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Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (1/28/83-2/2/83)

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FOIA

F03-002/5

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305

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171325	LETTER	JOHN EAST TO W. CLARK	2	1/7/1983	B1
171324	MEMO	K. DEGRAFFENREID TO W. CLARK RE LETTER FROM SEN. EAST	2	1/27/1983	B1
171315	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S	1	1/17/1983	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-42-1-5			
171316	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	2	1/29/1983	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-42-1-5			
171318	CABLE	MOSCOW 0973	8	1/25/1983	B1
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		PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-42-3-3			
171320	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	1/31/1983	B1 B3
		PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-42-3-3			

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171321	CABLE	MOSCOW 1271 PAR 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-42-4-2	2	2/1/1983	B1
171323	CABLE	MOSCOW 1331 (ORIGINAL + ANNOTATED COPY) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-42-5-1	8	2/2/1983	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1983

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE FROM
PRESIDENT REAGAN

American and Soviet officials have just resumed negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement to control intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We have proposed and will continue to urge the Soviets to agree to ban altogether both their intermediate-range land-based nuclear missile weapons and those we intend to deploy in response to their build-up. The Soviet insistence on maintaining a nuclear threat to America's Allies while denying them the corresponding means to deter that threat remains the principal obstacle.

A way must be found to overcome this obstacle. Just as our Allies can count on the United States to defend Europe at all cost, you can count on us to spare no effort to reach a fair and meaningful agreement that will reduce the Soviet nuclear threat.

In this spirit, I have asked Vice President Bush, in the city where East meets West, to propose to Soviet General Secretary Andropov that he and I meet wherever and whenever he wants in order to sign an agreement banning US and Soviet intermediate-range land-based nuclear missile weapons from the face of the Earth.

I make this offer out of a conviction that such an agreement would serve the interests of both sides and, most importantly, that the people of Europe want nothing more. I urge Mr. Andropov to accept it.

Ronald Reagan

U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT

- Q. Does the President's expression of readiness to meet with Andropov to sign an INF agreement signify a change in the U.S. attitude toward a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting?
- A. No. The President is simply stating that, if the Soviets and we are able to reach agreement to eliminate our land-based INF missiles, he is ready to meet with General Secretary Andropov to sign a Treaty reflecting that agreement. This is perfectly consistent with our long-held view that a meeting between the President and Mr. Andropov must be well prepared and yield concrete results.
- Q. If there were such a meeting to sign an INF treaty, would other subjects be discussed?
- A. ~~Of course.~~ Conceivably. (CONCEIVABLY)
- Q. Does this mean the U.S. would be willing to meet with the Soviet leadership only if the USSR agrees to a zero-zero outcome in INF (i.e., that this is a precondition)?
- A. The President has proposed through the Vice President that the President and Mr. Andropov meet wherever and whenever Mr. Andropov wants to sign an agreement banning all land-based INF missiles. That is the President's proposal, and it speaks for itself.
- Q. Would the President be prepared not simply to sign such an agreement but also to meet with Mr. Andropov in order to try to work out an agreement?

A. The responsibility for negotiating an agreement rests with the U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva. The President has full confidence in Ambassador Nitze's ability to work out such an agreement, if the Soviets are equally willing.

Q. Does this mean that the U.S. can accept only a zero-zero outcome in INF?

A. We have stressed from the beginning that we believe the total elimination of this entire class of missiles is the best outcome. We have also made it very clear that we will explore carefully any serious Soviet proposal.

Q. Were the Allies consulted on the President's letter?

A. No. The President's proposal was fully consistent with the NATO INF position.

We, of course, will be in close touch with the Allies as we await the Soviet reply to the President's proposal.

Q. Was this proposal conveyed to the Soviets through diplomatic channels?

A. No.

**National Security Council
The White House**

521
x

Package # 419

1615P
JAN 28 1993

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>[initials]</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

2 LTRS

6

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 0419

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
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Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 31, 1983

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation report on Soviet "active measures" in the United States. I too have read that classified report and agree with your assessment of its impact and relevance.

In answer to your question concerning public release of an unclassified version of this report, it is my understanding that the recent publication by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) of Hearings on Soviet Active Measures contains such an unclassified version in the prepared statement of FBI Assistant Director Edward O'Malley and its accompanying annex. These hearings provide an excellent source of detail on the nature and scope of Soviet activities. They have received wide public commentary (e.g., Mr. O'Malley's testimony was carried in the January 8, 1983, issue of Human Events).

I also agree that there is value in an effort to increase public awareness of this serious threat. Our concern is reflected in the detailed testimony by the intelligence community which has been made public as a result of the closed hearings before the HPSCI.

You may wish to discuss with Senators Denton and Goldwater the need for hearings or reporting for keeping the Senate informed on an annual basis.

I know Judge Webster stands ready to assist you in everyway possible. I have sent him a copy of your letter and have asked that he give serious consideration of the issues you have raised.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

The Honorable John P. East
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

By ECOS NARA, Date 12/14/15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 31, 1983


Dear Bill:

Thank you very much for your memorandum concerning Soviet active measures vis-a-vis the US peace movement. I know that it will be most helpful to the President. (S)

On a related matter, Senator East has written the enclosed letter to me, in which he points to the value of efforts to increase public awareness of Soviet active measures in the US. I referred him to the testimony recently published by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concerning Soviet active measures. I also indicated that I would refer his letter to you for your consideration of the additional issues which he raises. (C)

I would appreciate your consideration of his suggestions. (U)

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

Enclosure

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20530

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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	JOHN EAST TO W. CLARK			

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
171324	MEMO	2	1/27/1983	B1
	K. DEGRAFFENREID TO W. CLARK RE LETTER FROM SEN. EAST			

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FBI's Comprehensive Report

How Soviet 'Active Measures' Influence U.S. Peace Movement

President Reagan has consistently—and insistently—maintained that the Soviet Union has manipulated the peace movement in this country. And he is dead right. Through the World Peace Council, which is directly controlled by Moscow, the U.S. Peace Council (its American chapter), and the American Communist party (CPUSA), the Soviets have penetrated the peace movement in a serious fashion.

Many of the leading peace organizations, including those affiliated with certain religions, closely collaborate with these Soviet-controlled operations, with such groups as Women Strike for Peace, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and SANE allowing their own officials to serve as WPC members.

The President's charges, moreover, are not just based on newspaper articles, but on information prepared by U.S. intelligence agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As a result of hearings initiated by Rep. Bill Young (R-Fla.), a member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, the FBI's Edward O'Malley substantiated the President's accusations.

O'Malley, who is in charge of the FBI's Intelligence Division, gave oral testimony before the

select committee on July 14, 1982, and introduced into the hearing record an FBI document (reprinted below) which detailed Soviet efforts to use the peace movement for its own ends. In his testimony, O'Malley stressed some of the following points:

"The World Peace Council is, of course, the largest and most active Soviet front organization with affiliates in approximately 135 countries. It is one of the major Soviet instruments for political action and propaganda in the peace movement. The World Peace Council has placed the highest priority on the peace movement, and a program of action for 1982 calls for a worldwide campaign against the danger of nuclear war, and is clearly directed at U.S. defense and arms control policies. The World Peace Council has taken a direct hand in organizing and mobilizing the American peace movement...."

"World Peace Council activities in the United States have been coordinated in the past by the CPUSA. In 1979, however, the CPUSA assigned two of its longtime members to establish a U.S. chapter of the World Peace Council. At its founding convention in November 1979, the U.S. Peace Council was formed as a U.S. World Peace Council

affiliate. The key leadership positions in the U.S. Peace Council were given to CPUSA members...."

"...the KGB has clandestinely transferred funds to the CPUSA on behalf of the CP Soviet Union. Several Soviet officials affiliated with the KGB at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Soviet Mission to the United Nations are in regular contact with CPUSA members and officials of CPUSA front groups. They monitor CPUSA activities and transmit guidance to the CPUSA officials...."

"The U.S. Peace Council and the World Peace Council, as well as CPUSA members, were actively involved in the planning and implementation of the June 12 demonstration connected with SSOD II in New York. There were some 500,000 people who participated in that demonstration. I would not attribute the large turnout at this demonstration to efforts of the U.S. Peace Council, the World Peace Council, or the CPUSA. However, there was significant involvement by all these people concerned."

These observations were spelled out even more thoroughly in the FBI document on Soviet active measures that O'Malley submitted to the House members.

The following is the complete text of that document.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity today to respond to the Committee's request for information concerning Soviet active measures. Soviet use of active measures for influence and subversive purposes is a matter of concern, both in the United States and in other countries.

I have prepared an opening statement which provides an overview of Soviet active measures in the United States. I have also brought with me a report and several exhibits, which I would be happy to provide your staff, detailing specific examples of recent Soviet active measures operations in this country.

In my remarks today, I will focus on: the Soviet concept of active measures; the apparatus that controls and implements these operations; and the objectives, strategy, and techniques of active measures. I will conclude with some brief remarks concerning the FBI's investigation and assessment of Soviet active measures.

Definition and Concept of Active Measures

I would like to begin with a brief comment on the Soviet concept of active measures. The Soviets use the term "active measures" to refer to operations intended to influence or otherwise affect other nations' policies. They often use the term in an intelligence context to distinguish influence operations from espionage and counterintelligence.

But the Soviets do not limit the concept of active measures to intelligence alone. Active measures include a wide range of activities, including the following:

- Manipulation or control of the media;
- Written or oral disinformation;
- Forgeries;
- Use of foreign Communist parties and international front organizations;
- Clandestine radio broadcasting;
- Economic warfare;

Military and paramilitary operations; Political influence operations utilizing agents of influence, manipulation of private communication channels, and exploitation of unwitting contacts; and

Covert propaganda.

Furthermore, in addition to intelligence operatives, the Soviets regularly use party and government officials, journalists, academicians, representatives of other Soviet public organizations, and a network of pro-Soviet international front organizations and Communist parties in active measures operations.

Thus, active measures involves virtually every element of the Soviet party, state, and so-called private sector, and they are closely integrated and coordinated with traditional diplomatic activities.

Implementation of Active Measures

It is clear that the Soviet leadership

views active measures as an important, indeed indispensable, instrument in the conduct of foreign policy. The highest level of the Soviet system, the Politburo of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), ultimately approves the major themes of Soviet active measures and the means to implement them.

Under the Politburo's general direction, a large and complex bureaucracy designs and implements specific active measures campaigns. The most important agencies of implementation are two powerful CPSU Central Committee departments, the International Department and the International Information Department, and the Committee for State Security (KGB) [see charts, page 3].

International Department

The International Department, under the guidance of Boris Ponomarev, a candidate Politburo member and Cen-

tral Committee Secretary, plays a key role in orchestrating and coordinating Soviet active measures. In addition, it formulates many of the themes and designs many of the operations for specific active measures campaigns. In this regard, it works very closely with the International Information Department and Service A of the KGB in planning active measures activities.

The International Department also implements active measures through its mandate to control and administer pro-Soviet international front organizations, Soviet friendship societies, nonruling Communist parties, and certain other Socialist parties and liberation movements. One of the major objectives of the International Department is to influence and, in many instances, direct these organizations to support and carry out specific political action and propaganda campaigns on behalf of the USSR and the international Communist movement.

The International Department transmits policy guidance and directives to the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA) and to some of the CPUSA front groups. It also provides a considerable portion of the funds of the CPUSA for its activities on behalf of the Soviet Union. The funds are transferred clandestinely to the CPUSA by the KGB.

We believe that KGB Line PR officers in the United States support the International Department's mission by handling many of the monitoring and liaison functions in connection with the CPUSA and its front groups. Several KGB officers are in regular contact with CPUSA and CPUSA front groups.

International Information Department

The International Information Department is headed by Leonid Zamyatin, a Central Committee member and former director of the official Soviet news agency, TASS. Established in March 1978, the International Information Department is responsible for improving the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda abroad and Soviet domestic propaganda on foreign policy matters.

The International Information Department is also involved in the implementation of active measures by cooperating with the International Department and the KGB in the formulation and dissemination of Soviet propaganda worldwide. In its supervision of Soviet propaganda activities abroad, the International Information Department orchestrates a wide variety of propaganda outlets, which are to some extent involved in Soviet active measures. These include TASS No-



The FBI report notes: "The highest level of the Soviet system, the Politburo [above, voting at the opening session in 1981] of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ultimately approves the major themes of Soviet active measures and the means to implement them."

vosti, *Izvestia*, *Pravda*, and Radio Moscow which broadcasts internationally in 60 languages. Most Soviet news and press agencies have representatives in the United States who are available for active measures purposes.

KGB (Service A)

The KGB is primarily responsible for covert active measures operations throughout the world. Service A is the main component of the KGB responsible for the overall supervision and management of KGB active measures. It plans and directs active measures, keeps track of their status, and evaluates their results.

Service A works closely with the International Department and International Information Department in formulating and coordinating its operations. Although Service A is certainly subordinate to these Central Committee departments on foreign policy lines and is responsible to their wishes, it has wide latitude in the actual implementation of active measures and does not always give the International Department or the International Information Department specific details concerning how it will accomplish its mission.

KGB residencies in the United States receive guidance and requirements from Service A. Line PR in the KGB residency (the branch of the KGB residency abroad that is responsible for political and economic intelligence) is primarily responsible for the actual conduct of KGB active measures. In the two large KGB residencies in the United States (Washington, D.C. and New York), Line PR has subgroups that focus on active measures activities in the United States.

Implementation Costs

Soviet expenditures to conduct active measures operations worldwide are staggering. In an unclassified study of Soviet covert action and propaganda operation presented to the Oversight

Subcommittee, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, in February 1980, the CIA estimated that the USSR spends roughly \$3 billion per year on covert action and propaganda. This figure serves to highlight the extensive human and technical resources and the large complex bureaucracy devoted to the conduct of active measures.

While a precise estimate of the cost of Soviet active measures in the United States is not available, we do know that the Washington, D.C., and New York City KGB residencies are among the largest in the world, and several Soviet intelligence officers (particularly Line PR officers) are engaged in active measures activities in the United States. In addition, the CPSU provides subsidies to the CPUSA and international front organizations that have official status at the United Nations. Based on these facts, we believe that the Soviets allocate considerable financial and human resources to active measures operations in the United States.

I would like to proceed with my opening statement by presenting an overview of Soviet active measures objectives, strategy, and techniques in the United States.

Objectives

The basic aims of Soviet active measures are to weaken the opponents of the USSR and to create a favorable environment for the promotion of Soviet views and Soviet foreign policy objectives. The Kremlin continues to view the United States as the "main enemy," and most active measures are directed against American policies or American interests throughout the world.

Although specific objectives and tactics of Soviet active measures in the United States may vary in accordance with the changing world situation, they have certain long-range strategic objectives:

- Articulate and promote Soviet views and positions on foreign policy issues;
- Seek support for Soviet policy interests in all strata of American society (particularly political, business, academic, journalistic, and "progressive or activist" circles);
- Reinforce and mobilize domestic opposition to U.S. government policies that are considered inimical to Soviet interests;
- Promulgate justifications for Soviet actions at home and abroad;
- Portray Soviet government, society, and culture in a favorable manner.

Recent KGB active measures operations in the United States have focused on arms control and disarmament matters and the peace movement. Specific Soviet objectives are to promote Soviet views on intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations and strategic arms reduction talks (START) and to support and reinforce domestic opposition to Reagan Administration defense policies and budget, as well as the production and/or deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, enhanced radiation weapons or "neutron bomb," MX missile, and the B-1 bomber.

Strategy

The highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and the CPSU's pervasive control and direction in Soviet society enables the Soviet leadership to draw on all components of the party and government and so-called "private individuals and organizations" in orchestrating active measures. The overall strategy of Soviet active measures in the United States is to combine overt and covert KGB political influence operations with the orchestration of international front organizations and the CPUSA to support Soviet foreign policy objectives and encourage domestic opposition to Reagan Admin-

Special Supplement to

Human Events

Published weekly by Human Events, Inc.,
422 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20003

istration policies that are inimical to Soviet interests.

In recent years, the Soviets have de-emphasized Marxist-Leninist ideology in its appeal to foreign groups, probably because the tactic had become more of a hindrance than an aid to the promotion of Soviet goals. The Soviets are now interested in using such themes as peace and disarmament to gain support from groups in the United States, and they are trying to reach more

papers. Mailgrams were also sent to the U.S. ambassador to Sweden, the Swedish Mission to the United Nations, and the head of the U.S. National Security Council.

The mailgrams were all similar in content, stating that there exists a U.S.-Swedish agreement allowing the United States to use a facility at the Karlskrona naval base to facilitate U.S. satellite photographic reconnaissance of Poland and expressing disgust with

and NATO theater nuclear force modernization.

and some knowledge of how photographic reconnaissance satellites operate. It is also unlikely that an amateur would have picked the head of the Soviet Section, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, USDS, as one of the alleged senders.

Therefore, based on investigation and analysis, it appears that the mailgrams were probably a KGB active measures effort in retaliation for, and to divert attention from, the incident involving the Soviet submarine which ran aground in Swedish territorial waters.

Disinformation

The use of forgeries is one of the methods the Soviets use to purvey false or misleading information. Other techniques include oral and written disinformation. Following the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the crises situations in Poland, for example, KGB officers spread false and distorted statements to their American contacts, alleging that U.S. government and intelligence services' interference in the internal affairs of these countries forced the Soviets to take a tough stand.

A more sophisticated use of oral disinformation seemed to occur during the SALT II negotiations. Soviet intelligence officers stressed to many of their contacts in American government and political circles that the Soviets could not compromise on certain weapons systems, such as the Backfire bomber. Presumably, the Soviet government hoped this information

Manipulation of Foreign Media

In addition to overt propaganda articles that are sent to foreign media establishments, the Soviets frequently place, through trusted contacts and agents, falsely attributed or nonattributed press material in the foreign media. The recent conviction of a French journalist, who had acted as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959, is a harsh reminder of the Soviet campaign to manipulate the foreign media.

In the United States, the KGB has developed a few "trusted contacts" in local media circles and with activists who have some access to local media outlets. These contacts accept guidance and, in some instances, direction from the KGB. The Soviets are interested in developing contacts and cultivating prominent journalists. Obviously, under favorable circumstances, the Soviets would not hesitate to recruit journalists who work for nationally prominent news agencies.

Nonruling Communist Parties (CPUSA)

In addition to the techniques I have mentioned thus far, the Soviets also make liberal use of nonruling Communist parties and international front organizations. The Soviets have traditionally used nonruling Communist parties to help promote Soviet policies abroad. Throughout its history, the CPUSA has been one of the most loyal, pro-Soviet Communist parties in the



special interest or single issue organizations, such as environmentalists, anti-nuclear, and religious organizations.

Active Measures Techniques

The Soviet Union employs all the techniques commonly associated with political warfare to promote Soviet views and influence the policies of foreign governments and attitudes of foreign populations. Soviet active measures in the United States have included the following techniques.

Forgeries

The Soviets produce and circulate completely fabricated or altered versions of actual documents that are designed to mislead foreign governments, media, and public opinion. The quality of Soviet forgeries has improved over the years, and some bogus documents have received substantial publicity.

Most Soviet forgeries have surfaced abroad. However, three forgeries which the Soviets either initiated or attempted to exploit, recently surfaced in the United States. Let me briefly summarize one of these cases, involving a "Secret U.S.-Swedish Agreement," because it appears to represent a classic Soviet forgery operation.

On Oct. 27, 1981, a Soviet submarine ran aground near the Karlskrona naval base in Sweden, causing great embarrassment to the Soviet government. Shortly thereafter, from Nov. 8-11, 1981, a series of at least 12 Western Union mailgrams were sent to several Washington, D.C., based correspondents of various U.S. and foreign news-

papers. Mailgrams were also sent to the U.S. ambassador to Sweden, the Swedish Mission to the United Nations, and the head of the U.S. National Security Council.


The mailgrams were all similar in content, stating that there exists a U.S.-Swedish agreement allowing the United States to use a facility at the Karlskrona naval base to facilitate U.S. satellite photographic reconnaissance of Poland and expressing disgust with

and apologizing for this violation of Sweden's neutrality. Addressees were offered official copies of the agreement which the mailgrams imply is classified, although only one mailgram actually stated that the agreement is classified.

The senders were shown variously on the mailgrams as the Swedish ambassador to the United States, two senior U.S. Department of State (USDS) officials, and one senior U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) official, all of whom have stated that they did not, in fact, send the mailgrams attributed to them, and had no indication who might have sent them.

Investigation at Western Union determined that an unknown person or persons called the Western Union toll-free number to send these mailgrams. This number is answered at a central Western Union facility in New Jersey by any of a large number of operators. The text of the mailgram is typed into a computer, read back to the caller, and then electronically relayed to a Western Union facility near the mailgram's destination—in this case, Middletown, Va.—and then sent to the addressees. Western Union does not verify the address and telephone number to which the caller indicates the charge is to be billed.

An analysis of the mailgrams revealed that they were almost certainly drafted by a non-native English speaker, since the language used contained several syntactical errors and unusual grammatical constructions. Additionally, the mailgrams were probably not prepared by an amateur or a prankster, since the sender obviously



would be passed to American policymakers to discourage them from adopting a hard stand on certain Soviet weapons systems when, in fact, the Soviets might be willing to compromise if pressed by American negotiators.

The KGB residencies abroad obtain the stationery, letterheads and signatures of high-level American officials, apparently for use in forgery and written disinformation operations. In one instance, it appears that overt Soviet collection of maps produced in the United States played a part in a Soviet disinformation plan to inflame Austrian opinion against the United States

world and has unflinchingly accepted Soviet policy guidance and implemented Soviet policy directives. As previously mentioned, the CPUSA has received substantial financial support for its loyalty and service.

The CPUSA continues to receive policy directives and funding from the CPSU. During the last few years, the Soviets have instructed the CPUSA to place high priority on the issues of arms control and disarmament and the peace movement. The Soviets have urged the CPUSA to mount campaigns against the neutron bomb, NATO theater nuclear force modernization, and U.S.

government defense policies. Furthermore, the Soviets have requested the CPUSA to reinforce and mobilize the peace movement in this country.

Although outside the mainstream of American political life and lacking organizational strength, the CPUSA, with only a small number of members, has responded to Soviet requests for assistance with fervor. The organization has initiated letter-writing campaigns, sponsored and participated in demonstrations and rallies, formed coalitions with other organizations, and sponsored seminars and workshops to promote Soviet views on arms control and disarmament matters and to spur the American peace movement.

The CPUSA also has directed its major front organizations to support Soviet foreign policy interests. These organizations are often more effective than the CPUSA in reaching and forming coalitions with other organizations because they are not always identified as CPUSA-controlled or pro-Soviet organizations.

The KGB supports the International Department's mission to monitor and direct the activities of the CPUSA. As I previously mentioned, the KGB clandestinely transfers funds to the CPUSA on behalf of the CPSU International Department. Several KGB officers from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and Mission to the United Nations, are in regular contact with the CPUSA. They monitor CPUSA activities and transmit Soviet guidance to CPUSA officials.

World Peace Council

The World Peace Council (WPC) is the largest and most active Soviet international front organization, with affiliates in approximately 135 countries. The WPC is one of the Soviet's major instruments for political action and propaganda in the peace movement. The WPC has placed the highest priority on the peace movement. The WPC Program of Action for 1982 calls for a worldwide campaign against the danger of nuclear war, and it is clearly directed at U.S. defense and arms control policies.

The WPC has taken a direct hand in organizing and mobilizing the American peace movement. Romesh Chandra, president of the WPC, and other WPC officials have headed delegations that have traveled to the United States in connection with the peace movement. One delegation, which arrived in May 1981, toured major American cities and addressed sizable meetings of trade unionists, academicians, students, and women and peace activists.

Another WPC delegation visited in November 1981, on the occasion of the Second National Conference of the U.S. Peace Council, held in New York City. The delegation, led by Romesh Chandra, stressed the peace and disarmament theme and encouraged the United States Peace Council to initiate letter-writing campaigns, rallies and demonstrations. Chandra emphasized the importance of theater nuclear force

negotiations and praised proposals made by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on this matter.

United States Peace Council

WPC activities in the United States have been coordinated in the past by the CPUSA. During 1979, however, the CPUSA assigned two of its long-time members to establish a United States chapter of the WPC. At its founding convention in November 1979, the United States Peace Council (USPC) was formed as the United States WPC affiliate. The key leadership positions in the USPC were given to CPUSA members.

educational resources, conduct symposiums, and distribute publications on questions involving the struggle for peace. It seeks funding for a variety of educational projects, including publication of studies on the effect of the arms race and military budget on black and minority communities in the United States. Contributions to the PEF are to be sent in care of the USPC, according to a March 1981 letter signed by the USPC executive director.

World Federation of Trade Unions

The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), with headquarters in

political organizations intended to promote understanding and cooperation between the countries involved and the USSR. Unlike Western-sponsored organizations of this nature, however, the Soviets view binational friendship societies as political and propaganda instruments. The CPSU International Department is responsible for exploiting Soviet friendship societies, which have been established in approximately 80 countries throughout the world.

The Soviet friendship society in the United States is the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF). The NCASF was founded in 1943 by the CPUSA and has about 20 chapters located throughout the United States.


The stated purpose of the NCASF is to promote friendship, understanding, and cultural and educational exchanges between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. In practice, however, the NCASF serves to further Soviet active measures efforts. In addition, the NCASF is used by the Soviets as a bridge to reach people who are reluctant to participate in openly pro-Soviet organizations and as a spotting mechanism for potential active measures and espionage agents. Some of the Soviet intelligence officers I mentioned earlier in connection with the CPUSA are in regular contact with Soviet friendship society members.

The Soviets have recently urged the NCASF to focus its activities on arms control and disarmament matters and the peace movement. The NCASF has responded by sponsoring letter-writing campaigns, rallies and demonstrations to support Soviet interests in this matter. Affiliate chapters of the NCASF were urged at an NCASF executive meeting in April 1981 to join peace coalitions in their areas to ensure that such matters as a freeze on nuclear weapons are promoted and Soviet attitudes toward peaceful existence are brought to the attention of the American public.

Political Influence Operations

I would like to finish my remarks on Soviet active measures techniques with a brief discussion of one of the most common and yet least understood aspects of Soviet active measures, political influence operations. They are difficult to trace and document because they often fall in the gray area between the legitimate exchange of views and active collaboration with the Soviets.

Soviet political influence operations in the United States are designed to cultivate contacts with political, business, academic, and journalistic leaders and secure their collaboration. This does not necessarily require the actual recruitment of the individual, only his cooperation. Typically, the Soviets will play upon themes such as peace, disarmament, detente and peaceful co-existence to secure the cooperation of their target. Often the Soviets will offer inducements, such as invitations to the USSR, audiences with high-level Soviet officials, and information to further



In its never-ending, aggressive campaign of disinformation against the West—and particularly the U.S.—forged messages such as this one, a protest to the Swedish ambassador to the U.S., play their part in fomenting discord between Western nations.

With the establishment of the USPC, WPC-related activities in the United States increased noticeably. Utilizing various symposiums, conferences, demonstrations and publications, the USPC persistently lobbied for the halt of nuclear weapons production and deployment, particularly the "neutron bomb" and intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe.

I would like to offer the following examples of USPC activities in the United States in support of Soviet foreign policy interests:

The USPC has sponsored WPC delegations that have visited the United States, such as the WPC delegation that attended the USPC's Second National Conference in New York during November 1981.

The May-June 1981 issue of the USPC newsletter noted that a Peace Education Fund (PEF) had been formed and that it was presided over by a member of the USPC board who was also a vice president of the WPC. The PEF was formed to provide better

Prague, Czechoslovakia, serves as a Soviet front organization to infiltrate and influence foreign trade unions. American labor unions for the most part do not support the WFTU. Consequently, much of the activities on behalf of the WFTU in the United States are conducted by the CPUSA and its front organizations.

CPUSA national headquarters has asked its chapters to focus on the infiltration of labor and trade unions and to promulgate Communist doctrines and political lines. CPUSA members have been able to join the locals of several trade unions in the United States. The CPUSA has established concentration branches to target specific unions in an effort to recruit new members.

The WFTU and CPUSA believe that this is an ideal time to influence trade unions because of U.S. economic problems.

Soviet Friendship Societies

Soviet friendship societies in various countries represent themselves as non-

the individual's career. The major objective of these exercises is to inject the Soviet voice into foreign government, political, business, labor, and academic dialogue in a nonattributable or at least unofficial manner.

Political and Business Leaders

For instance, several Soviet intelligence officers in the United States have cultivated relationships with political and business figures, often using parallel interests or playing upon the ambitions of these individuals in an effort to influence them. Some Soviet intelligence officers have offered their services as "private" American contacts. In some cases, the Soviets probably use these private or informal channels to promote legitimate Soviet concerns or promote Soviet views. It is clear, however, that the Soviets also use these channels to pass a mixture of true, distorted, and even false information.

Academicians

Soviet academicians, who are often accepted as legitimate counterparts by American scholars, are nevertheless obliged to obey the instructions of the CPSU if they want to retain their status and travel abroad. Institutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences are frequently used by the CPSU International Department to establish professional contacts with U.S. scholars and scientists for influence purposes. Soviet academicians often attempt to persuade their American counterparts to accept Soviet views, and they often invite American scholars to the USSR as part of a cultivation process.

FBI Investigation and Assessment of Soviet Active Measures

In concluding my remarks today, I would like to comment on FBI investigation and assessment of Soviet active measures in the United States.

FBI Investigation


FBI investigation of Soviet active measures falls under the authority and guidelines of Executive Order 12333 (12-4-81), Attorney General's FCI Guidelines (5-1-80), and Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, and related statutes. Under these guidelines, the FBI has the responsibility to detect and prevent espionage, and other clandestine intelligence activities conducted by or pursuant to the direction of a foreign power. Active measures fall in the category of other clandestine intelligence activities.

FBI investigation of Soviet active measures is directed against the KGB as well as the CPUSA and pro-Soviet international front organizations that willingly accept Soviet policy direction and receive clandestine funding from the CPSU International Department.

FBI Assessment

Although it is often difficult to judge the effectiveness of particular Soviet active measures operations, the fact that the Soviet leadership continues to use and fund such operations on a large scale suggests a positive assessment of their value. An examination of the available information indicates that Soviet active measures are conducted on a worldwide scale, are well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy actions, and appear frequently to be effective.

FBI investigation has determined that Soviet active measures in the United States are responsive to and well integrated with Soviet foreign policy aims. They often fall in the gray area between overt efforts to influence and covert action operations. Soviet active measures attempt to exploit or manipulate individuals, organizations, or movements whose policies coincide with the goals or objectives of Soviet foreign policy. Soviet attempts to exploit unwitting contacts, either through KGB officers posing as "legitimate"



The grounding in Swedish coastal waters of a Soviet submarine in October 1981 sparked a series of at least 12 phony messages to various U.S. and foreign correspondents which threw up a smokescreen, alleging that Sweden and the U.S. had agreed to use a Swedish-based facility to take satellite photographs of Poland.

Soviet officials or through the CPUSA and international front organizations, are well documented.

At the same time, we do not see Soviet active measures in the United States as having a significant impact on U.S. decision-makers. Two of the primary instruments the Soviets use to implement active measures in the United States, the CPUSA and international Communist front organizations, are well-known for their adherence to Soviet dictates.

The CPUSA is a small organization outside the mainstream of American political life and does not receive much electoral or political support. American labor unions are fairly sensitive to the efforts of the CPUSA to agitate and promote Soviet views and policies among their members. The American media are sophisticated, and generally recognize Soviet influence attempts. In addition, Soviet active measures operations are often transparent and sometimes clumsily implemented. The FBI has uncovered no evidence that suggests American policymakers have been induced to adopt policies against this country's interests through KGB influence operations in the United States.

Annex

This annex provides examples of specific Soviet active measures activities and operations in the United States.

Dissent Paper on El Salvador And Central America

In late 1980, a so-called "Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America," dated Nov. 6, 1980, surfaced in the United States. Although unsigned, it implied that the document was distributed through the State Department Dissent Channel by foreign policy experts who were in disagreement with U.S. policy in El Salvador and Central America. The authors warned that current U.S. government policies in El Salvador and Central

America would lead to U.S. military intervention in this region.


The document, which has been determined to be a forgery, was apparently distributed in typescript form to various news agencies and then in print form by an organization calling itself the U.S. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. On March 6, 1981, Flora Lewis quoted this forgery, as if it were an authentic document in an article in the *New York Times*. Three days later Flora Lewis wrote that she had been duped by the forgery and that the "official paper" was indeed spurious. There are certain similarities of this operation with other Soviet forgeries. It is known that the Soviets attempted to surface this document in Central America through clandestine means.

Forgery: Presidential Review Memorandum on Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

In September 1980 a forgery titled "Presidential Review Memorandum NSC 46: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement," surfaced in the United States. The format of the document was similar to that of an actual Presidential Review Memorandum, but the document was a complete fabrication.

The forgery purported that the United States was supporting the government of South Africa, as well as using the CIA against black people in the United States. It also asserted that a secret American plan existed to sabotage relations between black organizations in the United States and nationalist movements in Africa.

On September 18, at a White House press conference, presidential spokesman Jody Powell identified this document as a forgery. Most newspapers refused to print it or exposed it as a forgery. However, the *San Francisco Sun Reporter* carried the full text of the



Indian Communist and KGB agent Romesh Chandra pins a "gold medal of peace" on Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in 1975. Chandra heads the World Peace Council, which "has taken a direct hand in organizing and mobilizing the American peace movement."



"The World Peace Council is the largest and most active Soviet international front organization, with affiliates in approximately 135 countries." Above, a meeting in Versailles, France, in February 1972, advancing the Red takeover of Indochina. Communist party leader Leonid Brezhnev sent a letter of support to the Soviet-sponsored conference, pledging all possible help.

forgery and indicated that it had been received by the political editor of the newspaper during a visit to Africa from a "top African official."

Although it is not certain who is responsible for this forgery, it should be noted that the Soviets quickly attempted to exploit the situation. On September 18, TASS, in an English language transmission, utilized this bogus document to attack the United States and to accuse the United States of engaging in CIA activities against the blacks in Africa and in the United States. The document was also reported as authentic by *Red Star*, and surfaced in newspapers in Mozambique and Zambia in 1980. The forgery has recently resurfaced in the Netherlands in an article in the *Volkskrant*.

Disinformation: Inaccurate Newspaper Articles Concerning U.S. Military Bases

Newspaper articles have appeared recently which denounce U.S. plans to build military bases abroad. These articles contain inaccurate information and are complicating ongoing negotiations concerning the military bases.

Investigation has determined that the author of these articles traveled to Moscow in mid-1975 as a representative

of the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), an international Soviet front organization. He is also involved with various U.S. organizations whose objectives are the furthering of world peace and total disarmament. It appears that the Soviets, through the WFSW, may be encouraging this individual, who perhaps is unwitting, to write articles attacking U.S. defense plans.

Written Disinformation: U.S. Maps of Austria

The Soviets recently initiated a disinformation operation aimed at inflaming Austrian opinion against the United States and NATO theater nuclear force modernization. An article published in the Soviet newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on Oct. 9, 1981, claimed that the United States has published a "map of Austria marking Austrian cities and installations as targets for nuclear destruction." The article alleges that the map is a "secret document" bearing the number 77707/10-70.

The charges are completely false. A map bearing the number does exist, but it is an unclassified base map of Austria. Similar maps are produced in the United States for virtually every country in the world and some are available from the Government Print-

ing Office. The map was probably purchased by the Soviets through the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Covert Propaganda: U.S. Boycott of Moscow Olympics

A covert action operation relating to the U.S. boycott of the Moscow Olympics was initiated by a Soviet intelligence officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. The Soviet intelligence officer contacted an American who has connections with a national political party in the United States to propose a letter-writing campaign concerning the U.S. boycott of the 1980 summer Olympic Games.

The Soviet intelligence officer suggested that a committee be formed of American political figures and athletes which would send approximately 60,000 letters protesting the boycott and imploring the recipients to contact their congressmen and the White House to oppose the Administration's policy.

To finance the protest, the Soviet intelligence officer offered to pay for the expenses of printing and mailing the letters. He also offered to pay the American an unspecified amount for his services. The Soviet intelligence officer told the American that he did not want his name or the fact that the Soviets initiated the letter-writing operation mentioned in the letter.

To further dramatize opposition to the boycott, the Soviet intelligence officer proposed that a group of Americans be formed to travel to the USSR to attend the summer Olympics. He also suggested the group issue a press release denouncing the boycott and declaring the protesters would attend the Olympics in defiance of the American boycott.

Use of International Front Organizations and CPUSA: Anti-Apartheid Campaign

A report of the Soviet Union given to the United Nations General Assembly International Conference on sanctions against South Africa, May 20-27, 1981, is the only example we have of the Soviet Union openly using the term "active measures" in a public document. In this report, the Soviet Union talks about its role in publicizing the fight against apartheid in southern Africa.

It says, "Active measures in this direction are being carried out by Soviet social organizations, including the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Soviet Afro/Asian Countries Solidarity Committee, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the Committee of Soviet Women, the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR and the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies."

Each of these, except for the last, is a Soviet constituent organization of an international Soviet front. They are the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Afro/Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, the World Peace Council, the

Women's International Democratic Federation and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

In the United States, two members of the World Peace Council organized a conference in solidarity with the "Liberation Struggles of the People of Southern Africa," October 9-11, 1981, in New York City.

The organizers served as Chair of the Preparatory Committee, Secretariat and Conference Coordinator, respectively. According to their own public documents the Conference organized support for the Soviet position on South Africa, including support to the African National Congress and South-west African Peoples Organization, two black nationalist organizations operating against the government of South Africa.

The CPUSA, in a letter dated Aug. 19, 1981, to all districts from Thomas Dennis, the chairman of the Communist Party Nationalities Department, instructed CPUSA members to organize for the October 9-11 conference. It instructed them to get a broad delegation from various areas in the United States to attend this conference. In addition, the CPUSA newspaper, *The Daily World*, has conducted an extensive propaganda campaign against apartheid in South Africa.

This example illustrates a commonplace Soviet tactic of creating a conference to focus on an issue for which there exists broad support in a way that direct Soviet involvement is not apparent.

Political Influence Operations: Soviet Efforts to Influence the American Peace Movement

In early 1982, it became apparent that peace activists in Western Europe and the United States were focusing on the Second Special Session on Disarmament at the United Nations (SSOD II) to make a major political statement on peace and disarmament. Peace organizations were urging concrete accomplishments from SSOD II, in particular, a U.S.-Soviet freeze on nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons.

Their call for action at the SSOD II was accompanied by a pointed notice that they intended to join forces and converge on New York City for a mass rally on June 12 in conjunction with SSOD II. Some organizations warned of vigils, public fasts, and acts of civil disobedience.

The Soviet Union, of course, was not only aware of the plans of the American peace movement concerning the rally, but was involved in them through its international front organizations and the CPUSA.

Listed below are several examples of Soviet involvement in the U.S. peace movement, particularly the June 12 disarmament rally in New York City,

which was attended by over 500,000 people and was one of the largest demonstrations of its kind in the United States.

KGB Activities

A primary focus of the KGB has been arms control and disarmament matters and the American peace movement. KGB officers have recently instructed their contacts to devote serious attention to the anti-war movement in the United States, especially with respect to coalitions forming among the various factions within the movement. The KGB is particularly interested in information concerning the peace movement's slogans, political platforms, plans for conferences or demonstrations and relations with European anti-war groups.

In addition, KGB officers have recently asked their contacts in the peace movement to report on meetings, participate in the planning of demonstrations, and distribute leaflets and other publications. Some KGB officers are also directly involved in efforts to influence the U.S. peace movement.

A Soviet diplomat involved in active measures operations assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been actively attempting to influence the American peace movement. He has attended numerous conferences and has made a substantial number of speeches to various peace and disarmament groups throughout the United States.

Indicative of Soviet concerns over the modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces in Western Europe, KGB officers have requested their contacts in the United States to warn American public officials and political leaders that the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe would result in an expensive arms race, which, in turn, would raise the chances of military confrontation in Western



"The basic aims of Soviet active measures are to weaken the opponents of the USSR... the Kremlin continues to view the U.S. as the 'main enemy...'" Above, former KGB head Yuri Andropov, now the No. 1 force to be reckoned with in the USSR.



Women Strike for Peace, headed by veteran far-leftist Cora Welss (inset), was a member of the U.S. delegation that attended an October 1981 World Congress of Women held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, which was sponsored by the Women's International Democratic Federation, whose membership consists largely of citizens of Communist countries. Above, in a typical caper, Women Strike for Peace members, holding paper doves, prepare to board a train in New York City to go to Washington to demonstrate there against the war in Vietnam.

Europe as well as spoil the prospects for East-West detente.

Another Soviet intelligence operative assigned as a correspondent for TASS in New York City has written several articles on the anti-war movement and disarmament campaigns in the United States. It appears that one of his major responsibilities is to monitor the American peace movement.

World Peace Council (WPC)

The World Peace Council (WPC) was deeply engaged (almost to the exclusion of other projects) in preparation for SSOD II. During SSOD II, WPC delegates met with representatives of U.N. Missions and with elected representatives of trade unions. They participated in many activities organized by the United Nations or non-government organizations during SSOD II and attempted to promote Soviet views.

The United States Peace Council (USPC) was directly involved in the planning of the June 12 demonstration. The USPC was a member of the June 12 coalition, which was responsible for actually coordinating and planning the rally. The USPC reportedly attempted to channel the theme of the protest away from the Soviet Union and against the United States. The USPC was also active in the planning of parallel demonstrations and rallies that were held during the course of SSOD II.

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

One of the major priorities of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and CPUSA is to mobilize the trade unions in the United States to join the peace movement.

In February 1982 the WFTU held its 10th Congress in Havana, Cuba. The conference focused primarily on peace and disarmament issues, particularly the social and economic costs of the arms race. During the conference,

Soviet delegates persistently espoused their views, motivations, and concerns in peace and disarmament issues and attempted to enlist the support of other delegations in a Soviet peace offensive. The Soviets emphasized to American trade union delegates the importance of mobilizing the trade unions to join the peace and disarmament rally in New York City in June 1982.

Representatives of the Soviet government in the United States have made numerous contacts with individuals in American labor unions, the CPUSA, and various peace and disarmament groups. They have also assisted in the travel of American labor activists to the USSR. These Soviet representatives are apparently interested in collecting information on the positions of U.S. labor officials and gaining support for Soviet goals within the unions. They have had numerous contacts and work closely with CPUSA members and WFTU representatives to the United Nations.

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) claims to have 129 affiliated organizations in 114 countries, and in 1966 claimed a total membership of over 200 million; however, most members are from Communist countries. The WIDF has close relations with other front organizations, particularly the WPC.

In October 1981, the WIDF sponsored a World Congress of Women, held in Prague, Czechoslovakia. The theme of the congress was coordination of women's groups in campaigns to generate public pressure against U.S. arms modernization and deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missile in Western Europe.

The November-December 1981 issue of the *Wree-View* identifies the American delegation that attended the Congress. This delegation included members of the Women for Racial and Eco-

nomie Equality (WREE) and the Women Strike for Peace (WSP). The U.S. delegation met with Olga Chechekina, a vice-president of the Soviet Women's Committee, who urged U.S. women to "fight to prevent war, to return to detente."


The appeal of the Congress addressed to "the women of the world" was clearly aimed at the West, not the USSR, pointing out that the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe and the production of the neutron bomb will lead to qualitatively new and more dangerous rounds in the arms race.

CPUSA

In April 1982 the CPUSA held an extraordinary conference and Central Committee meeting in Milwaukee, Wis. The meeting was attended by an estimated 700 participants, including a large number of non-party individuals. The purpose of the meeting was to move the entire party to bolder, more militant positions on various issues, including the peace movement. Gus Hall said that the CPUSA may have to stage and initiate sit-ins, kneel-ins, and confrontations... maybe a few of us will get our heads busted... some of us may go to jail.

The leadership of CPUSA is apparently convinced that the economic situation in the United States and the debate on defense spending in the United States has provided the CPUSA with an important opportunity to influence the peace movement. The Party leadership believes they have to take advantage of the economic situation and surrounding uncertainty to mobilize a broad front against "Reaganism and U.S. arms buildups" and to wage a struggle for unity of the people of the United States in the movement for peace, disarmament, and a nuclear freeze.

At another CPUSA meeting, a CPUSA official expressed extreme concern over the threat of U.S. nuclear



Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators demanding U.S. disarmament crowded the avenue outside the United Nations complex in New York City the weekend of June 13, 1982. "The Soviet Union, of course, was not only aware of the plans of the American peace movement concerning the rally, but was involved in them through its international front organizations and the CPUSA."

weapons against the USSR. At several meetings, information packets were presented to members to aid them in instigating local anti-military and anti-nuclear arms resolutions.

According to some CPUSA officials, the Party takes credit for the current popularity of the peace movement, estimating that one-third of the anti-nuclear movements across the United States were a direct result of CPUSA action and suggesting that the CPUSA had input into many others.

Exploitation of Friendship Societies: NCASF Role in the U.S.-USSR Citizen's Dialogue

In 1980, a group called the "U.S.-USSR Citizen's Dialogue" initiated a series of "U.S.-USSR Citizens Conferences on Peace and Security."

In connection with the above, a four-man Soviet delegation, consisting of three suspected intelligence officers and one member of the CPSU International Department arrived in the United States in mid-1980 to explore the logistics of the U.S.-USSR citizens conferences.

The Soviet delegation, which publicized itself as a contingent of non-government representatives, used this opportunity to visit American cities, speak to the press, and appear on radio talk shows. Without exception, the Soviet visitors promoted Soviet views and denigrated American government positions on Afghanistan, the Olym-

pics, and the SALT II treaty. The NCASF was one of the organizations that helped to arrange and sponsor the activities of this delegation.

Use of USSR Academy of Sciences: Targeting American Scholars

The KGB used the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences to cultivate an American academician employed with a prominent research agency in the United States. The American scholar targeted by the Soviets did not normally have access to classified information. Therefore it appears that the Soviets were interested in this individual for active measures purposes because of his position at a prominent research agency.

Use of Informal or Private Channels: Promoting Soviet Policies And Views Concerning SALT II

One Soviet intelligence operative has demonstrated diplomacy, assertiveness, and flexibility in dealing with his American contacts. He frequently entertains congressmen and staff members of congressional committees at expensive Washington restaurants and always insists on paying the bills.

Between November 1979 and April 1980 the Soviet intelligence operative contacted a staff member of a congress-

sional committee concerning the progress of SALT II. The Soviet intelligence operative informed this staff member that he is the "direct channel" between the U.S. Congress and the Soviet leadership and that his primary area of interest during this tour of duty is the ratification of SALT II.

In March 1980 the Soviet intelligence operative informed a U.S. government official that the Soviets would not have difficulty in renegotiating the schedule or extending the protocol of the SALT II treaty, although there were those in the Soviet Union who felt it was not necessary to observe the terms of SALT I.

Through his contacts with U.S. government officials and American journalists, the Soviet intelligence operative had been trying to assess the opinions of the U.S. government regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the implications of this event on the SALT II treaty. The Soviet intelligence operative clearly indicated that he intended to relate these opinions to the Soviet leadership in Moscow during his home leave.

In December 1980 the Soviet intelligence operative informed a staff member of a congressional committee that the USSR would insist on the ratification of the current SALT II agreement rather than the drafting of a new one, although the Soviet government would agree to some "cosmetic changes."

Overt Political Influence Operations: Promoting Soviet Views to Influence U.S. Policy on Afghanistan

A Soviet intelligence officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., cultivates contacts on Capitol Hill and in the American media in an effort to explain the rationale for Soviet policies and to favorably influence U.S. perceptions of the USSR. He informed one of his contacts on a congressional committee that the U.S. government is making it difficult for the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan by focusing attention on the issue. The Soviet intelligence officer told another contact on Capitol Hill that the Soviets will not be deterred from their mission in Afghanistan despite U.S. trade embargoes, the Olympic boycott, and other U.S. measures. He has promulgated Soviet views on Afghanistan to several U.S. journalists.

Agent of Influence Operation: Use of Agent to Promote Soviet Foreign Policy Interests

The KGB operated an agent in the United States who had developed contacts with several influential American public officials and private citizens. The Soviets apparently considered this agent to be influential with people at high levels within the American political community. The agent was pro-Soviet in his attitudes and con-



"Throughout its history the CPUSA has been one of the most loyal, pro-Soviet Communist parties in the world..." Above, CPUSA leader Gus Hall in a 1972 photo.

sistently lobbied for policies that would tend to benefit Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Use of USSR Academy of Sciences: Active Measures Using Academic Cover

A Soviet intelligence officer assigned to a position in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., told his American contacts that he is actually working on his Ph.D. thesis through the Institute of U.S.A. and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences, while at the same time performing diplomatic functions for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet intelligence officer has used his alleged connection with the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada to obtain library privileges at a prominent research institute in the Washington, D.C., area. During his visits to the research institute, the Soviet intelligence officer attempted to assess and cultivate members of the institute, presumably for future political influence operations.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
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NLRR 748-23-42-1-5

January 29, 1983

INFORMATION BY KOB NARA DATE 12/14/85

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Beir

DR

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: U.S./Soviet Relations

Arthur Hartman, our ambassador to the Soviet Union, has sent Secretary Shultz a message (attached) providing his views on US/Soviet relations. Highlights are as follows:

- We have now seen enough of the Andropov regime's foreign policy to detect implications for our policy and our relations with the Soviets. The Andropov approach is not marked by significant experimentation or initiative.

- A priority item in Soviet policy under Andropov is the Soviet relationship with the United States. We are confronting a regime which will be every bit as hard to deal with as the Brezhnev regime, which is more vigorous and probably more intelligent, but which has a certain dependency on its relations with the United States.

- The first principle of our relationship with the Soviet Union is our own security. Our basic approach must be designed to lessen the danger of nuclear war.

- The two U.S. mistakes of the 1970s were to: (1) emphasize arms control without parallel emphasis on defense, and (2) to count on arms control to carry too much of the weight of the entire relationship. Fortunately, we are not prone to those mistakes today. If we are not careful, however, trends and public opinion on nuclear issues, particularly in Europe, could undermine our ability to correct these mistakes. In this context, we must give a heightened emphasis to arms control.

- Our INF negotiating position of zero-zero is reaching the end of its usefulness. The time has come to change it.

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- The Soviets do not want an arms control solution to INF (in contrast to their policy toward START). They want to prevent our deployment without affecting theirs. They are trying to achieve this by manipulating both their negotiating position in Geneva and their overall propaganda.

- We want a solution that strengthens -- or at least does not weaken -- the Alliance. The security of the United States is less dependent on the number of INF missiles we can deploy than on the cohesiveness of the Alliance and the credibility of our commitment to defend our allies.

- The greatest danger in the current INF debate is the threat to alliance unity. Our holding to zero-zero will imperil that unity. Zero-zero was an Alliance, not just a U.S., decision. If our allies begin to come off it -- as Hartman believes is happening -- then Alliance unity itself is called into question.

- The Vice President should get a feel for the views of the allies during his trip.

- We should come forward with a formula which provides more flexibility than zero-zero. Our aim should be to present alternatives which are so reasonable that our allies could have no plausible excuse for nondeployment if the Soviets reject them. Hartman thinks we should not delay much beyond March 6, the date of the German election.

As you know, we have been taking these kinds of points into account in our internal deliberations and the planning underway for The Vice President's trip.

Attachment

Tab A Message to Secretary Shultz from Ambassador Hartman

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NLRR 748-23-42-4

BY ESB NARA DATE 12/14/85

1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE NOW SEEN ENOUGH OF THE ANDROPOV REGIME'S
FOREIGN POLICY TO DETECT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OWN
POLICY AND FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS
MESSAGE DRAWS SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHERE WE SHOULD
BE TRYING TO GO IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS AND HOW WE CAN GET THERE.

3. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE
ANDROPOV APPROACH IS NOT MARKED BY SIGNIFICANT
EXPERIMENTATION OR INITIATIVE. INTERNALLY,
ANDROPOV IS MAKING MAJOR EFFORTS TO MAKE THE
ECONOMY RUN BETTER, BUT HE IS USING TRADITIONAL
AND CONSERVATIVE METHODS - AN EMPHASIS ON
DISCIPLINE AND AN ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE. IN

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FOREIGN POLICY, HE HAS DEPARTED IN NO WAY FROM THE BREZHNEV POLICY. HE SEEMS TO BE GOING OUT OF HIS WAY TO KNOCK DOWN SPECULATION THAT HE WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON AFGHANISTAN OR POLAND; AND EVEN ON ISSUES OF LESS IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION, LIKE SOUTHERN AFRICA, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO RELAXATION OF THE HARD LINE. IF ANYTHING, THE BEST CANDIDATE FOR CHANGE, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM, WOULD SEEM TO BE AN ACCELERATION OF SOVIET OVERTURES TO CHINA - A DEVELOPMENT THAT IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS. I REMAIN NEVERTHELESS CONVINCED THAT A PRIORITY ITEM IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER ANDROPOV IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US. IN SHORT, WE ARE CONFRONTING A REGIME WHICH WILL BE EVERY BIT AS HARD TO DEAL WITH AS THE BREZHNEV REGIME, WHICH IS MORE VIGOROUS AND PROBABLY MORE INTELLIGENT, BUT WHICH HAS A CERTAIN DEPENDENCY ON ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

4. AGAINST SUCH A BACKGROUND, IT SEEMS TO ME WE SHOULD GO BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS OUR OWN SECURITY. WHATEVER THE CONDITION OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP OUR BASIC APPROACH MUST BE DESIGNED TO LESSEN THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE TWO MISTAKES OF THE 1970'S WERE (1) TO EMPHASIZE ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A PARALLEL EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE AND (2) TO COUNT ON ARMS CONTROL TO CARRY TOO MUCH OF THE WEIGHT OF THE ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP. FORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT PRONE TO THOSE MISTAKES TODAY. IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE, COULD

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UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO CORRECT THESE MISTAKES.

5. IT IS WITH THIS CONTEXT IN MIND THAT I SAY WE MUST NOW GIVE A HEIGHTENED EMPHASIS TO ARMS CONTROL, AND I THINK THIS ISSUE DESERVES HIGH PRIORITY ON YOUR OWN GLOBAL AGENDA. I SAY THIS BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS THE ONLY CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CATALYST TOWARD STARTING A PROCESS OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THAT FIRST PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY. AND I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS NOW PERCEIVED BY PUBLICS TO BE THE WEAKEST ASPECT OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION - A WEAKNESS WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE EXPLOITING IN WESTERN EUROPE WITH GROWING EFFECT. SINCE THE DEPLOYMENT TIMETABLE MAKES INF A MORE URGENT MATTER THAN START, IT IS INF THAT I WANT TO ADDRESS HERE. IN MY VIEW, OUR INF NEGOTIATING POSITION OF ZERO-ZERO IS REACHING THE END OF ITS USEFULNESS. THE TIME HAS COME TO CHANGE IT.

6. I WAS IN WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION; I HAVE BEEN IN MOSCOW DURING THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO TEAR THAT DECISION APART. THE SOVIET STRATEGY IS QUITE PLAIN; IT HAS NOT CHANGED FROM BREZHNEV TO ANDROPOV. THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT AN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION TO INF (IN CONTRAST TO THEIR POLICY TOWARD START). THEY WANT TO PREVENT OUR DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT AFFECTING

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER
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THEIRS. THEY ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE THIS BY MANI-
PULATING BOTH THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA
AND THEIR OVERALL PROPAGANDA; THEIR AIM IS TO
SWEET-TALK (AND THREATEN) WESTERN EUROPEAN, AND
PARTICULARLY GERMAN, PUBLIC OPINION. THEIR NEGOTIA-
TING POSITION IS LIKE AN ONION. IT BEGAN AS ABSURDLY
EXTREME; BUT AS THEY HAVE PEELED EXTRANEIOUS LAYERS
OFF ONE BY ONE, IT IS BEGINNING TO LOOK ATTRACTIVE TO
THE EUROPEANS EVEN THOUGH IT REMAINS A SHAM. SO FAR
THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS AT VERY LITTLE COST;
EUROPEAN PUBLIC PRESSURE IS NOW FUCUSSING ON U.S.,
NOT SOVIET, "RIGIDITY" EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE
NOT PROPOSED THE DESTRUCTION OF A SINGLE SS-20.
I EXPECT THAT, AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTION, WE SHALL
SEE SOME MORE EXTRANEIOUS LAYERS PEELED OFF. IF WE
DONT MOVE NOW TO ANTICIPATE THIS, I'M AFRAID OUR
DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WILL BE IN REAL TROUBLE.

7. I REMEMBER VIVIDLY HOW THE INF DEBATE AND
ULTIMATE DECISION DEVELOPED BETWEEN 1977 AND 1979.

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THE ORIGIN WAS WESTERN EUROPE'S FEAR THAT, WITHOUT U.S. WEAPONS IN EUROPE TO RESPOND TO THE SS-20, THE U.S. MIGHT HESITATE TO DEFEND A EUROPE THREATENED BY THE SS-20. THE DECISION TO DEPLOY GLCM'S AND PERSHING-II'S WAS NOT PRIMARILY A MILITARY DECISION (AFTER ALL, WE HAD THE MILITARY MEANS TO RESPOND TO AN SS-20 ATTACK; WE HAD OUR WHOLE STRATEGIC ARSENAL). THE DECISION TO DEPLOY WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL DECISION: TO GIVE THE EUROPEANS CONFIDENCE THAT WE WOULD TREAT A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THEM AS IF IT WERE AN ATTACK ON OURSELVES. AS I REMEMBER IT, THERE WAS NO GREAT SANCTITY ABOUT THE NUMBERS IN INF. THE NUMBER 572 WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE (1) 572 WAS LESS THAN THE PROJECTED SS-20 WARHEAD ARSENAL (TO EQUALIZE THE SS-20'S WAS CONSIDERED "DE-COUPLING" SINCE THE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE COULD THEN TAKE PLACE SOLELY IN EUROPE) BUT (2) 572 WAS ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH U.S. CREDIBILITY IN DEFENDING EUROPE .

8. I RECALL ALL THIS HISTORY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS PERCEIVED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN EUROPE AND, THEREFORE, STRENGTHENING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. HOWEVER WE COME OUT ON INF, WE SHOULD KEEP THAT OBJECTIVE FIRMLY IN MIND: WE WANT A SOLUTION THAT STRENGTHENS - OR AT LEAST DOESN'T WEAKEN - THE ALLIANCE. THE SECURITY OF THE U.S. IS LESS DEPENDENT ON THE NUMBER OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WE CAN DEPLOY ON EUROPEAN SOIL THAN ON THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR ALLIES AGAINST

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AN ATTACK.

9. THE GREATEST DANGER IN THE CURRENT INF DEBATE IS THE THREAT TO ALLIANCE UNITY. ONE THING IS BECOMING CLEAR: OUR HOLDING TO ZERO-ZERO MUCH LONGER WILL IMPERIL THAT UNITY. ZERO-ZERO (LIKE THE 1979 DECISION ITSELF) WAS AN ALLIANCE, NOT JUST A U.S. DECISION; IF OUR ALLIES BEGIN TO COME OFF IT - AS I BELIEVE TO BE HAPPENING - THEN ALLIANCE UNITY ITSELF IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ACCEPT ZERO-ZERO; THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO DISMANTLE THEIR ENTIRE SS-20 FORCE, EVEN AT THE PRICE OF NATO'S CARRYING OUT SOME OR ALL OF ITS INF DEPLOYMENTS. THAT WOULD NOT BE ALL BAD IF WE COULD BE SURE OUR DEPLOYMENT WOULD GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF SOVIET REJECTION OF ZERO-ZERO, BUT WILL THE GERMANS, OR EVEN THE BRITISH, PERMIT DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT OUR SEEKING TO NARROW THE NEGOTIATING GAP? WHILE I'M NOT DEALING WITH THOSE COUNTRIES ANYMORE, I STRONGLY DOUBT IT. GEORGE BUSH SHOULD GET A FEEL FOR THIS DURING HIS TRIP. IF THEY DON'T AGREE TO THE DEPLOYMENT, WE ARE THEN FACED EITHER WITH A CRISIS WITH OUR TWO MAJOR ALLIES OR WITH A FACE-SAVING "DELAY" IN DEPLOYMENT WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE (WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THAT THE MISSILES ARE NEVER DEPLOYED). EITHER WAY THE SOVIETS WIN.

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10. I THEREFORE BELIEVE WE MUST PUT FLEXIBILITY INTO OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION WHILE THERE IS STILL SOME CREDIBILITY IN OUR DEPLOYMENT OPTION. WE SHOULD COME FORWARD WITH A FORMULA WHICH PROVIDES MORE FLEXIBILITY THAN ZERO-ZERO. IN FACT, WE MIGHT PRODUCE DIFFERENT FORMULAS AT DIFFERENT STAGES - DOING SOME ONION-PEELING OURSELVES FOR EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO PRESENT ALTERNATIVES WHICH ARE SO REASONABLE THAT OUR ALLIES CAN HAVE NO PLAUSIBLE EXCUSE FOR NON-DEPLOYMENT IF THE SOVIETS REJECT THEM. WHATEVER OUR FORMULAS, ZERO-ZERO CAN AND SHOULD REMAIN OUR STATED IDEAL SOLUTION AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. IF WE GET AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR NEW APPROACH, WE WILL HAVE REINFORCED ALLIANCE UNITY, REDUCED THE SS-20 PROGRAM, AND CREATED A CATALYST FOR MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

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11. ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO OFFER A NEW U.S. APPROACH, I LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS. THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT REMOVE ANOTHER LAYER OF THE UNION UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTION. THUS, WE CAN PROBABLY WAIT TILL THEN. THERE MAY BE GERMAN REASONS FOR WAITING, TOO, SINCE A U.S. MOVE BEFORE MARCH 6 MIGHT STRENGTHEN THOSE IN THE FRG WHO ARE LEAST COMMITTED TO THE DOUBLE DECISION. IN ANY CASE, I THINK WE SHOULD NOT DELAY MUCH BEYOND MARCH 6, SINCE AT THAT POINT WILL BEGIN THE PERIOD OF MAXIMUM SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.

12. MOVEMENT ALONG THE LINES I HAVE PROPOSED CAN PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR THE ACCELERATED BILATERAL DIALOGUE THAT WE DISCUSSED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. IF WE MOVE ON INF, YOUR NEXT TALK WITH GROMYKO--WHETHER HERE OR ELSEWHERE--COULD BE THE OCCASION FOR INTRODUCTION OF THE IDEA OR--IF ALREADY TABLED IN GENEVA--FOR EMPHASIS TO SOVIET LEADERS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP OF AN EARLY INF AGREEMENT. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO COME TO MOSCOW WOULD DEPEND ON THE WEIGHT WE ATTACH TO GETTING DIRECTLY AT ANDROPOV. AFTER SUCH A ROUND WE COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHERE TO TAKE THE PROCESS NEXT. HARTMAN

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Jacque Hill	3		
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Summary of Hartman cable
Also see Paul's analysis and 1st package.

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_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Admin. Office
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Pipes	_____ Capt. Sims	
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90106

28

Date JAN 31 1983

**UNCLASSIFIED UPON
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12/14/15 [initials]

Subject: US - USSR RELATIONS

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. McGaffigan	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Weiss
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_____ Cmdr. Blair	_____ Mr. Kimmitt	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Col. Russell	_____ Col. Wheeler
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Log Number 90106

Date JAN 31 1983

Subject: US - USSR RELATIONS


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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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JAN 31 5 03 PM '83

BY CW NARA DATE 1/13/12

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90106

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

White House Gu
By [Signature] NARA, Date 12/14/85
3, August 28, 1987

ACTION

January 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: RICHARD T. BOVERIE [Signature]

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman's Message on U.S.-Soviet Relations

As requested by John Poindexter, attached is a memo you could send to the President regarding Ambassador Hartman's recent message on U.S.-Soviet relations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the attached memo to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Letter to The President for Signature
- A Message to Secretary Shultz from Ambassador Hartman

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

171321

21

PAGE 1 - 216

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83/1035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATAGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED (RE/INSP)

NLRR 1418-2342-42

BY 6000 NARA DATE 4/8/83

HCE213
STU0726
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHMO #1271 0321502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZZK
O 011501Z FEB 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2899
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE NIACT IMMEDIATE 1733
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 3186
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA NIACT IMMEDIATE 6611
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4277
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RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 8342
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5694
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2027
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD C487
BT
UNCLAS MOSCOW 01271
THE HAGUE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY
USINF/USSTART
E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO EUROPE

•

1. (U) UPI HAS JUST PROVIDED US BY TELEPHONE WITH EXCERPTS OF A NOVOSTI APN COMMENTARY TELEXED TO UPI ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE, RELEASED YESTERDAY IN BERLIN BY THE VICE PRESIDENT.

•

BEGIN EXCERPTS

--WHAT PEOPLE ALL OVER EUROPE HOPED FOR WAS THAT MR BUSH WOULD HAVE IN HIS POCKET NOT A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMING U. S. ADHERENCE TO THE TOTALLY UNREALISTIC ZERO OPTION, BUT CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS AIMED AT CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO NEGOTIATING PARTNERS IN GENEVA, AND THEY WERE SORELY

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 217

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DISAPPOINTED.

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--MR. BUSH'S STATEMENTS SO FAR INDICATE THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO BE OBLIVIOUS TO THE FACT THAT PEOPLE EXPECT OF IT NOT POMPOUS BUT EMPTY EULOGIES ON THE NEED TO REDUCE ARMS BUT CONCRETE DEEDS TO FURTHER THE SAME.

•
•

--THE U. S. PLAN TO CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO DISMANTLE ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN RETURN FOR A PLEDGE BY WASHINGTON NOT TO DEPLOY THE NEW GENERATION OF ITS MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE IS TANTAMOUNT TO A DEMAND THAT ONLY THE SOVIET MISSILES BE BANNED FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH: IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS A CALL FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT IN THIS TYPE OF WEAPONRY.

•
•

--THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING WELL-PREPARED SUMMITS, BUT SUCH MEETINGS SHOULD BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, EFFECTING EQUITABLE ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION AGREEMENTS AND NOT TO LEGITIMIZE UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION.

•
•

--UNFORTUNATELY, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LATEST PROPOSAL HAS NOT ERADICATED SUSPICION THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS STILL NOT SERIOUS ON ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTIONS ISSUES OR ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT.

HARTMAN
BT
#1271
NNNN

SENSITIVE

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time stamp

33

STAFF	C/O
Clark	
McFarlane	C
Poindexter	O
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

Admiral
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has been
made.

Manning
Advise if you
wish a copy sent
to Judge Clark

C : Copy

O : Original

WHSR,
Route to Dobrinsky
and Tenczowski.
Done ML



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL NOD029

SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----260305 021638Z /46

R 021617Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2969

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECLI OADR
TAGS: SCUL, OEXC, OSCI, UR US
SUBJ: US/SOVIET EXCHANGES

NLRR 748-23-42-5-1

BY 14011 NARA DATE 4/8/0

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MEMORANDUM (NSDD) HAS BEEN ISSUED CALLING FOR EXPANDED EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FOR AN OFFICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURING RECIPROCITY IN SUCH EXCHANGES. I WELCOME THIS.

3. IT IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, WE LACK A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURING RECIPROCITY IN THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN OUR OPEN AND THE SOVIET CLOSED SOCIETY. NEGOTIATION OF THE FORMER AGREEMENT PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A BALANCING-OUT OF U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS, WHEREAS THE CURRENT SITUATION ENABLES THE SOVIETS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR OPEN SOCIETY WITHOUT GRANTING US ACCESS TO THEIR CLOSED ONE. THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

FREQUENT APPEARANCES OF ARBATOV AND HIS FRIENDS ON NATIONWIDE AMERICAN MEDIA, THE SOVIET FILM WEEKS, AND THE HAMMER-WEINTRAUB AND AXELROD IMPRESARIO ACTIVITIES ARE BUT SELECTED EXAMPLES, WHICH CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH MY LIMITED PROGRAM OF FILM SHOWINGS AND CULTURAL EVENTS IN SPASO HOUSE.

4. MOREOVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE CUTTING OURSELVES OFF FROM IMPORTANT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FROM ACCESS TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THROUGH OUR CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE OFTEN CITED THE FACT THAT MANY OF MY BEST YOUNG OFFICERS ARE PRODUCTS OF THE EXHIBIT GUIDE EXPERIENCE AS AN EXAMPLE OF A PROGRAM NO LONGER POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, AT LEAST FOUR OF MY SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN EXHIBITS AND/OR ACADEMIC EXCHANGES UNDER THE FORMER AGREEMENT. GIVEN THE SAD STATE OF SOVIET STUDIES IN THE U.S., WE'RE COASTING RIGHT NOW ON CAPITAL WE GAINED WHEN THE EXCHANGES WERE AT THEIR PEAK. WITHOUT THE EXCHANGES AS A NATION WE'LL SOON BE VERY HARD UP FOR GOOD RUSSIAN LINGUISTS AND PEOPLE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT SOVIET AFFAIRS.

5. IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET REGIME, NEED MORE AMMUNITION FOR THE COMPETITION FOR PEOPLES' MINDS - A COMPETITION WHICH WE ARE BOUND TO WIN. THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC IN AMERICAN EXHIBITS, BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS, FILMS, TV PROGRAMS AND RADIO HAS NO COMPARABLE COUNTERPART IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, GIVEN THE LATTER'S UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE BEST FROM THE ENTIRE WORLD.

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Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03

MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

6. THUS, IN IMPLEMENTING THE NSDD, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATION OF AN UMBRELLA/FRAMWORK AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH A BROAD RANGE OF ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, INFORMATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES COULD FUNCTION IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. THE BROADER THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, THE BETTER WE CAN TRADE OFF OUR INTERESTS AGAINST THEIRS - AND THUS ACHIEVE RECIPROCITY. IT WOULD THUS BE A MISTAKE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM ACADEMIC EXCHANGES. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AGREEMENT WOULD EASE THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, WHICH BOTH OUR FINDINGS AND A RECENT NAS STUDY SHOW COMES PRIMARILY FROM PRIVATE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL EXCHANGES CONTACTS. IF WE OPEN UP OFFICIAL EXCHANGES AGAIN WE CAN CONTINUE TO CONTROL THEM CLOSELY; AT THE SAME TIME, OPENING UP THE OFFICIAL CHANNEL WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE PRIVATE SIDE, WHICH IS HARDER FOR US TO POLICE.

7. IN STARTING THE PROCESS TOWARD A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, THERE IS NO NEED TO CONVEY A POLITICAL SIGNAL UNLESS WE WANT TO. WE SHOULD PLAY THIS AS A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT THAT IS NO SIGNAL ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND THAT IS AIMED AT MAKING POSSIBLE A RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES NO MORE THAN A FRAMEWORK.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01331 02 OF 02 021636Z
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----260311 021638Z /46

R 021617Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2960

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO FULL
POLITICAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF
OUR RELATIONSHIP.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT WE BEGIN PREPARING FOR
NEGOTIATION OF A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, LOOKING
FOR IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
GREATER RECIPROCITY AND ACCESS, WHILE ASSERTING
THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. THERE IS NO REASON,
FOR EXAMPLE, GIVEN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR RESUMPTION
OF A CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, WHY WE CANNOT
ACHIEVE GREATER ACCESS TO NATIONWIDE SOVIET TV
AUDIENCES, TV HAVING REPLACED FILM, WHICH WAS CITED
BY LENIN IN HIS TIME AS THE "GREATEST MEDIUM FOR
EDUCATING THE MASSES",
HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State

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R 021617Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2959

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

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FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SCUL, OEXC, OSCI, UR US
SUBJ: US/SOVIET EXCHANGES

1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MEMORANDUM (NSDD) HAS BEEN ISSUED CALLING FOR EXPANDED EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FOR AN OFFICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURING RECIPROCITY IN SUCH EXCHANGES. I WELCOME THIS.

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

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CONFIDENTIAL

NO DISSEMINATION



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

6. THUS, IN IMPLEMENTING THE NSDD, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATION OF AN UMBRELLA/FRAMWORK AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH A BROAD RANGE OF ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, INFORMATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES COULD FUNCTION IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. THE BROADER THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, THE BETTER WE CAN TRADE OFF OUR INTERESTS AGAINST THEIRS - AND THUS ACHIEVE RECIPROCITY. IT WOULD THUS BE A MISTAKE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM ACADEMIC EXCHANGES. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AGREEMENT WOULD EASE THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, WHICH BOTH OUR FINDINGS AND A RECENT NAS STUDY SHOW COMES PRIMARILY FROM PRIVATE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL EXCHANGES CONTACTS. IF WE OPEN UP OFFICIAL EXCHANGES AGAIN WE CAN CONTINUE TO CONTROL THEM CLOSELY; AT THE SAME TIME, OPENING UP THE OFFICIAL CHANNEL WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE PRIVATE SIDE, WHICH IS HARDER FOR US TO POLICE.

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Department of State

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO FULL
POLITICAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF
OUR RELATIONSHIP.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT WE BEGIN PREPARING FOR
NEGOTIATION OF A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, LOOKING
FOR IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
GREATER RECIPROCITY AND ACCESS, WHILE ASSERTING
THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. THERE IS NO REASON,
FOR EXAMPLE, GIVEN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR RESUMPTION
OF A CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, WHY WE CANNOT
ACHIEVE GREATER ACCESS TO NATIONWIDE SOVIET TV
AUDIENCES, TV HAVING REPLACED FILM, WHICH WAS CITED
BY LENIN IN HIS TIME AS THE "GREATEST MEDIUM FOR
EDUCATING THE MASSES",
HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~