

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

USSR (01/24/1983-01/27/1983)

Box: RAC Box 23

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder USSR (1/24/83-1/27/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

304

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171306	CABLE	MOSCOW 0917	4	1/24/1983	B1
	R	4/8/2013			CREST NLR-748-23-41-1-6
171309	CABLE	COPY OF CABLE IN DOC #171307 (MOSCOW 0973)	8	1/25/1983	B1
171310	CABLE	COPY OF CABLE IN DOC #171307 (MOSCOW 0973)	8	1/25/1983	B1
171311	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE CABLE FROM HARTMAN	3	1/28/1983	B1
171307	CABLE	MOSCOW 0973 (INCL. COVER SHEET)	9	1/25/1983	B1
171312	CABLE	242202Z JAN 83	1	1/24/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171306

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0917 DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013537
SIT526 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 024/1542Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-41-1-6

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

BY C013 NARA DATE 12/8/13

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0917/01 0241457
O 241448Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2631

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 0372

- AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1891
- AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0687
- AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0273
- USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0993
- USMISSION USNATO 3145
- AMEMBASSY LONDON 5902
- AMEMBASSY PARIS 3078
- AMEMBASSY BONN 4225
- AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4666
- AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3974
- AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1072
- AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5663
- AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1603
- AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0743
- AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0591
- AMEMBASSY MANILA 0803
- AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0872
- AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1137
- CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 00917
E. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US, CH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON DEP FONMIN KAPITSA
REF: (A) 82 MOSCOW 15302, (B) MOSCOW 543, (C) MOSCOW 787,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(D) MOSCOW 824, (E) MOSCOW 834

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DURING A JANUARY 24 COURTESY CALL BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN, SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MIKHAIL KAPITSA PORTRAYED SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AS IMPROVING BUT NOT WITHOUT COMPLICATION. WHILE CHINA'S MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO INTERNAL MODERNIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY HAD RESULTED IN SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS IN THE BILATERAL FIELD, KAPITSA HELD OUT LITTLE HOPE FOR EARLY OR DRAMATIC RESULTS FROM THE SPRING ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS. KAPITSA CHARACTERIZED AS "FIRM AND FINAL" THE SOVIET STAND THAT IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA WOULD NOT COME AT

THE EXPENSE OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND HINTED THAT A RECENT HOSTILE SOVIET MAGAZINE ARTICLE WAS A RESPONSE TO PRC PRESS CRITICISM OF THE USSR. KAPITSA SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF US-PRC RELATIONS RETURNING TO THEIR HIGH OF PREVIOUS YEARS AND COMPARED JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S REMARKS IN WASHINGTON TO THOSE OF JAPAN'S PRE-WAR MILITARY REGIME. HE CLARIFIED THAT HIS CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE THE MFA'S FIRST AND SECOND FAR EAST DEPARTMENTS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPARTMENT, AND THAT HE FREQUENTLY OVERSEES SOUTHERN ASIA AS WELL. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN PAID ONE-HOUR COURTESY CALL JANUARY 24 ON ONE OF THE MFA'S TWO NEWLY APPOINTED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS (REF A)--LONG-TIME ASIA HAND MIKHAIL STEPANOVICH KAPITSA. KAPITSA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY USA DEPARTMENT DEPUTY DIRECTOR SERGEY TARASENKO AND AN INTERPRETER, WHO DID NOT SPEAK AS KAPITSA USED ONLY ENGLISH. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY'S OIC FOR EXTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS PARRIS.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: "INTERESTING, BUT NOT SO SIMPLE"

4. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S OPENING OBSERVATION THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE

MOSCOW 0917 DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013537
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTERESTING, KAPITSA GAVE A CANDID AND BY NO MEANS OPTIMISTIC PICTURE OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THE SITUATION, HE SAID, WAS "INDEED INTERESTING-- BUT NOT SO SIMPLE." POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALWAYS FAVORED GOOD RELATIONS WITH BEIJING AND HAD TAKEN REPEATED STEPS IN THE PAST FIRST TO HALT THE DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS AND THEN TO OPEN UP PATHS FOR IMPROVEMENT, HE INDICATED THAT RECENT PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION HAD COME AS A RESULT OF CHANGES IN CHINA.

5. RESPONDING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT LAY BEHIND THE CHANGE IN THE CHINESE APPROACH, KAPITSA IDENTIFIED THREE MAIN FACTORS. ALL, HE CLAIMED, WERE REFLECTED IN THE OUTCOME OF THE SEPTEMBER 1982 CCP CONGRESS. THESE WERE:

- THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM THROUGH "MORE TRADITIONAL MEANS" THAN DURING THE PERIOD OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH;
- CHINA'S TURN AWAY FROM A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US TOWARD A MORE TRADITIONAL POSITION OF STRUGGLE AGAINST

MOSCOW 0917

DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013537

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0917 DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013542
S1T525 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 024/1544Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCFS EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0917/02 0241458
O 241448Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2632

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 0373

- AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1892
- AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0688
- AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0274
- USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0994
- USMISSION USNATO 3146
- AMEMBASSY LONDON 5903
- AMEMBASSY PARIS 3079
- AMEMBASSY BONN 4226
- AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4667
- AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3975
- AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1073
- AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5664
- AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1604
- AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0744
- AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0592
- AMEMBASSY MANILA 0804
- AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0873
- AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1138
- CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 00917
BOTH SUPERPOWERS, A STANCE WHICH GAVE IT GREATER FLEXI-
BILITY AND LEVERAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND WAS IN
GREATER KEEPING WITH CHINA'S HISTORICAL "INCLINATION TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE;"

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- A REALIZATION IN BEIJING THAT CHINA WOULD NEED MORE
TIME THAN EXPECTED (50-70 VERSUS 20 YEARS, ACCORDING TO
KAPITSA) TO MODERNIZE, AND THAT IT WOULD NEED "VARIOUS
SOURCES OF COOPERATION" AND AID.

6. THESE FACTORS HAD LED THE PRC TO PURSUE A "STEP-BY-
STEP" APPROACH TO NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE USSR OVER
THE PAST YEAR. THE PROCESS, KAPITSA NOTED, HAD ALREADY
BORNE FRUIT. THERE HAD BEEN NO BORDER DIFFICULTIES IN TWO
YEARS (CHINESE AND SOVIET BORDER GUARDS NOW CALLED ONE
ANOTHER "CONRADE"). BILATERAL CONTACTS HAD EXPANDED
STEADILY. TRADE, WHILE STILL LIMITED, HAD REACHED THE
LEVEL OF 300 MILLION DOLLARS LAST YEAR AND COULD REACH
ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN 1983. THE PROCESS HAD BEEN

"CROWNED" BY WHAT KAPITSA FIRST TERMED "CHINA'S PROPOSAL,"
AND THEN DESCRIBED AS "CHINA'S AGREEMENT TO OUR PROPOSAL"
TO RESUME A BILATERAL DIALOGUE.

SINO-SOVIET TALKS

7. KAPITSA CLAIMED TO SEE LITTLE PROSPECT OF QUICK OR
DRAMATIC RESULTS ARISING FROM THE SINO-SOVIET CONSULTATIVE
PROGRESS BEGUN IN OCTOBER. HE WAS FRANK IN ADMITTING THAT
"THEIR PROPOSALS TO US ARE UNACCEPTABLE; OUR PROPOSALS TO
THEM ARE UNACCEPTABLE." HE ADMITTED THAT MOSCOW'S CHINESE
INTERLOCUTORS HAD TALKED OF THE NEED FOR "FIVE ROUNDS,
EVEN TEN ROUNDS," BUT THE IMPORTANT THING TO KAPITSA WAS
THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE TALKING. MOREOVER, WHILE THE
OCTOBER ROUND WAS BASICALLY A "RECONNAISSANCE MEETING,"
IT HAD IDENTIFIED AREAS (E. G., BORDER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES, CULTURAL MATTERS) WHERE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE AT
SOME POINT REACHED. WHILE IT WAS STILL TOO SOON TO TELL
WHAT MIGHT COME OUT OF THE MARCH TALKS, ONE POSSIBILITY
COULD BE THE CREATION OF WORKING GROUPS TO EXAMINE SUCH
ISSUES.

"THIRD-COUNTRY OBSTACLES"

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. IN RESPONSE TO A PROBE BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ON CHINA'S
MAKING SUCH ISSUES AS AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA A PART OF
THE SINO-SOVIET DIALOGUE, KAPITSA FELL BACK ON THE SOVIET
PUBLIC POSITION THAT, WHILE THE PRC AND THE USSR COULD
"DISCUSS" SUCH INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THEY COULD ONLY
"RESOLVE" BILATERAL ISSUES. NOTING THAT HE FELT THE PRC
UNDERSTOOD SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS MATTER, KAPITSA REFERRED
TO BREZHNEV'S MARCH 24 BAKU SPEECH AND SPECIFICALLY ITS
ASSERTION THAT IMPROVEMENT OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES WOULD NOT COME ABOUT AT THE EXPENSE OF THIRD
COUNTRIES. THIS, HE STRESSED, WAS THE "FIRM AND FINAL
POSITION" OF THE USSR.

NEW TIMES ARTICLE

9. KAPITSA DID NOT SHRINK FROM DISCUSSING "NEW TIMES"
MAGAZINE'S HARSH JANUARY 14 ATTACK ON ALLEGED PRC CLAIMS
TO TERRITORY CEDED TO THE USSR DURING THE TSARIST PERIOD--
THE FIRST DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE PRC TO APPEAR IN THE
SOVIET PRESS SINCE BREZHNEV'S DEATH (REF B). ACKNOWLEDGING

MOSCOW 0917

DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013542

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0917
SITS23 DATE 01/24/83

DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013554
TOR: 024/1514Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCFS EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT; CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0917/03 0241459
O 241448Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2633

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 0374
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1893
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0689
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0275
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0995
USMISSION USNATO 3147
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5904
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3080
AMEMBASSY BONN 4227
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4668
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3976
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1074
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5665
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1605
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0745
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0593
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0805
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0874
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1139
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 0917
THAT THE PRC GOVERNMENT DOES NOT, IN FACT, CURRENTLY DEMAND
REVISION OF THE RUSSO-CHINESE TREATIES, HE STATED THAT
CHINESE MAPS AND TEXTBOOKS DO SHOW AREAS CEDED UNDER THE
TREATIES AS HAVING ONCE BELONGED TO CHINA. SUCH PRACTICES,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

KAPITSA OBSERVED, RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO CHINESE INTEN-
TIONS AND COULD, IF LEFT UNCHALLENGED, "LEAD TO ANARCHY."
THAT WAS WHY "WE DECIDED TO RESPOND" THROUGH THE "NEW TIMES"
ARTICLE.

10. IN AN ASIDE ON WHAT WE VIEW TO BE THE REAL IMP
FOR THE ARTICLE (AS OPPOSED TO HIS DUBIOUS OFFICIAL ONE),
KAPITSA NOTED THAT THE "NEW TIMES" PIECE DID NOT SIGNAL
A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILE SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT OF CHINA.
THE USSR NONETHELESS RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RESPOND TO PRC
PRESS CRITICISM, "AND NO DOUBT WOULD FROM TIME TO TIME."
US-PRC RELATIONS

11. COMMENTING IN PASSING ON THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO CHINA
OF SECRETARY SHULTZ, KAPITSA REMARKED THAT HE FELT MANY OF
THE ISSUES WHICH HAD TROUBLED US-PRC BILATERAL RELATIONS IN
RECENT MONTHS WERE SOLVABLE. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT
THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD EVER RETURN TO THE STATE WHICH
EXISTED BEFORE THE 12TH CCP CONGRESS. THE CHINESE HAD NOW
RECOGNIZED THE ADVANTAGES OF A MORE INDEPENDENT STANCE,
AND HAD DEMONSTRATED THIS IN RECENT COMMENTS ON SUCH
ISSUES AS NAMIBIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR
HARTMAN POINTED OUT THAT, WHILE THERE WAS CERTAINLY A NEW
DECLARATORY POLICY IN BEIJING, THE FACT WAS WE CONTINUED
TO HAVE FREE AND USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE ON A
RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS

12. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S OBSERVATION THAT RECENT SOVIET
MEDIA COVERAGE OF PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON (REF C) CONTRASTED RATHER DRAMATICALLY WITH
MOSCOW'S CAREFULLY CULTIVATED IMAGE AS A CHAMPION OF
NON-USE OF FORCE IN EUROPE PROMPTED SOME INTERESTING
COMMENTS FROM KAPITSA. NOTING THAT "THOSE WERE JUST PRESS
STATEMENTS," KAPITSA POINTED OUT THAT NAKASONE'S REMARKS
IN WASHINGTON COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED "ANTI-SOVIET,
HOSTILE AND MILITARISTIC." THEY SOUNDED, HE SAID, LIKE
THE SORT OF STATEMENTS ISSUING FROM JAPAN IN 1939. THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USSR HAD TO REACT. "FOR THE TIME BEING" IT HAD DONE SO
IN THE PRESS. KAPITSA ADDED THAT IN OTHER RESPECTS SOVIET
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN WERE "NOT BAD," POINTING OUT CURRENT
AND POTENTIAL AREAS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY
WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE BAM RAILWAY.

KOREA AND CROSS RECOGNITION

13. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, KAPITSA DESCRIBED
SOVIET-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS AS "IMPROVING," AND RULED
OUT ANY POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR CROSS RECOGNI-
TION IN THE NEAR FUTURE (DETAILS SEPTEL).
ASIA--MFA DIVISION OF LABOR

14. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S REQUEST FOR CLARI-
FICATION AS TO KAPITSA'S PRECISE CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES,
KAPITSA SAID THAT:

MOSCOW 0917

DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013554

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0917 DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013552
SIT524 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 024/1511Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

16. KAPITSA ALSO CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD SOON BE MAKING A "GET ACQUAINTED" VISIT OF MALAYSIA, THAILAND AND INDONESIA IN HIS NEW CAPACITY AS DEPUTY (REF E). HE VOLUNTEERED THAT HE EXPECTED TO GET TO HANOI SOME TIME AFTER HIS ASEAN TOUR, AND THAT HE HOPED TO PARTICIPATE IN APRIL IN ANNUAL DEPUTY MINISTER LEVEL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS IN JAPAN. HARMAN

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCFS EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

MOSCOW 0917

DTG: 241448Z JAN 83 PSN: 013552

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0917/04 0241500
O 241448Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2634

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 0375
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1894
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0690
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0276
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0996
USMISSION USNATO 3148
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5905
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3081
AMEMBASSY BONN 4228
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4669
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3977
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1075
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5666
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1606
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0746
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0594
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0806
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0875
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1140
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 00917
-- HE WAS GENERALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL OF "ASIA;"
-- HE FOLLOWED THE PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA ON A FULL-
TIME BASIS;
-- HE ALSO SUPERVISED SOUTH ASIA (AS FAR WEST AS PAKISTAN)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DURING THE FREQUENT PERIODS WHEN FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER MALTSEV, WHO NORMALLY WATCHED THIS REGION, WAS
ABROAD OR SERVING AS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER.

15. KAPITSA CONFIRMED (REF D) THAT DEPUTY MINISTER
IL'ICHEV WOULD REMAIN AT THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION
DURING THE FORTHCOMING SINO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW.
POINTING OUT THAT IL'ICHEV, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS AN
EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR, HAD ONLY BEEN GIVEN THE RESPONSIB-
ILITY IN SEPTEMBER, KAPITSA OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD "MAKE
NO SENSE" TO REPLACE HIM NOW. FOR THE TIME BEING, THERE-
FORE, KAPITSA WOULD REMAIN "IN RESERVE."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/24/83-1/27/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

304

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171309	CABLE COPY OF CABLE IN DOC #171307 (MOSCOW 0973)	8	1/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/24/83-1/27/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

304

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
171310	CABLE COPY OF CABLE IN DOC #171307 (MOSCOW 0973)	8	1/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

ID 8390103

21

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/14/85 eob

RECEIVED 29 JAN 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 28 JAN 83

HARTMAN, ARTHUR

25 JAN 88

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: AMB HARTMAN CABLE ON US ~ USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390065 8390106 NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 1/31	Action completed by	90/06	Do ✓

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/24/83-1/27/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

304


<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171311	MEMO P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE CABLE FROM HARTMAN	3	1/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

25



WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/24/83-1/27/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

304

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
171307	CABLE MOSCOW 0973 (INCL. COVER SHEET)	9	1/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26 Jan

35

Bud

You might store this
away in your mind for
future reference.

gil

7

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/24/83-1/27/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

304

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171312	CABLE 242202Z JAN 83	1	1/24/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 27, 1983

NOTE FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GILBERT D. RYE *GR*

WPC HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Articles on Soviet Space Threat

Attached are two articles on the same subject for your information. As I have indicated before, the intelligence community will complete a National Intelligence Estimate of the Soviet Space Threat this spring. We should arrange a briefing to the President at that time. It should coincide nicely with our National Space Strategy.

Attachments

*Agree - also, speeches
S.V. are being planned on overall
threat + this should be
included - see Greenie
WPC*

William D. Hall, Editor • Richard Tuttle, Managing Editor • David Bond, Senior Associate Editor • Kenneth E. Gazzola, Publisher
Published daily except Saturdays, Sundays and holidays by the Business Publications Division of The Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, Inc. • Kenneth Koppel, President
SUBSCRIPTION RATE: One year \$750 6 Months \$450 Quantity rates on request.
COPYRIGHT © 1983 ZIFF-DAVIS PUBLISHING CO. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NONE OF THE CONTENT OF THIS PUBLICATION MAY BE REPRODUCED,
STORED IN A RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS (ELECTRONIC, MECHANICAL, PHOTOCOPYING, RECORDING
OR OTHERWISE) WITHOUT THE PRIOR WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE PUBLISHER.

WPC HAS SEEN

SOVIET SYSTEM, VALUES FOSTER SPACE INVESTMENTS, CRS FINDS

Differing social systems and values may make the Soviet Union the most fertile breeding ground for long-term investments in space, according to a newly published analysis of the Soviet space program.

The report, prepared by the Congressional Research Service and issued recently by the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, said technological lags and personnel limitations won't prevent the Soviets from moving as fast as any nation can on a few, selected space projects, provided that they give these projects high enough priority.

The Soviets lack depth in a number of important technologies, and this seems to stretch out some of their development programs "inordinately," CRS said, but their "seriousness and steadiness" make up for it.

"If they maintain the pace, as they show every sign of doing, by the end of the century their space enterprises cannot help but be very formidable in the scientific, economic and military sense," CRS said. "In the lifespan of nations this pace toward opening the solar system and applying technology to gain the benefits of space is close to revolutionary."

Investments Outrank Consumer Gains

CRS said the Soviet Union is more likely than the U.S. to subordinate immediate consumer gains in favor of space program investments, take a longer view in judging the value of such programs, and finance them on a multi-year basis.

Soviet leaders include men with professional training in engineering and science, CRS commented, and Soviet space program advocates can be confident that their arguments "will be quickly understood, tested, and accepted in terms of engineering logic."

These and other factors led CRS to an assessment of long-term U.S.-Soviet space investment prospects that is unusually pessimistic for a government organization.

"Already accepting the concept of personal denial in the present for Communist 'pie-in-the-sky' later on, the space program as a long term investment may have better luck in the Soviet Union than it will in a Western society that wants personal goods and services in the immediate present and whose economists apply 10% discount rates to future benefits from space which may make it 'objectively' unattractive to put capital into space systems that offer a poor return on investment."

Noting that the Soviet space program currently is the world's largest, "with no sign that this level of effort cannot be sustained indefinitely," CRS didn't recommend a particular U.S. response. It did say the U.S. could react with a "mixture" from these options: deciding U.S. issues on their merits without regard to Soviet actions; "bowing out and leaving the field to the Russians;" matching the Soviets competitively; and "negotiating various accommodations, divisions, and cooperative ventures."

Although the Soviets generally are considered to trail the U.S. in some technological areas, such as electronics, microminiaturization, computers and "some kinds of chemistry," such comparisons "are relative and subject to change," CRS said. While the lag in computers is put at four to five years, it was said to be seven to nine years not long ago, it noted.

(Continued On Following Page)

SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM (Cont.)

"While clerks in a store may use the abacus, computers in high priority uses are conducting support for space rendezvous and missile intercepts, or supporting the Gosplan. Hence, even if it was judged that in many technical fields they were two to five years behind the United States, that would hardly be a basis for writing off their capacity for further progress, or for finding ways around some specific limitations."

Similarly, CRS noted that Soviet engineers, while superior in numbers, are said to be trained more narrowly and may be less adaptable collectively than those of the U.S. But this is misleading in terms of what the Soviets can put into their highest-priority efforts: "At the top, the very best people in terms of performance, breadth of grasp, creativity, are about equal in both countries."

In other comments, CRS said that:

—Virtually all major flight programs now are backed up by engineering models for ground testing and troubleshooting, but the Soviets probably don't have as much computer capacity dedicated to checkout and testing as the U.S. does.

—The Soviets are unlikely to open up a fourth launch site. Kapustin Yar traffic is down to one or two satellites per year, plus sounding rockets, and eventually it may be phased out like Wallops Island.

—Despite many years of similar, unfulfilled expectations, the "best guess" still is that the mammoth G launch vehicle will be flown successfully "one of these days." The D launcher "seemed a natural" for manned missions but hasn't been used for them, and this "points to troubles." A "gap filler," between the D and the G in capability, would be useful for Earth orbit and deep space missions but "remains highly speculative."

—The Soviets show no sign of moving to cryogenic propellants, as the U.S. did a decade ago for efficiency, and this is "a surprise." More exotic propellants are "even less likely." There is evidence of Soviet flight tests of electric rockets using solar cells for "measurable" orbit changes, but with only small velocity changes. "Future systems may do more but, to date, the full-scale fission type chain reactors have been employed only to provide electrical power for side-looking radar systems and not for electrical propulsion." Soviet incentives toward a reusable space vehicle may be even greater than those of the U.S. because more frequent Soviet flights would recoup development costs sooner, but "it could be quite late in the development program before there are overt signs of such a new system."

—The Soviets can be expected to "press vigorously" for military space breakthroughs "as much in self protection as in seeking their own advantage."

—Soviet support for space science programs probably will continue. The Soviet Academy of Sciences "enjoys a special position of power which exceeds the more peripheral and advisory role of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences."

The recently published volume, titled "Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80," is the first of three parts.

* * *

40

STUDY PUTS SOVIET SPACE SPENDING AT \$14-\$28 BILLION ANNUALLY

Citing U.S. intelligence estimates that the Soviet Union may be spending as much as 1 to 2 percent of its GNP on its space program, the Congressional Research Service says that the Soviet Union may have spent between \$14 billion and \$28 billion on its space program in 1980.

The CRS estimates are included in a 445-page report, "Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80," prepared for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation. It is the first of a three-part report on Soviet space programs in the 1976-80 period, and it updates similar reports prepared for the Commerce Committee for 1966-70 and 1971-75.

That the Soviets might be spending 2 percent of their GNP on space was reported last spring (Defense Daily, April 30), with the Soviets credited with an 8 percent real growth annually in space spending over the past 20 years (Defense Daily, July 1).

An Air Force official has estimated Soviet space expenditures in FY '83 at about \$16 billion, or \$3 billion above the U.S. total (Defense Daily, Sept. 23).

That the Soviets are outspending the U.S. in space is evident from the fact that the Soviets have launched twice as many spacecraft as has the United States. For the 1970-1981 total, the number of successful launchings was as follows:

Year	U.S.	USSR	Year	U.S.	USSR
1981	18	97	1975	27	89
1980	13	89	1974	22	81
1979	16	87	1973	23	86
1978	32	88	1972	30	74
1977	24	98	1971	30	83
1976	26	99	1970	28	81

Note: Total 1957-81--U.S. 744; Soviet Union 1,436.

Space expenditures by the Soviet Union are mitigated by the use of standard, generally austere spacecraft. On the other hand, while the Soviet Union has not had the multi-billion expense of developing a Space Shuttle, the Soviets are working on "new boosters... able to put certainly more than 100,000 pounds into lower orbit, a class similar to that of the Saturn V," according to the Pentagon. In addition, the Soviets are conducting activities which the Defense Department believes are "related to a Space Plane," which is expected to "be similar in some aspects to the Shuttle and probably will be associated with the Salyut Space Station, i.e., it will be able to dock and shuttle astronauts from the ground to the Space Station and back again."

Suggests Economy May Force Cut In Soviet Space Effort

Without much evidence, the CRS study suggests that pressing needs of the Soviet economy may force the Soviets to reduce their expenditures on space.

This ignores the fact that 85 percent of the Soviet space expenditures are for military missions, and that defense remains inviolable in Soviet planning.

But CRS finds that "Soviet leaders have shown an increasing concern about the progress in civilian industries, transportation and agriculture," but even if they significantly increase the civilian share of investment funds, "it will be difficult to meet the pressing needs of those sectors of the economy."

It won't do to try to transfer space technology, because "the specialized, high-technology inputs of the Soviet space program are not easily convertible to civilian investment needs in the short run," CRS said.

(Continued On Page 132)

STUDY PUTS SOVIET SPACE SPENDING AT \$14-\$28 BILLION ANNUALLY

(Continued From Page 130)

"Nevertheless, the difficult economic choices which confront Soviet leaders in the 1980's are likely to force them to reconsider all existing resources allocation patterns including the continued priority of space," CRS concludes.

According to the report, in the 1958-80 period, the U. S. orbited 1,036 payloads, versus 1,846 for the Soviet Union. The U. S. payloads included 590 civilian and 446 military; the Soviet payloads, 758 civilian and 1,088 military.

The military payloads were subdivided as follows:

U.S./Soviet Military Space Payloads: 1957-1980

	U.S.:	USSR:
Reconnaissance	231	501
Calibration	43	119
Elint Ferret	81	67
Navigation	40	57
Tactical Communications	0	247
Early Warnings	39	20
FOBS	0	18
Ocean Surveillance	12	26
ASAT Targets	0	16
ASATs	0	17

SYSTEM II PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8390095 ⁴²

RECEIVED 29 JAN 83 14

TO WHEELER

FROM POLLOCK

DOCDATE 27 JAN 83

BOVERIE

27 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: IG

SPACE PROGRAMS

USSR

SUBJECT: MTG OF AD HOC IG GROUP ON 1 FEB RE COSMOS 1402

ACTION: WHEELER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE.

STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

Carolyn E. Cleveland

12/28

For Brian 1/28

for your records -
Those who could not
rec. by CDK were
called by CC -
names indicated.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs*- Philip Hughes*MR. WILLIAM VITALE
Director, Office of
Executive Secretariat
Department of EnergyMR. L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of StateMR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence AgencyLTC W. RICHARD HIGGINS
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of DefenseLTC DENNIS J. STANLEY
Special Assistant for
NSC Affairs
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon*Roger Clegg*
MR. HENRY F. HABICHT
Special Assistant to the Attorney
General
Department of Justice*- Kelly*MS. KATHERINE M. ANDERSON
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of TransportationMR. KENNETH PEDERSON
Director of Intl Affairs
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration*Gail Sawyer*MR. GERALD S. MARTIN
Executive Administrator
Federal Emergency Management Agency*- Verne*SUBJECT: Meeting of the ad hoc Interagency Group on COSMOS 1402The ad hoc interagency group will meet at 0930, Tuesday, February 1, in Room 305 of the Old Executive Office Building. Please telephone the names of your attendees to Flora Paoli, on 395-3162.

Thank you.

Carol Cleveland for
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

45

MEMORANDUM

System II
90095

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL WHEELER

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *RB 1/27*

FROM: RAY POLLOCK *RP*

SUBJECT: Call for COSMOS-1402 Meeting (U)

Another formal meeting of the ad hoc IG is necessary to determine how best to deal with the remnant of the Soviet COSMOS-1402 satellite still in orbit.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum to the agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Memorandum to the agencies