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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/15/2015

File Folder USSR (2/3/83-2/10/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

306

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171329	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-43-1-4</i>	2	5/18/1983	B1
171330	MEMO	STEARMAN TO CLARK RE THOUGHTS ON U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-43-2-3</i>	1	2/3/1983	B1
171331	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO REAGAN RE ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR SUMMIT <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-43-3-2</i>	1	3/2/1981	B1
171332	REPORT	OBSERVATIONS ON A SUMMIT - WILLIAM L. STEARMAN <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-43-3-2</i>	2	ND	B1
171334	MEMO	R. PIPES TO R. ALLEN RE APPROACHES TO A SUMMIT MEETING <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-43-4-1</i>	2	2/26/1981	B1
171335	CABLE	STATE 33515 <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-43-5-0</i>	2	2/4/1983	B1
171336	CABLE	MOSCOW 1511 <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-43-6-9</i>	7	2/5/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171338	CABLE	MOSCOW 1559	5	2/8/1983	B1
171345	MEMO	M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY IN BERING SEA	1	2/8/1983	B1
171339	MEMO	M. GUHIN TO W. CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY IN BERING SEA	1	2/1/1983	B1
171340	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY IN BERING SEA R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-43-9-6	2	1/21/1983	B1
171341	MEMO	P. DUR THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE NEW EDITION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER (INCL. ATTACHMENTS) R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-43-10-4	7	2/9/1983	B1
171342	CABLE	STATE 38417 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-43-11-3	3	2/1/1983	B1
171343	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE DOBRYNIN'S DEMARCHE (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	4	2/10/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8390129

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/15/15 WDD

RECEIVED 03 FEB 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 03 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON US - USSR SUMMITRY

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

		2/11	Mafalone noted w/ comment		
Stearman	S	2/11	prepare memo for Clark		
Clark	X	5/19	for information		
Pres	IP	6/2	for information via PDB		
			Per noted		ST

JUN 02 1983

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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USSR (2/3/83-2-10-83)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171329	MEMO W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY	2	5/18/1983	B1

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System II
90129 (Redo)

MLL *N*
6/2
President has seen. p

51

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 18, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Summitry

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-43-1-4

BY COB NARA DATE 4/8/13

2
171329

We can expect continuing pressure for a Reagan-Andropov Summit from State, our allies and others. So far, the President has wisely resisted a summit until the Soviets demonstrate better intentions through concrete, positive actions. He should continue to hold the line for reasons explained below.

The President is, in a way, emulating Eisenhower's wise example. After Stalin's death in 1953, Eisenhower stated he would go to a summit if the Soviets agreed to: A German Peace Treaty, an Austrian State Treaty or significant arms control measures. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty in 1955 and a summit took place in Geneva a few months later. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" reinforced a Soviet detente campaign which was beginning to weaken NATO until detente ended with the Hungarian Revolution. At least Eisenhower made the Soviets pay a price for the summit.

The record of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being merely unnecessary to being nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) convinced Khrushchev that Kennedy could be pushed around, and the result was the Berlin Wall and later the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David, on the other hand, bought us valuable time needed to toughen our position on Berlin.

The 1961 Vienna summit illustrates a principal danger in summitry. There is bound to be an unbridgeable gulf between the mind-set of a Soviet leader and that of any American President. This compounds the danger of misunderstandings and miscalculations. This danger is further compounded by the fact that summits are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore, the serious and complex subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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CONFIDENTIAL

2

(9A)

The Soviets presently feign disinterest in a summit; however, they would probably leap at one were it offered. Summits help them promote detente and "peace" campaigns, provide a convenient propaganda platform, and are regarded by the Soviets as necessary reaffirmations of their co-equal status as a "super power." U.S. participation in a summit may temporarily buy the Administration some domestic and foreign political advantages, but can also backfire when unrealistic expectations are dashed by the usual absence of concrete results -- for which the U.S. may be blamed as much as the Soviets (or even more). Of course, this would not be the case if a summit only ratified agreements already concluded -- which is the only circumstance under which I feel a summit is warranted at all.

cc: John Lenczowski

CONFIDENTIAL

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**National Security Council
The White House**

531 k

Package # 90129

1815 P
FEB 03 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	X	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>
<u>STEARMAN</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

SI

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 3, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR 748-23-43-2-3

~~SECRET~~

BY 607 NARA DATE 4/8/13

RCM HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Thoughts on U.S.-Soviet Summitry

The President's "letter to Europe" was exactly the right approach to summitry: Do something concrete and significant, and then we'll meet. We should not, however, leave it at this. We must persist in publicizing and promoting this approach, because pressures are going to build here and abroad for a summit. It is clear from Andropov's reply to the President's letter that the Soviets still want a summit for political and propaganda reasons. (See text at Tab A.)

At Tab B are Dick Pipes' and my thoughts on summitry which went to the President early in this Administration. You might find them useful in countering pressures for a summit. I would add to my earlier comments the additional observation that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the mind-set of a Soviet leader and that of any American President. This compounds the danger of misunderstandings and miscalculations that can result from U.S.-Soviet summits. It was precisely this, for example, that produced the Cuban missile confrontation in 1962.

Attachments

- Tab A Andropov reply
- Tab B RVA memo to the President dtd March 2, 1981

See: Please Review & Security "Summit" memo - WLS

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

6



ANDROPOV REPLIES TO REAGAN DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

LD011636 Moscow TASS in English 1632 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS -- The newspaper PRAVDA for February 2 publishes the answers by Yuriy Andropov to questions by its correspondent.

Question: What is your attitude to the U.S. President's letter to the people of Europe, in which he proposed that the USSR and the United States sign on American terms an agreement on the elimination of medium-range land-based missiles?

Answer: First of all, I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about -- and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of -- is the same "zero option". That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognised. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category.

It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure.

As I have already said, the U.S.S.R. will not agree to unilateral disarmament. If things are carried to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, we shall answer this in a due way. But this would not be our choice.

In so far as
The Soviet Union is for a different road. It would be best, and we suggest this, not to have in the European zone nuclear weapons at all, either medium-range or tactical weapons. And seems [as received] the United States does not agree to this, we are prepared also to such a solution under which the Soviet Union would have no more missiles than NATO already has in Europe. At the same time an arrangement should be reached on cutting to the equal levels by both sides of the number of aircraft capable of medium-range nuclear weapon delivery. Thus, there would be complete parity in missiles and aircraft, and the parity at a far lower level than now.

The Soviet Union is prepared to sign such an agreement. Is the President of the United States prepared to sign such an agreement based on the principle of "equality and equal security"?

Question: The U.S. President suggests meeting with you to sign the agreement which he proposes. What can you say on this score?

Answer: We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have special significance to resolving complicated problems. This determines our serious approach to them.

For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game. A meeting between the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at developing relations between our countries, would be useful both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe and to the whole world.

- But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted.

[Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 2 February carries on page 1 the above interview with Yuriy Andropov. The interview in PRAVDA, entitled "Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's Replies to a PRAVDA's Correspondent's Questions" has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version and minus the TASS dateline and introductory paragraph has been found to be identical except for the following variation: Paragraph six, line three reads in PRAVDA: ...In so far as the United States... (substituting "in so far as" for "and seems [as received]")]

U.S.-USSR INF DELEGATIONS HOLD MEETING 1 FEB

LD011202 Moscow TASS in English 1142 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Geneva February 1 TASS -- The delegations from the Soviet Union and the United States held a plenary meeting here today at the talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe.

DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE SESSION OPENS IN GENEVA

LD011135 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Geneva February 1 TASS -- The 1983 12-week session of the Committee on Disarmament opened here today. The priority items on the agenda of the current session are talks on termination of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the problem of prevention of the arms race in outer space, an all-embracing programme of disarmament, a ban on radiological weapons, and the strengthening of guarantees of security for non-nuclear states.

The Committee on Disarmament is an important component of the international mechanism of multi-lateral talks on disarmament. (The) committee consists of five nuclear states (the PRC, the USA, France, Britain, and the USSR) and 35 other states including Algeria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Japan, Cuba, the GDR, Mongolia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Sweden and the FRG.

Israelyan Remarks on Session

LD011440 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Today the Disarmament Committee renewed its work at the Geneva Palace of Nations. Here is what Viktor Levonovich Israelyan, the head of the Soviet delegation at the committee said to our correspondent:

[Begin Israelyan recording] The session of the Disarmament Committee has opened in an aggravated international situation. The military preparations of the United States of America and its NATO allies have reached a huge scale.

a



ED

81 FEB 27 A 8: 26

JANET COLSON

[Handwritten signature]

BUD NANCE

[Handwritten signature]

DICK ALLEN

[Handwritten checkmark]

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

This is good stuff

11
re: 0792

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dr. Pipes - This paper
looks good to me
but would like to
have your comments to
go in to Dick

Bud Nauman
2/25/57

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President has seen _____

WASHINGTON

March 2, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-27-43-3-2

BY CZB NARA DATE 4/8/13

171331

OK
m
(3/9/81)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Analysis of Brezhnev Proposal for a Summit

Richard Pipes and William Stearman of the NSC Staff have provided a short analysis of the Brezhnev proposal for a summit, and conclude that it is not advisable.

While I concur, I thought you would benefit from the interesting historical framework which these two experts use to evaluate the matter.

Attachments

- Tab A - Observations on a Summit - William L. Stearman
- Additional Comments - Richard Pipes

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OBSERVATIONS ON A SUMMIT -- WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

171332

Brezhnev wants a summit meeting in order to resurrect detente and to slow down US and NATO defense improvements. If the President wants a summit, he might follow President Eisenhower's example and put a price tag on it.

Early in Eisenhower's Administration, he was faced with the issue of meeting with the post-Stalin leaders of the USSR. Churchill, for one, was pushing for a Four Power summit at this time. On April 16, 1953, Eisenhower made public a list of specific actions the USSR would have to take before the US would agree to a summit. These included arms control measures, a German Peace Treaty, and an Austrian State Treaty, any one of which would pay the price of admission. After eight years of stalling, the Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty, which was signed in May 1955 and resulted in the Geneva Summit that summer.

Actually, the record of US-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being unnecessary to nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) was largely responsible for both the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David turned out to be useful in stalling off Soviet action on Berlin until U-2 coverage revealed there was no "missile gap" which encouraged us to take a tougher stand on Berlin.

The Soviet leaders have looked upon summits as an essential element of their "detente" campaigns. The "Spirit of Geneva," the "Spirit of Camp David," the "Spirit of Glassboro" were touted as evidence of a "relaxation of tensions" (i.e. detente) and were designed, among other things, to lull the West into a false sense of security. A principal goal of Soviet detente moves has been to encourage NATO to decrease arms expenditures. They have usually followed periods of Soviet-induced tension which have resulted in increased Western defense efforts: 1949, after the airlift defeat of the Berlin Blockage and after the first SAC deployment to Europe; 1955 (actually beginning in 1953), after our huge Korean War buildup; 1963, after the failed Cuban missile caper and in recognition of the enormous US strategic advantage; 1971-72 to control US MIRV and ABM advantages and to gain increased access to Western technology and financing (among other things). Brezhnev's opening speech at the 26th CPSU Congress makes it quite clear that the Soviets want badly to resurrect detente in order to delay or fend off the announced US military buildup and concomitant strengthening of Western European defenses through TNF modernization, etc. Brezhnev's avowed eagerness to parley with us is the clear result of a tougher US stance vis-a-vis the USSR and an increased US defense budget.

Apart from providing the Soviet leadership with a convenient propaganda platform, summits present other intrinsic problems. They are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore the serious and complicated subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed. This, in turn, can lead (and has led) to misunderstandings and miscalculations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-43-3-2

BY EDS NARA DATE 9/8/13

Despite the pitfalls of summit meetings with the Soviets, it is probably unrealistic to expect the President to avoid them altogether. Since we established relations with the USSR, every US President has met with his Soviet counterpart (bilaterally beginning with Camp David). Presidents can scarcely resist the urge to size up their main opponent. In addition, I would imagine that our European allies, who live under the shadow of Soviet power, would not want us to reject Brezhnev's summit proposal out of hand.

If Eisenhower's example is followed, a number of summit price tags could be announced, for example:

- Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan (if we wanted to avoid a summit altogether);
- Withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Angola and Ethiopia;
- No Soviet assistance, direct or indirect, to revolutionaries in this Hemisphere;
- No direct Soviet military intervention in Poland;
- Conclusion of a satisfactory SALT III Treaty.

It goes without saying that any approach to the Soviets on a summit should be carefully worked out on an interagency basis here and then with our allies. For the time being, our public position on Brezhnev's proposal should remain strictly noncommittal.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS - RICHARD PIPES

I concur in general with Bill Stearman's assessment of Brezhnev's initiatives and his options. The Soviet leaders have shown every sign of exasperation with the Reagan Administration's casual attitude toward negotiations with them: in part, because such behavior deflates their global image as a "superpower" which the USA is required to take into account in all its foreign policy initiatives, and in part because it deprives Moscow of an opportunity to size up the new U. S. Government.

However, because the "negotiating process" is popular among left-of-center groups in Western Europe, it would not be prudent to dismiss Brezhnev's summit suggestion out of hand. "Interesting," "worthy of consideration" should be the U. S. reactions. In practice, the proposal should be shelved. There is no need for a summit, at any rate now or in the foreseeable future. Should the President nevertheless find a purely negative stance politically ill-advised, he may want to pose very high preconditions: sufficiently high ones to preclude a cosmetic concession on the part of Moscow which would look like a genuine peaceful gesture and make us look bad if we did not wind it up with a summit.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 26, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-434-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

BY KDJ NARA DATE 7/15/85
4/8/03

SUBJECT: Approaches to a Summit Meeting

A ddt. from comments by Richard Pipes

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*I agree.
That's what's
being done.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review February 26, 1987.

792 add-on 15
RP
171334

War buildup; 1963, after the failed Cuban missile caper and in recognition of the enormous US strategic advantage; 1971-72 to control US MIRV and ABM advantages and to gain increased access to Western technology and financing (among other things). Brezhnev's opening speech at the 26th CPSU Congress makes it quite clear that the Soviets want badly to resurrect detente in order to delay or fend off the announced US military buildup and concomitant strengthening of Western European defenses through TNF modernization, etc. Brezhnev's avowed eagerness to parley with us is the clear result of a tougher US stance vis-a-vis the USSR and an increased US defense budget.

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- Withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Angola and Ethiopia;
- No Soviet assistance, direct or indirect, to revolutionaries in this hemisphere;
- No direct Soviet military intervention in Poland;
- Conclusion of a satisfactory SALT III Treaty.

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/15/85

RECEIVED 25 FEB 81 12

TO ALLEN

FROM STEARMAN, W

DOC DATE 24 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

NATO

SUBJECT: APPROACHES TO A SUMMIT MTG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 26 FEB 81 STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

~~BEAVER~~

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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<i>Allen</i>	<i>x 2/26</i>	<i>for info</i>		
	<i>3/3</i>	<i>LVA rpt memo to Pres</i>		<i>EM, VP, JB</i>
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 3/3</i>	<i>for info</i>		
	<i>C 3/9</i>	<i>Pres has seen</i>		

DISPATCH

WATCH FILE

FILE

LA (C)

RP, [unclear], SL
LA (C)
cm

ANDROPOV REPLIES TO REAGAN DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

LD011636 Moscow TASS in English 1632 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS -- The newspaper PRAVDA for February 2 publishes the answers by Yuriy Andropov to questions by its correspondent.

Question: What is your attitude to the U.S. President's letter to the people of Europe, in which he proposed that the USSR and the United States sign on American terms an agreement on the elimination of medium-range land-based missiles?

Answer: First of all, I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about -- and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of -- is the same "zero option". That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognised. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category.

It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure.

As I have already said, the U.S.S.R. will not agree to unilateral disarmament. If things are carried to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, we shall answer this in a due way. But this would not be our choice.

In so far as
The Soviet Union is for a different road. It would be best, and we suggest this, not to have in the European zone nuclear weapons at all, either medium-range or tactical weapons. And seems [as received] the United States does not agree to this, we are prepared also to such a solution under which the Soviet Union would have no more missiles than NATO already has in Europe. At the same time an arrangement should be reached on cutting to the equal levels by both sides of the number of aircraft capable of medium-range nuclear weapon delivery. Thus, there would be complete parity in missiles and aircraft, and the parity at a far lower level than now.

The Soviet Union is prepared to sign such an agreement. Is the President of the United States prepared to sign such an agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security?

Question: The U.S. President suggests meeting with you to sign the agreement which he proposes. What can you say on this score?

Answer: We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have special significance to resolving complicated problems. This determines our serious approach to them.

For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game. A meeting between the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at developing relations between our countries, would be useful both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe and to the whole world.

But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted.

[Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 2 February carries on page 1 the above interview with Yuriy Andropov. The interview in PRAVDA, entitled "Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's Replies to a PRAVDA's Correspondent's Questions" has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version and minus the TASS dateline and introductory paragraph has been found to be identical except for the following variation: Paragraph six, line three reads in PRAVDA: ...In so far as the United States... (substituting "in so far as" for "and seems [as received]"]

U.S. -USSR INF DELEGATIONS HOLD MEETING 1 FEB

LD011202 Moscow TASS in English 1142 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Geneva February 1 TASS -- The delegations from the Soviet Union and the United States held a plenary meeting here today at the talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe.

DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE SESSION OPENS IN GENEVA

LD011135 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Geneva February 1 TASS -- The 1983 12-week session of the Committee on Disarmament opened here today. The priority items on the agenda of the current session are talks on termination of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the problem of prevention of the arms race in outer space, an all-embracing programme of disarmament, a ban on radiological weapons, and the strengthening of guarantees of security for non-nuclear states.

The Committee on Disarmament is an important component of the international mechanism of multi-lateral talks on disarmament. (The) committee consists of five nuclear states (the PRC, the USA, France, Britain, and the USSR) and 35 other states including Algeria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Japan, Cuba, the GDR, Mongolia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Sweden and the FRG.

Israelyan Remarks on Session

LD011440 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Today the Disarmament Committee renewed its work at the Geneva Palace of Nations. Here is what Viktor Levonovich Israelyan, the head of the Soviet delegation at the committee said to our correspondent:

[Begin Israelyan recording] The session of the Disarmament Committee has opened in an aggravated international situation. The military preparations of the United States of America and its NATO allies have reached a huge scale.

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

171335

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

NLRR 78-23-43-5-0

HCE876

OO RUEHC RUEHMO RUFH LG

DE RUEHC #3515 0360230

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O P 042336Z FEB 83

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2277

INFO RUFH LG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 5483

BT

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 033515

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SCUL, UR, US

SUBJECT: BILLY GRAHAM MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN

BY GDB NARA DATE ~~2/16/85~~
4/8/831. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BILLY GRAHAM SPECIAL ASSISTANT DR. JOHN AKERS BRIEFED EUR/SOV OFFS ON FEBRUARY 4 MEETING BETWEEN DR. GRAHAM AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN. SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR CHETVERIKOV HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT.

3. SUMMIT POSSIBILITIES. DOBRYNIN HAD VOLUNTEERED THAT A REAGAN-ANDROPOV SUMMIT WOULD BE A GOOD THING, BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE THE PRESIDENT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FIRST-HAND DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP - A LEARNING EXPERIENCE, AS IT WERE. HE SAID THAT ANDROPOV WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING. ACCORDING TO AKERS, DOBRYNIN DID NOT MAKE THE USUAL QUALIFICATIONS ABOUT NECESSARY PREPARATIONS OR PRECONDITIONS. WHEN DR. GRAHAM SUGGESTED A MEETING COULD BE WORTHWHILE EVEN WITHOUT A PRIOR AGENDA, DOBRYNIN GAVE NO RESPONSE.

4. DOBRYNIN WAS VERY CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S OPEN LETTER TO ANDROPOV, WHICH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH READ IN BERLIN. HE SAID THAT SUCH DEVICES ARE NOT HELPFUL, AND THAT SERIOUS PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PURSUED THROUGH PROPER DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

5. MOST OF DOBRYNIN'S QUESTIONS TO DR. GRAHAM INVOLVED THE U.S. POLITICAL SCENE AND THE INCREASING ROLE OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS. GRAHAM POINTED OUT THAT ANDROPOV HAS A REAL "IMAGE PROBLEM" WITH THE U.S. RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY BECAUSE OF HIS SUPPRESSION OF

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RELIGION IN THE USSR AS KGB HEAD.

6. GRAHAM RETURN TO USSR. AKERS SAID THAT DR. GRAHAM CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTED IN A PREACHING VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH THIS HAD NOT BEEN RAISED DIRECTLY IN THE DOBRYNIN MEETING. TWO GRAHAM REPRESENTATIVES, DR. HARASZTI AND DR. WALTER SMITH, WILL BE GOING TO THE USSR IN LATE MARCH FOR A 10-14 DAY EXPLORATORY VISIT TO PLACES THAT DR. GRAHAM MIGHT GO. AKERS SPECIFICALLY CITED TASHKENT, TBILISI, ALMA-ATA, AND NOVOSIBIRSK.

7. SOVIET BAPTIST "PEACE CONFERENCE." HARASZTI AND SMITH WILL BE INVITEES OF THE ALL-UNION COUNCIL OF BAPTISTS, WHICH IS HOSTING A "PEACE CONFERENCE" IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 28. AKERS' IMPRESSION IS THAT THIS IS A REGULAR EVENT SPONSORED BY VARIOUS REGISTERED BAPTIST GROUPS IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND HE DID NOT THINK OTHER DENOMINATIONS WOULD PARTICIPATE. WESTERN PARTICIPATION IS DOUBTFUL, ALTHOUGH TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAPTIST WORLD ALLIANCE, AN INTERNATIONAL BODY HEADQUARTERED IN NEW YORK, ARE EXPECTED TO ATTEND.

8. EMBASSY PENTECOSTALISTS. GRAHAM AND DOBRYNIN DID NOT DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. AKERS TOLD EUR/SOV, HOWEVER, THAT A GRAHAM RETURN TO THE USSR WOULD BE "EXTREMELY DIFFICULT" IF THE PENTECOSTALISTS' SITUATION REMAINED UNRESOLVED. DEPTOFFS ENCOURAGED AKERS TO ENSURE THAT THIS POINT WAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS. DAM

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PAGE 1 - 589

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83/1047

1-71336

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE003
 STU1956
 OO RUEHC
 DE RUEHMO #1511/01 0360952
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 050950Z FEB 83
 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3091
 INFO RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 9538

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 14823-43-6-9BY GD/S NARA DATE 4/8/13

BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 01511
 EXDIS

USIAEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: TNUC, UR, SCSA, US, PARM, IAEA

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION

REF: 82 STATE 355858 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS TOLD US FEBRUARY 4 THEY WILL PROBABLY AGREE TO ANOTHER ROUND OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION IN JUNE. THEY APPEAR UNUSUALLY SOLICITOUS OF U. S. NEEDS IN IAEA AT THE MOMENT, AND STATE FLATLY THAT CONTINUED U. S. PARTICIPATION, FULL PARTICIPATION, IS "ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL" TO THE NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF THE AGENCY. THEY BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF CONGRESSIONAL INSISTENCE ON IAEA CERTIFICATION OF FULL ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP, AND GAVE US THEIR THOUGHTS ON IT. THEY AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE INFORMAL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BEFORE GOVERNORS' MEETINGS IN VIENNA SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO AGENDA ITEMS, BUT ADD THAT THERE ARE ITEMS NOT ON THE AGENDA WHICH REQUIRE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEAREST FUTURE. WE OF COURSE DREW THEIR ATTENTION TO THE ABSENCE AT THIS POINT OF ANY FIRM U. S. DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN IAEA MEETINGS. END SUMMARY.

3. SCIENCE COUNSELOR FOR PAST WEEK HAD BEEN TRYING FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MOROZOV TO PASS MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTTEL, BUT WHEN TOLD IT WOULD BE ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE MOROZOV COULD RECEIVE HIM, ACCEPTED A MEETING FEBRUARY 4 WITH M. N. RYZHOV AND A. N. ROGOV, TWO OF MOROZOV'S DEPUTIES. (MOROZOV, IT TURNS OUT, HAS BEEN ILL - SEE BELOW.) SCIENCE COUNSELOR GAVE

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RYZHOV THE FOLLOWING NON-PAPER, DRAWN FROM REFTEL,
AND ASKED THAT IT BE PASSED TO MOROZOV:

BEGIN TEXT:

DURING THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION
IN WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MOROZOV
INVITED THE U. S. SIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN A FURTHER
ROUND OF SUCH TALKS IN MOSCOW LATE IN 1983. AMBASSADOR
KENNEDY ANSWERED THAT WE WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THE
IDEA OF ANOTHER SESSION AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME.
SUCH A TIME COULD OCCUR IN JUNE, RATHER THAN WAITING
UNTIL LATER IN THE YEAR. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR
AMBASSADOR KENNEDY AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION
TO COME TO MOSCOW AS A CONTINUATION OF THEIR TRIP
TO VIENNA FOR THE IAEA GOVERNORS' MEETING SCHEDULED
DURING THAT MONTH. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE MEETING,
WHEN HELD, WOULD AVOID DEALING WITH DETAILED IAEA
TOPICS, EXCEPT WHEN STRICTLY USEFUL AND NECESSARY,
AND WOULD MAINTAIN THE BROAD POLICY FOCUS OF THE
DISCUSSIONS HELD IN DECEMBER.
END TEXT.

4. RYZHOV, SPEAKING AS IF HE WERE IN CHARGE OF SUCH
MATTERS IN MOROZOV'S ABSENCE, SAID HE COULD SEE NO
REASON WHY THE MEETING COULD NOT BE HELD IN JUNE,
IF THE U. S. THOUGHT THAT WOULD BE USEFUL. HE SAID
IT WOULD BE THE STATE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION
TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES THAT IT BE HELD AS THE U. S.
NON-PAPER SUGGESTED. HE ASKED IF THE U. S. HAD
SPECIAL ISSUES WHICH REQUIRED DISCUSSION BY JUNE.
SCIENCE COUNSELOR ANSWERED THAT WE BELIEVED IT
WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SUCH MEETINGS MORE OFTEN
THAN ONCE A YEAR, AND HAD THEREFORE SUGGESTED THE
POSSIBILITY OF JUNE. RYZHOV SAID HE WOULD REPLY
OFFICIALLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. SCIENCE COUNSELOR TOLD RYZHOV THAT WE H
RECEIVED SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET
DELEGATION TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING IN
VIENNA LATER THIS MONTH WOULD LIKE TO MEET BEFORE-
HAND WITH THE U. S. DELEGATION. SCIENCE COUNSELOR
EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED OUR
REASSESSMENT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE AGENCY, AND
WERE THEREFORE UNCERTAIN WE WOULD BE THERE AT ALL.
HOWEVER, IF WE WERE TO ATTEND, WHAT SORT OF
CONSULTATIONS DID THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND? THE
U.S. BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO COVER BROADER

SENSITIVE

2x

PAGE 1 - 591

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83/1047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TOPICS IN OUR CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND
MOSCOW, RESTRICTING OUR DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA TO
BT
#1511
NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE004

STU1957

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHMO #1511/02 0360953

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 050950Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3092

INFO RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 9539

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 01511

EXDIS

USIAEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: TNUC, UR, SCSA, US, PARM, IAEA

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION
IAEA-RELATED TOPICS.

6. RYZHOV CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INDEED BEEN INTERESTED IN A MEETING BEFORE THE BOG, BUT SAID CHANGES IN SOVIET INTERNAL SCHEDULES NOW MADE IMPOSSIBLE ANYTHING VERY AMBITIOUS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WILL NOT ARRIVE IN VIENNA UNTIL FEBRUARY 20, ONLY ONE WORKING DAY BEFORE THE BOG. BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WILL NEVERTHELESS STILL BE USEFUL - INDEED NECESSARY- BUT THEY WILL HAVE TO TAKE PLACE INFORMALLY.

7. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS AGREE THAT THERE IS SOME UTILITY IN KEEPING THE MOSCOW-WASHINGTON FORUM SEPARATE FROM IAEA-ASSOCIATED DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA. SOME SEPARATION IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TWO FORA HAS ALREADY BEGUN WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY, AND CONSIDERATION IS EVEN BEING GIVEN TO HAVING DIFFERENT HEADS OF DELEGATION.

8. HE CONTINUED THAT THERE NEVERTHELESS WERE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH WERE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO IAEA BUT WHICH WE SHOULD DISCUSS BILATERALLY IN VIENNA EVEN IF WE DO DECIDE TO MEET IN JUNE. PRIMARY AMONG THEM ARE THE ZANGGER AND LONDON LISTS AND IPS, BUT SUCH MATTERS AS PUNE COULD ALSO BEAR A FULLER DISCUSSION.

9. RYZHOV THEN CHANGED GEARS, MOVING DIRECTLY INTO CONTINUED U. S. PARTICIPATION IN IAEA. HE ASKED IF THE SCIENCE COUNSELOR WAS CURRENT ON THE VIENNA CONSUL-

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TATIONS ON THE U. S. REQUEST FOR AN IAEA CERTIFICATION OF FULL ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP. WHEN SCIENCE COUNSELOR SAID HE WAS NOT, RYZHOV OFFERED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR CURRENT STATUS.

10. BLIX, HE SAID, WHEN IN WASHINGTON, HAD OFFERED TO SEND THE ADMINISTRATION, FOR TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS, A LETTER STATING THAT REJECTION OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION'S CREDENTIALS DID NOT AFFECT ISRAEL'S CONTINUED FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE AGENCY. RYZHOV SAID THAT "HARDER FORCES" IN WASHINGTON HAD DECIDED THAT OFFER WAS NOT SUFFICIENT, AND SUGGESTED INSTEAD THAT THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS CERTIFY TO THE ADMINISTRATION THE CONTINUATION IN FORCE OF THAT PORTION OF THE AGENCY'S CHARTER WHICH DEALS WITH EXPULSION OF MEMBERS. THIS WOULD INDIRECTLY SHOW THAT UNTIL THE PROVISIONS ARE APPLIED TO ISRAEL, IT WILL CONTINUE ITS MEMBERSHIP.

11. RYZHOV SAID THAT NO ONE, CERTAINLY NOT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WOULD DENY THAT THE CHARTER CONTINUED IN FORCE, AND THAT THE EXPULSION PROVISIONS ARE PART OF THE CHARTER. HOWEVER, IT STRUCK SOME OBSERVERS AS STRANGE THAT THE BOG WOULD BE ASKED TO CERTIFY THAT OBVIOUS FACT IT ALSO SEEMED TO SOME THAT THE U. S. WAS IN SO DOING ASKING THE BOG BY IMPLICATION TO OVERRULE THE DECISION BY THE GENERAL CONFERENCE, WHICH, BY AGENCY CHARTER, IS A HIGHER INSTANCE.

12. RYZHOV, WHO WAS CAREFUL NOT TO SAY THAT EITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVES WAS UNACCEPTABLE, SAID THAT CONTINUED U. S. FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE AGENCY IS "ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL" TO ITS NORMAL FUNCTIONING. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WILL DO WHAT IT CAN TO HELP FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE PRESENT U. S. PROBLEM. BUT THE U. S. ITSELF SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IT IS NOW DOING SOMETHING IT HAS BEEN PREACHING AGAINST - POLITICIZING AN ISSUE IN AGENCY COUNCILS.

13. RYZHOV ASKED SCIENCE COUNSELOR TO KEEP HIM AS CLOSELY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE AS THE ISSUE DEVELOPS. HE VOLUNTEERED IN TURN TO KEEP THE EMBASSY INFORMED IF NEW DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

14. HE ADDED THAT MOROZOV, WHO HAS A RECENT HISTORY OF FRAIL HEALTH, TOOK A TURN FOR THE WORSE LATELY, AND, EVEN AFTER A REST OF SEVERAL WEEKS, STILL IS NOT BACK ON HIS FEET AND MAY NOT ATTEND THE UPCOMING BOG. THE PROBLEM APPARENTLY HAS TO DO WITH THE HEART, THOUGH RYZHOV VOLUNTEERED NO DETAILS. RYZHOV ADDED THAT IF

PAGE 1 - 588

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MOROZOV CANNOT ATTEND, THE STATE COMMITTEE AND MFA WILL
BE IN A REAL QUANDARY DECIDING WHO TO SEND IN HIS
BT
#1511
NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE005
UTS8502
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHMO #1511/03 0360954
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 050950Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3093
INFO RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 9540
BT
SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 01511
EXDIS
USIAEA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: TNUC, UR, SCSA, US, PARM, IAEA
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION
PLACE. SCIENCE COUNSELOR EXPRESSED WISH ON BEHALF OF
HIS U. S. COLLEAGUES FOR MOROZOV'S SPEEDY RECOVERY.
15. COMMENT: RYZHOV, WHO HAS USUALLY BEEN COOL AND
DISTANT IN PAST MEETINGS, WAS WARM, VOLUBLE, AND OPENLY
SOLICITOUS ABOUT U. S. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH IAEA. HIS
REASONING WAS ON OCCASION A BIT SHAKY (LAST SENTENCE
OF PARA 12), BUT HIS ATTITUDE SEEMED TO REFLECT A MORE
OPEN COMMITMENT TO WORKING TO ENSURE A CONTINUED
U. S. ROLE IN THE IAEA THAN MOROZOV WAS ABLE TO GIVE
DURING THE DECEMBER MEETING IN WASHINGTON.
HARTMAN
BT
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306

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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171338 CABLE

5 2/8/1983 B1

MOSCOW 1559

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171345	MEMO M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY IN BERING SEA	1	2/8/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Confirm from Mike ^{3/3}
Guhin what we're
looking for when we
specify "policy-level
review."

MW

2/08
0560

505
36

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 0560

'83 FEB -1 A11 :58

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[check]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[check]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>[check]</u>	<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

nsds
ps give me copy back
w/notes down

37

National Security Council The White House

Package # _____

32 -1 11-8

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information. A-

cc: VP Mees

Confirm from Mike
Guhin what we're
looking for when we
specific "policy-level"

Mike

2/08
0560

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Collection Name

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171339	MEMO M. GUHIN TO W. CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY IN BERING SEA	1	2/1/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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S/S 8301646



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 21, 1983
83 JAN 22 P10: 27

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NLRR 748-23-43-9-6

BY LC08 N RA DATE 4/8/0

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SE
SITE NO. 0011

Subject: U.S./Soviet Maritime Boundary in the Bering Sea

In July 1981 the President approved our having technical discussions with the Soviets concerning apparent technical differences in the U.S.-Soviet maritime boundary. Our discussions in November 1981 (in Washington) confirmed the existence of these technical but substantial differences, based on differing interpretations of the 1867 Convention on the Cession of Alaska. Specifically, the United States and the USSR use different techniques to plot the line set forth in the 1867 Convention with the result that there is a crescent-shaped area in the Bering Sea (thirty miles across at its widest point) which each side considers to be on its side of the Convention Line.

Since 1977, when both Governments declared 200-mile fisheries jurisdictions, both countries have used the line set out in the Convention as the maritime boundary for purposes of delimiting our respective fisheries zones. The United States, so far without Soviet objection, has also used this line to delimit our continental shelf. Establishing the Convention Line as the continental shelf boundary would be to our advantage, particularly in the resource rich Bering Sea.

In September 1982 the Soviets asked our views on holding further technical discussions to clarify the exact location of the boundary. In view of lease sales planned for 1984 by the Department of the Interior under the Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas leasing program in the Bering Sea, part of which would include the area which we now know to be claimed by both Governments, we believe it is in our interest to agree to hold further technical discussions. Clarification of the boundary would also reduce the risk of confrontations in our respective fisheries enforcement programs. We have raised the matter with Secretary Watt who agrees that the future of our oil and gas lease sales and their success may depend upon a final resolution of the maritime boundary. A number of oil companies interested in the hydrocarbon potential of the area appear to be aware of the problem and also have stressed the importance of clarification of the boundary.

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- 2 -

If these discussions do not result in Soviet acceptance of our understanding of the exact location of the boundary, we will have to consider whether to seek a negotiated solution, whether to withdraw tracts in the area of overlapping claims from the proposed 1984 lease sale, or whether there are other ways of protecting our interests. At this stage, the issues are technical ones and the matter can be viewed as one of bilateral "house-keeping." However, there is an obvious potential political dimension.

We plan to propose technical discussion with the Soviets (in Moscow) in March. Prior to these discussions, we would initiate appropriate Congressional consultations and would also inform the new Governor of Alaska. We do not contemplate the need for any Congressional action.



L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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RECEIVED 22 JAN 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 21 JAN 83

12/15/15608

KEYWORDS: MARITIME

USSR

SUBJECT: US - SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY IN THE BERING SEA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 24 JAN 83 STATUS S FILES

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<i>Clark</i>	<i>x z/s</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>FEB 0 8 1983</i>	<i>Clark approved</i>		
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>FEB 0 8 1983</i>	<i>for signature</i>	<i>2/9</i>	
	<i>c z/s</i>	<i>Wheeler Sgd Hand to Bremer</i>		<i>INDEX, INT, INF, mt</i>
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MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

171341

February 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *B*
FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *lid*
SUBJECT: New Edition of Soviet Military Power (U)

NOTE

Dick Boverie and I attended the kick-off meeting today at DOD hosted by Gen Stilwell (DUSD/Policy). Representatives from CIA, DIA, State, and USIA were also in attendance. A copy of the proposed table of contents is at Tab A, and the work schedule -- culminating in publication on 9 March -- is at Tab B.

Pursuant to the discussion at the 8 February staff meeting, Stilwell made it clear that Secretary Weinberger would have liked to have had the publication date moved up to the first of March. This was not feasible for technical reasons, and the earliest possible date for publication is 9 March.

Other interesting points which came up at this first meeting include:

- This revision is aimed principally at the Congress and their constituents as they deliberate on the DOD budget; it will also be written with foreign audiences in mind.
- Although too late for the forthcoming FRG elections, it is planned that the 1983 edition will be commercially published in several foreign languages and distributed widely in all the principal European countries.
- New emphasis on Soviet military posture in this hemisphere and in Asia will make it appropriate to distribute the 1983 Edition in Latin America as well as Japan.
- We will need to ensure that the NATO Allies concur in the NATO-PACT force comparisons. The basic reference for NATO forces will be the NATO-PACT assessment prepared by the Alliance in 1982.

Based on the proposed outline and the quality of the first edition, the 1983 edition promises to be a hard-hitting and quality product. We will work closely with others on the staff to expedite the preparation and clearance of this important publication. As the drafting and editing effort progresses, we will keep you apprised of any issues or problems.

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Attachments

Tab A Table of contents

Tab B Work Schedule

cc: Walt Raymond
Bob Sims
Paula Dobriansky
Bob Helm
Al Myer
Sven Kraemer
Bob Linhard

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AA

SOVIET MILITARY POWER: 1983

PREFACE

I - SOVIET MILITARY POWER

- A. Introduction of 1983 edition to include statement about comparative Red/Blue data
- B. Role of military force in Soviet strategy
- C. Introduce new chapters

II - SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

- A. Land-based Strategic Missiles
 - 1. Modernization (e.g., new ICBM)
 - 2. Warhead trends
 - 3. Cruise Missiles (e.g., new long-range system)
 - 4. US force data
- B. Sea-based Strategic Systems
 - 1. TYPHOON and DELTA III
 - 2. Warhead trends
 - 3. Cruise Missiles
 - 4. US force data
- C. Bombers
 - 1. BLACKJACK A
 - 2. Cruise Missiles
 - 3. US force data
- D. Strategic Defense
 - 1. Early Warning
 - 2. Ballistic missile defense
 - 3. Aircraft
 - 4. SAMs
 - 5. Passive defense
 - 6. US Approach

III - THEATER FORCES

A. Theaters of operations: strategy and doctrine

- 1. NATO
- 2. Southern USSR
- 3. Far East

B. Force modernization opposite NATO

- 1. Key ground force improvement (e.g., T-80 tank, SP 152, OMG)
- 2. Soviet Air Forces (SU-24, MiG-25)
- 3. Forward deployment of nuclear systems (e.g., SS-21, SS-23)
- 4. Theater nuclear forces (e.g. deployment of SS-20)
- 5. CW and EW
- 6. US theater forces (e.g. Tanks, Pershing II, GLCM, etc.)
- 7. Other nuclear forces

C. Soviet Southern Forces

- 1. Afghanistan war
 - a. Status of the war
 - b. Reaction of the soldiers who fought
- 2. Threat to Middle East (e.g, SA-5, T-72, new radars)
- 3. US Force data

D. Far East

- 1. Forces opposite China (e.g, BACKFIRE, SS-20)
- 2. Forces in Vietnam
- 3. Forces in the Pacific Area
- 4. Threat to Asian nations
- 5. US force data
- 6. China's nuclear forces

E. The Soviet Navy

- 1. US-Soviet data

F. NATO - WP Comparison

IV - Space Forces

V - Soviet Technology and Resource Allocation

A. Condense and update old chapter VI

- B. Tech-transfer
 - 1. What the Soviets are after
 - 2. What the west acquires from the Soviets and Eastern Europe
- C. Resources for defense and related US data
 - 1. Percent of GNP
 - 2. Military investments
 - 3. Military-industrial base
- D. Update Soviet/WP weapons production figures, 1981-82, and related US/NATO data

VI - Power Projection

- A. Soviet Active Measures
- B. Regional Activities
 - 1. Central/South America
 - 2. Africa
 - 3. Middle East
 - 4. Southwest Asia
 - 5. Asia
- C. Arms sales as an instrument of foreign policy
- D. Soviet long term objectives

VII - Conclusions

- A. Statement on the challenge we face
- B. Statement on what the US is doing to meet the challenge

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 5, 1983

SOVIET MILITARY POWER
1983

Production Schedule for OSD/JCS/DIA Editorial Board

Week of February 7-11

Wednesday, February 9: Editorial Board members review draft tables, graphs and related text on Blue-Red comparison/blue forces. Cover approved.

Conference with CIA, State, USIA, NSC staff coordinators to brief on outline and procedures for clearance/coordination.

TBD Meeting of International Information Committee to brief on project and begin overseas exploitation preparations.

Week of February 14-18

Monday, February 14: Editorial Board members receive DIA/JCS draft text of Second Edition.

OSD Executive Secretariat circulates to USIA, CIA, State and NSC/White House for formal review - responses/concurrences due Friday, February 18.

Tuesday, February 15: Provide ASD(PA) relevant Public Affairs inputs.

Wednesday, February 16: Review and approval of all graphics, in final form, prepared by DIA/JCS for Second Edition.

Thursday, February 17: Wrap up graphics clearance with CIA; make graphics available for interdepartmental review.

Friday, February 18: Editorial Board collates/screens interdepartmental comments; provides text revisions to DIA; DIA proceeds with layout and preparation of page proof over weekend.

Week of February 21-27:

Wednesday, February 23: Board Members receive page proof for review and 12-hour turnaround to DIA.

Thursday, February 24: Secretary of Defense sends message to NATO and selected other Defense Ministers advising of Second Edition and highlights thereof.

- Saturday, February 26: Page proof of Second Edition, ready for printer, delivered to Secretary of Defense for final approval and signature.
- Sunday, February 27: Soviet Military Power delivered to printer.
- Week of March 7-11:
- Tuesday, March 8: Secretary of Defense receives first copies of Soviet Military Power from printer.
- Wednesday, March 9: Secretary of Defense Press Conference.

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 967

MC

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>		<u>N</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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TO CLARK FROM DUR

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/15/15 CDB

DOC DATE 09 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: MILITARY POSTURE USSR MEDIA

SUBJECT: NEW EDITION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

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FOR AMBASSADOR LONDON FOR AS BURT ONLY
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MPOL, ;9, IS, SY
SUBJECT: SOVIET DEMARCHE ON SA-5'S TO SYRIA

1. ~~5~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FEBRUARY 8 TO DELIVER AN ORAL DEMARCHE ON SOVIET PROVISION OF SA-5'S TO SYRIA (TEXT OF DOBRYNIN'S SPEAKING NOTE IN PARA 3). DOBRYNIN VOICED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST SYRIA, AND REPEATED PREVIOUS SOVIET ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE DEFENSIVE CHARACTER OF THE SA-5 MISSILES. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SOUGHT CLARIFICATION AS TO THE SOURCE OF SOVIET CONCERNS, AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REITERATED U.S. VIEW THAT THE SA-5 DEPLOYMENTS ESCALATED TENSIONS IN THE REGION. END SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF DOBRYNIN'S DEMARCHE:

-- AS IS KNOWN, THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN US AND THE U.S. SIDE CONCERNING CERTAIN DEFENSIVE MEASURES THAT ARE BEING TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION. TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING WE CLEARLY PRESENTED THE ACTUAL STATE OF THINGS TO THE-U.S. SIDE. IN DOING SO WE PROCEEDED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD EXERCISE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL.

-- NEVERTHELESS, ISRAEL CONTINUES TO BUILD UP TENSION.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 84171 DTG: 100329Z FEB 83 PSN: 040365

MAINTAINING THAT IT WILL NOT PUT UP WITH THE "THREAT TO ITS SECURITY", THOUGH THERE IS NO GROUND WHATSOEVER TO POSE THE ISSUE IN SUCH A WAY, ISRAEL, IN FACT, DECLARES ITS INTENTION TO DELIVER A STRIKE AGAINST SYRIA. THE MATTER IS NOT CONFINED TO DECLARATIONS ALONE - ACCORDING TO THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION THE ISRAELIS ARE CARRYING OUT CORRESPONDING PREPARATORY MEASURES AS WELL.

-- IT APPEARS THAT TEL AVIV, INTOXICATED BY IMPUNITY, IS NOT CAPABLE OF ASSESSING REALISTICALLY THE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION BY ISRAEL OF ITS THREATS WOULD ENTAIL.

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE, THOUGH, THAT THE U. S. GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE INDIFFERENT TO SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS BOTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN A BROADER CONTEXT.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN WITH ALL CLARITY THAT THE MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY SYRIA TO STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES ARE THE ONES IT IS FORCED TO TAKE AND ARE OF A LEGITIMATE NATURE. THEY REPRESENT NOTHING ELSE BUT A NATURAL REACTION TO THE INCREASING AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS BY ISRAEL, AND TO ITS CONSTANT THREATS AGAINST SYRIA.

-- THIS IS THE REASON ALSO FOR OUR STEPS IN HELPING FRIENDLY SYRIA BY SUPPLYING IT WITH MORE ADVANCED TYPES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS.

-- IF AN UNBIASED VIEW IS TAKEN ON THIS ISSUE THE FACT THAT SYRIA IS ACQUIRING AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF MAKING IT SAFE FROM AIR ATTACKS CAN BE REGARDED IN NO OTHER WAY BUT AS A MEANS TO EXERCISE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL, THAT IS, AS A FACTOR OBJECTIVELY STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN THAT REGION.

-- AS WE HAVE ALREADY STATED TO THE U. S. GOVERNMENT - AND WE WISH TO REAFFIRM IT ONCE AGAIN THE AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEMS BEING DEPLOYED IN SYRIA ARE INTENDED FOR NO OTHER PURPOSES EXCEPT TO PROTECT IT AGAINST AN AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF ISRAEL. WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO SAY IT WITH FULL CONFIDENCE. THE DEPLOYMENT AS SUCH OF THOSE AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEMS DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO ISRAEL OR TO ANYONE ELSE. PREVENTING AN ATTACK ON SYRIA IS A GUARANTEE THAT THOSE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE USED.

-- IT IS IN THIS DIRECTION THAT THE U. S. COULD APPLY PROPER EFFORTS, GIVEN THE POSSIBILITIES IT HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL.

-- WE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT THE U. S. SIDE WILL PROPERLY APPRECIATE THIS MESSAGE ON OUR PART AND WILL MAKE ITS PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS QUIETING THE SITUATION.

END TEXT

4. AFTER DOBRYNIN HAD COMPLETED HIS ORAL REMARKS, UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, REFERRING TO THE LANGUAGE ABOUT INFORMATION THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARING FOR A STRIKE AGAINST SYRIA, ASKED IF THE AMBASSADOR HAD ANY PARTICULAR REASON OR IMMEDIATE CONCERN ABOUT SUCH AN ISRAELI ACTION. DOBRYNIN REPLIED THAT PERSONALLY HE HAD NO INFORMATION TO CLARIFY THE STATEMENT.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 84171 DTG: 100329Z FEB 83 PSN: 040365

5. AMBASSADOR EAGLEBERGER SAID THAT WE WOULD STUDY THE SOVIET STATEMENT AND PROVIDE A RESPONSE SHORTLY. HE ADDED THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE THREE POINTS, HOWEVER, AT THIS TIME. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE U. S. HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT ON THIS MATTER. THE SECOND WAS THAT U. S. INFLUENCE OVER ISRAELI

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NATIONS WAS NOT ALWAYS AS GREAT AS SOME SUPPOSED. FINALLY, HE WISHED TO REPEAT THE POINT WE HAD EMPHASIZED IN OUR EARLIER EXCHANGES: THE U. S. STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT THE SA-5S ARE A DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE REGION AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED.

6. WE HAVE RECEIVED TUNIS 996 REPORTING A SIMILAR SOVIET DEMARCHE TO THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. WE ARE PREPARING OUR ANALYSIS OF THESE SOVIET APPROACHES AND WILL CABLE IT TO POSTS SHORTLY. DAM

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AM-DOBRYNIN
BY JEFFREY ANTEUIL

2/10/83 5A

WASHINGTON, FEB 10, REUTER -- VETERAN SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLY DOBRYNIN WILL LEAVE WASHINGTON THIS YEAR BECAUSE THE KREMLIN FEELS HE WILL BE MORE USEFUL AT HOME THAN IN DEALING WITH A U.S. ADMINISTRATION NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN DOING BUSINESS WITH MOSCOW, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID TODAY.

THE SOURCES SAID DOBRYNIN, THE KREMLIN'S VOICE IN WASHINGTON FOR 21 YEARS, ALSO FEELS FRUSTRATED BY THE ABSENCE NOWADAYS OF THE HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE HE ENJOYED WITH FIVE PREVIOUS U.S. PRESIDENTS,

DP

THEY SAID SOVIET LEADER YURI ANDROPOV, WHO ACCORDED DOBRYNIN THE UNUSUAL PRIVILEGE OF A TWO-HOUR MEETING IN MOSCOW LAST DECEMBER, WANTED HIS EXPERIENCED COUNSEL AT A TIME OF HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE KREMLIN.

THEY SAID THE IMPENDING DEPARTURE OF DOBRYNIN, 63, REFLECTED THESE REALITIES RATHER THAN A DECISION BY THE KREMLIN TO DOWNGRADE TIES WITH WASHINGTON OR SHOW DISPLEASURE OVER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TOUGH POLICIES AND ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC.

A SEARCH IS UNDER WAY IN MOSCOW FOR SOMEONE OF STATURE TO SUCCEED HIM WHEN HE LEAVES LATER THIS YEAR, SAID THE SOURCES, WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED FURTHER.

MORE 1036 AJ

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AM-DOBRYNIN 2 WASHINGTON

THE SOURCES SAID OTHER SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN WASHINGTON ALSO WOULD BE LEAVING, STARTING WITH DOBRYNIN'S DEPUTY, ALEXANDER BESSMERTNYKH. HE IS GOING HOME THIS WEEK.

DOBRYNIN, DEAN OF THE WASHINGTON DIPLOMATIC CORPS, HAS REPRESENTED MOSCOW FROM THE TENSE DAYS OF THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS THROUGH THE FLOWERING OF U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE IN THE EARLY 1970S AND ITS COOLING LATER IN THE DECADE.

HE AND ANDROPOV, WHO SUCCEEDED THE LATE LEONID BREZHNEV LAST NOVEMBER, BELIEVE A LESS EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT COULD HANDLE THE JOB, WHICH HAS BECOME BASICALLY ONE OF CARRYING MESSAGES BETWEEN THE KREMLIN AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE SOURCES SAID.

"WE DON'T NEED DOBRYNIN TO REPORT THE VIEWS OF EAGLEBURGER (UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER) OR SHULTZ (SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ)," ONE SAID.

REFERRING TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE REAGAN TOOK OFFICE IN 1981, HE ADDED: "THERE'S HARDLY A RELATIONSHIP."

THE SOURCES SAID DOBRYNIN WOULD BECOME A SENIOR ADVISER TO ANDROPOV MORE OR LESS EQUAL TO ANDREI GROMYKO, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SINCE 1957.

THEY ADDED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE HE WOULD EVENTUALLY SUCCEED GROMYKO, WHO IS 73 BUT HAS GIVEN NO HINT HE PLANS TO RETIRE.

MORE 1039 AJ

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AA-DOBRYNIN 3 WASHINGTON

DOBRYNIN, WHOSE HUMOR AND GOOD SENSE HAVE EARNED HIM THE RESPECT OF HIGH U.S. OFFICIALS DESPITE DIFFERENCES IN POLICY AND IDEOLOGY, IS CLEARLY AT THE PEAK OF THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC SERVICE.

HIS REPORTS BACK TO MOSCOW, UNLIKE THOSE OF OTHER SOVIET ENVOYS, FREQUENTLY GO DIRECTLY TO THE TOP KREMLIN LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITBURO, THE SOURCES SAID.

BUT THEY SAID HIS STATUS HAS DECLINED IN WASHINGTON SINCE REAGAN DECLARED, AT HIS FIRST PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE, THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD "LIE, CHEAT (OR) COMMIT ANY CRIME" IN PURSUIT OF WORLD COMMUNISM.

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY WAS SYMBOLIZED IN ITS FIRST WEEKS WHEN IT RESCINDED DOBRYNIN'S LONG-STANDING PRIVILEGE OF PARKING HIS CAR IN THE PRIVATE STATE DEPARTMENT GARAGE AND TAKING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PERSONAL LIFT TO THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE.

DURING THE NIXON, FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS, THE AMBASSADOR WAS OFTEN INVITED FOR LONG, SERIOUS DIALOGUES AND BACK-CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SECRETARIES OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND CYRUS VANCE, WHO PUBLICLY VOICED ADMIRATION FOR DOBRYNIN'S DIPLOMATIC SKILLS.

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AA-DOBRYNIN 4 WASHINGTON

NIXON AT ONE TIME ACCORDED DOBRYNIN A DIRECT "CHANNEL" WHICH ALLOWED HIM TO SLIP UNNOTICED INTO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR REGULAR PRIVATE TALKS ON U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES WITH THE PRESIDENT AND KISSINGER, THEN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.

BY LAST MARCH, SOVIET OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON TOLD REUTERS THEY WERE DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT WHAT THEY SAW AS A REAGAN POLICY OF SHARPLY REDUCING THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE AND IGNORING MAJOR INITIATIVES FROM MOSCOW.

THEY MADE IT CLEAR THEIR UNHAPPINESS STEMMED FROM A FEELING THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET UNION AS AN EQUAL WORLD POWER ENTITLED TO FULL CONSULTATION ON IMPORTANT MATTERS.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS IN TURN ACCUSED THE SOVIETS OF SHEDDING "CROCODILE TEARS" AND BLAMED MOSCOW'S ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND ELSEWHERE FOR THE FACT THAT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WERE REDUCED -- A DEVELOPMENT THEY SAID DATED BACK TO THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/15/85 COS

RECEIVED 10 FEB 83 14

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 10 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SYRIA

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: AMB DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE ON SA-5 DEPLOYMENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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	<i>C</i> MAY 03 1983	<i>ONE / NFAA per Kemp</i>		

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 3, 1983

TO: NSC/S
FROM: Geoff Kemp
SUBJECT: #0154

Original attached for your
files. OBE.

National Security Council
The White House

58

SYS II

Package #

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John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
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Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
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