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File Folder USSR (3/3/83-3/7/83)

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309

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171385	CABLE	STATE 57582 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-46-1-1	1	3/3/1983	B1
171386	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SHULTZ'S NEW MEMO ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-46-2-0	3	3/9/1983	B1
171387	MEMO	SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-46-3-9	8	3/3/1983	B1
171388	MEMO	SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1983 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-46-4-8	4	1/19/1983	B1
171389	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SHULTZ'S MEMO TO REAGAN	2	3/8/1983	B1
171390	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY THROUGH C. TYSON TO W. CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST	1	3/2/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171391	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-46-7-5</i>	1	3/4/1983	B1
171392	LETTER	RICHARD NIXON TO G. SHULTZ <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-46-8-4</i>	5	3/4/1983	B1
171393	CABLE	MOSCOW 2729 <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-46-9-3</i>	1	3/5/1983	B1
171394	CABLE	MOSCOW 2709 <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-46-10-1</i>	1	3/5/1983	B1
171395	CABLE	GENEVA 2171 <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-46-11-0</i>	7	3/5/1983	B1
171396	MEMO	M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE SPRING GRAIN CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-46-12-9</i>	1	3/7/1983	B1
171397	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE GRAIN CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS	1	2/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171398	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE SPRING GRAIN CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS	1	2/25/1983	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-46-14-7			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171385

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 7582607 DTG: 030051Z MAR 83 PSN: 070528
SIT689 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 062/0514Z

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MESSAGE:

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O 030051Z MAR 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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748-23-46-1-1

BY COB

DATE 12/15/15

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2978
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 8634
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 057582
EXDIS - USSTART/USINF
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UR, US
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS ON NEW ICBM TESTS

4. IN REPOSE, SOKOLOV SAID THAT HE ;OULD TRANSHIT THE U.S. REQUEST TO MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE U.S. EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN UNTIL IT COULD BE DETERMINED WHAT, IN FACT, WERE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF - THE FEBRUARY 8 TEST, IF SUCH A TEST HAD INDEED OCCURRED.

5. BURT SAID THE U.S. WAS SEEKING TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. HE RECALLED THAT AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN HAD NOTIFIED THE U.S. LAST OCTOBER REGARDING THE FIRST TEST OF THE "RS-22," AND SAID HE HOPED THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION IN THIS MANNER SO THAT CONFUSION COULD BE AVOIDED. BURT ADDED THAT, SPEAKING CANDIDLY, THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MISSILE TESTED ON FEBRUARY 8 IS DIFFERENT FROM THE "RS-22" HAS, IN FACT, CAUSED CONCERN IN THE U.S.

6. SOKOLOV SAID THAT HE TOO RECALLED THE OCTOBER CONVERSATION. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE THRUST OF BURT'S REMARKS, AND WOULD SEEK A RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW.
DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 7582607 DTG: 030051Z MAR 83 PSN: 070528

1. ~~6~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT CALLED IN SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELDR OLEG SOKOLOV ON MARCH 2 TO MAKE DEMARCHE REQUESTING EXPLANATION OF SOVIET TEST ON FEBRUARY 8 OF AN ICBM DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE "RS-22" TESTED IN OCTOBER, 1982. ALSO PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR ROBERT DEAN, AND EUR/SOV OFFICER ALEXANDER VERSHBOW (NOTETAKER).

3. IN HIS DEMARCHE, BURT MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE KNOW THAT ON FEBRUARY 8 THE SOVIET UNION FLIGHT-TESTED AN ICBM FROM THE PLESETSK TEST RANGE, AND THAT THIS MISSILE WAS DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE "RS-22" WHICH YOU TESTED LAST OCTOBER.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS TEST FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND FOR PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL.

-- YOUR EARLIER STATEMENTS HAVE S;GGESTED THAT, LIKE THE U.S., THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO AVOID ACTIONS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT EXISTING SALT AGREEMENTS WHILE O'R COUNTRIES PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW START AGREEMENT.

-- WE ACCORDINGLY REQUEST THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION OF THE ICBM TEST OF FEBRUARY 8 IN LIGHT OF THESE EARLIER STATEMENTS, AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE SALT II TREATY.

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8390254

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/15/85 (201)

RECEIVED 07 MAR 83 14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 03 MAR 83

LENCZOWSKI

08 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8291025 8291028 NSCIFID NSDD0075 (B / 8)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X</i> MAR 08 1983	<i>Pres for info</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>1P</i> MAR 09 1983	<i>for info</i>		
	<i>C</i> MAR 10 1983	<i>then noted</i>		<i>JC</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOTED

171386

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March 9, 1983

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NLRR 748 23262-2

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

BY *LSB* DATE *4/8/83*

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's New Memorandum on U.S.-Soviet Relations

The memorandum to you from George Shultz at Tab A is an almost identical repetition of his January 19 memo to you. It is so similar that the outlines of both memoranda are the same, many sentences are repeated verbatim, and the recommendations are almost the same only with minor modifications. The only difference is that the words "intensified dialogue" are given less prominence in the text, which has been lengthened.

Like the old version, the new one calls for a strategy of intensified dialogue on bilateral issues and in specific areas: arms control, regional issues (Afghanistan, Southern Africa), human rights, and economic relations. George's reason for persisting with this recommendation is that he has detected in his recent meetings with Dobrynin "a few tentative signs of Soviet willingness to move forward on specific issues -- the Pentecostalists and technical level exchanges on consular matters." Thus, he feels that dialogue, initially through his channel with Dobrynin, could serve to see that the Soviets are "seriously tested" and "challenged."

While State's final recommendations downplay the importance of summitry, all the logic that was used to justify a summit in the previous memo remains. The new recommendations include: discussing new subjects such as MBFR; quiet diplomacy to encourage progress in the Shcharansky case; confidential talks to trade improvement in human rights for a CDE; and negotiations to open a U.S. Consulate in Kiev and a Soviet Consulate in New York.

There are several problems with this memorandum. Principally it fails to reflect a full understanding of the nature of the Soviet threat and the way the Soviets operate. What is systematically ignored here is the fact that the Soviets are engaging in low-intensity, political conflict with the West -- an attack whose thrusts we have failed to deter. What is also ignored is that our existing policy of deterrence, which posits that the enemy should lose more by an attack than he could hope to gain, applies solely to the military sphere and not to the proxy-military and non-military forms of attack.

As a result the memo reflects a misunderstanding of what it takes to get the Soviets to come to terms with us. State believes that all it is likely to take is a "successful demonstration of our resolve" as manifested by renewed economic and military strength, revitalized alliances, a new relationship with China, regional peacekeeping efforts and an ideological offensive. There is some truth to this -- but only partly so. With the exception of possible political losses inflicted on the Soviets by our young and fragile ideological offensive, none of this will cause the Soviets to lose more than they gain by attacking the Free World in their low-intensity fashion. Thus, the references to warning the Soviets about the "consequences of unacceptable behavior" ring hollow -- no meaningful consequences are proposed.

State's memo also contains several questionable assumptions. One is that the U.S. is as responsible as the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions. This is implicit in the memo's last sentence which suggests that we should do our part to demonstrate our peaceful intentions -- as if we have not done so for years. Another questionable assumption is that we can easily sustain public support for our defense buildup and demonstrate our resolve by engaging in precisely the dialogue which the Soviets want us to do -- the kind that generates false public expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations, which in turn induce public pressures on us to make concessions. Yet another questionable assumption is that there has been any kind of indication of Soviet willingness to make concessions on any of the issues that separate us. The reference to flexibility on the Pentecostals, for one, has no basis in fact.

Altogether, this memo is another State Department attempt to explain how increased dialogue can help pressure the Soviets into more acceptable behavior. The many reasons given as to how dialogue can pressure the Soviets to do anything are weak, and unconvincing, as they reflect a wishful-thinking perception about the nature of the Soviet system and its willingness to compromise. If we follow its recommendation for intensified dialogue, especially at a time of possible defense cuts, and unilateral disarmament and freeze movements, we will be sending all the wrong signals to the Soviets. We will be "improving" U.S.-Soviet relations on Soviet terms, and not on our terms and thus portraying an image of political weakness that is the exact opposite of the image of revived spiritual strength that your election symbolized.

In spite of your earlier decision and rejection of the same recommendation to intensify dialogue, State asserts that: "We now need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue." This persistence merits an appropriate response: I believe that you and I should meet with George, so that he can discuss his recommendations and address the problems we have with them. However, before the meeting takes place I would like to present you with an alternative set of recommendations which we could simultaneously address.

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ATTACHMENT:

Tab A Secretary Shultz's memorandum, March 3, 1983

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A

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

171387

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March 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *gjs*
SUBJECT: USG-Soviet Relations -- Where Do We Want To Be and How Do We Get There?

I have now had the discussions with Dobrynin which you authorized me to undertake. Dobrynin has come into these talks with a series of proposals for introducing new movement into the bilateral relationship. They are along familiar Soviet lines, with the focus on arms control and reviving bilateral agreements or processes that died largely as a result of Soviet misbehavior. In the background has been a series of statements by you and by Andropov on US-Soviet relations, with both of you saying you are willing to move forward, but that it is up to the other to take the first step. Meanwhile the Soviet "peace offensive" to derail INF deployments in Europe has continued.

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 798-23-116-3-9
BY 1608 NARA DATE 4/8/83

From my talks with Dobrynin there have emerged a few tentative signs of Soviet willingness to move forward on specific issues -- the Pentecostalists and technical-level exchanges on consular matters. But the Soviets have not yet been seriously tested, and my feeling is that the time has come to use my channel through Dobrynin for that purpose. Before I proceed, however, we should take a look at our broader, longer-term strategy for dealing with them. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss both that strategy and the immediate steps we might take to implement it.

Minimum and Maximum U.S. Objectives

Our minimum objective for US-Soviet relations over the next few years is to make clear that we are determined to resist Soviet efforts to use their growing military power in ways which threaten our security. The Soviets must recognize that, while we are serious in our arms control proposals, we also have the will and capacity to correct the imbalances which their military buildup has created. There must be no doubt in Moscow or elsewhere that we will not permit a resumption of the Soviet geopolitical expansionism in the Third World which we saw in the 1970s. Finally, the Soviets must understand that we are not prepared to insulate the bilateral relationship from these issues or our concerns about Soviet human rights behavior. In sum, it must be clear that we see the US-Soviet relationship as fundamentally adversarial and that we are fully prepared to compete effectively and vigorously.

8

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-2-

There may also be a chance to go beyond this minimum objective and make some progress toward a more stable and constructive US-Soviet relationship over the next two years or so. This can occur only if the Soviet leadership concludes that it has no choice but to deal with this Administration on the basis of the comprehensive agenda we have established over the last two years. Some of the factors that will shape this critical decision of the Soviet leadership are beyond our effective control. These include the outcome of the succession process, the overall performance of the Soviet economy, and the ability of the new leadership to deal with the long-term malaise of Soviet society.

There are, however, a number of areas in which our actions, and particularly the degree of progress we make in achieving priority objectives beyond the US-Soviet bilateral relationship, will be critical to the decisions of the Soviet leadership. Thus, sustaining the momentum of the efforts we have begun in the following areas represents an essential precondition for inducing the Soviets to deal seriously with the agenda we have established:

- (1) Rebuilding American economic and military strength: With economic recovery now under way, we must redouble our efforts to rebuild American military strength. In particular, we need to solve the MX basing problem and obtain congressional approval for our strategic forces modernization program.
- (2) Maintaining the vitality of our alliances: In this category, our two priority objectives should be a successful outcome in INF and the development of a new framework for East-West economic relations.
- (3) Stabilizing our relations with China: Building on the basis established during my trip to Beijing, a summit later this year would solidify our own relations with Beijing, despite continuing differences on Taiwan, and inhibit improvement in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
- (4) Continuing regional peacekeeping efforts: We have no illusions about the prospects for rapid success in the Middle East or a regional settlement in southern Africa. However, U.S. diplomatic activism in key third world areas reduces Soviet maneuver room and can help control destabilizing activities by the Soviets and their allies. To the extent that we are able to

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-3-

make real progress in resolution of regional problems, the Soviets are progressively frozen out of areas of key importance to us.

- (5) Continuing vigorous competition in ideas: We want to have obtained congressional funding for the democracy initiative and a supplemental for the radios, establish our new party political foundations(s) and generally put our offensive in support of Western values into high gear.

If we are able to achieve real progress in these areas, we will have demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that it cannot expect a radical departure in U.S. policy of the kind that has occurred too often in the past decade. Thus, 1983 will represent a critical test of whether a U.S. Administration can not only put in place the kind of US-Soviet policy we have established -- but see it through.

While the Soviet response to a successful demonstration of our resolve is not entirely predictable, I believe that the Soviet leadership might conclude that it had no alternative but to come to terms with us. In that event, opportunities for a lasting and significant improvement in US-Soviet relations would be better than they have been for decades. If the Soviets remained intransigent, we would have nonetheless taken the essential steps needed to ensure our security.

The US-Soviet Agenda -- What Can We Realistically Aim to Achieve?

If the above analysis is correct we can realistically expect to confront the following opportunities and risks in specific areas of the US-Soviet agenda:

A. Arms Control

Here we have taken the approach that it is meaningful agreements that count, and you have established high standards: real reductions; equality in the important measures of military capability; verifiability; and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance. These criteria form the basis of our proposals in INF and START, and must continue to do so as we consider our negotiating positions over the coming year or so. We should be patient; we should be deliberate; and we should be alert to openings from the Soviet side. Given the strength of the Soviet "peace offensive," our positions should

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also enable us to assume the strongest possible public posture. It must always be evident that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that is impeding progress toward agreements.

In INF, we should: (1) adhere to the arms control criteria we have established; (2) demonstrate to the Soviets and western publics that we are seriously searching for an agreement; and (3) undertake the necessary preparations for initial INF deployments at the end of the year.

In START, we should hold firm to the new conceptual framework that underlies our proposal, with its emphasis on substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We should continue to negotiate seriously, taking as our point of departure the fact that the Soviets appear to have accepted the principle of reductions.

Prospects for agreements in START and INF before the end of 1984 are highly problematical; nevertheless, we should continue to press the Soviets for early progress on the basis of our proposals. We should also urge new Soviet movement in other arms control areas -- in MBFR, in CSCE, in CBMs and in our proposals for verification improvements to the TTBT and the PNET. In MBFR we are now studying ways to break the deadlock over data. In CSCE, the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

We should keep the pressure on Moscow for serious responses to our proposals in these areas, to keep the onus for lack of progress on the Soviet Union. We will be negotiating in good faith. But if it is not possible to achieve agreements, it will be important to have maintained the high standards of your approach to arms control and to have won the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that was to blame.

B. Regional Issues

Our minimum objective over the next few years is to ensure that there is no new successful aggression by the Soviet Union or its allies in the Third World. This will require that we follow through on the security commitments we have made to Third World friends and allies and that we remain ready to use American military strength to keep the peace. It may also require that we reinforce warnings to the Soviet Union

11

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-5-

concerning the consequences of unacceptable behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MIGs to Nicaragua.

The fact that we have engaged Moscow on key regional issues -- particularly Afghanistan and Southern Africa -- positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process in the intermediate term. In this connection, we should consider ways of using our bilateral dialogue to move the Soviet Union towards constructive involvement in negotiations that might lead to acceptable settlements of these issues. A litmus test of Soviet seriousness in response to our concerns would be whether they are moving seriously toward real pullback from one of the inroads gained in the 1970s.

C. Human Rights and Western Values

We should continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: release of prisoners of conscience including Anatoliy Shcharanskiy; resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation; and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our objective should be to have achieved significant progress on one or more of these fronts by the end of 1984. Where it would enhance the chances of success, our focus should be on private diplomacy leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We also want to increase our ideological impact inside the Soviet Union through expanded exchange programs and access of Americans to Soviet society.

In this area we must recognize that there is a natural tension between open discussion of and attacks on Soviet misdeeds and quiet discussion that will produce results on specifics. The Soviets never tire of suggesting that things are better accomplished in the shadows when it comes to human rights. On the other hand, they also know that we neither can nor want simply to turn off our public expressions of indignation and support for freedom. As we proceed, there will thus be a constant interplay between the public approach for which our values call and quiet diplomacy focussed on results. This interplay means that human rights issues must be handled in a somewhat special way.

In connection with human rights, the dilemmas of our Poland policy are likely to become more acute. On the one hand, we cannot relax our insistence that real improvement in our relations with Poland can take place only if there is improve-

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12

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ment in the human rights situation in that country. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly evident that prospects for a revival of the Solidarity period are dim for the foreseeable future. There is no certain prescription for resolving this dilemma, given the limitations of our influence over events in Poland. Nevertheless, our Poland policy must continue to be based on determination to support the Polish people in their desire to exercise fundamental human rights -- with the kind of rewards for specific human rights progress which you set forth in your December speech.

D. Economic Relations

Our primary objective over the next year should be to develop and begin to implement a new framework for East-West economic relations; this would ensure that Western economic strength does not contribute to Soviet military power or subsidize the Soviet economy. It would also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take in the area of bilateral economic relations is geared to our overall strategy for US-Soviet relations.

US-Soviet Bilateral Dialogue

Bilateral dialogue with the Soviets has an important place in this overall strategy. Our exchanges with the Soviets are a constant testing process, in which we probe for possible new Soviet flexibility on the issues, while insisting that real progress must involve concrete Soviet actions to address our concerns. These exchanges put us in control of that process -- in a position to bring it to a halt at every step if the Soviets are unwilling to proceed with real give-and-take. In particular, they allow us to ensure that our dialogue with Moscow does not generate momentum toward a summit that would be difficult to rein in, should we find it in our interest do so. Further, these exchanges permit us to make sure that anything we are prepared to do is reciprocated. Finally, they give us a greater capacity to control international events, by reaffirming to the Soviets and others that we intend to play a role commensurate with our renewed strength and a self-confidence. An active US-Soviet dialogue will be critical to our efforts to maintain allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet "peace offensive." And if the Soviet leadership does conclude that it must seriously address our concerns, there should be an active bilateral dialogue underway to enable us to exploit fully this opportunity to advance U.S. interests.

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-7-

We now need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue, and if so how. If we proceed in this direction, we will inevitably arouse concerns that we are returning to business-as-usual, and generate charges that our Soviet policy is more bark than bite. I believe that these problems are manageable, because we will not relax our insistence on balance and Soviet performance as we proceed. Continuing to work from the US rather than the Soviet agenda, and to require deeds rather than just words, is the way to manage the problem, but we should recognize it will remain with us.

If that makes sense to you, I have some ideas about next steps. My thought would be to see Dobrynin again and present him with a four-part work program of specifics covering each of the areas on the US agenda: arms control, regional issues, human rights and bilateral topics. This would serve to drive home to him that old bilateral agreements and arms control are not and cannot be the only central issues in US-Soviet relations if we are to achieve serious progress. Furthermore, the specifics would challenge the Soviets to concrete responses, as part of the testing process we envisage:

-- Arms Control: I could offer to discuss START/INF issues with Gromyko at a meeting soon after the current round of Geneva negotiations ends, making clear that I would of course address our overall agenda and not just arms control; I would say we want to work more intensively on MBFR, without further elaboration; I would point to TTBT verification improvements and nuclear CBM's where we have introduced specific proposals; and I would be downbeat on prospects for reviving the defunct arms control negotiations for which the Soviets are pushing.

-- Regional Issues: I could note we are still looking at Southern Africa for positive Soviet action; reiterate our basic positions on Afghanistan (total Soviet withdrawal, Afghan independence and self-determination, return of refugees); and offer to send Ambassador Art Hartman to see Gromyko's Deputy again for another routine exchange of information and views of the Middle East. Such discussions provide a useful and low-cost means of keeping the Soviet at bay on this issue in our bilateral relationship.

-- Human Rights: After reiterating your strong interest in human rights and your preference for "quiet diplomacy," I would welcome the message on the Embassy Pentecostals,

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but indicate that we still face the practical problem of how to convince the families to take up the offer; refer to indications that movement on Shcharanskiy now seems possible; and suggest serious and confidential talks about what might be possible on human rights in connection with CSCE at Madrid, where the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

-- Bilateral Issues: Here several alternatives are possible. I could say we propose beginning with a single step both sides can agree is useful and which you approved in NSDD-75 -- negotiation of a new cultural exchanges agreement -- and have the rest of the bilateral issues we talked about earlier under review. I could also suggest that we would be prepared to renew discussions on opening a US Consulate in Kiev and a Soviet Consulate in New York. This could give us an invaluable listening post and do little for the Soviets (because of their UN Mission). The disadvantage of both the cultural agreement and the Kiev/New York consulates is that we would be undoing Afghanistan sanctions. The advantage is that in both cases we would be improving our access to Soviet society. I will, of course, adjust what I say to Dobrynin on these bilateral issues to your view of how significant a signal we wish to send Moscow.

Conclusion

The next few years will be a period of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviets. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for further progress toward a more stable, if competitive, US-Soviet relationship. Bilateral exchanges are an important part of it, but only a part. The approach outlined above would protect our security interests while establishing realistic benchmarks by which to measure progress. But it can succeed only if we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach you have established these past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to see an improvement in the relationship on those terms. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part in good faith, and the responsibility for a continuation of the present tensions will rest squarely with them.

4

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

II 90063 16

171388

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 19, 1983

To: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz
Subject: US-Soviet Relations in 1983

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-23-464-8
BY KDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

The recent NSPG discussion of US-Soviet relations underscored the fact that increased Soviet activism since Andropov's rise to power confronts us with a situation requiring strength, imagination and energy. This memo sets forth a strategy for countering this new Soviet activism by using an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the US-Soviet relationship is possible. Even if no improvement ultimately takes place, the dialogue itself would strengthen our ability to manage the relationship and keep the diplomatic initiative in our hands.

As we proceed, we must keep in mind that our challenge is not to launch a bold, new initiative, but to build on the good beginning we have made in the patient, steady, yet creative management of a long-term adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. I look forward to an early opportunity to discuss this topic with you in greater detail.

Enduring Features of US-Soviet Competition: The US-Soviet competition has deep roots in the fundamentally different nature of the two societies and in Moscow's readiness to use its growing military power in ways that threaten our security. Thus there is no realistic scenario for a breakthrough to amicable relations with the Soviet Union.

To be sure, the Soviet system is beset by serious weaknesses. But it would be a mistake to assume that the Soviet capacity for competition with us will diminish at any time during your Presidency. While recognizing the adversarial nature of our relationship with Moscow, we must not rule out the possibility that firm U.S. policies could help induce the kind of changes in Soviet behavior that would make an improvement in relations possible.

We have made considerable progress toward a more effective Soviet policy through our long-term rearmament program, actions to revitalize our Alliances, a new ideological offensive on behalf of our fundamental values, and arms control proposals that have made clear our seriousness in the search for peace.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

The Challenge of US-Soviet Relations in 1983: There is already evidence of greater foreign policy energy and sophistication under Andropov, and the Soviets will clearly be on the offensive in 1983. In Europe, we can expect that the Soviets will make the fullest possible use of Western hopes raised by the succession to redouble their appeals to Western publics on issues such as INF. In Asia, Moscow will use renewed talks with the Chinese to press its diplomatic offensive, while hinting at new flexibility on Afghanistan. I believe that we can best preempt this increased Soviet maneuvering with increased diplomatic and public activism of our own, including through an intensified dialogue with Moscow. If this dialogue does not result in improved US-Soviet relations, the onus will rest clearly on Moscow; if it leads to actual improvement, all the better.

Preconditions for Effective Dialogue: To proceed with an intensified dialogue while protecting our security interests, we need to fulfill the following preconditions: (1) continued rebuilding of American economic and military strength; (2) continued revitalization of our Alliances; (3) stabilization of relations with China; (4) continued regional peacekeeping efforts (Middle East and CBI); and (5) continued competition in ideas.

The Purposes of Intensified US-Soviet Dialogue: Such a dialogue could serve our interests by: (1) probing for new Soviet flexibility (get Andropov to put his money where his mouth is); (2) controlling events (reaffirming our determination to play a central role on all issues while preventing opening of gaps between us and our Allies); (3) maintaining Allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet "peace offensive".

Substance of the Dialogue: As we intensify dialogue, it is neither necessary nor advisable to abandon the policy framework we have established. We must continue to insist that US-Soviet dialogue address the full range of our concerns about Soviet behavior: the military buildup, international expansionism, and human rights violations. We must be prepared for evolution of our substantive positions in the give and take of negotiations, but we must not lower our basic requirements for improved US-Soviet relations.

A. Arms Control: We must not abandon the high standards we have set for potential agreements -- real reductions, equality in the important measures of military capability, verifiability, and enhanced stability. We must at the same time win the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that is impeding progress toward agreements.

Our most formidable arms control challenge will be in INF: at stake is whether or not we can sustain the integrity and vitality of the Western Alliance. In START, we should hold firm on the

conceptual framework of our approach, including substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We must negotiate seriously, taking as the point of departure the apparent Soviet willingness to accept the principle of reductions.

B. Regional Issues: The fact that we have engaged Moscow on regional issues -- Afghanistan and southern Africa -- positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process this year. Given the many signals we have heard on Afghanistan, we should test Soviet intentions by another round of our bilateral talks, and possibly by tabling a bold framework for a comprehensive settlement.

We must also deal effectively with the Soviet "Asian offensive" by adding substance to the US-PRC dialogue and holding firm on our requirements for a Kampuchean settlement. This will be one of the objectives of my China trip.

On other issues, we may wish to renew bilateral discussions with Moscow on Namibia/Angola to press for Cuban troop withdrawal. In some cases, we may need to reinforce warnings about possible unacceptable Soviet behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MiGs to Nicaragua. In the Middle East, we want to continue to avoid dialogue that could help Moscow regain a role in the peace process.

C. Human Rights and Western Values: We must continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: relief of prisoners of conscience, resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation, and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our focus should be on private diplomacy leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We must also press our democracy offensive and ensure that human rights remains a major component of our policy toward Poland and in the CSCE context.

D. Economic Relations: Any steps we take must not contribute to Soviet military power, subsidize the Soviet economy, or undercut our efforts to develop a new framework for East-West economic relations. We must also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take is geared to our overall US-Soviet strategy. A possible mechanism for managing these pressures would be to restore government-to-government economic contacts through a session of the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC).

E. Bilateral Relations: Small steps have a modest but real role to play in the relationship, and we should seek opportunities to use them. We should be careful to ensure that benefit is mutual and reciprocal and that our actions advance our objective of broadening access to Soviet society. We could implement Charlie Wick's suggestion to negotiate a new umbrella cultural agreement; this would

prevent Soviet cultural groups from making their own arrangements with U.S. sponsors, while denying us reciprocal access to the USSR.

The Process of Dialogue: We should begin to put in place the building blocks for a productive summit, but without committing ourselves prematurely. Four levels of dialogue should be considered:

--Summitry: The dialogue process should be constructed to lead to a summit if relations warrant, but without initially defining a summit as the only possible outcome. Should we later decide on a US-Soviet summit, you should probably meet with the Chinese first.

--Ministerial-Level Contacts: We could consider another meeting between Gromyko and me, possibly in Moscow if a meeting with Andropov could be guaranteed. Another option would be a neutral site. We might also consider a possible Weinberger-Ustinov meeting.

--Dialogue through Ambassadors: We should make maximum use of both Dobrynin and Art Hartman, and possibly try to regularize their access to Gromyko and me. We might also recall Art for consultations this spring and send him back with a message from you to Andropov.

--Dialogue between "Departments and Desks": We could accept Dobrynin's proposal of intensified dialogue between specialists on US-Soviet relations from the State Department and the Soviet MFA.

Conclusion: In sum, 1983 will be a year of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for an intensified dialogue with Moscow along the lines I have described. Such a dialogue would protect our security interests while giving the Soviets incentives to address our concerns -- as long as we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach we have established over the past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to satisfy our criteria for an improvement in the relationship. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part, and the responsibility for continued tensions will rest squarely with Moscow.

National Security Council
The White House

570 ^{NO}

'83 MAR -8 P7:30

Package #

90254

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>separate copy</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action B-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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171389	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SHULTZ'S MEMO TO REAGAN	2	3/8/1983	B1

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The White House

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Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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DEX #

DTG 050042Z MAR 83

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1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM POINDEXTER / SAN FRANCISCO

TOR/050457Z MAR 83

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171390 MEMO

1 3/2/1983 B1

P. DOBRIANSKY THROUGH C. TYSON TO W.
CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 4, 1983

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR 748-23-46-7-5

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/03

SUBJECT: Appointment Request: Ambassador Arthur Hartman

I do not concur with the recommendation made by Paula Dobriansky and Roger Robinson that the President meet with Ambassador Hartman. Unless the President has made a regular policy of routine meetings with Ambassadors, there does not appear to be a compelling reason why he should take the time for such a meeting.

Although there has been a leadership change in the USSR with a few minor shifts of emphasis in domestic policy that are not out of the ordinary, nothing has occurred that is of such significance that would warrant a special briefing of the President.

Unless the State Department can furnish some more compelling reasons, such as recommendations for new courses of action or the presentation of policy dilemmas that require Presidential-level attention, I see no particular benefit for the proposed meeting.

26



~~SECRET~~

1364

27

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

White House Use Only, Approved, 1997
By COB NARA, Date 12/15/15

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Arthur Hartman
(U.S. Ambassador to Moscow)

PURPOSE: To brief the President on the situation
in the Soviet Union

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman has valuable information
to impart to the President about the current
situation in the USSR and U.S.-Soviet
relations -- leadership changes, new
domestic policies and more vigorous foreign
affairs initiatives.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Meeting with the President on October 1,
1982.

DATE AND TIME: 9:30 a.m.; March 9, 1983 DURATION: Open

LOCATION: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs William P. Clark
Ambassador Arthur Hartman

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Ambassador Hartman will brief the President.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking Points to be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open

RECOMMENDED BY: National Security Council
Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: William P. Clark

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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II



88 P PII 05

8305803 1364 29

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


February 28, 1983

SITE: 140004

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request - Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

Our Ambassador to the USSR, Arthur Hartman, will be in Washington March 7-11 for consultations. He would like appointments with the President and with you to discuss recent developments in US-Soviet relations. Ambassador Hartman possesses a unique vantage point on the Soviet leadership and we feel that it would be especially valuable for the President and for you to review with him the state of our relations with the Andropov regime, and to discuss possible directions for US policy. We recommend that you and the President meet with the Ambassador.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8390352

30

RECEIVED 23 MAR 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM NIXON, RICHARD M

DOCDATE 04 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUMMIT

ANDROPOV, YURIY

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: CY OF NIXON LTR TO SHULTZ RE POSSIBLE SUMMIT MTG W/ ANDROPOV

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

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DTG 120128Z MAR 83

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TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT/CAMP DAVID MD/TOR:

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

CLASSIFICATION

RICHARD NIXON

26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY

3-4-83

Dear Judge -

I thought you might
be interested in some of these
observations - having in mind
that you probably have
some of these considerations in
mind already -

With warm regards -



DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90352

33

NLRR 748-23-46-84

BY 1008 NARA DATE 4/8/13

RICHARD NIXON
March 4, 1983

171392

26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY

EYES ONLY

Dear George

In a private letter I sent to the President prior to his trip to California, I set forth some general ideas with regard to his possible summit meeting with Andropov. Being aware of his admirable attitude that political considerations should in no way affect his decision as to whether or when a summit should be scheduled, I am passing on some observations on that issue which might be taken into consideration before a final decision is reached.

I agree with the idealistic dictum that foreign policy should be above politics and that the only test of a policy is whether it serves the interests of the country and the cause of peace. What we must all recognize, however, is that the President's re-election is absolutely indispensable to the cause of peace and the interests of the country. This means, therefore, that what is best for the President politically, as far as timing and substance of a summit is concerned, is best for the country as well.

I gather from press reports that a Reagan/Andropov summit will take place some time this year or next. If that decision has been made, I would strongly urge that consideration be given to these thoughts with regard to substance and timing.

First as to substance, I totally disagree with

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Page 2
The Honorable George Shultz
March 4, 1983

those who believe that a quickie get-acquainted summit should be scheduled for some time in the next few months with the thought in mind that it would take the steam out of the peace at any price movement both in Europe and in the U.S., and on the further ground that the very fact that the two leaders meet and get to know each other can reduce the possibility of conflict coming from one miscalculating the intentions or will of the other.

Johnson's summit with Kosygin at Glasboro in 1968 shows why such a summit would be a disaster, both substantively and politically. The two met with no agenda, discussed a number of issues and reached no agreements, and later met with the press and talked glowingly about how both had grandchildren and were united in a desire to see that their grandchildren grew up in a peaceful world. The U.S. media lapped this up and practically went bonkers with euphoria. As a result of the publicity, Johnson went up ten points in the polls the following month. Two months later, he dropped down twelve points.

There is a lesson in this. Where a summit produces spirit but has no substance, the spirit evaporates very quickly.

To those who would argue that this meeting would simply be a preliminary to a formal summit sometime next year, the answer is that the first meeting and only the first meeting will command dramatic and total news attention. It must be set up in a way that it will produce substance which will not be washed away by the next week's news story.

As far as substance is concerned, I strongly feel that arms control, while an important element of the summit, should not be built up as the primary subject for consideration. It is by far

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Page 3
The Honorable George Shultz
March 4, 1983

the most complicated and difficult issue on which to find agreement. And beyond that, even the most far-reaching arms control agreement in history - without progress on political issues - will not produce the peace that the arms control lobby predicts. Even if agreement were reached on cutting nuclear arms in half, both sides would still have enough left to destroy each other and most of the rest of the world if their political differences erupt into armed conflict. That is why this summit, like our first one in 1972, should have a broad agenda. Agreement may not be reached on political issues like Soviet adventurism in Latin America, Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Mideast. But even though agreement is not reached on such issues, progress can be made in reducing the possibility of armed conflict over resolving our disagreements.

In this same vein, I strongly feel that economic issues should have high priority. To the extent possible, the Soviets should be given an economic stake in peace. Having in mind our justifiable opposition to trade involving technology which could strengthen them militarily, we must have in mind that if we have something substantial to take away the next time they misbehave, we will have a much greater chance to influence them than was the case when they went into Poland and our bilateral trade was a miniscule two billion dollars a year as compared with Europe's forty billion dollars a year. Equally important are the steps that can be taken to strengthen the processes like the hot line, which will reduce the possibility of accidental war, as well as a program for annual summits, which in itself will inhibit the Soviets from engaging in adventurist activities prior to an upcoming summit.

As far as timing is concerned, political considerations must be taken into account. Generally speaking, the later it could be held the better, provided it is not so close to the election

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36

Page 4
The Honorable George Shultz
March 4, 1983

to be vulnerable to the charges of political manipulation. Under no circumstances should it be scheduled in the near future. If the summit is held in 1983, the positive results will be forgotten by the time November 1984 rolls around and the nit-pickers will have had time to cut it up. It is ridiculous to suggest that the President needs it now. Let the up-turn in the economy be the news for the next few months.

From a substantive standpoint, to have a successful summit months will be needed to prepare the agenda and to work out the tentative agreements which will be negotiated finally when the two leaders meet.

A word with regard to where. It should not, under any circumstances, be in Geneva or Vienna. The place to have it is in Moscow. This makes much bigger news and above all it gives the President an opportunity to have a massive impact on the Soviet people when he speaks to them on television.

The following scenario might be considered: start private talks immediately on a secret basis as to agenda, timing, etc. Make a public announcement this summer setting a date in 1984 for a meeting in Moscow.

From the time the announcement is made, the Democratic Presidential candidates will be inhibited from getting out too far on a limb on the nuclear freeze issue for fear that the rug might be pulled out from under them. Democrats from the House and Senate leadership should be taken along only if preliminary discussions indicate that the summit is relatively sure of success and will leave them no choice but to support it.

Two final thoughts. The agenda at the meeting in Williamsburg with our European friends could be expanded to include East/West issues generally so

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Page 5
The Honorable George Shultz
March 4, 1983

that the President could go to Moscow justifiably claiming that we had talked to our friends before we talked to our potential adversaries. The same, of course, goes for the Chinese. Assuming that the Prime Minister comes here, his visit should be scheduled before announcement of the Soviet summit. I have an uneasy feeling that this must be handled in a very gingerly way with the Chinese. If they see us moving too eagerly toward detente with Moscow, they may move too sharply in that direction themselves.

One final political thought. Virtually all of the Democratic candidates made fatuous fools of themselves on the nuclear issue in their San Francisco meeting. Each tried to one-up the other by saying that his first act as President or even as President-Elect, would be to meet with Andropov and agree to a nuclear freeze. They are way out there on a limb. I would leave them there for awhile and then saw it off piece by piece. The announcement of the summit meeting will mute their criticism and agreements reached at the summit will isolate all of them except those who want to cave completely to Soviet demands and have peace at any price.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bill Clark. Beyond the two of you, I would appreciate it if it could be closely held.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



The Honorable
George Shultz

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

178

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171393

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2729 07831 DTG: 051355Z MAR 83 PSN: 075477
SIT155 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 064/2006Z

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS IN 1978, EXPRESSED THEIR FIRM CONVICTION THAT A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AT THIS TIME WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO HIM AND REQUESTED THAT HE MAKE ONE.

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTCHECKLIST----- EM-(10N)Y PRESS

5. COMMENT: DESPITE THE VIEWS OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS, WE STRONGLY QUESTION THE UTILITY AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME OF ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY ONE REPEATING THE 1978 DECLARATION OF ANATOLIY'S INNOCENCE. THERE RECENTLY HAVE BEEN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOVIET INTIMATIONS THAT THEY MAY HAVE SOMETHING IN THE WORKS--ANDROPOV'S LETTER TO MARCHAIS (REF. A), WHICH EVIDENTLY STATED THAT, WHILE SOVIET LAW PROVIDES FOR THE REDUCTION OF PRISON SENTENCES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IS NOT AIDED BY NOISY CAMPAIGNS AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES; AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S FEBRUARY 10 MEETING WITH SERGEI KONDRASHEV (REF. B), WHO SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR SHCHARANSKIY TO APPLY FOR A PARDON; AND THE FEBRUARY 21 TASS DISPATCH (REF. C), THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATION THAT SHCHARANSKIY MIGHT BE PARDONED. THESE INTIMATIONS MAY WELL SIMPLY BE ATTEMPTS TO QUIET WESTERN VOICES; HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT ON SHCHARANSKIY, A HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENT COULD COMPLICATE MATTERS. IN OUR VIEW, ANY SOVIET DECISION TO FREE SHCHARANSKIY MUST BE BASED ON THEIR ABILITY TO SAVE FACE AND TO PRESERVE THE "CORRECTNESS" OF THEIR ORIGINAL FINDING ON SHCHARANSKIY--

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-46-9-3

BY COB NARA DATE 4/8/03

ROUTINE
DE RUEHMO #2729 0641355
R 051355Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4044

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 1024
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SHUM, UR

SUBJECT: SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER AND BROTHER REQUEST
- STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

REFS: (A) STATE 002671, (B) MADRID 01598 (NOTAL),
- (C) MOSCOW 02148 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT HE WAS GUILTY. A HIGH-LEVEL PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SHCHARANSKIY'S INNOCENCE COULD CAUSE THEM TO BACK AWAY AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME. END COMMENT.
ZIMMERMANN

2. DURING MARCH 3 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER (SEPTEL), SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER IDA MILGROM AND BROTHER LEONID ARRIVED JUST AFTER MRS. MILGROM HAD A MEETING AT KGB HEADQUARTERS WITH AN OFFICIAL WHO HAD REFUSED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF. MILGROM INFORMED US THAT HER INTERLOCUTOR HAD TOLD HER THAT A FUTURE MEETING BETWEEN ANATOLIY AND HER "DEPENDS ON HIS BEHAVIOR" AND THAT HE IS FEELING BETTER AND IS TAKING MEDICINE. IN ANATOLIY'S RECENT LETTER TO HER, SHE CONTINUED, HE HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD WRITE HER AGAIN ON FEBRUARY 21. WHEN

MOSCOW 2729 07831 DTG: 051355Z MAR 83 PSN: 075477

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SHE ASKED THE KGB OFFICIAL ABOUT THIS LETTER, HE REPLIED THAT ANATOLIY ACTUALLY HAD WRITTEN HER ONLY ON FEBRUARY 28 AND, AS OF MARCH 3, THE LETTER STILL WAS UNDERGOING CENSORSHIP. HE ASSURED HER, HOWEVER, THAT IT SOON WOULD BE PUT INTO THE MAIL TO HER AND THAT SHE THEREFORE SHOULD RECEIVE IT WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.

3. MILGROM ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE KGB OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HER THAT HER LETTER OF FEBRUARY 14 TO ANDROPOV HAD NOT REACHED THE GENERAL SECRETARY. RATHER, THIS OFFICIAL SAID, IT HAD BEEN INTERCEPTED AS "INAPPROPRIATE" FOR ANDROPOV'S ATTENTION.

4. MILGROM, BONNER AND LEONID SHCHARANSKIY, RECALLING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

39

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2709 07831 DTG: 051027Z MAR 83 PSN: 075005
SIT158 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 064/1305Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHMO #2709 0641028
O 051027Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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NLRR 748-13-4610-1
BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/0

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4022
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AMEMBASSY MAORID 2240
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 02709

EXDIS

MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE - AMB. KAMPELMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SHUM, UR, NO

SUBJECT: SAKHAROV ACCEPTS NORWEGIAN OFFER TO EMIGRATE

REF: OSLO 0991 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING A MARCH 3 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER, WE GAVE HER A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT SAKHAROV IN THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVE OSMUND FAREMO AND FOREIGN MINISTER STRAY AND ASKED HER ABOUT SAKHAROV'S PLANS TO EMIGRATE. BONNER REPLIED THAT SHE HAD HEARD ON THE BBC THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD INVITED SAKHAROV TO LIVE IN NORWAY AND WANTED TO MEET WITH NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT TO DISCUSS THIS OFFER. BONNER ADDED THAT SAKHAROV WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO AN OFFER FROM THE NORWEGIAN GOVERN-

MOSCOW 2709 07831 DTG: 051027Z MAR 83 PSN: 075005

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MENT THROUGH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO HIM TO LIVE IN NORWAY.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY ON MARCH 3 WE INFORMED THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY OF BONNER'S DESIRE FOR A MEETING, AND MET ON MARCH 4 WITH A NORWEGIAN EMBOFF TO BRIEF NORWEGIANS FULLY ON WHAT WE KNOW OF SAKHAROV'S RESPONSE AND TO MAKE PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS. NORWEGIAN EMBOFF INFORMED US THAT THEY ARE CABLING OSLO, AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SEE BONNER EARLY NEXT WEEK.

EMBOFFS MET AGAIN WITH BONNER AT MIDDAY MARCH 4. AT THIS MEETING SHE SHOWED THEM A COPY OF A LETTER FROM SAKHAROV TO THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH SHE PLANS TO GIVE TO NORWEGIAN EMBOFF. THE ORIGINAL, BONNER CLAIMS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

40

Package # _____

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TAG

MAR 05 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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Sensitive

TO: NSC-
F.O. - Mr. Clark

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Executive Secretary

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-5 MAR 83 11 15Z Department of State INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 02171 01 OF 03 051033Z
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 02171

NODIS/SPHINX

SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

USINF EYES ONLY FROM NITZE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-4671-0

BY COB NARA DATE 10/4/83

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, INF
SUBJECT: NITZE-KVITSINSKIY LUNCHEON CONVERSATION,
-- MARCH 4, 1983

1. ~~SECRET~~--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BELOW ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF NITZE'S PRIVATE CONVERSATION DURING LUNCHEON AT THE SOVIET MISSION.

K: WHEN DO YOU EXPECT TO MAKE A MOVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

N: I HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY NEW INSTRUCTIONS AND DO NOT
-- KNOW WHETHER I WILL.

K: IF YOU DON'T, THERE IS VERY LITTLE LEFT TO TALK
-- ABOUT.

N: WE PROPOSE TO REBUT YOUR PLENARY STATEMENTS ON THE
-- BRITISH AND FRENCH ISSUE. I DID SO IN PART IN THE
-- LAST POST-PLENARY BUT OUR SIDE SHOULD ALSO DO SO IN

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 02171 01 OF 03 051033Z

-- A PLENARY. WE ALSO WISH TO SUMMARIZE OUR POSITION
-- ON VERIFICATION,

K: BUT HOW DO WE MOVE FORWARD ON THE MAIN ISSUE?

N: I HAVE EXPLORED A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE APPROACHES WITH
-- YOU. ONE WAS TO RESUME OUR WALK IN THE WOODS
-- TECHNIQUE. ANOTHER WAS TO CONSIDER EACH SIDE'S
-- CRITERIA AS BEING THOSE WHICH IT WOULD USE IN JUDGING
-- A CONCRETE PACKAGE OF PROVISIONS, BUT WHICH NEITHER
-- SIDE WOULD EXPECT THE OTHER TO AGREE TO. PERHAPS
-- WHEN ASSESSING A COMPLEX PACKAGE, A CRITERION WHICH
-- HAD APPEARED TO BE ABSOLUTE WHEN CONSIDERED IN
-- ISOLATION MIGHT BE SEEN, WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS AND
-- IN A CERTAIN CONTEXT, TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS IMPORTANT
-- THAN SOME OTHER OBJECTIVE OR PRINCIPLE. IN THE FINAL
-- ANALYSIS, ONE CAN ONLY JUDGE SUCH THINGS
-- PRAGMATICALLY. BUT TO GO FORWARD WITH ANY SUCH
-- APPROACH REQUIRES SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT BY BOTH
-- SIDES.

K: MOSCOW THINKS IT HAS GONE AS FAR AS IT CAN WITH THE
-- 162 EQUAL TO BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES APPROACH,

N: THAT POSITION REPRESENTS NO MOVEMENT ON YOUR SIDE
-- FROM YOUR JANUARY 1982 POSITION. GRANTED, THERE
-- HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT ON THE US SIDE SINCE THEN.
-- BUT A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY SUCH AS OURS HAS TO PUT
-- FORWARD A WHOLLY REASONABLE INITIAL APPROACH.
-- OTHERWISE IT IS ATTACKED BY THOSE WHO THINK WE ARE
-- BEING UNFAIR TO THE RUSSIANS. I AM SURE THAT NO
-- SOVIET NEWSPAPER WOULD ATTACK YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR
-- BEING UNFAIR TO THE AMERICANS.

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 02171 01 OF 03 051033Z

K: NO, THE SITUATION IS THE SAME IN MY COUNTRY, BUT NOT
-- THROUGH THE PRESS. THERE ARE THOSE WHO ATTACK
-- WHATEVER POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN FROM MANY SIDES.

N: IN ANY CASE, MOVEMENT BY BOTH SIDES IS REQUIRED IF
-- WE ARE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT.

K: NOT ONE PERSON IN THE POLITBURO FAVORS GIVING UP ON
-- COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES.

N: NOT ONE NATO COUNTRY FAVORS COMPENSATING THE USSR
-- FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES.

K: YOU SHOULDN'T AGAIN REFER TO GROMYKO NOT HAVING
-- RAISED COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES
-- IN HIS OCTOBER 1981 DISCUSSIONS WITH HAIG. GROMYKO
-- IS MOST PERSISTENT IN ALWAYS RAISING THIS ISSUE
-- AND SENSITIVE ABOUT IT.

N: YES, I SHOULDN'T HAVE PUT IT THE WAY I DID. I DID
-- LOOK AT THE RECORD OF THE 1980 PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS
-- AND SPURGEON KEENEY MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT WE WERE
-- NOT AGREEING TO COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH
-- FORCES. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT YOUR SIDE WAS AMBIGUOUS
-- AS TO HOW IT THOUGHT COMPENSATION SHOULD BE ACHIEVED.

K: I HAVE LOOKED AT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR NEGOTIATORS,
-- AND IF THEY DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE EXPECTED
-- COMPENSATION, THEY VIOLATED THEIR INSTRUCTIONS.

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-5 Department of State

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 02171 02 OF 03 051036Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8879

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 02171

NODIS/SPHINX

N: OBVIOUSLY I DIDN'T SEE THEIR INSTRUCTIONS. I DID
-- READ WHAT THEY WERE RECORDED AS HAVING SAID.

K: BUT IN ANY CASE, HOW DO WE MOVE FORWARD?

N: I DON'T SEE ANY CLEAR WAY. I REGRET WE CAN'T.
-- RESUME THE "WALK IN THE WOODS" PROCEDURE, BUT YOU
-- SAY YOU CAN NOW ONLY WORK UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM
-- MOSCOW.

K: THE TROUBLE WITH THAT PROCEDURE WAS THAT IT LEAKED.
-- MY OPPONENTS IN MOSCOW SAID IT WOULD LEAK AND I
-- SAID IT WOULDN'T. WHEN IT DID, THAT HURT ME. I
-- HAD NEVER THOUGHT MY SIDE WOULD AGREE TO THE FULL
-- PACKAGE, BUT I THOUGHT IT COULD BE USED TO WEAVE A
-- POSITIVE THREAD. I PERSONALLY WAS HURT WHEN THE
-- WALK IN THE WOODS LEAKED.

N: BOTH MY GOVERNMENT AND I TRIED HARD TO AVOID ANY
-- LEAK. THE FIRST LEAK WAS IN PARIS TO THE CHICAGO
-- TRIBUNE.

K: THE FRENCH HAVE A POSITIVE INTEREST IN PREVENTING
-- AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

N: LET'S RETURN TO THE SUBJECT OF WHERE DO WE GO NOW.

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 02171 02 OF 03 051036Z

K: MY SIDE WON'T MOVE ON THE QUESTION OF BRITISH AND
-- FRENCH COMPENSATION.

N: NEITHER WILL MINE.

K: WHAT HAPPENS, THEN?
N: WE KEEP ON NEGOTIATING.

K: BUT TIME RUNS OUT.

N: AND WHY?

K: WE GET TO THE END OF THE YEAR.

N: WE CAN STILL KEEP ON NEGOTIATING.

K: BUT THE SITUATION WILL HAVE CHANGED.

N: ONLY IN THAT THE US WILL HAVE BEGUN DEPLOYMENTS AND
-- YOUR SIDE CAN THEN NO LONGER CLAIM THAT IT IS THE
-- ONLY ONE WITH SUCH WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

K: BUT WE WILL THEN HAVE TO INCREASE OUR DEPLOYMENTS.

N: BY 224 SYSTEMS? YOU CAN THREATEN US WITH SO MANY
-- WEAPONS ALREADY THAT THAT NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL
-- SYSTEMS CAN'T MAKE THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE. YOU
-- REMEMBER MY REFERENCE IN MY LAST PLENARY TO THE
-- DIFFERENCE IN SIGNIFICANCE OF 100 SYSTEMS, A SECOND
-- HUNDRED SYSTEMS, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN
-- ADDITIONAL 500. IN THE CONTEXT OF THREATS TO THE
-- TERRITORY OF THE US OR OF THE USSR WE ARE TALKING

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 02171 02 OF 03 051036Z

-- ON MUCH GREATER NUMBERS.

(IN THE ABSENCE OF A RESPONSE FROM KVITSINSKIY, NITZE CONTINUED WITH A NEW QUESTION.)

N: HAVE YOU HEARD FROM MOSCOW RE OUR PROPOSAL THAT THIS
-- ROUND TERMINATE ON MARCH 29?

K: NO, BUT I THINK IT WILL BE ALL RIGHT. I WILL BE
-- URGED TO INSIST THAT YOU BRING BACK SOMETHING NEW.
-- HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER IF THERE COULD BE
-- SOME CLARIFICATION BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND.
-- IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE END OF THIS ROUND AND
-- THE FIRST OF JUNE, MOSCOW MAY WELL BELIEVE IT
-- NECESSARY TO MAKE CERTAIN DECISIONS.

(KVITSINSKIY THEN RETURNED TO PREVIOUS SUBJECT MATTER.)

K: EVEN THOUGH I WAS HURT BY THE WALK IN THE WOODS, MY
-- AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE WAS NOT REMOVED.

N: MINE HAS NOT BEEN REMOVED EITHER. BUT YOU HAVE MADE
-- IT CLEAR THAT YOU WON'T TALK UNLESS I CAN ASSURE YOU
-- THAT I HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PUT FORWARD WHATEVER
-- I PUT FORWARD.

K: I AM AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS ANY EXPLORATORY IDEAS YOU
-- MIGHT PUT FORWARD, TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY ON SOME,
-- AND TO GET A QUICK RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW ON OTHERS.

~~SECRET~~

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-5 MAR 83

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Department of State 0022

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 02171 03 OF 03 051036Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 02171

NODIS/SPHINX

N: I WILL THINK ABOUT WHAT YOU HAVE SAID AND LET YOU
-- KNOW. I HAVE ONE FURTHER QUESTION WITH RESPECT TO
-- THE TERMINATION OF THIS ROUND AND THE BEGINNING OF
-- THE NEXT. SUPPOSING THAT AFTER THE END OF THIS
-- ROUND AND MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON IT BECAME EVIDENT
-- THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO RESUME EARLY IN
-- MAY RATHER THAN EARLY IN JUNE, WOULD IT PRESENT A
-- PROBLEM TO YOU TO CHANGE THE RESUMPTION DATE?

K: I THINK NOT. NITZE

~~SECRET~~

49

**National Security Council
The White House**

1545

MAR 07 1983

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	<u>2</u>	<u>HAS SEEN</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

*we/Weinberger passed
to Pres. 3/7/83 at
a 4:30 mtg.*

JH

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

7 MAR 19 3

Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

Attached is an advance copy of the 1983 edition of Soviet Military Power for your information.

This new edition includes substantial data on U.S. and Allied forces enhancement as well as some comparative U.S.-USSR and NATO-Warsaw Pact tables.

I plan to present the President with a copy of Soviet Military Power tomorrow. However, the booklet is embargoed until its official release at my news conference on Wednesday, March 9.

Sincerely,



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

171396

CONFIDENTIAL

March 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR 748-23-46-12-9
BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/13

SUBJECT: Spring Grains Consultations with the Soviets

NSC has reviewed and concurs with State's memorandum of February 25, 1983, on Grains Consultations with the Soviets. However, we ask that all position papers for the consultations and USDA/State press guidance be coordinated and cleared through NSC. To ensure that domestic and foreign audiences do not perceive that these routine consultations constitute a renegotiation of the Long-Term Agreement, USDA and State's press guidance should clarify the necessary distinctions.

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

National Security Council
The White House

560
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1220P

Package # 1307

MAR 0 1 1983

<i>Bovine</i>	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>NW</u>	<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

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171397	MEMO	1	2/28/1983	B1
	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE GRAIN CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS			

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United States Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

Washington, D.C. 20520

NLRR 748-234614-7

February 25, 1983

BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/93~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Spring Grains Consultations with the Soviets

The Soviets have proposed to USDA that the semi-annual grains consultations provided for under the Long-Term Grains Agreement (LTA) be held in Moscow March 22-23 or 23-24. We have informed USDA that this is acceptable to us. The U.S. delegation will probably be headed by the new Undersecretary of Agriculture, who has yet to be named. These talks are held on a regular basis semi-annually and are informational in nature rather than policy discussions.

We will, of course, consult with USDA on the preparation of papers and positions for the consultations, in particular with reference to the LTA. The Department's position is that the Polish sanction postponing negotiation of a new LTA is still in effect, that now is not an appropriate time politically to discuss a new LTA, and that the USG has taken no decision as to the future of the LTA.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

56

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES RECEIVED 25 FEB 83 17

12/15/15 6:05

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 25 FEB '83

KEYWORDS: GRAINS

USSR

SUBJECT: GRAINS CONSULTATIONS W/ THE SOVIETS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 28 FEB 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

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COMMENTS

REF# 8305611

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Clark	3/1	In Discussion	3/5	PO
Wheeler	5 MAR 07 1983	Clark approved for signature		
	3/7	Wheeler for memo		index DO, KO, MK

DISPATCH ed 3/7/83

W/ATTCH FILE PK (C)N