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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, National  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

**File Folder** USSR (3/10/83-3/21/83)

KDB 12/16/2015

**FOIA**

**Box Number** 24

F03-002/5

SKINNER

311

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171414	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE TODAY'S MEETING ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-1-8</i>	1	3/10/1983	B1
171416	SCHEDULE PROPOSAL	RE 3/10/83 MEETING ON US-USSR RELATIONS <i>R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-1-8</i>	2	ND	B1
171417	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE USG-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-2-7</i>	8	3/3/1983	B1
171415	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #171414 (J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE TODAY'S MEETING ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS) <i>R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-1-8</i>	1	3/10/1983	B1
171418	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE MARCH 10 MEETING W/PRESIDENT (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	2	3/9/1983	B1
171419	CABLE	MOSCOW 2927 <i>R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-4-5</i>	1	3/1/1983	B1
171420	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE STATE MEMO ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	3/22/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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**File Folder** USSR (3/10/83-3/21/83)

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SKINNER

311

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171421	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO REAGAN RE NEXT STEPS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-6-3</i>	2	3/25/1983	B1
171422	MEMO	SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE NEXT STEPS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-7-2</i>	3	3/16/1983	B1
171423	MEMO	COPY OF DOC #171420 (LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE STATE MEMO ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS)	1	3/22/1983	B1
171424	PRESS RELEASE	THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN (CONTINGENCY PRESS RELEASE, W/NOTATIONS) <i>R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-9-0</i>	1	3/18/1983	B1
171425	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE SPRING GRAIN CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS <i>R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-2-10-8</i>	1	3/21/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
12/17/15 GDS

RECEIVED 10 MAR 83 11

DOC DATE 10 MAR 83

TO CLARK

FROM LENCZOWSKI

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: MARCH 10 MTG ON US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( B B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP</i> MAR 1 0 1983	<i>for info via PDB</i>		
	<i>C</i> MAR 1 0 1983	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>JL ✓</i>
	<i>C 3/10</i>	<i>Clark noted</i>		

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

**National Security Council  
The White House**

2

Package # 90281

1135A  
MAR 1 0 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>Separate Copy</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

*Judge, For 2:00 p.m. meeting,  
John will need some guidance  
on whether you want him to  
say anything in the meeting. I  
think it depends on whether  
Eagleburger and Burt speak up.*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17144

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1983

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-24-2-1-8 WPG HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

BY WJ NARA DATE 6/3/13

SUBJECT: Today's Meeting on U.S.-Soviet Relations

One point that you might raise in today's discussion is the pressure the U.S. is facing not only from the Soviets, the freeze movement and the unilateral disarmament movement, but from our allies to make concessions in our arms control talks. Yesterday, Italian Foreign Minister Colombo asked the President "to get those [INF] negotiations going again."

The critical premise underlying this recommendation is the same premise behind State's call for increased dialogue: This is that the U.S. is as responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions and lack of progress in negotiations as the USSR. This premise is false.

To follow Colombo's recommendation, or to start intensified dialogue would be to accept that this premise is true and that it is our responsibility to do more to reduce tensions that we allegedly helped create. It would also be a clear signal to the Soviets of American political weakness and our vulnerability to their manipulation of Western public opinion.

If you would like me to verify this at the meeting from a Sovietologist's point of view, you might want to ask me to do so in this way:

*[Handwritten flourish]*

"John has recently published a major book on Soviet perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. John, how would the Soviets view a move by us to enter an intensified dialogue?"

I would briefly respond by saying that they see it as a sign of political weakness.

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

17/4/6

PS

SECRET

MEETING ON U.S.-USSR RELATIONS

NLRR 74824-21-8  
BY 1803 NARA DATE 6/3/13

DATE: Thursday, March 10, 1983  
LOCATION: Cabinet Room  
TIME: 2:00 - 3:00 p.m.  
FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

I. PURPOSE: To discuss the State Department's recommendations for U.S.-Soviet relations, but not to make any decisions.

II. BACKGROUND: The State Department sent you a memorandum on January 19 recommending "intensified U.S.-Soviet dialogue." Despite a rejection of that recommendation transmitted on your behalf to State, it sent a second memorandum on March 3 whose contents, both language and recommendations, are virtually identical to the earlier memorandum (Tab B).

Both memoranda are seriously flawed. Their recommendations are based on false and questionable premises and a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet system and its goals. This meeting has been called so that State can further air its views.

III. PARTICIPANTS: List attached.

IV. PRESS PLAN: No press plan.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

- President to state purpose of meeting.
- Secretary Shultz to present State Department's case.
- President to ask questions.
- Discussion.
- No decisions to be made.

Attachments:

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B State memoranda dated January 19 and March 3.

Prepared by:  
John Lenczowski

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Declassify on: OADR

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
Counselor to the President Edwin Meese III  
Chief of Staff to the President James A. Baker, III  
Deputy Chief of Staff Michael K. Deaver  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs William P. Clark  
Deputy Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
Richard Burt  
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American  
Affairs Thomas O. Enders  
U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Arthur Hartman  
John Lenczowski, NSC Staff Member







DECLASSIFIED

SYSTEM II  
90254

8

NLR 74824-22-7

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

171407

BY KTB NARA DATE 6/3/13

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

March 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

George P. Shultz *gsh*

SUBJECT:

USG-Soviet Relations -- Where Do We Want To Be and How Do We Get There?

I have now had the discussions with Dobrynin which you authorized me to undertake. Dobrynin has come into these talks with a series of proposals for introducing new movement into the bilateral relationship. They are along familiar Soviet lines, with the focus on arms control and reviving bilateral agreements or processes that died largely as a result of Soviet misbehavior. In the background has been a series of statements by you and by Andropov on US-Soviet relations, with both of you saying you are willing to move forward, but that it is up to the other to take the first step. Meanwhile the Soviet "peace offensive" to derail INF deployments in Europe has continued.

From my talks with Dobrynin there have emerged a few tentative signs of Soviet willingness to move forward on specific issues -- the Pentecostals and technical-level exchanges on consular matters. But the Soviets have not yet been seriously tested, and my feeling is that the time has come to use my channel through Dobrynin for that purpose. Before I proceed, however, we should take a look at our broader, longer-term strategy for dealing with them. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss both that strategy and the immediate steps we might take to implement it.

Minimum and Maximum U.S. Objectives

Our minimum objective for US-Soviet relations over the next few years is to make clear that we are determined to resist Soviet efforts to use their growing military power in ways which threaten our security. The Soviets must recognize that, while we are serious in our arms control proposals, we also have the will and capacity to correct the imbalances which their military buildup has created. There must be no doubt in Moscow or elsewhere that we will not permit a resumption of the Soviet geopolitical expansionism in the Third World which we saw in the 1970s. Finally, the Soviets must understand that we are not prepared to insulate the bilateral relationship from these issues or our concerns about Soviet human rights behavior. In sum, it must be clear that we see the US-Soviet relationship as fundamentally adversarial and that we are fully prepared to compete effectively and vigorously.

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DECL: OADR

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There may also be a chance to go beyond this minimum objective and make some progress toward a more stable and constructive US-Soviet relationship over the next two years or so. This can occur only if the Soviet leadership concludes that it has no choice but to deal with this Administration on the basis of the comprehensive agenda we have established over the last two years. Some of the factors that will shape this critical decision of the Soviet leadership are beyond our effective control. These include the outcome of the succession process, the overall performance of the Soviet economy, and the ability of the new leadership to deal with the long-term malaise of Soviet society.

There are, however, a number of areas in which our actions, and particularly the degree of progress we make in achieving priority objectives beyond the US-Soviet bilateral relationship, will be critical to the decisions of the Soviet leadership. Thus, sustaining the momentum of the efforts we have begun in the following areas represents an essential precondition for inducing the Soviets to deal seriously with the agenda we have established:

- (1) Rebuilding American economic and military strength: With economic recovery now under way, we must redouble our efforts to rebuild American military strength. In particular, we need to solve the MX basing problem and obtain congressional approval for our strategic forces modernization program.
- (2) Maintaining the vitality of our alliances: In this category, our two priority objectives should be a successful outcome in INF and the development of a new framework for East-West economic relations.
- (3) Stabilizing our relations with China: Building on the basis established during my trip to Beijing, a summit later this year would solidify our own relations with Beijing, despite continuing differences on Taiwan, and inhibit improvement in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
- (4) Continuing regional peacekeeping efforts: We have no illusions about the prospects for rapid success in the Middle East or a regional settlement in southern Africa. However, U.S. diplomatic activism in key third world areas reduces Soviet maneuver room and can help control destabilizing activities by the Soviets and their allies. To the extent that we are able to

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make real progress in resolution of regional problems, the Soviets are progressively frozen out of areas of key importance to us.

- (5) Continuing vigorous competition in ideas: We want to have obtained congressional funding for the democracy initiative and a supplemental for the radios, establish our new party political foundations(s) and generally put our offensive in support of Western values into high gear.

If we are able to achieve real progress in these areas, we will have demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that it cannot expect a radical departure in U.S. policy of the kind that has occurred too often in the past decade. Thus, 1983 will represent a critical test of whether a U.S. Administration can not only put in place the kind of US-Soviet policy we have established -- but see it through.

While the Soviet response to a successful demonstration of our resolve is not entirely predictable, I believe that the Soviet leadership might conclude that it had no alternative but to come to terms with us. In that event, opportunities for a lasting and significant improvement in US-Soviet relations would be better than they have been for decades. If the Soviets remained intransigent, we would have nonetheless taken the essential steps needed to ensure our security.

#### The US-Soviet Agenda -- What Can We Realistically Aim to Achieve?

If the above analysis is correct we can realistically expect to confront the following opportunities and risks in specific areas of the US-Soviet agenda:

##### A. Arms Control

Here we have taken the approach that it is meaningful agreements that count, and you have established high standards: real reductions; equality in the important measures of military capability; verifiability; and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance. These criteria form the basis of our proposals in INF and START, and must continue to do so as we consider our negotiating positions over the coming year or so. We should be patient; we should be deliberate; and we should be alert to openings from the Soviet side. Given the strength of the Soviet "peace offensive," our positions should

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-4-

also enable us to assume the strongest possible public posture. It must always be evident that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that is impeding progress toward agreements.

In INF, we should: (1) adhere to the arms control criteria we have established; (2) demonstrate to the Soviets and western publics that we are seriously searching for an agreement; and (3) undertake the necessary preparations for initial INF deployments at the end of the year.

In START, we should hold firm to the new conceptual framework that underlies our proposal, with its emphasis on substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We should continue to negotiate seriously, taking as our point of departure the fact that the Soviets appear to have accepted the principle of reductions.

Prospects for agreements in START and INF before the end of 1984 are highly problematical; nevertheless, we should continue to press the Soviets for early progress on the basis of our proposals. We should also urge new Soviet movement in other arms control areas -- in MBFR, in CSCE, in CBMs and in our proposals for verification improvements to the TTBT and the PNET. In MBFR we are now studying ways to break the deadlock over data. In CSCE, the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

We should keep the pressure on Moscow for serious responses to our proposals in these areas, to keep the onus for lack of progress on the Soviet Union. We will be negotiating in good faith. But if it is not possible to achieve agreements, it will be important to have maintained the high standards of your approach to arms control and to have won the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that was to blame.

#### B. Regional Issues

Our minimum objective over the next few years is to ensure that there is no new successful aggression by the Soviet Union or its allies in the Third World. This will require that we follow through on the security commitments we have made to Third World friends and allies and that we remain ready to use American military strength to keep the peace. It may also require that we reinforce warnings to the Soviet Union

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concerning the consequences of unacceptable behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MIGs to Nicaragua.

The fact that we have engaged Moscow on key regional issues -- particularly Afghanistan and Southern Africa -- positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process in the intermediate term. In this connection, we should consider ways of using our bilateral dialogue to move the Soviet Union towards constructive involvement in negotiations that might lead to acceptable settlements of these issues. A litmus test of Soviet seriousness in response to our concerns would be whether they are moving seriously toward real pullback from one of the inroads gained in the 1970s.

C. Human Rights and Western Values

We should continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: release of prisoners of conscience including Anatoliy Shcharanskiy; resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation; and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our objective should be to have achieved significant progress on one or more of these fronts by the end of 1984. Where it would enhance the chances of success, our focus should be on private diplomacy leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We also want to increase our ideological impact inside the Soviet Union through expanded exchange programs and access of Americans to Soviet society.

In this area we must recognize that there is a natural tension between open discussion of and attacks on Soviet misdeeds and quiet discussion that will produce results on specifics. The Soviets never tire of suggesting that things are better accomplished in the shadows when it comes to human rights. On the other hand, they also know that we neither can nor want simply to turn off our public expressions of indignation and support for freedom. As we proceed, there will thus be a constant interplay between the public approach for which our values call and quiet diplomacy focussed on results. This interplay means that human rights issues must be handled in a somewhat special way.

In connection with human rights, the dilemmas of our Poland policy are likely to become more acute. On the one hand, we cannot relax our insistence that real improvement in our relations with Poland can take place only if there is improve-

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-6-

ment in the human rights situation in that country. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly evident that prospects for a revival of the Solidarity period are dim for the foreseeable future. There is no certain prescription for resolving this dilemma, given the limitations of our influence over events in Poland. Nevertheless, our Poland policy must continue to be based on determination to support the Polish people in their desire to exercise fundamental human rights -- with the kind of rewards for specific human rights progress which you set forth in your December speech.

#### D. Economic Relations

Our primary objective over the next year should be to develop and begin to implement a new framework for East-West economic relations; this would ensure that Western economic strength does not contribute to Soviet military power or subsidize the Soviet economy. It would also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take in the area of bilateral economic relations is geared to our overall strategy for US-Soviet relations.

#### US-Soviet Bilateral Dialogue

Bilateral dialogue with the Soviets has an important place in this overall strategy. Our exchanges with the Soviets are a constant testing process, in which we probe for possible new Soviet flexibility on the issues, while insisting that real progress must involve concrete Soviet actions to address our concerns. These exchanges put us in control of that process -- in a position to bring it to a halt at every step if the Soviets are unwilling to proceed with real give-and-take. In particular, they allow us to ensure that our dialogue with Moscow does not generate momentum toward a summit that would be difficult to rein in, should we find it in our interest to do so. Further, these exchanges permit us to make sure that anything we are prepared to do is reciprocated. Finally, they give us a greater capacity to control international events, by reaffirming to the Soviets and others that we intend to play a role commensurate with our renewed strength and a self-confidence. An active US-Soviet dialogue will be critical to our efforts to maintain allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet "peace offensive." And if the Soviet leadership does conclude that it must seriously address our concerns, there should be an active bilateral dialogue underway to enable us to exploit fully this opportunity to advance U.S. interests.

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-7-

We now need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue, and if so how. If we proceed in this direction, we will inevitably arouse concerns that we are returning to business-as-usual, and generate charges that our Soviet policy is more bark than bite. I believe that these problems are manageable, because we will not relax our insistence on balance and Soviet performance as we proceed. Continuing to work from the US rather than the Soviet agenda, and to require deeds rather than just words, is the way to manage the problem, but we should recognize it will remain with us.

If that makes sense to you, I have some ideas about next steps. My thought would be to see Dobrynin again and present him with a four-part work program of specifics covering each of the areas on the US agenda: arms control, regional issues, human rights and bilateral topics. This would serve to drive home to him that old bilateral agreements and arms control are not and cannot be the only central issues in US-Soviet relations if we are to achieve serious progress. Furthermore, the specifics would challenge the Soviets to concrete responses, as part of the testing process we envisage:

-- Arms Control: I could offer to discuss START/INF issues with Gromyko at a meeting soon after the current round of Geneva negotiations ends, making clear that I would of course address our overall agenda and not just arms control; I would say we want to work more intensively on MBFR, without further elaboration; I would point to TTBT verification improvements and nuclear CBM's where we have introduced specific proposals; and I would be downbeat on prospects for reviving the defunct arms control negotiations for which the Soviets are pushing.

-- Regional Issues: I could note we are still looking at Southern Africa for positive Soviet action; reiterate our basic positions on Afghanistan (total Soviet withdrawal, Afghan independence and self-determination, return of refugees); and offer to send Ambassador Art Hartman to see Gromyko's Deputy again for another routine exchange of information and views of the Middle East. Such discussions provide a useful and low-cost means of keeping the Soviet at bay on this issue in our bilateral relationship.

-- Human Rights: After reiterating your strong interest in human rights and your preference for "quiet diplomacy," I would welcome the message on the Embassy Pentecostals,

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-8-

but indicate that we still face the practical problem of how to convince the families to take up the offer; refer to indications that movement on Shcharanskiy now seems possible; and suggest serious and confidential talks about what might be possible on human rights in connection with CSCE at Madrid, where the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

-- Bilateral Issues: Here several alternatives are possible. I could say we propose beginning with a single step both sides can agree is useful and which you approved in NSDD-75 -- negotiation of a new cultural exchanges agreement -- and have the rest of the bilateral issues we talked about earlier under review. I could also suggest that we would be prepared to renew discussions on opening a US Consulate in Kiev and a Soviet Consulate in New York. This could give us an invaluable listening post and do little for the Soviets (because of their UN Mission). The disadvantage of both the cultural agreement and the Kiev/New York consulates is that we would be undoing Afghanistan sanctions. The advantage is that in both cases we would be improving our access to Soviet society. I will, of course, adjust what I say to Dobrynin on these bilateral issues to your view of how significant a signal we wish to send Moscow.

### Conclusion

The next few years will be a period of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviets. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for further progress toward a more stable, if competitive, US-Soviet relationship. Bilateral exchanges are an important part of it, but only a part. The approach outlined above would protect our security interests while establishing realistic benchmarks by which to measure progress. But it can succeed only if we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach you have established these past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to see an improvement in the relationship on those terms. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part in good faith, and the responsibility for a continuation of the present tensions will rest squarely with them.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17405

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1983

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR 748-24-27-8

FROM: JOHN LENZOWSKI *JK*

BY CDL NARA DATE 6/3/13

SUBJECT: Today's Meeting on U.S.-Soviet Relations

One point that you might raise in today's discussion is the pressure the U.S. is facing not only from the Soviets, the freeze movement and the unilateral disarmament movement, but from our allies to make concessions in our arms control talks. Yesterday, Italian Foreign Minister Colombo asked the President "to get those [INF] negotiations going again."

The critical premise underlying this recommendation is the same premise behind State's call for increased dialogue: This is that the U.S. is as responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions and lack of progress in negotiations as the USSR. This premise is false.

To follow Colombo's recommendation, or to start intensified dialogue would be to accept that this premise is true and that it is our responsibility to do more to reduce tensions that we allegedly helped create. It would also be a clear signal to the Soviets of American political weakness and our vulnerability to their manipulation of Western public opinion.

If you would like me to verify this at the meeting from a Sovietologist's point of view, you might want to ask me to do so in this way:

"John has recently published a major book on Soviet perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. John, how would the Soviets view a move by us to enter an intensified dialogue?"

I would briefly respond by saying that they see it as a sign of political weakness.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

**National Security Council  
The White House**

572 11

Package # 90281

MAR 10 1963

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			<u>3/10</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>Tab 1 given to</u>		
Sit Room	<u>President at 0930</u>		
			<u>J</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

P's Mtg Thurs 3/10, 2pm  
(Copies in Mtg Folder)

Judge, shall we give a copy to VP?  
J

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

*Drawer*

KDB 12/16/2015

*File Folder*

USSR (3/10/83-3/21/83)

*FOIA*

F03-002/5

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*Box Number*

24

311

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171418	MEMO  LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE MARCH 10 MEETING W/PRESIDENT (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	2	3/9/1983	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171419

20

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2927 13362 DTG:111633Z MAR 83 PSN: 007474  
SIT041 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 070/1853Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

NORWEGIAN DEMARCHE BEFORE FORMALLY APPLYING TO EMIGRATE. THE NORWEGIANS PLAN TO CONTACT BONNER AFTER HER RETURN FROM GOR'KIY ON APRIL 5. (BONNER PLANS TO TRAVEL BACK TO GOR'KIY THE EVENING OF MARCH 12.)

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOBWHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST (COPY TO SIGUR FOR ACTION) Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHMO #2927 0701634  
O 111633Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

5. BONNER ALSO REPORTEDLY STATED TO THE NORWEGIANS THAT SAKHAROV AND SHE FEEL "MORE INSECURE" SINCE BREZHNEV'S DEATH AND FEAR THAT THE AUTHORITIES MAY AT ANY MOMENT TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT HER FROM VISITING MOSCOW. BONNER ALSO TOLD THE NORWEGIANS THAT, ALTHOUGH SAKHAROV AND SHE ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THEIR CHANCES OF RECEIVING PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE TO NORWAY, THEY BELIEVE THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S DEMARCHE MAY RESULT IN AN IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR SITUATION IN THE USSR.

6. WE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN A READ OUT OF THE MEETING FROM BONNER ON MARCH 12. ZIMMERMANN

MOSCOW 2927 13362 DTG:111633Z MAR 83 PSN: 007474

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4182

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1080  
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 2261  
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 1540  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1992  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 74824-24-5  
BY KOB NARA DATE 6/5/03

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 02927  
EXDIS  
MADRID FOR U.S. DEL CSCE - AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR, NO  
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS ON SAKHAROV  
REFS: A) MOSCOW 02778, B) MOSCOW 02709

1. C ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NORWEGIAN EMBOFF INFORMED US ON MARCH 11 THAT BONNER HAD BEEN TOLD DURING HER VISIT TO THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY THE PREVIOUS DAY (REF A) THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON SAKHAROV IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THE DEMARCHE WOULD INCLUDE:  
1) A FORMAL INVITATION TO SAKHAROV AND BONNER TO EMIGRATE TO, AND TO LIVE IN, NORWAY; AND 2) A REQUEST TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ACT POSITIVELY ON THEIR EVENTUAL, FORMAL APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE TO NORWAY. IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REJECTS THIS REQUEST, THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF ADDED, THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WILL ASK THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW BONNER TO TRAVEL TO ITALY FOR TREATMENT OF HER GLAUCOMA. (NOTE: THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF SAID THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT MAY ALREADY HAVE MADE SUCH A DEMARCHE, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF "POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS" WITH THE SOVIETS IN OSLO THIS WEEK. THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF NOTED THAT BONNER HAD NOT BEEN TOLD THAT THE DEMARCHE MAY ALREADY HAVE TAKEN PLACE.)

3. OUR INTERLOCUTOR SAID THAT BONNER HAD GIVEN THEM A COPY OF SAKHAROV'S LETTER (REF B). BONNER EXPLAINED THAT, FEARING A POSSIBLE SEARCH EN ROUTE BACK TO MOSCOW, SHE HAD DECIDED TO CARRY ONLY A COPY OF SAKHAROV'S LETTER AND HAD SENT THE ORIGINAL TO THE U.S.

4. THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF SAID THAT BONNER HAD STATED THAT SAKHAROV AND SHE WILL AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8301677

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 14 MAR 83 10

12/7/15 603

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 12 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SAKHAROV, ANDREY

fy in

SUBJECT: US & EMIGRE INVOLVEMENT IN SAKHAROV BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION

ACTION: PREPARE-MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 16 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

LORD

MYER

STEARMAN

FRAN -

This memorandum is OBE. (another memo re; Sakharov  
# 2224 is under review). Please xerox <sup>Bremer</sup> at that close out.  
(for the record)

COMMENTS

PAULA

4/5/83

REF# 8307047

LOG

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
NSC/S	C 6 Apr	see PD note		DO

DISPATCH

RECEIVED 09 APR 83 11

TO PRESIDENT

FROM PECK, RUSSELL

DOCDATE 14 MAR 83

GORDON, MARSHALL

14 MAR 83

HILL

08 APR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: PECK & GORDON LTR TO PRES RE US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO WHEELER TO KELLEY DUE: 15 APR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

MYER

STEARMAN

ROBINSON

*concur w/attached.*

*PD 4/11/83*

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 4/11</i>	<i>Wheeler's ltr memo</i>		<i>MS</i>

~~DISPATCH~~ *4/11*

~~W/ATTCH~~ FILE *(2/11)* *(C)*



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: MICHAEL O. WHEELER

*Card Cleveland  
for*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Russell Peck and  
Marshall Gordon re U.S.-Soviet Relations

We have reviewed the attached correspondence and concur with the State Department's recommendation that identical but separate letters, signed by a member of the White House Staff, be sent to Messrs Peck and Gordon. We also concur with the draft response prepared by State.

Attachments



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2400

**UNCLASSIFIED**

PII: 01

April 8, 1983

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOMMEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Request to forward letter to the President from  
Russell Peck and Marshall Gordon of Greensboro, North  
Carolina

The Department recommends that a member of the White House Staff reply with a noncommittal letter of thanks to the suggestions of Peck and Gordon (attachment 2). Accordingly, provided herewith is a draft response (attachment 1) for signature by a member of the White House Staff. Each man may receive the same response, but within separate letters. Also, enclosed is a Department letter (attachment 3) acknowledging the reception of the Peck and Gordon correspondence.

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

**UNCLASSIFIED**

SUGGESTED RESPONSE  
TO  
GORDON-PECK CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Mr. Gordon/Mr. Peck:

On behalf of the President, I want to thank you for your letter and thoughtful suggestions concerning U.S.-Soviet relations; it will receive due consideration. Your expressions of support are appreciated.

See ML  
action

OC 26  
TN  
hold for Steve V...

14 February 1983

Richard E. Combs, Jr.  
Acting Director  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Combs:

Thank you for your letter of 28 December. The enclosed letter to President Reagan reflects our response and evaluation based on the recent direction of the President's public statements and political emergence of the "nuclear freeze" movement in this country. We would appreciate very much your forwarding it.

Sincerely,

Russell Peck  
407 S. Mendenhall Apt. 6  
Greensboro, NC 27403

Marshall Gordon  
310 Ashland Drive Apt. D  
Greensboro, NC 27403

May I do this  
- SV

14 March 1983

President Ronald Reagan  
c/o Richard E. Combs, Jr., Acting Director  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear President Reagan:

Like you we are disturbed by Soviet-inspired turmoil in the Third World, and are not allied with those who seek a nuclear freeze and other ways to appease an enemy that talks peace while supporting warfare against America's vital interests. Facing such a foe we agree it would be necessary to use even those means we would otherwise eschew as counter to religious principle and national character. However, while the Soviet effort mounts, so does opposition to your policy of building up American military strength and preventing Communist insurgency in Central America. And it is in this context we wish to suggest the value of your proposing US/Soviet cooperation to end starvation.

For if they reject the proposal this would be conclusive proof that they are the enemy without scruple, the evil party that would prefer to have people languish in poverty and hunger in order to "liberate" them for Communism. Thus Soviet rejection of the idea would surely create a wave of awakened American realism that would in turn create a mandate for the vigorous military response you've been calling for. Moreover, it would unequivocally alert the rest of the world too, including America's allies as well as the people of the USSR and the East bloc, to the nefarious character of Soviet leadership.

On the other hand, if they accept the proposal, they would be obliged to commit themselves to helping this country cure the very destabilizing conditions of Third World hunger and poverty that are now weakening America and creating "opportunities" for the USSR. It would also represent an ideological change in Soviet


doctrine. Indeed, the revolutionary aspects of their philosophy, which can be seen to have legitimacy in a starving world of enemies, would become obsolete and globally unacceptable; and the massive military reductions you seek would assuredly follow.

In essence, you have said you're "playing poker" with the Soviet Union, and we suggest it is time for you to "call the bet" by playing your moral trump card. With your timely proposing of superpower cooperation to end starvation you would have taken the necessary step to insure that the United States and the people of the world will discover before it's too late where the Soviet Union truly stands. If they say no, peace through military strength is the only answer; if they say yes, peace and prosperity through moral strength will prevail.

Sincerely,



Russell Peck  
407 S. Mendenhall Apt. 6  
Greensboro, NC 27403



Marshall Gordon  
310 Ashland Dr. Apt. D  
Greensboro, NC 27403

cc: Senators Howard Baker and Jesse Helms; ABC, CBS, NBC,  
New York Times, and Washington Post.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 5, 1983

Mr. Marshall Gordon  
310 Ashland Drive Apt. D  
Greensboro, North Carolina 27403

Dear Mr. Gordon:

Thank you for your thoughtful suggestions concerning  
U.S.-Soviet relations.

Since Mr. Combs is temporarily absent from the office, I  
have forwarded your letter to the White House.

Sincerely,

Steven Vornov  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs

cc: Russell Peck



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 5, 1983

Mr. Russell Peck  
407 S. Mendenhall Apt. 6  
Greensboro, NC 27403

Dear Mr. Peck:

Thank you for your thoughtful suggestions concerning  
U.S.-Soviet relations.

Since Mr. Combs is temporarily absent from the office, I  
have forwarded your letter to the White House.

Sincerely,

Steven Vornov  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs

cc: Marshall Gordon



NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8390316

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
12/15/83

RECEIVED 17 MAR 83 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 16 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION  
LENCZOWSKI

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# 8307414

LOG 8291025

8291028

NSCIFID

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X</i> MAR 2 2 1983	<i>Pres for info</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 3/25</i>	<i>for info via PDB</i>		
	<i>C</i> MAR 2 6 1983	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>JY</i>
		<i>incorporated as TAB 1 of 90423</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

32

3/25

Cathy,

The Judge sent  
this to President  
this morning. Not  
change in Fran line

R

541 33

**National Security Council  
The White House**

Package # 90316

1900 P

MAR 2 2 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JI</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information   **A-Action**   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP   Meese   Baker   Deaver   Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

*Judge wants to take this up at 0930 Thursday.*

**National Security Council  
The White House**

34

MAR 1 7 1983  
1130A

Package # 90316  
SYS II

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>LENCZOWSKI</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc:    VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

*John:*  
The Judge would like a quick  
turn around on this with  
a cover memo for the President.

**National Security Council  
The White House**

35

Package # 90316

3/17/83  
1130A

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>ADVANCE</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark		<u>has seen</u>	
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

*Original sent to Jencyowski for action.*

*Bud,*

*This came over in envelope marked Eyes Only for the Judge. Clay requested I give directly to him which is what I did. J*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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*File Folder*

USSR (3/10/83-3/21/83)

*FOIA*

F03-002/5

SKINNER

*Box Number*

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171420	MEMO  LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE STATE MEMO ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	3/22/1983	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Mr. President

3/25  
PRESIDENT HAS  
~~NOT~~ REVIEWED.

Preparatory to  
your 2:30 meeting with  
George Shultz, it might  
be well for you to review the  
attached two papers



WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

Bine

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

The President has seen

PDB

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

March 25, 1983

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

171421

NLR 148-242-6-3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

BY COB NARA DATE 6/5/83

SUBJECT: Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

The attached memorandum (Tab A) outlines Secretary Shultz's proposals for relations with the Soviets according to his understanding of your guidance at last week's meeting. His basic thrust is that both he and Ambassador Hartman should continue talks with the Soviets to press them on issues of special concern to us including human rights issues, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations.

This memo represents a continuation of State's insistence on intensified U.S.-Soviet dialogue. However it appears to recognize a bit more explicitly than previous communications on this subject the dangers of being perceived as returning to "business as usual" with the Soviets. State thus reassures you that our public statements should continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet misbehavior.

With a couple of exceptions, State's proposals, if carried out discreetly and judiciously, may serve our interests in small but concrete ways. They may yield some very limited positive results. But we must be under no illusions: the Soviets will neither change their communist system to please us nor pull out of places like Afghanistan until they are forced to by exceedingly high costs. They may let the Pentacostalists or Shcharansky go, but their only real motivation for doing so would be to encourage the illusion in Western minds that bigger and better things can be accomplished (when the fact is that the kinds of things we really want cannot be accomplished without major political change in the Soviet system). Thus, certain concessions they might make to us are part of the general Soviet strategy of deception.

It is for this reason that the way we go about a dialogue with the Soviets, the way we handle it publicly, is the most critical question here. It is a very delicate balancing act. On the one hand, we want to appear reasonable, peaceful, and ready to deal with the Soviets in ways that minimize the possibility of war. On the other hand, this entails the enormous risk of raising false public expectations -- i.e., deceiving our own people about the possibility of achieving a true accommodation with communism.



Since the number one theme of Soviet disinformation strategy is to make the West believe that true peace is possible with the USSR, we must be extremely wary about serving as accomplices to this Soviet deception. That is why it is encouraging to see State's acknowledgement that our public statements will continue to be tough. Nevertheless, I have my reservations about how State will handle all this. Its heart is in dialogue and detente and not in the kinds of public statements that are necessary to sustain public vigilance and support for our defense buildup. Unfortunately, whenever you tell the blunt truth about the nature of communism, too many people at State cringe in embarrassment. The issue here is that the truth is the only real weapon we have in our political competition with the Soviets, whose principal weapons are falsehood and deception.

The other great danger in the way we handle any limited dialogue is the kind of signal we may be sending to the Soviets. If we appear too eager to make concessions, or to pursue a greatly expanded agenda for talks, they will get the immediate impression that their manipulation of Western public opinion forced us into talks with them, and that we are weakening and they are getting stronger. We may not see things this way. But this is the way the Soviets look at it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they believed that their greater political and military strength had actually forced us into talks and negotiations with them. It was on the basis of these kinds of perceptions of U.S. weakness that they made many of their calculations to advance geopolitically worldwide.

I have strong reservations about State's two proposals for bilateral relations. The first, a new cultural agreement, seems innocuous enough. But the issue is part of a whole complex of questions that relate to reciprocity and controlling the KGB presence in our country. I will be sending you a more detailed explanation on this. But for now, we should not yet authorize any negotiations until the issue has been thoroughly aired at an NSC meeting. The second proposal is equally problematical: opening a U.S. consulate in Kiev and a Soviet consulate in New York. This also needs much further study.

Otherwise, so long as State's proposed talks are held very discreetly, with no public fanfare, no bragging about great accomplishments, I believe we can achieve the two political results we want: projecting our peaceful intentions and maintaining realism and vigilance with regard to the Soviet threat.

Prepared by:  
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A      Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, March 16, 1983

NLRR 748,242-7-2

SYSTEM II  
90316BY 1003 NARA DATE 6/3/13THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTONSECRET/SENSITIVE

March 16, 1983

TO: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *WPS*  
SUBJECT: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

In accordance with your instructions, here is how I propose to proceed in our bilateral relations with the Soviets in the coming months. I will continue to report to you and seek your further guidance at each stage of the process.

Human Rights: We will continue to keep this issue at the top of our agenda with the Soviets, focusing on:

--The Pentecostals: I will meet with Dobrynin this week to begin implementing the approach you have approved. Emphasizing that the recent Soviet response does not go far enough, I will press Dobrynin to permit the immediate emigration of the one member of the family (Lydia) who was evacuated from the Embassy in connection with her hunger strike last year. I will also give him our understanding of the Soviet statement concerning the Pentecostals still in the Embassy, i.e. that they will be given permission to emigrate if they return to their home and submit applications. At this initial meeting, I will inform Dobrynin that I have discussed areas for possible progress in our bilateral relations with you, but will reserve further discussion of these for a later meeting.

--Shcharanskiy: I will continue in subsequent meetings to reiterate our strong interest in an early release of Shcharanskiy and indicate that we remain interested in the possibility of an exchange for him (as you know, there has recently been some movement on this score).

--Madrid: Underscoring our interest in a balanced outcome at Madrid, I will continue to reinforce Max Kampleman's suggestion that Soviet release of a number of prisoners of conscience would remove a major obstacle to a successful conclusion of the conference.

Arms Control: In my meetings with Dobrynin and in our other diplomatic contacts, we will stress our intention to continue serious negotiations at Geneva. Our arms control approach will continue to be based on the criteria you have established -- real reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance.

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL. OADR

Regional Issues: In accordance with our overall policy of probing Andropov for new flexibility on regional issues, we will continue to raise these issues with the Soviets. Because we do not wish to fall into the old pattern of conducting most of our exchanges through Dobrynin, our principal interlocutor with the Soviets on these issues will continue to be Art Hartman. I believe that in coming months Art should test the Soviets on the following regional issues:

--Middle East: Art should meet with senior MFA Officials for a discussion of the Middle East, as he has done on two recent occasions. These exchanges represent a low-cost means of keeping the Soviets at bay on this issue and, of course, would not touch upon more sensitive aspects of our diplomacy. They also give us a means of reiterating our concerns about unhelpful Soviet behavior, such as the export of SA-5s to Syria.

--Afghanistan: Art should also be instructed to keep the pressure on Moscow by reiterating our basic position on Afghanistan -- something we have not done in detail since Andropov became General Secretary. Following the visit of UN SYG Perez de Cuellar to Moscow this month and the next round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva next month, we will again assess whether there is more we can do, together with the Pakistanis and Chinese, to press Moscow on Afghanistan.

--Southern Africa: We are carefully considering whether further US-Soviet dialogue would advance our Namibia/Angola initiative and our broader objectives in the region. If this review suggests that more exchanges would be in our interest, I would anticipate that Art would be our principal channel of communication on this issue as well.

Bilateral Relations: In this area, we will move deliberately and cautiously, looking at each step in terms of our interests and the requirements of our overall policy approach. In accordance with your guidance, I will in subsequent meetings with Dobrynin indicate our willingness to take two steps that are in our interest:

--Negotiation of a new cultural agreement to enforce reciprocity and enhance U.S. ideological penetration of the Soviet Union itself;

--Opening of a U.S. consulate in Kiev to establish a new U.S. presence in the Ukraine.

As for the existing bilateral agreements which come up for review/renewal over the next year, we will examine carefully each agreement on its merits to ensure that any action we take is clearly in the U.S. interest. The first of these is the Fisheries Agreement where we are already under pressure from Congress and U.S. fishing interests to negotiate a new agreement with expanded joint venture fishing activities -- steps which would rescind elements of our Afghanistan and Poland sanctions regime. I will be sending you a recommendation on this issue shortly.

As I suggested in our recent discussions, the long-term grains agreement is a special case requiring careful handling. I will shortly be sending you a recommendation on this matter.

High-level Dialogue: As noted above, I will be implementing your instructions in meetings with Dobrynin, focusing first on the Pentecostalists, and then addressing other issues in subsequent meetings. I will instruct Art Hartman to pursue his contacts with the Soviet MFA on regional issues. If these discussions indicate that a meeting before the next UNGA between Gromyko and me would be in our interest, I will have further recommendations on timing and venue.

Public Handling: As we proceed, it will be essential that our public statements on US-Soviet relations continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet behavior -- their military buildup, geopolitical expansionism, and human rights violations. Against this background of Soviet behavior, we must continue to stress the necessity for a renewal of American economic and military strength. It must be equally clear that we have no intention of returning to "business-as-usual" in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union -- there must be significant concrete changes in Soviet behavior.

Our public statements should also emphasize that we intend to continue the dialogue with the Soviet Union which we began at the outset of this Administration on the full agenda we have established. We should continue to emphasize our intention to negotiate in good faith in the START and INF talks. But we should also underscore that we have engaged the Soviet Union in discussion of human rights, regional issues, and our bilateral relations. While continuing to stress the continuity of our policy of realism, strength, and dialogue, we can proceed with confidence to take limited steps in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union where it is in our interest to do so.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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*Withdrawer*

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
171423	MEMO	1	3/22/1983	B1
	COPY OF DOC #171420 (LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE STATE MEMO ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS)			

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 29 MAR 83 19

14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM CLARK 12/17/15 GAT

DOC DATE 18 MAR 83

KEYWORDS USSR

MEDIA

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE FOR PRES MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8390398

NSCIFID NSDD0075

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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W/ATTCH FILE

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SECRET SENSITIVE

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/17/85 CSD

*RR*

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

PAGES ONE

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TTY #     

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

FROM/LOCATION/

1. JUDGE CLARK, THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT      CAMP DAVID      TOR:

2. \_\_\_\_\_  
3. \_\_\_\_\_  
4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

*Buoy*  
*File in SYS II*

*R 3/28/83*

RECEIVED  
1983 MAR 19 P 4: 38  
CAMP DAVID

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CLASSIFICATION

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NLRR 148-24-290

BY CRJ NARA DATE 6/5/17

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CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

March 18, 1983

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN

Q: Can you confirm that the President met recently with Dobrynin? What was discussed at this meeting?

A: I can confirm that the President and Secretary Shultz recently met with Ambassador Dobrynin at the White House for a discussion of US-Soviet relations.

--The meeting was an element in the [active] diplomatic dialogue [at all levels] which we have conducted with the Soviet Union since the beginning of the Administration. This dialogue has included a meeting between Andropov and the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, and Ambassador Hartman at the time of the Brezhnev funeral, as well as four meetings at the level of Foreign Minister and numerous contacts through the embassies in Washington and Moscow.

--At their recent meeting, the President and Dobrynin addressed all areas of the comprehensive agenda we have established for US-Soviet dialogue -- human rights, arms control, regional issues, and bilateral relations. In accordance with our normal practice, I will not go further into the substance of a confidential diplomatic exchange with the Soviet Union.

Q: Was this the first meeting between the President and Dobrynin?

The President was received by Dobrynin when he visited the Soviet Embassy to sign the condolence book for the late President Brezhnev.

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 22 MAR 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

12/17/65 603

DOC DATE 21 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

GRAINS

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: DRAFT SCOPE PAPER / SPRING GRAINS CONSULTATIONS W/ SOVIETS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 25 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MCMINN

MYER

BAILEY

NAU

STEARMAN

MARTIN

Close out -

(delegation as of today  
is in Moscow)

Norm Bailey already informed USDA that we concur  
with State's comments - drop pt. 4, amend pts. 1 and 3.

COMMENTS

However, <sup>he</sup> told USDA to make its own determination as to  
whether an additional consultation meeting should be held in June.  
State was apprised as well.

REF# 8308201

LOG 8301307

Paula 3/23/83

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

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23 Mar

see note by Dobriansky

DISPATCH

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DECLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

NLDR 7/8-24-2-10-8

Washington, D.C. 20520

1911

BY 603 : "A DATE 6/5/13  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 21, 1983

83 MAR 22 12: 54 171425

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Spring Grains Consultations with the Soviets  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

The Department has reviewed the draft scope paper provided by USDA for the upcoming US-Soviet grains consultations March 24-25 in Moscow. Other than a few minor changes, which we expect to work out with USDA, the Department has the following two comments on the paper, which have been sent to USDA and USTR.

1. The USDA paper proposes that we offer the Soviets an additional consultation meeting this summer primarily so the new Undersecretary could meet his Soviet counterparts. While we do not oppose such a meeting in principle, we do not think now is the time to propose it, especially since a new Undersecretary of Agriculture has neither been announced nor confirmed. Furthermore, the issue of holding such talks should be considered at the policy level and formally by the NSC. If the new Undersecretary decides he would like to go ahead with such talks, the issue could be reviewed once he is confirmed.

2. We are basically in agreement with USDA on their three points under "Status of LTA Talks." We proposed modifications to points 1 and 3, which USDA accepted, including dropping the phrase in point 3, "other than to say...can be rescheduled." However, the USDA paper proposes going beyond these points, which would merely reiterate present policy, and querying the Soviets on their views on a new and enlarged LTA. We believe that putting forth such a question would signal the Soviets that we are ready to discuss a new LTA at a time when the USG has not decided on a course of action on this issue. Rather, we should simply stick to the guidance in points 1-3, as amended; that is, if the Soviets raise the issue, we listen, but say no more than that we are not prepared to comment on a new LTA or what might be included in a new LTA.

With these two changes, the Department of State could concur with the USDA paper.

Attachment:  
Draft Scope Paper

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL:OADR



United States  
Department  
of Agriculture

Foreign  
Agricultural  
Service

Washington,  
D. C.  
20250

A9

March 18, 1983

TO: Mr. Hefferan  
Mr. Hart  
✓ Mr. Goodrich  
Ms. Early

FROM: Mr. Novotny

Attached is a clean version of the overall guidance paper for Mr. Tracy's delegation to next week's grain consultations with the USSR. Also attached are some draft opening remarks.

We have recast the portion of the overall guidance which deals with "status of LTA talks;" the delegation would avoid any comment about the desirability or content of a future LTA, but would be prepared to take note of any points that the Soviets might wish to register on this topic.

As for an additional consultation meeting later in summer, it would be commercially beneficial, so we would like to have everyone's concurrence in going ahead with such an arrangement.

I felt this revised paper should be circulated today in as much as Mr. Goodrich is leaving earlier than the rest of the delegation; hopefully there would be no further point needing to be resolved, but if this is not the case, please let me know.

Attachments

cc: Mr. Robinson, NSC  
Mr. Tracy, USDA

The Soviets may ask about our new credit and export expansion initiatives, as they have before. We would briefly explain these. We would indicate that they are designed mainly to tap demand in poor countries which cannot be satisfied due to financial constraints. Recognizing that government credit and credit guarantees are prohibited by law, we could say that:

- 1) These programs are designed particularly for the poor, less-developed countries.
- 2) For developed countries, almost no use is being made of special credit programs since we expect them to use commercial bank credit.
- 3) We would like to reiterate, as stated in our previous consultation meeting, that the U.S. has no problem with the use of commercial credit by the USSR to buy U.S. grain.

The Soviet side may also suggest that there are growing tendencies toward a trade war among agricultural exporters, and may seek comment from the U.S. side. We could respond that:

- 1) We do not expect recent developments to result in a trade dispute among agricultural exporters. We are continuing our efforts to reduce trade barriers and unfair trade practices.
- 2) While we are attempting, at the same time, to remain competitive, the major thrust of new U.S. export initiatives is to develop new markets and expand the overall volume of trade.

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3) Despite the current weakness in grain prices, we believe that there is a good possibility of a tighter supply/demand situation in the near future. We expect significant production cutbacks to result from our domestic farm programs, and the continued drought in the southern hemisphere does not bode well for 1983 crops. In light of these factors, and the possibility of increased demand--due, in part, to economic recovery--we anticipate stronger prices in the coming year.

In response to the Soviet presentation, the U.S. side may for example ask about the following:

- 1) The outcome of the 1982 grain crop.
- 2) Are there problems with the current winter crop, and might they cause larger imports next year than this year?
- 3) Progress of their food program (port construction; plans to import more feed additives).

Agenda Item 2: Status of Shipments/Sales

Following the normal exchange of data on shipments and sales for the current year, the U.S. delegation should inquire about trade prospects for this year. (There will be no need, at this session, to deal with the issue of offering U.S. grain over-and-above the 23 million tons currently available.) Example questions are:

1) The Soviet side indicated at the last meeting that total wheat and coarse grain imports in the July-December 1982 period would be only 12 or 13 million tons. What was the actual total? Is an increase expected in the January-June 1983 period?

2) Is the recent decline in USSR total feedgrain imports, relative to wheat, a temporary situation?


3) Is livestock feeding activity being accelerated?

4) Is the increase in wheat import demand this year a result of quality problems in Soviet domestic wheat? Is this a new trend?

5) Is the reduction of coarse grain imports simply a result of changes in domestic production, or has there been a significant change in plans for livestock production?

Agenda Item 3: Other Business - Quality

In addition to the usual update on quality by shipment, there may be some additional discussion on wheat scab--an issue given considerable attention in the fall meeting. We have considered the problem resolved. The Soviets sent a special team here in November to investigate the scab situation; a protocol was signed and we have received word from the Soviets that the initial wheat shipments from the U.S. have been satisfactory, and in accordance with what was agreed in November. If the Soviets indicate that new problems have arisen--and it is unlikely, as we would probably have heard already--we would express our willingness to take their comments back to the inspection and industry people in the U.S. for consideration.



Additional Consultation Meeting

This year, it would be helpful, when holding the consultations with the Soviets, to arrange an extra consultation meeting for early summer. This year's spring consultation, because of dates fixed some months ago, is being held earlier than usual. Also, when the date for this year's consultation was set, we were unaware of the major new programs for domestic acreage reduction which would be taking shape at this time, and we were, of course, unaware that a permanent USDA Under Secretary would not be in place at this time. While one option would have been to postpone this March consultation session, it was felt that this might be a negative signal to the Soviets and would weaken the possibility for their making further purchases of U.S. grain for shipment in the remaining months of this agreement year.

A new USDA Under Secretary, who should be in place soon, will have need for early direct contact with Soviet officials concerned with our grain trade, and an extra consultation session set now for perhaps a date in mid-June, would provide such opportunity. Extra consultation sessions are specifically provided for under the agreement and have in fact been held in the past.

Therefore, at the close of the forthcoming Moscow session, the U.S. side will plan to propose that an extra consultation session meeting be set for mid-June. The delegation will offer specific dates and a location away from Washington, suggesting a city in the mid-west or possibly San Francisco. If the Soviets indicate a preference for a third-country location the delegation could agree to Vienna.

5A

Although the key reason for the extra consultation session will be to assure an opportunity for the new USDA Under Secretary to review our current year grain trade with the Soviets, and to discuss our supply situation in light of our major new domestic production cut-backs, an additional factor will be the status of the existing LTA. The question of a new LTA will need to be addressed in coming weeks as a result of pressures from both agricultural sectors and the Congress. Presumably a definitive administration position on what to do about post-September 30 grain trade relations with the USSR will be developed within the next couple of months.

#### Status of LTA Talks

The Soviets have asked informally if the U.S. delegation will have any proposals to make regarding a new LTA. They have been informally told that we will not. While avoiding any substantive discussion on a new LTA, the delegation may make the following points:

1. The U.S. values our grain trade with the Soviet Union. We think it is a mutually advantageous relationship. We recognize that an LTA has been a useful and desirable framework for our grain trade relations. We hope that this trade can increase.
2. At one time, talks toward a new LTA had been scheduled, but were postponed because of circumstances in Poland. We do not know at this time when it might be possible to re-schedule talks.



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3. Thus, we are not prepared at this time to comment on a new LTA, or what might be included in a new LTA, [other than to say that we remain interested if and when talks can be rescheduled.]

4. We are, however, prepared to hear Soviet views on a new and enlarged LTA.

## Possible Points to Include in Opening Remarks

1. It is a great pleasure for me to be a part of this consultation process. We view this process as an important avenue for communication and cooperation which has been mutually beneficial.
2. As you know, Mr. Lodwick has resigned from USDA, and as yet, we do not have a permanent, new Under Secretary. I am the Acting Under Secretary and have worked quite closely with Mr. Lodwick for some time. He has spoken very highly of Mr. Gordeev and his distinguished delegation. I look forward to our working together.
3. I would like to reaffirm the view expressed in previous consultations that our grain trade and our grain agreement are an important thread in overall relations between our two countries. As always, the strength of that thread depends upon our ability to work together in a spirit of cooperation and mutual benefit.
4. We hope that this thread will continue to strengthen. We have taken a number of steps in the U.S. to allow U.S. sellers and Soviet buyers to trade with confidence--confidence in our reliability as a supplier. Since our two sides last met, the U.S. Congress and the Administration have taken firm action --through legislation--to reaffirm the commitment of our country to the sanctity of agricultural trade contracts.
5. Our farmers are now making very important decisions regarding our production in the coming year. The U.S. Government will also be making a decision soon on what production cutbacks, if any, might be necessary for 1984, and possibly beyond. What we do here in our talks and in our trade will have a significant impact on these decisions.
6. We hope that there will be further opportunity in the future to meet, cooperate, and facilitate the growth of our important grain trade. At the end of this session, I would hope that our two sides could consider this further.