

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, National  
Security Council: Country File

**Folder Title:**

USSR (03/08/1983-03/09/1983)

**Box:** RAC Box 24

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 12/16/2015

**File Folder** USSR (3/8/83-3/9/83)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 24

SKINNER

310

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171405	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO R. MCFARLANE RE REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT	1	3/8/1983	B1
171406	CABLE	MOSCOW 2729 <i>R</i> <i>6/5/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-24-1-2-8</i>	2	3/5/1983	B1
171407	MEMO	DOBRAINSKY TO CLARK RE AMB. HARTMAN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT	1	3/8/1983	B1
171408	MEMO	CLARK TO REAGAN RE MEETING WITH HARTMAN <i>R</i> <i>6/4/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-24-1-4-6</i>	1	ND	B1
171409	TALKING POINTS	NOTE CARDS FOR REAGAN'S MEETING WITH HARTMAN (ORIGINALS + COPIES) <i>R</i> <i>6/4/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-24-1-4-6</i>	3	ND	B1
171410	CABLE	MOSCOW 0973 <i>R</i> <i>6/3/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-24-1-5-5</i>	9	1/25/1983	B1
171411	CABLE	MOSCOW 1331 <i>R</i> <i>6/3/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-24-1-6-4</i>	4	2/2/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 12/16/2015

**File Folder** USSR (3/8/83-3/9/83)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 24

SKINNER

310

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171412 TALKING POINTS	RE MEETING WITH AMB. HARTMAN	1	ND	B1
<i>R</i>	<i>6/3/2013</i>	<i>CREST NLR-748-24-1-7-3</i>		
171413 MEMO	BOB HELM THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE AMB. DAILEY'S MEMO (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	3	3/9/1983	B1
<i>R</i>	<i>6/3/2013</i>	<i>CREST NLR-748-24-1-8-2</i>		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

---

8:45 a.m. - Tuesday, March 8

President/Meeting with Secretary  
Weinberger at National Security  
Briefing

Oval Office

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBERGER

DATE: March 8, 1983

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 8:45-8:50 a.m.

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

I. PURPOSE

The meeting will provide you an opportunity to receive a copy of DOD's 1983 edition of the Soviet Military Power booklet.

II. BACKGROUND

This brief ceremony will be followed on March 9 with a press release on the booklet and a host of other activities to include briefings, TV interviews, press conference by the Secretary of Defense with live satellite coverage in Europe, and special distribution of the booklet to numerous veterans, business, and industry organizations.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President  
Secretary Weinberger  
Edwin Meese III  
James A. Baker, III  
Michael K. Deaver  
William P. CLark

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photo opportunity, with distribution of photo to the press. A Presidential statement on the booklet will be released as a press statement on March 9.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

8:45-8:50 a.m. -- Presentation of Soviet Military Power booklet, followed by brief remarks.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points  
Tab B Press Statement

2

Talking Points for Your Meeting with  
Secretary Weinberger

March 8, 1983

-- I appreciate the hard work that has been done to produce this second edition of Soviet Military Power and look forward to reviewing it later today.

-- A straightforward, factual presentation of the threats facing our nation is essential if we -- both the policymakers and the public -- are to make the right decisions to protect the peace and preserve our free way of life.

-- I understand that this book will be widely distributed, both in the United States and abroad. I urge that people everywhere take the time to examine the hard facts about Soviet military power and compare Soviet forces with our own.

-- An informed public will make the right decisions concerning our national defense needs; that is why this book is so important.

Our defense policy is based on a very simple premise: the United States will not start fights. We will not be the first to use aggression. We will not seek to occupy other lands or control other peoples. Our strategy is defensive; our aim is to protect the peace by ensuring that no adversaries ever conclude they could best us in a war of their own choosing.

What this means is that we design our defense program not to further ambitions, but to counter threats. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the greatest of these threats comes from the Soviet Union, the only nation with the military power to inflict mortal damage directly on the United States.

This also means that if the American people are asked to support our defense program, they must get the straight facts about this threat. The Defense Department's first edition of Soviet Military Power gave them those facts; this revised edition will keep them up to date and will give them a new opportunity to compare Soviet forces with our own.

The facts in this book are straightforward. The Soviets have not slowed the pace of their enormous military buildup. In little over a year, they have begun testing new models in almost every class of nuclear weapons. They are dramatically expanding their Navy and Air Force, are training and equipping their ground forces for pre-emptive attack, and are using their military power to extend their influence and enforce their will in every corner of the globe.

We must continue to demonstrate our resolve not to allow the military balance to tip against the United States. By demonstrating

that resolve, we will not only deter aggression, but we will also offer the Soviets a real incentive to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction.

Let me quote a statement Winston Churchill made to the House of Commons in late 1934, as he urged the British to stop dismantling their defenses:

"To urge the preparation of defense is not to assert the imminence of war. I do not believe that war is imminent or that war is inevitable, but....that if we do not begin forthwith to put ourselves in a position of security, it will soon be beyond our power to do so."

A strong, credible American defense is indispensable to protecting the peace and preserving the free way of life our people cherish.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

*Withdrawer*

KDB 12/16/2015

*File Folder*

USSR (3/8/83-3/9/83)

*FOIA*

F03-002/5

SKINNER

*Box Number*

24

310

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171405	MEMO  P. DOBRIANSKY TO R. MCFARLANE RE REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT	1	3/8/1983	B1

---

---

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECALLED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

17406

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 2729  
EOB368 RECALLED

DTG: 051355Z MAR 83 PSN: 075477  
TOR: 064/2006Z CSN: HCE176

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL-01 /001 A0  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:

ROUTINE  
STU8431  
DE RUEHMO #2729 0641355  
R 051355Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR748-24-1-2-8

BY KDB NARA DATE 6/5/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4044

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1024  
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2242  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3896

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 02729

EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR  
SUBJECT: SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER AND BROTHER REQUEST  
- STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
REFS: (A) STATE 002671, (B) MADRID 01598 (NOTAL),  
- (C) MOSCOW 02148 (NOTAL)

1.  - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. DURING MARCH 3 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER (SEPTEL), SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER IDA MILGROM AND BROTHER LEONID ARRIVED JUST AFTER MRS MILGROM HAD REFUSED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF. MILGROM INFORMED US THAT HER INTERLOCUTOR HAD TOLD HER THAT A FUTURE MEETING BETWEEN ANATOLIY AND HER "DEPENDS ON HIS BEHAVIOR" AND THAT HE IS FEELING BETTER AND IS TAKING MEDICINE. IN ANATOLIY'S RECENT LETTER TO HER, SHE CONTINUED, HE HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD WRITE HER AGAIN ON FEBRUARY 21. WHEN SHE ASKED THE KGB OFFICIAL ABOUT THIS LETTER, HE REPLIED THAT ANATOLIY ACTUALLY HAD WRITTEN HER ONLY ON FEBRUARY 28 AND, AS OF MARCH 3, THE LETTER STILL WAS UNDERGOING CENSORSHIP. HE ASSURED HER, HOWEVER, THAT IT SOON WOULD BE PUT INTO THE MAIL TO HER AND THAT SHE THEREFORE SHOULD RECEIVE IT WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.
3. MILGROM ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE KGB OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HER THAT HER LETTER OF FEBRUARY 14 TO ANDROPOV HAD NOT REACHED THE GENERAL SECRETARY. RATHER, THIS OFFICIAL SAID, IT HAD BEEN INTERCEPTED AS "INAPPROPRIATE" FOR ANDROPOV'S ATTENTION.
4. MILGROM, BONNER AND LEONID SHCHARANSKIY, RECALLING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS IN 1978, EXPRESSED THEIR FIRM CONVICTION THAT A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AT THIS TIME WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO HIM AND REQUESTED THAT HE MAKE ONE.
5. COMMENT: DESPITE THE VIEWS OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS, WE STRONGLY QUESTION THE UTILITY AT THIS PARTICULAR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

RECALLED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 2729

DTG: 051355Z MAR 83 PSN: 075477

TIME OF ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY ONE REPEATING THE 1978 DECLARATION OF ANATOLIY'S INNOCENCE. THERE RECENTLY HAVE BEEN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOVIET INTIMATIONS THAT THEY MAY HAVE SOMETHING IN THE WORKS--ANDROPOV'S LETTER TO MARCHAIS (REF. A), WHICH EVIDENTLY STATED THAT, WHILE SOVIET LAW PROVIDES FOR THE REDUCTION OF PRISON SENTENCES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IS NOT AIDED BY NOISY CAMPAIGNS AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES; AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S FEBRUARY 10 MEETING WITH SERGEI KONDRASHEV (REF. B), WHO SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR SHCHARANSKIY TO APPLY FOR A PARDON; AND THE FEBRUARY 21 TASS DISPATCH (REF. C), THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATION THAT SHCHARANSKIY MIGHT BE PARDONED. THESE INTIMATIONS MAY WELL SIMPLY BE ATTEMPTS TO QUIET WESTERN VOICES; HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT ON SHCHARANSKIY, A HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENT COULD COMPLICATE MATTERS. IN OUR VIEW, ANY SOVIET DECISION TO FREE SHCHARANSKIY MUST BE BASED ON THEIR ABILITY TO SAVE FACE AND TO PRESERVE THE "CORRECTNESS" OF THEIR ORIGINAL FINDING ON SHCHARANSKIY-- THAT HE WAS GUILTY. A HIGH-LEVEL PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SHCHARANSKIY'S INNOCENCE COULD CAUSE THEM TO BACK AWAY AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME. END COMMENT.  
ZIMMERMANN  
BT

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8301530

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/16/85 (20)

RECEIVED 09 MAR 83 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 08 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

AM

STAHL, DAVID

SHCHARANSKY, AVITAL

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR SHCHARANSKY W/ MCFARLANE ON 10 MAR

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 10 MAR 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C MAR 10 1983

*Mcfarlane approved*

*DO*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

*9A*

*(C)*

03 MAR -8 P6:52

51010

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 1530

\*83 MAR -8 P6:52

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>N</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/14/15 GDB

ID 8390269

RECEIVED 08 MAR 83 19

TO CLARK

FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 08 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

HARTMAN, ARTHUR

SUBJECT: AMB HARTMAN MTG W/ PRES

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*C* MAR 09 1983 *Clark noted*

*Do*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council  
The White House

570 ✓

Package # 90269

'83 MAR -8 P6:52

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information   A-Action   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP   Meese   Baker   Deaver   Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

*Judge,  
Recommend you skin this.  
I don't think anything needs  
to go to the President.  
X*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

*Withdrawer*

KDB 12/16/2015

*File Folder*

USSR (3/8/83-3/9/83)

*FOIA*

F03-002/5

SKINNER

*Box Number*

24

310

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
171407	MEMO  DOBRAINSKY TO CLARK RE AMB. HARTMAN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT	1	3/8/1983	B1

---

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



10

10

176408

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

WPC HAS SEEN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-241-4-6

BY COB NARA DATE 6/4/03

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

On March 9 or later this week, Ambassador Hartman will accompany me to your morning briefing at 9:30 a.m. Your last meeting with the Ambassador was on October 1, 1982 -- before the death of Brezhnev and the subsequent leadership changes.

The purpose of this meeting should be twofold: to solicit Ambassador Hartman's views on what is going on in the USSR right now and what we can expect in the future and to share with him the Administration's current thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations. He may discuss his two cables on INF and U.S.-Soviet exchanges:

-- In the first cable on INF (Tab B), Ambassador Hartman maintains that the zero-zero option has outlived its usefulness. You should point out that any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.

-- In his second cable on U.S.-Soviet exchanges (Tab C), the Ambassador suggests we lay the groundwork for a renegotiation of an umbrella agreement on U.S.-Soviet scientific, cultural and technical exchanges. There is a need to assert that before this idea can be contemplated, ideological reciprocity must be ensured -- that is, our ability to present our views to Soviet audiences (general, as well as specialized) should be at a level commensurate with Soviet access to the U.S. media and academic institutions (i.e., television, op eds in Pravda, etc.).

Attached for your use at Tab A are talking points.

Attachments: Tab A Talking Points  
Tab B Moscow cable 973  
Tab C Moscow cable 1331

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky

16



171409

DECL

NLRR 748-24-1-4-6

BY KOB NARA DATE 6/4/73

---

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN (MOSCOW)

- GREET HARTMAN AND PRAISE HIM FOR HIS OUTSTANDING SERVICE.
- PURPOSE OF MEETING TWOFOLD: SEEK HIS VIEWS ON CURRENT SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS & WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED IN FUTURE -- SHARE VIEWS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
- REAFFIRM POSITION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT SEEK CONCRETE IMPROVEMENT -- (ACTION) NOT JUST WORDS. (I.E., LOOK FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT IN REGIONAL CRISES, MOVEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL.)

17

-- IDEOLOGICAL RECIPROCITY MUST BE  
ENSURED IN ANY PROSPECTIVE U.S.-SOVIET  
EXCHANGE FRAMEWORK.

-- ZERO-ZERO OPTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

18

19

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR  
HARTMAN (MOSCOW)

- GREET HARTMAN AND PRAISE HIM FOR HIS OUTSTANDING SERVICE.
- PURPOSE OF MEETING TWOFOLD: SEEK HIS VIEWS ON CURRENT SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS & WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED IN FUTURE -- SHARE VIEWS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
- REAFFIRM POSITION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT SEEK CONCRETE IMPROVEMENT -- (ACTION) NOT JUST WORDS. (I.E., LOOK FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT IN REGIONAL CRISES, MOVEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL.)

-2-

- IDEOLOGICAL RECIPROCITY MUST BE ENSURED IN ANY PROSPECTIVE U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE FRAMEWORK.
- ZERO-ZERO OPTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

Department of State  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

EYES ONLY <sup>B</sup> TC  
BOVERIE \_\_\_\_\_  
BLAIR \_\_\_\_\_  
GREGG FOR VP \_\_\_\_\_  
DOBRIANSKY \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment Classification

---

TO: Admiral Poindexter

**NO DISTRIBUTION — NODIS**

**Sensitive**

973

The attached document may be seen only by the addressee and, if not expressly precluded from doing so, by those officials under his authority who he considers to have a clear-cut "need to know."

The document is not to be reproduced, given any additional distribution or discussed with others in the Department of State, or in other Departments, Agencies, or Bureaus without the express prior approval of the Executive Secretary.

Agencies outside the Department of State should handle the document in accordance with the above instructions on NODIS.

When this document is no longer needed, the recipient is responsible for seeing that it is destroyed and for mailing a record of destruction to Mr. Elijah Kelly, Jr., S/S-I, Room 7241, N.S. Originals of non-telegraphic NODIS material, however, should be hand-carried to S/S-I for appropriate disposition.

Executive Secretary

**NO DISTRIBUTION — NODIS**

Attachment Classification

22



25 JAN 83 1/2 297  
Department of State

008717  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

171460

CONFIDENTIAL NODM92

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z  
ACTION NODS-00

COPY 12 OF 20 COPIES

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W  
-----273233 251423Z /41

O 251346Z JAN 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2673

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00973

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER  
DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: US/SOVIET RELATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-24-1-5-5

BY KDB NARA DATE 6/3/13

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE NOW SEEN ENOUGH OF THE ANDROPOV REGIME'S  
FOREIGN POLICY TO DETECT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OWN  
POLICY AND FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS  
MESSAGE DRAWS SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHERE WE SHOULD  
BE TRYING TO GO IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE  
SOVIETS AND HOW WE CAN GET THERE.

3. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE  
ANDROPOV APPROACH IS NOT MARKED BY SIGNIFICANT  
EXPERIMENTATION OR INITIATIVE. INTERNALLY,  
ANDROPOV IS MAKING MAJOR EFFORTS TO MAKE THE  
ECONOMY RUN BETTER, BUT HE IS USING TRADITIONAL  
AND CONSERVATIVE METHODS - AN EMPHASIS ON  
DISCIPLINE AND AN ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE. IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NODS-00  
NODS-00  
NODS-00  
NODS-00



23



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NO DISSEMINATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z

FOREIGN POLICY, HE HAS DEPARTED IN NO WAY FROM THE BREZHNEV POLICY. HE SEEMS TO BE GOING OUT OF HIS WAY TO KNOCK DOWN SPECULATION THAT HE WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON AFGHANISTAN OR POLAND; AND EVEN ON ISSUES OF LESS IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION, LIKE SOUTHERN AFRICA, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO RELAXATION OF THE HARD LINE. IF ANYTHING, THE BEST CANDIDATE FOR CHANGE, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM, WOULD SEEM TO BE AN ACCELERATION OF SOVIET OVERTURES TO CHINA - A DEVELOPMENT THAT IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS. I REMAIN NEVERTHELESS CONVINCED THAT A PRIORITY ITEM IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER ANDROPOV IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US. IN SHORT, WE ARE CONFRONTING A REGIME WHICH WILL BE EVERY BIT AS HARD TO DEAL WITH AS THE BREZHNEV REGIME, WHICH IS MORE VIGOROUS AND PROBABLY MORE INTELLIGENT, BUT WHICH HAS A CERTAIN DEPENDENCY ON ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

4. AGAINST SUCH A BACKGROUND, IT SEEMS TO ME WE SHOULD GO BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS OUR OWN SECURITY. WHATEVER THE CONDITION OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP OUR BASIC APPROACH MUST BE DESIGNED TO LESSEN THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE TWO MISTAKES OF THE 1970'S WERE (1) TO EMPHASIZE ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A PARALLEL EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE AND (2) TO COUNT ON ARMS CONTROL TO CARRY TOO MUCH OF THE WEIGHT OF THE ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP. FORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT PRONE TO THOSE MISTAKES TODAY. IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE, COULD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NOV-1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z

UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO CORRECT THESE MISTAKES.

5. IT IS WITH THIS CONTEXT IN MIND THAT I SAY WE MUST NOW GIVE A HEIGHTENED EMPHASIS TO ARMS CONTROL, AND I THINK THIS ISSUE DESERVES HIGH PRIORITY ON YOUR OWN GLOBAL AGENDA. I SAY THIS BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS THE ONLY CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CATALYST TOWARD STARTING A PROCESS OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THAT FIRST PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY. AND I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS NOW PERCEIVED BY PUBLICS TO BE THE WEAKEST ASPECT OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION - A WEAKNESS WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE EXPLOITING IN WESTERN EUROPE WITH GROWING EFFECT. SINCE THE DEPLOYMENT TIMETABLE MAKES INF A MORE URGENT MATTER THAN START, IT IS INF THAT I WANT TO ADDRESS HERE. IN MY VIEW, OUR INF NEGOTIATING POSITION OF ZERO-ZERO IS REACHING THE END OF ITS USEFULNESS. THE TIME HAS COME TO CHANGE IT.

6. I WAS IN WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION; I HAVE BEEN IN MOSCOW DURING THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO TEAR THAT DECISION APART. THE SOVIET STRATEGY IS QUITE PLAIN; IT HAS NOT CHANGED FROM BREZHNEV TO ANDROPOV. THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT AN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION TO INF (IN CONTRAST TO THEIR POLICY TOWARD START). THEY WANT TO PREVENT OUR DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT AFFECTING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 02 OF 03 251417Z

THE ORIGIN WAS WESTERN EUROPE'S FEAR THAT, WITHOUT U.S. WEAPONS IN EUROPE TO RESPOND TO THE SS-20, THE U.S. MIGHT HESITATE TO DEFEND A EUROPE THREATENED BY THE SS-20. THE DECISION TO DEPLOY GLCM'S AND PERKSHING-II'S WAS NOT PRIMARILY A MILITARY DECISION (AFTER ALL, WE HAD THE MILITARY MEANS TO RESPOND TO AN SS-20 ATTACK; WE HAD OUR WHOLE STRATEGIC ARSENAL). THE DECISION TO DEPLOY WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL DECISION: TO GIVE THE EUROPEANS CONFIDENCE THAT WE WOULD TREAT A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THEM AS IF IT WERE AN ATTACK ON OURSELVES. AS I REMEMBER IT, THERE WAS NO GREAT SANCTITY ABOUT THE NUMBERS IN INF. THE NUMBER 572 WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE (1) 572 WAS LESS THAN THE PROJECTED SS-20 WARHEAD ARSENAL (TO EQUALIZE THE SS-20'S WAS CONSIDERED "DE-COUPLING" SINCE THE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE COULD THEN TAKE PLACE SOLELY IN EUROPE) BUT (2) 572 WAS ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH U.S. CREDIBILITY IN DEFENDING EUROPE .

8. I RECALL ALL THIS HISTORY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS PERCEIVED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN EUROPE AND, THEREFORE, STRENGTHENING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. HOWEVER WE COME OUT ON INF, WE SHOULD KEEP THAT OBJECTIVE FIRMLY IN MIND: WE WANT A SOLUTION THAT STRENGTHENS - OR AT LEAST DOESN'T WEAKEN - THE ALLIANCE. THE SECURITY OF THE U.S. IS LESS DEPENDENT ON THE NUMBER OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WE CAN DEPLOY ON EUROPEAN SOIL THAN ON THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR ALLIES AGAINST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOV-1963



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NOON-11-03-79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 . MOSCOW 00973 02 OF 03 251417Z

AN ATTACK.

9. THE GREATEST DANGER IN THE CURRENT INF DEBATE IS THE THREAT TO ALLIANCE UNITY. ONE THING IS BECOMING CLEAR: OUR HOLDING TO ZERO-ZERO MUCH LONGER WILL IMPERIL THAT UNITY. ZERO-ZERO (LIKE THE 1979 DECISION ITSELF) WAS AN ALLIANCE, NOT JUST A U.S., DECISION; IF OUR ALLIES BEGIN TO COME OFF IT - AS I BELIEVE TO BE HAPPENING - THEN ALLIANCE UNITY ITSELF IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ACCEPT ZERO-ZERO; THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO DISMANTLE THEIR ENTIRE SS-20 FORCE, EVEN AT THE PRICE OF NATO'S CARRYING OUT SOME OR ALL OF ITS INF DEPLOYMENTS. THAT WOULD NOT BE ALL BAD IF WE COULD BE SURE OUR DEPLOYMENT WOULD GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF SOVIET REJECTION OF ZERO-ZERO. BUT WILL THE GERMANS, OR EVEN THE BRITISH, PERMIT DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT OUR SEEKING TO NARROW THE NEGOTIATING GAP? WHILE I'M NOT DEALING WITH THOSE COUNTRIES ANYMORE, I STRONGLY DOUBT IT. GEORGE BUSH SHOULD GET A FEEL FOR THIS DURING HIS TRIP. IF THEY DON'T AGREE TO THE DEPLOYMENT, WE ARE THEN FACED EITHER WITH A CRISIS WITH OUR TWO MAJOR ALLIES OR WITH A FACE-SAVING "DELAY" IN DEPLOYMENT WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE (WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THAT THE MISSILES ARE NEVER DEPLOYED). EITHER WAY THE SOVIETS WIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NO DISSEMINATION


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 03 OF 03 251417Z

11. ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO OFFER A NEW U.S. APPROACH, I LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS. THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT REMOVE ANOTHER LAYER OF THE UNION UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTION. THUS, WE CAN PROBABLY WAIT TILL THEN. THERE MAY BE GERMAN REASONS FOR WAITING, TOO, SINCE A U.S. MOVE BEFORE MARCH 6 MIGHT STRENGTHEN THOSE IN THE FRG WHO ARE LEAST COMMITTED TO THE DOUBLE DECISION. IN ANY CASE, I THINK WE SHOULD NOT DELAY MUCH BEYOND MARCH 6, SINCE AT THAT POINT WILL BEGIN THE PERIOD OF MAXIMUM SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.

12. MOVEMENT ALONG THE LINES I HAVE PROPOSED CAN PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR THE ACCELERATED BILATERAL DIALOGUE THAT WE DISCUSSED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. IF WE MOVE ON INF, YOUR NEXT TALK WITH GROMYKO--WHETHER HERE OR ELSEWHERE--COULD BE THE OCCASION FOR INTRODUCTION OF THE IDEA OR--IF ALREADY TABLED IN GENEVA--FOR EMPHASIS TO SOVIET LEADERS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP OF AN EARLY INF AGREEMENT. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO COME TO MOSCOW WOULD DEPEND ON THE WEIGHT WE ATTACH TO GETTING DIRECTLY AT ANDRUPOV. AFTER SUCH A ROUND WE COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHERE TO TAKE THE PROCESS NEXT. HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~







32



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NON-SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

FREQUENT APPEARANCES OF ARBATOV AND HIS FRIENDS ON NATIONWIDE AMERICAN MEDIA, THE SOVIET FILM WEEKS, AND THE HAMMER-WEINTRAUB AND AXELROD IMPRESARIO ACTIVITIES ARE BUT SELECTED EXAMPLES, WHICH CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH MY LIMITED PROGRAM OF FILM SHOWINGS AND CULTURAL EVENTS IN SPASO HOUSE.

4. MOREOVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE CUTTING OURSELVES OFF FROM IMPORTANT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FROM ACCESS TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THROUGH OUR CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE OFTEN CITED THE FACT THAT MANY OF MY BEST YOUNG OFFICERS ARE PRODUCTS OF THE EXHIBIT GUIDE EXPERIENCE AS AN EXAMPLE OF A PROGRAM NO LONGER POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, AT LEAST FOUR OF MY SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN EXHIBITS AND/OR ACADEMIC EXCHANGES UNDER THE FORMER AGREEMENT. GIVEN THE SAD STATE OF SOVIET STUDIES IN THE U.S., WE'RE COASTING RIGHT NOW ON CAPITAL WE GAINED WHEN THE EXCHANGES WERE AT THEIR PEAK. WITHOUT THE EXCHANGES AS A NATION WE'LL SOON BE VERY HARD UP FOR GOOD RUSSIAN LINGUISTS AND PEOPLE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT SOVIET AFFAIRS.

5. IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET REGIME, WE NEED MORE AMMUNITION FOR THE COMPETITION FOR PEOPLES' MINDS - A COMPETITION WHICH WE ARE BOUND TO WIN. THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC IN AMERICAN EXHIBITS, BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS, FILMS, TV PROGRAMS AND RADIO HAS NO COMPARABLE COUNTERPART IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, GIVEN THE LATTER'S UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE BEST FROM THE ENTIRE WORLD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

33



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

6. THUS, IN IMPLEMENTING THE NSDD, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATION OF AN UMBRELLA/FRAMWORK AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH A BROAD RANGE OF ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, INFORMATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES COULD FUNCTION IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. THE BROADER THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, THE BETTER WE CAN TRADE OFF OUR INTERESTS AGAINST THEIRS - AND THUS ACHIEVE RECIPROCITY. IT WOULD THUS BE A MISTAKE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM ACADEMIC EXCHANGES. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AGREEMENT WOULD EASE THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, WHICH BOTH OUR FINDINGS AND A RECENT NAS STUDY SHOW COMES PRIMARILY FROM PRIVATE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL EXCHANGES CONTACTS. IF WE OPEN UP OFFICIAL EXCHANGES AGAIN WE CAN CONTINUE TO CONTROL THEM CLOSELY; AT THE SAME TIME, OPENING UP THE OFFICIAL CHANNEL WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE PRIVATE SIDE, WHICH IS HARDER FOR US TO POLICE.

7. IN STARTING THE PROCESS TOWARD A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, THERE IS NO NEED TO CONVEY A POLITICAL SIGNAL UNLESS WE WANT TO. WE SHOULD PLAY THIS AS A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT THAT IS NO SIGNAL ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND THAT IS AIMED AT MAKING POSSIBLE A RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES NO MORE THAN A FRAMEWORK.

CONFIDENTIAL

NSDD-SS NSDD-SS NSDD-SS

3x



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM  
001030

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N00031

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01331 02 OF 02 021636Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----260311 021638Z /46

R 021617Z FEB 83  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2960

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO FULL  
POLITICAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF  
OUR RELATIONSHIP.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT WE BEGIN PREPARING FOR  
NEGOTIATION OF A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, LOOKING  
FOR IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN  
GREATER RECIPROCITY AND ACCESS, WHILE ASSERTING  
THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. THERE IS NO REASON,  
FOR EXAMPLE, GIVEN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR RESUMPTION  
OF A CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, WHY WE CANNOT  
ACHIEVE GREATER ACCESS TO NATIONWIDE SOVIET TV  
AUDIENCES, TV HAVING REPLACED FILM, WHICH WAS CITED  
BY LENIN IN HIS TIME AS THE "GREATEST MEDIUM FOR  
EDUCATING THE MASSES".  
HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35



TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

-- Indicate the purpose of the meeting is twofold: to solicit his views on current Soviet developments and what can be expected in the future and to share with him the Administration's current thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations.

-- If raised, address Hartman's two cables on INF (Tab B) and U.S.-Soviet exchanges (Tab C). On INF, assert that the zero-zero option has not outlived its usefulness. State that any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise. On U.S.-Soviet exchanges, mention that there is a need to secure ideological reciprocity -- that is, an ability to present our views to Soviet audiences at a level commensurate with Soviet access to U.S. media and academic institutions -- before this idea can be contemplated seriously.

-- Time permitting, pose some of the following questions:

- o U.S.-Soviet Relations. What is on Andropov's agenda? What is he prepared to give for genuine improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations?
- o Sino-Soviet Relations. Are the Soviets prepared to thin out forces along the Sino-Soviet border and put pressure on the Vietnamese to make them more flexible on Cambodia?
- o Arms Control. In the wake of Kohl's election, can a more flexible Soviet position be anticipated?
- o Soviet Foreign Policy Mix. What serious departures from Brezhnev's course, if any, can be anticipated?
- o Afghanistan. Ask what is his explanation for the recent flurry of Soviet articles on Afghanistan which for the first time unequivocally mention Soviet casualties and portray the Afghan situation as a difficult one? Can we expect escalation or moves toward disengagement?
- o Human Rights. Can we expect the continuation of the present harsh policies on dissidents, Jewish emigration, etc.?

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-24-1-7-3

BY CSA NARA DATE 6/3/73

NW

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

171413

INFORMATION

March 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE

FROM: BOB HELM <sup>PH</sup>SUBJECT: Ambassador Dailey's Assessment of Soviet Military Power

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-24-1-8-2

21 0013 1

DATE 4/3/13

Ambassador Dailey sent you a copy of his memo to Secretary Weinberger commenting upon the plan to jointly telecast the briefing of Soviet Military Power in the Pentagon and in Brussels with NATO officials present on March 9 (Tab I).

Ambassador Dailey cited four points he felt the briefing should stress:

1. our defensive strategy
2. our preference for arms reductions
3. we are not increasing, but modernizing our nuclear forces; and
4. the President's proposal to eliminate an entire category of intermediate range nuclear weapons.

Dennis Blair and I reviewed the draft of Secretary Weinberger's briefing and added the relevant points. Ambassador Dailey's views were reflected in the Secretary's presentation.

Dennis Blair concurs.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Secretary Weinberger from Ambassador Dailey dated March 3, 1983



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

1464

March 3, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Release of Updated Version of Soviet Military Power

I appreciated our meeting Monday. It was most informative. My concerns about the telecast circuit satellite broadcast to Europe have lessen considerably. I was not aware that it was a closed circuit to Brussels for a specific audience. I was under the misconception that it was for broad scale viewing throughout Europe.

It is my understanding that your telecast will include Secretary Luns in Brussels. That will be most helpful in increasing the NATO content of our message. It is important that Europeans understand that our defense posture as it relates to Europe and particularly for intermediate range nuclear weapons is a NATO defense rather than American weapons being placed on European soil.

Following are some additional points which I believe will help enhance our position with the European public and follows up on themes the President and Vice President have used with great success.

1. NATO is a defensive alliance. Our assessment of Soviet military power indicates what we must do to assure our security. Our programs for weapons modernization and replacement, are designed only to reestablish the "margin of safety," that balance of nuclear power, technology, and conventional forces which provides for our security and deters Soviet aggression.
2. Our preferred objective is arms reductions, not arms buildup. We are pursuing defense modernization on a contingency basis. The Soviets should know that we will meet any challenge they present, but that we would prefer to join with them in an effort to reduce the number of weapons.
3. Our nuclear programs are designed to modernize and replace existing nuclear forces. We are not simply adding weapon upon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL:OADR



139

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

weapon. We have fewer weapons and less explosive power today than we did 15 years ago. We are satisfied with this position since we are regaining the margin of safety.

4. The President's proposal to eliminate an entire category of intermediate range nuclear weapons from the face of the earth is a sincere one. It goes beyond anything proposed by various peace and nuclear freeze groups. We hope to have a serious response from the Soviet Union. As yet we have heard nothing but talk. There has been no serious proposal presented at the negotiating table in Geneva that meets the reasonable criteria outlined in the President's speech February 22.

In order to better communicate with the public here and in Europe, we believe that all of us should refrain from acronyms or jargon and spell out our terms. It is important that we explain the President's Zero Option Proposal as "The President's proposal to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons from the face of the entire earth."

Many thanks for all your help.



Peter H. Dailey, Chairman  
Interagency Committee for  
European Security and Arms Control

cc:  
STATE - Secretary Shultz  
NSC - William P. Clark  
USIA- Charles Z. Wick

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council  
The White House

572<sup>10</sup>

'83 MAR -9 P5:56

Package # 1464

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<del>X</del>	I
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/16/85 (603)

RECEIVED 04 MAR 83 14

TO CLARK

FROM DAILEY, P

DOCDATE 03 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: MILITARY POSTURE

NATO

WEINBERGER, C

ARMS CONTROL

USSR

MEDIA

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF UPDATED VERSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 07 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HELM

BOVERIE

KRAEMER

DOBRIANSKY

FORTIER

DUR

MYER

LINHARD

SIMS

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*Clark*

*IX*

*3/9*

*for information*

*C*

*3/14*

*Noted by Ponderstein*

*PA, ES*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

*(PA)*

*H. (c)*