrounding issues, at bottom, addresses the whole question of whose assessment of the USSR is correct -- that of the President and those who are realistic about the Soviets, or that of his critics -- the proponents of detente and those who are inclined toward wishful thinking and a mirror-image perception of the USSR. Put yet another way, the real question here is: are the Soviets actually communists or not, and if they are, will we conduct our foreign policy on the basis of this fact?

#### The Position of the President's Critics

The President's critics answer every one of the above questions on the basis of a wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR.

- They believe that the Administration is just as responsible as, if not more responsible than, the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions, the arms race and lack of progress in arms control. This is evident in their pressures on the President to back off his zero-zero proposal in order to "get the negotiations moving again." Apparently, the fact that they are not criticizing and pressuring the Soviets to do something means that in their view, the Soviet position is reasonable and the President's is unreasonable. Somehow it is the Soviets and not the President who deserve the benefit of the doubt. Implicit in this view is the mirror-image perception that the Soviets must feel threatened by the prospective U.S. INF deployments and defense buildup and that their fears are legitimate ones.
- They either trust the Soviets (on account of the fact that they never raise questions about Soviet treaty compliance) or they argue that we need not trust them: instead we can rely on the fallacious, mirror-image assumption that the Soviets have just as much incentive to control arms as we do (e.g., the problems of their domestic economy). Their trust of the Soviets manifests itself in another, even more important way: they refuse to believe that the Soviets are using arms control negotiations as an integral part of their ideological struggle against democracy and that such negotiations are the key to the Soviet strategy of deception.

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- They believe that the President (and Adelman as well) is not truly committed to arms control, and that as a result, the Administration position is not only unreasonable but even provocative toward the Soviets. Not one of the Senators opposing Adelman acknowledged that there is any legitimacy to the President's (and Adelman's) hesitation about rushing Cranston-style into new agreements with the Soviets -- a hesitation based exclusively on a realistic suspicion about Soviet motivations and behavior.
  
  - They believe that some kind of real peace and accommodation can be reached with Soviets if only we try harder and give the Soviets the right incentives to cooperate with us to realize our alleged "mutual interests." Arms control negotiations are thus seen as the key to this process. Originally, it was detente that made arms control both possible and desirable. But, since the policy of detente was called into question by Soviet misbehavior, the only thing left to keep detente alive was arms control -- the only arena where there appeared to be a mutuality of interest, an interest in avoiding war. Thus the President's critics see arms control as a cooperative enterprise in confidence building and reduction of tension, a process of mutual concessions, mutual interests and mutual advantages. This is in direct contrast to the Soviet, ideological approach to diplomacy which considers negotiations as an arena of class struggle, a zero-sum game where one side must win and the other must lose.

The common denominator of each of these positions held by the President's critics is that the Soviets are not really communists and therefore do not pursue the unlimited international objectives of a revolutionary communist power, using any means necessary to achieve these goals. Instead they feel that the Soviets are just like any other normal great power, possessing limited international objectives, and desiring their fair share of the spoils. The assumption here is that once the Soviets get their fair share, which may include a "legitimate" security buffer, then they will behave like a good citizen in the existing international order and find an ever greater mutuality of interest with us in controlling arms and maintaining a peaceful international status quo.

*This is not correct.*

If this view of the Soviets is correct, then the policy of detente with its elements of appeasement and accommodation would be a legitimate foreign policy path to explore. If it is incorrect, then all elements of the policy of detente, including arms control, are put into question and we have to face up to the possibility that we are facing not just a "potential adversary" but a real, live, communist enemy, for whom the mere existence of a democratic United States is an ideological and therefore internal security threat.

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As part of their wishful thinking, the President's critics refuse to listen to any portrayal of the East-West conflict that is couched in moral terms. They refuse to acknowledge that military forces are a reflection of political, ideological and moral differences and not the cause of them. To repeat, they refuse to believe that the Soviets are really communists.

The President's critics are so unwilling to face this possibility (just as Chamberlain and Co. were unwilling to take Naziism's unlimited revolutionary objectives seriously), that they remain committed to doing everything they can to try to teach the Soviets to be something they cannot be.

To find an arms control violation thus represents not only a failure of these efforts and a failure of the policy of detente, but it represents a repudiation of their wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR, a view which is the only thing that seems to sustain their hope that peace on earth is possible. Thus, any violations of agreements must be made to go away: either they did not occur, they were passing aberrations, or they have no significant military or political consequences.

It is for this reason that the Carter Administration defined a SALT violation not as an act contrary to the terms of the agreement, but as a deliberate act, contrary to the precise terms of SALT, which results in a significant increase in Soviet strategic power.

### The Soviet Role

The Soviets have one overall objective in this context: to change the correlation of forces (both political and military) in their favor. Their immediate objective is to stop our INF deployments and force us to reduce our defense budget and our strategic programs. Their principal means for achieving these goals are the use of deception and intimidation.

Deception: Their primary deception -- their number one disinformation theme -- is to convince the West that they are really not communists and that therefore a true accommodation is possible between us and them. They try to cultivate the notion that they do not really believe in their ideology any more, that they have lost their revolutionary elan, and that there is a new non-orthodox "pragmatic" group in power. The more they can promote this fallacious mirror-image perception in the minds of Western leaders, the more those leaders can be convinced that the Soviets are as interested in arms control as they are.

A related disinformation theme is the idea that the Soviets have as much to fear from Western military forces as we do from theirs. This theme promotes the idea that the U.S. is as responsible as, if not more responsible than the USSR for the arms race and lack of progress in arms control.

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If the Soviets can compel Western publics to accept these premises and assumptions, then they can much more easily force us to play the peace game on their terms rather than ours. Thus, they can come to the arms control table and make countless false statements, engage in all sorts of circumventions and violations, and still compel us to sit at the table with them. In spite of a decade's worth of unilateral U.S. restraint, in spite of all our peaceful international intentions and behavior, much of the West accepts these false notions to be true.

*We must do better than we have in negotiating this*

Intimidation: As part of their effort in psychological conditioning, the Soviets have used various forms of intimidation to compel Western publics and leaders to accept their terms of the "peace" game. Principal among these is to encourage us that there will be dire consequences if the arms control process does not continue. Others forms of intimidation include the recent threats that INF deployments would compel the Soviets to target European cities and station similar weapons close to American borders, and the threat of nuclear attack against the Japanese.

The Soviet Assessment of Western Behavior

The one factor that rarely is considered in situations like this is the true Soviet view. Almost always, the fallacious, mirror-image perception of the Soviet view is the basis upon which Western decisions are made. This mirror-image perception invariably explains that the Soviets will see how their own alleged interests in reducing their own military expenditures and reducing tensions with the West are advanced by the arms control process. This mirror-image perception also explains that the Soviets regard all U.S. negotiating proposals as signs of U.S. strength and self-confidence: after all, isn't the reverse true? -- didn't we tell ourselves that the Soviets would never negotiate until they felt strong enough to bargain from a position of relative parity and therefore strength?

The facts are the complete opposite. The Soviets view the very fact that we are sitting at the table with them as something they forced us to do. Every time we impatiently come up with another negotiating proposal (usually a fall-back position), they regard it the same way. Most significant of all is their perception of our utter lack of response in the face of their continuing circumventions and violations of existing agreements. They can only see this as proof that the correlation of forces has shifted so much in their favor that Western leaders have no choice but to accommodate themselves to the Soviet position that no violations have occurred. *I agree and must insist on enforcing the latter very agreement and have.*

*A count of the GCHQ. by front group meeting GCHQ Table.*

What Is To Be Done

As things currently stand, we are in the intolerable position of being forced by our allies to reject the zero-zero proposal as if we were the ones responsible for no progress in the INF talks, as if we have been negotiating in bad faith. In other

*I don't believe this is accurate. We know from the 1st we might have to settle for less but whatever gains we made might make it easier to ultimately get zero zero.*



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words, we are being forced to act as if we are the principal cause of East-West tensions and the arms race. Since this is unequivocally not so, the Soviets can only view their disinformation efforts as successful and remain convinced that even under Ronald Reagan, the U.S. is too weak to compete politically with them.

If the President loses the nuclear freeze vote (a Soviet proposal, after all), the defense budget vote, the Adelman vote, the MX vote, the Soviets will be even further convinced of the Administration's and America's political weakness. And they will make further plans for more geopolitical offensives around the world based on this view.

The only recourse available to us to reverse this situation is to expose Soviet bad faith in arms control. No explanations of arcane weapons comparisons or military force balances (which can be easily manipulated by sophisters) will either be as convincing or comprehensible to Western publics as a clearcut accusation that the Soviets have been cheating.

If, however, the President accuses them of a violation only on the PL-5 issue, and only on the grounds of impermissible changes in the RV to throw-weight ratio (which would be utterly incomprehensible to the public), then he will be put in a very politically precarious position. His critics will easily be able to portray him as having gotten overly exercised about a miniscule violation that is strategically insignificant. They will try to make the President look petty and foolish.

What he must do, therefore, is to explain to the public that this is the last straw -- the straw that broke the camel's back. He would then explain what all the others straws are.

#### Presenting the Catalog of Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations

The President can then point out that:

- The Soviets have consistently violated the 1972 Agreement on the Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and the USSR. Since the SALT II Treaty states in its preamble that it "proceeds" from the Basic Principles Agreement, the only foundation of SALT II is being violated.
- The Soviets have violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements of 1962 on the placement of offensive weapons in Cuba. (The President and three top national security officials are already on record with this charge.) Specific violations include the TU-95 Bear, the nuclear capable MIG 23/27's and others.
- The Soviets have committed more than 30 violations of both SALT I and II and other arms control agreements.

Explaining Why Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations are an Intrinsic Element of Soviet-Communist Strategy

The most convincing way the President can present the catalog of Soviet violations is by putting them in the context of communist (particularly Leninist) strategy. For the first time in decades, the President can explain the real basis of the East-West conflict and thus why both sides have the kinds of arsenals they do.

What this really means is that he must show the American people that the Soviets really are communists. He must explain that whether they believe in the ideology or not, the system requires that they must behave as if they believe in it entirely. He must show how the Soviet Party leaders use their ideology as the standard against which deviationism is measured -- and how this is the way they identify threats to their rule and thus stay in power.

From this analysis necessarily follows a foreign policy which cannot accept a "social status quo" and thus which considers negotiations as part of the class war.

What Then?

If the President comes forward with these charges and explanations, many will instantly conclude that arms control is dead and that he is leading us to war. To curtail the effect and spread of such accusations, he can immediately declare that the U.S. will continue to negotiate with the Soviets and do everything possible to reach a verifiable agreement -- only now it will be on our terms and no longer on Soviet terms.

A Challenge Brewing in the Senate

If the President fails to raise the entire compliance issue he will face a major challenge from conservative Senators. As far as I can tell two measures are being prepared: a SALT II withdrawal resolution and an amendment prohibiting U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II (on Constitutional grounds).

- If the resolution or amendment wins, SALT II is dead.
- If either fails, it will be followed by passage of a Senate advice and consent resolution on SALT II ratification.
- If this wins, the conservatives will have at least prompted U.S. compliance with SALT II to be in accordance with their Constitutional powers on treaty making.
- If consent for SALT II ratification is given then the President will be in a very difficult spot. He will have to ratify a treaty which he declared to be "fatally flawed" and he will have to do so in the context of the recent evidence of Soviet violations, and face charges of appeasement and cover-up.

- If the President refuses to ratify SALT II after Senate consent, he may face a major conflict with the Senate that may have Constitutional implications.

If the President fails to charge Soviet violations in his March 31 speech, it is very likely that he will be faced with this predicament.

### Conclusion

If the President follows the recommendations in this memo:

- He will not only avoid the potential challenge in the Senate;
- He will seize the moral high ground;
- He will take the steam out of the freeze movement;
- He will demonstrate to the Soviets his and America's political strength, thus strengthening our military deterrent in a non-military way;
- He will re-enter the peace game on American terms while rejecting Soviet terms;
- He will gain as good a chance as any of winning the votes on Adelman, the MX, the freeze, and the defense budget;
- He will have told the unadulterated truth, thus confounding the Soviets' number one foreign policy priority -- namely to silence Ronald Reagan, and aborting the efforts of their principal disinformation campaign -- to convince the West that they are not really communists and that a true accommodation, especially in the form of a good faith arms accord can be reached with them.
- He will have made the strongest case he could possibly make in each of the upcoming political battles he faces.
- He will have avoided appealing to the weakness of the American people -- their naive good will and willingness to give others (including the Soviets) the benefit of the doubt; but rather,
- He will have appealed to the strengths of the American people -- their pride and greatness, their commonsense view of right and wrong, their devotion to truth, justice and fair play.

Sven Kraemer and Ken <sup>SK</sup> DeGraffenreid concur.