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KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder USSR (2/11/83-2/20/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

307

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171350	CABLE	STATE 40934 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-1-3	3	2/11/1983	B1
171354	CABLE	STATE 40921 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-2-2	2	2/11/1983	B1
171355	MEMO	G. TEICHER AND G. KEMP TO R. MCFARLANE RE CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY	2	2/14/1983	B1
171356	LETTER	L. EAGLEBURGER TO MCFARLANE RE CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-4-0	2	2/8/1983	B1
171357	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-5-9	1	2/22/1983	B1
171358	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY	1	2/17/1983	B1
171359	MEMO	CLARK TO VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-7-7	1	2/22/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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307

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171361	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO CLARK RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-8-6	1	2/15/1983	B1
171362	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-44-9-5	1	2/22/1983	B1 B3
171363	MEMCON	RE 1/28/83 MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET OFFICIALS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-10-3	3	1/29/1983	B1
171364	CABLE	MOSCOW 2077 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-11-2	5	2/18/1983	B1
171365	CABLE	STATE 47758 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-44-12-1	2	2/20/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171350

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 09341 DTG: 112342Z FEB 83 PSN: 043548
SIT764 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 043/0447Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP VP SIT EOBT EOB
EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTTULTZ REPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0934 0422346
O 112342Z FEB 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-23-44-1-3

BY LCDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 040934

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR/LONDON FOR BURT ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MPOL, UR, IS, SY.

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF SOVIET DEMARCHE ON ISRAEL-SYRIA

REF: A. STATE 38417 B. TUNIS 996 C. DAMASCUS 1088

1. ~~(S)~~ --ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS PROMISED REF A. DEPARTMENT IS PROVIDING OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET MOTIVATIONS IN MAKING DEMARCHE IN WASHINGTON CONCERNING THE THREAT OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIA.

3. IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES REFS B AND C, WE HAVE NO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EVIDENCE SUGGESTING ISRAELI PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTACK ON SYRIA AS MENTIONED IN SOVTET DEMARCHE. EMBASSY TUNIS MAY SO INFORM THE TUNISIANS, BUT SHOULD ALSO BE CAREFUL TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE TALKING ONLY OF THE ABSENCE OF INDICATORS SUGGESTING PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH A STRIKE. WE IN NO WAY ISH TO GIVE THE TUNISIANS THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PROVIDING A GUARANTEE THAT SUCH AN ACTION WILL NOT TAKE PLACE OR ARE ASSUMING ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUTURE ISRAELI ACTIONS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN ATTACK IS ;NLIKELY, BUT DO NOT WISH TO GO THAT FAR IN

DESCRIBING OUR VIEWS TO THE TUNISIANS.

4. AS FOR SOVIET MOTIVATIONS, THE OLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET DEMARCHE SENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE FEBRUARY 9, PROVIDED FYI

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 09341 DTG: 112342Z FEB 83 PSN: 043548

ONLY:

5. BEGIN TEXT:

-- AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FEBRUARY 8 TO PRESENT FURTHER SOVIET VIEWS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF SA-5 MISSILES TO SYRIA, ABOUT WHICH WE HAD AN EXCHANGE WITH THE SOVIETS LAST MONTH. AT THAT TIME, WE EXPRESSED OUR BELIEF THAT THESE DEPLOYMENTS WERE DESTABILIZING AND TOLD THE SOVIETS THEY WOULD BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY CONSEQUENCES. THEY REPLIED THAT THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES WERE SUPPLIED TO SYRIA PURELY OR SELF-DEFENSE AND DENIED THEY WOULD BEAR ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADVERSE RESULTS.

-- THE NEW ELEMENT IN DOBRYNIN'S APPROACH YESTERDAY WAS AN EXPRESSION OF HEIGHTENED CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIA. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT ISRAEL "DECLARES ITS INTENTION TO DELIVER A STRIKE AGAINST SYRIA" AND THAT "ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE INFORMATION. . . THE ISRAELIS ARE CARRYING OUT CORRESPONDING PREPARATORY MEASURES AS WELL." HE ADDED THAT THE AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEMS NOW BEING DEPLOYED IN SYRIA WERE TO MEET THIS ISRAELI THREAT AND SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH TEL AVIV TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF RENEWED CONFLICT. HE NOTED THAT "PREVENTING AN ATTACK ON SYRIA

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IS A GUARANTEE THAT THOSE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE USED."

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE LATEST SOVIET DEMARCHE IS PART OF A CAMPAIGN TO JUSTIFY DEPLOYMENT OF THE SA-5S IN SYRIA AND TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE UNFAVORABLE TO AN ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST THEM DURING THE CRUCIAL PERIOD WHEN THE MISSILE SITES ARE BECOMING OPERATIONAL. THE SOVIETS ALSO SEE ADVANTAGES IN MAINTAINING A SENSE OF CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO FACE A SERIOUS THREAT FROM ISRAEL, DESPITE ANY ADVANTAGES TO FACE A SERIOUS THREAT FROM ISRAEL, DESPITE ANY NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS. WHILE SUCH A STRATEGY IS HELPFUL TO THE SOVIETS IN CREATING CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT ISRAEL'S LONG-TERM INTENTIONS AND POSSIBLE PROBLEMS IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS, MOSCOW MAY GENUINELY FEAR A SUCCESSFUL ISRAELI STRIKE ON THE SITES WHICH WOULD, AT LEAST IN AN IMMEDIATE SENSE, DISPLAY SOVIET POWERLESSNESS

IN THE FACE OF ISRAEL'S REGIONAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO TRYING TO BUILD A CASE FOR THE RECENT MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS AS A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE TO A PRE-EXISTING ISRAELI THREAT, THEREBY DENYING OUR ASSERTION THAT THEIR ACTIONS REPRESENT A MAJOR NEW DESTABILIZING ELEMENT IN THE REGION. ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN TUNIS RECENTLY MADE A SIMILAR DEMARCHE TO THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. FOR THE LAST MONTH, THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE BEEN REPORTING ISRAELI MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON'S BEKAA VALLEY. (WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH ISRAELI PREPARATIONS AND WE DOUBT THE SOVIETS DO EITHER.)

-- THE OTHER PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE SOVIET DEMARCHE, AS WELL AS MUCH OF THEIR RECENT DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITY, IS TO PUT ISRAEL ON THE DEFENSIVE WHILE THE SA-5S ARE BEING DEPLOYED. INTELLIGENCE SHOWS THE MISSILE SITES ARE JUST ABOUT TO BECOME OPERATIONAL--AN ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE MOMENT AND THE BEST TIME FOR STAGING A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK. THE SOVIETS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY CALCULATED THAT A CAMPAIGN TO FOCUS PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ATTENTION ON ISRAEL'S ACTIONS OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM ATTACKING THE MISSILES.

-- IN ADDITION, BY REITERATING--IN MORE EXPLICIT FORM--THEIR PREVIOUS STATEMENT THAT THE MISSILES ARE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PURELY FOR THE DEFENSE OF SYRIA AND WILL NOT BE USED UNLESS THAT COUNTRY IS ATTACKED, THE SOVIETS ARE WORKING TO EASE OUR CONCERNS IN THE HOPE OF AVOIDING A BILATERAL CRISIS OVER THIS ISSUE.

-- MOREOVER, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE A SECOND APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE, LESS THAN A MONTH AFTER OUR PREVIOUS EXCHANGE, IMPLIES THAT THE MIDEAST HAS A HIGH PRIORITY FOR THEM IN OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE AND THAT THEY INTEND TO CONTINUE ENGAGING US, PERHAPS TO UNDERLINE THAT THEY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM EVOLVING EVENTS IN THE REGION. MOSCOW MAY ALSO WISH TO SIGNAL THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION TO WITHDRAW THE SA-5S AND THAT, IN FACT, IT HAS A CASEWHICH JUSTIFIED EVEN MORE DELIVERIES OF NEW TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE SYRIANS.

6. WE ALSO AGREE WITH THE POINTS MADE ABOUT SOVIET/SYRIA MOTIVATIONS IN REF C. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 09341 DTG: 112342Z FEB 83 PSN: 043548

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171354

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 09211 DTG: 112125Z FEB 83 PSN: 043545
SIT765 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 043/0442Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB EOBT EOB

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTTULTZ REPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0921 0422136
O 112125Z FEB 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-41-2-2

BY LCOR NARA DATE 4/8/13

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2472
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5203
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 8311
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 5516
AMCONSUL MUNICH IMMEDIATE 5758

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8272
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8124
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1311
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1244
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6613
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 040921
NODIS
FORAMBASSADOR/LONDON - MUNICH FOR AS BURT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, AF
SUBJECT: EAGLEBURGER-DOBRYNIN EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN

1. 8 - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING COURSE OF A MEETING ARRANGED TO DISCUSS SEPARATE MATTER FEBRUARY 8, AM4ASSADOR EAGLEBURGER RAISED ISSUE OF AFGHANISTAN WITH AMBASSADOR DO9RYNIN, ASKING HOW SOVIETS ASSESSED RECENT CORDOVEZ MISSION TO SW ASIA. DOBRYNIN REPLIED THAT HIS ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THINGS WERE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MOVING SLOWLY BUT THAT MOVEMENT WAS TAKING PLACE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PAKS HAD NOT YET AGREED TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH THE DRA, SUGGESTING THIS WAS ONE AREA IN WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE LOOKING FOR PROGRESS.

3. DOBRYNIN ADDED THAT "WE THINK THAT THE CORDOVEZ EFFORT IS ONE AVENUE FOR US TO PULL OUT OF AFGHANISTAN." SHULTZ

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 09211 DTG: 112125Z FEB 83 PSN: 043545

SECSTATE WASHDC 09211 DTG: 112125Z FEB 83 PSN: 043545

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2/11/83

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#A504

DR

R I WYFCZCUIV

FBC-DOBRYNIN-02-11

BY HENRY TRENHITT

(c) 1983 THE BALTIMORE SUN (FIELD NEWS SERVICE)

WASHINGTON - SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN; WHO IS SAID TO KNOW AMERICANS BETTER THAN THEY KNOW THEMSELVES; WILL RETURN TO MOSCOW LATER THIS YEAR; AN AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE SAID; TO BECOME A SENIOR ADVISER TO PARTY LEADER YURI V. ANDROPOV.

THE REASON; THE SOURCE SAID THURSDAY; IS THAT DOBRYNIN; WHO IS APPROACHING HIS 21ST ANNIVERSARY HERE; CAN BE MORE USEFUL IN MOSCOW THAN HE CAN DEALING WITH A U.S. ADMINISTRATION THAT HE DEEMS UNINTERESTED IN PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS. EXACTLY WHEN HE WOULD LEAVE; HOWEVER; WAS NOT SPECIFIED.

WITH THAT; THE MATTER OF DOBRYNIN'S FUTURE BECAME THE QUINTESSENTIAL INSIDE-WASHINGTON EXCHANGE OF LEAK AND PRIVATE COMMENT. THE SOURCE; WHO CONFIRMED A WIRE SERVICE REPORT; DEMANDED ANONYMITY.

A SOVIET EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID MERELY THAT "THE AMBASSADOR IS THE AMBASSADOR. WE WILL HAVE NO COMMENT ON THAT." ANOTHER SOVIET DIPLOMAT ONLY CHUCKLED AT THE REPORT.

ASKED FOR COMMENT; A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN DUCKED. "I HAVE NOTHING FOR YOU ON THAT;" SPOKESMAN ALAN ROMBERG SAID.

WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD THE ADMINISTRATION THAT DOBRYNIN WAS LEAVING; ROMBERG ANSWERED: "I COULDN'T GET INTO THE QUESTION OF WHAT WE'VE HAD PASSED TO US IN DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES."

BUT ROMBERG AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WERE SPECIFIC ON ONE POINT; THE CLAIM THAT U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES ARE INADEQUATE.

"RIDICULOUS;" SAID A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN. THERE WERE CONSTANT CONTACTS; ROMBERG SAID; HERE; IN MOSCOW; AND IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND VIENNA.

ANOTHER U.S. DIPLOMAT; ASSUMING THE REPORT WAS A SOVIET LEAK; CALLED IT "A CHERP SHOT." IT MAY BE "TIME FOR DOBRYNIN TO GO;" ONE SAID; "BUT IF SO; IT IS BECAUSE HIS HEALTH IS BAD; OR BECAUSE ANDROPOV NEEDS HIM. AFTER ALL; HE IS HIGHLY SKILLED; HE IS ANDROPOV'S TYPE OF PRAGMATIST; AND HE MAY BE IN LINE TO BECOME FOREIGN MINISTER."

WHAT IS CERTAIN IS THAT DOBRYNIN; 63; NO LONGER HAS THE ACCESS HE ENJOYED FOR ALMOST TWO DECADES IN WASHINGTON. NOW THE DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS; HE IS WIDELY REGARDED AS A HIGHLY SKILLED OPERATOR; ONE WHO COULD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY OR BANTER WITH AMERICAN LEADERS.

HENRY A. KISSINGER; THE FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; CALLED HIM A "THOROUGHGOING PROFESSIONAL." ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI; PRESIDENT CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER; CALLED HIM IN A WAY TRIBUTE "A CHARMING HOST AND A SKILLFULLY EVASIVE NEGOTIATOR."

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SOME CAREER DIPLOMATS; WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING HIS SKILLS; HAVE COMPLAINED THAT PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS TENDED TO ROMANTICIZE DOBRYNIN BECAUSE OF THE WAY HE BLENDED INTO AMERICAN CULTURE. THEY FORGOT; ONE SAID; "THAT HE WORKED FOR THE SOVIET UNION."

THE CLIMATE BEGAN TO CHANGE NOTICEABLY WITH THE FADING OF DETENTE; AND LATER WITH THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN LATE 1979 AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR SUPPRESSION OF THE FREE LABOR MOVEMENT IN POLAND.

WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE VOCALLY ANTI-SOVIET REAGAN ADMINISTRATION; SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG; JR.; SIGNALLED THE CHANGE PUBLICLY BY CANCELING DOBRYNIN'S LONG-STANDING PRIVILEGE OF ENTERING THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRIVATELY THROUGH THE BASEMENT.

IT IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT DOBRYNIN'S DEPARTURE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SPECULATION. THE QUESTION HAS ARISEN SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST DECADE AND HAS BEEN ASKED MORE OFTEN SINCE PRESIDENT REAGAN TOOK OFFICE. IN BOTH 1980 AND 1981; HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE RETURNED TO MOSCOW FOR TREATMENT OF UNSPECIFIED ILLNESSES.

EQUALLY ACTIVE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT HE MIGHT SUCCEED ANDREI A. GROMYKO AS FOREIGN MINISTER. GROMYKO; NOW 73; BECAME MINISTER IN 1957 AFTER SERVING IN COVETED AMBASSADORIAL ASSIGNMENTS IN WASHINGTON; LONDON AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

SOME ANALYSTS OF SOVIET AFFAIRS SUGGEST THAT DOBRYNIN'S LONG SERVICE IN WASHINGTON HAS ENABLED OTHERS TO GET AHEAD OF HIM IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY. BUT THAT MAY MEAN NOTHING; THEY SAY; IF DOBRYNIN; AS THEY SUSPECT; SUITS THE STYLE OF ANDROPOV.

THE ONLY THING WRONG WITH THAT LINE OF THOUGHT; THEY CONCEDE; IS THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT GROMYKO; WHO IS NOT OLD BY SOVIET LEADERSHIP STANDARDS; INTENDS TO STEP DOWN.

END

NYT-02-11-83 0114EST

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National Security Council
The White House

Package # 1028

'83 FEB 15 A11 :57

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	X	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>		
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

*Wal - Let Harry on
the phone
(on Tans per KEM)*

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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171355	MEMO G. TEICHER AND G. KEMP TO R. MCFARLANE RE CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY	2	2/14/1983	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1983

Geoff Kemp
✓ Howard Teicher

Subject: Conference on Soviet Jewry

Please review the attached and give me your recommendations as to how to proceed.

Many thanks

Bud

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bud", written over the typed name "Bud".

United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 8, 1983

171356

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-44-4-0

BY ECB NARA DATE 12/5/15

Dear Bud:

The Third International Conference on Soviet Jewry is to be held in Jerusalem this March. The organizers of the Conference seek to have a senior Administration official address the group. I understand that they have approached the Vice President's office, Jean Kirkpatrick and me to request our participation.

I believe it would be a mistake for a senior official to speak at the Jerusalem conference. A prominent personal appearance by a senior U.S. official would reinforce the perception that Soviet Jewry is primarily a U.S.-Soviet issue. That will not help the Soviet Jews nor advance our objectives vis-a-vis the Soviets.

Of even greater concerns are the difficulties that could spring up to face a senior official visiting Israel in March. The unpredictable, choppy course of Middle Eastern diplomacy could well create an embarrassing and potentially damaging situation.

Nonetheless, we should make an effort to show the flag at the Jerusalem meeting. If we refuse to have anyone attend, the Jewish community may take it as a sign that we are boycotting Israel or backing away from our commitment to Soviet Jewish rights.

One suggestion, which I think has considerable merit, is to ask the President to videotape a five minute greeting to the conference that could be played on a large screen during the opening ceremonies. This is a perfect medium for the President, would score points with the American Jewish community, and would eliminate the need for a senior official to attend the meeting. In his short message, the President could speak about his personal commitment to the cause of Soviet Jewry without portraying it as an anti-Soviet issue, and would be able to avoid any references to the Middle East.

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs,
The White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL


2

There is, of course, the danger that the audience may greet the President's message discourteously. The probability depends on the course of Middle Eastern diplomacy over the next month.

How do you think we should proceed on this?

Sincerely,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Call me, pls.


CONFIDENTIAL

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8301028

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/15/85 CDB

RECEIVED 14 FEB 83 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM KEMP

DOCDATE 14 FEB 83

TEICHER

14 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJECT: CONF ON SOVIET JEWRY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 18 FEB 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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c FEB 2 4 1983 *Mcfarlane approved*

OK, HT

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

Pa

(C) *MD*

12/15/83

RECEIVED 16 FEB 83 09

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 15 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

ADM

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL CONTACTS W/ SOVIET EMBASSY BY SENIOR LEVEL US GOVT OFFICIALS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 18 FEB 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MYER

STEARMAN

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8304543

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>x 2/17</i>	<i>for signature</i>		
	<i>FEB 22 1983</i>	<i>Clark sgd memo</i>		<i>index, fo,</i>
<i>Doquendy</i>	<i>FEB 22 1983</i>	<i>further action</i>	<i>2/24</i>	<i>Lowczowski</i>
<i>Clark</i>	<i>x rpe</i>	<i>add-on for signature</i>		
	<i>MAR 07 1983</i>	<i>Clark noted</i>		<i>Do</i>

DISPATCH *ed. 2/22*

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *MB*

National Security Council
The White House

55016

Package # 1078

'83 FEB 22 P6:35

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

**National Security Council
The White House**

546A

Package # 1078

'83 FEB 17 P7:43

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
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Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Brown, NSC/s
 Dispatch memo and then send
 Judge's question to Paula. [initials]

18

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

171357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 22, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet Embassy

WPC HAS SEEN

With regard to your query on my memorandum concerning U.S. official contacts with the Soviet Embassy (Tab A), the two officials who breached the Administration's policies were Seeley Lodwick, Under Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, and Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. Both attended the New Year's Celebration, January 10, 1983, at the Office of the Soviet Trade Representative.

Attachment:

Tab A Previous memoranda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ALR 748-23-44J-9
BY EA HARADATE/8/3

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171358	MEMO DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY	1	2/17/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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1078

171359

21

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 22, 1983


DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
 THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
 THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
 THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
 COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
 THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
 NATIONS
 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

NLRR 748-23-44-7-7
 BY KDB NARA DATE 4/8/03

SUBJECT: Official Contacts with the Soviet Embassy by
 Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials (U)

Recently, several unauthorized visits to the Soviet Embassy by United States Government officials have taken place. I would like to reaffirm the Administration's policy on such contacts. As part of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, restrictions were placed on social meetings with Soviet officials. Specifically, contacts with the Embassy were limited to the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and to those officials with routine working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to these guidelines has been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs who has each year been designated as the senior U.S. Government representative at the Soviet national day reception. I urge that all high-level officials affected by these restrictions strictly adhere to the Administration's policies. (C)


 William P. Clark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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1078
22



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United States Department of State

NLRR 748-2344-8-6

Washington, D.C. 20520

BY KDK NARA DATE 12/15/05

February 15, 1983

171361

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE S


SUBJECT: Official Contacts with the Soviet Embassy by
Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials

BACKGROUND

As part of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan, restrictions were placed on social contacts with Soviet officials. In Washington the level of USG official permitted social contact with the Soviet Embassy and its associated offices was limited to Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and specifically to officials with regular working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to this has been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who has each year been designated as the senior USG representative at the Soviet national day reception. Senior officials have understood this policy and until recently strictly adhered to it.

However, the Department learned of two breaches of this policy when two Executive Branch officials above the Deputy Assistant Secretary level recently attended a reception given by an element of the Soviet Embassy.

We regularly remind other agencies of this policy and provide guidance if requested. It may be timely, however, for the White House to issue a reminder of the policy at the Cabinet level. Such a reminder might also serve to quiet speculation about a change in our stance toward the Soviets in response to their change of leadership.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 22, 1983

1196

Jmp -
741
Bud ho
orig
HW
23

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *b*

SUBJECT: Request by Ambassador Morton Abramowitz for
Appointment with You

I believe it would be useful politically and substantively if you would grant Morton Abramowitz (U.S. MBFR) his request for a brief office appointment sometime before March 1/2.

Sven Kraemer, Dennis *DK* Blair and I could sit in with you if you like.

SD
Sven Kraemer and Dennis Blair concur.

Atch

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES 12/15/85 (20)

Subject: NSC #8301078

2x

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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ADMINISTRATOR, NASA 400 Maryland Avenue, SW				
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CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1717 H. Street, NW				
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ADMINISTRATOR, NATL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) 1800 G Street, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) 800 Independence Avenue, SW (DOT)				
MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR (Dept. of Transportation) 400 7th Street, SW.....				
MR. EDWIN MEESE III, COUNSELLOR 1st Floor, West Wing	1	gone	to	BM
MR. JAMES BAKER III, CHIEF OF STAFF 1st Floor, West Wing	1	gone	to	BM
MR. MICHAEL DEEVER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 1st Floor, West Wing				
MR. EDWIN HARPER, POLICY DEVELOPMENT 2nd Floor, West Wing				
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MR. RICHARD DARMAN Ground Floor, West Wing.....				
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McFarlane | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Helm | <input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Myer | <input type="checkbox"/> Capt. Sims |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Adm. Poindexter | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kemp | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nau | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sommer |
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THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.	1			
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DIRECTOR, USIA 1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW	1			
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR) Rm 209 Winder Bldg 17&F St NW	1			
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street, SW				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS) 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
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The Pentagon	1			
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Room 5933/Dept of State				
CHAIRMAN, US START DELEGATION				
C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR CIA				
Langley, VA/or Pickup	1	2/22	11:20	
CHAIRMAN, JCS				
The Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE				
14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851.	1			
DIRECTOR, OMB				
Room 252 OEOb	1			
DIRECTOR AID				
Room 5942 New State				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY				
GA257, Forrestal Bldg.	1			
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION				
400 7th Street S.W.	1			
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS				
Room 6333/State Dept.	1			
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL				
10TH/Const. NW, Room 5119	1			
DIRECTOR OSTP				
Room 380, OEOb				25X1
DIRECTOR, USIA				
1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR				
18th & E. Street NW	1			
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE				
Independence & 14th SW	1			
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR)				
Rm 209 Winder Bldg 17&F St NW	1			
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA				
500 C Street, SW				
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8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
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29

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
12/15/18 C/AS

RECEIVED 15 FEB 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM EAGLEBURGER, L

DOCDATE 15 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF EAGLEBURGER MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN ON 28 JAN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

REF# 8302894

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The White House**

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545 II
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FEB 1 5 1983

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>LENCZOWSKI</u> <u>DOBRIANSKY</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>I</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Shall I show this to Dobriansky?

YES NO

Lenchowster

YES NO

[initials]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SY-11
90170 M

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Bill Clark - The Secretary
asked that I make
a specific effort to
brief you on his talk
with Dob. Here is the
memo; I'll be glad
to go into more detail
if you wish. llc

32



United States Department of State

SYSTEM II
90170

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NLRR 748-23-44-10-3

Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

171363

DIST:
S
D
S/S
NSC(e.o. Clark)

~~SECRET~~

BY KDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

WPC HAS SEEN

Subject: US-Soviet Relations

Participants: Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
DCM Alexander Bessmertnykh

The Secretary
Under Secretary Eagleburger
Assistant Secretary Burt, Designate

Date: January 28, 1983 Time: 12:30 p.m.

Place: The Secretary's Office

* * * * *

Dobrynin joined the Secretary for lunch and an informal, wide-ranging discussion of US-Soviet relations. After a private meeting with Dobrynin the Secretary and Dobrynin joined others for lunch. Present were on the American side, Lawrence Eagleburger and Richard Burt and on the Soviet side, Alexander Bessmertnykh. The Secretary briefly summarized the private meeting by saying that the two had agreed to meet regularly on US and Soviet questions, including arms control, regional issues and bilateral questions. They had surveyed the various exchanges now under way in Geneva, Madrid and Vienna, as well as the discussions that had been held earlier on non-proliferation and southern Africa. They had agreed that a Foreign Ministers' meeting should probably be held sometime before the next UNGA, but that it was too early to suggest a specific date. They had also agreed on the general desirability of a U.S.-Soviet summit, but that it was the U.S. view that such a meeting achieve concrete results. The Secretary asked Dobrynin whether this was a fair summation of their private dialogue and Dobrynin agreed.

Dobrynin then went on at length about his conception of the best way to do business on arms control. He felt little progress in arms control negotiations had been made thus far. It was important to have a channel in which to resolve difficult problems; this could be the Shultz-Gromyko channel. The negotiators in Geneva did not have sufficient flexibility to resolve major problems. Nitze tried but did not succeed. The experience of the past ten years showed that when major problems arose, the Foreign Ministers were required to meet and resolve them. It was then left to the negotiators to put the results into treaty language.

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-2-

The Secretary did not rule out the possibility of discussing INF and START in the Shultz-Gromyko channel, but noted the US preference for conducting the negotiations in Geneva and added that with new rounds beginning in both negotiations, that it made sense now to see what developed in the talks before deciding how to treat arms control in any future Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

Turning to the issue of bilateral relations, Dobrynin proposed that progress between the two sides might be made by expanding areas of bilateral cooperation. During recent consultations in Moscow, Dobrynin said, Andropov asked him what the Reagan Administration had done in a positive sense in US-Soviet relations. Had the Americans agreed to even one thing? Dobrynin said he had to answer no. Dobrynin pointed out that over the course of the past year a number of bilateral agreements had lapsed. He suggested that perhaps we should now consider making an inventory of bilateral agreements, with each side listing bilateral agreements and less formal undertakings under such categories as "cancelled," "lapsed," "ongoing," and "close to agreement." The Secretary agreed and suggested that such lists might be discussed at his next meeting with Dobrynin -- perhaps in late February. Dobrynin agreed and said that he would be in touch with Eagleburger next week on this project.

Dobrynin said there were a number of other bilateral talks in the national security area that were also worth exploring, such as discussion of radiological weapons, chemical weapons, conventional arms transfers, and Indian Ocean naval deployments. The Secretary was noncommittal.

Dobrynin then listed a number of broader issues that in his opinion were topical, including the CSCE meeting in Madrid, South Africa, the Middle East, nonproliferation, and the Warsaw Pact's recent Prague Declaration. Concerning Madrid, Dobrynin said only that he had recently met with US delegation chief Max Kampelman. Dobrynin characterized the several bilateral exchanges on South Africa as "not bad." The Secretary noted that these exchanges so far had resulted in little, but agreed that they probably should be continued as circumstances warranted.

On the Middle East, which Dobrynin characterized as a "sacred area" for the United States, the two sides should consider bilateral talks that would be given little or no publicity. The Secretary said that he and Gromyko had already discussed the Middle East at length, as had Secretary Haig and Gromyko, and indicated that the United States was not prepared to go beyond those discussions.

The Secretary agreed with Dobrynin that the Washington bilaterals on nonproliferation had been useful and should be continued. Dobrynin said he would like to talk about the Prague Declaration, which contained many good ideas. He complained that so far,

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-3-

Washington had ignored the proposals contained in the communique. The Secretary said he would be willing to listen if Dobrynin wished to discuss that matter at their next meeting.

The Secretary stressed there were other regional issues of importance to the United States that must remain on the agenda. These included Poland, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and Central America. Dobrynin said that he would be willing to address these in future meetings.

In addition, the Secretary continued, human rights issues were in our view also central to the relationship. They were an "historic issue" for the United States. During the Vice President's meeting with Andropov in Moscow last November, Andropov had underscored the importance of noninterference in internal affairs. We understood that concern. But for the United States, human rights was a question of major importance, and would remain so. These issues, such as the situation of Soviet Jewry, should be handled in a practical way, without publicity. Dobrynin commented that issues of this sort were most easily resolved in a climate of overall improvement in the relationship and noted the negative impact that the Jackson Amendment had had on Soviet emigration.

Summing up, Dobrynin characterized arms control negotiations as by far the most important area for progress, and indicated that in addition to surveying bilateral agreements, START and INF should be on the list of discussion topics for the next meeting.

The Secretary said that although the primary negotiations should remain in Geneva, he would not object if Dobrynin wished to discuss START and INF. While not as important, confidence-building measures comprised an area where relatively early accomplishments were possible. At the same time, human rights and regional issues must also remain on the agenda.

At the conclusion, Eagleburger reminded everyone that Bessmertnykh would soon be leaving for Moscow to head the U.S. department in the Soviet MFA. All Americans present wished him luck.

Drafted: EUR:RBurt^{RB}
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Cleared: P:LSEagleburger^{ME}

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RECEIVED 22 FEB 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM SHULTZ, G ^{12/15/15 COB}

DOCDATE 15 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SHULTZ - AMB DOBRYNIN MEMCON RE US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390170 NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

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2/6
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SIT900 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 049/1628Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST...BLAIR FOR ACTIONDISSEM.ER DISSEM.

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MESSAGE:

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P 181533Z FEB 83
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NLRR 74823-44-11-2
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3530

- INFO SECDEF WASHDC
- USIA WASHDC 3509
- USMISSION USNATO 3292
- USMISSION GENEVA 6688
- AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4762
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- AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0173
- IUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 8046
- AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8955
- AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8552
- AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4642
- AMEMBASSY SOFIA 8024
- AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8712
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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LIMDIS
USINF/USSTART
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PINF
SUBJECT: ARBATOV-STOESSEL CONVERSATION ON ANDROPOV,
- POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, MILITARY DECISION-
- MAKING
REF: MOSCOW 1909 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY: IN A PRIVATE MEETING WITH CHIEF OF U.S. UNA SUBGROUP ON ARMS CONTROL, WALTER STOESSEL, USA/CANADA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV SHARED A FEW "IMPRESSIONS" OF ANDROPOV. THEY WERE PREDICTABLY FLATTERING. ARBATOV SEEMED DETERMINED TO DASH EVERY HINT OF A POWER STRUGGLE, PAST OR PRESENT, SAYING THAT THE SUCCESSION HAD BEEN DETERMINED LAST MAY

AND THAT ANDROPOV, NOT CHERNENKO, WAS BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL CHOICE AS SUCCESSOR. THE INSTITUTE DIRECTOR REFUSED TO SPECULATE ON WHO THE NEXT SOVIET PRESIDENT WILL BE, BUT DID SAY THAT, BESIDES ANDROPOV, THE KEY DECISION MAKERS ARE USTINOV, CHERNENKO, GORBACHEV, AND GROMYKO. ARBATOV ALSO APPEARED TO TAKE PAINS TO SCOTCH ANY RUMORS OF ANDROPOV'S ILL HEALTH. ON QUESTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STOESSEL'S SOVIET INTERLOCUTOR REPEATED OLD REFRAINS. END SUMMARY.
STOESSEL MEETING WITH ANDROPOV

2. (C) IN REPLY TO AN EARLIER REQUEST BY STOESSEL TO MEET WITH ANDROPOV, USA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV FEBRUARY 16 SAID THAT ANDROPOV WOULD BE UNABLE TO DO THIS. ANDROPOV HAS A HIGH REGARD FOR STOESSEL BECAUSE OF HIS PREVIOUS SERVICE IN THE USSR, BUT TO SEE HIM WOULD "OPEN A PANDORA'S BOX." ARBATOV SAID HE WOULD SEE ANDROPOV SOON, AND ASKED WHETHER STOESSEL HAD ANY MESSAGE. STOESSEL REPLIED, TELL HIM THE U. S. HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS.
ANDROPOV

3. (C) IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH STOESSEL AND HELMUT SONNENFELDT, ARBATOV DISCUSSED ANDROPOV AND THE LEADERSHIP:
- ... THE MAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- ANDROPOV IS A DISCIPLINED MAN, A HARD WORKER.
- HE IS WELL PREPARED AND KNOWS INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. HE IS A VERY GOOD DRAFTER, "BETTER THAN HIS SPEECHWRITERS." ANDROPOV IS AN INTELLIGENT AND ABLE MAN WHO "UNDERSTANDS."
- HE KNOWS THE SCORE.
- ANDROPOV NOW ENGAGES IN NO SPORTS. HE DOES CALISTHENICS, HOWEVER, FOR AN HOUR EVERY MORNING. ON THE WEEKENDS ANDROPOV LIKES TO GO TO THE COUNTRY AND TAKE WALKS. HIS SON SAYS IT IS HARD TO KEEP UP WITH HIS FATHER.
- --ANDROPOV HAD A HEARTATTACK IN THE 1950S.

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3531

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LIMDIS
USINF/USSTART

- HE IS NOW OKAY. HE HAS SOME HEALTH PROBLEMS,
- WHICH IS NORMAL FOR A MAN HIS AGE. GENERALLY,
- HOWEVER, HE IS OKAY AND VIGOROUS.
- --WHEN ARBATOV WORKED FOR ANDROPOV IN THE
- CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT, ANDROPOV
- STUDIED ENGLISH EVERY MORNING, FROM 0800 TO
- 1000. HE WAS "UNAPPROACHABLE" AT THAT TIME.
- ARBATOV USED TO GIVE HIM DETECTIVE STORIES
- IN ENGLISH TO READ. ANDROPOV HAD NO PROBLEM
- READING POLITICAL ARTICLES IN ENGLISH.
- --ANDROPOV COULD UNDERSTAND ENGLISH WELL, AND
- SPEAK FAIRLY WELL, BUT HE WAS NOT CONFIDENT
- OF HIS ABILITY. ARBATOV DOES NOT KNOW
- WHETHER ARBATOV KEPT UP HIS ENGLISH WHILE

- AT THE KGB.
- ...AND SUCCESSION

- --ANDROPOV WAS BREZHNEV'S CHOICE AS NUMBER 2
- AND SUCCESSOR. CHERNENKO WAS NEVER IN THIS ROLE.
- --ANDROPOV OCCUPIED SUSLOV'S OFFICE AFTER
- SUSLOV DIED--CHERNENKO HAS IT NOW.
- --ANDROPOV CHAIRED POLITBURO MEETINGS WHEN
- BREZHNEV WAS ABSENT--CHERNENKO CHAIRED
- WHEN ANDROPOV WAS ABSENT.
- --THE SUCCESSION WAS DECIDED IN MAY AFTER
- SUSLOV'S DEATH AND BREZHNEV'S SICKNESS IN
- TASHKENT.

MILITARY DECISIONMAKING

4. (C) STOESEL ASKED WHETHER ANDROPOV IS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE COUNCIL. ARBATOV ANSWERED THAT HE ASSUMES ANDROPOV IS, ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NEVER BEEN ANNOUNCED. "ANDROPOV IS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES." (THE USA INSTITUTE'S GEN. LT. MILSHTYEN, WHEN ASKED BY ANOTHER U. S. UNA PARTICIPANT ABOUT ANDROPOV CHAIRING THE DEFENSE COUNCIL, REPLIED, "HE IS THE GENERAL SECRETARY, ISN'T HE?")

5. (C) STOESEL ASKED ARBATOV ABOUT BREZHNEV'S OCTOBER 27 SPEECH TO THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ARBATOV SAID THIS WAS A "NORMAL THING." USUALLY SUCH A SPEECH IS GIVEN EVERY YEAR. THERE WAS SOMETHING IN BREZHNEV'S SPEECH FOR EVERYONE. IT WAS NO BIG DEAL. ARBATOV SAID THAT ANDROPOV IS NOT A BIG EXPERT ON ARMS CONTROL, BUT HE KNOWS THE SUBJECT WELL. AS A POLITBURO MEMBER, HE HAS BEEN IN ON ALL THE DECISIONS.
CHERNENKO

MOSCOW 2077

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2077 05901 DTG:181533Z FEB 83 PSN: 052271
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUEHMO #2077/03 0491552
P 181533Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3532

INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 3511
USMISSION USNATO 3294
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AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4764
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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LIMDIS
USINF/USSTART

6. (C) ARBATOV DESCRIBED CHERNENKO AS NOT A BAD
MAN. HIS SPEECHES WERE THOUGHTFUL AND GOOD.
ALTHOUGH THEY WERE DONE BY SPEECHWRITERS,
CHERNENKO SHOULD GET THE CREDIT FOR GIVING HIS
SPEECHWRITERS GOOD GUIDANCE.
TOP DECISIONMAKERS

7. (C) ST0ESSEL ASKED ARBATOV WHO WERE THE TOP
DECISIONMAKERS, THOSE IN ON ALL THE MAJOF
DECISIONS. ARBATOV SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO
ANDROPOV THERE WERE FOUR: USTINOV, CHERNENKO,
GORBACHEV, AND GROMYKO. ARBATOV SAID HE WAS

HIGH ON GORBACHEV. HE IS A MAN WHO IS ABLE TO
COPE. HE IS BRILLIANT.

8. (C) RYZHKOV IS ALSO VERY GOOD, ARBATOV SAID.
SLYUNKOV, WHO HAS BEEN SENT TO BYELORUSSIA AS THE
NEW FIRST SECRETARY, IS A SUPERB ORGANIZER AND
GOOD MAN. IT'S A SHAME, ARBATOV SAID, THAT HE
WAS SENT AWAY FROM MOSCOW, BUT HE WILL COME BACK.
ARBATOV DESCRIBED DOLGIKH AS ALSO VERY GOOD. HE
WAS LONG IN THE SHADOW OF KIRILENKO, BUT HE
WILL DO ALL RIGHT. TIKHONOV IS A GOOD MAN, BUT
VERY OLD. ARBATOV SAID THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN
MANY POSTS IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS.
THERE ARE SO MANY OLD PEOPLE. IN RESPONSE TO A
QUESTION ABOUT WHO WOULD ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY,
ARBATOV PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW.
ANDROPOV AND THE ECONOMY

9. (C) AS FOR ECONOMIC ISSUES, ARBATOV SAID
ANDROPOV IS "BORING INTO THE PROBLEMS." HE WILL
BE EFFECTIVE. BREZHNEV MADE MANY DECISIONS, BUT
HE DIDN'T FOLLOW THEM UP. ANDROPOV WILL. THOSE
WHO DON'T PERFORM WILL BE SACKED.

10. (C) ARBATOV SAID THAT WHAT ANDROPOV IS DOING
NOW WITH THE ECONOMY IS PLUGGING GAPS. BIGGER
CHANGES IN THE PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MINISTRIES WILL COME. ST0ESSEL POINTED TO THE
NEED FOR INCENTIVES; MORE CONSUMER GOODS, WHICH IN
TURN WOULD AFFECT RESOURCE ALLOCATION. ST0ESSEL
SAID THIS WOULD REQUIRE TOUGH DECISIONS. ARBATOV
SAID ANDROPOV KNOWS THIS AND IS READY TO MAKE SUCH
DECISIONS. MUCH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE SHORT-
TERM BY TIGHTENING UP. THIS WILL ACHIEVE BETTER
COORDINATION OF PRODUCTION. FOR EXAMPLE, BETTER
HANDLING OF GRAIN TRANSPORT AND STORAGE CAN ACHIEVE
GAINS WITHOUT A BIG INVESTMENT.
HUMANITARIAN CASES

MOSCOW 2077

05901 DTG:181533Z FEB 83 PSN: 052271

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2077 05901 DTG: 181533Z FEB 83 PSN: 052281
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHMO #2077/04 0491553
P 181533Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3533

- INFO SECDEF WASHDC
- USIA WASHDC 3512
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- USMISSION GENEVA 6691
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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LIMDIS
USINF/USSTART

11. (C) STOESSEL PRESSED ARBATOV AGAIN ON HUMANITARIAN CASES (REFTEL). IT WOULD BE A GOOD MOVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO DO SOMETHING ON SHCHARANSKIY AND SAKHAROV. ARBATOV SAID THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE NOW. ANDROPOV WILL REVIEW CASES OF THIS KIND. IF THE PERSONS ARE NOT GUILTY, THEY WILL BE FREED; IF THEY ARE GUILTY, THEY WILL NOT BE FREED. ANDROPOV WILL NOT BE SWAYED BY PUBLIC PRESSURE. "HE WILL DO WHAT'S RIGHT."

12. (C) REPEATING A FAMILIAR REFRAIN, ARBATOV SAID THAT PAST SOVIET EXPERIENCE WITH ACTION ON HUMANI-

TARIAN CASES HAS BEEN BAD. THE US USES SUCH CASES FOR PROPAGANDA. STOESSEL REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE OUR PURPOSE. ARBATOV SAID HE WAS NOT CONVINCED.
EAGLEBURGER REMARKS AND US-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS

13. (C) ARBATOV SAID HE WAS FURIOUS ABOUT UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER'S REMARKS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM. ARBATOV SHOWED STOESSEL A TASS REPORT LABELED "TOP SECRET" (SOVERSHENNO SEKRETYI). IT CONTAINED EAGLEBURGER'S REMARKS. STOESSEL ASKED WHY A TASS REPORT WOULD BE TOP SECRET. ARBATOV RESPONDED THAT IT WAS BECAUSE THE REMARKS WERE SO ANTI-SOVIET.

14. (C) ARBATOV READ FROM THE TASS REPORT. HE SAID THAT EAGLEBURGER ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE ENEMY OF ALL MANKIND. ARBATOV ASKED HOW CAN THE US EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO MOVE WHEN LANGUAGE LIKE THIS IS USED.

15. (C) STOESSEL SAID THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO COMMUNICATE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, SUCH AS THROUGH LETTERS. ARBATOV SAID THAT SUCH COMMUNICATIONS WERE USEFUL ONLY IF THEY CONTAINED SOME SUBSTANCE. OTHERWISE, THEY WOULD BE SEEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS A PROPAGANDA EFFORT.
ARBATOV

16. (C) ARBATOV SAID HE HEADED A CONSULTING GROUP FOR ANDROPOV WHEN THE LATTER WAS IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT IN THE 1950S.

17. (U) PARAGRAPHS 2-16 WERE TAKEN FROM DETAILED WRITTEN NOTES PROVIDED BY AMBASSADOR STOESSEL.
EMBASSY COMMENT

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2077 05901 DTG: 181533Z FEB 83 PSN: 052280
SIT895 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 049/1626Z

LEADERSHIP HARMONY ORGANIZED AROUND ANDROPOV AND TO
DISCOUNT EVIDENCE OF FRICTIONS WITHIN THE "COLLECTIVE
LEADERSHIP." ZIMMERMANN

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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AMEMBASSY SOFIA 8028

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8716

USMLM BERLIN

USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2042

USNMR SHAPE BE

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

AMCONSUL Leningrad 0797

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 02077

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LIMDIS

USINF/USSTART

18. (C) ARBATOV'S COMMENTS ON ANDROPOV AND THE LEADERSHIP WERE, OF COURSE, NOT "DISINTERESTED." A FORMER PROTEGE OF ANDROPOV, ARBATOV WAS ROOTING FOR THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY EVEN PRIOR TO BREZHNEV'S DEATH. LEADERSHIP PROTOCOL RANKINGS, EXTENSIVE REVIEWS LAST FALL OF A CHERNENKO BOOK, THE LATTER'S SPEECH IN TBILISI IN LATE OCTOBER, AS WELL AS COMMENTS MADE BY A NUMBER OF SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS -- ALL BELIE ARBATOV'S ASSERTION THAT ANDROPOV WAS BREZHNEV'S CHOICE AS SUCCESSOR. A NUMBER OF SOVIET SOURCES ALSO TOLD US THAT IT WAS CHERNENKO, NOT ANDROPOV, WHO CHAIRED POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT MEETINGS WHEN BREZHNEV WAS NOT PRESENT. THESE STATEMENTS SERVE TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7758 0510021
O 200012Z FEB 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2685

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5139
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5595
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2284
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 6935
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BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 047758
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US, IS, SY
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN'S FEBRUARY 8 DEMARCHE
ON ISRAEL/SYRIA

REF: (A) STATE 04007; (B) MOSCOW 0267; (C) STATE 7750;
- - (D) STATE 038417

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT

1: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT CALLED IN SOVIET
EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELOR OLEG SOKOLOV FEBRUARY 19 TO
PROVIDE FURTHER U. S. RESPONSE, AS PROMISED BY UNDER
SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, TO DOBRYNIN'S FEBRUARY 8 DEMARCHE
(REF D) ON SOVIET PROVISION OF SA-5'S TO SYRIA, IN WHICH
SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

STRIKE AGAINST SYRIA. AFTER SUMMARIZING PREVIOUS
EXCHANGES (REFTELS), BURT MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- IN ALL CANDOR I MUST SAY THAT NOTHING WE HAVE LEARNED
IN OUR VARIOUS EXCHANGES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS
SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHES OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE
DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF THESE MISSILES. AS UNDER
SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER MENTIONED BEFORE, THE RANGE AND
CAPABILITY OF THESE WEAPONS MAKE THEM INHERENTLY
DESTABILIZING BECAUSE THEY CAN BE USED FROM SYRIA FOR
OPERATIONS WELL OUTSIDE SYRIAN TERRITORY. IT IS
THEREFORE DESIRABLE THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS NOT OCCUR.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE NOTED "THE FULL CONFIDENCE"
OF THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THESE MISSILES, IF DEPLOYED,
WOULD ONLY BE ; SED IN CERTAIN VERY LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

-- ALTHOUGH WE CAN IN NO WAY ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISRAELI ACTIONS OR INTENTIONS IN THIS MATTER, WE HAVE INFORMED THE ISRAELIS OF US-SOVIET EXCHANGES.

-- IN DOING SO WE HAVE CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELIS YOUR STATEMENTS ABOUT THE DEFENSIVE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THESE MISSILES WOULD BE DEPLOYED.

-- WHAT ASSURANCE DOES THE SOVIET UNION HAVE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL NOT USE THIS SYSTEM IRRESPONSIBLY?

3. IN RESPONSE, SOKOLOV, REITERATING POINTS MADE IN PREVIOUS EXCHANGES, SAID THAT THE MISSILES WERE MEANT FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND SOLELY TO PROTECT SYRIA FROM AIR ATTACKS FROM ISRAEL. HE ADDED THAT PREVIOUS SOVIET "ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN IN FULL AUTHORITY AND FULL CONFIDENCE BY OUR SIDE."

4. SOKOLOV ALSO ASKED BURT WHAT THE ISRAELI RESPONSE HAD BEEN TO THE INFORMATION THE U. S. HAD PROVIDED ON SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS. BURT RESPONDED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD CONTINUED TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS QUITE NATURAL FOR QUESTIONS TO REMAIN ABOUT THE CONCRETENESS OF SOVIET STATEMENTS ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS ISSUE AND ASKED IF THE SOVIETS COULD PROVIDE ANY MORE INFORMATION ON WHAT THEY HAD DONE TO ENSURE THAT THE MISSILE SYSTEMS WERE DEFENSIVE AND ONLY FOR USE IN A DIRECT STRIKE ON SYRIA.

5. SOKOLOV SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT OUR FURTHER COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS TO MOSCOW. WITH REFERENCE TO BURT'S STATEMENT ABOUT U. S. INFLUENCE OVER ISRAELI ACTIONS, HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS "PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE U. S. HAS ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO MAKE ISRAEL'S REACTION RESTRAINED."

6. BURT REPLIED, REPEATING AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER'S PREVIOUS STATEMENT TO DOBRYNIN, THAT WE DO NOT HAVE AS MUCH INFLUENCE OVER ISRAEL AS OTHERS SOMETIMES BELIEVE.
SHULTZ

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~~SECRET~~