

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

USSR (02/21/1983-03/02/1983)

Box: RAC Box 23

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

KDB 12/15/2015

FOIA

Box Number 23

F03-002/5

SKINNER

308

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171366	MEMCON	RE 2/15/83 MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET OFFICIALS (INCL. ATTACHMENT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-1-2	21	2/17/1983	B1
171367	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE GROMYKO'S FEB. 24 PRAVDA INTERVIEW R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-2-1	2	2/25/1983	B1
171368	MEMO	B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE ATTACHED MATERIAL	1	ND	B1
171371	MEMO	COPY OF DOC #171370 (W. CLARK TO L. EAGLEBURGER RE MOST RECENT SOVIET ICBM TEST) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-4-9	1	ND	B1
171373	MEMO	COPY OF DOC #171372, W/SAME NOTATIONS (B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES)	3	2/25/1983	B1
171375	MEMO	UNANNOTATED COPY OF DOC #171372 (B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES)	3	2/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

308

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171369	MEMO	W. CLARK TO L. EAGLEBURGER RE MOST RECENT SOVIET ICBM TEST (DRAFT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-4-9	1	ND	B1
171384	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S	1	2/26/1983	B1
171376	MEMO	B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK	1	ND	B1
171370	MEMO	W. CLARK TO L. EAGLEBURGER RE MOST RECENT SOVIET ICBM TEST R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-4-9	1	ND	B1
171374	MEMO	COPY OF DOC #171372, W/SAME NOTATIONS (B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES)	3	2/25/1983	B1
171372	MEMO	B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES	3	2/25/1983	B1
171377	CABLE	MOSCOW 2287 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-7-6	1	2/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

KDB 12/15/2015

Box Number 23

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

308

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171378	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE SOVIET MESSAGE ON EMBASSY PENTECOSTALISTS (+ ATTACHMENT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-8-5	2	2/28/1983	B1
171379	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY THROUGH C. TYSON TO W. CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST	1	3/2/1983	B1
171380	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-10-2	1	3/4/1983	B1
171381	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-11-1	1	2/28/1983	B1
171382	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET MESSAGE ON EMBASSY PENTECOSTALISTS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-12-0	1	ND	B1
171383	MEMO	ORIGINAL OF DOC #171378 (G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE SOVIET MESSAGE ON EMBASSY PENTECOSTALISTS, + ATTACHMENT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-45-13-9	2	2/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Brian, 2/21

545 II. Route
eyes only copy
to Lenczowski and
Dobriansky. J



171366

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748 23-45-1-2

BY ~~KIX~~ NARA DATE 4/8/13

DATE: February 15, 1983
TIME: 7:00 p.m.-8:15 p.m.
PLACE: The Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS: United States

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV, Department of State

U.S.S.R.

Anatoliy F. DOBRYNIN, Soviet Ambassador
Oleg M. SOKOLOV, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington
Viktor F. ISAKOV, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington

The Secretary said he would briefly summarize the meeting with the President and invited Ambassador Dobrynin to comment if he differed with what the Secretary said.

The President knew of the series of meetings between the Secretary and Dobrynin, and had decided it would be useful were he to meet directly with the Ambassador to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. The President has very definite views, as Dobrynin had discovered; they were not always the views ascribed to him. He had spent longer than the Secretary thought he would; of course Dobrynin had spoken too. The net result was that Dobrynin, for Gorbachev, and the President for himself had agreed that both countries should make a genuine effort to solve problems so that the bilateral relationship could progress. We could not say how far this would go, but we want to improve it. The discussion with the President had covered a four-point agenda.

(1) Arms control has many aspects: START, INF, MBFR, and related SAs. It is an area of great importance, and we should try to identify aspects where progress may be possible. We should be ambitious where we can, for instance on START and INF.

(2) There are a number of regional issues. Dobrynin had mentioned the Middle East, and the President had mentioned Poland, Afghanistan, and Central America. Southern Africa, while perhaps

somewhat different in character, is also important. We are unlikely to be able to resolve our differences; but on some we might do something. We should try to make progress. We had tried on Afghanistan, but without results. Our talks on southern Africa had not been wholly unproductive, but not much had been accomplished. They were more in the nature of informational meetings.

(3) Economic topics perhaps fit best in the framework of bilateral relations, but they also could be looked at on the basis of individual issues.

(4) The President had put great emphasis on human rights. Dobrynin had seen how important these questions were to the President and how important they were to the relationship between the two countries. The President had made very clear that his approach was a quiet one; he wishes to talk, not to have newspaper stories or claims of "victory."

This represents a sweep of the issues discussed; we should try for progress in all areas, recognizing that we cannot do everything at once, but seeing if we can get something done on the agenda across the board. The closing note of both the President and the Ambassador had been that both parties are interested in a genuine effort to improve conditions; Dobrynin, in fact, had expressed optimism that this could happen.

Dobrynin said that, with the addition of working more closely in this channel, the Secretary had given a fair summary.

- - - -

The meeting was the President's idea, the Secretary added, and was not on his calendar. We have no intention of making a statement on it, but knowing how Washington works a question is conceivable. We plan to answer that the meeting took place; that Dobrynin had called on the President with the Secretary, in connection with his series of talks with the Secretary; that the President had suggested the meeting; and that we would have no further comment. Dobrynin said that it is not the Soviet practice to comment on such matters, but what the Secretary had said about the U.S. approach was acceptable.

The Secretary said that with the President, and then together in the car on the return to the Department, he and Dobrynin had talked about a meeting of the Secretary with Gromyko, and then of a meeting of Gromyko with the President at the time of the UNGA. Dobrynin noted that the latter would restore normal practice.

Moreover, the Secretary continued, they had talked about the Secretary's meeting Andropov if the Secretary were to travel to Moscow. They had also discussed Ambassador Hartman's access to people in Moscow, a topic they had talked about before.

- - - -

The Secretary then turned to matters at hand, saying time was too short for him to discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin his Far East trip at length. But, to summarize, he had found Afghanistan and Kampuchea much on people's minds; further, arms control is not just a U.S. and European issue, but is much on minds in Asia as well. Dobrynin asked if this meant the Asians were prepared to take part in arms control, not now perhaps, but in some other forum at some time in the future. He realized the Secretary could not speak for them -- for the Japanese and Chinese -- but wondered whether they would be willing to negotiate in the future. The Secretary replied that he did not get to that point with them. However, he had been impressed in Korea, China and Japan with the interest in what the Soviets are doing. In side meetings his people had with subordinate officials, they were impressed with how much the hosts knew about arms control negotiations underway, and how well informed they were.

- - - -

The Secretary suggested that they go through the work of their staffs on the bilateral lists (attached).

He began with a brief review of the four pages of agreements still in force, saying that he was glad to note the 1973 taxation convention, since it had been his responsibility in the Nixon Administration.

Dobrynin turned to page 5, which lists agreements up for renewal in 1983/1984 (transportation, atomic energy, fisheries, grains, housing, world ocean, economic-industrial-technical cooperation). The Soviets favor continuing these agreements. We could look at them later, or, if the Secretary had comments on all or any of them, he was prepared to discuss them. In any event the Soviets are in favor of renewing them. The U.S. side had added grains to this list; the Soviets had reminded us of the others. On grains, he asked if the U.S. was proposing renewal. The Soviets did not want to force themselves on us; if the U.S. dropped it, they would let it go. The rest they thought worthwhile to renew. If the U.S. thought one or another should be dropped, we should say so. The rest can be sent to the working level for further work.

The Secretary commented that we find the seven agreements generally constructive. Given Dobrynin's statement, we would begin to review them through our interagency process. We would develop positions -- presumably positive -- on each and as this work proceeds we will get back to the Soviets. Dobrynin asked if this meant the basic U.S. intention was positive. The Secretary replied that it did.

Dobrynin said that the third category listed (agreements in force, but where more active implementation would be useful) really had no substance now (agriculture, environment, health, artificial heart). The Soviets would like to invite us to give more life to these agreements. We should consider renewal of working groups, for example. If the Secretary agreed in principle, and after the U.S. had completed its internal process, then we could proceed to meetings between small delegations or work with the Soviet Embassy to put life back into the agreements. There were four of these agreements. If the U.S. was not negative, we could go ahead.

The Secretary said this was a worthwhile field on which to exchange ideas, but there is the question of how far and how fast to proceed, and the question of whether to engage higher level officials in these exchanges. Dobrynin said level is not really a question. It is not a matter for Gromyko and the Secretary. It is a question of letting people who know each other, who are old friends, get together to find out what can be achieved. Agriculture is an example; let our working people find out what can be done -- draw on their experience -- and then report to their superiors.

Dobrynin continued that the Soviets are proposing working groups from Moscow or from here, for an active exchange. This is not a new avenue; it is a matter of restoring substance to agreements now in disuse. No publicity is necessary. Delegations can be sent by the Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, or there can be experts on the environment that sit down together. This is only renewal of what went on before.

The Secretary said it is not a question of who goes where, but there is an issue of level of representation. We will consider the matter and get back to the Soviets at the working level. Dobrynin suggested that the embassies might be the appropriate channel.

Dobrynin turned to the fourth category (agreements expired or in suspense). The Secretary commented that we need to examine further what might be worked on in this category.

Dobrynin noted that civil air, maritime, science and technology, and energy agreements had been proposed by the Soviets; the rest (space, trade, culture, Kama and consulates) by the U.S. The Soviets are prepared to look at all of them. He asked how the Secretary proposed to proceed. The Secretary commented that all were worth reviewing, but without commitment at this point.

Dobrynin said commercial flights under the civil air agreement had been stopped; with regard to the maritime agreement, it is a question of implementation; the U.S. had added the references to the trade, culture, Kama and consulate agreements. What did the Secretary have in mind?

Eagleburger commented that where we added items to the list of agreements from which we are working, it was solely for the purpose of making the list complete. Dobrynin said the intention was to add items to make things more active; what did adding the Trade Agreement mean? Eagleburger said our only purpose was to assure that we had before us a complete list of all agreements -- nothing more than that.

The Secretary commented that all these items have merit; we need to pick and choose among them, and assign priorities. Once this has been done, Dobrynin said, you can instruct the Soviet desk on next steps and we can then talk further.

Dobrynin then turned to the fifth category (regular consultations), which includes Foreign Ministers at the UNGA, pre-UNGA working level, delegations at IAEA meetings, incidents at sea, grains, Nazi war crimes. He suggested that meetings of Foreign Ministers between UNGA sessions should be added. The Secretary commented meetings only once a year is insufficient, and agreed to Dobrynin's suggestion.

On pre-UNGA consultations, Dobrynin noted that these take place between the MFA and State, and asked if we had anything else in mind. Simons noted that our intention was to record what exists; Dobrynin responded that we should also try to move forward.

We are discussing non-proliferation, Dobrynin pointed out. The Secretary said this was a useful step, and we are looking toward another meeting. Simons noted we seem close to agreement on another separate bilateral session in June.

Dobrynin said that the incidents at sea consultations are useful. On the grains consultations, the Soviets agree to them if the LTA is agreed, but they would drop it if not.

Dobrynin then turned to the sixth category (recent consultations) which lists Afghanistan, southern Africa, CSCE, and nuclear non-proliferation. He said the Soviet side agreed to continue all of them.

The Secretary noted we had had consultations on Afghanistan that went nowhere. The UN process is now going on. If it works, fine; we do not need to be involved in everything.

Dobrynin replied that there is no need for a meeting each month, but if we need a meeting we should agree to have one. The matter is now going through the UN. There is no big movement, but things are positive. Still, there is a possibility to continue bilaterally as well. He understood that this was Ambassador Hartman's field. When and how is up to the U.S. to decide.

The Secretary said that on so-called regional issues, we should work to see where emphasis might prove productive. Leaving Afghanistan aside, southern Africa is somewhat different. Afghanistan is snuggled close to the Soviet Union. Southern Africa is a long way from both of us: we both have an interest, we are both involved, and the world is interested. It could be an example of effective collaboration, and would be to everyone's benefit. This may also be true of other issues nearer or farther away. On southern Africa, though, he had to say he was disappointed that our talks have not produced more. They have been informational, but not operational.

Dobrynin said he would pass the Secretary's comments to Moscow.

The Secretary continued that on CSCE we understand each other. When he and the Vice President had been in Moscow, Andropov had lectured them that this was none of our g.d. business. The President had just told Dobrynin our views. The Soviets might not agree with them, but they are our views.

Dobrynin said our CSCE delegations are in touch, and that is not the problem; the Secretary agreed. These contacts could be improved, however, Dobrynin said. The big question is that in previous administrations, as Eagleburger well knew, the Secretary and Gromyko might decide that an additional push could be useful at some point, and would then act to break deadlocks.

The Secretary noted that on issues where we had recently consulted, the last three (southern Africa, CSCE and non-proliferation) had resulted from his New York meetings with Gromyko, whereas the first (Afghanistan) had been agreed to before his time.

Dobrynin said he had mentioned the Middle East to the President, and previously discussed it with the Secretary. He asked why we should not add it to the list. He was not speaking here on behalf of Gromyko, but there had been a meeting between Hartman and Korniyenko, and even though it was inconclusive, why not add it to the list?

The Secretary said he and Gromyko had discussed the issue in New York, and agreed to be back in touch if there were anything further worth reporting. Dobrynin suggested again that it be added. The Secretary agreed.

Dobrynin then turned to the seventh category of consultations under discussion (deep seabed mining aspects of LOS, nuclear non-proliferation, Pacific maritime boundary, bilateral consular matters):

Deep seabed mining talks had taken place, Dobrynin said, and were good, though outside the Law of the Sea Treaty context. Non-proliferation talks were okay too. We need to find a solution on the Pacific maritime boundary. The Secretary said this would be a tough one, but needs to be resolved. Dobrynin agreed.

Dobrynin said that on consular talks we have gone back and forth on the issue of an agenda, thus far without results. The Secretary said he had a possible solution, and proposed that we schedule a preliminary informal session in Moscow and a formal opening in Washington one month later. We need to confront the officials involved with two scheduled meetings, thus forcing them to use the first to get ready for the second. Dobrynin said this sounded good if the first meeting was for discussion of substance and not just the agenda, and was to be continued in Washington. The Secretary noted that it is hard to begin discussions without an agenda. Dobrynin said he would support the Secretary's proposal with Moscow. Eagleburger said that when we had a response, we could schedule the meetings.

Dobrynin then turned to the Soviet-proposed category on arms control talks (conventional arms transfers, CTB, CW, Indian Ocean, ASAT, RW, non-proliferation). All except No. 7 (non-proliferation) had been stopped, and the Soviets would like to resume. He asked if the Secretary had any comment on the first six.

The Secretary said he had two comments:

- On TTBT, which is not included, the U.S. owes the Soviet side a proposal, and is about to make one. Rick Burt has been designated to be in touch.

-- On the others, returning to what had been discussed with the President, we had identified arms control, regional issues and human rights (as a kind of special category) as areas for discussion. We ought to list these categories separately, and see where things can progress. We should look at what is most promising, but also most worthwhile. We should not confine ourselves just to the easiest issues, but include also the most important questions, even where we know they will be difficult. We need to develop a sense of priorities, of places where we need a political impulse to make something happen. We need to get back to each other on things we have identified, to construct an agenda. Dobrynin had told the President, and Gromyko told the Secretary that arms control is at the top of the Soviet priority list. There is no question that it is an important category, but there are other important categories as well.

Dobrynin said there is no question of the importance of the three negotiations (INF, START, MBFR) now underway, but he invited comment as to whether the U.S. was ready to talk on any of the others. The Soviet side was prepared to talk on all seven listed in this category. His government was prepared to talk, but he did not know if the U.S. government was. If not it was all right, but the Soviets want answers. Perhaps not today, but the matter is important. Non-proliferation was being discussed, but some of the other issues were also ready to be discussed: He was not pressing, but wished to report to his government which issues we should continue on. He and the President had agreed that the three negotiations must be included, but success on the others is also important.

The Secretary replied "maybe." We would get to the Soviets on TTBT. On the seven others, we would get back to them. He noted that the Soviets never mention MBFR. Dobrynin said the Soviets agreed it is important.

The Secretary said that on INF we feel the Soviets believe we will not deploy the missiles. But we will, in the absence of a negotiated agreement. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets also think we will. The Secretary said that our position is that we are prepared to make a reasonable agreement, but equality does not mean the Soviet Union being equal to everyone combined. We think the U.S. and the USSR are the relevant standard, with SS-20's,

Pershing II's, and GLCMs the main items. We do not think the proposal Dobrynin described to the President is responsive or acceptable.

The Secretary said he did not want to repeat the argument, but wondered whether it was worthwhile to push on INF given the Soviet analysis. Nitze is ready to listen to any suggestions, or to discuss principles. Dobrynin said principles had been discussed more than enough. The Secretary said perhaps they should be discussed some more. But we also need to look at whether START is more significant, or whether it is time to turn to MBFR. Certainly there is a relationship between nuclear weapons under discussion in INF and the conventional weapons we are talking about in MBFR, and perhaps this relationship cannot really be handled by the individual negotiators. Perhaps in trying to respond to the President, Dobrynin, with his experience, and without our going around the negotiators, could suggest ways to move forward. The Secretary concluded that he was looking for a way of sorting out issues on a broad agenda to see how to get someplace, to see what political impulse is needed.

Dobrynin said not just the Soviets, but also the U.S., needed to suggest, through our channels. If the Secretary had some ideas, he should not hesitate to put them forward. On INF the Soviets have made three proposals, and the U.S. has stuck to the zero option. He did not know what to think when the U.S. said it was open to serious suggestions. The Soviets thought the U.S. would deploy the missiles, because it is sticking to a zero option that is totally unacceptable to the Soviets. If the U.S. stood on it, it will put the missiles in, he said, and the Soviets and the U.S. and your generals and at least some U.S. Allies know it. But if the U.S. wants some way out of the impasse, compromise will be required.

The Secretary noted that our position was not take-it-or-leave-it, as the Vice President had made clear. Dobrynin said we should use back channels. The Secretary replied that the Soviets and the U.S. should evaluate what would be the most fruitful arena for a political impulse, whether in INF or somewhere else.

Dobrynin said that in the three negotiations, including INF where we are working under an artificial deadline imposed by the U.S., we should try for a breakthrough, but this did not mean the others are hopeless. The Secretary reminded him that we are negotiating in good faith, as we are sure the Soviets are.

But, Dobrynin replied, the U.S. Ambassador had made clear that the U.S. did not like the three Soviet proposals, and the Secretary had said they were not acceptable. The Vice President and the Secretary could say the U.S. position was not take-it-or-leave-it, but the Soviets had made proposals to reopen the talks, in an attempt to find a way out. They proposed going from what they have to 162, almost half.

The Secretary said it was not clear to him whether systems reduced were to be destroyed or removed. Dobrynin said this could be discussed if the cards were on the table. The Secretary specified he had not meant to say the offer was acceptable, but our friends in China and Japan had made clear they are worried that an agreement would only move the missiles which would then be pointed at them. Dobrynin said the Asians could discuss this with the Soviets.

- - - -

The Secretary suggested that further staff contacts take place on the lists. Dobrynin responded that this would not solve the basic issues. The Secretary continued that they had had a broad, penetrating discussion between 5:00 and 8:15 p.m., which covered a lot of ground. We agreed on some things; on others we compared notes; on others we need further work. We should let our staffs work with some urgency, and hope to meet again, perhaps next week, if not early in March after the Queen's visit. He would give Dobrynin feedback, and would expect feedback from Dobrynin on what the President had said.

Dobrynin said the President had raised one question (i.e., Pentacostalists) which he would try to clarify to Andropov. The President had raised it as a good will step; he took this to mean the President did not mean the whole field of emigration, though he had mentioned that too. The Secretary said he would try to interpret the President's remarks. We have many human rights concerns, including Jewish emigration; the President's specific reference is an example of those concerns. The President had also mentioned Jackson-Vanik, making clear he did not like that approach.

Dobrynin concluded that it was, however, for each separate side to determine according to its own law how to deal with its citizens.

Dobrynin said our colleagues should work hard, looking toward a meeting next week. The Secretary said he would try to get back in touch next week; he was to leave again March 2.

12

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-11-

EUR/SOV: TWSimon^{son}s, Jr.
2/17/83 x23738 3581B

Clearance:
P: LSEagleburger **LSE**
S/S:

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS BY CATEGORY

I. Bilateral Agreements Made with the Soviet Union and Still in Force

A. 1933-1940

1. 1933. Arrangements relating to the establishment of diplomatic relations, nonintervention, freedom of conscience and religious liberty, legal protection, and claims.

2. 1935. Agreement relating to the procedure to be followed in the execution of letters rogatory.

3. 1939. Agreement concerning the exchange of parcel post, with detailed regulations for execution.

4. 1942. Preliminary agreement relating to principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, and exchange of notes.

5. 1945. Agreement relating to a change of boundary lines between the American and Soviet zones of occupation in Germany.

7. 1945. Agreement relating to the disposition of lend-lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United States.

8. 1946. Agreement on the organization of commercial radio teletype communication channels.

B. 1950-1959

1. 1955. Protocol defining the location of the boundary of Greater Berlin.

2. 1955. Agreement relating to the exchange of medical films.

3. 1958. Agreement relating to the reciprocal waiver of visa fees to nonimmigrants.

C. 1960-1969

1. 1961. Agreement on the 3-to-5 day rule for diplomatic visa issuance.

2. 1962/1970. Understandings concerning Cuba.

3. 1963. Memorandum of understanding regarding the establishment of a direct communications link, with annex.

4. 1964/1968. Consular convention.

5. 1966. Civil air transport agreement with exchange of notes; agreement supplementary to the civil air transport agreement.

6. 1968. Arrangement relating to the inauguration of air service between New York and Moscow.

7. 1969. Agreement on the reciprocal allocation for use free of charge of plots of land in Moscow and Washington with annexes and exchanges of notes.

D. 1970-1979

1. 1971. Agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

2. 1971. Agreement on measures to improve the direct communications link, with annex.

3. 1972. Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection.

4. 1972. Agreement on cooperation in the field of medical science and public health.

5. 1972. Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas.

6. 1972. Communiqué on the establishment of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission.

7. 1972. Agreement with respect to purchases of grains by the Soviet Union in the United States and credit be made available by the United States with exchange of notes.

8. 1972. Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease, reciprocal aid and claims.

9. 1972. Agreement on the conditions of construction of complexes of buildings of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in Washington with attachment.

10. 1973. Agreement relating to the consideration of claims resulting from damage to fishing vessels or gear and

measures to prevent fishing conflicts, with annex and protocol.

11. 1973. Protocol to the agreement of May 25, 1972 on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas.

12. 1973. Agreement on cooperation in the field of agriculture.

13. 1973. Agreement on cooperation in studies of the world ocean.

14. 1973. Agreement on cooperation in the field of transportation.

15. 1973/1976. Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters.

16. 1973. Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

17. 1973. Protocol to the agreement of February 21, 1973 relating to the consideration of claims resulting from damage to fishing vessels or gear and measures to prevent fishing conflicts, with annex.

18. 1973. Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.

19. 1973. Protocol relating to the possibility of establishing a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce.

20. 1973. Protocol relating to expansion and improvement of commercial facilities in Washington and Moscow.

21. 1973. Protocol on questions relating to the expansion of air services under the civil air transport agreement of November 4, 1966, with agreed services and annex.

22. 1973. Protocol relating to a Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R. in Washington and a Commercial Office of the U.S.A. in Moscow.

23. 1974. Memorandum of understanding on participation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in deep sea drilling project.

24. 1974. Agreement on cooperation in artificial heart research and development.

25. 1974. Agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other construction.

26. 1974. Long term agreement to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation.

27. 1975. Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of multiple entry and exit visas to American and Soviet correspondents.

28. 1975. Agreement on the supply of grains by the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

29. 1976/1978. Convention concerning the conservation of migratory birds and their environment.

30. 1976. Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes, and related letter.

31. 1977. Agreement concerning the translation and publication in English of Soviet journals and articles, with annexes.

32. 1977. Agreement concerning dates for use of land for, and construction of, embassy complexes in Moscow and Washington.

33. 1978. Agreement concerning the translation and publication in English of copyrighted Soviet books, with form.

34. 1978. Agreement relating to privileges and immunities of all members of the Soviet and American embassies and their families, with agreed minute.

35. 1979. Agreement on exchange of recreational facility sites.

E. 1980

1. 1982. Agreement on special flights in support of embassies.

II. Bilateral Agreements Coming Up for Renewal in 1983 and 1984

1. Agreement on cooperation in the field of transportation. Signed June 19, 1973; extended June 19, 1978, by exchange of notes until June 19, 1980; further extended June 19, 1980 according to its own terms for an additional three years; to be further extended June 19, 1983 unless there is notification to the contrary 30 days before, i.e. by May 19, 1983.
2. Agreement on cooperation in the field of atomic energy. Signed June 21, 1973, for a ten-year period; may be renewed by mutual agreement.
3. Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed November 26, 1976; entered into force February 28, 1977; extended July 1, 1982, with change of two ports to which Soviet vessels have access under the agreement, for one year.*
4. Agreement on the supply of grains by the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed October 20, 1975; extended September 30, 1981, and September 30, 1982, for one year.
5. Agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other construction. Signed June 28, 1974; extended June 28, 1979, on its own terms for an additional five years; to be renewed automatically on June 28, 1984, unless there is notification to the contrary six months before, i.e. by December 28, 1983.

*The Soviet side notes that practical implementation by both sides of all the provisions of the fisheries agreement is unresolved. By practical implementation it means allocations to Soviet vessels now operating with the West Coast joint venture; and, most important, the USSR national allocation in general under the provisions of Article III, paragraph 1(d) of the Fisheries Agreement. It is prepared to discuss the agreement with the goal of renegotiation which takes all these implementation matters into account as well as participation in joint ventures. The U.S. side notes that the agreement provides for U.S. implementation and Soviet recognition of the U.S. 200-mile Fisheries Conservation Zone, but does not provide for a USSR national allocation or participation in joint ventures on either coast.

6. Agreement on cooperation in studies of the world ocean. Signed June 19, 1973; extended by mutual agreement until December 15, 1978; further extended December 15, 1978, with modifications contained in an exchange of notes, until December 15, 1981; extended December 15, 1981, on its own terms as last amended, for three years; may be renewed by mutual agreement.

7. Long term agreement to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation. Signed June 29, 1974, for a ten-year period; may be renewed on June 29, 1984, by mutual agreement six months before, i.e. by December 29, 1983.*

III. Bilateral Agreements in Force for Which Soviet Side Considers More Active Implementation Would Be Useful**

1. Agreement on cooperation in the field of agriculture. Signed June 19, 1973; June 19, 1978 extended according to its own terms for an additional five years; will be further extended according to its own terms for an additional five years as of June 19, 1983.

2. Agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection. Signed May 23, 1972; extended May 23, 1977, according to its own terms for an additional five years; further extended May 23, 1982 according to its own terms for an additional five years.

3. Agreement on cooperation in the field of medical science and public health. Signed May 23, 1972; extended May 23, 1977, according to its own terms for an additional five years; further extended May 23, 1982, according to its own terms, for an additional five years.

* This is a framework agreement, and the Soviet side considers that it would be useful to agree to renewal in December 1983.

** In general the Soviet side favors full implementation of all agreements in force, and infusing them with concrete, business-like substance. As a practical matter it favors renewal of meetings of working groups and joint or mixed bilateral commissions. This would contribute to the development of bilateral relations. These four agreements are cited in addition to those listed in Section II.

19
4. Agreement on cooperation in the field of artificial heart development and research. Signed June 28, 1974; extended June 28, 1977, according to its own terms for an additional five years; further extended June 28, 1982, according to its own terms for an additional five years.

IV. Bilateral Agreements Expired or in Suspense*

1. Civil air transport agreement with exchange of notes; agreement supplementary to the civil air transport agreement. Signed November 4, 1966, amended June 23, 1973.**

2. Maritime agreement. Signed October 14, 1972; extended on December 31, 1975, for an additional five years; extended December 31, 1980, for an additional year; expired December 31, 1981. Ancillary agreements on certain maritime matters, signed in 1975 and entering into force in 1976, and a memorandum of understanding on marine cargo insurance, signed and entering into force in 1979, lost applicability at that time.

3. Agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Signed May 24, 1972; extended May 18, 1977, to enter into force on May 27, 1977; expired May 23, 1982, due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

4. Agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Signed May 24, 1972; extended on July 8, 1977, for an additional five years; expired July 7, 1982, due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

* The Soviet side is prepared to consider restoration of the agreements noted at Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9. It also favors restoration of direct commercial flights between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

** The U.S. side considers that the civil air transport agreement and the supplementary agreement to it of 1966 are in force, and notes that there is no level of service provided by the agreements. The Soviet side notes that the civil air transport agreement of 1966 and the supplementary agreement of 1973 provide for regular commercial flights between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

20

5. Trade agreement. Signed October 18, 1972. Did not come into force. Certain provisions were applied.*

6. General agreement on cultural relations (contacts, exchanges, and cooperation in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields). Signed June 19, 1973; expired December 31, 1979. Distribution of Amerika and Soviet Life in the respective countries continues.

7. Exchange of letters relating to the establishment of the Temporary Purchasing Commission for the procurement of equipment for the Kama River Truck Complex. Signed October 18, 1972; expired April 18, 1982, due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

8. Agreement on establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York City. Joint communique signed July 3, 1974; implementation negotiations in suspense due to the U.S. decision of January 4, 1980.

9. Agreement on cooperation in the field of energy. Signed June 28, 1974; extended June 28, 1979, with modifications, for an additional three years; expired June 28, 1982 due to the U.S. decision of December 29, 1981 not to renew.

V. Regular consultations

1. Meetings of Foreign Ministers during UN General Assembly sessions.

2. Pre-UNGA consultations.

3. Bilateral meetings of delegations on nuclear non-proliferation matters.

4. Incidents at sea consultations.

* The U.S. side notes the following examples of provisions of the Trade Agreement that have been applied:

-- Article 4, dealing with payment in U.S. dollars or other freely convertible currencies;

-- Article 5, on setting up a U.S. commercial office in Moscow and a Soviet trade representation in Washington;

-- Article 6, on opening representations for firms (Belarus and Sovfracht in the U.S.); and

-- Article 7, on encouraging use of arbitration.

5. Grains consultations.

6. Cooperation in investigating Nazi war crimes.

VI. Issues on which bilateral consultations recently held

1. Afghanistan (July 1982)

2. Southern Africa (September, December 1982)

3. CSCE matters (October 1982)

4. Non-proliferation matters (December 1982)

VII. Issues on which bilateral consultations are agreed to or being considered

1. Deep seabed mining aspects of Law of the Sea (February 1983)

2. Nuclear non-proliferation matters

3. Pacific maritime boundary

4. Bilateral consular issues

22

Bilateral Negotiations on Certain Aspects of Arms Control and Disarmament Previously Held between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

1. On the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Conducted (with British participation) from July 1977 to November 1980.
2. On the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Conducted from June 1977 to May 1980.
3. On the limitation and further reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean. Started in 1977 and conducted until February 1980.
4. On limiting conventional arms transfers. Conducted between December 1977 and December 1978 (heads of delegations met in Washington in December 1979).
5. On antisatellite weapons limitation. Conducted from June 1978 to June 1979.
6. On the prohibition of radiological weapons. Conducted from June 1977 to July 1979. To expedite completion of the draft Treaty in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament it would be useful, in Soviet view, to continue the bilateral negotiations.
7. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet side confirms that it is prepared to continue bilateral consultations.

23

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8301318

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/15/15 LDB

RECEIVED 26 FEB 83 10

DOCDATE 25 FEB 83

TO CLARK FROM BREMER

~~SUSPENSE~~

KEYWORDS: INF START GROMYKO, ANDREI A
USSR MEDIA

SUBJECT: GROMYKO FEB 24 PRAVDA INTERVIEW ON INF & START

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 02 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
KRAEMER	LINHARD	BOVERIE
	DOBRIANSKY	MYER
		STEARMAN
		SIMS

COMMENTS

REF# 8305613 LOG NSCIFID (N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 3/3	OR		

PA

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

DECLASSIFIED

S/S 8305613

United States Department of State

NLRR 748-23-45-2-1

BY KOR NARA DATE 4/8/13 Washington, D.C. 20520

171367

February 25, 1983

30

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Gromyko's February 24 Pravda Interview on INF and START

TASS has run the full text of responses by Gromyko to questions on INF and START ostensibly posed by a Pravda correspondent. While most of the "interview" contains standard propagandist themes (the U.S. is not serious; U.S. proposals amount to unilateral Soviet disarmament, etc.), Gromyko provides the most authoritative commentary thus far on the question of "interim solutions" in INF. As such, it may be intended by Moscow to dampen hopes in Western Europe generated by the Vice President's trip about a possible U.S. shift off zero/zero.

Without explicitly rejecting an interim solution, Gromyko dismisses possible variants to the zero option as nothing more than new approaches to implementing NATO's plan to "railroad new U.S. missiles into Western Europe." Gromyko calls a "delusion" the belief that the INF talks could proceed as if nothing had happened once U.S. deployments had begun. Deliberately left unclear is whether he means to imply that the Soviets would walk out of the INF talks, or whether the basis for negotiations would change from existing NATO and Soviet systems to new U.S. missiles vs. Soviet counterdeployments. In either case, the message is that Moscow will not accept an interim solution under which some U.S. deployments were codified and Soviet missiles were reduced.

It is possible that Moscow will ultimately fall off this position if it concludes that INF deployments are going to proceed on schedule. But the Soviets clearly perceive their near-term interest in scotching any speculation that they are prepared to alter their "principled" stance that even one U.S. missile would upset the existing "balance" in medium-range systems in Europe. We may be able to exploit the Soviet "intransigence" reflected in Gromyko's comments, but in so doing we will need to be careful not to imply that we consider U.S. INF deployments to be a foregone conclusion.

Gromyko also puts great stress on the point that the Andropov proposals would reduce Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: 2/24/89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

to a level below that which the Soviets had prior to the introduction of the SS-20 in 1976. The Soviets have previously shied away from this argument (which is likely to be extremely effective in the hands of anti-INF forces in Western Europe), since their contrived calculations about the existing "parity" in medium-range systems fall apart when warheads rather than launchers are used as the unit of account.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED FOR
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/15/15 KDB

ID 8390217

RECEIVED 26 FEB 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 25 FEB 83

KRAEMER

25 FEB 83

BOVERIE

25 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

ICBM

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: USSR LAUNCH OF NEW MISSILE PL-4 / PL-5

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	FEB 28 1983	Clark disapproved		
Boverie	S FEB 28 1983	prepare memo for Clark		
Clark	X FEB 28 1983	for signature		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171368	MEMO B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE ATTACHED MATERIAL	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90217

29

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

171371

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-45-4-9

BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
SUBJECT: Most Recent Soviet ICBM Test (U)

It appears to me that it would be in the U.S. interest for you to call in your Soviet counterpart in the very near future to discuss the Soviet ICBM test conducted on February 8. The purpose of a meeting would be to make the point that the U.S. is very concerned about this event, and to elicit any explanation of the test that your Soviet counterpart may wish to offer. (S)

As you know, an interagency working group has been established to evaluate the data on this test and to explore both the problems and the potential opportunities that this Soviet action offers to us. While this work is on track, it has now been almost three weeks since the test; and we have not yet recorded our concern about this activity with the Soviets in diplomatic channels. If we wait until all currently planned staffing is complete, then it could well be that the first time we register our concern about this potentially very significant event (other than in the press) will be in mid-March at the upcoming SCC session. While the SCC is certainly the appropriate forum for discussing U.S. concerns about compliance with SALT, to wait until that time may signal that the U.S. places less significance on this event than it actually does. (S)

To support this meeting, the Department of State should develop a set of talking points for your use and circulate them for review by other agencies prior to the meeting. ACDA representation at this meeting would also seem appropriate. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TAB A

10

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
171373	MEMO	3	2/25/1983	B1
	COPY OF DOC #171372, W/SAME NOTATIONS (B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES)			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171375	MEMO UNANNOTATED COPY OF DOC #171372 (B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES)	3	2/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90217

71

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

171369

NLRR 748-23-45-4-9

BY LEDS NARA DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Most Recent Soviet ICBM Test (U)

It appears to me that it would be in the U.S. interest for you to call in your Soviet counterpart in the very near future to discuss the Soviet ICBM test conducted on February 8. The purpose of a meeting would be to make the point that the U.S. is very concerned about this event, and to elicit any explanation of the test that your Soviet counterpart may wish to offer. (S)

As you know, an interagency working group has been established to evaluate the data on this test and to explore both the problems and the potential opportunities that this Soviet action offers to us. While this work is on track, it has now been almost three weeks since the test, and we have not yet recorded our concern about this activity with the Soviets in diplomatic channels. If we wait until all currently planned staffing is complete, then it could well be that the first time we register our concern about this potentially very significant event (other than in the press) will be in mid-March at the upcoming SCC session. While the SCC is certainly the appropriate forum for discussing U.S. concerns about compliance with SALT, to wait until that time may signal that the U.S. places less significance on this event than it actually does. (S)

To support this meeting, the Department of State should develop a set of talking points for your use and circulate them for review by other agencies prior to the meeting. ACDA representation at this meeting would also seem appropriate. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
171384	PROFILE SHEET NSC/S	1	2/26/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

171376 MEMO

1

ND

B1

B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE
TO W. CLARK

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

0x

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90217

41

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR 748-23-45-4-9 (71370)

BY 6013 NARA DATE 4/8/0

MEMORANDUM FOR LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Most Recent Soviet ICBM Test (U)

It appears to me that it would be in the U.S. interest for you to call in your Soviet counterpart in the very near future to discuss the Soviet ICBM test conducted on February 8. The purpose of a meeting would be to make the point that the U.S. is very concerned about this event, and to elicit any explanation of the test that your Soviet counterpart may wish to offer. (S)

As you know, an interagency working group has been established to evaluate the data on this test and to explore both the problems and the potential opportunities that this Soviet action offers to us. While this work is on track, it has now been almost three weeks since the test; and we have not yet recorded our concern about this activity with the Soviets in diplomatic channels. If we wait until all currently planned staffing is complete, then it could well be that the first time we register our concern about this potentially very significant event (other than in the press) will be in mid-March at the upcoming SCC session. While the SCC is certainly the appropriate forum for discussing U.S. concerns about compliance with SALT, to wait until that time may signal that the U.S. places less significance on this event than it actually does. (S)

To support this meeting, the Department of State should develop a set of talking points for your use and circulate them for review by other agencies prior to the meeting. ACDA representation at this meeting would also seem appropriate. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

22

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Drawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

171374 MEMO

3 2/25/1983 B1

COPY OF DOC #171372, W/SAME NOTATIONS (B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

National Security Council
The White House

557

Package # 90217

'83 FEB 26 A9:32

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Boverie</u>	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

171372 MEMO

3 2/25/1983 B1

B. LINHARD/S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. BOVERIE
TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET MISSILES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171377 18

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2287 26556 DTG: 250929Z FEB 83 PSN: 061318
SIT827 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 056/0940Z

GENEVA.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT SIGR NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTT COMBINED WITH VALLETTA 0424

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #2287 0560930
O 250929Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-23 45-7-6
BY COB NARA DATE 8/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3688

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3341

- USMISSION GENEVA 6725
- AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2084
- AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2121
- AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4790
- AMEMBASSY BONN 4451
- AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2971
- AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 2004
- AMEMBASSY LISBON 1372
- AMEMBASSY LONDON 6096
- AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0656
- AMEMBASSY MADRID 2200
- AMEMBASSY OSLO 1519
- AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1941
- AMEMBASSY PARIS 3317
- AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0627
- AMEMBASSY ROME 8459
- AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1785
- AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5792
- USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2058
- USNMR SHAPE GE
- CINGCAG OFFUTT AFB NE
- USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
- AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0857

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 02287

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USINF/USSTART

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2/25/89

TAGS: MNUC, PARM

SUBJECT: ALLEGED GROMYKO THREAT TO BREAK OFF INF TALKS

REFS: (A) USNATO 1248, (B) MOSCOW 2271

1. (U) GROMYKO'S REMARKS IN PRAVDA FEBRUARY 24 STATE THAT "PEOPLE ARE BEING INDOCTRINATED TO BELIEVE THAT DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW U.S. MISSILES WOULD NOT ALLEGEDLY BE AT VARIANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GENEVA TALKS NOW IN PROGRESS: DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES WOULD BEGIN, WHILE TALKS WOULD PROCEED BY THEMSELVES AS IF NOTHING WAS HAPPENING. THIS IS A DELUSION." GROMYKO GOES ON TO SAY THAT NEW U.S. DEPLOYMENTS WOULD CREATE A "QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION." AND THUS WOULD "UNDERCUT" THE TALKS IN

2. (C) COMMENT: WE DO NOT INTERPRET THIS AS AN EXPLICIT THREAT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GENEVA TALKS IF U.S. DEPLOYMENTS GO AHEAD (REF A). RATHER, IT IS PRIMARILY A HIGH LEVEL STATEMENT OF THE CONSISTENT SOVIET POSITION THAT NEW U.S. DEPLOYMENTS WOULD UPSET THE ALLEGED EXISTING BALANCE OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE, AND THUS FORCE THE USSR TO RECONSIDER ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION SEEKS MUTUAL REDUCTIONS FROM THIS EXISTING ALLEGED BALANCE (OF ABOUT 1,000 SYSTEMS ON EACH SIDE), AND IS CONDITIONED ON NO NEW U.S. DEPLOYMENTS. THUS, IN THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, IF U.S. DEPLOYMENTS GO AHEAD THE CURRENT SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITION IS OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. FROM GROMYKO'S STATEMENT ONE CANNOT RULE OUT, HOWEVER, THAT POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE "NEW SITUATION" MIGHT INCLUDE THE OPTION OF WALKING OUT OF THE TALKS. LIKE U.S. NATO WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACTUALLY TAKE THIS STEP.

3. (U) THE SOURCE OF CONFUSION OVER WHAT GROMYKO ACTUALLY SAID MAY BE A FEBRUARY 23 MISLEADING ASSOCIATED PRESS DISPATCH FROM MOSCOW, WHICH CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SAID U.S. DEPLOYMENTS WOULD "CURTAIL" THE GENEVA TALKS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ZIMMERMANN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

51

NLRR 7-1823-45-8-5

171378

BY KDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

m

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 28, 1983

To: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GS*
Subject: Soviet Message on Embassy Pentecostalists

Dobrynin is ill, and called to ask that I receive his Minister-Counselor, Sokolov, briefly this afternoon. Sokolov brought with him the text of a message from Moscow on the Pentecostalists in our Embassy there. The text is attached.

The message begins with the standard Soviet line that we are responsible for both the problem -- keeping Soviet citizens in the Embassy -- and the solution -- making them leave. It also reiterates previous statements that the Soviets will not "persecute" them if they leave. Then, in what Sokolov described as "the constructive part" of the message, it says that if they return to their home town in Siberia, "the question of their leaving the USSR will be considered," with "account taken of all the circumstances involved."

Formally, this does not go beyond what the Soviets have said before. Nevertheless, the Soviets are obviously trying to be responsive to your deep interest in the Pentecostalists' plight. Thus, although the written message keeps their formal line intact, they may in fact be offering a kind of assurance that emigration will be permitted if the families return home first.

There are two problems with this. First, the families have had several lifetimes of broken promises, and it may take a great deal more than this sort of vague and masked assurance (if that is what it is) to convince them to leave their refuge in the Embassy and apply for emigration from home. Second, given the vagueness of the message, we should be skeptical too.

I will be reviewing the issue of how we should respond, and will want to get the views of Ambassador Art Hartman, who will be here for consultations next week. I will then be giving you my recommendations.

Attachment: As stated

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL. OADR

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

TEXT OF SOVIET MESSAGE ON PENTECOSTALISTS

We already explained to the American side our principled position on this subject. Keeping Soviet citizens in the U.S. Embassy for such a long time is clearly illegal and abnormal. Their further stay there only aggravates the situation, and the responsibility for that fully rests with the American side. The resolution of this issue depends precisely on the American side: the above mentioned persons should leave the U.S. Embassy.

In this connection we can say definitely that no one is going to persecute them, there are no such intentions. Accordingly, after those persons return to the place of their residence, the question of their leaving the USSR will be considered. It will be done with account taken of all the circumstances involved in this matter.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Drawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder

USSR (2/21/83-3/2/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

308

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171379	MEMO P. DOBRIANSKY THROUGH C. TYSON TO W. CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST	1	3/2/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

171380

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 4, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATIONNLRR 74823-45-102

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

BY 603 NARA DATE 4/8/83

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Appointment Request: Ambassador Arthur Hartman

I do not concur with the recommendation made by Paula Dobriansky and Roger Robinson that the President meet with Ambassador Hartman. Unless the President has made a regular policy of routine meetings with Ambassadors, there does not appear to be a compelling reason why he should take the time for such a meeting.

Although there has been a leadership change in the USSR with a few minor shifts of emphasis in domestic policy that are not out of the ordinary, nothing has occurred that is of such significance that would warrant a special briefing of the President.

Unless the State Department can furnish some more compelling reasons, such as recommendations for new courses of action or the presentation of policy dilemmas that require Presidential-level attention, I see no particular benefit for the proposed meeting.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVA
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/15/15 KOB

TAB

I

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guide
By COB NARA,Jul 23, 1997
12/15/95SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Arthur Hartman
(U.S. Ambassador to Moscow)

PURPOSE: To brief the President on the situation
in the Soviet Union

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman has valuable information
to impart to the President about the current
situation in the USSR and U.S.-Soviet
relations -- leadership changes, new
domestic policies and more vigorous foreign
affairs initiatives.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Meeting with the President on October 1,
1982.

DATE AND TIME: 9:30 a.m.; March 9, 1983 DURATION: Open

LOCATION: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs William P. Clark
Ambassador Arthur Hartman

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Ambassador Hartman will brief the President.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking Points to be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open

RECOMMENDED BY: National Security Council
Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~

Declassification: OADR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/15/08
CDS

T A B

 I

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

83 FEB 26 11:05

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 28, 1983

171381

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-23-45-11-1

SITUATION ROOM

BY KSB NARA DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request - Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

Our Ambassador to the USSR, Arthur Hartman, will be in Washington March 7-11 for consultations. He would like appointments with the President and with you to discuss recent developments in US-Soviet relations. Ambassador Hartman possesses a unique vantage point on the Soviet leadership and we feel that it would be especially valuable for the President and for you to review with him the state of our relations with the Andropov regime, and to discuss possible directions for US policy. We recommend that you and the President meet with the Ambassador.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*12/05/83
GWS*

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

PAGES 06

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 182

RELEASER G.W.

PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG 050042Z MAR 83

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM POINDEXTER / SAN FRANCISCO

2.

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

PACKAGE #1364

*Judge says OK.
We don't need proposal.
Will do at 0930 on*

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

*Wednesday 9 March
J*

low
om
60

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~SENSITIVE

March 2, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT:

Soviet Message on Embassy Pentecostalists

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

By KDB NARA, Date 12/15/85

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President concerning a message on the Pentecostalists delivered to State by Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov of the Soviet Embassy. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which forwards the Secretary's memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

*Judge discussed with President
3/4/83. J*

Attachments:

- Tab I. Memorandum to the President
- Tab A. Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, February 28

cc: John Lenczowski
Carnes Lord
Roger Robinson
William Stearman

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council
The White House

563⁶¹

3-2-83
850 pm

Package # 1372

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
<i>Boreie</i> John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>B</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information **A-Action** R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Forward to West Coast

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/15/15 (COJ)

62

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

PAGES

DACOM #

DEX #

TTY #

26

6

RELEASER

DTG

WHC

03214Z

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM JOHN POINDEXTER / Los Angeles

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. *Pres takes 4 March 85*

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

↓ S. discussed with Pres
Send to Plane
ACTION
Judge —

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

We have already given the Shultz memo to the President. Unless you want to give Pres info in last paragraph of your memo to him, recommend we just hold this.

lw
dm
63

MEMORANDUM**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**SECRETSENSITIVE

March 2, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT:

Soviet Message on Embassy Pentecostals

DECLASSIFIED

 White House Co s, August 28, 1987
 By EDB NARA, Date 12/15/85

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President concerning a message on the Pentecostals delivered to State by Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov of the Soviet Embassy. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which forwards the Secretary's memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, February 28

cc: John Lenczowski
Carnes Lord
Roger Robinson
William Stearman

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

171382

~~SECRET~~SENSITIVE**DECLASSIFIED**INFORMATION

NLRR 748-23-45-12-0

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY 6058 NARA DATE 4/8/13

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Soviet Message on Embassy Pentecostalists

George Shultz forwarded you a memorandum (Tab A) concerning a message on the Pentecostalists delivered to State by the Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy, Sokolov. The message reiterates the standard Soviet position that the U.S. bears full responsibility for both keeping the Pentecostals in the U.S. Embassy and for encouraging them to leave. It also states that the families will not be persecuted if they leave and "the question of their leaving the USSR will be considered," with "account taken of all the circumstances involved."

Based on the tone of his discussions with Sokolov, George speculates that the Soviets may want to resolve this long-standing problem. He asserts that although this message adheres to the standard line, Soviet authorities may in fact permit the Pentecostalists to emigrate once they return home. After George discusses this matter further with Ambassador Hartman, he will forward you his recommendations.

While this interpretation of Soviet actions cannot be ruled out, I am skeptical that the Soviets have any intention of permitting the Pentecostalists to leave. In February 1982, one of the Pentecostalists, Lidiya Vashchenko did return to Chernogorsk on the condition (as promised by Soviet authorities) that her exit visa application be reviewed. Since that time, she has been prevented from applying for emigration. Hence, if we are to convince the families to leave the Embassy, clear assurances by a high-level Soviet official that the Pentecostalists will be permitted to emigrate should be attained.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, February 28

~~SECRET~~~~SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1372

65

171383

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 28, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

To: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Soviet Message on Embassy Pentecostalists

NLRR 748-2345-13-9
BY 600 NARA DATE 4/8/13

Dobrynin is ill, and called to ask that I receive his Minister-Counselor, Sokolov, briefly this afternoon. Sokolov brought with him the text of a message from Moscow on the Pentecostalists in our Embassy there. The text is attached.

The message begins with the standard Soviet line that we are responsible for both the problem -- keeping Soviet citizens in the Embassy -- and the solution -- making them leave. It also reiterates previous statements that the Soviets will not "persecute" them if they leave. Then, in what Sokolov described as "the constructive part" of the message, it says that if they return to their home town in Siberia, "the question of their leaving the USSR will be considered," with "account taken of all the circumstances involved."

Formally, this does not go beyond what the Soviets have said before. Nevertheless, the Soviets are obviously trying to be responsive to your deep interest in the Pentecostalists' plight. Thus, although the written message keeps their formal line intact, they may in fact be offering a kind of assurance that emigration will be permitted if the families return home first.

There are two problems with this. First, the families have had several lifetimes of broken promises, and it may take a great deal more than this sort of vague and masked assurance (if that is what it is) to convince them to leave their refuge in the Embassy and apply for emigration from home. Second, given the vagueness of the message, we should be skeptical too.

I will be reviewing the issue of how we should respond, and will want to get the views of Ambassador Art Hartman, who will be here for consultations next week. I will then be giving you my recommendations.

Attachment: As stated

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL. OADR~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TEXT OF SOVIET MESSAGE ON PENTECOSTALISTS

We already explained to the American side our principled position on this subject. Keeping Soviet citizens in the U.S. Embassy for such a long time is clearly illegal and abnormal. Their further stay there only aggravates the situation, and the responsibility for that fully rests with the American side. The resolution of this issue depends precisely on the American side: the above mentioned persons should leave the U.S. Embassy.

In this connection we can say definitely that no one is going to persecute them, there are no such intentions. Accordingly, after those persons return to the place of their residence, the question of their leaving the USSR will be considered. It will be done with account taken of all the circumstances involved in this matter.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

ID 8301372

RECEIVED 01 MAR 83 12

12/15/15 CDB

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 28 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR
CM

HUMAN RIGHTS

HARTMAN, ART

SUBJECT: SOVIET MSG ON EMBASSY PENTECOSTALISTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 01 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION
DOBRIANSKY

FOR CONCURRENCE
ROBINSON
LORD

FOR INFO
MYER
STEARMAN
WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8202582 NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X 3/8</i>	<i>fail to Peng for 9/80</i> <i>Clark discussed w/Pres</i>		<i>SI, LO, RA, LE, [unclear]</i> <i>DO</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE *82* (CDB)